(3 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will quote directly from the Home Secretary, who said:
“It is right that I have had many discussions with the Metropolitan police and specifically the commissioner on Friday and over the weekend in relation to preparations and planning prior to Saturday evening. My comments are public and on the record regarding what has happened and, quite frankly, the upsetting images of Saturday evening. A review is now being conducted by Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary. It is right that that takes place.”—[Official Report, Commons, 15/3/21; col 29.]
The noble Lord talks about operational independence. It is absolutely right that the police have operational independence, but it is also absolutely right that, first, the Government make the law and, secondly, that conversations take place between the Executive and some of the agencies of government.
My Lords, as the day wears on, many protests give rise to excesses all round. My family tells me that, this Sunday afternoon, the police were courteous but firm. Was it the Government’s purpose in their regulations to ban all protests? If so, will they now regulate to preserve the right of protest, so that both police and the public are able to return to normality?
My Lords, noble Lords will recognise that banning protests was not at the heart of what the Government did; banning protests was part of keeping the public safe in this global pandemic—keeping down the numbers of people who get infected and therefore keeping people out of hospital.
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall intervene briefly on Amendments 66C and 71, which I support. I have been involved as a beneficiary all my professional life with legal aid. Its roots go back to the Labour Governments of 1945 and 1951. When I began practising at the Bar in 1959, it was just about being given new life, and what a blessing it has been to people with limited or no means.
My noble friend Lord Kennedy has put down Amendment 71 which, together with the Government’s amendment, is a clear statement that no appropriate health professional may impose a fee for the purposes of obtaining legal aid by an applicant. Health professionals are paid in accordance with the terms of their contracts. My understanding is that on occasion, such as for medical certificates for insurance and travel purposes, they are entitled to charge extra fees. I am grateful for the Minister’s very careful explanation of what they can do.
There is obviously a loophole that needs to be filled. This is confirmed by the very fact of the result of the Government’s work, on which I congratulate them, in moving Amendment 66C. The need to fill in the loophole is confirmed. The Government seem to have covered all contingencies, and it obviously overtakes the Opposition’s amendment. I also congratulate my noble friend Lord Kennedy on the hard work he and others have done; the result is what we see before us today. It confirms the value of this House as a reforming, confirming and improving Chamber. With those few words, I support the Government’s amendment.
My Lords, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, who is next on the list, has withdrawn from this debate, so I call the noble Baroness, Lady Burt of Solihull.
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord, Lord Balfe, who is next on this list, is unable to take part in this debate, so I call the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to say it is beyond argument that this is an important Bill. In my professional career, I dealt with many cases of child abuse. I practised at the criminal Bar, not the family Bar. Fortunately, sitting as a recorder, I did not have to try or sentence anyone convicted of child abuse.
It is important to get the legislation right. At my first reading, I thought the Bill was sufficiently comprehensive to deal with any wrongdoing. The steps in the ladder are clear: first, the relationship is set out in Clause 1(2); then we go on to the type of relationship, supplemented in subsections (3) and (4); then subsection (5) deals with indirect behaviour. The amendment’s supporters seek to redefine this, by adding words to give an example of behaviour which is reprehensible. I understand the aims of the proposers and their real concerns. We have listened to the passionate speeches made today. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, has added his name to the amendment. From long experience, I would listen to his words, and the House always does with very great respect.
My fear is that this amendment is over-prescriptive. Putting this into the Bill might limit the generality of the encompassing nature of subsection (5). At the moment, I have serious doubts about whether the amendment is needed at all, as such particularising may limit the thrust of the subsection so far as other conduct is concerned. In these circumstances, having heard all the arguments, I would recommend its rejection by your Lordships.
My Lords, I commend my noble friend Lady Meyer on her courage and resilience in tabling this amendment again today. I first had the privilege of meeting her and hearing her story many years ago, and since then she has been a tireless campaigner on this issue despite, as we have seen both today and in Committee, often intense and personal challenge.
As we have heard, parental alienation is a devastating form of abuse that can extend for decades and have deeply traumatic effects on both the children and the excluded parent. There has, however, been strong resistance to recognising this as a form of abuse. Those who oppose it argue that abusive parents may themselves use the defence of parental alienation to continue their abuse. Surely, though, this is precisely why we have judges. We must have confidence in our courts and our police to make these judgments, just as they have to make countless others every day of the week.
The amendment seeks insert into the legislation the line
“such as a parent’s behaviour deliberately designed to damage the relationship between a child of the parent and the other parent”.
I am hopeful that the Government should be able to confirm that this is indeed included in the definition of coercion, as my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay and my noble friend Lady Meyer have requested. This addition would specifically draw attention to parental alienation while simultaneously giving the family courts a sound basis on which to better distinguish between genuine and false allegations of parental alienation. The amendment identifies parental alienation and protects those who are vulnerable from exploitation of the law.
The dynamics expressed in the amendment are important for a number of reasons. Alienation adversely affects the psychological development of a child in that it prevents a natural, healthy bond and relationship with a parent. A child needs to be nurtured and protected by its mother. Erica Komisar, a leading expert in attachment theory and the neuroscience of motherhood, highlights that children are at a higher risk of social, emotional and developmental issues when the essential presence of a mother is missing. But it is equally important that the child should have a relationship with their father. In a major study by the Journal of Applied Economics entitled The Impact of Income and Family Structure on Delinquency, it was found that when the interactions between a parent and a child diminish, such as in the case of parental alienation, the child perceives a decline in that parent’s benevolence. If the decline is sufficient, the child will accept its implications and move to feelings of abandonment, alienation and a lack of trust. Both the parent and the child are worse off.
Research from the Institute for Family Studies has also found that, controlling for race and parental income, boys raised without their father are much more likely to use drugs, engage in violent or criminal activity and drop out of school, while girls are more likely to engage in early sexual activity or have a child out of wedlock. The consequences of parental alienation can be deep and severe on the next generation.
There can be no doubt that judicial decisions in cases involving children must take account of all aspects of the family dynamic, including all types of abuse. There is a need for qualified professionals to assist the court in assessing whether there is abuse and, if so, its severity and how it should affect child/parent residence and contact arrangements. But the need for expertise in handling these delicate situations should not dissuade us from addressing this often hidden but deeply damaging form of abuse.
The Bill is strengthened if it captures all forms of domestic abuse and improves outcomes for those who are vulnerable to experiencing it, and we look to the Minister today to confirm that the concept of alienation is included within the definition of domestic abuse.
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I wish to speak in support of Amendments 10 and 14 tabled by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Lord, Lord Randall of Uxbridge. It seems there is significant agreement on the need for these amendments, so I will keep my remarks relatively brief.
Amendments 10 and 14 are reasonable amendments that seek to clarify the wide variety of domestic situations in which abuse can occur. Numbers of people up and down the country are now accustomed to doing things such as renting out spare rooms and having people not related to them living in their household. Amendment 10 rightly recognises that when a perpetrator and victim live together in a domestic situation, the abuse should be considered domestic whether or not they are biologically related or in a romantic relationship.
Amendment 14 recognises that it should be considered domestic abuse when the perpetrator has regular contact with the home or lives in the home despite not having legal guardianship or a biological relationship with the child, as we have heard. Both amendments are about ensuring that the Bill is thorough in recognising what constitutes domestic abuse and in identifying the victims and perpetrators, to ensure that we can identify and intervene in the wide range of domestic abuse scenarios.
Amendment 10 relates to the legal definition of “personally connected” when assessing the relationship between a perpetrator and victim. The suggested insertion of the line,
“they are ordinarily resident in the same household”,
recognises that “personally connected” should capture those living in domestic situations who may not otherwise be in a romantic relationship or biologically related. As the definition of domestic abuse is set out in Clause 1, abusive behaviours, such as
“physical or sexual abuse … violent or threatening behaviour … controlling or coercive behaviour … economic abuse … psychological, emotional or other abuse”,
are all able to and do occur in domestic situations where the perpetrator and victim live in the same household, but are not in a romantic relationship. As such, I argue that those who live together should be considered personally connected, in the context of the Bill.
Amendment 14 relates to how we define abuse as domestic in relation to a child and recognises that children can be victims of domestic abuse where their perpetrator is not the legal parent, the guardian or biologically related. The suggested insertion of the line,
“the person lives in the same household as the child or regularly visits the household”,
broadens the scope of the different environments in which a child can be personally related to their abuser.
Children can be and are victims of domestic abuse, even where there is no legal guardianship or relation to the perpetrator, as this amendment suggests, when the perpetrator lives in the same domestic situation or is a regular visitor to the home. An obvious example, and why this amendment is necessary, is the case of a new partner to the parent or the child who regularly comes into contact with the child and may spend prolonged or regular contact in the home, or even live in the home, without legal guardianship. Abuse in this situation is self-evidently domestic, despite the abuser not having legal guardianship of the child. Child abuse is 40 times more likely when single parents find new partners. According to a study of children living in homes with unrelated adults, children are nearly 50 times as likely to die of inflicted injuries, compared with children living with two biological parents.
In conclusion, both Amendments 10 and 14 are sensible and reasonable, and strengthen the Bill in its aims to promote awareness, and better protect and support victims of domestic abuse and their children. I hope that we find a way to take these amendments forward.
My Lords, I speak briefly on Amendments 6 and 7, which I support. Unfortunately, I was cut off from making further comments at Second Reading as I would have exceeded the time limit. I seek clarification on Clause 2(1), which I would have mentioned then. On the face of it, it appears to cover most, I hope all, the eventualities of which we can conceive. But I must express concern when the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss—who knows more about these matters than anyone else in your Lordships’ House—seeks to amend the Bill, and I endorse the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh. They seek to add to the definition of “personally connected” in the Clause, with the words “guardian of the other” and
“lives in the same household as the child”.
An amendment that goes in the same direction adds the definition that one person is a “provider of care” for the other.
In my Second Reading speech, I would have referred to my recollection, as a very young man, a long time ago, of occasionally appearing in undefended divorce cases. To claim a divorce for your client, one had to satisfy the judge of, first, the grounds for the divorce, which did not usually take up much judicial time, and, secondly, the arrangements for the “child of the family”. That was taken seriously. The child of the family did not need a blood relationship. I found no difficulty with this extended relationship from the make-up of my own family.
Of course divorce law has changed considerably since that time, but on the face of it, if you couple the definition in Clause 2 and the words “parental responsibility”, having the same meaning as in Section 3 of the Children Act 1989, which I have reconsidered, it should be sufficiently all-embracing. Obviously the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, is concerned, and the Minister should dwell deeply and give us clarification.
The mischief we are trying to cover adequately is the definition of parent and child and the words “parental responsibility”. My short point is, having regard to the amendments proposed by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is the Minister satisfied that Clause 2 is sufficiently all-embracing? I would be surprised if it is not, but I am not a family lawyer. I have been only a criminal lawyer for most of the past 40 years. I hope the Minister will give the Committee the assurances which the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and all of us would like to have.
My Lords, I suspect most members of the public think of the typical case of domestic abuse as being that of an overbearing man who physically bullies his wife or partner and often the children of the household as well. This Bill enlarges that paradigm at Clause 1(3) by skilfully categorising the very different forms that abusive behaviour can take—all those forms, I suggest, being bullying behaviour. The Bill also rightly recognises that although most victims are women, a sizeable minority —about a third—are men, and the Bill is rightly gender-neutral for that reason.
However, I still believe, as I said at Second Reading, that in treating domestic abuse as limited by the definition of personal connection in Clause 2(1), the Bill has been too narrowly drawn so that it does not capture many of the relationships that give rise to abusive behaviour within a domestic context. I agree with other noble Lords who have spoken that by this narrow classification, we risk unnecessarily and unwisely excluding numbers of victims and potential victims who are no less vulnerable and no less exposed to domestic abuse than those who fall within the proposed definition. It follows that I do not accept the Government’s response in the House of Commons to an amendment on carers, when the Minister, Victoria Atkins, MP, said that the Government had,
“tried to guard against addressing all forms of exploitative behaviour in the Bill”—[Official Report, Commons, Domestic Abuse Bill Committee, 9/6/20; col. 109.]
and so dilute the understanding of domestic abuse as being focused around what she described as “a significant personal relationship”. I fully accept the sincerity of that approach, but it fails to grapple with the reality that domestic abuse happens far more widely than the paradigm cases would suggest. I therefore invite the Minister to move from that position.
With some caveats, I broadly support all the amendments in this group. I see no reason, for example, not to include in the Bill abusive behaviour by guardians towards their wards, as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has argued in support of Amendment 1, or abusive behaviour by carers of persons with disabilities towards the people for whom they are supposed to be caring. I also agree that it should not matter whether the care is paid or unpaid, nor whether the carer and the victim live in the same household. I also agree that the type of care involved should be broadly defined to include emotional or psychological care as well as physical care. I also strongly support Amendment 8 dealing with forced marriages, but I wonder whether its proposers and the Government may wish to consider the amendment further, certainly to ensure that it protects anyone at risk of being forced into marriage by the potential spouse rather than by someone else, as in the amendment as presently drafted.
Amendment 9, relating to abuse by domestic employers towards those in domestic servitude, makes reference, as I read it, particularly to those held in servitude contrary to the Modern Slavery Act or Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights. That is clearly what the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, intended. However, it may be that the definition should be clarified or enlarged, so as to ensure that it includes all those who are coerced into working in their employer’s households in inhumane conditions, for vastly excessive hours and for hopelessly inadequate wages—if indeed they are paid at all. These victims have often been brought here from abroad as members of their employer’s households, and they are often frightened that, outside those households, they have no way of staying here legally and no means of support.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe fundamental difference between then and now is the additional safeguards built into the proceedings, which in my view make them a more effective set of arrangements. There is also the notion of proportionality, which is crucial for both accused and victim.
My Lords, the Home Secretary claims that Brexit makes us safer. Is the sharp decrease in extradition cases at Westminster Magistrates’ Court, from about 10 cases a day to about one, a direct result of losing fast access to the European crime DNA databases? Does this reflect the position nationally?
We are on day 14 of the new arrangements so it is probably a bit difficult to give reliable data at this point. The agreement allows UK law enforcement to continue to share DNA and fingerprints so I am slightly confused by the premise of the noble and learned Lord’s question.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I want to make it perfectly plain that I totally disagree with the arguments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew. Of course, a lot of skilled, professional, operational work has gone in to whatever is being planned. But part of that operational skill, which is professionally done, should be taking full account of what is challengeable under the rule of law. If there is nothing to fear on that front, then there is nothing to fear in terms of the proposal of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd.
If I were asked to pick one amendment from this group that had particularly cheered me, it would be that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd; it seemed to me that he was bringing muscle to bear on the theory and operation of the rule of law. We can all talk about the rule of law, and it is nice to think that in a civilised society we have it, but how can it act in time? We all know what can happen in operations of this kind: so much momentum and impetus build up that one thing leads to another, and it becomes very difficult to reverse. I applaud the amendment tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd.
My support has gone to Amendment 7, because the work that we are discussing should not become a matter of convenience in the operation of government. It has to be serious, and if we are making the rule of law essential to our concerns, it has to be dealing with serious crime.
I am also very glad to be associated with Amendment 17 on the relevance of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. It may not be everybody’s immediate cup of tea, but I am very glad to see Amendment 43, with its provisions for the review of authorisations over a period of time. In a democracy, we have to keep a political and active eye on what trend seems to be being established if there are trends, and what they might be.
The amendments in this group dealing with the rule of law and judicial approval, which is crucial, have all been encouraging. I cannot have more respect than I do for some of those who were involved in tabling Amendment 46, and I am sorry, because I respect them, but I hope that they have some time for my concern as a layman.
I am doubtful about the whole concept of special arrangements for the appointment of judicial commissioners in this way. How can we be cast-iron certain that this does not become open to manipulation by the Executive? Either people are judicial commissioners, or they are not. We should keep our minds very much on that principle. This is a terribly important group of amendments, and I wish most of them well.
My Lords, I intervene briefly to support Amendments 5 and 16. The experience of so many noble Lords in this debate has been salutary. In Committee I expressed my views on the need for supervision of authorising conduct under the Bill prior to the event—I emphasise “prior”—preferably by judicial authority. I will not elaborate on what I have already said, save to repeat that from the highest level of the judiciary down, it has been my experience that there is always availability, 24 hours a day, seven days a week. I have never had to make an application in the course of advocation as counsel, but I have had to make emergency applications and judges have always been available. In my experience—limited as it was as a law officer not directly involved—I never had any anxiety that there were no judges available to take decisions.
The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, with his great experience, queried the use of the judiciary, as I understand his speech. I see no difficulty in the Lord Chief Justice selecting a number of High Court judges who, despite the views of the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, would have had the necessary skills to adjudicate on these matters. They are probably unsurpassed in the range of decision that they must take: quite a few of them are life or death matters, which I will not elaborate on. Members of the judiciary from the highest to the lowest level must make difficult decisions well beyond their training and well beyond what they had thought that they might have to adjudicate on.
This has been a fascinating debate. At this hour I will not go on, save to say that authorising conduct of this kind is a very serious matter. Trying to square authorising breaches of the law with the rule of law is mind-boggling. I shall not attempt it. All I will say is that I support Amendments 5 and 16.
My Lords, I speak briefly to a number of amendments. First, on Amendment 5, I do not believe whatever I have heard, even from my noble friend who spoke before me, that there is sufficient experience and competence on this kind of activity in a judicial world for a clear decision to be made. Therefore, I do not support having judicial approval.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberWe cannot hear him. I call the next speaker, the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann.
My Lords, this is a modest but nevertheless important Bill, which received cross-party support in the other place. It is long overdue. At Second Reading, I will not go into any of the detail but will merely refer to the background. Some concerns were expressed in the other place and I hope that we shall return to them.
The first thing that I want to say is fairly obvious: there is no doubt that domestic abuse occurs and we should improve our system for dealing with it considerably. Secondly, we have become aware of only the tip of the iceberg. I read in yesterday’s Times the concern of the coroner in the sad case of Kellie Sutton, highlighting the lack of a national system to check on reports of those accused of domestic abuse. By Report, I would welcome an account of further progress on improving the system of national intelligence reports.
As a former MP for many years in an industrial constituency, I am deeply conscious of the problems of young mothers with young children living in small flats in high-rise buildings without a garden. I think we have built far too much of this kind of accommodation. I hope that in future city fathers will take our present problems into account and reduce the number of such dwellings.
The Director of Public Prosecutions, Mr Max Hill QC, was right to raise the alarm on one of the effects of the lockdown. He said:
“Lockdown has taken its toll on us all, but it assumes an even darker dimension for those deprived of the temporary respite of going out to work or visiting friends and family.”
I welcome his absolute assurance, as head of the CPS, that no one will be prosecuted for leaving an abusive setting. It is frightening to read that at present the police are making 70 references to the CPS every hour during peak hours. The Early Intervention Foundation, a charity, estimates that 15,000 children were living in a household where violence occurs during the Christmas period. The tragedy of current events was highlighted when the Office for National Statistics revealed last month that one in five crimes reported during the spring lockdown related to domestic violence. I ask the Minister specifically to convey to the Attorney-General my request for an update from the DPP on the situation arising over this Christmas and during this lockdown.
I have been waiting for many years for the opportunity to say that the family, with a mother and father, is the glue that enables society to function, with the mother, as mine did, giving her all to ensure that the breadwinner goes to work and the children go to school every morning, although she might be working as well. I surmise that there is a weakness in the family structure when there is the absence of a father to give guidance, ensure discipline and act as a role model. Family breakdown leads to many problems.
Sitting as a recorder in the Crown Court over many years, from time to time I had to deal with binding over to keep the peace applications, when a weekend family quarrel had become violent. Fortunately, few cases actually came to court. Indeed, if the police had intervened, particularly if a mature and experienced sergeant had been involved, he would have been able to calm the situation and no more would be heard of it. I hope that the Minister will convey to the Home Secretary my approval and appreciation of the work done by the police in this respect.
I want to ask the Minister how the definition of a child—
The noble and learned Lord is going considerably over the advisory four minutes, so perhaps he would not mind drawing his remarks to a close.
[Inaudible] responsibility of work in practice. I close with those remarks and will come back to some of them in Committee.
(4 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I agree with everything that has been said in this group so far. Of course, it comes at the problem from a slightly different angle. We heard in the last group that the purposes for which a CCA may be issued are incredibly broad, with definitions taken from the realms of international law not practicable enough to work at a fairly junior authorising level for something as severe as criminal conduct. This group comes at the same problem from the angle of protecting groups—legitimate political and trade union groups, and so on—which have been, on the evidence, targeted for abusing and intrusive surveillance in the past, and now there is the greater risk that comes with criminal conduct and immunity.
I join others in thanking the Minister for her comments about the victims of undercover police officers who formed intimate relationships, sometimes over many years and sometimes producing children. Her apologies and reassurances will give some comfort to the women in question, but in that spirit of constructive debate and listening, it must be pointed out that there were abuses beyond even those, including the abuses experienced by my noble friends Lord Hain and Lady Lawrence, and others, who were not subject to that sexual intrusion, but were none the less subject to intrusion on the basis of their political views and activities alone. As it stands, there is nothing on the face of the Bill that would protect such legitimate democratic actors from similar or greater abuse in the future, given that what we are talking about now is criminal conduct with total immunity, as we have heard.
I look forward once more to the Minister’s reply to the very constructive suggestions that come in a number of different forms in this group.
My Lords, I wish to speak briefly to Amendment 28, which I support. I was surprised at the breadth of the debate on Amendment 22 and others, as some of the comments on trade unions might have been more appropriate in this debate. Nevertheless, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made some worrying points in that debate in comparing RIPA and seeking justification for the words in this Bill. I suspect that he will want to return to them, given the inadequacy of the reply of the Minister, who gallantly recognised the points he made.
The state is sometimes minded to intervene in fields where it should not. The words in the clause,
“in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom”,
may need clarification and, indeed, very close scrutiny. In my view—I think I am quoting Shakespeare—they need to be “cabined, cribbed, confined”. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, also made some pertinent points in rightly parading some historical matters. Can the Minister refer to the precedents for words of this kind? I suspect they may have been used before. If so, it should be looked at very carefully as to whether they should be repeated, because as they stand, they are a licence to do anything. The line is a very thin one, from my past experience, between legitimate activity and activity in which the state is sometimes minded to intervene. In the Bill, there is no qualification of these words, but one is mightily needed.
I have no present interests to declare, but I was for many years a member of APEX, subsequently taken over by GMB, and I was in turn a Member of Parliament sponsored by those unions. As a retired member, I no longer have that interest to declare but, as a practising barrister, I had the privilege of giving legal advice to the south Wales miners during the miners’ strike. My junior counsel was Mr Vernon Pugh, later a very eminent Queen’s Counsel. The circumstances of that particular legal advice escape me—indeed it would not be appropriate to comment any further—but it was during that period that I believe the Thatcher Government crossed the line and intervened in lawful industrial activity. The freedom of the trade unions to assemble, protest, negotiate and represent was a battle that had been won over many years. My noble friends Lord Kennedy—in a very forceful speech—and Lord Judd made reference to these points. Nobody in their right senses would want to return to that and not follow the best practice of ensuring that trade unions are able to do their work.
The amendment seeks, with belt and braces, to protect trade unions from authorisation for a criminal activity. The words are a matter of great concern. It would be a sad day if we in any way return to the state interfering with trade unions and their activities and particularly condoning and authorising criminal offences involving the proper and lawful activities of trade unions. Amendment 28 is a clear warning: keep off the pitch. No normal Government would dream of crossing the line.
Regrettably, we have lived through a period when tempers were frayed, unfortunate incidents occurred and the Government did intervene. What we do not know is how infiltration occurred during that period. It is a fundamental point that we should know more. We are not talking of surveillance; that is the vital difference. Surveillance may be proper in some circumstances, but authorising criminal activity involving trade unions is not. To avoid repetition of what has happened in the past, and with those few words, I support the amendment.
My Lords, if the noble and learned Lord was referring at the beginning of his contribution to the term “economic well-being”, I hope that the references made during the earlier debate will be helpful. I certainly agree with him about the breadth of what is in the Bill and the distinction between surveillance and authorising criminal conduct.
The amendments in this group raise the issue of whether we are concerned about the activity or the actor. My noble friend Lord Paddick questioned Amendment 29 and the term “legitimate political activity”. I had in fact made a note that that quite attracted me, but he and I have not had the opportunity to thrash this out between us. We may get it on the floor of the House if the noble Baroness brings the matter back at a future point.
On Amendment 78, on the equality impact assessment, frankly, the Government would be ill advised to resist this. I am mindful of the need to avoid the identification of agents. The noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, was very clear about that the other day but, as the amendment is worded, I do not think that there should be such risks—although of course I am not experienced in this area.
In Amendment 56A, my noble friend has stood back to look at the purpose. Again, it is the broader point of addressing the principle rather than producing a list or a detailed prescription. I hope that the Minister will accept that we are keen to address the problems that the Bill throws up without undermining it. I am sorry that, today at any rate, I will not get the chance to speak after she has responded to my noble friend, but I believe that he has come up with a formula that is well worth pursuing.
(4 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support the case for strengthening oversight as put forward in Amendments 46 and 73, and I add my voice to those questioning the case for prior judicial approval of criminal conduct authorisations.
I speak not as a lawyer or practitioner but as another former member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, where we had plenty of evidence of the importance of covert human intelligence sources. I share the view that we need to get the balance right between, on the one hand, constructing a rigorous legal framework to support the activities of our intelligence and security agencies while, at the same time, still giving them the practical operational flexibility to carry out their difficult work effectively.
I have listened carefully to the strong arguments in favour of prior judicial authorisation. It is, as has been pointed out, what is required for other activities of the intelligence services and police. Should we not follow the practice of communications interception or search warrants? There are important differences. The person authorised to tap a phone or search a premises will be a public servant: an agent of the state. The person being given a criminal conduct authorisation may be a private citizen—possibly but not necessarily—from the margins of society, acting almost certainly from a complex set of motives and probably knowing that they are putting themselves in danger.
In the first case, authorisation seems to be essentially a judgment about compliance with the law. However, a criminal conduct authorisation requires, in addition, personal knowledge of the agent concerned and human relationships involved in complex circumstances. It is about making a judgment, possibly urgently, on human motivation, limitations and behaviour, and about operational context and risk. Therefore, on balance, I share the view that the handler or controller is better placed than a judicial commissioner to make that judgment call on what should and should not be authorised. Obviously, I am in no way against judicial authorisation in principle; it is about getting the best decision.
I would add a small point. For the handler to know that he or she is the authorising officer makes him or her more clearly accountable. It concentrates the mind to sign something off. As my noble friend Lord Anderson observed, it also concentrates the mind to know that your decision will be scrutinised immediately and rigorously. I therefore strongly share the view the present oversight arrangements should be significantly strengthened in the ways put forward in Amendments 46 and 73 to allow immediate scrutiny by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. My noble friend Lord Anderson and colleagues from the Cross Benches have spoken with much greater experience than me on the need for real-time oversight. I find the arguments persuasive. Indeed, there may be a case for giving judicial oversight powers more teeth—perhaps along the lines of Amendment 47 or something similar.
Finally, I said at the outset that we are looking to get the balance right between a robust legal framework and operational flexibility. Obviously, this applies across the Bill. I ask the Minister to consider whether, by strengthening significantly the oversight arrangements, she will mitigate some of our other concerns around, for example, immunity or the serious crimes threshold in this important Bill.
My Lords, I support Amendment 14. I was sorry that I was unable to attend Second Reading. I was sitting on a sub-committee of the EU Select Committee and was therefore unable to welcome the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, and congratulate him on an impressive maiden speech. He gave the impression that he had been introducing Bills in your Lordships’ House all his life.
I welcome the Bill, which provides for authorising offers to be given express powers to authorise criminal conduct that would otherwise be illegal. They carry a heavy responsibility, hence the need for supervision. Given the history of direct government intervention in coal mining disputes many years ago, I look forward to debating amendments in the names of my noble friends dealing with trade unions. Powers given
“in the interests of the economic well-being”
of the state will need close scrutiny. I am proud that, in a small way, I was able to give a little legal advice to the south Wales miners during the miners’ strike—for the most part, pro bono—many years ago. During my time as a law officer for England and Wales, and separately as Attorney-General for Northern Ireland, although the Attorney-General has general oversight and appropriate clearance, I was not troubled on any issue arising from the Bill. As the House will know, law officers have general oversight and supervision of the offices of state concerning both the rule of law and other matters.
I wish to endorse and reinforce the points made by my noble friend Lord Rosser in his Second Reading speech about the need for judicial oversight prior—I emphasise “prior”—to the event. There is no argument that there should be supervision. The only issues are, first, who should supervise, and secondly, whether it should be post or prior the event. I believe that the arguments for proper prior supervision are fundamental. In our legal processes, we have judges available 24 hours a day. This particularly includes the long vacation— indeed, any time, any place, throughout the year. They can adjudicate from home if necessary; I am told that that is not unusual. Provided a judge is given the right information, a proper judgment can be given. The same applies down the line to the magistracy, which performs a very vital role. Before a warrant is issued, evidence in one form or another is given and judicial authority is given.
I was never involved as counsel on these procedures during my time as a criminal practitioner, but I can give a personal example of the availability of magistrates on family matters. My wife sat for 18 years in the London juvenile courts. Part of her duties involved the care of children who were, or might be, vulnerable. I recall many occasions when I had to leave the sitting room of our London house at the request of a welfare officer so that she could hear evidence, hear witnesses sworn in and adjudicate, pending the following morning when a proper courtroom could be convened. It was vital that there was availability. My point is that there has never been an issue with non-availability of a court sitting at any level. The Minister is not very persuasive in his brief comment in Column 1046. I need to be persuaded why you can have judicial intervention and a judicial decision in so many other fields but not in this one.
We are dealing with very serious matters. Authorising criminal conduct is important and a departure from the ordinary rules of law. If there is any problem about the security clearance of a particular judge, I would be surprised if that could not be achieved. If a High Court judge cannot be trusted, who can? It would not be beyond the administration of justice to have a panel of designated judges with experience in this field who adjudicate from time to time and can authorise the necessary activities.
This brings me back to the key question: who is to guard the guardians? This is not to denigrate the experience of the highly trained authorising officers, nor the retrospective—I emphasise “retrospective”—oversight of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. Prior judicial authority is the best safeguard to ensure that, where there is a departure from the rule of law in ordinary circumstances, there is proper supervision of the activities.
(4 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I was fortunate in my time as a law officer that I did not have to advise on new terrorism legislation, so my advice on the detail of the Bill will be limited. Northern Ireland, for which I had a separate responsibility, enjoyed considerable calm in my time, although I had to adjudicate, in a diminishing number of terrorist-related offences, on whether to allow a Diplock court. In passing, I would favourably consider any temporary Diplock courts in England and Wales to help to reduce the backlog in crown court cases which have risen by 6,000 to 43,000. The option, at least, of a Diplock court should be closely considered. As a firm defender of jury trials over the whole of my professional career, I look forward to the Lord Chancellor’s proposals.
My first point on the Bill is to question the efficacy of the Prevent strategy. How confident are the Government that it is producing results? It is sad that the independent review of the strategy cannot take place in the time limit imposed by statute. I commend the work of the previous independent reviewers and have a high regard for the work of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. Given the new leeway which the Government require, I trust that Parliament will be given the opportunity of considering the revised terms of reference.
My second point is that reservations have been raised in the Commons about the use of polygraph tests to monitor compliance with licence conditions. We should not shy away from new mechanisms. Many, many years ago, under my Minister, I helped to pilot breathalyser legislation through Parliament. It was not without controversy, but now it is accepted as effective and permanent. I note that the Scottish justice system chose not to use polygraph tests due to lack of evidence of their effectiveness. I hope the Minister can put forward the Government’s view of the differing approach of the law in Scotland and the law, as it will be, in England and Wales. Specifically, why are the proposals for England and Wales are preferred to those in Scotland? I am, of course, aware of their views in other fields.
Lastly, I am concerned, as a criminal lawyer, about the lowering of standards of proof for imposing TPIMs from balance of probabilities to reasonable grounds for suspecting, which is a very low standard. The Joint Committee on Human Rights and the independent reviewer, Jonathan Hall QC, are concerned about the proposed lowering of standards. As a life-long criminal practitioner, I share that concern. I note the views of the national convenor on counterterrorism. I would not wish to contradict the operational evidence given by the assistant chief constable, but I would bear at the back of my mind the maxim: “Hard cases do not make good law.” I look forward to the Minister’s detailed justification on this aspect.
I support the Bill, having observed with horror the tragedy at Fishmongers’ Hall, involving caring members of one of my old universities, and other tragedies beyond belief, such as that in Manchester. The protection of the public must be a paramount consideration. Nevertheless, detailed questioning of the present proposals is more than fully justified.