Northern Ireland Protocol Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Altmann
Main Page: Baroness Altmann (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Altmann's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(2 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I congratulate the noble Baronesses, Lady Suttie and Lady Ritchie, on their amendment. I associate myself with the remarks about the democratic deficit problems that have arisen in Northern Ireland as a result of Brexit. Many of us in this House have always believed that a hard Brexit was incompatible with the Good Friday agreement. However, the Government assured the people of Northern Ireland and this Parliament that the Northern Ireland protocol was the answer to ensuring that Brexit would work with the Good Friday agreement. It clearly imposed a border between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as the impact assessment explained. The problems that have arisen do not seem due to the intransigence of the EU; they are inherent in the protocol.
Brexit is yet another example of how, for so long—decades and decades—Britain has imposed things on the people of Northern Ireland and, as the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, said, done things to Northern Ireland, rather than working with the people there. But that is not a reason for our Government, shortly after signing the protocol, to say, “We don’t like it. We don’t like ECJ oversight or the EU deciding what it considers a risk to its single market. We must do that”, and then expecting the EU simply to accept that, in contravention of our signature on an agreement and of what was promised to the people of Northern Ireland.
Clearly, there is an issue. I hope my noble friend can explain how removing ECJ oversight and allowing the UK Government to assess risks to the single market will make hard Brexit work for all of the parties in Northern Ireland, not just the DUP.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, made a powerful—emotional, to some extent—speech last week and it certainly resonated with me. To a large extent, that has been reflected in the contributions so far, acknowledging that things have been done to Northern Ireland. Of course, when we consider what was done to Northern Ireland in relation to this protocol, it is right to remember that the then Prime Minister went to the DUP party conference and assured it that it was “oven ready”. In an aside, he also said, “Don’t worry about the paperwork”. Perhaps the DUP was overconfident in relying upon the word of the former Prime Minister: what has happened since has exploded the idea that what was in the protocol would somehow cover all circumstances.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, referred to the most helpful Library briefing, which says on page 50 that Article 16 is a “safeguard” mechanism. Are we looking for safeguards? Yes, of course we are. It allows either party to take temporary
“measures if the application of the Protocol leads to serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties that are liable to persist”.
On the attitude being taken by the DUP, what better definition can we have than this expression that embraces its concerns—almost exactly and in detail? It goes on to say that the “diversion of trade” is an issue that would justify reference to Article 16.
It seems that Article 16 has been rejected by the Government. I have never really heard a proper argument for why that should be the case. I will put it this way: if Article 16 does not cover what we are about today, when will it ever be of any relevance? This question would give an answer, though perhaps not one that would suit the DUP in every respect. Should Article 16 be invoked, an answer to this question would go a long way to helping those—including me—concerned about anything that might have the effect of undermining the Belfast agreement.
I think we will have a discussion later this week in this House about trade arrangements, so I will repeat a point I made in the last debate: the trade arrangements that were held in front of all our noses were those to be made with the United States. They were going to remedy any difficulties or subtractions that we might experience if we left the European Union. However, nothing much has happened with that. As I said then—I say it again now—we forget the extent to which the politics of the United States, as they affect us domestically in both Houses and across both sides of the aisle, are influenced by their attitudes towards Ireland. It seems that, so long as we have this unresolved issue, the prospects for a trade agreement are pretty remote. For this reason, I ask the DUP why Article 16 is not enough for it, and I ask the Government to give us a coherent explanation of why they are not willing to invoke it. At the very least, by invoking it, we would be able to test it.
My Lords, it is indeed a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, with whom I had the honour of serving alongside for many years in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. I understand that he continues to serve there with great distinction, so it is a pleasure to hear what he has to say.
On the issue of Article 16, I say with the greatest of respect: I well remember that, when this was being discussed and advocated by us and others, there was agreement that some of the articles in the Northern Ireland protocol should be suspended. Article 16 was absolutely opposed tooth and nail by the vast bulk of everybody, not just in Northern Ireland on the nationalist side but both here in this House and in the other place. In the last debate, I quoted statements from leading members of what was then Her Majesty’s Opposition, including the Liberal Democrat Benches—as well as others on the Conservative Benches—who were vociferous and vehement in their opposition to any notion of the implementation of Article 16. The Irish Government went so far as to say that it would completely upend the Belfast agreement, which seems to be the chosen form of words when something is proposed that is not liked. I hear with interest what noble Lords are saying now about Article 16, but that certainly was not what was being said a few months ago. Noble Lords should look back in Hansard to what the situation actually was. The reality is that Article 16—whether or not it was invoked—was not going to solve all the problems.
Other Members have had their say so I am going to proceed in terms of my speech.
The amendment before us from the noble Baronesses, Lady Suttie and Lady Ritchie, has the intent of saying that the Bill’s operative clauses should not proceed unless there is approval from the Northern Ireland Assembly. I note, however, that this is not by cross-community vote. What is fascinating about people who defend and say they are defending the Belfast agreement—as amended by St Andrews, of course—is that they say, “Let’s give a vote to the Northern Ireland Assembly”. Regardless of whether or not it is reserved, the fact is that you are giving a power to the Assembly, and the Assembly in Northern Ireland operates by cross-community vote: there must be a majority of unionists, a majority of nationalists and an overall majority for all major pieces of legislation to pass. If it is subject to a majority vote, it can be turned into a cross-community vote by a petition of concern. Yet, uniquely, the proponents of the Belfast agreement only ever want to give a vote on the protocol issues to the Northern Ireland Assembly without a cross-community vote. So, if we are going to be consistent about defending the Belfast agreement and the institutions thereof, this amendment should include provision for a cross-community vote.
The other big flaw of course is that there is no such requirement for the absolute implementation of the protocol itself. I pointed out that Article 50 of the joint declaration in December 2017, signed by the EU and the United Kingdom Government, said that there could be no regulatory difference between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom unless it was by a cross-community vote of the Assembly and the Executive in Northern Ireland. So that is what should be the priority. As my noble friend Lord Browne said, there needs to be a prior step before we go down this route, which is to ask whether the protocol has the assent of the Northern Ireland Assembly on the basis of the Assembly’s decision-making powers, which are by cross-community vote.
It has also been said that the democratic deficit argument is not valid because there are other countries that have no say in laws that govern them. Norway was cited. Of course, Norway is a member of the European Economic Area but is not a member of the customs union, so it does not have EU customs laws applied to it in the way that Northern Ireland has. That is a significant difference. But the other major difference is this: the whole of Norway is a member of the single market. Northern Ireland is separated out from the rest of the United Kingdom, so one part of the United Kingdom is subject to EU laws while the rest goes its own way, making its own laws and being free to make its own decisions. Given that Northern Ireland does more trade with the rest of the United Kingdom than with the rest of the world, Europe and the Republic of Ireland put together, that makes no sense whatever. So it is entirely wrong to suggest, “Oh, well, there’s no difference between Northern Ireland and places like Norway”—there is a world of difference. I am surprised that that has not been noted.
Then we have the argument that it is the Government who have set out the position as to what needs to be done in relation to the protocol and putting it right. They issued a Command Paper in July 2021 and have now published this Bill. A lot of it is good in terms of restoring democratic control over laws that apply to Northern Ireland; it goes some way to rectifying that, although it does not do everything that we would like. Then we are told that if the DUP do not get on board with this—the Government’s proposals—then somehow the rules for power sharing in Northern Ireland should be cast aside. Again, I ask defenders of the Belfast agreement: where are you when people say, “Let’s just do away with the cross-community mechanisms and go for majority voting”? We have not had majority rule in Northern Ireland for over 50 years.
But when people talk about the Assembly not functioning for a large bulk of the period since the Belfast agreement, remember that between 2003 and 2007 it was down because of the actions of Sinn Féin and its military wing, the IRA, in robbing the Northern Bank. The Government rightly insisted that it would have to give up its weaponry before it could be considered fit to have a place in the Government of Northern Ireland. For four years—and between 2017 and 2020, again Sinn Féin kept the Assembly down and boycotted the Executive—would not agree to re-form it—on the issue of language and culture. But, as soon as there is any suggestion that the DUP insists on the democratic rights of people in Northern Ireland to be treated in the same way as other citizens of the United Kingdom, to have their say and vote on laws that affect them, we have the defenders, it appears, of the Belfast agreement saying, “No, let’s jettison all that, let’s change the rules”. Well, I am afraid that really is a recipe for disaster.
No other noble Lords have taken interventions, so I will complete my points if I may.
It is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, who made the points I was about to make about Article 16. When I was on the Front Bench here, I repeatedly stated that the conditions for meeting Article 16 had been met but we would prefer to proceed by negotiation. I was looked at as some sort of barbarian by many people in this House, and elsewhere, for daring to contemplate such a possibility. Yet it now seems that it is what many people would wish to do to resolve this situation—the natural way of doing so. I am very glad that is the view, but I am afraid that my view is that the situation on the ground in Northern Ireland has gone beyond that and Article 16 will not be the best way to resolve that.
I thank my noble friend for giving way. The view that I think many around the Committee hold is that the triggering of Article 16 was something that we did feel would be premature and we had all expected that there would be negotiations with the EU. However, the opposition to triggering that stage never envisaged that something like this Bill could be introduced which would rip up the whole protocol before negotiations had even been completed.