Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Bill

Lord Brougham and Vaux Excerpts

Tuesday 5th November 2013 Lords Chamber

Can the Minister define what is meant in this Bill by a sovereign power? Will he confirm that communications between officials from the Republic of China-Taiwan and Ministers and officials will be afforded the same protection as other states? I beg to move.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Brougham and Vaux) (Con)]

I advise the Committee that if this amendment is agreed to I cannot call Amendment 2 due to pre-emption.

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to my amendments in this group which seek to achieve the same aim as Amendment 1 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie. I will keep my comments fairly brief as the noble and learned Lord has made the case that I would have made. However, I want to make a few points in support of the thrust of what these amendments seek to achieve. The Short Title of this Christmas tree Bill begins, “Transparency of Lobbying”. That is misleading because the Bill does not contribute to transparency of lobbying. The Bill may result in us knowing who engages in the activity of lobbying—in other words, lobbyists—but it contributes little to knowing what lobbying takes place on particular policies or measures. It could be argued that it is necessary to know who the lobbyists are in order to know what lobbying takes place, but it is certainly not sufficient, and I am not sure that it is even necessary.

The value of a register of lobbyists is far from clear. As I argued on Second Reading, I am not clear what the compelling argument is for introducing a register. The value of the register proposed in the Bill is especially unclear. It is not a register of lobbyists. It is not even a register of professional lobbyists; it is a register of some professional lobbyists. If one is to have a register of lobbyists and, as I say, I am not persuaded of the case for it, one should at least try to make it comprehensive. This entails broadening the class of lobbyists covered in the Bill as well as the class of those being lobbied. This group of amendments deals with the class of lobbyists. We will come shortly to the other aspect of the Bill and its limitations. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, powerfully made the case for the measure to be extended to encompass in-house lobbyists. As I argued at Second Reading, I see no case for distinguishing between those who are paid and are external to a company and those who are employed directly by a company.

It is no good saying that in-house lobbyists should be excluded as it is apparent on whose behalf they are lobbying. The fact that someone works for a company as a political lobbyist is not necessarily a matter of public record. They may have a title which masks their activity and may work in a public affairs division rather than a parliamentary affairs unit. If one is truly going to have a register of lobbyists for the purposes of transparency, one should aim, as I say, to be comprehensive and not go for an option that excludes more than nine out of every 10 lobbyists.

My amendments, like those of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, are designed to encompass in-house lobbyists. That is the purpose of the whole grouping. I am not particularly wedded to the wording because the aim at this stage is to get the Government to concede that the Bill as drafted will not make any significant difference to transparency in respect of lobbying government. Indeed, Part 1 conflicts with what the Government seek to achieve because it establishes a new regulatory regime at public expense and for no clear purpose. The taxpayer will not get value for money. If my noble friend the Minister argues that extending the definition to in-house lobbyists is too complex or not practically feasible that, I fear, is not so much an argument for rejecting the amendments as it is for dropping this part of the Bill.