Coalition Government: Constitution Committee Report

Lord Maclennan of Rogart Excerpts

Tuesday 13th May 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I am delighted that this important and timely report is being debated this evening. Like others, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, and the Constitution Committee on a valuable and prudent analysis of the constitutional implications of coalition Government. I was especially impressed by the committee’s analysis of the convention of collective responsibility. Its explanation of and justification for the convention are superb. I support strongly its recommendations in paragraphs 138 to 141. Indeed, there are no recommendations that I do not support, although—as I shall argue—there are some that I would wish to develop.

The report is measured and realistic. Its starting point is that there may again be coalition Governments following elections in which no one party wins an absolute majority of seats but it accepts that that is a case of if rather than when. The conditions of 2010 were exceptional in terms of the confluence of electoral arithmetic and economic crisis. In other circumstances, the outcome of a hung Parliament may be minority Government rather than a coalition. If there is an indecisive outcome and if negotiations take place for the formation of a coalition Government, it would be desirable to have in place some agreed framework for those negotiations. The report offers eminently reasonable recommendations for that framework.

The recommendations are essentially modest in that they cannot solve two basic problems associated with such negotiations, but they go some way to addressing one of them. The basic problem is that of a democratic deficit. Coalitions formed as the result of post-election bargaining lack the seal of electoral approval. Some argue that if party A gets 35% of the vote and party B gets 20%, then a coalition of the two parties enjoys the support of 55% of the electorate. It does not. It enjoys the definitive support of not one elector because nobody was given the opportunity to vote for A plus B. Its legitimacy comes from the support of the parties in Parliament. Its popular legitimacy is, in essence, indirect rather than direct.

The second problem is that of incomplete information. Whatever one thinks of party manifestos, each party has time to prepare its policy proposals to put before the electorate. There may be a lengthy process of internal discussion and, indeed, of external consultation, drawing in specialists to advise. There may even be an opportunity to anticipate one’s stance in the event of an indecisive election result, but one cannot utilise the same process of consultation and discussion. In coalition forming, as we have already heard, there is pressure to reach agreement quickly—at least, there is in the United Kingdom.

We are used to a quick and almost seamless transition from one Government to another, usually on the day following the general election. As has been mentioned, by our standards, the five days of negotiations in 2010 were a long time. The pressure on negotiators was to reach agreement quickly and in conditions of competition. The discussions took place in secrecy. Deals were agreed in a virtually sealed environment. There was no opportunity to consult on what was being agreed, in terms of not just political acceptability but feasibility. I am concerned here not with the partisan aspects but with the evidence base. Those involved with the negotiations may be very bright, but they may not be specialists in all the subjects under discussion.

Let me illustrate that with a couple of commitments embodied in the coalition agreement. The Conservatives conceded the case for a fixed-term Parliament. The coalition agreement stated:

“We will put a binding motion before the House of Commons stating that the next general election will be held on the first Thursday of May 2015”.

No binding Motion was ever brought before the House of Commons, for one very good reason: there was no one to be bound by such a binding Motion. The prerogative cannot be bound by what is a declaratory Motion.

The agreement also said that the legislation would provide for an early dissolution if 55% or more of MPs voted for it. Did this figure derive from a study of practice in other legislatures? If one looks at the provisions of other legislatures, the answer is clearly no. It was the product of a quick calculation based on party strengths in the new Parliament. It was only later that a change was made to make the figure two-thirds of MPs, a figure employed by several other legislatures.

I take those as illustrative of the problem of incomplete information. The pressure to reach agreement quickly in conditions of secrecy may result in commitments that are difficult to undo. There is added pressure on Parliament, not least your Lordships’ House, but if the coalition partners mobilise a majority in the other place, we are limited in challenging the ends of the policy even if we have the scope to affect the means. It would be far better if the policies agreed were the product of considered and informed reflection. I therefore welcome the recommendation of the Constitution Committee at paragraph 22 that five days should not be taken as a complete period for forming a government. It recommends that no more or less time should be taken than is required to produce a government able to command the confidence of the House of Commons. I would be inclined to say there should be no more or less time than is required to generate informed policy commitments and to command the confidence of the House of Commons.

[Lord Maclennan of Rogart (LD)]

Does my noble friend agree that to seek to lay down a programme for government for five years in five days is in itself unachievable, that events will change things, and that it is therefore better to enunciate the principles, vision or goals rather than the precise methods of achieving them?