European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 26th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith]

They were, because the charter provided for them. The Human Rights Act incorporated one set of provisions only, the European Convention on Human Rights, which goes back to just after the Second World War and which provides the classic political and civil rights. The other rights that we find in the charter, which is a much longer document and refers to socioeconomic rights, were not included in the Human Rights Act because they were not included in the European Convention on Human Rights.

The right-by-right analysis demonstrates which of these rights are not included. Given that the Government’s objective, as stated by the Prime Minister, is to ensure that the protections for people in this country are the same the day after exit as the day before, I respectfully suggest that it is not for me to identify why that is not right; it is for the Government to demonstrate why it is. When we have substantial independent bodies such as the Bingham Centre and independent opinions from QCs demonstrating that actually it is not the case that the protections remain the same, the Government need to explain. I shall come on to that further.

Obviously there are examples of rights in the charter that reflect precisely other rights that we have within our law. In particular, there are a number of rights in the charter that are explicitly based on the European Convention on Human Rights; they are the same. Indeed, during the negotiations I went to some pains to try to ensure that they were phrased in the same way so as to prevent lawyers from saying, “It’s written differently so it must mean something different”. However, those are not the only rights that are there. As I noted at Second Reading, the charter is based not just on the European Convention on Human Rights but on principles of EU law and on principles that are commonly accepted by the member states, and those are in a different position from the ECHR rights.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

Just take one of the rights that is precisely mirrored in the convention. Is it suggested that henceforth, the wise complainant who faces primary legislation here which is incompatible with that right should therefore sue under both the charter and the convention because, lo and behold, under the convention, despite the constitutional arrangement whereby the court’s powers are limited to a declaration of incompatibility, he can disapply the primary legislation? Is that to be the consequence: that in a case where it matches, the convention trumps the constitutional settlement we arrived at, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, referred?

[Lord Goldsmith]

That will depend on the shape of the Bill when it is completed—in particular, what is said about the provisions which deal with primacy of EU law—but at the moment, as the noble and learned Lord will know well from the cases he sat on, people have been bringing cases by reference to both the charter and the convention. One reason for that is that the protection under the charter is more powerful. In future, if people want protection of human rights, they will want the more powerful protection, and if that remains available after the Bill is enacted, they will look to it.

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There is a further problem—

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

I promise that I will not intervene again—I loathe intervening. But does the noble and learned Lord agree, although he proposes the domestication of the charter, it will still be necessary in future to decide what is within the ambit of what used to be EU law, because that is where the operation of the charter is presently confined—or does he suggest that now it opens up and encompasses all UK law, so that it is a wider application than it was originally? Are we going to have to go again through the impossible exercise, notoriously uncertain in application, of having to decide what is specifically and directly within the ambit of EU law in future as well?

[Lord Goldsmith]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord and I know that this is a point that troubles him, but he should bear in mind that what we have in Clauses 2, 3 and 4 of the Bill are provisions to bring specific aspects of EU derived legislation and EU direct effect legislation into UK law. That is the Union law that will continue, and that is what is defined as retained EU law—and it is to that retained EU law that the charter will continue to have effect under the scheme that I advocate to your Lordships, not to anything else or more broadly UK law.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

So the right to dignity would exist in the context of EU law, but not otherwise? Is that really how it is intended to work? Can the noble and learned Lord give an illustration of a case that will succeed under the right to human dignity in future—I mean, there has not ever been one in the past that has succeeded under that—when otherwise it would fail?

[Lord Goldsmith]

The noble and learned Lord knows that I took Article 1 as an example only because it is the very first article in the charter. I have respectfully invited noble Lords to look at the Joint Committee on Human Rights report, where the committee goes through each of the articles and through what the Government have said in relation to them, and identifies where they find place already in existing, enforceable UK law, and where they do not. It is where they do not that we are concerned with, and where they do not that there will be the very gap that the Prime Minister has said should not exist.

There is the further problem that, even if the rights survive, they will survive without the enhanced status and protection that they currently have. They have an enhanced status at the moment because of the 1972 Act and because of EU membership, but from the date of this Act they will only survive in a delegated form and be amendable by delegated legislation. They are not protected from being amended or removed by delegated legislation.

Compare the position in relation to the ECHR and the Human Rights Act. The Bill says in three places—in Clauses 7(7)(e), 8(3)(d) and 9(3)(d)—that the Human Rights Act is protected from amendment or revocation. The classic civil and political rights, but no more, which are, rightly, protected by the HRA, are protected from being amended other than by primary legislation to which this House and the other place have specifically agreed after proper scrutiny. However, none of the rights underlying the charter will be protected in that way, unless they find themselves within the ECHR, which is only some of them. That is unacceptable for many people.

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[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, may I respond to some of the objections that have been raised to the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, with whose speech I agree entirely?

Many of the objections—those raised by the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, are typical—are to the content of the charter or to its implications. The Committee should appreciate that that is not the Government’s position. The Government’s position is not that they seek to exclude the charter because its contents or implications are objectionable. Their position is very clear indeed. If noble Lords read the debates in the House of Commons or look at the report of the Constitution Committee, they will see that the Government’s position is simply that we do not need the charter in this Bill because its contents and implications are already contained in the retained EU law that is being read across through this Bill. So many of the objections that the Committee is listening to are simply beside the point: they are not the Government’s objection to the charter. The Government’s objection to the charter—it is unnecessary because its contents are already part of retained EU law—is, I am afraid, simply unsustainable. I will not take up time on this, because the hour is late, but if any noble Lords are doubtful about it, I simply suggest they read the helpful opinion by Jason Coppel QC, in which he clearly sets out the equality and human rights position. That is the first point.

Turning to the second point, I am always reluctant to disagree with my noble friend Lady Deech, because she taught me law at Oxford, but I have to disagree with her on this occasion. Her objection, as she explained it, and I hope I do not misrepresent her, is that she is concerned that the charter will enable the courts to overturn legislation enacted by Parliament—she is nodding. But I am sure she appreciates that that is inherent in this Bill. The whole point of the Bill is to read across as retained EU law the content of existing EU law that is applicable to this country and to give it—see Clause 5—supremacy. Supremacy means that it takes priority, as in the Factortame case, over anything enacted by Parliament which is inconsistent. So the suggestion that we must oppose the charter because it gives courts that power is simply inconsistent with what the Bill does.

Turning to the third objection, my noble and learned friend Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood was concerned about whether the inclusion of the charter would, in some way, give a power that expands the role of the charter further than under EU law. My simple answer to that is no, of course it does not. The charter is being read across only because it is part of existing EU law, and it comes across as retained EU law. It will not have any greater force than it already has as part of EU law.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

In those circumstances, does my noble friend agree that the result of that is that we are henceforth, instead of treating retained EU law as part of domestic law—having discarded the separation and shed the notion that it is a distinct body of law—still going to have to wrestle with all the difficulties inherent in distinguishing operations or actions pursued in the ambit of EU law from those that are not? Will that problem continue into the distant future?

[Lord Pannick]

My answer is very simple: yes, of course. The whole point of the Bill is to read across the EU law which currently applies to this country and for it to continue to apply. That is the Government’s objective. It is their objective because they—very sensibly, in my view—wish to ensure legal certainty and clarity on exit day. That is exactly the legal position. It is not my idea; it is the Government’s intention in this Bill.

As to all the concerns about what the charter might or might not do, one should bear in mind that the charter has been applicable in the courts of this country for many years. No one has suggested that there is some case or principle which is so objectionable that we need now to make an exception for the charter, when the Government’s intention in the Bill is to read across all retained EU law to ensure a functioning statute book that preserves the legal position and ensures clarity, certainty and continuity. That is what this Bill is about.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

I seek clarification from the noble and learned Lord. As I understand it, the words “so far as”, are intended to give Clause 2 limited range. Is this a useful touchstone, in so far as without the provisions we would have failed to implement our obligations under EU law? As I understand it, paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) address aspects of our domestic legislation that are designed to give effect, as they had to, to EU law, but only in so far as they are achieving that objective does Clause 2 have any application. Is that right?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

That is indeed my reading. The noble Baroness alluded to this earlier in her contribution. That is why I sought to emphasise the term “EU-derived” domestic legislation. It is the derivation of that aspect of a particular Act which is to be brought within the ambit of retained EU law for these purposes.

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[Lord Adonis]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend. For those of us who are not lawyers and are uninitiated in the complexities of this law, what does “implemented” mean? As I understand it, once the Council of Ministers adopts a directive, it is then the responsibility, under the European Communities Act 1972, of member states to implement it. Presumably the question is: what duties lie on Her Majesty’s Government and Parliament to implement directives which have been adopted by the Council but which would, in the normal course of events, be implemented over a period that might or might not span beyond 29 March next year? I assume that that becomes a very important issue in the scenario that my noble friend Lord Liddle has just referred to, where, in the “implementation period”, the United Kingdom is undertaking to abide by the evolution of European law in the making of new directives over that period. I am not sure whether I should call him the non-Advocate-General for Scotland, but could the noble and learned Lord, in whichever capacity he is speaking to us this afternoon, give us a view on this matter?

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

My Lords, further to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, as I have said before, this Bill deals with a crash-out situation in which there is no transitional period. If there is a transitional period, a good deal of this will have to change or will require some alteration—the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Liddle. As far as the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, is concerned, once the directive is adopted, the member states are then given a particular period—generally two years—in which to implement it, and sometimes they are late in doing it. This Bill surely ought to deal with the two situations, including the one where the implementation date has passed, in which case we would perhaps be in a rather different situation from that which assumes that the implementation date has not yet arrived when we leave, and so a different answer might be given as to how you deal with this position.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I shall speak very briefly, first, because it is already past my bedtime and, secondly, because noble Lords have already outlined some of the problems. It was a pleasure to hear the noble Lord, Lord Renfrew, speak on this matter in relation to archaeology. I started a speech about 15 years ago, when he was in the audience, by saying that when I was a trainee archaeologist he was such an icon that I thought he was already dead. I am therefore absolutely thrilled to see that he is still not dead; it is always a pleasure to hear him.

I want to put my comments in simple terms so that Members of your Lordships’ House on the other Benches understand exactly what the problem is with the EU withdrawal Bill on this issue. Amendment 28 —and, by implication, Amendment 26—is designed to make sure that we do not miss out on important parts of EU law; namely, directives. EU directives place obligations on our Government to act in particular ways, such as bringing forward particular legislation. Examples include the working time directive, a social measure, and the habitats directive, an environmental measure. These directives cover a wide span of issues. The wording of the Bill leaves huge gaps that these important directives could fall through. The amendments would plug those gaps and make sure that they are all brought over into UK law. They would also allow or require Ministers to make sure that these directives are properly implemented so that we receive whatever benefits, rights and remedies were intended. As has been said several times, the big problem with the approach set out in Clause 4 is that it will exclude legal rights simply because they have not been litigated on. I do not see the sense in that. I am sure the Government will see that it needs a little bit of fixing and that we will see some positive compromises come forward.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

I rise to seek clarification on the precise objective of Clause 4(2)(b) in this whole pattern of legislation, and therefore on the effect of the attempt made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to get shot of it. As I understand it, Clause 4(1) faithfully reproduces Section 2(1) of the 1972 Act. On the face of it, these directly effective provisions are to continue to apply. Of course, it is not always easy to decide what is a directly effective provision that comes within the ambit of Section 2(1) of the 1972 Act, which is here given effect to. As I see it, though I may be quite wrong—I should like the Minister to confirm or reject this—subsection (2)(b) is there basically to say: “Look, if it’s one of those doubtful provisions as to whether it is indeed a directly effective provision under the EU legislation, whether it is completely unclear—there isn’t a case on it—and nobody has specifically suggested that it is, it is not to be argued henceforth that it is”. In other words, the certainty and clarity that this legislation overall is designed to achieve is supposed to be advanced by getting rid, in Clause 4(2)(b), of cases where the past jurisprudence simply leaves the thing high up in the air with no proper guidance.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 5th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I agree very substantially with my noble friend Lord Pannick’s general approach. Any attempt to repeat or paraphrase what he said would merely weaken it. I shall not do so, but I will make two comments.

First, on the supremacy question, my noble friend is clearly right that this is a wholly alien notion and we do not want it incorporated in the Bill. I confess I could not find what he calls Amendment 31A in my Marshalled List—this must be my fault. Is it the same as what I have as Amendment 32B? I suspect it may be. I certainly read that amendment as modelled on Professor Paul Craig’s proposal for how to deal with this. If that is the position—my noble friend nods helpfully to indicate that it is—I entirely support that approach. The language is substantially Professor Craig’s and it is altogether satisfactory.

Secondly, my noble friend canvassed an outline of the alternative ways to deal with giving legal status to, and the categorisation of, retained EU law. On the one hand, the Constitution Committee suggested that we turn it all into UK primary legislation. Then there is Professor Paul Craig’s competing approach, which is also endorsed by the Bingham Centre. I have a huge preference for the latter, not the former. As Paul Craig points out, we pass, in round figures, about 40 statutes a year. If we suddenly turn 10,000 or so instruments—the figure I think he suggests—which obviously in the ordinary categorisation would fall into the category of secondary legislation, into primary legislation, with all the consequences of that, we would simply overwhelm the statute book. We would make it impossible to deal with them properly as statutes. We would then inevitably start needing Henry VIII clauses in full measure. We would devalue primary legislation and give credibility and justification to use of Henry VIII powers, which is the last thing we want to do. Go down the Craig-Bingham line, not the Constitution Committee’s recommended route. I say that with all respect and deference to the committee, whose report is overall an enormously helpful document.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, I can be brief. I wish to support the various submissions made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, but also to draw your Lordships’ attention to some revealing contents of the Constitution Committee’s report, in particular the words of the Solicitor-General, which seem to indicate very clearly the weakness of the Government’s position.

As I recall, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, confined himself to the first sentence of paragraph 69 of the report:

“It is constitutionally unacceptable for ministers to have the power to determine something as fundamental as whether a part of our law should be treated as primary or secondary legislation”.


He went on to say that this is a recipe for confusion and legal uncertainty. I invite your Lordships to look to paragraph 67 on page 23 of the report, particularly the direct quote from the evidence given by the Solicitor-General. He says of the powers under discussion that,

“there is nothing unusual about these powers. However, I accept that the way and the context in which they are used is somewhat unusual … I accept that we are in new territory here. Having said that … when embarking on new territory, all Ministers tread extremely carefully”.

If this is genuinely new territory, it is inevitable from the Solicitor-General’s expression that there is no precedent. If there is no precedent for exercise of powers in the way the Government seek, that is not just something where we should tread extremely carefully; it is something which should be rejected outright.

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[Lord Pannick]

Of course, “case-by-case basis” suggests lots of work for lawyers and a lot of legal uncertainty. I am grateful to the Minister and all those who spoke in the debate. There was, I think, widespread agreement in the debate—apart from the Minister—and from expert commentators that a legal status does need to be conferred in the Bill on retained EU law. How one confers the legal status is much more difficult than what legal status one confers. I would say that there is more than one way to skin a cat—but that may upset those who spoke in the previous debate.

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lords, Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Goldsmith, for supporting the approach recommended by your Lordships’ Constitution Committee. But I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, that there is also great force in the suggestion made by Professor Paul Craig that the Bill should confer a status of either primary or secondary legislation, dependent on the category of EU law from which the retained EU law derives. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, who asked about this, that Professor Craig is not advocating a process of allocation on a case-by-case basis; he is advocating that legal status should depend on the article of the EU treaty from which the retained EU law derives—a much more objective approach.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

Did my noble friend hear Paul Craig say at a seminar, as I did, that it would take four competent EU lawyers four days in Brussels to classify, consistently with the classification both pre and post Lisbon, all this legislation? Four lawyers, four days—that is perhaps the answer to the question of the noble Lord, Lord Adonis.

[Lord Pannick]

Well, it depends. How long is a piece of string—how long does it take EU lawyers to allocate? But it is an objective approach. There may be difficulties, but they would be far fewer than the problems that would be posed by not addressing this problem at all in the Bill or by leaving it to Ministers to determine the matter. The other suggestion was that made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. She may have the right answer. She spoke of various baskets—I think it was “baskets” rather than the word used by Sir John Major as Prime Minister in relation to opponents of the Maastricht treaty.

The core point is that it is unacceptable for the Bill to ignore the question of legal status. It is a problem that needs to be addressed if the Bill is to achieve its objective of securing legal certainty. Therefore, I hope that the Government will, as the Minister indicated, reflect on these issues before Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 5th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Massey of Darwen (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 37 focuses on the protection, welfare and rights of children once the UK is no longer a member of the EU. I am disturbed by the notion of excluding the European Charter of Fundamental Rights in our domestic systems. Why is removing this being considered? What can be put in its place that is better? Perhaps the Minister can give the House an explanation.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

Are the microphones on?

[Baroness Massey of Darwen]

I apologise if there are no microphones, although it is not my fault. There has been little effort to consider how Brexit might affect children. I do not know who has been consulted on this. Perhaps the Minister can tell me. Have children been consulted? Organisations now often consult children about matters which affect their lives. Have the UK commissioners for children been consulted? They are advocates for, and speak for, children. Has the voluntary sector, which does such a splendid job in supplying information and support to children and those of us who work for them, been consulted? If not, why not? Have academics who support children’s rights been consulted? If all these people have been consulted, what are the results of such consultations? Has an impact assessment on how Brexit will affect children been considered? If not, why not?

I believe that there are 80 EU instruments which entitle children to protection and welfare. EU directives have not all been incorporated into UK law, yet these are comprehensive. There are numerous case studies on children as victims of crime—the sexual abuse and exploitation of children, criminal justice, and legal aid for victims. All these emphasise what it will mean to not have the European charter in place. Some have argued that our domestic laws on children are sufficient to protect them in all instances. This is not the case and I shall discuss it in a moment.

Last Monday, my noble and learned friend Lord Goldsmith spoke about the need to retain the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and stated that the charter will not be downloaded into our domestic law. An opinion by a Queen’s Counsel concludes that this would weaken human rights protection in the UK. The independent Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law has stated that the charter does much more than codify rights and principles. The Joint Committee on Human Rights, commenting on the Government’s right-by-right analysis of the withdrawal Bill, concluded with six devastating paragraphs in support of retaining the charter. The final paragraph states that some of the charter rights,

“are based wholly or in part on provisions of the ECHR”.

Other international treaties also come into play that have not been incorporated into domestic law, such as the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which the UK is a signatory. However, the UNCRC is not incorporated fully into UK law and there are no legal or financial sanctions for non-compliance with its provisions. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, was hoping to comment on this but has had to leave.

The response also states that,

“a failure to preserve relevant parts of the Charter in domestic law after Brexit will lead to a significant weakening of the current system of human rights protection in the UK”.

The Children’s Rights Alliance points out that the European Charter of Fundamental Rights sets out in a single document the fundamental rights protected in EU law and of particular importance to the protection of children’s rights.

We all know that the UK under successive Governments has made great strides to protect and enhance the welfare of children. Examples include the Children Acts of 1989 and 2004 and the Children and Social Work Act 2017, which is not yet in force. However, our domestic laws do not cover the full range of children’s entitlement regulated by the EU. We have no constitutional commitment to children’s rights at central government level, the level at which most EU legislation will be amended or repealed after Brexit.

I give other examples. The Children Act 1989, of course, enhanced the welfare of children but did not regulate the full range of children’s rights to protection covered by EU law—for example, as regards consumer protection and health and safety. The Children Act 2004 strengthened the 1989 Act but does not cover cross-border recognition and enforcement of family orders currently regulated by EU Brussels I and II. In particular, the right of a competent child to be heard in relation to child abduction or family disputes is significant. The Equality Act, welcome though it is, is not particularly strong as an instrument for children’s rights and does not cover many issues that would be of concern post Brexit—for example, equality in the workplace.

The Children and Social Work Act improves decision-making and support for looked-after children and for safeguarding work at the local level. It also makes relationships and sex education appropriate to age mandatory in schools. However, it seems to contradict amendments introduced by the Immigration Act 2016, specifically on care support for unaccompanied children when they reach the age of 18 and do not have leave to remain, are not asylum seekers or do not have a first immigration application for leave to enter or remain.

Other Acts such as the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and the broadcasting Act 2003 contain measures to protect children, but are not fully comprehensive and obligations may be vulnerable to repeal when implemented through statutory instruments. The EU (Withdrawal) Bill could create problems for thousands of families affected by divorce or separation or involved in cross-border EU-UK family or child protection cases.

In 2017, UNICEF published its report on the progress made on children’s rights in the UK. It stated that while we have made much progress, we are weak in assessing the impact of legislation and policy on children. There have been significant advances in child protection and welfare in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. However, these devolved measures will be impaired by Brexit as much of EU law affecting children may well be repealed through the use of delegated powers at a centralised level. This, of course, is worth a debate in itself. The Minister may say that Government cannot ignore the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Equality Act 2010. But these Acts, welcome though they are, have limited relevance to children. The European Charter of Fundamental Rights and the UNCRC go wider and deeper. Does the Minister accept this? If so, could he say—I ask this again—what will replace the European Charter of Fundamental Rights? The only way to ensure that children’s rights and welfare are protected is for it to be incorporated as part of retained EU law.

The Government should ensure that all existing protections for children’s rights and welfare in the EU legislative framework are reserved in domestic law. We cannot leave children from the UK—but also, in certain cases, from the EU—vulnerable to unclear or non-existent laws. I cannot understand the decision to drop the European Charter of Fundamental Rights when nothing else is in its place, and I do not know what will be. Why bother? Why reinvent? Any charter or convention, if attacked, must surely weaken the commitment to human rights, and we should resist such attacks with all our might.

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[Lord Russell of Liverpool]

That committee was chaired by Sir William Cash and included a certain Member for the 18th century, Mr Rees-Mogg, so I think that we can conclude that it was clearly completely impartial. We have got the message.

The question that we are posing to the Government, in response to a wide range of representations which many of us have had, is whether they will honour their commitment to defend the rights of children as we come through this process.

I mentioned at Second Reading that scrutinising and discussing this Bill in a non-partisan and apolitical way might be helpful, so I have a specific question for the Minister: does he have a twin brother or a doppelganger? Can he be same person who on 30 January was responsible for writing two articles? One of them appeared on the ConservativeHome website and said:

“From the beginning we have been clear that we need—and indeed want—to adopt a collaborative approach and listen to the views of Parliamentarians from all sides of the House. The necessity and sheer scope of this legislation means that thorough debate and examination is more important than ever. We took this approach in the House of Commons and we will continue to do so in the Lords … The House of Lords has a well-deserved reputation for its detailed and thorough scrutiny. This Bill should be no exception—it will benefit from the forensic examination the Lords can bring and we look forward to that razor-sharp review”.


On the same day, in the Sun newspaper, he wrote:

“We are seeing a co-ordinated push by the defeated elites; the Europhiles will use their majority in the Lords—a majority that rests heavily on quangocrats and busybodies, some of them in receipt of fat Brussels pensions”—


which possibly includes Members of the European Parliament—and:

“For the Lords to overturn a result supported by more British voters than anything else in history would be outrageous”.


He described some of your Lordships as scheming Peers who want an anti-democratic coup. So I have two more questions for the Minister; could he share with us what he had for breakfast the day he wrote those two reports, because I shall try to avoid eating the same? Secondly, did he ever consider a career in the Foreign Office?

Let us please forget the unending politics and focus on the children, whose voice and interests have hardly been top of mind as a rather unseemly procession of opinionated individuals compete for media airtime and attention. I recall noble Lords to the fact that I am speaking to Amendments 37 and 70. Amendment 37 aims to bring into domestic law the parts of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights into UK law that are necessary to protect children’s rights. I appreciate that we are not going to bring the charter overall into our law; however, it has some very important provisions: the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration in all actions, children’s views may be expressed and shall be taken into consideration, and children have a right to maintain a personal relationship with both their parents unless that is contrary to their interests. It contains other articles, as other noble Lords have mentioned, including on education and the prohibition of slave labour—the Minister will be aware that our Prime Minister has a particular interest in anything to do with child slavery.

Amendment 70 goes about achieving the same end in a different way. The UNCRC is viewed by most of us as the gold standard. The Government have stated that the source of the rights of the child set out in Article 24 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights stem from the UNCRC, but as others have mentioned, it is not incorporated into domestic law. We share the concerns outlined by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its recent report, Legislative Scrutiny: The EU (Withdrawal) Bill: A Right by Right Analysis. There are several examples of where the UNCRC and the charter have fundamentally helped where there are gaps in our own law. Among these are cross-border family breakdown; the right to be forgotten and data protection; and where 17 year-olds, who are still children under the law, are arrested and treated as if they are adults, which is against the law.

I believe that we must protect the hard-won protections of children and ensure that they are not inadvertently lost. I also support Amendments 68, 69 and 97, all of which are simply trying to probe the Government, to understand how they see the way forward. What all of us are saying is that, however we go forward, we must ensure that in no way, shape or form are the rights and protections of children in any way impaired.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

My Lords, I too strongly support the rights of children. Indeed, I support the rights of the elderly, in whom, like the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, I must, alas, declare an interest. However, with the best will in the world, I cannot support any of these amendments. The first point I make is that we debated reasonably fully last week the desirability or otherwise of incorporating this charter into UK domestic law in this Bill. The previous group is said to have been “already debated” and I find it difficult to see the logic of now debating a host of questions which raise the same idea, only more narrowly focused on one or two specific, individual charter provisions. This debate has ranged far and wide. We have even been back to cross-border co-operation, which was the subject of an earlier group, and I am certainly not going back down that trail.

I shall turn to the specific rights addressed here. The suggestion that the rights of children could be a primary consideration in any decision affecting them is hardly radical. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, noted earlier, the Children Act 1989 puts it rather higher than a primary consideration: it is the “paramount consideration”. Of course there are areas beyond the scope of the Children Act as such which are in play with regard to children, but for the life of me I cannot think of a single case in recent years affecting children—or, indeed, the elderly—which would have failed under the convention and the common law but would have succeeded only by reference to the charter; nor can I envisage such a case in the future. Somebody may be able to devise a scenario which would meet that but I have not been able to do so.

In any event, the Article 24 rights are regarded as retained general principles of EU law and therefore will continue to apply. The right to be heard on the part of children is not a contentious one. I took the opportunity of the regrettably short break we were given this evening to look at a particular decision—indeed, I think it was one of the last Supreme Court cases I was involved in, and my noble and learned friend Lord Hope will remember it because he presided over it. It was a group of extradition cases under the title of HH v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic. In the course of it the question of the children’s views was raised; it was an extradition case but the same principle applies across the wide field of children’s interests. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale of Richmond, who gave the lead judgment in the case, concluded:

“I share the view of the Official Solicitor that separate legal representation of the children will rarely be necessary, but that is because it is in a comparatively rare class of case where the proposed extradition is likely to be seriously damaging to their best interests. The important thing is that everyone, the parties and their representatives, but also the courts, is alive to the need to obtain the information necessary in order to have regard to the best interests of the children as a primary consideration, and to take steps accordingly”.


I do not know of cases where children’s interests are lost because they are not permitted to express their views.

[Baroness Massey of Darwen]

I have a number of case studies on these issues, which I will show the noble and learned Lord. Children’s rights are not always consistent, particularly in youth justice cases. I know that children in custody in the youth justice system are very often ignored, mistreated and not heard.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

I would be extremely obliged to the noble Baroness if she would put these cases clearly and crisply on a piece of paper and share them not only with me but with the Official Solicitor, who I think would be extremely interested in the proposition that children’s rights are being ignored in the youth justice system. But if they are ignored now, when the charter is available, what is to be lost?

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

The noble and learned Lord may remember that in my speech, which was about the UN convention rather than the charter, I cited a case, which I am sure he is familiar with—R(SG) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions—where three of the judges, including the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, found that the Department for Work and Pensions was in breach of the UNCRC, but because it was not incorporated they could not find against the Government and said that it was for Parliament. Here is a clear example of where three out of five judges found that children’s rights in the charter—the best interests of the child—were not being treated as a primary concern, yet they could not find for those families.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

I was going to come specifically to that case but, as I understand it, it was put forward not as a charter case but as a UNCRC case. I am not talking about that yet; I am talking about the charter because if it would not avail those children, then what is the point and why is it so important to incorporate those provisions of the charter? The UNCRC is a completely distinct point. I acknowledge that there may be a case and if that case is made good and establishes in full measure the proposition which the noble Baroness is advancing, it may be sensible, whether in this legislation or somewhere else—it would not logically take any part in this Bill—to incorporate the convention into domestic law. I acknowledge that it has not been. But unless you can show that something is to be lost by not continuing to honour the charter—if you fail to do that—with respect, it does not make any logical sense to bring in the UNCRC at this point of the Bill. I hope that the Committee can follow the logic of the way I put that.

I do not really want to spend a long time on this. The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, and I are even more concerned about Article 25 and the rights of the elderly. That charter right is put in this way and it is worth incorporating what it says:

“The Union recognises and respects the rights of the elderly to lead a life of dignity and independence and to participate in social and cultural life”.


That is of course an admirable sentiment, a great principle and a suitable aspiration. But is it really said to be an enforceable right, which the courts would pay regard to if they had already rejected the claim under the common law and the convention? With the best will in the world, it does not make sense. I do not want to rain more heavily on everybody’s parade but I respectfully submit that it would not be a good idea to adorn this Bill, which has a limited aim, with these additional rights that logically do not stem from the ending of the charter.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Excerpts

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 23rd April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I am a remainer, but I am one despite—not because of—the charter. To leave the EU but nevertheless retain the charter as part of our domestic law would be the worst of all possible worlds, the very opposite of Panglossian.

Before explaining why I oppose Amendment 15 so strongly, let me acknowledge that getting rid of the charter represents an exception to the broad principle that the Government have stated as the central objective of this Bill: ensuring that our laws will be the same on the day after Brexit as on the day before. I accept that, in certain limited respects, the charter confers rights not available under either the European convention—to which we remain and intend to remain party—or our own, ever-dynamic, common law on human rights. Perhaps the best—certainly the most often cited—example of this is the Watson case, to which the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, David Davis, lent his name at one point. The case held that one part of the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 breached a particular charter privacy provision, which was found to go further than Article 8 of the convention. That has now been corrected in the Data Protection Bill, which is currently before the other place and will shortly come back to us on ping-pong. It is to that Bill, not the charter, that we will henceforth look in terms of data rights protection. Watson points up another aspect of the charter: although it applies only to the implementation of EU law—a real problem that I will have to come back to—where it applies it goes wider than the convention because it requires the courts here to strike down and disapply our primary legislation. I regard that as a minus, not a plus; it is a flaw, rather than a virtue, in the charter and it is of course inconsistent with the Human Rights Act approach.

Besides being a remainer, I am also a strong believer in parliamentary sovereignty and the supremacy of Parliament. Twenty years ago, when the Human Rights Act was enacted, the then Lord Chancellor, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg—who I am happy to see in his place today—incorporated, very wisely and skilfully, the rights accorded by the convention into our law on the explicit basis that if our legislation is shown to be inconsistent with a convention right, the courts can and will declare so. They can make a declaration of incompatibility, leaving it to Parliament to adjust the position as it thinks right and proper. However, our courts cannot strike down primary legislation. That constitutional arrangement was carefully decided on; indeed, it has helped to keep our judges out of the firing line and out of conflict with Parliament. It is unlike the position in the United States where, as noble Lords know, Supreme Court Justices are highly politicised figures. Here, Parliament remains sovereign—but not in those rare cases where the charter applies.

The other case, besides Watson, that best illustrates this point is the Benkharbouche case, which has been mentioned once or twice in our debates and was decided by the Supreme Court here just 18 months ago. I shall briefly summarise. Two north African nationals, one of whom has given his name, Benkharbouche, to the case, following their dismissal from employment by two north African embassies here in London, brought claims against those states in the employment tribunal. Some of those claims were based on our domestic law—unfair dismissal, non-payment of wages, refusal of holiday pay—but others, particularly under the working time directive, were based on EU law.

On the face of it, all claims, domestic and EU, were barred by the State Immunity Act 1978—primary legislation—which denied claimants the right to sue embassies in this country. Barring access to a court is, unsurprisingly, a breach of the right to justice and therefore a breach of the European Convention on Human Rights at Article 6 and of the charter at Article 47. The result of the case, which I suggest was deeply unsatisfactory, was that the EU claims succeeded—the State Immunity Act was disapplied in their case—but the major domestic law claims of unfair dismissal and so forth failed because the court, under the Human Rights Act, declared simply that the State Immunity Act was incompatible with the convention.

This curious and regrettable anomaly in our law and its effect on the position of the judges has attracted very little attention because until recently the charter itself has been little noticed in litigation in this country. When, in a brief intervention in Committee on 26 February at col. 544, I put this problem to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, he suggested that the charter could be appropriately amended after this Act by delegated legislation. Opinions vary on whether that is possible but, either way, does it really make sense, given that we are now leaving the EU—regrettably, as I have indicated I feel—to carry over into our own law an instrument designed specifically for use only in the EU context, which, on occasions, requires our judges to disapply our legislation?

Thus far, I have focused on just the constitutional incongruity of the charter given the Human Rights Act, but there are other very powerful objections to our domesticating the charter. I will briefly touch on two real objections. I hope others hereafter will expand on these. One is the striking vagueness of the charter’s many articles. Some of course provide for real rights and those almost entirely and substantially overlap and mirror the convention rights that we have anyway, but much of the charter is merely aspirational—statements of broad principle. Indeed, Article 52(5) of the charter makes the distinction between principles and rights, and limits the legal effect of the principles—not that that distinction is by any means clear. Many legal commentators have described it as entirely confusing. For example, the so-called rights of the elderly are given as an example of a principle as opposed to a right. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, suggests that certainty and clarity would be advanced by his amendment. I respectfully suggest, on the contrary, that they would be very far from advanced. This would be wonderful for the lawyers, but frankly, for few others.

The other central objection is that the charter, as I indicated, can only ever be used when “implementing EU law”. That in itself is a notoriously uncertain concept. The boundary between what is domestic law and what is the implementation of EU law is one that we are now sensibly intent on simply sweeping away. In response to another intervention of mine in Committee, at col. 549, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, suggested that the charter would continue to apply just to EU law, which he identifies as all the law which is to be retained under this Bill. What if that law comes to be amended by Parliament or by secondary legislation, as some of it surely will? For example, if we were to consolidate all employment law provision so that in future Benkharbouche-type cases all claims would fall under a new UK statute. I suggest that it would be nothing short of absurd to perpetuate the distinction between EU law and domestic law, a distinction that will recede ever further into history, simply to continue to provide an area of law in which the charter would operate.

In short, I agree with everything that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, had to say back in 2009 when seeking to keep the charter out of the Lisbon treaty. But at least then the charter had the merit of constraining the exercise of legislative power by EU institutions, which were not subject to the constraints of the European convention. At least, too, we were then a member state and our citizens were citizens of the Union. What folly it would now be, as we leave the Union, quite unnecessarily to incorporate the charter as part of domestic law. I urge your Lordships to reject the amendment.

[Lord Howarth of Newport (Lab)]

My Lords, two main arguments have been put forward today and in Committee for writing the Charter of Fundamental Rights into our law. One is that we must bring the charter across into our domestic law because it would be anomalous not to do so; it would be inconsistent with the Government’s purpose in this Bill of transposing the whole body of EU law that presently binds us. It would be offensive for me to pray in aid Ralph Waldo Emerson’s dictum,

“A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen”,


and peculiarly inappropriate when the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is the most ardent advocate that consistency should be our guiding principle here, supported by his distinguished co-signatories. Nevertheless, consistency is a poor justification for incorporating the charter. Schematic approaches will not serve us well in these impassioned and volatile political times.

I recognise the compelling practical reasons for transferring existing EU law into our domestic law, so that we are not sucked into a legal void at the moment we cease to be a member of the EU. However, it does not seem a necessary or desirable consistency to include in that transfer a charter which does not have value as the fountain-head of human rights and whose title, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, portentously symbolises the very jurisdiction that the people of this country have voted to reject and which will be a diminishing element of our law as they are progressively released from it through their Parliament’s future legislative work.

The other main justification offered is that we need to hold on to hard-won and precarious human rights. That is a good motive, which I share, but it does not follow that we should transpose the charter. People who want to do so say that our constitution has saddled us with an elective dictatorship, that Parliament cannot be trusted in these days of political extremes, and that the charter should be valued as a foundational document in a developing written constitution. It is suggested that we need more checks and balances, not so much against the Executive as against Parliament itself. Happily, for those of this cast of mind, the judges are available. They, it is hoped, will imbue our polity with a higher wisdom than that of the people’s elected representatives, disapply statute when Parliament gets it wrong and rescue us from ourselves and our tendency to excess.

Have we, as parliamentarians, entirely lost confidence in the institution that we have the honour to serve and of which our country was once so proud? As we debate Brexit it sometimes appears that for many remainers almost anything is preferable to resuming full responsibility for our own decisions in our own parliamentary democracy. “Yes”, they say, through gritted teeth, “of course we respect the vote of the people on 23 June 2016, but actually it would be safer to stay in a protectionist customs union and a single European market in whose governance our elected representatives will have no say, and with Parliament trammelled by unelected judges constrained to follow the developing practice of the European Court of Justice”. If parliamentarians do not trust Parliament, why should the people do so, and then what happens to our democracy? I say gently to my noble and learned friend Lord Goldsmith that this is not about ideologically driven hatred of the European Union, as he suggests in today’s Guardian, but about commitment to the renewal of parliamentary democracy.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Excerpts

Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 25th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

I intervene to ask the Minister whether he agrees with this. Although —and I support the amendment—it is right to say that “necessary” involves a degree of objectivity, the clause would actually be applied in court on any challenge, and it would be a judicial review challenge to the making of regulation, on the basis that it is, in the reasonable opinion of the Minister, necessary. That is how the clause as amended would be applied on a challenge in court. Would he agree?

[Lord Goldsmith]

I am delighted to be described as a Minister in that question—not a role that I am eager to take on—but it may be that the question was intended for the Minister himself when he comes to respond.

The important point, as the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, made clear, as did other speakers, is that, as the Bill stands it is subjective and imposes a vague, low test. It is subjective because it is what the Minister considers, and it is a low test because it is what he considers appropriate.

As I told your Lordships previously—I will repeat it just this one last time—as someone who has spent a life as a practising lawyer, a court advocate, advising Ministers and being a Minister, I know that there is all the difference in the world between saying, “You can do this if you consider it appropriate”—nobody can second-guess that—and saying, “You can do this if it’s necessary”. It introduces an objective test, and that is what matters. This is what we invite the House to say to the Government is necessary in these circumstances. That is the only power they should take, and I hope that when the noble Lord presses the amendment to a vote, it will be supported by many Members of this House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wigley (PC)]

My Lords, I intervene briefly in support of the amendment moved by the noble Lord on the question of animal sentience. I should declare an interest. I am an honorary associate of the BVA and I want to underline the representations that it has made—I think that a number of noble Lords will have received them at various times. It feels very strongly that steps need to be taken prior to Brexit to include provisions for animal sentience in UK law. When representations of this sort come from such a respected body as the BVA, I think that we are duty-bound to take good notice of it, and I hope that noble Lords on all sides of the House will act accordingly tonight.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

My Lords, I want to follow up on what my noble and learned friend Lord Hope said. He referred to proposed new subsections (4), (5) and (6), which deal with the devolved Administrations, but of course Clause 3 deals with our central Parliament and thus the English position, and exactly the same point arises.

My further concern is that, assuming that we did not have that apparent bar on any question of judicially reviewing Ministers of the Crown, it would be very difficult to see by what sort of touchstones any legal challenge would work. Proposed new subsection (1) says:

“Ministers of the Crown and the devolved administrations must pay due regard to the welfare requirements of animals”.


Heaven knows, I hope that I am as anxious as the rest of the House about the welfare of animals—certainly, my cat would never forgive me if I were not—but, as I understand it, the only substantive provision in this proposed new clause is subsection (7), which requires an annual report, although that is obviously a separate and discrete obligation. However, I am not quite sure how judicial review in this context would work or, without it, what is envisaged in the way of Parliament exclusively holding Ministers of the Crown to account. It is all rather abstract and I am a little unsure of how it is intended to work.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Trees, has introduced the amendment in his characteristically persuasive manner. He has an exemplary record in the area of animal welfare. As a senior veterinary surgeon, he has enormous professional knowledge and, above all, personal courage in being prepared to speak up about what are often controversial matters. I have had the privilege of working with him on a number of areas of welfare: the welfare of animals at the time of killing, or WATOK, regulations; meat labelling; the export of live animals and so forth. Therefore, I like to think that my commitment to an appropriate standard of animal welfare is not in question, and I believe that a reading of Hansard would show that.

However, as I have told the noble Lord, I am afraid that I cannot support him this evening. We are discussing the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, which is focused on the process of disentangling this country from the European Union, not on the shape of policy post Brexit. Special issues such as animal sentience, important and vital though they are, are not really part of that withdrawal process. However, I can promise the noble Lord that when we come to discuss animal sentience and welfare in legislation focused on the policies of the new world, I shall be right there with him to ensure that there is no diminution, weakening of or sliding away from proper standards of animal welfare. On that, the noble Lord, Lord Trees, can count on my full support. But not, I am afraid, on this amendment this evening.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Excerpts

Report: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 30th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Adonis (Lab)]

My Lords, I strongly support the amendment and, along with many of my noble friends, I will vote for it.

Few of us would have started from here. Most of us are in the position of the now-famous maiden aunts of the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, who turned up at the Odeon next to the Electric Ballroom on 23 June 2016 to find that only two films were showing: “Reservoir Dogs” and “The Texas Chain Saw Massacre”. I am now in a position to tell the House what happened after they went to the cinema. They have been in touch and told me that they decided to return home without watching either film. With the noble Lord’s help, they put a DVD on. It was Alfred Hitchcock’s “Psycho”. They are still watching it in slow motion. To their horror, the point they have reached is that of Janet Leigh about to go into the shower—or, to be more precise, she goes into the shower on 29 March next year, in 333 days. The big question facing your Lordships and the country is this: is there a better ending to the film, knowing—as we do—that the British people will suffer serious harm if Brexit proceeds, but equally that we are a democracy and believe in the will of the people?

The only way I can see of deciding Brexit democratically, with a real option to reject it, is a referendum on Mrs May’s withdrawal treaty after she presents it to Parliament this autumn. Like many noble Lords, I am not a fan of national referendums for all the reasons that Churchill and Attlee banned them in post-war Germany. The imperative for a referendum on the Brexit deal is that we currently have a Government in office who believe that they are operating under an instruction from the British people two years ago to withdraw from the European Union. If that view turns out not to be supported by a majority of the Members of the House of Commons when they consider the exit treaty in the autumn but the Government present the treaty as a matter of confidence—which they surely will, and must, given its centrality to government policy—the only constitutional course is for the people to judge whether the Brexit treaty is their considered will or their considered will is to stay in the European Union. This could take the form of a general election but we have already had two of those in the last three years so a referendum looks like a highly credible option.

I want to make three quick points. First, I say this to my noble friends: the amendment straightforwardly supports Labour Party policy. The resolution on Brexit, passed unanimously by our conference last year, stated:

“Unless the final settlement proves to be acceptable, then the option of retaining EU membership must be retained. The final settlement should therefore be subject to approval, through Parliament and potentially through a general election or referendum”.


That is party policy and what the amendment enshrines in law.

Secondly, it is important not to be distracted by subsidiary issues. Is the time ripe? In my experience, the time is never completely ripe, but this is probably the only chance we will get before the withdrawal treaty so there is not much time left and we should seize it. What about the referendum question? Parliament will decide on that; of course, as said by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, it will be a decision between the treaty and staying in the EU, because if the majority of MPs are for a referendum, that is the choice they will want to put before the country. Is a referendum too divisive? Well, it will be, but nothing like as divisive as when Brexit goes badly wrong, there is a search for scapegoats and we have to try to get back into the EU after we have left.

Finally, I want to make a point about abstention, which, to my great regret, is my party’s whip. On the great issues of life and politics, it is hard to abstain with dignity and self-respect. All of us will be asked what we did. I for one do not intend to say, “I abstained”. I will say, “I voted for the British people to be in control of their destiny at a moment of supreme national crisis”.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I abstained on the last vote because I thought that many of the arguments against that amendment were very powerful and it was, in many ways, a defective amendment. However, I strongly support this amendment. I have no such doubts. I support it even though I readily recognise that it is entirely possible—many people think, highly likely—that in a further referendum, the vote would again be in favour of leaving. This time, I suggest there is much to be said for making the next referendum, unlike the first, legally binding, with no question of “neverendums”.

Of course, the public have already voted, and certainly that vote—although not legally binding—made it imperative that we give an Article 50 notification. We have done that and continue to explore what terms for leaving the EU are available to us. The public cannot yet vote on those available terms, but why should they not eventually be allowed to do so? Surely not even the most fervent Brexiteer would argue that a further referendum would not present the public with an altogether clearer, and better informed, choice than last time. Why would that not be properly regarded as giving them a further choice and further respecting, rather than betraying, the earlier expression of the popular will?

I have struck out a great deal from what I was intending to say because much of it has already been said by others. However, I should deal with one further point. An argument, which I confess initially troubled me against a further referendum, is this: because the other 27 countries would prefer us to remain, as I think most people believe, if there is a further referendum, they will make the terms of leaving as unattractive as possible to maximise the chance of the public rejecting the deal on a further vote. So, it is said, a commitment to a further referendum would compromise our negotiating position. But I have concluded that, ultimately, that is a completely unreal objection.

In the first place, given that a further vote could very well still, as I say, be to leave, and that if, finally, we were to do so, then it is patently in the interests of all the EU states that we leave on mutually beneficial terms. I do not believe that the proposal of a further referendum would, in truth, worsen those terms. But put that thought aside. The plain fact is that, in any event, there is an obvious and powerful reason why the remaining 27 will not wish to allow us too favourable a deal—namely their concern to discourage from leaving any other state which is possibly inclined to exit the Union as we now propose.

One other point I will touch on is that made by my noble friend Lord Green of Deddington. I am not sure that the noble Lord, Lord Butler, quite appreciated it. What I think my noble friend Lord Green said is: how do we know that we will not, if we vote to remain, lose the rebate and our right not to be within euroland? The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, has made it plain—there is nobody better able to do this—that, in his view, a right to withdraw our notification must inevitably leave us in the same position as we started in. I support that view too. Again, given that the other 27 would want the vote to be to remain, I think that they would readily make that clear.

In short, the case for the public to have the final vote on this really most momentous of issues, perhaps in many of our lifetimes, now seems to be overwhelming and I urge your Lordships to support it.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, this amendment is reckless. It is peculiarly reckless proposed in an unelected House. It would be reckless if it were to be entertained by the elected House. The 2016 referendum generated bitter divisions in our country. To rub salt in those wounds and fan the flames of that anger by offering this option, raising hopes of a further referendum, seems to be most unwise. My noble friend Lord Adonis, in his Hitchcockian script, truly made my flesh creep.

The 2016 referendum exposed depths of mistrust and resentment against the political establishment and against what has broadly been the policy orthodoxy of recent decades. The appropriate response to that, surely—even if you deeply disagree with the view that was taken by the majority then, even if you consider that people were voting against their own best interests—is not to say, “You are stupid, bigoted and ignorant. You are wrong. You should think again and get it right”. That is how it will be perceived.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Excerpts

Report: 6th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 8th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, I strongly support the amendment, partly to give our support to the Prime Minister against those within her divided Government who do not believe that it is important to stay closely associated with these agencies.

Perhaps I may give a little of their history. I was on the staff of Chatham House in the early 1980s when the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, first proposed the single market and made it clear that what was in Britain’s interests—as well as, she argued, in enlightened European interest—was to replace a tangle of different national regulations with single regulations in a single market. She did not assume that we would get rid of all these regulations but that we would agree on common regulations. Many of the agencies then grew up to make sure that these regulations were observed and enforced, and altered and developed as technology, pharmaceutical research and other things changed. That was why they were clearly in Britain’s interests. There were always some in the Conservative Party who did not believe in that—they believed in deregulation—and thus were dubious about the single market because it was replacing national regulations with common European regulations.

One of the most interesting pieces of research carried out for Chatham House in that period was by an American trade lawyer who wrote about the extraterritorial jurisdiction of US regulations over the United Kingdom until the single market was formed. Very often business, engineering, the chemical industry and the pharmaceutical industry in Britain simply followed American regulation. The idea that we had sovereign regulation on our own did not exist. As the single market developed, so European regulations, over which we had considerable influence, replaced the British adoption of regulations designed for American purposes, which we felt we had no choice but to accept.

That is these agencies’ historical origins and they clearly still serve British national interests. It is therefore important that if and when we leave the European Union we remain associated with them. Technology and research have continued to develop and these agencies therefore serve an increasingly important role. I therefore hope that the Minister in replying will reinforce what the Prime Minister said in her Mansion House speech and make it clear that a major objective of the Government is to remain as closely associated with these agencies as possible, even if Boris Johnson may then denounce it in the Daily Mail.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I share in full measure the hopes and concerns articulated today by so many of your Lordships. That said, if the amendment is put to the vote, I shall not feel able to support it. My approach to this amendment, as to earlier amendments to the Bill, has been essentially that it is fine to tell the Government what they must do once they have achieved what they regard as the best available deal, but it is not fine to seek to impose on the Government requirements as to precisely what that deal must be or how to achieve it. In other words, we can tell the Government what rights Parliament or, as I promoted, the public should have on a further referendum as to what we can do and should do, by way of approving or rejecting the proposed final deal—or, indeed, a decision to exit with no deal—but we should not seek to bind or inhibit the Government in reaching a deal and so risk weakening their negotiating position.

The Bill is not for that purpose but to keep our statute book intact. I urge your Lordships, rather than indulge all our hopes and wishes in this area, to think about whether we ought to put these explicit requirements into this legislation.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, I wonder whether the noble and learned Lord is reading the same amendment as me. The one I am reading, which was so well introduced by the right reverend Prelate, states:

“Nothing in this Act shall prevent the United Kingdom from … replicating”,


or “continuing to participate”. It does not say that we have to do it. It just says that nothing shall prevent our doing it. Perhaps I am reading a different amendment from the noble and learned Lord.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

Funnily enough, when I first read the amendment, I took the same point from it that my noble friend has taken. However, it seemed that it could not be so because it simply would not make sense to move an amendment that is not intended to have any effect on the Government as they pursue this legislation.