Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Lord Dodds of Duncairn Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 11th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Jay, who chairs our committee on the protocol with such distinction.

In my view, the Bill is necessary and provides the potential for helping to resolve the crisis in the political process in Northern Ireland brought about by the protocol. There are many aspects that we would prefer were dealt with differently, all of which will need to be addressed and resolved in due course. However, it is clear that the protocol, albeit implemented only partially so far, has the following effects. First, as the courts in Northern Ireland have adjudicated, it rips up the free trading arrangements enshrined in Article 6 of the Act of Union itself. It runs completely contrary to the cross-community arrangements—not majority rule, which some people are referring to, but the cross-community arrangements—that are at the heart of the Belfast agreement, unless people want to change the Belfast agreement to majority rule. It is contrary to the consent principle. As the Minister said, it upsets the delicate balance of the agreements, and it has undermined and continues to undermine the institutions of the very agreement that it was designed and purports to safeguard.

The protocol also negates democracy itself. Up until 31 December 2020, the people of Northern Ireland, in common with the rest of the United Kingdom, were able to elect legislators to make all the laws to which they were subject. From 1 January 2021, every citizen of the United Kingdom living in Northern Ireland has had the experience of having the significance of their votes slashed as the responsibility for making the laws of Northern Ireland over vast swathes of the economy has been taken from them and given to the members of a legislature of a foreign political entity of which they are not part, and in which they have no representation—in relation not just to one statute or one area of law, but to 300 areas of law.

The outworking of Northern Ireland being subject to European Union law, while the rest of the United Kingdom is not, has massive, far-reaching, detrimental consequences, both constitutional and economic, which will get worse over time as divergence increases. Given that the rest of the United Kingdom is by far our greatest market for trade, as a result of dividing up our country in this way we have increasing friction for goods from one part of the United Kingdom to another as a result of needless checks and tonnes of paperwork, and we have divergence of trade, restricted consumer choice and increased costs. We have threats to investment through having different state aid arrangements and regimes for Northern Ireland and Great Britain, as the Minister acknowledged when we discussed this in Committee. We are denied the benefit as British citizens of the United Kingdom of UK-wide tax changes, while being subject to EU VAT rules.

As I looked around to try to describe the reality of what confronts us, the only model that I could find that comes close to fitting is the UN category of a non-self-governing territory, which is the current term for a colony. Most colonies today are largely self-governing; they remain classified as colonies because they are not entirely self-governing. That such a solution be thought desirable, or indeed workable, for part of this United Kingdom in the 21st century beggars belief.

We have heard about this Bill and international law this afternoon. Of course, nobody seems to object to the breach of international law which is at the heart of extending unilaterally grace periods or standstill. That is a breach of international law, and yet everybody seems quite content to go along with that.

The erosion of our citizens’ rights to fundamental democratic rights under this protocol is contrary to international law. We should look again at Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 21 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which states:

“Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives”.


That is denied to the people of Northern Ireland when it comes to legislating on large parts of the economy, and of course it violates the Belfast agreement, which commits to no erosion of democratic rights. Article 2.1 of the protocol refers to no diminishment in the rights accorded by the Belfast agreement, and those who support the Belfast agreement so vehemently should be defending what we are trying to do in restoring democratic rights to the people of Northern Ireland.

So, the greatest urgency now is to restore full democratic rights to people in Northern Ireland. We cannot defend and support the sovereignty of Ukraine—rightly so—and at the same time defend and support the trashing of the sovereignty of the United Kingdom. Whether by negotiation or by legislation, the objective of restoring sovereignty to the people of Northern Ireland, to all citizens of the United Kingdom who should all be treated equally, must be achieved, and with it the full restoration of Northern Ireland’s place in the internal market of the United Kingdom.

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[Lord Clarke of Nottingham (Con)]

My Lords, by far the most important reason for opposing this Bill is the fact that it is a clear breach of international law and gives Ministers powers to free themselves from parliamentary supervision in future, on an unprecedented scale. This has already been eloquently and authoritatively set out by many speakers, so I do not propose to dwell on it. I agree entirely with everything that everybody from my noble friend Lord Cormack onwards has said on that subject, and I think it would be a great blow if we were to pass legislation of this kind.

I thought in the 1990s and the 2000s—that more optimistic time—that one of the greatest things happening across the globe was the development of a rules-based international order, which gave us all great hope that we should have a more peaceful future. I never imagined that the United Kingdom would contemplate defying the rule of law—moving away from the basis of international order in a treaty with its closest allies and friends—in the way now being contemplated, but there we are. As I said, many Members of this House have eloquently set out that case, and I am sure many Members of the Government are secretly, privately, very worried about their being party to this.

Moving on to the actual politics of it, remember how we got here. The policy now being put forward is not that of a Conservative Government, unless the new Government are a total reversal of their predecessor. Boris Johnson was very proud of the agreement he reached after it was negotiated by the noble Lord, Lord Frost. There were long negotiations and no doubt about what had been negotiated. They had found a solution to the Irish problem caused by the Good Friday agreement and the fact that you cannot safely have controls on the border—something rightly sacrosanct to both the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom Government. They came up with this marvellous remedy that Northern Ireland would remain in the single market and the customs barriers that would inevitably follow from our withdrawal would be, first, along the English Channel between Dover and the continent, and then down the Irish Sea, with the Northern Irish having the advantage to many parts of its economy of being able to remain in the single market.

That was the policy; it should be the policy still. The part that changed was changed by the policy of the Democratic Unionists. They are the authors of this Bill, as already very eloquently expressed in this debate by the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, and his colleagues. They demanded the pistol. Theirs is the finger on the trigger because they used it as the basis for not joining a power-sharing Executive in Northern Ireland, causing the crisis. Boris Johnson immediately started changing his position once this happened. Within a week or two, he was making statements about what he had just signed—which were plainly incompatible with the policy contained in what he had just signed. From then on, so long as the Democratic Unionists would not join the power-sharing Executive, we have gone on and on until the stage we have reached now.

I do not doubt the Democratic Unionists’ sincerity on the symbolism of a customs border down the Irish Sea; they have always been consistent. But I think there is another reason behind the DUP’s position: the party has just done badly in Ulster elections and is using the Northern Ireland protocol as its explanation, as it would say—excuse, I would say—for not joining a Northern Irish Executive under Sinn Féin leadership. Sinn Féin should be entitled to the First Minister’s position. They are all nodding away at me. They still hold that pistol and the Government—

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord for giving way since he has made a direct accusation. I reassure him and the House that the Democratic Unionist Party would have no difficulty in re-entering the Executive with a Sinn Féin First Minister. We do not like that outcome but we will do that if the protocol is sorted out, so let us not go down a blind alley or a false argument as far as that is concerned.

[Lord Clarke of Nottingham (Con)]

I am extremely reassured to hear that but it is still “if the protocol is sorted out”. Who will decide whether the protocol is going to be sorted out? Who will determine the negotiating position of British Ministers in their discussions with the European Union? It will be the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, and his Democratic Unionist colleagues. The British Government will not—and, given the policy now, cannot—sign up to anything unless the Democratic Unionists agree because they will not achieve their aim of getting back to power-sharing. This is an impossible position.

We should have had a softer Brexit, but the hard Brexiteers took over. We should have stayed at least in the customs union, but that is now water under the bridge. The fact that we have come out is causing difficulties at Dover as much as it is in Belfast; it is causing damage to the United Kingdom economy just as it is to sections of the Northern Ireland economy—although some are lucky enough still to be in the single market and benefit from that. The only way out, as everybody has said, is sensible negotiations, but negotiations on the British Government’s own terms. They should get the DUP onside if they can, but we cannot allow the whole thing to be dictated by the sincere opinions of the Democratic Unionist Party, as it has been so far to get us to this position.

Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Lord Dodds of Duncairn Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I bow to the noble Lord, who has immeasurably more knowledge and experience of Northern Ireland than I could possibly have, but of course I have read the Northern Ireland agreement and understand that there are two documents in international law. The simple point is that, in the protocol, we agreed the means by which we take the view that the Good Friday agreement should be implemented in the context of the United Kingdom leaving the EU. That is what we agreed; we cannot now say that we are going to resile from it unilaterally. It is as simple as that.

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

My Lords, I had not intended to take part in this debate because I had not realised that it would range so far and wide and across so many general issues. We had a lengthy debate at Second Reading in which a number of these topics were discussed; nevertheless, I think it is worth addressing some of the points that have been made and putting some of the issues on record as far as we are concerned.

I begin by joining noble Lords and noble Baronesses in their tributes to the late Baroness May Blood, who passed away recently. She lived and was brought up in the same part of Northern Ireland that I had the honour of representing in another place for almost 20 years, so I knew her very well indeed. I pay tribute to her great resilience, hard work, dedication and tenacity in her pursuit of the issues in which she believed strongly, as well as her dedication to young people in the Shankill and integrated education, as has been mentioned.

It is not incompatible to support this Bill and seek a negotiated outcome. On the negotiated outcome, although there is not a great history of flourishing talks with the EU and the United Kingdom on the protocol issues thus far, we hope that any negotiations lead to an outcome that is compatible with the aims and objectives contained in this Bill. This is not a matter of just tinkering around the edges and finding practical solutions, as has been said; some of the issues are fundamentally contained in the protocol. You cannot address the democratic deficit issue satisfactorily unless you address some of the content of the protocol.

No matter how much consultation, prior notice, discussion or involvement you agree to give Northern Ireland politicians in relation to EU laws covering 300 areas such as the economy—as well as further issues such as state aid, VAT and so on—the fundamental fact is that no elected representative of Northern Ireland either here at Westminster or in the Northern Ireland Assembly has any vote or decision-making capacity on vast swathes of laws that apply in Northern Ireland. How will that be addressed? This Bill goes some way to addressing that, but nothing I have heard being suggested by the proponents of delay, who are against the Bill, has offered any solution to that point. The noble Lord, Lord Hain, acknowledged the problem.

Our Sub-Committee on the Protocol, of which I have the honour of being a member, has looked at this issue in considerable detail; I recommend that noble Lords and noble Baronesses read the report that we commissioned on the scrutiny of legislation now applicable to Northern Ireland. They will see the extent to which Northern Ireland has been removed from the normal processes of democratic lawmaking, which people in this House have spoken about with great eloquence but which does not apply anymore to United Kingdom citizens in the 21st century. That is entirely unacceptable and is contrary to all the traditions of democracy that this mother of Parliaments has sought to uphold both here and abroad.

It has been asked what the problem is with delay. The noble Lord, Lord Bew, has dealt with one issue—

[Lord Clarke of Nottingham (Con)]

My Lords—

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

The noble Lord, Lord Clarke, has already spoken. I want to get on and not delay the House any longer, but I will give way once.

[Lord Clarke of Nottingham (Con)]

I am extremely grateful to the noble Lord. I have every respect for him; we have been together in Parliament for years. I want to understand clearly what he is saying. Is he saying that the Democratic Unionists will not withdraw their objections to the whole protocol unless Northern Ireland is allowed to leave the single market with the rest of the United Kingdom as the United Kingdom is otherwise developing? That would mean us telling the European Union that the single market has got to have a great hole in it, with no border controls at all so far as the Republic of Ireland and Ulster are concerned—because that is the Anglo-Irish agreement—no customs barriers in the Irish Sea and no application of single market law in Northern Ireland. Is that the proposition on which the DUP is saying that it is going to stop returning to a power-sharing agreement in Northern Ireland?

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

I am grateful for the opportunity that the noble Lord gives me to clarify that point. If he looks in detail at the Bill, he will see that it does provide the opportunity for regulations to come forward. The Government have announced that they will produce regulations which allow for checks on goods destined for the European Union, and for the Irish Republic exclusively.

I agree with what the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, said in her amendment about the publication of regulations. It is important that the regulations provided for in the clauses in the Bill are published, and as quickly as possible, so that we can all see exactly what is proposed to replace the current, unacceptable arrangement. However, my understanding is that those regulations have talked about a red and a green channel, and that checks will be applied only to goods coming into the Irish Republic, so there will not be that gap or hole that the noble Lord, Lord Clarke, talked about.

It is also clear from the Bill that access to the single market would be retained, but that it would be the choice of businesses in Northern Ireland whether they want to be subject to EU or UK regulation, therefore sorting out to a large extent the democratic deficit point, while providing a way forward economically which is in everybody’s interests. When we come to sorting out the problems of the protocol, we have been told that no impact assessment has been carried out and that we need one for the Bill. There was no impact assessment carried out when the protocol itself was introduced, of course, concerning the negative impact that it has had on business.

I have a letter here from hauliers in Northern Ireland, who have written to a number of noble Lords saying that it is their contention that the economic costs of the protocol far outweigh the economic benefits. They say that if the protocol was implemented in full, it would crash Northern Ireland’s chilled and frozen food supply chains within 48 hours, and that it is reasonable to anticipate that this would cause a socioeconomic crisis. They talk about the need for the Bill. These are businesspeople. These are people who carry goods into Northern Ireland from Britain, into the Irish Republic, and from the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland into Great Britain. They know what they are talking about, so we should not generalise here. We must take the evidence of the damage that has been done economically and constitutionally.

On international law, I bow to the superior knowledge of many very distinguished lawyers and practitioners in this House, but the noble Lord, Lord Bew, is right when he argues about the prior position of the Belfast agreement and that the protocol references the Belfast agreement in its wording—as amended by the St Andrews agreement, of course—and that cannot be ignored. We are told that upholding and keeping our word is vital to our international standing. However, I have in front of me the joint report, from the negotiators of the European Union and the United Kingdom Government, of 8 December 2017, when Theresa May was trying to make progress in her negotiations with the European Union. That agreement was hammered out over a number of days. If we are talking about people maintaining and upholding their word, I point out that it contains the following, in Article 50:

“In the absence of agreed solutions… the United Kingdom will ensure that no new regulatory barriers develop between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom”,


which they now have,

“unless, consistent with the 1998 Agreement”—

so the EU and the UK Government recognise that it is inconsistent with the Belfast agreement to have such regulatory difference—

“the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly agree that distinct arrangements are appropriate for Northern Ireland.”

The Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly have never agreed to that. They were never even asked. This was the promise made to people in Northern Ireland by the EU and the UK. After that was agreed, the UK Government, never mind the EU, paid scant attention to that article when seeking the agreement of people in Northern Ireland to any regulatory divergence. If we are talking about upholding our word, people in Northern Ireland are entitled to ask, “What happened to that agreement? What happened to that commitment? Why was the protocol imposed without any say or consent by people in Northern Ireland?”

We talk about the blunderbuss—the threat that has been put on the table. I remind noble Lords that the EU has now launched infringement proceedings against the United Kingdom for its having unilaterally extended grace periods and other matters—without which, as the hauliers say in their letter, the supply chain to Northern Ireland would crash and burn within 48 hours. This is essential for the free flow of goods to Northern Ireland, yet the EU has put on the table legal action against the UK Government, and that is not mentioned.

I will close; I am conscious of time, but it has been a wide-ranging debate thus far. The Bill is necessary because the protocol, as it stands, is incompatible with the Belfast/Good Friday agreement. At the heart of that agreement, as amended by the St Andrews agreement, is the principle of consent. It is not only the DUP that opposes the current arrangement. Every single unionist elected to the Northern Ireland Assembly, as late as five or six months ago, opposes the protocol. The foundation of power-sharing in Northern Ireland is not majority rule any more; we have not had majority rule for 50 years in Northern Ireland. It is the mutual agreement of unionists and nationalists, and not a single unionist of the Ulster Unionist Party, the Democratic Unionist Party, the Traditional Unionist Voice, or independents, of which there are a number, supports the current arrangements.

The protocol is incompatible not only with the Belfast agreement but with Northern Ireland’s constitutional position. I am conscious of the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Bew, that it was not necessary to deal with that in this legislation, but the courts have ruled that Article 6 of the Act of Union has been subjugated by the protocol and that Great Britain is now a third country as regards “imports” from Great Britain into Northern Ireland.

As I have said, the protocol is incompatible with the upholding of proper British and UK democratic standards, for the reasons that I have already outlined, and it is damaging our prosperity. You cannot have VAT exemptions or derogations, which the UK Government have recently announced on energy products, applied to Northern Ireland, because we are subject to EU VAT rules. That cannot be right. It is also contrary to the New Decade, New Approach document, which was agreed by all the parties, the Dublin Government and the UK Government in January 2020. It says on page 47, annexe A:

“The Government is absolutely committed to ensuring that Northern Ireland remains an integral part of the UK internal market”,


As has been set out in the reasons given for the introduction of the Bill, this is to address the fact that Northern Ireland is no longer an integral part of the UK single market. That is indisputable.

To those who say it is unbelievable that a Conservative Government would be doing this and bringing forward this legislation, I say it is unbelievable that a Conservative and Unionist Party ever brought forward the protocol in the first place. That is the really telling point. We did not support it. What we are asking for is our democratic rights to be restored.

The Conservative Party can be criticised for many things, and we have criticised it very often. We have had our battles over the years. But if there is now an attempt to put right something that is fundamentally wrong, antidemocratic and runs counter to the Belfast agreement, runs counter to the agreement the basis of which was for the restoration of Stormont and the Assembly, that should be applauded. I hope negotiations can succeed, but they will have to deliver what is in the protocol, otherwise we will not get to a point where we will have stable government restored in Northern Ireland. That is a fundamental fact. Sinn Féin kept Stormont down for 1,044 days over the Irish language issue that the noble Lord, Lord Bew, referred to.

We do not want instability to continue for one day longer. In July 2021, the Government published a Command Paper saying that the conditions had been met then for the instigation of Article 16. As has been said, Article 16 is now very much flavour of the month, but at the time it was denounced by all the parties in Northern Ireland and most people here as being an outrageous infringement of democratic norms and a breach of good faith and of international law. All sorts of things were said about it. So there is urgency, and that is why I urge noble Lords to proceed with the Bill and move ahead. If negotiations do not end in a satisfactory outcome, we will have to return to this legislation, and it is better to proceed with it now than to have to start further down the road at a point when it would become absolutely essential.

[The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon) (Con)]

My Lords, first I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. As I was rising, I looked at the clock and never in the Ahmad history in the House of Lords has something so innocuous as saying “I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into a Committee on the Bill,” resulted in such an intense debate. I shall remember for next time.

Secondly, my noble friend Lord Clarke mentioned that he looks towards the House of Lords and, as he comes here more often, I assure him, not that I agree with the substance of what he has said, but that his contributions and those of all noble Lords enrich the debate. One of the key components of the House of Lords is asking the Government to think again. I am sure I speak for my colleagues on the Front Bench as well in saying that we have certainly been in thinking mode.

There is a third element before I get into the detail. I was taken by the various descriptions of the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, referred to it as a “pig”. As a Minister who also is a practising Muslim, I thought for a moment that the stewardship and handling of the Bill would cause me a cultural challenge. But I soldier on with loyalty to King, country and Government.

In all honesty, this debate has been an important one. I think we are all agreed that it has again brought forward views on the importance of Northern Ireland as an integral part of what defines our very United Kingdom. Notwithstanding the different perspectives, I know all Members of your Lordships’ House are at one on the principle that the integrity of the United Kingdom must be protected. The fact is that the Northern Ireland protocol must work for all communities in Northern Ireland and, of course, the wider United Kingdom. Of course, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is correct—we signed the Northern Ireland protocol. But any contract—I do not speak as a lawyer but I have done a few contracts in a previous life as a banker—is also signed in good faith. It has to work for all sides and all communities.

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[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

My Lords, with all due respect to the noble Lord, Lord Bew, and in due deference to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I will now inject the perspective of an economist and businessperson.

I support Amendments 3 and 67 and will try to inject a different perspective here. The arguments about protecting the Good Friday agreement are of course important and real. However, it seems that, despite arguing that the UK has contributed to the problem—which is essentially part of the reason why the doctrine of necessity seems unable to be applied here—there are options open to the United Kingdom to respect the Good Friday agreement, including maintaining regulatory alignment. Were regulatory alignment to be maintained, the east-west problem would not necessarily arise—because the EU could be reassured that there is less of a threat to its single market—and the north-south element would also not arise. If the UK wanted to diverge regulatorily, it has the option to negotiate that. So there are practical resolutions within our power to protect the Good Friday agreement and the protocol.

If we cast our minds back to the awful Brexit and post-Brexit periods, an assurance was given to noble Lords, including myself, that there would be technical arrangements—alternative arrangements—that would permit the flow of goods across the border that could be tracked, with trusted traders and technology being introduced, that would mean that we would not have these problems of customs procedures. If those arrangements were to be in place, the problem would not arise. So again, the UK Government have the option of saying, “We will maintain regulatory alignment until we have introduced those arrangements”. That would allow us to be in a position where we would not be breaking international law.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Bew, when he said that, if there is a problem, we should try to find a compromise, but that again means negotiation and using the facilities we have signed up to ourselves rather than threatening to blow up the whole agreement. I urge my noble friends on the Front Bench to try to get away from the magical thinking that we can somehow square this circle by threats or by breaking international law—or even by threatening to break international law—and instead to get around the table and negotiate a reasonable way forward that gets away from this kind of argument.

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

My Lords, this debate illustrates one of the issues deeply affecting Northern Ireland politics: trust and agreements. Noble Lords have talked about agreements entered into and then broken. One of the problems that exists for unionists at the moment in Northern Ireland is that so many promises and pledges have been made but have not been fulfilled. I referred in the earlier debate to the provisions of Article 50 and the joint report published on 8 December 2017, a commitment entered into by both the European Union and the UK Government. The noble Lord, Lord Caine, was present for some of the discussions we had with Theresa May in Downing Street when this matter was discussed. Provisions were inserted, and this was agreed by the European Union and the UK Government: no regulatory difference would exist unless by the express agreement of the Assembly and the Executive. That was ditched.

This has led to a situation—and this is just one example—where unionists now feel that their voice is not listened to and that commitments entered into are not accepted or followed through. This has led to a hardening of views across unionism generally, resulting in people now saying, “We need to see the colour of people’s money and actual delivery, not promises”. I listened with great interest to Steve Baker the other day, who said, “You know, unionists should choke down their concerns; they can count on us”. I have the greatest respect for Steve Baker and others in the Government, but quite frankly the days of counting on others and taking people’s word for it—even when international agreements are set aside during negotiations —have unfortunately gone.

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[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I understand that my noble friend—if I can call him that—has been lied to repeatedly, but he was lied to by the Government. I gently suggest that his beef ought to be with the noble Lords opposite me, rather than my party. As he says, our position on Article 16—as you would expect, and as I attempted to explain earlier—has evolved in the context of what we are being presented with by the Government. This approach was not previously conceived of; now that it is, it puts Article 16 in a slightly different light. This is not especially complicated, but it is the view of the Labour Party.

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, and I understand what she is saying, but the issues that were being discussed at the time by Her Majesty’s Government, as it then was, and which the Labour Party was responding to, are the same issues that are before us today, which are affecting the political process in Northern Ireland and leading to problems with the supply of goods from Great Britain. They are exactly the same but when the solution, “Let’s trigger Article 16; let’s go into negotiations”, was suggested, the Labour Party derided that as being toxic. The Labour Party gave support and succour to those who have allowed this position of instability and economic and constitutional harm to continue. A lot of lies have been told around the place, but it is no good, if I may say so, the noble Baroness putting all the blame on to the Government when everybody in Parliament and all political parties have to accept that the goalposts have been shifted, often by consensus, in a way that has done damage to the Belfast agreement, as amended by St Andrews, in a way that has undermined the trust of the people in Northern Ireland in the institutions.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I entirely understand the noble Lord’s political grievance, but the fact is that Article 16 is part of the protocol and the political grievance cannot itself provide the basis for necessity in international law. This group of amendments is seeking to understand what the legal advice of the Government is.

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[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

Do not worry, I will not be arguing that passionately for any Bill that could end up being withdrawn. We have been down this road before. All I say is that I support measures that, in my view, help to deal with the protocol issues that we have. I accept what the noble Lord is saying in terms of the LibDem position, although Layla Moran pointed out last year that triggering Article 16 would be a terrible thing and tragic, and all the rest of it, so it is not exactly totally consistent on the Article 16 point.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, there is a difference between recognising that there are mechanisms that could be put in place as safeguarding and rebalancing measures, and unilateral actions that seek to go beyond what Article 16 would be for the protocol. That is the entire point.

In supporting my noble friend’s Amendments 3 and 67, I understand that the Government will have prepared—the Advocate-General will correct me if I am wrong—a legal issues memorandum, a LIM, before the Bill was approved. That goes to the Attorney-General and to the Advocate-General for Scotland, and they will have approved this legal issues memorandum which, I understand, would have had to consider the very questions that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, indicated with regard to the options open to the Government to meet their policy ambitions. That would have included the protocol element of Article 16, as the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, indicated. In many respects, and I cover many trade debates in this House, Article 16 elements are fairly typical WTO mechanisms of safeguarding and rebalancing. The legal issues memorandum will have had to consider these options. So, at the very least, the Advocate-General can confirm to the Committee that there was a legal issues memorandum, and it did consider all these options.

The next question, therefore, is precisely where the legal argument on necessity originated. Did it originate from the FCDO? I understand that the memorandum goes to the FCDO also, for the treaties department. I am sure the Advocate-General will say that he cannot disclose this information for us, but on an issue of this importance, where did the argument for legal necessity originate? Was it his department? Was it the Office of the Advocate-General for Scotland? He is in his place precisely because his predecessor resigned, saying that his position was undermined in his endeavour to find, to quote from his letter, “a respectable argument” for breaches of international law in the United Kingdom Internal Market Act. The then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland said, notoriously, that it was a “specific and limited” breach, but the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, struggled hard to find a respectable argument to present for it, and because the Secretary of State was honest, the noble and learned Lord resigned. I note that the Constitution Committee report said, as has been referred to before:

“In this case, reliance on the doctrine of necessity is not a ‘respectable’ legal argument.”


I think we will touch on it when we discuss whether Clause 123 stands part, so it will be very interesting to hear what the Advocate-General says in winding on this group in order to inform some of our discussions on the next group.

I have sympathy with what has been referred to by others and I have an inkling as to what the Advocate-General may have in the folder in front of him. He may say, “It’s a long-standing convention, for very good reason, that legal advice is not published in full”, and he is no doubt prepared to say it, but why my noble friend Lord Campbell of Pittenweem is correct is that we are now in a realm of significance, given the scale of what the breach of international law would be.

I will refer to it in the next group, but my noble friend provided an amuse-bouche of the case of Hungary and Slovakia, to which the Advocate-General had referred. I also read that judgment in full. It may help the noble Lord, Lord Bew, to know what the ICJ has found repeatedly. Let me quote from its judgment in one of the cases that the Advocate-General cited.

“According to the Commission”—


that is the International Law Commission—

“the state of necessity can only be invoked under certain strictly defined conditions which must be cumulatively satisfied;”—

this is the point I want to stress—

“and the State concerned is not the sole judge of whether those conditions have been met.”

So even if he is right, one state party cannot determine solely, and the ICJ has found that repeatedly.

Even if the Advocate-General for Scotland says that it is a long-standing convention and cites examples of where legal advice was not furnished—he may overlook some examples of where it has been, of course, but that is a separate issue—the area that I want to ask about concerns what the former Advocate-General for Northern Ireland and the Attorney-General, Sir Geoffrey Cox, said in Committee in the Commons.

“There is plenty of precedent for the Attorney General coming to the House—I should know, I did it—to answer questions about the international law compatibility of a measure in this House. Indeed, it goes way back, I think, to either the Wilson Government or the Heath Government … I invite the Minister … to invite the Attorney General to come and answer those questions, because, in my judgment, it is an obligation to the House. The Attorney General has a residual duty to advise the House on matters such as this.”—[Official Report, Commons, 13/7/22; col. 400.]


Will the Advocate-General state why this has not happened? Will he provide the equivalent to this House in a Statement? We are asking the same as has been asked in the past of Attorneys-General.

Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Lord Dodds of Duncairn Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 31st October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, made a powerful—emotional, to some extent—speech last week and it certainly resonated with me. To a large extent, that has been reflected in the contributions so far, acknowledging that things have been done to Northern Ireland. Of course, when we consider what was done to Northern Ireland in relation to this protocol, it is right to remember that the then Prime Minister went to the DUP party conference and assured it that it was “oven ready”. In an aside, he also said, “Don’t worry about the paperwork”. Perhaps the DUP was overconfident in relying upon the word of the former Prime Minister: what has happened since has exploded the idea that what was in the protocol would somehow cover all circumstances.

The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, referred to the most helpful Library briefing, which says on page 50 that Article 16 is a “safeguard” mechanism. Are we looking for safeguards? Yes, of course we are. It allows either party to take temporary

“measures if the application of the Protocol leads to serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties that are liable to persist”.

On the attitude being taken by the DUP, what better definition can we have than this expression that embraces its concerns—almost exactly and in detail? It goes on to say that the “diversion of trade” is an issue that would justify reference to Article 16.

It seems that Article 16 has been rejected by the Government. I have never really heard a proper argument for why that should be the case. I will put it this way: if Article 16 does not cover what we are about today, when will it ever be of any relevance? This question would give an answer, though perhaps not one that would suit the DUP in every respect. Should Article 16 be invoked, an answer to this question would go a long way to helping those—including me—concerned about anything that might have the effect of undermining the Belfast agreement.

I think we will have a discussion later this week in this House about trade arrangements, so I will repeat a point I made in the last debate: the trade arrangements that were held in front of all our noses were those to be made with the United States. They were going to remedy any difficulties or subtractions that we might experience if we left the European Union. However, nothing much has happened with that. As I said then—I say it again now—we forget the extent to which the politics of the United States, as they affect us domestically in both Houses and across both sides of the aisle, are influenced by their attitudes towards Ireland. It seems that, so long as we have this unresolved issue, the prospects for a trade agreement are pretty remote. For this reason, I ask the DUP why Article 16 is not enough for it, and I ask the Government to give us a coherent explanation of why they are not willing to invoke it. At the very least, by invoking it, we would be able to test it.

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

My Lords, it is indeed a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, with whom I had the honour of serving alongside for many years in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. I understand that he continues to serve there with great distinction, so it is a pleasure to hear what he has to say.

On the issue of Article 16, I say with the greatest of respect: I well remember that, when this was being discussed and advocated by us and others, there was agreement that some of the articles in the Northern Ireland protocol should be suspended. Article 16 was absolutely opposed tooth and nail by the vast bulk of everybody, not just in Northern Ireland on the nationalist side but both here in this House and in the other place. In the last debate, I quoted statements from leading members of what was then Her Majesty’s Opposition, including the Liberal Democrat Benches—as well as others on the Conservative Benches—who were vociferous and vehement in their opposition to any notion of the implementation of Article 16. The Irish Government went so far as to say that it would completely upend the Belfast agreement, which seems to be the chosen form of words when something is proposed that is not liked. I hear with interest what noble Lords are saying now about Article 16, but that certainly was not what was being said a few months ago. Noble Lords should look back in Hansard to what the situation actually was. The reality is that Article 16—whether or not it was invoked—was not going to solve all the problems.

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

My Lords—

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

Other Members have had their say so I am going to proceed in terms of my speech.

The amendment before us from the noble Baronesses, Lady Suttie and Lady Ritchie, has the intent of saying that the Bill’s operative clauses should not proceed unless there is approval from the Northern Ireland Assembly. I note, however, that this is not by cross-community vote. What is fascinating about people who defend and say they are defending the Belfast agreement—as amended by St Andrews, of course—is that they say, “Let’s give a vote to the Northern Ireland Assembly”. Regardless of whether or not it is reserved, the fact is that you are giving a power to the Assembly, and the Assembly in Northern Ireland operates by cross-community vote: there must be a majority of unionists, a majority of nationalists and an overall majority for all major pieces of legislation to pass. If it is subject to a majority vote, it can be turned into a cross-community vote by a petition of concern. Yet, uniquely, the proponents of the Belfast agreement only ever want to give a vote on the protocol issues to the Northern Ireland Assembly without a cross-community vote. So, if we are going to be consistent about defending the Belfast agreement and the institutions thereof, this amendment should include provision for a cross-community vote.

The other big flaw of course is that there is no such requirement for the absolute implementation of the protocol itself. I pointed out that Article 50 of the joint declaration in December 2017, signed by the EU and the United Kingdom Government, said that there could be no regulatory difference between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom unless it was by a cross-community vote of the Assembly and the Executive in Northern Ireland. So that is what should be the priority. As my noble friend Lord Browne said, there needs to be a prior step before we go down this route, which is to ask whether the protocol has the assent of the Northern Ireland Assembly on the basis of the Assembly’s decision-making powers, which are by cross-community vote.

It has also been said that the democratic deficit argument is not valid because there are other countries that have no say in laws that govern them. Norway was cited. Of course, Norway is a member of the European Economic Area but is not a member of the customs union, so it does not have EU customs laws applied to it in the way that Northern Ireland has. That is a significant difference. But the other major difference is this: the whole of Norway is a member of the single market. Northern Ireland is separated out from the rest of the United Kingdom, so one part of the United Kingdom is subject to EU laws while the rest goes its own way, making its own laws and being free to make its own decisions. Given that Northern Ireland does more trade with the rest of the United Kingdom than with the rest of the world, Europe and the Republic of Ireland put together, that makes no sense whatever. So it is entirely wrong to suggest, “Oh, well, there’s no difference between Northern Ireland and places like Norway”—there is a world of difference. I am surprised that that has not been noted.

Then we have the argument that it is the Government who have set out the position as to what needs to be done in relation to the protocol and putting it right. They issued a Command Paper in July 2021 and have now published this Bill. A lot of it is good in terms of restoring democratic control over laws that apply to Northern Ireland; it goes some way to rectifying that, although it does not do everything that we would like. Then we are told that if the DUP do not get on board with this—the Government’s proposals—then somehow the rules for power sharing in Northern Ireland should be cast aside. Again, I ask defenders of the Belfast agreement: where are you when people say, “Let’s just do away with the cross-community mechanisms and go for majority voting”? We have not had majority rule in Northern Ireland for over 50 years.

But when people talk about the Assembly not functioning for a large bulk of the period since the Belfast agreement, remember that between 2003 and 2007 it was down because of the actions of Sinn Féin and its military wing, the IRA, in robbing the Northern Bank. The Government rightly insisted that it would have to give up its weaponry before it could be considered fit to have a place in the Government of Northern Ireland. For four years—and between 2017 and 2020, again Sinn Féin kept the Assembly down and boycotted the Executive—would not agree to re-form it—on the issue of language and culture. But, as soon as there is any suggestion that the DUP insists on the democratic rights of people in Northern Ireland to be treated in the same way as other citizens of the United Kingdom, to have their say and vote on laws that affect them, we have the defenders, it appears, of the Belfast agreement saying, “No, let’s jettison all that, let’s change the rules”. Well, I am afraid that really is a recipe for disaster.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, is there not a very short answer to all of this: not to proceed with the Bill?

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

My Lords, if I may make a short point before the Minister gets up to speak, it is clear that we are going to have a debate on international law and so on about every set of clauses. All I want at this stage is to draw attention to the actual situation and practical reality for people moving goods between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as a result of the application of EU customs law for those goods coming to Northern Ireland. Briefly, and cutting through the arguments about international law, let us have a look at the reality.

The Government will have spent £340 million through the Trader Support Service helping traders process 2.3 million customs declarations for trade between two parts of the United Kingdom. For those 2.3 million declarations, by the end of the year the taxpayer will have forked out almost £350 million, and that comes on top of the movement and assistance schemes and other schemes designed to help people with the paperwork. According to some estimates, it could amount to £500 million. That support is not guaranteed to continue into the future. It has been extended for another year but at some point those costs will have to be borne by hauliers—the companies which move those goods—and consumers. There will certainly be a massive increase in the cost of living. Already, as a result of the paperwork that people have to go through, even with that support we have seen example after example of firms in Great Britain simply refusing to have any further dealings with Northern Ireland. It is simply not worth their time, effort or money, even with those vast millions going into the Trader Support Service.

I urge noble Lords to look at what people in companies such as McBurney Transport and McCulla—the people who transport goods to the Irish Republic as well, not just Northern Ireland—are saying about the paperwork and the reality of these customs burdens on trade between one part of the United Kingdom and another, and then tell people that this is a sensible way of approaching it. We need change. I understand the arguments about international law and all of that but we need to have this rectified. We cannot continue to fork out this kind of money and still have companies refusing to do business with one part of the United Kingdom; namely, Northern Ireland.

Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Lord Dodds of Duncairn Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 31st October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I want to bring the focus back to Article 2. The noble Lord, Lord Bew, said that this Bill is modest but the problem is that the law of unintended consequences could come into play here.

My noble friend Lord Purvis of Tweed coined the phrase “Rumsfeld clauses”. I do not want to detract from his trademark on that phrase—he will kill me—but, as concerns Article 2, the Bill shows some evidence of having been written on the back of an envelope. Concerns about human rights and equality have been at the heart of the conflict in Northern Ireland, so those concerns were central to the Good Friday agreement.

Thus Article 2 of the protocol, ensuring a non-diminution of the wide range of rights set out in the Good Friday agreement, is a key clause. However, there are worrying implications of the Bill for human rights and equality protections, which are in danger of being overlooked. The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission and the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland point out that the Explanatory Notes to the Bill make no reference to any consideration having been given to compliance with Article 2 of the protocol. Those two commissions have previously recommended that this should be the case regarding all relevant legislation. I understand that the Leader of the House of Commons, the right honourable Penny Mordaunt, is talking about draft guidance to Bill teams on this matter. This is in response to concerns that have been raised for quite a few months now by various committees, such as the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee and Women and Equalities Committee in the other place, the Joint Committee on Human Rights, on which I have the pleasure to sit, and our own Northern Ireland Protocol Sub-Committee. They have all raised concerns about compliance with Article 2 of the protocol.

The Government gave assurances about their commitment to Article 2, and it is true that this article gets a degree of protection under the Bill; for instance, that Clause 15 does not permit Ministers to make regulations defining Article 2 among “excluded provisions”. However, even Clause 15 needs completion, as the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, pointed out. The logic of protection of Article 2 is far from fully reflected in other clauses of the Bill. Hence these amendments—and I support all those tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, not just the two I have co-signed—propose a strengthening of Clauses 9, 10, 13 to 15 and 20.

This Government do not like the European Court of Justice, but its role is essential at various points in relation to Article 2. That article includes a commitment to keep pace with EU laws, as the noble Baroness pointed out, with EU law developments falling within the scope of the six equality directives listed in Annexe 1 to the protocol. As these directives are updated or replaced under the normal process of EU legislation, the UK Government are committed to ensuring that domestic legislation in Northern Ireland reflects any substantive enhancements in relevant protections. There are also other relevant EU laws beyond the six equality directives that underpin rights in the Good Friday agreement, such as the victims’ directive, the parental leave directive, and the pregnant workers’ directive.

The Government are committed to ensuring that there will be no diminution of protections as contained in relevant EU law on 31 December 2020. The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission and the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland have acquired additional powers to oversee the Government’s commitment under Article 2. However, it is essential that Clause 20, which removes the binding nature of judgments of the European Court of Justice, is amended to ensure that the dynamic alignments—the keeping pace—guaranteed under the protocol for citizens’ rights in Northern Ireland can be delivered. The same applies to Clause 13.

The UK-EU joint committee supervises the implementation of the withdrawal agreement, but where there is a dispute regarding the interpretation of EU law which the joint committee or the arbitration panel cannot resolve, then under Article 174 of the withdrawal agreement, the ECJ must be asked to give a binding interpretation. This needs to be recognised and incorporated in Clause 13.

I mentioned Clause 15. The remaining problem there is that it does not prevent Article 14(c) of the protocol, which provides for the UK-EU specialised committee to consider matters brought to its attention by the two commissions in Northern Ireland—human rights and equalities—from becoming excluded provision by sort of oversight. The same applies to the lack of protection of the protocol’s Article 15, which provides for a joint consultative working group on the effective operation of Article 2.

The other amendments in this group raise similar and related issues. For reasons of time, I will not dwell on them. I am sure that noble Lords get the drift. One is left to conclude that there was either a lack of thorough preparation on the Bill—hence my quip about the back of an envelope—or a disturbingly cavalier disregard for Article 2 of the protocol. I am not sure which is worse. Neither is excusable, but I hope the Minister can tell me that the Government will take away especially all those excellent, very dense and precise questions raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie. Quite honestly, what is in the Bill at the moment is not remotely satisfactory to honour and safeguard Article 2 of the protocol.

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

My Lords, these amendments relate to Article 2 of the protocol. However, it is clear that Articles 1 and 2 subject that protocol to the prior treaty, the Belfast agreement. That is the fundamental point that must not be overlooked. There is merit in examining in detail what, for instance, Article 2(1) says, because it lends weight to arguments that we have advanced on our side and that have been advanced very eloquently by the noble Lord, Lord Bew. Article 2(1) specifically places an act of duty on the UK Government. That duty is as follows:

“The United Kingdom shall ensure no diminution of rights, safeguards and equality of opportunity as set out in that part of the 1998 Agreement entitled Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity results from its withdrawal from the Union”.


However, the operation of the protocol, as it is currently being operated and is designed to operate, is diminishing the rights set out in

“that part of the … Agreement entitled Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity”

and in the Belfast agreement, which sets out

“the right to pursue democratically national and political aspirations”.

That applies right across the whole remit of lawmaking in the Northern Ireland Assembly. Up until 31 December 2020, the people of Northern Ireland were represented in all the lawmaking to which they were subject.

However, since then, more and more laws are being applied that have been developed by the European Union, in which Northern Ireland representatives have absolutely no representation whatever. It is helpful that we are looking at Article 2. The operation of the protocol is therefore actively diminishing the Belfast agreement’s

“right to pursue democratically national and political aspirations”.

People in Northern Ireland can currently not do that—by standing for election or electing someone to the relevant legislature, whether here at Westminster or at Stormont—because they cannot make any laws. They have no say in any laws to which the people of Northern Ireland are subject in over 300 areas, hence the need for the Bill, which will return lawmaking powers for goods destined for Northern Ireland to a legislature within the United Kingdom.

I have listened to the outrage—as the noble Lord, Lord Bew, described it very well—that has been expressed about the powers that will be taken by Ministers. However, there seems to be little or no outrage felt at all about the absolute lack of any democracy whatever when it comes to whole swathes of laws over the economy in Northern Ireland. Never mind giving the powers to Ministers, or bringing forward regulations or statutory instruments capable not of being amended but at least of some scrutiny in a United Kingdom legislature—these are laws being brought forward on a dynamic basis, aligning Northern Ireland to EU law, different from UK law in many cases, with no scrutiny, say, vote, or anything else by anyone elected in Northern Ireland.

Where is the outrage about that? Where are the fulsome expressions of how this is a travesty of democracy, the like of which has not been seen—I cannot count any kind of precedents for it. The noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, referred to the idea of a stool that has legs being cut off it. It reminds me of the description of the Belfast agreement as amended by the St Andrews agreement: a three-legged stool, with strands 1, 2 and 3; strand 1 being the internal affairs of Northern Ireland, the Assembly and so on; strand 2 being north-south; and strand 3 being east-west. When you interfere and cut the leg of the east-west relationship, which is what has happened as a result of the protocol, and you also interfere with the cross-community voting mechanisms of the Assembly itself in order to undermine any kind of unionist opposition to the protocol, you are cutting away at the legs of the Belfast agreement as amended by St Andrews. That is the reality, and, as the noble Lord, Lord Bew, said, we need to focus on the fundamental problem, which is that the Belfast agreement is being undermined by the protocol. Until it is sorted out, there will not be proper functioning of that agreement.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I want to rise very briefly in support of these amendments and also to say that my noble friend Lady Ludford made an extremely clear and very good case. I just want to add three very brief points.

The first is that I refer the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, to Hansard in 2019 and my contributions, among others from these Benches. We debated these issues and highlighted them, and he knows that. I am sure this evening it is just rhetoric in our Committee. He knows we have raised the concerns that he just outlined now. They are why we opposed it. So I do not think he can present that fact towards these Benches.

The second is that in my view Article 2 of the protocol should not be seen in a static form. Article 2(1) states:

“The United Kingdom shall ensure that no diminution of rights … results from its withdrawal from the Union”.


This is a permanent agreement, a permanent commitment, and therefore it cannot be seen that those that were in place in 2019 are now kept in aspic. So my noble friend is absolutely right that if you are taking away what is case law and when those rights and freedoms protected by Annexe 1 powers are adapted, unless they are dynamic, there is a diminution of those rights, by definition. The Bill proposes retaining them in aspic. The noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, is absolutely right to highlight the fact that those Article 2 rights need to continue to be dynamic.

I know the hour is late, but I want to remind the noble Lord, Lord Bew, and others of Northern Ireland Protocol Bill: UK Government Legal Position, which is the founding basis upon which this Bill has been brought for our consideration. The final sentence of the penultimate paragraph is:

“The UK urges EU Member States to provide a new negotiating mandate to the Commission, wide enough to change the terms of the Protocol to respond to the full range of issues addressed by this legislation.”


So far, I have not heard a squeak from any Minister saying that the position of the Government is still that there should be a new negotiating mandate from the Commission to EU member states. I have not heard that; I am willing to be intervened on, or, if not, I want to hear from the Minister whether that is still the position. That was the legal position of the Government: that they are seeking a new negotiating mandate from the Commission. It is there in black and white, but I have not heard whether that remains the same. When it comes to putting faith in the negotiations, what is the basis of these negotiations if the Government’s legal position is that there has to be a new mandate and that is not forthcoming?

Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Lord Dodds of Duncairn Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 2nd November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

As so often, the noble Lord puts it very well. It ought to be a parliamentary lesson to us all: never seek to take to yourself powers that you would not be happy to see the other side have. The noble Lord put it very succinctly and I endorse what he said.

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

My Lords—

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

The big point about this clause is the one made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell. We should not be writing into our statute book such extraordinary sweeping powers, to be exercised at the stroke of a pen, with no real supervision or scrutiny by the Executive.

I would like to speak briefly to the second important point, which is, in my view, the one made by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, when he spoke of the “chill effect”. I also found things I agreed with in the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, rather to my surprise. The chill effect is real and will continue. Investors will be deterred from coming to Northern Ireland, and Northern Irish businesses will be deterred from investing, by the uncertainty which will not be resolved by the passage of this Bill but created by its passage. The effect of Clause 12, taken with Clause 22, is to enable the Minister to establish a different regime in Northern Ireland from the regime in Great Britain. The assumption might be that if the protocol falls, what results is the status quo ante: the UK rules. That is not the case. The Minister would be entirely free to produce whatever rules for Northern Ireland he thought fit. It is obvious what that uncertainty does to investment.

I am surprised at the silence of the DUP.

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

We cannot get in.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

I am delighted that the silence may be about to be broken. It seems to me it would be odd to be insouciant about this uncertainty. The DUP may have been given assurances that only UK rules will be applied and nothing will be different, in which case I suppose it might believe such assurances. That would be a triumph of hope over experience, because we would not be where we are today—we would not have this Bill to discuss—if the DUP had not been betrayed and misled by the last Prime Minister but one.

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

My Lords, I am truly grateful for the opportunity to participate, and would have done so earlier had I stood up more quickly. I will address some of the issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge.

First, the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, touched on the reasons behind Clause 12 and why it is necessary, and I think it is worth reminding noble Lords of the current position following the approval of the Subsidy Control Act. Under the provisions of that Act, Northern Ireland is specifically excluded from the UK subsidy scheme. Therefore, we are subject, as per Article 10 of the Northern Ireland protocol, to EU state aid laws, and all the laws listed in Annexe 5 to the protocol shall apply to the UK

“in respect of measures which affect that trade between Northern Ireland and the Union which is subject to this Protocol.”

I have spoken to Invest Northern Ireland—the body that looks after foreign direct investment into Northern Ireland—about these matters. In effect, while the UK is setting up a new, more flexible state aid regime, under Article 10 of the protocol the UK subsidy control regime would apply only to about 50% of the financial support that will be provided to Northern Ireland, with the remainder continuing to fall within the scope of EU state aid rules, applying mainly to the manufacturing of goods.

So, Northern Ireland will be forced to adhere to the strict rules and conditions of EU law on things such as no expansions, maximum grant rates, only new establishments and so on, and when the projects are large or outside the scope of the exemption regulations, Northern Ireland will have to seek European Commission approval. Effectively, we have two regimes which are very different in policy terms and practical effect. Under the UK scheme, things effectively will be automatically approved unless specifically prohibited, and in Northern Ireland, under EU rules, everything will be prohibited unless approved—very different policies, and two very different systems operating in one country.

The reasons behind Clause 12 are sound; otherwise, there will be no level playing field across the United Kingdom for state aid. The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, talked about uncertainty, but Invest NI has expressed concerns about the application of this dual regime. We will be at a disadvantage compared to other parts of the UK competing for inward investment. Other parts could be much more attractive as a location for investment as a result of not having to wait for European Commission approvals, for instance. Northern Ireland approvals will take significantly longer than the new timescales envisaged in the Subsidy Control Act for the rest of the United Kingdom. Other areas could have far fewer conditions or restrictions and might well receive greater levels of funding and subsidy than will be possible under the EU regime in Northern Ireland, which prohibits subsidies greater than 50%, whereas under the Act subsidies should be “proportionate”, but no maximum is specified.

Indeed, your Lordships’ Select Committee on the protocol in Northern Ireland, on which I am honoured to sit, wrote to the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, on this matter. He responded by letter on 22 March 2022, saying that he recognised that

“in some cases a more flexible approach will be available in Great Britain than in Northern Ireland and that this could affect all subsidies relating to trade in goods.”

There are real concerns about the application of EU state aid to Northern Ireland when it is not applicable to the rest of the United Kingdom.

On the issue of what replaces the EU regime for Northern Ireland, I have heard what has been said. That is why I am on record in this House as agreeing with the Opposition Front Bench that we need to see the regulations, and they should be published in good time for your Lordships to consider in detail. It is not enough simply to have broad outlines of policy or indications of where it might go; we need to see the regulations at the same time as the legislation. I fully accept that this should be done, and I said so in a previous debate.

I understand also the very strong opinions, many of which I share, on the idea of giving the Executive more and more power at the expense of the legislature. However, I ask noble Lords to bear in mind the situation we are faced with in Northern Ireland as a result of the protocol. Powers have been taken away in 300 areas of law affecting the economy in Northern Ireland. Powers have been taken away from this House, this Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly in Stormont, and handed over to the European Commission in Brussels, which initiates law in all those areas.

Noble Lords have expressed great dissatisfaction with the idea, which is regrettable in many cases, that one of His Majesty’s Ministers may be able to sit down with a pen and paper or an iPad and write what comes to mind; but we have a situation where somebody in the European Commission building in Brussels—I do not know who or where they will be, or their name; they are certainly not accountable to anyone here or in Northern Ireland—will write laws for Northern Ireland. It will not be a question of putting them down in statutory instruments, which this House may reject—although we have heard that it hardly ever rejects them. There will be no system of approval or disapproval at all. There will be dynamic alignment of the laws of the European Union with Northern Ireland. Legislators and the people of Northern Ireland will be handed those laws by the European Commission and told: “That’s the law you’re now operating.” Those laws are not necessarily going to be made in the interests of Northern Ireland. They are made by people who have their own interests.

I understand why noble Lords may rail against the delegated powers in this Bill, but why is not the much greater problem of the powers that have been given to Brussels to impose laws directly on part of the United Kingdom in the 21st century a subject for even more outrage? People may say that the Government signed up to this. I agree—they did, against our advice. We voted against it, as did other noble Lords in this House and Members of the other place. But we have this problem and we need to fix it. If it cannot be fixed, we are in serious trouble. I hope that negotiations and the negotiating mandate of the European Union will change to allow these things to be negotiated, but there is no sign of that thus far. If they do not change, this sovereign Parliament must take action to protect the people of Northern Ireland against laws imposed on them. Surely that should have the support of all true democrats in this mother of Parliaments.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

My Lords, listening to the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, just then, my mind drifted back a decade or so to a debate in the domed hemicycle in Strasbourg on the issue of state aid in a neighbouring jurisdiction, one that was partially under single market regulation; namely, Switzerland. One after another the MEPs from different groups got up and fulminated against the unfair competition and unfair subsidies that were being carried out in particular Swiss cantons. It became clear as they spoke that what they regarded as unfair subsidies were lower taxes—lower corporation and business taxes, and a lower VAT rate. My point is that what we regard as an objective measure will not necessarily be seen that way in Brussels when it has full control of these things.

I did not make the wise life choices that my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley did, so I have no idea how efficacious these vehicles are, but surely that is an issue that ought to be determined through our own national democratic mechanisms and procedures, rather than handed to us by people over whom we have no control. It is this point of trade-offs that I think is being missed.

Of course, how could one not be persuaded by the customary wry, terse brilliance of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, in the way he phrases the problem of executive overreach? I think that all of us on all sides recognise the problem. But we are dealing with a world of imperfections, and the alternative is an also unconstrained, and to some degree arbitrary, power where decisions are made, often by middle-ranking European Commissioners who are not accountable to anyone. Inadequate as the statutory instrument is, there is some mechanism of control here. But, as the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, just explained, we will have a situation where the state aid regime in Northern Ireland is being imposed by people who are completely outside the democratic process.

Now, I very much hope that this Bill goes through without these amendments. I realise that I am a very lonely supporter of it in these debates, but I hope that once it has gone through, Northern Ireland can become a bridge between the United Kingdom and the European Union, and a forum for co-operation. But that will be possible only if we live up not only to the Belfast Agreement but to the wider principles on which it rests: above all, representative government and a proper link between taxation, representation and expenditure.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

There are many difficulties with that argument, the first being that there are good-faith negotiations that the United Kingdom is involved in. One cannot assume that they will not succeed. We do have a protocol.

The noble Lord, Lord Dodds, made a point which has been made previously in Committee, concerning the democratic deficit in Northern Ireland. There is a provision in the protocol that expressly addresses democratic consent in Northern Ireland: Article 18. It sets out a detailed procedure to ensure that there is democratic consent, and it requires in detail provisions to ensure the consent, in due course, of both communities, the nationalist and the unionist. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, will say that it is far from perfect and that he does not like the detail set out there—but that is what we agreed. It simply cannot be said that the subject of democratic consent has been ignored. It was negotiated and it was agreed.

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

Does the noble Lord accept that the provisions of Article 18 are contrary to the agreement that was made between the European Union and the UK Government in December 2017? Article 50 of the joint report said that before there could be any regulatory difference between Northern Ireland the rest of the United Kingdom, there had to be the assent of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Executive. The current arrangements are in breach of an EU-UK agreement and the process for giving consent is deliberately made a non-cross-community vote, contrary to the Belfast agreement.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

It is elementary as a matter of diplomacy and of international law that a country is perfectly entitled to reach a new agreement in the circumstances as they then exist. That is what happened when the protocol was agreed. Both sides agreed a mechanism in Article 18 for ensuring democratic consent.

Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Lord Dodds of Duncairn Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 2nd November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Suttie (LD)]

I thank the noble Lord for that clarification. However, probably lots of people out there would regard statutory instruments and secondary legislation, and such phrases, as sounding rather technical—but the point that my noble friend was making is that they are important. If we get the laws wrong, they will directly impact on the people of Northern Ireland, who have gone through a difficult situation since the passing of Brexit.

The effect of Amendment 25 would be to safeguard Article 18 of the protocol and allow the democratically elected Northern Ireland Assembly to have its say. I think the noble Lord, Lord Caine, is going to respond, as he is sitting in the middle of the three noble Lords. I would be very interested to hear, for the record, whether he considers that there are circumstances under which he could imagine using the powers granted under Clause 15(2) of this Bill to remove Article 18 of the protocol and remove the right of the Assembly to have that vote in 2024. If that possibility exists, can he imagine that it would ever actually be used?

On a second issue, in an article in June this year, Tony Connelly of RTÉ raised an interesting question about which version of the protocol would be voted on in 2024 by MLAs. Would it be the original EU version of the protocol, or the version as amended by this Bill, if it were to be passed and enacted? It is an interesting question, and I would like to know the Minister’s view on it. Tony Connelly says that those parties that want the protocol to stay

“will have a very strong case to say in 2024 they are being denied a democratic vote that has been mandated by international law.”

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

I shall just intervene briefly in this interesting debate on the amendment proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie. Just to follow on on what the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, has said about which form of the protocol will be voted on, I do not mean this in a trite or trivial way, but I suspect that, if it were the original form of the protocol, it is unlikely that there would be a meeting of the Assembly to vote on it. That is just the reality. As the noble Lord, Lord Bew, said, it brings us back time and again to the fundamental reasons why this Bill is before your Lordships’ House.

I listened to the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, say that the protocol is not subject to cross-community consent because it is a reserved matter and does not fall within the purview of the devolved institution. There are a couple of answers to that; the first one is that the idea that we can dismiss the issue of unionist dissent from the protocol on that technical ground is complete political nonsense. It just will not work. We are in a dire situation politically in Northern Ireland, and to use a technical argument is not going to persuade anyone; it is not a good argument to use.

On the actual position, if we believe that the protocol is a reserved matter, then the decision is for this House and this Parliament. However, the Government, by agreement with the EU, decided that there should be some kind of consent mechanism and a vote in the Northern Ireland Assembly. Then they decided to change the rules of the Belfast agreement and the consent mechanisms within strand 1, the Assembly, having given the decision to that Assembly, by taking away the cross-community element of the vote and saying that it had to be by a majority vote. I have said this before: this is the only single major issue in Northern Ireland that can be decided by a majority vote. Everything else is subject to either cross-community agreement or susceptible to being turned into a cross-community vote by a petition of concern. Why did that happen? In order to prevent unionist dissent from derailing the protocol.

When the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland (Democratic Consent Process) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 were debated in Grand Committee on 1 December 2020—the statutory instrument brought in to implement Article 18—the noble Lord, Lord Empey, and the late Lord Trimble were both present and indicated their strong concerns, as architects of the original Belfast agreement, about how this drove a coach and horses through the consent principle of the Belfast agreement. People in Northern Ireland are mystified, continually, by people who stand up and say, “We are protecting the Belfast agreement; this is all about protecting the Belfast agreement”, and then they want to change the rules of the Belfast agreement when it does not suit them. They cannot have it both ways.

The fact is that Article 18 of the protocol is a vote four years after the event, four years after Northern Ireland is brought under the auspices of the protocol, four years after there has been dynamic alignment with EU law and four years after gradual separation between regulations and laws in Great Britain and the rest of the United Kingdom, in Northern Ireland. We will have had four years during which trade continues to diversify and so on, where laws are being made with no say, and then the Northern Ireland Assembly is to be given a vote, but not on a cross-community basis. No one says, “Are unionists happy? Are nationalists happy? Is there an overall majority?”, which is what the cross-community voting mechanism is. No, it is to be a straight majority vote.

All this is obvious to unionists in Northern Ireland. This is why we have the problems we do. Anyone who tries to pretend, without addressing these matters, without fixing these problems, that we are going to get anywhere is living in cloud-cuckoo-land. We are not going to get devolution restored, because unionists—not just the DUP—will not accept it. I respect greatly what the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, has said on the issue of delegated legislation and Henry VIII clauses. I understand all that and the noble Lord, Lord Bew, made that point. He talks about this draconian power to rip up Acts of Parliament and all the rest of it, but the protocol itself allows, in 300 areas, for EU law to rip up statute. It also provides for the addition of annexes to new EU legislation within the scope of the protocol, in addition to the 300 areas where we dynamically align. That can rip up Acts of Parliament.

So, I accept the problems that have been highlighted by some about giving Ministers sweeping powers, but we have to fix the problems that are there. We have to do it, acknowledging that if we do not, there is real damage being done to the Belfast agreement, as amended by the St Andrews agreement. That should be the priority. Articles 1 and 2 of the protocol make it clear that the Belfast agreement, as amended, is the key overriding objective. If people believe in that, then they should be prepared to consider carefully what we are saying, and they should therefore accept the rules of consent within the Northern Ireland Assembly itself. I look to the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, to uphold this. It is ironic, given the changes that were made by St Andrews, that somehow there is now a drawing away from that consent principle.

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[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

With respect, I will answer the noble Lord’s question first. We had a UK-wide referendum. Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom, as provided for under the Belfast agreement. The United Kingdom is the sovereign Government. Therefore, it is not that Northern Ireland is some kind of hybrid or special joint condominium with the Irish Republic, and it can go its own way if the rest of the United Kingdom is doing something else. It was a UK-wide referendum and, just as in Scotland, where people voted a different way, so in Northern Ireland—but we had to respect the outcome of the UK referendum.

[Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, for giving way. Further to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, would the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, accept that around 56% of the people of Northern Ireland voted to remain within the EU, and we did not give our consent to Brexit. While it may have been a UK vote, and the noble Lord and I will remember well the debates in the other place on this specific matter in terms of the post-referendum Bill and the arrangements thereof, would he accept that the 56% who voted to remain did not give their consent to Brexit and to leaving the European Union?

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

The 44% who voted to come out was a much higher figure than people had expected—but I accept what the noble Baroness says. But we are part of the United Kingdom and, just as Scotland and London and other parts of England voted in a certain way, we had to respect the overall vote. And if every single person in Northern Ireland had voted to remain—never forget—there would still have been a majority for Brexit and Northern Ireland would still have left the European Union, because we are part of the United Kingdom. The Belfast agreement did not create a hybrid situation in Northern Ireland. The sovereign UK Government are the responsible Government. We are United Kingdom citizens. Special arrangements were made for governance, but not for sovereignty, and that needs always to be borne in mind by those who try to conflate the two things. I think I have said enough on the specific detail.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Before the noble Lord sits down, I am grateful. I understand his arguments. It is not a question with regards to the result of the referendum. My question is in the context of having scrutinised many trade agreements and treaties, and the deficiencies in the CRaG process. I agree with the noble Lord that there are challenges when it comes to agreements made by the Executive under their prerogative power to negotiate, and then what ability do we have, even quasi-representatives in an unelected Chamber such as this, to raise issues? I get that entirely. But, if the Government secure agreement as a result of these talks, has the noble Lord given any thought to the mechanism for seeking consent for what the Government bring forward?

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

Well, there are a lot of “ifs” there. If I understand the noble Lord, he is asking, “If there’s an agreement, what should the Government do in terms of getting an endorsement of it?” I presume they would come to both Houses of Parliament and consult with the parties in Northern Ireland. As we learned from the original Brexit negotiations, the Government would be very wise to consult with the parties in Northern Ireland before any final arrangements are entered into.

I have a lot of sympathy with the view expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, that there is a lot of secrecy around the negotiations. Nobody is quite sure what is going on—technical talks, negotiations or whatever. However, I remember living through one particular week when the UK Government went off to Brussels and then came back again because they had not consulted properly. I would not like to see that happen again, because the whole objective here is to ensure that we can get arrangements which allow the devolved Government to get up and running again, with the support of nationalists and of unionists. So, before we came to any formal vote, I suspect that there would need to be quite considerable discussions and consultations with the parties in Northern Ireland.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I would expect that, too, and I think it is regrettable that we have got to where we are. I was one of those people in the other place who very regularly got up and asked Ministers about Northern Ireland and what the plan was, because there were obviously going to be these issues. There were other solutions; we could have had a customs union or some kind of single market arrangement that would have maybe dealt with this in a slightly different way. I remember talking to one of the noble Lord’s colleagues who said, “Well, we don’t mind what it is as long as we’re all treated the same within the United Kingdom”. Ministers cannot be surprised that we are still having these discussions now.

I want to talk a little bit about this issue of cross-community consent; I am just reflecting on the speech made by my noble friend Lady Ritchie on Monday. It seems clear that the intention of Ministers is to protect the Article 2 rights of individuals, the Article 3 common travel area and the north-south co-operation in Article 11. We have debated the protection of the rights of individuals before, but what we really need is some sort of assurance from the Government that those intentions are reflected throughout the Bill in a consistent and watertight way. So can the Minister confirm that there is no prohibition on the overriding of Article 18 of the protocol, which deals with cross-community consent? We have rightly heard a great deal about this issue, and I would like the Minister to address it to make sure that I have understood it correctly.

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[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, we will build up a fair canter with the next couple of groups because their principles are similar.

Part of the thrust of the argument is that we should be considering how we approach a new regime regarding Northern Ireland as we would for all other parts of the UK. The amendments in this group would do exactly that. They would adopt commitments provided by the Government in other legislation for the implementation of other agreements, including trade agreements, the operation of the single market and consideration of how that market will operate.

For example, Amendment 31 seeks that when the Government wish to operate the framework, they do so informed by the statutory bodies that Parliament has placed in legislation that would operate for all other parts of the UK single market. They should therefore, similarly, consult the Trade and Agriculture Commission, a statutory body tasked with looking at what Governments propose for the operation across the whole United Kingdom, and the Competition and Markets Authority, in relation to the operation of the UK internal market.

These have not been considered burdensome or lacking in timeliness, since these are all provisions in other pieces of legislation. If the thrust of the argument is that there should be consistency in operation for these, surely the Government would want to put in place the consultation of the statutory bodies to inform and advise, on the same statutory basis as in the other pieces of legislation. These amendments should not be too troublesome for the Minister to accept. I beg to move.

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, said, I hope we are speeding up a little. I will speak very briefly to Amendments 27 and 28 in this group, in his name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford.

In relation to consultation with various organisations —not statutory bodies—such as the chamber of commerce, the CBI, the Federation of Small Businesses, Trade NI, and, as mentioned in Amendment 28, the UFU, Food NI and the Northern Ireland Food and Drink Association, I wonder why those ones were chosen. If you are a member of Hospitality Ulster, you might be feeling a bit left out. If we are putting this in statute, why are certain groups put into statute and others left out?

Also, picking up on concerns raised earlier—I listened very carefully—proposed new subsection (3A)(e) talks about

“any other persons whom the Minister considers appropriate as representatives of business, trade and economic interests”.

The Government could be consulting for a very long time. Is the noble Lord not concerned that that could give a very open-ended power to the Minister, and would maybe provide him with too much discretion? I am very concerned about anything given to Ministers that allows them an open-ended process. Surely that would be of concern. I agree with the necessity of consultation with bodies such as this, and statutory bodies and so on, but I do not think it is necessary to put it in statute.

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[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I have a 25-minute speech on VAT and tax, but I might just summarise it for the benefit of the Committee. Again, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has highlighted an inappropriately wide delegation of power. Here, it is on what would genuinely be an extremely controversial and sensitive issue of tax powers, excise and tax policy. The Government have said it is “not possible” to make such provisions in the Bill. I am just testing why it is not possible to state what a framework would be for provision of taxes, VAT and excise duties.

Everywhere else, what the framework would be is in the Bill—and for good reason. People need to know what the tax powers are and who holds them, and of course it is of controversy that the protocol has these linked elements. So I am simply seeking for the Government to fill in the gaps, state in clear terms why it is not possible and give a bit more information about what they consider to be their proposed framework when they move away from the protocol in these areas. This is the first attempt to get some more information from the Government—because the memorandum was not clear—in order for us to consider it, review it and perhaps return to this issue.

I would be happy for the Minister to write to me on my final point, rather than answer at this stage, because it is genuinely a probing question. Noble Lords may well recall that there had been successful attempts to amend the cross-border trade Act in Section 54, which is the prohibition on the collection of certain taxes or duties on behalf of country or territory without reciprocity. That includes in Section 54(2) that it shall be unlawful for HMRC to account for any duty or customs or VAT or excise duty collected by HMRC to the Government of the country outside the United Kingdom unless reciprocal.

The Government seem to be proposing a breach of Section 54, because the regime that they seem to be proposing is that we would be accounting to the European Union for taxes which we have set ourselves. I am happy to be contradicted about that and similarly happy if the Minister wishes to write on that point. I beg to move.

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 35A in my name on VAT and excise. I do not wish to prolong the debate at this hour. Very briefly, noble Lords will remember back in March when the then Chancellor Rishi Sunak announced measures in the fiscal event—mini-budget, estimate, whatever it was—that there was a zero VAT cut for households installing energy-efficiency measures, which would apply throughout Great Britain, but not to installation in homes in Northern Ireland of materials such as solar panels, insulation or heat pumps.

Consumers in Northern Ireland could not benefit from that VAT cut because of the protocol. Something that was warmly welcomed across the rest of the United Kingdom provoked concern and outrage across the communities in Northern Ireland. Mr Sunak announced that there would be extra money provided by way of Barnett consequentials to make up for it, but, as people with experience of the operation of the Executive know, sometimes the direct tax cut is the most effective and efficient way of getting these things done.

I have tabled this amendment to explore and seek the Government’s reasoning on their approach to the VAT issue. They have not gone down the route that they have in relation to state aid in Clause 12 of excluding Article 10 and annexes 5 and 6 of the protocol. They have not decided to exclude the relevant article of the protocol which applies the VAT rules. Instead, they have adopted the approach of saying there are large areas where we simply disapply that article and we can make provision by regulations in relation to the VAT excise duties and other taxes.

It is more akin to the situation that we find ourselves in with the protocol itself in relation to customs: Northern Ireland is nominally within the UK customs regime, but all the rules of the EU apply. What is the impact of the Government taking this approach in relation to VAT? Why are they not taking the same kind of approach to VAT as they have to state aid? What are the implications? It says clearly in the subsections what steps can be taken in relation to differences in VAT and making sure that the situation that we saw in March may not arise in the future, but what are the implications of not taking out the relevant article in the protocol completely?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I was wondering pretty much the same thing. This is a slightly odd clause, because it says a lot but actually leaves the door open to not doing anything at all. It gives Ministers the right to change

“any other tax (including imposing or varying the incidence of any tax), which they consider appropriate”.

That is fine, but they might not consider anything appropriate and might not do anything.

Subsection (2) says:

“The regulations may, in particular, make any provision”


to bring closer together, or reduce differences between, various taxes in Northern Ireland and Great Britain. I am sure that that is how the Government want to signal their intention, but the Bill does not do that—it leaves it open to Ministers to do nothing at all, or even to create greater variance in the situation. So I was curious about why the Bill says that, rather than saying, “We will make the situation in Northern Ireland the same as it is in the rest of the UK, notwithstanding the various revenue-raising powers that there are in devolved Administrations.”

Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Lord Dodds of Duncairn Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 7th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Empey (UUP)]

The noble Lord is correct. I agree that history tells us that a vacuum will be filled, and it will not be filled by people who are committed to the democratic process. That is well established. There is no legitimacy for joint authority. The manifesto of the Government was clear in 2019 that it was explicitly excluded, although it was interesting that at this weekend’s Sinn Féin conference, its plan B was specifically aimed at some form of jointery. That is why I say we can see where the road is leading us.

I come back to the Minister and ask him to prevail on his colleagues to open the door to the people of Northern Ireland and the elected Members, so that they can participate in the process of negotiations; they will not be sitting in the front row, but they can be in the room, they can be advising Ministers, they can be contributing and they can feed that back to their supporters. It will have a calming effect if they can see that, and if the people who have to implement the thing on the ground are part of the solution. Surely that makes common sense. What is the point of having devolution if the people who have responsibility for delivering parts of this are not even at the table?

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

My Lords, we have ranged once again, in a debate on one of the amendments, far and wide across the whole gamut of the protocol Bill and the protocol itself. In that context, I want to follow up on the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, who talked about the state of the negotiations, the technical talks, the discussions, the conversations or whatever they may be. As he rightly said, we are not au fait with the detail, and those of us whom the noble Lord, Lord Empey, referenced who deal with politics in Northern Ireland and represent people in Northern Ireland are not privy to the details either.

I think that it is correct, as the noble Lord, Lord Kerr said, that there appears to be no difference in the negotiating mandate of Commissioner Vice-President Šefčovič so far as the EU side of the negotiations is concerned. Indeed, that has been confirmed to me and, I am sure, to other noble Lords informally by people who are closer to the talks than many of us are. Of course, the Government’s position has been set out in the Command Paper, published in July 2021, and in the Bill, but so long as the negotiating mandate of the European Union negotiator is not changed, there can be little prospect for any positive outcome from the discussions, certainly not in the short term.

We can all agree that we need to solve this problem, and there are only two ways that it can be solved. It is either by negotiation or by action on the part of His Majesty’s Government. The danger of saying, “We’re not going to get anywhere in the discussions and we should pull or pause the Bill” is in what happens in Northern Ireland. What happens to the Belfast agreement as amended by the St Andrews agreement? What happens to the institutions? I have heard very little reference thus far from noble Lords who do not have a direct connection with Northern Ireland about the implications on the political and peace process in Northern Ireland.

The longer we do not have any outcome from negotiations, and if nothing is happening on the Government’s side on legislation, then the institutions will not be reformed, because there is not the basis for power sharing, when you have trashed one of the main strands of the agreement—strand 3, the east-west dimension—and when you have undermined the Northern Ireland Assembly through the removal of the cross-community consent principle. We have to address these matters.

While people may focus on what the outcome may be in terms of the withdrawal agreement and the trade and co-operation agreement—I entirely understand that—we also have to examine the implications on the Belfast agreement, on the St Andrews agreement, and on the peace and political process in Northern Ireland, which is in a very fragile state. The noble Lord, Lord Kilclooney, highlighted a recent example of where these things can go.

I urge your Lordships to examine and bear in mind the implications, if we do not get a negotiated outcome which is satisfactory. I share the analysis of noble Lord, Lord Kerr, that it does not look as if that is going to happen—certainly any time soon—and if we at the same time do not proceed with the Bill, where on earth does that leave the political process in Northern Ireland? It leaves it in a continuing state of limbo, which we have all agreed can be filled only by dangerous people—men of violence. We need to address these matters urgently.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

May I clarify something? My position is that there will be no progress with these talks until there is the involvement of high-level politicians from this country. I remember in the 1990s the attempt to move Congress from its support of the wrong side—in the British Government’s view—in Northern Ireland. I was ambassador and made a certain amount of progress, but the real progress was made only when Prime Minister Major and the then Minister of State, now the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, took an active involvement in helping me to see the people one had to convince on the Hill. We need the involvement of senior British Ministers. I strongly agree with the noble Lord, Lord Empey, that we need the involvement of people from Northern Ireland. This must not be an agreement, if one is achieved, that is imposed on Northern Ireland. It has to be one that is owned by Northern Ireland.

However, my view is that there is no chance of persuading the Council of the European Union that it should modify Mr Šefčovič’s mandate while technical talks are going nowhere and there are no signs of any movement, or even active involvement, by the highest levels of the British political establishment. I do not mean that I think the talks are bound to fail; I mean that, at present, they are not succeeding.

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[Lord Cormack (Con)]

My Lords, like the noble Baroness, I hope to be able to be present for the unveiling of the portrait of the late John Hume. It is a pity that our recently departed colleague Lord Trimble is not able to be there for that extraordinary occasion.

It seems to me that what the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, said was wholly in tune with what the noble Lord, Lord Empey, said earlier in our debates: how important it is to involve the politicians in Northern Ireland. It is also important to do something else, which was touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, in his speech just half an hour ago. I am very glad that the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, is in the Chamber at the moment, because the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, talked about the crucial importance of involvement at the highest possible level. We would never have had any agreement without John Major and Albert Reynolds, built upon by Sir Tony Blair, the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, and others. It is very important indeed.

No one appreciates more than I do, I hope, the tremendous tasks facing our new Prime Minister, and I wish him every possible success. However, as soon as it is possible, he should involve himself. He should go over to Belfast and meet the Northern Ireland politicians, the Taoiseach and others, because there has to be involvement at the highest level. The success of such talks would be increased if this wretched Bill were at the very least paused.

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

My Lords, I want to make a brief comment on Amendment 40, which is about approval by a resolution of the Northern Ireland Assembly. In support of this amendment, it has been stated that adherence to the spirit and intention of the Belfast agreement is vital. But if we are to be faithful to that agreement as amended by the St Andrews agreement, and to its spirit and intention, then the amendment is defective in that it does not include cross-community consent. Is this a resolution by cross-community consent?

The point that I have made—and as other noble Lords who are aware of the details of the Belfast agreement will know—is that every major decision in the Northern Ireland Assembly is made on a cross-community consent basis. That means a majority of nationalists, a majority of designated unionists and a majority overall. Anything that is not specifically a cross-community vote is capable of being turned into one by a petition of concern. If you are using the argument that you are defending the Belfast agreement, as amended, then why is the cross-community element of resolutions in the Northern Ireland Assembly left out? Why is that the case? Why is it not required to have the support of unionists and nationalists? That is the basis on which the Belfast agreement was written.

My second point is about the involvement of Northern Ireland parties. I have a lot of sympathy there, but it is worth bearing in mind that in the run-up, between 2018 and 2020, when we had all the discussions about the backstop and negotiations overall, the Irish Government made it clear on a number of occasions to us that they did not wish to have any engagement directly with political parties in Northern Ireland on the issue of Brexit. They did not see a role. Nor did Michel Barnier see any role for the political parties in Northern Ireland; I put that point to him directly in his office in Brussels.

Lest we move to the position that the British Government have prevented this or not done enough, I say that the Irish Government and the Brussels Commission were very clear: “This is a matter on which the EU is represented by Monsieur Barnier. He speaks for the EU.” Leo Varadkar was very clear when we met him in Belfast and urged him to encourage a more imaginative approach that would involve the Northern Ireland political parties and the Irish Government talking directly to political parties about Brexit—and the UK Government, of course. That was rejected: “No, Michel Barnier speaks for the EU. It is between Her Majesty’s Government”, as it then was, “and the EU. There is no role for anyone else.” That was spelled out explicitly.

While I have a lot of sympathy with the proposition, this is not as straightforward as it would appear. I think some of the problems we have seen might well have been made easier to resolve had there been more flexibility on the part of the EU and the Irish Government, but it needs to be put on record that it was and, as far as I understand it, remains, the position both of the Dublin Government and Brussels. It would be very interesting to see whether Leo Varadkar maintains that position when he takes over as Taoiseach in a few weeks’ time. It would be worth exploring that with the Irish Government, because the portrayal that this has been a one-sided exclusion is not accurate.

[Lord Murphy of Torfaen (Lab)]

My Lords, I did not intend to come in at this stage—there are further amendments later that I am interested in making a contribution to—but I agree with an awful lot of what the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, has said. Over the last year or two, I have been complaining that the real difficulty in this negotiation, if that is the right word to use for it—and I do not think that it is, by the way—lies in the way the protocol was born. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the protocol, or of the Bill—and I think there is an awful lot wrong with it—I am not at all convinced it is doing what it set out to do: in fact, it has failed to do that, because the DUP has not moved considerably because of the nature of the Bill. One reason is that the negotiations have been almost exclusively between the European Union on one hand and the British Government on the other, as the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, said. That is a fundamental problem.

I understand why the Irish Government feel that way. They are part of the European Union; the European Union negotiates on their behalf. I thought it would be a good idea if that were reversed: the Irish Government could have negotiated on behalf of the European Union because, as we have heard a number of times this evening, the issues we are dealing with reflect two international agreements. The first and overriding one is the Good Friday agreement. That is an international agreement lodged at the United Nations and it overrides everything, so far as we can see, with regard to the future of Northern Ireland. How on earth can officials from the European Union understand the issues facing Northern Ireland in the way that the Irish Government could?

That reflects too, of course, on how you involve the Northern Ireland parties. If anybody thinks that this whole issue is going to be resolved in Brussels, that is for the birds. The issue is to be resolved in Belfast: that is where the impasse is. The impasse is: why have we not got the institutions of the Good Friday agreement up and running? It is simple. It is because people have not talked to each other. There have not been proper negotiations.

I spent five years of my life negotiating in Northern Ireland so I know how intense those negotiations have to be. There were negotiations involving the European Union at some stage, but nothing like the negotiations between, on the one hand, the two Governments—the British Government and the Irish Government—and, critically, the Northern Ireland political parties on the other. In the end, they will have to decide this.

One of the great tragedies of all this—it was not the fault of the DUP; it was the fault of Sinn Féin, in this case—is that the Assembly and the Executive were brought down over the then Irish language Bill. The result was that there was no proper Executive comprised of the parties in Northern Ireland, who could have discussed all the issues we have been discussing for the past three weeks. Had there been a proper Executive and Assembly up and running, we would not—I hope—be here in the way we are. I have a lot of sympathy for what the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, said.

I still hope that, over the next few months, the Irish Government can discuss meaningfully with the British Government. I particularly hope that there are proper, meaningful negotiations involving the political parties in Northern Ireland. By that, I mean negotiations; I do not mean going to Belfast for a couple of hours, meeting the political leaders, and then coming back again. That is not going to work. You have to get people around a table. You have to involve all the political parties in Northern Ireland. You have to do the things that we have done over the past 10 or 20 years to achieve a real, lasting solution to this issue. What we are doing now is a sham. It will not solve anything at all. The only way we can do it is through negotiations that involve the Governments and the political parties in Northern Ireland.

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[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, I wish to add for a moment or two to what has been some pretty powerful gunfire from those who are eminently qualified in making the serious submissions they have made.

My attention has been caught by Clause 22(6), which seeks to interfere, one might say, with devolved authorities. Looking at my friend, the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, it occurred to me that, were he part of a devolved authority in Northern Ireland and there was the exercise of a power under subsection (6), he would take pretty short shrift with it, I am sure.

To introduce perhaps a rather vulgar political point, we in Scotland are concerned constantly with the movement towards independence. Part of that movement is, often by fiction, offered to the potential electors in a referendum on the basis that Westminster wants to interfere with Scotland. It seems to me that subsection (6) might provide rather more substantial evidence of an intention of that kind.

I know that there are honourable men sitting on the Government Front Bench, but do they really believe in their hearts that it is right to urge upon this Committee the contents of this particular subsection? Surely they must realise that it is inimical to every principle upon which Parliament is founded and this House operates. If I may be forgiven for my impropriety, it is time for the Front Bench to fess up.

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord. I take the point that he made about Clause 22(6). As a Member of the Northern Ireland Assembly for many years, I know how much Members of the Assembly value their right to make laws in the areas that are devolved to it. However, I must say gently to your Lordships that, in recent times, there have been a number of examples of this House and the other place interfering in the devolved settlement in Northern Ireland. Although some of us have pointed that out, it has been with your Lordships’ positive assent and approval that the overriding of the devolved settlement in Northern Ireland has taken place in a number of areas. I would like to see a consistent approach to the devolved settlement in Northern Ireland, not this pick-and-choose approach where something being okay appears to depend on the issue of the day but, if you do not like what the Assembly has done, you can interfere—as seems to have happened on a number of recent occasions in this Parliament.

I want to highlight Clause 22(3). On the face of it, it appears—I am open to correction by those who are much more learned and have more legal expertise in these matters than me—to put some kind of restriction on the wide Henry VIII powers that are given under this particular clause. The one thing that it is apparently not possible for regulations under the Bill to do is

“create or facilitate border arrangements between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland which feature at the border … physical infrastructure (including border posts), or … checks and controls, which did not exist before exit day.”

Having listened to the debate, I think that may well be able to be swept aside at any point. However, why is emphasis put on the one thing that is mentioned? I look to the Government Front Bench as to why it is mentioned, given that it really has no effect. Of course, we do not want any extra infrastructure at the border between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic and it has never been the desire or wish of anyone in the Northern Ireland political parties, or the Irish Government, the British Government or the EU, to have such infrastructure. But it would be quite helpful and an acknowledgement of unionist concerns if there were a similar provision which acknowledged—under strand 2, the north-south approach in the Belfast agreement and the importance of that relationship, but also strand 3, the east-west dimension—that regulations may not create or facilitate border arrangements between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom.

[Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)]

I am following the noble Lord closely on this point. Does he realise that today Maroš Šefčovič talked about the need for fewer border checks and, in fact, that they could be invisible on the Irish Sea border. Does the noble Lord agree that if they can be invisible on the Irish Sea border, they can be invisible at the frontier, where of course checks should happen between one country and another independent country?

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

Of course. It appears that things may have moved on, because once all these ideas were dismissed as completely fanciful. Indeed, “unicorns” were brought into play and all sorts of dismissive language was used. I am glad that now there is at least an acknowledgement that some of these checks can be done in the way that the noble Baroness has described Maroš Šefčovič as talking about.

The important point here is that we have been told throughout the Brexit process that there cannot be a single check or single piece of infrastructure on the Irish border because otherwise that will lead to violence—it will be attacked and that will undermine the Belfast agreement—without anyone, hardly, making the obvious point that, if that is unacceptable north-south, then it is doubly unacceptable between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom. What does that say to the unionist population?

One of the reasons we have the alienation of people in Northern Ireland is the one-sided approach and interpretation of the Belfast agreement. I would just like an explanation. Whatever its actual import or ability to be enforced, or the fact that it can be superseded by a ministerial direction, why do the Government highlight that issue and not the fact that the reason why we have such a problem in Northern Ireland with the political institutions is that we have this similar kind of infrastructure and checks between one part of the United Kingdom and the other?

On the point that has been raised very powerfully by noble Lords on the legal issue, I fully understand why they take the position they do and, as has been said, it has been raised in relation to other Bills and Acts. I would love to see the same outrage and anger expressed more widely; it may well have been during the passage of the then Bill, before my time in your Lordships’ House.

You can imagine therefore that if there is such outrage about powers being given by Parliament to the Executive and UK Ministers, how citizens of Northern Ireland—British citizens, fully part of the United Kingdom—feel about powers being not just taken from Parliament and given to Ministers but given to foreign officials of the European Commission to propose law. They are totally unaccountable to anyone in the United Kingdom. They do not have to answer to anyone or answer any questions. There is no parliamentary process whatever within the United Kingdom that can even challenge the directives and regulations that cover 300 areas of law affecting the economy of Northern Ireland. Therefore, while accepting entirely the points made about delegated legislation and Henry VIII powers, I would like to see reflected some of the same concerns about how we in Northern Ireland feel about the way that laws are now made by a foreign polity in its own interest. It is not in our interest; it is made in its own interest.

The Bill is part of an effort to try to remedy that problem. People have said we will have negotiations. But given that we have already had communicated to us that the EU is not open at this stage to changing the mandate of its main negotiator, certainly, how else are we going to get to a situation where that outrageous situation in Northern Ireland is remedied?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I thank—I think—all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. There were some highlights. I have to go home and explain to Lady Ahmad that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, dreamt about me over the weekend. That is a moment to ponder and reflect on, as any good Minister would, from the Dispatch Box.

Like the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, I have the opportunity to travel, although I was asked today as I came into your Lordships’ House, “Tariq, why aren’t you in Sharm el-Sheikh?”. I said three words—“Northern Ireland protocol”—which put that colleague in their place. I heard what the noble Lord said about international law and the rule of law. Notwithstanding the challenges, it is right that we have this level of scrutiny. I listened very carefully to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and I agree with her. We are all talking about time in Parliament, et cetera. The other day, I was informed that I am now second only to the noble Earl, Lord Howe, in term of my time on the Front Bench. Let us watch that space as well. With the nature of reshuffles, you never know what will happen when.

In all seriousness, we have a lot of respect internationally. That is why, in successive elections in the ICC, three major positions have been held by the UK. Again, in the ILC, a successful campaign was run. I feel very strongly that, irrespective of the nature of the discussions we are having, the United Kingdom has a very strong reputation internationally and I, for one, am very proud to be not just a British parliamentarian but a British Minister representing these interests abroad.

I come to the specifics now, the nitty-gritty of the amendments themselves. I first say again that on the issue of the Henry VIII clause—specifically on this clause, but more generally across the Bill—of course the Government are listening very carefully to the contributions being made. We have had legislation in the past where we have equally had this level of scrutiny. It is a reflection of our democracy that it allows us to have these challenges to the Government.

I turn to Amendment 44. The Bill provides specific powers to make new law in certain areas, as noble Lords have pointed out, including where we are disapplying the EU regime in domestic law and where such laws are required to make our new regime work. To give effect to the new regime set out in the Bill, amendments to domestic legislation may be required, including Acts of Parliament where appropriate.

Moreover, certain sectors in Great Britain are currently also regulated by retained EU regulations which have protected status under Section 7 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 and cannot be modified except by an Act of Parliament or certain specified subordinate legislation. An example is retained EU regulation 2016/425, which currently regulates personal protective equipment in Great Britain. It may be appropriate to amend such legislation for the purposes of the dual regulatory regime to ensure that the UK regime applies appropriately also to all of the UK and appropriately to Northern Ireland.

We recognise, of course—and I have heard it again today—the seriousness of amending legislation, and also proposing new legislation. The noble and learned Baroness pointed to legislation already passed, where Henry VIII clauses have been included. I will not challenge the fact we have had quite challenging discussions in this respect as well, but Parliament has already considered and put on the statute book these particular issues of amending legislation. While it might be somewhat of a small recognition of the powers, these particular powers to amend Acts of Parliament will be subject to the affirmative procedure, allowing Parliament to scrutinise and review any changes to existing legislation, even where these changes are consequential, or technical. I recognise, of course, the depth of the challenge that has been put to the Government and, in all respects, respect the seriousness of the contributions that have been made.

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[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

I shall of course cover the specific point the noble Lord has highlighted, as well. I appreciate that it is for the Government to make the case on the specific provision contained in the Bill to ensure that we can, as far as possible, satisfy the issues and the questions being raised.

Clause 22 sets out the general scope and nature of the powers contained in the Bill. This will ensure the powers have the appropriate scope to implement the aims of the Bill. The clause sets out that regulations made under the defined purpose of the powers in this Bill can make any provision—this was a point noble Lords made—for that purpose that could be made by an Act of Parliament. This includes amending the Bill, as the noble Lord has just pointed out, or making retrospective provision.

As the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, said, the clause confirms that regulations under this Bill may not create or facilitate border arrangements between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland that feature, at the border, either physical infrastructure or checks and controls that did not exist before exit day.

Subsection (6) provides that a Minister can facilitate other powers under this Bill to be exercisable exclusively, concurrently or jointly with devolved Administrations. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, raised a specific point just now, which does require clarification on two elements within the clause. I will make sure that they are covered.

A concern was raised about the ability of the Government to work with the devolved Administrations. As I said on an earlier group, the former Foreign Secretary wrote to the devolved Administrations and we are engaging with them on the implementation and provisions of this Bill. It is the Government’s view that these new powers are necessary to make the regime work smoothly and to provide certainty to businesses.

While recommending in Committee that this clause stand part of the Bill, I recognise that, while we share moments of humour in Committee, it is right that these detailed concerns were tabled in the way they were. This allows the Government—

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

I am very grateful to the Minister before he sits down. He sort of glossed over Clause 22(3) by, in effect, reading out what it says. But I respectfully seek an explanation of why that subsection has been inserted when there is no similar provision on checks and infrastructure between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom.

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We must not forget that the wrecking ball in all of this was Brexit, out of which was born the backstop, to be replaced by Johnson’s protocol. That is why we have arrived at this point—so many things have been undermined by that tsunami of Brexit. That is very unfortunate, because it is has impacted on the island of Ireland in terms of our political relations and our economic stability. It is time that we got back to brass tacks and went down the road of a negotiated settlement in respect of the protocol that involves everyone—but particularly the Members of the Assembly—to address the issue of the democratic deficit.

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick. I have just a couple of small points before dealing with some of the wider issues raised by the amendments tabled in this group.

First, on the negotiations, I do not disagree with the involvement of Northern Ireland parties, as I said previously. It was suggested earlier—I think by the noble Lord, Lord Empey, who I regret is not in his place at the moment—that it did not matter what the EU thought as long as the British Government involved the Northern Ireland parties, but we are not talking about consultations; we are talking about negotiations. I think the noble Lord, Lord Murphy of Torfaen, put his finger on it: it is about getting people around the table. If you are going to negotiate, you need the EU and the Irish Government to be on board. The fact is that, regrettably, they have not changed their position from their previous utterances, where they said that this is entirely a matter for the EU, not for regional parties or any individual member state Government; they have said it is for the European Commission, negotiating under the mandate given to it by the Council of Ministers.

My second point is on the issue that the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, raised about the joint First Minister nomination, which was also raised on the previous set of amendments. It should be remembered that the Saint Andrews agreement took place towards the end of the 2000s, in an effort to restore devolution after years in which it had been brought down—again, by Sinn Féin, given the fact that it was out murdering people in the streets, and had not decommissioned its weapons, despite promises that it would do so. There was the famous quote by the late Lord Trimble, who said, “We have jumped, now it is your turn.” Of course, Sinn Féin never did reciprocate. As a result, we had the Northern Bank robbery, and the institutions were down for three or four years. They were eventually restored as the result of Saint Andrews, and that was a cross-community agreement which made the arrangements in relation to the nomination of First and Deputy First Minister. That was the result of a cross-community agreement, so the idea that that is contrary to the principle is simply wrong.

I fully endorse what the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, said about her amendment. It is an important amendment which deals with an issue that has caused considerable concern and anxiety in Northern Ireland, which is the fact that thus far the courts have ruled that Northern Ireland’s constitutional position, Article 6 of the Act of Union, has been subjugated by the Northern Ireland protocol. That is a legal ruling. If we are paying such close scrutiny to the legal technicalities, the legal position set out in the Bill and all its intricacies—which is perfectly proper—we cannot then simply dismiss the ruling of the courts in relation to the Act of Union as neither here nor there. This is an important matter for unionists. It is the foundational constitutional document of Northern Ireland’s place within the United Kingdom, so this is no small matter. It is something that is being challenged by unionist political leaders right across the board, and it is therefore important that it is addressed.

That is why the Belfast agreement, as amended by St Andrews, is in some considerable difficulty, because the protocol has this effect on our constitutional position. The fact is that we have another series of amendments, tabled in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Ritchie and Lady Suttie, about “consent of the Northern Ireland Assembly”, which does not include the cross-community element—the cross-community vote. Again, this says to unionists that, while some are prepared to defend and speak up for the Belfast agreement, and say that this is all about protecting it, when it suits them they just change it. The Belfast agreement provides for votes like this on a cross-community basis, yet time and time again we see things being tabled in this House which undermine the agreement. We are told that we should respect the agreement and its spirit, yet here we have amendments that go against what is in the Belfast agreement—never mind the issues about the east-west relationship and strand three of the agreement, which are trashed by the protocol, and the removal of the democratic consent mechanism for the protocol itself, which means that the Assembly had absolutely no say at all before the protocol was introduced. So we are in a very difficult situation.

There is no doubt that unionists have lost a large degree of confidence in the institutions of the Belfast agreement. On what was agreed in 1998, many of us opposed those elements which released unrepentant murderers back on to the streets of Northern Ireland after serving only two years for some of the most heinous crimes imaginable of murder and depravity—people from both sides of the community were allowed to walk free from jail. The Royal Ulster Constabulary was consigned to history, and there were all sorts of issues about Sinn Féin being admitted into government while the Provisional IRA was still murdering people in the streets, as I said, and were still fully armed. Those of us who opposed these things were told, “You’ve got to accept all these things in the name of peace.” Many people did accept them; there was a referendum, it was passed, and the institutions were set up. But unionists had to accept into government people who parties here in Westminster—and, ironically, the parties Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil in the Irish Republic—would not accept into coalition with them. Northern Ireland is lectured all the time about democracy and accepting Sinn Féin into government—and we have accepted Sinn Féin into government, as per the votes of the people who gave them votes and demanded a coalition arrangement. However, the same people who lecture unionists refuse to have anything to do with them in terms of a coalition in the Irish Republic—and I imagine that neither the Labour Party nor the Conservative Party would admit them into a Government here.

We are seeing that the basis of the settlement in 1998 is now continually undermined. The principle of consent has been breached as a result of this protocol. We now have increasing clamour, including recently from the Irish Taoiseach, about changing the rules of the Belfast agreement and how the Assembly should operate. Indeed, I understand that the Taoiseach went so far as to say that it was a matter for the Irish Government, the British Government and the parties. I am sorry, but strand one is a matter for Northern Ireland parties and the UK Government; it is not a matter for the Irish Government. They are entitled to be involved in strand two and strand three issues, but not the internal government of Northern Ireland. This is causing real concern among unionists. We are in a dangerous situation, and not just because of the protocol but because we are seeing that the Belfast agreement is now going to be completely undermined if some people get their way. Majority rule, which, as we have heard, has not happened and has not been the case in Northern Ireland since the early 1970s, is something which has been railed against for over 100 years. However, as a result of boundary changes and the rest, as soon we have a non-unionist majority in the Assembly—it is not a nationalist majority; unionists are still the biggest designation—and because that now does not suit Sinn Féin, the SDLP or even the Alliance Party, some say, “Let’s change the rules.” If unionists had been suggesting such a thing in the late 1990s, during the 2000s or up until 2019, we would have been howled down as being in breach of the very fundamental principles of the Belfast agreement.

The more talk there is of that; the more talk there is about joint authority in the event of no devolution—something that, again, is entirely contrary to the Belfast agreement—the more talk there is about the protocol being rigorously implemented or not changing the protocol in the way it needs to be changed to get unionist consent; the more we are in danger of seeing the restoration of the Assembly and the institutions of the Belfast agreement receding further and further into the distance. That is the reality. We do not want that to happen. We need to get a grip. The more delay there is, either in negotiations or in the UK Government taking the action needed to restore unionist faith in the political process in Northern Ireland, the longer the institutions will be down. This Government cannot have a situation in which Northern Ireland is left in limbo, where no decisions are taken by anybody, where there are no Ministers and where civil servants do not even have the powers they had the last time. We need Northern Ireland to be governed. The UK Government, who have sovereign responsibility under the Belfast agreement and their constitutional responsibilities, need to take responsibility and act for the good government of Northern Ireland.

[Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)]

My Lords, I shall add a few remarks. The constitutional position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom is a very important issue for many people in Northern Ireland, and certainly for the unionist population. There is no doubt whatever that the protocol is undermining and has undermined Northern Ireland’s position. I believe it is a vehicle to continue to undermine the position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom. The protocol has brought a profound constitutional change to the very heart of the United Kingdom, because the courts have now ruled that the meaning of the Act of Union, the foundation of the union, has been changed by the protocol, courtesy of it being given direct effect in UK law through the withdrawal agreement Act, with the effect that this subjugates the meaning of Article VI of the Act of Union to the protocol.

I was asked this afternoon how many years I had been in public life in Northern Ireland. It is hard to believe, but in May next year, it will be 50 years: 37 years in the council, 25 years in the other House as a Member of Parliament, 16 years in the Northern Ireland Assembly—and so it goes on. And then in this place here. Now, over the years, I have seen and witnessed, sadly, Northern Ireland’s position being pushed on to the ledge of the union, as it were—pushed to the side. Our position in the United Kingdom has been undermined.

I have to say to your Lordships’ House that the unionist people are very suspicious of both Front Benches, and indeed other parties in this House. When it comes to defending positions, Dublin will defend the nationalist and republican position, but who will defend the unionist position? You would expect the United Kingdom Government to do that, but it is sad to say that successive Governments have not been very good at it. As my noble friend Lord Dodds mentioned a moment ago, certainly strands 2 and 3 give Dublin the right to have a say. But when it comes to strand 1—last week we had the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in conference with the Foreign Minister of the Irish Republic to talk about whether there should be a poll in Northern Ireland and an election for the Northern Ireland Assembly. Those are the internal affairs of Northern Ireland, yet the basis of the Belfast agreement was that Dublin has no right to a say on such matters. That once again makes people suspicious.

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[Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I want to make it very clear to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, that I love listening to him speak and I have no aspersions against him whatever. I was just pleased that perhaps he felt that my amendment was worth considering enough to not contribute.

On this, I know it is extremely difficult for the Minister to do so, but could he give us some idea of how long he visualises—he is smiling, so I think he knows what I am going to ask—the negotiations going on before someone actually says that this is not going to work? One of the reasons I am very keen to get this Bill through as quickly as possible is so that we have it there as a safeguard. It would be helpful to know if there are any discussions going on behind the scenes on timing and just how long we can keep negotiating if we are not getting anywhere.

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

My Lords, I commend the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, because I think I heard him say earlier that he returned from Buenos Aires this morning and then went straight into this debate on the Northern Ireland protocol. It is very appropriate that he is the proposer of the last two amendments. I commend him on his stamina. I agree with the idea that regulations should be published as quickly as possible.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have participated in this brief debate. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, for combining the last two groups, which means that I cannot actually say I did 13 groups in total today. I am really grateful for the contributions that have been made.

To pick up the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, about the time of negotiations, I would put my career as a Minister—and indeed that of any negotiator—on the line if I were to determine the length of negotiations. As I said, I have shared as much as I can. I have heard the desire to know more and I fully recognise that; if I were sitting anywhere else in the House but in this position, I would be pushing in the same manner for more details of the discussions and negotiations. I am pressing colleagues across the Government to see how much more we can share about discussions taking place both in Northern Ireland and, importantly, within the EU.