Battle of the Somme: 110th Anniversary

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 12th November 2026 Commons Chamber

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Over a century after the appalling losses on the western front, historians still debate whether any alternatives existed. Some blame political intrigue and poor generalship; others emphasise technology, with the battlefield dominated by interlocking fields of fire, which ensured that slowly advancing troops would be mown down by machine guns before making any worthwhile inroads into the enemy’s trenches. Minor advances that were occasionally achieved were usually reversed by counter-attacks or simply absorbed into a new, static confrontation a short distance from the original one.

We heard echoes of some of those controversies, with the pendulum ascribing guilt and responsibility swinging first one way, then another, in the very perceptive speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Dumfries and Galloway (John Cooper). I was first influenced by a work of fiction—a rather more in-depth work of fiction than the immensely entertaining television series to which he alluded. It was a book by a Sheffield journalist and writer called John Harris, entitled “Covenant with Death” and published in 1961.

In 1961, the people who had fought on the Somme were still living, and John Harris interviewed many of them. He says in the introduction to his great novel that although the characters are fictitious, the real people will recognise many of the incidents that he describes. The story is based on the Sheffield City Battalion. On 1 July 1916, the battalion sent 700 men over the top. The majority of them—nearly 500 men—became casualties, half of whom were killed, and only four of their officers survived the battle.

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend is giving an incredibly powerful speech. He is recognising quite properly those who were in teeth arms and running towards the ballistics and bullets coming at them, but will he also recognise the military medics? They were so important and often ran into danger, and they included Captain Noel Chavasse, who won not only the Military Cross and bar but the Victoria Cross in the Somme.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

Yes, indeed. I believe I am right in thinking that he won the VC twice overall—one of three people to do so—and I am delighted that my hon. and gallant Friend has put that on the record.

In more recent years, there has been a swing of the pendulum that has tried to justify the scale of loss on the Somme by saying that it was necessary for lessons to be learned for the ultimately successful campaigns of 1918. Some of the people who have put forward that proposition undoubtedly know more about the history of the first world war and its battles than I do, but I simply do not buy that. You should not have to waste the lives of tens of thousands of soldiers to learn lessons, some of which ought to have been obvious from the beginning.

One of those lessons was the need for surprise. Before 1 July 1916, there was a seven-day bombardment by British artillery on the Somme. Everybody knew what was going to happen and where it was going to happen. In 1918, at the start of the successful 100 days offensive—the phenomenal, brilliantly fought campaign that led to Germany suing for armistice in November 1918—everybody had secrecy impressed on them. Every officer and man had a passbook in which it was deemed essential that they must not say anything about what preparations were being made.

Similarly, when the Germans mounted their spring offensive in March 1918—which, for a while, looked as if it could have put Britain out of the war—one of the reasons it succeeded was that they too had an element of surprise. They had three alternative plans and decided on one of them, the Operation Michael attack, very much at the last minute before it was launched. You did not have to be a strategic genius to know that you needed an element of surprise in order to achieve tactical success. Similarly, the lessons of the Somme were not learned very quickly, because the same thing happened again in April 1918 with the second battle of Arras and, later in the year, with the third battle of Ypres, known as Passchendaele.

Let me conclude by quoting someone who was not an amateur historian: a man called Sholto Douglas, who later became Marshal of the Royal Air Force. He stated that, as he looked down from his aircraft at the field of Passchendaele in 1917, his mind was full of the sort of questions that many people have asked about the futility of the tactics. He said then, and I agree with him now, that those questions are very, very difficult to answer.

Submarine Service 125th Anniversary

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 10th November 2026 Westminster Hall

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

It was an inspired idea of my hon. Friend the Member for Dumfries and Galloway (John Cooper) to mark the 125th anniversary of the founding of the submarine service today, the eve of the anniversary of Armistice Day. In preparation I spent time happily reminiscing about my schooldays in the 1960s, when I devoured a large range of books about the history of the Royal Navy in general and of submarines in particular. In those days there were still people alive who had participated in the battles of the first and the second world wars, and many of them were writing books. I will begin with a quotation from one of those books:

“When submarines first became units of the fighting fleets of the world in the early years of the twentieth century, they were unimpressive, unseaworthy craft equipped with an unreliable, low performance weapon. Those who manned them were, like the early aviators, looked on as harmless cranks. When the First World War broke out, they had not entirely lived down this reputation. Sea-power was still believed by the orthodox sailor to lie with the squadrons of stately battleships.

But before that war was over Britain, at that time the world’s greatest naval power, had been brought to within sight of total defeat by the submarine in the hands of her enemies. At the same time British submarines, with fewer opportunities to show their potentialities, had dominated the Baltic Sea and held German sea-power at bay on behalf of Britain’s Russian ally.

Submariners had thus joined the front rank of fighting seamen, though they still formed a group apart. In doing so they had revolutionized naval warfare.”

The author of that preface to his book “Fighting Under the Sea” was Captain Donald Macintyre DSO and two bars, DSC. Together with Captain Johnnie Walker, he was one of the two most successful U-boat hunters of the second world war. In the 1960s, such people were writing up the lessons they had learned. It was a great opportunity for those of us studying such subjects to be in touch with them. Indeed, I have a letter from Captain Macintyre regretting the fact that I had been unable to obtain a copy of his first book “U-Boat Killer”, which describes his role in the battle of the Atlantic, and that he was unable to supply me with a copy because he himself had managed to pick up one only when the Boots library sold off stock. Today, with the computer revolution, a copy of “U-Boat Killer” can be obtained with a few taps of the keyboard. I commend it to those who are interested in the story of the other side of the submarine equation.

The other matter to which I would like to draw attention in the limited time available is the question of submarine escape. Hazardous as the profession was, a great deal of inventiveness and ingenuity was put into the idea of how it might be possible to survive if something went terribly wrong. Captain W. O. Shelford was the Navy specialist in submarine escape during the second world war and the 1950s. He wrote a book called “Subsunk” that I also commend because it tells of the tragedies and the successes in trying to save life when something goes wrong.

Let us remember that something terrible did go wrong shortly before the second world war. In 1939 in Liverpool bay the submarine HMS Thetis, on its maiden voyage with 103 people onboard because many of the people from the builders were taking part in what was supposed to be the first of its sea trials, sank due to a concatenation of circumstances that are almost unbelievable until read in the account of the disaster given in “The Admiralty Regrets” by Jim Warren and James Benson. Both those people, like Captain Macintyre, knew that of which they spoke. One had been a human charioteer in the second world war; the other had served in midget submarines. In that case, 103 people were trapped in a submarine. They managed to raise its stern above the surface of the water, yet only four people were able to escape. Subsequently, the submarine was raised and recommissioned as HMS Thunderbolt. It had a distinguished wartime career until, sadly, it was lost with all hands in the Mediterranean.

On the credit side, in terms of looking at the price that had to be paid, were some of the achievements that the submarine service wrote into history. One of the most famous was the midget submarine attack on the German battleship Tirpitz in the Norwegian fjord, where it was hiding in 1943. On that occasion, three midget submarines penetrated and at least two of them managed to lay their charges beneath the hull of the battleship. When they were captured—some of the crew survived; some sadly did not—and taken aboard, they said nothing about the mighty explosion they knew was about to happen underneath them. That explosion disabled the battleship for a considerable length of time.

One has to remember that they were very young men, but some of them went on to have distinguished careers. Two of the midget submarine commanders, Godfrey Place and Donald Cameron, were awarded the Victoria Cross. The third, Lieutenant Henty-Creer, was sadly not awarded the VC because his submarine was destroyed and it is not known whether they successfully laid their charges and were on the way out, or whether they were still trying to get in to lay them. I always feel there is an unfairness that the crew of the X5 did not get the same recognition as the commanders of the X6 and X7, who were awarded VCs. As I think Churchill once said, every medal “casts a shadow”. Lieutenant Godfrey Place went on to become a rear-admiral in charge of reserves. I am not allowed to display accessories while making a speech, but if anyone wants to see it, I still have the autograph of Rear-Admiral Place, as he then was, from when he visited Swansea to meet the reserves back in the 1960s.

I hope hon. Members can see from my enthusiasm, if not the rather unstructured way in which I have made my remarks, that 60 years later, some of us are still inspired by the memory of what it was like to read about the extreme peril that very young men put themselves into—usually, if not always, as volunteers. So many of them did not live to tell the tale, but my goodness, what a glorious page in British naval history they wrote.

Budget Resolutions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 29th October 2026 Commons Chamber

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

The Defence Secretary, who opened the debate for the Government, is undoubtedly a versatile and an entertaining politician, but he did himself a little less than full justice in being so casually dismissive of the remarks made by the Labour Chairman of the Defence Committee, the hon. Member for Slough (Mr Dhesi), who, for the record, I have found to be thoughtful, knowledgeable and patriotic. He deserves to be listened to, just as his predecessors in the role, including me, were listened to with, I believe, respect by Conservative Governments, even when we were criticising them. Criticise them we did. As long ago as June 2018, the Defence Committee published a report entitled “Beyond 2 per cent”—that is HC 818, for those nerds interested in looking it up—which called for a level of defence expenditure approaching the figure of 3% of GDP, which the United Kingdom still maintained as late as the mid-1990s.

The mid-1990s were six years or so after the fall of the Berlin wall, and when Government Members keep saying, as the Chancellor said yesterday and as the Defence Secretary repeatedly said today, although he did not take interventions on it, that they are proud to be part of a Government who are behind the biggest increase in defence spending since the end of the cold war, the question we need to ask is this: how much do they think this country spent on defence during the cold war? When the cold war was over, the threat diminished. The threat is now high—as high as it ever was during the cold war.

During the 1980s, as I have said many times, we spent between 4.5% and 5% of GDP, calculated by today’s method of calculation, on defence. In June 2025, the Hague summit declaration called for NATO members to spend 5% of GDP on defence by 2035, consisting of 3.5% on core expenditure and 1.5% on wider defence-related items. We are already beginning to hear how the 3.5%, or even the 3%, will be made up by creative accounting. Let us bear in mind that 3.5% is to be on core defence. The creative accounting elements, if they are lucky, may deserve to be included in the 5%, but that is it.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 19th October 2026 Commons Chamber

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

14. What his policy is on the future of the British military base on Diego Garcia.

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Wes Streeting)]

Diego Garcia is a key strategic military asset for the United Kingdom and the United States. As I said in the US last week, our priority is to secure the long-term operation of the base and protect UK national security. To that end, we are working closely with Mauritius and the United States to secure an agreement that can command the support of all parties involved. Any arrangement must be acceptable to all of us, including President Trump, and that will be our focus in the coming months.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

In his discussions in the United States, did the Defence Secretary explain to our counterparts there that Mauritius is a signatory to the Pelindaba treaty, which means that no nuclear weapons can be deployed or stored anywhere on its territory? If Mauritius takes over the sovereignty of the Chagos islands, that means that no nuclear weapons can be stored in the Diego Garcia base. How did the Americans react to that disclosure, if the Defence Secretary saw fit to make it?

[Wes Streeting]

As a matter of policy, we obviously do not talk about the storage of nuclear weapons. Suffice it to say that however much people want to try to find another way around this, I can only assure the House that, having looked at this issue with a fresh pair of eyes, I have reached the same conclusion as every Prime Minister since Boris Johnson, including this one. That conclusion is that the capabilities provided by the Diego Garcia base make it extremely unwise—and a risk not worth taking—to have legal uncertainty, which is why efforts to negotiate a treaty continue. [Interruption.] Conservative Members may disagree now. If they do, they should explain why Boris Johnson, Liz Truss, and the right hon. Member for Richmond and Northallerton (Rishi Sunak) were all trying to achieve the same outcome.

Ukraine and Russia

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 10th September 2026 Commons Chamber

[Wes Streeting]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for raising that very serious and important issue. She will understand that, as a matter of policy, I will not comment on intelligence, but I will address the reports she has raised.

One of the great privileges of being in this post in the last seven weeks has been meeting the people in our special forces and seeing the capability that they have. It is truly remarkable and my only regret is that we are not able to show, for obvious reasons, the country more publicly just how exceptional these people and their capabilities are. It is in that spirit that I find it utterly unthinkable and shameful that anyone who has served this country, in whatever capacity, would think it in any way acceptable to support the Russian state as it wages war in Ukraine. The Ukrainians’ fight is our fight. Their frontline is the frontline for freedom and democracy. Those actions are an affront not only to this country and our values, but to the values that underpin the uniform that those who serve in our armed forces wear. I know I speak for the entire armed forces community in saying that.

Let me reassure the House and send a very clear message that we have robust legislation in place to tackle foreign hostile activity. The National Security Act 2023 gives our intelligence agencies and the police the tools they need to detect and disrupt threats, but the Act specifies under its interpretations that

“‘information’ includes information about tactics, techniques and procedures”.

It is applicable to any individual and extends beyond the period in which personnel are employed by the UK armed forces. Let that be a warning to anyone who has supported, or considers supporting, the Russians as they wage war in Ukraine.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I warmly endorse almost everything the Secretary of State has said today, and I genuinely congratulate him on his appointment. In my first speech in this House almost 30 years ago, I promised to support Labour Governments as long as they supported the nuclear deterrent, the conventional armed forces and NATO. I would like to think that I have kept that promise.

The one area where I have to dissent, however, is the section where he comes on to the proportion of GDP spent on defence. As I have said to some of the right hon. Gentleman’s predecessors, it is no good banging on about something being the largest increase since the end of the cold war. We are now in a situation that is worse than that at the height of the cold war, so the comparison we have to make is between what we are spending now and what we spent during the cold war, which was, in modern calculating methods, between 4.5% and 5.1% on defence. So let us not talk about increases to 2.7%. We really must remember that even when the Berlin wall came down, we were spending over 4% of GDP on defence at that stage. Those are the sorts of efforts that we have to make, because if Putin fails in Ukraine, the threat to this country will recede for a generation.

[Wes Streeting]

I give the right hon. Gentleman an undertaking on those three things to make it as easy as possible for him to support this Government: supporting the nuclear deterrent, building capacity in our armed forces and supporting NATO are things I believe in very strongly. In the spirit on these exchanges, I will take at face value the point he makes about the comparison with the cold war and resist the temptation to discuss the starting point we were faced with on defence spending and the condition of our armed forces when this Government arrived.

The right hon. Gentleman is right to draw historical comparisons and provoke all of us to think more widely about the context we are operating in domestically, across Europe and internationally. I have not heard a suggestion from the official Opposition that the Government should be making a 4% or 5% commitment, nor any proposals to that effect, but let this discussion help the public understand why, at a time of constrained resources for households, businesses and Government, we are making an active political choice to invest more in our defence. I respectfully say, as someone who has been responsible for hospitals and the NHS, that schools, hospitals and homes are important things, but they are valueless if reduced to rubble. That is the experience of the Ukrainians; that is the kind of threat that we are operating under; and that is why we must commit, and continue to commit, to increasing defence spending.

Rearmament and Warfighting Readiness

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Wednesday 8th July 2026 Commons Chamber

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

I begin by congratulating the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells (Mike Martin) and the Backbench Business Committee for scheduling this important and timely debate, which coincides with the NATO summit. I will make what is perhaps a point of consensus: yet again, when we debate the defence of the realm—the first duty of Government—the Reform Bench is empty; yet again, the plastic patriots have gone AWOL when we discuss the defence of this country. Count Binface clearly has them worried in Clacton.

As I am a historian by training, perhaps I can offer some historical context. Arguments about military readiness are not new. The Roman military theorist, Vegetius, some two millennia ago, coined the now-famous phrase, “Si vis pacem, para bellum”—he who desires peace should prepare for war, in order to deter it. There have been times in British history where we have disregarded Vegetius’s sage advice. For instance, in 1919, following the first world war, when Britain had fought at great cost—both human and financial—a Liberal-led Government introduced the concept of a 10-year rule: a pan-Whitehall edict that no major war was likely for at least a decade. That continued on a rolling basis into the 1930s. On 9 February 1933, just 10 days after Hitler became Chancellor of Germany, in the now famous Oxford Union debate, referred to several times already, the students resolved by more than two to one that:

“This House would, under no circumstances, fight for King and country.”

And yet, a few years later, we know that many of them did.

The 10-year rule was only finally rescinded in the mid-1930s. Nevertheless, as General Lord Dannatt pointed out in his excellent recent book “Victory to Defeat”, our armed forces still did not recover sufficiently in time to deter Hitler from launching what eventually became world war two, in which some 60 million people perished worldwide.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Having spoken on this very subject the week before last, I thought that I would, for once, sit and listen to what others have to say. Does my right hon. Friend agree that one of the reasons for the failure of deterrence at the beginning of both the second world war and the first world war was that the United States was detached from the future of security in Europe? The success of NATO has hinged on the knowledge that an attack on any NATO country would mean war with the United States from the outset. Does he share my concern that the United States is at present led by someone with insufficient regard for that history?

[Mr Francois]

NATO is the most successful defensive alliance in history, and article 5 is its absolute fulcrum. We must maintain our commitment to article 5 to keep all NATO nations safe.

In 1946 in Fulton, Missouri, Churchill said that an iron curtain had descended, leading us into the cold war. In the mid-1980s, under Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, defence spending was gusting about 5% of gross domestic product. When the Berlin wall came down in 1989, countries across the west took a peace dividend. Francis Fukuyama wrote his famous book “The End of History” in 1992, and many in the west believed that the threat of world war had finally receded. When the Conservatives left office in 1997, we were spending around 3% of GDP on defence, and that downward trend continued under Tony Blair’s Government—although, in fairness, he was only doing what many other western democracies were also doing.

Today, we face a revanchist Russia led by Putin—

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Bailey]

The removal of funding specifically in 2010 resulted in the removal of Nimrod and the reduction of our shipyards and boatyards, which has led to the risks that are manifesting today. The Opposition cannot deny that is the reason that we are in the position we are in now.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Bailey]

In time.

Two years ago, this Government inherited a defence programme that was overcommitted, underfunded and fundamentally unsuited to countering the very real threats we now face. Since then, we have published a strategic defence review, the defence industrial strategy and, most recently, the defence investment plan. We are building a far more modern and lethal military, through massive increases in defence spending, radical reform of the armed forces and close collaboration with our NATO partners to protect Europe’s and Britain’s borders, showing Putin that the alliance remains as strong as ever.

As technology reshapes warfare at the fastest pace in history, and as the world becomes increasingly dangerous, our overwhelming focus at the Ministry of Defence is to get warfighting ready as fast as possible, and that was the critical tilt in the change between the two Defence Secretary’s DIPs. This DIP is a defining moment in that journey, committing, as I said, £298 billion for our armed forces over the next four years, ensuring that they have the kit and weapons they need. That is £15 billion more—more than significant—and £1.5 billion more than was announced just a few weeks ago.

The DIP means that UK defence spending will rise in real terms by 27% between 2023-24 and 2029-30—the largest sustained increase since the cold war. Indeed, the Ministry of Defence budget will grow faster over this Parliament than the budget of any other major Department. The £74 billion allocated next year—2027-28—is £20 billion more for our armed forces than the last year of the previous Government, and the budget will continue to grow in real terms for the rest of this Parliament.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

I congratulate the Minister on acceding to office, but he needs to appreciate that the cost of all Departments goes up in absolute financial numerical terms year on year, but the way in which we measure the investment in defence is by looking at it as a proportion of GDP. During the cold war, when the risk was almost as high as it is now, we were spending 4.5% to 5% of GDP. Vladimir Putin does not have nine years for us to spend 3.5% of GDP. Those are the measurements the Minister has to look at; we are nowhere near spending enough.

[Mr Bailey]

Twenty four years of serving this great nation means that I am acutely aware of the risks that the Opposition presented me and manifested during my time in service. That is why I am resolute in addressing these challenges and why I am backing the defence investment plan.

Let me make one point crystal clear: Britain has always met its NATO spending obligations in the past, and under this Government we always will. That begins with the early delivery of our first commitment to raise defence investment to 2.7% of GDP next year, compared with just 2.3%, which was missing from the Opposition’s analysis of the decline in our defence spending.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 6th July 2026 Commons Chamber

[Luke Pollard]

We inherited a situation where the north-east was the region with the lowest Ministry of Defence spend in the country and we have made it a mission to increase defence spending in the north-east. We have an incredible talent pool in the north-east, with brilliant defence companies both large and small doing brilliant work. We are determined, now that we have an uplift in defence spending, that more of it will be spent with British firms, and I want to see more of that spend in the north-east as well.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

My salary is “up to” £1 billion a year, but sadly that does not make me a billionaire. [Laughter.] Does the Secretary of State accept that when checking how much money a country is spending on defence, the accepted way of doing it is by percentage of GDP?

Defence Investment Plan

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 30th June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to the Chair of the Select Committee for the scrutiny that I know he will apply to this important piece of work. He reeled off a number of different capabilities, and I am very happy to discuss those with him in more detail.

The essence of my hon. Friend’s question was to seek an assurance that I will commit to fight for the funding that defence needs, and I will, of course, give him that commitment. It is my job now to ensure that we have the resources we need to field the kind of capabilities required to keep our country safe at a point of great challenge. That does involve working very closely with our NATO allies and providing them with the certainty of our long-term commitment towards defence funding, and it will require us to show a trajectory to our commitment to 3.5%.

He is also right to raise the point about backing Britain. The Prime Minister, the Chancellor and other ministerial colleagues have been absolutely clear that, while we require additional resource to provide the capabilities we need, we must do that in a way that ensures we are best able to grow our economy, and create and sustain good, well-paid defence jobs right around the United Kingdom. That is an absolute priority for me, and I give him an assurance that we will work closely with him on it.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

At last, we have agreement on a defence expenditure statistic. When the Secretary of State says that what the settlement means is that the proportion of GDP spent on defence by the end of this decade will now be higher than at any time in the past 30 years, he is quite right. The trouble is that if we go back 30 years to 1995, what we were spending then under the new accounting rules was 3% of GDP, and that was six years after the fall of the Berlin wall. Given that we are now in a more dangerous situation today than at any time since at least the height of the cold war in the 1980s, should we not be looking at the sort of percentages we spent then? Under the new accounting rules, that was between 4.1% and 5.5%. Haven’t we still got a long way to go?

[Dan Jarvis]

The right hon. Gentleman knows that I always listen very carefully to what he has to say, not least because he talks a lot of good sense on these matters. Over the many years of him being sat on the Government Benches and me sat on the Opposition Benches, I remember listening to the case he made for investment in defence, including investment in nuclear. I know, therefore, that he will welcome the £63 billion over the next four years to strengthen the UK’s nuclear deterrent. He has spoken with great consistency on these matters over many, many years.

The right hon. Gentleman is right to say that there is still work to do to point the trajectory to 3.5%. I think today is a very significant step forward in terms of providing additional resource and additional capability. The £298 billion is a very significant commitment by this Government. When we came into office two years ago, the percentage of GDP was at 2.3%. We have increased that. We are on a trajectory to increase it over the next few years, and we must ensure that, through the next spending review process, we have the resource that I think most right hon. and hon. Members agree we now need to chart that course to 3.5%. That is an absolute commitment that we will honour, and we will work closely with our NATO allies in order to do so.

Defence Spending and Readiness

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I don’t know what the hell you’re talking about. [Laughter.]

In those conversations, we decided that there was clearly no future for us in the Army. Now, I did stay on a bit longer, but many left who I knew were very competent and very good people, and it is difficult to fill those posts. That is the bit in the armed forces that is critical to everything else that happens. If we do not have a cadre of middle-ranking and senior non-commissioned officers, we do not have an Army. We just have a lot of orders from the top down but are unable to do them.

What we speak about today is critical, because we have to send a message to our armed forces that we believe in them fully and strongly and will support them in every way. That is why it is a pleasure to see the hon. Member for Birmingham Selly Oak (Al Carns) sitting in his place after his resignation. He has the respect of many of my colleagues on these Benches, without question, not only for his past but for his present. I know what it is like to resign when you disagree with the Government—I have done it a few times myself—but the reality is that he will never regret it. The thing that matters most of all when we come to this place is not us or the debates that we have here and away; it is the people out there who put us here. If we do not plan to speak up, even when our own side does not want us to, we are not worthy of being in this place. I therefore congratulate him, not because I am in a party political game but because I respect him for having called out a problem that the Government face. All the Ministers on the Front Bench know that, as does he. The question is: what will we do about it?

I want to start by talking about Northern Ireland, and I shall be here on 4 September, cheering my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne on with his private Member’s Bill. We cannot for one moment forget that we have reduced the morale of British soldiers who have served—veterans who are now often in their late 70s and 80s—and who find themselves persecuted. I say to the Defence Ministers that this really started in the Northern Ireland Office, which was overly persuaded by Sinn Féin that they could somehow change what had happened and come out as victors. As the hon. Member for Birmingham Selly Oak said in his resignation speech, they lost; they lost because of the efforts of the armed forces, and of all those who did not see another day and who died in the service of their country.

More importantly, we forget that walking down the streets in your own country armed and trying to protect civilians against aggression is quite different from anything else that the armed forces were trained to do. In doing it, they had to figure out all sorts of complications. The trouble with the Northern Ireland Troubles Bill is that it does not deal with the sense of what we asked our soldiers to do in risking their lives to protect the British public on the streets of the United Kingdom. We therefore have to understand that the legislation that the Government have brought forward is wrong. That does not mean to say that what the Conservative Government brought through was fantastic. It was not. There were many flaws and failings in it, but many of us felt that we would support it because it did one major thing: it stopped the constant attacks on those poor veterans whose lives are now coming to an end and who see themselves being dragged through the courts all over again.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

One of the strong arguments put forward for the legislation is that it will help families to find out the truth of what happened to their loved ones, yet by repealing the Conservative legislation, it makes that less likely rather than more likely—because who is going to come forward and incriminate themselves by saying what happened to people who were unlawfully killed if they know that they will not then have immunity from prosecution?

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

That is exactly the point. I hope that we will be able to drag this point out again on 4 September and make it very clear that if we in this House do not stand by those whom we order to go to war or to bear arms for the sake of the country, who is going to do that? We have the power to sweep things away or to make them. I have disagreed with my own Government many times, but I say gently to this Government: think again. Do not allow the Northern Ireland Office to drive this thing through when Ministers know full well that it is wrong; they need to defend those soldiers, despite the rows that might take place in Cabinet or among Ministers.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I do; it was difficult and we stuck to the task. We were not very popular at the time, but that has been a constant in my life. [Laughter.] I think you only know you are successful when you are not popular, and we were not popular on that. What we were trying to get was not perfect, but it was better than what we now have, and that is the key. At the heart of it was the aim of protecting those who have been sent, bearing arms, to defend the British people. We need to defend them and respect the sacrifice they made.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

Another spurious argument, which I am afraid we heard earlier in the debate, is that the legislation put our armed forces on the same level as terrorists. The truth is that everybody is on the same level before the law. In any case, the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 sold the pass on that anyway, because under it nobody—even if they were convicted of first-degree murder, as the Americans might say—goes to jail for more than two years. That put everybody on the same level before the law, as any such legislation has to do.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

Yes, that is quite correct, and my right hon. Friend is exactly right to make the point now.

We really must understand that, if the first priority of Government is defence of the realm, then the second priority is defence of those they send to fight to protect the realm. If we cannot defend them, we are not worthy of being here. I say gently to Ministers that the House would support them if they went back to the Government and said about the Northern Ireland position, “This is quite wrong. It is unbalanced and deeply unfair.” I hope that they will do just that.

The real reason that I decided to speak today is because I am really, really worried. As I have been saying for some considerable time, we are now in a more dangerous situation than we have been in not since the cold war—at least we arrived at the cold war knowing what we had to do; Governments co-operated, NATO was fairly newly formed, we were full of the attitude that we would defend one another no matter what, and we were armed and ready—but since the 1930s. I am not in the business of saying that this Government are responsible; all Governments bear responsibility, as my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne said. We are seeing the rise of a threat very similar to what we saw in the 1930s, and our behaviour towards that threat is exactly the same as it was in the 1930s.

My father wrote a book many years ago about his time. He was a highly decorated fighter pilot, with five gallantry medals; he commanded in the war and fought all the way through. He said that he could never forgive politicians for having placed the country in the parlous situation of being close to losing the war because they did not see the danger and did not want to be involved in spending more on defence. That was the point he made, and it has resonated with me forever.

I happen to believe that we are seeing in front of us the growth of totalitarian states. China is at the centre, but North Korea, Iran and Russia are there, and others, like Myanmar, are developing. More totalitarian states are coming to fruition around the world, and they now outnumber democratic states in the United Nations. The axis has shifted. Over the last 15 or 20 years, not only have we not made ourselves ready—even today we are not—but we have simply failed to recognise that they have made themselves ready. One naval shipyard in China now builds more naval ships than the whole of the United States in one year. I am told that China now has 130 times the capacity of America to build naval vessels. It is no good looking at Europe, because we hardly build naval vessels any more either. The difference between now and what happened in 1937, 1938 and 1939 is that we then had major industry here—an industry that could build tanks and aircraft, had brilliant aircraft designers, and could build ships. We had probably the most powerful fleet in the world ready to go to war if we had to. We are not in that situation today.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

This debate has been characterised by so many powerful speeches that I think it would be invidious to pick out any of them. I congratulate everyone who has contributed, particularly the Government Back Benchers who have evidently come to the debate espousing the principle that the best defence is attack. Some of their speeches have been so combative that it is hard to believe that only recently they lost their Secretary of State for Defence, their Minister for the Armed Forces, and even their Prime Minister. If morale is indeed the measure of a successful fighting force, those Government Back Benchers are doing extremely well.

By happy coincidence, I had a letter published in today's edition of The Times, which I had submitted before I knew that this debate was going to take place. I say that it is a happy coincidence because I know that you, Madam Deputy Speaker, are worried about the ticking clock, and one requirement for a letter to be published in that esteemed newspaper is for practically all the argument to be compressed into no more than 150 words. These are the slightly fewer than 150 words that I chose:

“An erratic, isolationist White House, a ruthlessly imperialist Kremlin and a disturbing relationship between the two have put peace in Europe at greater risk than at any time since the height of the Cold War. The prime minister’s valedictory boast of securing ‘the biggest uplift in defence spending since the Cold War’ should therefore cut little ice. We are nowhere near investing even the 3 per cent of GDP—under current MoD calculation criteria—still being spent when the Conservatives were defeated in 1997, years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Under Margaret Thatcher throughout the 1980s—again applying today’s criteria—defence received between 4.1 per cent and 5.5 per cent of GDP. This shows the scale of effort required once again to boost deterrence and prevent the appalling costs, in blood as well as in treasure, of full-scale war between Russia and the West.”

That was the letter, and I will now briefly pick a couple of aspects of it on which to expand. The first is the use of the word “deterrence”. I am perturbed about the sense of inevitability that there is going to be a conflict with Russia, perhaps as soon as 2030. However, the question of whether or not there is such a conflict is not just down to Russia; it is also down to what we do—the preparations that we make, the investment that we think we can bear in the military in order to ensure that if Russia looks at the prospect of war with the NATO powers, it will see that the outcome is uncertain and the cost is likely to be unbearable. So we have to do our bit.

The other aspect of that letter on which I would briefly like to comment is the opening point—the point about the isolationist White House. No one knows how far the isolationist virus that is embodied by President Donald J. Trump has spread throughout the rest of the American political system, but if when he is eventually replaced that virus reappears in his successor, the future for peace in Europe will indeed be imperilled, because the key achievement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was to ensure that any potential aggressor against any of the member countries would know that if they attacked, from day one they would be at war with the United States of America.

What Donald Trump has done is cause that guarantee to be undermined. I do not know why he does it. I do not know what the nature is of what I described in that letter as his “disturbing relationship” with the killer in the Kremlin. All I know is that Europe will not be safe until again we can rely on the United States to guarantee our freedom. In the meanwhile, we must send a signal across the Atlantic, for our part, that we will do everything necessary to invest in our armed forces and to make the necessary preparations. If we do that, we will maximise the chance of restoring stability to the power balance between east and west, which saw us through the most deadly threats of the cold war—the times when it was thought that civilisation could perish—and we will get back to a situation in which people can then think about what it is nice to pay for in order to have a modern, civilised, compassionate society.

Let me end with a famous quote from another Healey who was a Defence Secretary, Denis Healey. He said, memorably, that if we do not have adequate defence, we do not have all the aspects of a society that we wish to cherish; we do not have schools, we do not have hospitals, we do not have houses—what we have is “a heap of cinders”. So let us invest what we can while we can, let us get our priorities right, and let us restore the guarantee of the transatlantic relationship, which kept the peace and prevented a third world war.

Defence Investment Plan

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Wednesday 10th June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Luke Pollard]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for mentioning the new colours awarded to the Royal Marines. My colleague the Minister for the Armed Forces was there with the King for that ceremony, which reflects the continuing relevance and importance of the Royal Marines, which will be shown clearly in the defence investment plan.

The hon. Gentleman asks me about a specific capability proposed by the previous Government that may be included in the defence investment plan. I hope he will understand that I will not be able to go into that line item description today. However, on the broader point about ensuring the air defence of our naval assets, we have seen from Ukraine that there are new capabilities that can provide elements of that. We have also seen from the UK response to the Iranian drone threat to our sovereign base areas and our friends in the Republic of Cyprus how we can create a truly layered air defence, which is an important lesson we have learned from Ukraine. We have applied that not just to our sovereign base areas, but to our naval assets and our friends in the middle east.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

May I offer some advice to Defence Ministers in their bare-knuckle fight with the Treasury for adequate defence funding? They really should move away from this glib spin doctor’s line about defence expenditure rising faster now than at any time since the end of the cold war. The situation we are in now is as dangerous as any that took place not at the end of the cold war, when defence expenditure was declining, but at its height, when Conservative Governments—with, I think, Opposition approval—regularly spent between 4.5% and 5% of GDP on defence. Please, Minister, do not parrot a line that goes way below what we need in the circumstances that we face today.

[Luke Pollard]

I have a lot of time for the right hon. Gentleman, with whom I have spent many hours discussing defence spending. I am certainly very aware of the danger we now face—it is one of the reasons why the Government have decided to declassify a number of the threats facing the United Kingdom. When the Defence Secretary declassified the activities of the Russian spy ship Yantar over our undersea cables, for example, it was both to explain the threats that we are now facing as a nation and to send a clear signal to Putin that we see what he is doing. Deterrence takes a number of forms; there are certainly our capabilities, but the ability to call out and, in doing so, to restrict the ability of Russia to threaten the UK and our allies is also important. I understand what he says, however, and take it seriously.