Read Bill Ministerial Extracts
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateJoanna Cherry
Main Page: Joanna Cherry (Scottish National Party - Edinburgh South West)Department Debates - View all Joanna Cherry's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(4 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberI absolutely accept and understand the motivation behind my hon. Friend’s intervention, and he makes such a recommendation not just as Chair of the Select Committee, but as a guardian of the principles of the rule of law, which, after all, is what we, as a nation, are trying to defend against those who would kill, shoot and bomb their way into power and influence. He can be reassured that this—if you like—reversion to the previous standard of proof is all about making sure that we have as agile a tool as possible, bearing in mind the rapidly changing nature of the terrorist threat that we face. It is vital that we make sure that, when applications for TPIMs are made, they can be done not only in such a way that there is clearly an evidential basis and those grounds exist, but in a way that means they can be effective and as rapidly implemented as possible. The focus of the TPIM and the number of people on it will change, adapt and evolve according to the constant and the changing nature of the threats.
I thank the right hon. and learned Gentleman for giving way. The point made by the Chair of the Justice Committee is very well made. Not only has the current independent reviewer of terrorism, Jonathan Hall QC, not recommended the change, but he has specifically questioned the basis for the change. So again, is the Lord Chancellor able to clearly articulate for us why this change in the burden of proof is necessary?
I am grateful to the hon. and learned Lady for her question. Indeed, in the lengthy answers that I am giving, I am trying to do just that. What I am trying to explain is—I know that she knows this—that the TPIM mechanism is not something that is entered upon lightly. It involves a high degree of resource and a high intensity of resource management. It is a self-evident truth that the resources of the state, however large they may be, are not infinite and therefore choices and priorities have to be allocated. What I can assure the House of is that of course every time we assess that the grounds are met and that there is a risk, we will act. That is what our security services do, day in, day out, for us. What I am saying is that the change in the threshold creates that greater agility. I accept that it will be a lower standard, yes, but the reason for that is to allow for greater flexibility when our operational partners come to apply them.
I was talking about the importance of TPIMs’ use being proportionate. I believe that the annual review of TPIMs, which is going to be part of this process to qualify the question about their indefinite duration, strikes the right balance between the need for vigilance and control against the need for those basic civil liberties that we all guard jealously to be maintained. Let us not forget that where it is no longer necessary or proportionate to extend a particular TPIM for the purposes of public protection, that TPIM will be revoked. That check and balance is very much at the heart of the regimen that we are proposing in the Bill.
The Bill also amends legislation governing serious crime prevention orders. Those are civil orders imposed by the courts that protect the public by preventing, restricting or disrupting an individual’s involvement in serious crime, which of course includes terrorism. The Bill supports the use of these orders in terrorist-related cases by allowing counter-terrorism policing to make a direct application to the High Court for a serious crime prevention order. We are therefore streamlining that process. The independent reviewer of terrorism legislation has noted that these mechanisms are at the moment an under-utilised tool in terrorism cases, and I believe that by streamlining the process we will see a greater reliance upon them.
We are also adding the offences of breaching a TPIM notice and breaching a temporary exclusion order to the list of relevant terrorism offences that can trigger the registered terrorist offender notification requirements. Again, the independent reviewer has publicly confirmed his support for that change. The regime requires individuals aged 16 or over who have been sentenced to 12 months or more in custody for a relevant terrorism offence to provide certain information about changes in their circumstances, such as their address, to the police and to notify them of any foreign travel plans. Together, these changes strengthen our ability to manage the risk posed by those of terrorism concern in our community, including those who have been released from prison without a period on licence.
The Bill also reforms how we deal with terrorist offenders under the age of 18. We recognise, of course, that there is a separate sentencing framework for that category of offenders, and that it has distinct purposes and aims that differ from those relating to adult offenders. We have carefully considered which measures it would be appropriate to apply to under 18-year-olds in developing this proposed legislation. Although we remain firm in our aim to ensure that custody should be used only where absolutely necessary, it is a sad and inescapable fact that some young people are susceptible to radicalisation or to the adoption of extremist views, and that among those, there are a few who pose a very serious threat to the public.
The Bill will therefore ensure that the courts have the right range of tools at their disposal to deal with those under the age of 18 who commit serious terrorist or terrorist-related offences. We will do that by introducing a youth equivalent to the special sentence for offenders of particular concern. This will mean that, if convicted of terrorist offences serious enough to warrant custody, these offenders will serve a fixed period on licence once they have been released into the community. This will ensure that they receive an appropriate level of supervision. We are also replicating the changes to the extended determinate sentence to ensure better public protection from young terrorist offenders who have been assessed as dangerous. This removes Parole Board consideration of the two-thirds point for the most serious terrorism offences, and in the interests of public protection, it gives the courts the option to apply an extension period of up to 10 years on licence. I accept that this is an exceptional series of measures, but we are dealing with an exceptional type of offending.
We in the Scottish National party take our duty to protect the public from all serious crime, including terrorism, very seriously, as our record in government in Scotland shows. We have a number of reservations about the Bill, which I shall outline, but like the official Opposition we do not intend to divide the House. We intend to take a constructive but critical approach. To that end, we will play a full part in the Bill Committee.
I thank the Lord Chancellor and his colleagues for the engagement that we have had to date on the Bill. I look forward to further discussions about the Scottish National party’s and the Scottish Government’s concerns. I also thank the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) and the hon. Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds) for the constructive discussions that we have had prior to Second Reading. It is fair to say that the Scottish National party shares many of the official Opposition’s concerns about the Bill. We note that those concerns relate to matters about which the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation has also expressed reservations. That is to say, they are responsible concerns.
No discussion about terrorist legislation in this House should take place without parliamentarians taking the opportunity to extend their deepest sympathies to all those who have suffered bereavement or injury as a result of terrorist acts. I look back to the past, particularly in Northern Ireland and indeed the whole island of Ireland in that respect. On behalf of the SNP, I also pay tribute to the brave members of our police and security services, first responders, those in the Prison Service, probation officers and those who work in rehabilitation. All those people have to deal with the consequences of terrorism. We have heard some moving tributes to them. I also pay tribute to the brave bystanders who have intervened to help others in the immediate aftermath of terrorist attacks.
Many of the provisions in the Bill relate to sentencing, which is of course a devolved matter. Discussions are ongoing between my colleague Humza Yousaf, Scotland’s Justice Secretary, and the Lord Chancellor. Of course, there will need to be a legislative consent motion. I will outline the concerns that I share with the Scottish Government and my colleagues in the Scottish Government about the sentencing aspects of the Bill, as well as the use of polygraphs, the changes to TPIMs and the provisions regarding the review of the Prevent strategy. I want to make it clear that I do so from this viewpoint: it is the Scottish National party’s aim that our communities in Scotland are inclusive, empowered and resilient, so they can resist those sowing the seeds of division that can lead to radicalisation and terrorism.
The Bill has some far-reaching changes in it, with implications for human rights as well as policy, and the Scottish Government have already expressed their concerns directly with the Lord Chancellor, as I have done with his junior colleagues. I know that the UK Government, in relation to this Bill at least, realise that they need to work closely with Members of all parties and with the devolved Administrations, because that is what is necessary to ensure effective counter-terrorism measures across the United Kingdom and in Northern Ireland. I hope that this consideration will be at the forefront of the Minister’s mind as the Bill pilots its way through the House.
On the issue of sentencing, I am pleased that the UK Government are following the Scottish Government’s lead in ending automatic early release for the most serious offenders. Some time has now passed since the Scottish Government introduced a change to the effect that no long-term prisoner—four years or over—would be eligible for automatic early release after two thirds of their sentence. However, I am far from convinced—as I know others are far from convinced—that simply locking up terrorists for longer and then providing longer supervision on release is going to do much to deradicalise terrorist offenders.
The Bill will require the courts to ensure that certain terrorist offenders receive a custodial sentence of a certain minimum length and that a minimum length of supervision applies on release. In that respect it is a form of minimum mandatory sentencing, which is against the general approach in Scotland. However, it is not completely new to the justice system in Scotland, and that is why discussions are ongoing with my colleague, the Scottish Justice Secretary.
Sentencing is only a small part of the answer to terrorism, however. What happens during the sentence also matters, and, to date, deradicalisation and disengagement programmes have been largely underfunded and poorly executed. That is not my view; that is the view of Nazir Afzal, the former chief Crown prosecutor for the north-west of England. He is an experienced lawyer and a prosecutor worth listening to. He says that this has happened as a direct consequence of the decision by successive Conservative Governments to cut funding to probation and other rehabilitation programmes. The costs of extensive post-release surveillance far outweigh the costs of adequate funding for preventive measures and deradicalisation. I wonder whether the Lord Chancellor agrees with me and Mr Afzal on that point, and whether he is in a position to assure the House that sufficient funds and resources will be made available to deal with preventive and deradicalisation programmes in prison.
Can the Lord Chancellor also assure me that the Bill will not turn out to be counterproductive by leading to less parole, less offender management and less incentive to behave well during a sentence and to attempt deradicalisation? In this respect it will be interesting to hear what the professionals who work in the area of offender management and parole have to say about the Bill, and I look forward to the Bill Committee’s evidence sessions. I am pleased that will there be more than one of those—
Three? Excellent.
The hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill) raised the issue of polygraphs. He will be aware that in Scotland’s justice system, polygraph testing is not used as a mechanism to monitor compliance with licence conditions or any kind of orders. Indeed, it is not used at all. The reason we have chosen not to use it is the lack of evidence of its effectiveness. If the provisions of the Bill were to apply in Scotland, that would require a significant shift in policy and practice and could also have significant implications for investment in infrastructure. In Scotland, we already have mechanisms in place to monitor compliance with licence conditions and conditions associated with statutory justice orders. These include supervision by justice social workers and the use of electronic monitoring for high-risk offenders. There is a multi-agency public protection arrangement—MAPPA. Under that procedure, those assessed as high or very high risk and who require multi-agency management are subject to a regular review. In Scotland, individuals convicted of terrorism-related offences can be managed under that MAPPA approach, and there are indeed a small number of cases that have been managed in this
More generally on the issue of polygraph testing, I note, as has already been said, that the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation expressed some concerns about the lack of pilots and emphasised that there would therefore be a very strong case for very thorough post-legislative scrutiny of the measures. I look forward to hearing what the Minister summing up has to say in response to that point.
On TPIMs, much of what I have to say has already been canvassed. Clearly, the amendments would: reverse the changes to the burden of proof, lowering the burden of proof; reverse changes to the curfew provisions to allow for what is effectively home detention; and allow us to make the orders potentially indefinite. I am not convinced that the changes are necessary and nor are my colleagues in the Scottish Government. We are fortified in that view by the views of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, who is also unconvinced of the necessity of the changes. To be frank, I have heard nothing so far this afternoon to convince me that our reservations are wrong. Those reservations are really important because of the human rights implications, the lack of safeguards built into the Bill, and the lack of any review mechanism.
I am not going to go through what Jonathan Hall, QC said in his two very detailed notes, but he has tackled, in some detail, both the reduction of the standard of proof and making the orders potentially indefinite. He has been very clear that he is not convinced of the case for change, so my questions for the Minister are these. Can we hear more clearly why? Can we see an example of what justifies both the reduction in the burden of proof and the need for the orders to be without time limit? Can we hear why, in the face of such potentially draconian powers, there are no safeguards in the Bill? Would the Government be prepared to consider an oversight mechanism or a review mechanism?
Finally, on Prevent, it is important to remember that the delivery of the Prevent strategy in Scotland is devolved and that while national security is referred to the UK Government, the way the Scottish Government deliver the Prevent strategy in Scotland reflects Scottish differences and is unique to the challenge faced by Scottish communities. I think it is fair to say that the delivery of the Prevent strategy in Scotland has not encountered the same community resistance and community impacts as it has south of the border. Because of the problems encountered in England, the Scottish National party supported the call for a review of the Prevent strategy, but we also shared the very widespread concerns about the Government’s initial choice of reviewer. We believe now that it is very important that a new reviewer is found quickly, and that lessons about impartiality and the important appearance of impartiality are learned from the debacle over the previous putative appointments, so that the review can be seen as genuine and robust. We are a little concerned that the time limit for the review has been removed. I heard what the Lord Chancellor had to say about that, but it is very important that the removal of the time limit does not simply become an excuse to kick this into the long grass. That is the final point on which I seek reassurance from the Minister in his summing up.
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill (First sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateJoanna Cherry
Main Page: Joanna Cherry (Scottish National Party - Edinburgh South West)Department Debates - View all Joanna Cherry's debates with the Home Office
(4 years, 4 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThe question is probably useless, then. I was going to ask whether they had reassured you that things had changed for the better, but clearly you have not seen them.
Jonathan Hall: No. I am sorry; I have not seen them.
Q
I will start by asking you a couple of questions about the effect of the proposed sentencing changes in Scotland. You have produced a “Note on Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill: Sentencing Reforms (3)” that deals with the effect of the proposed sentencing changes in Scotland and Northern Ireland. In particular, in paragraphs 8 and 9, you raise the question of how what is proposed for Scotland under clause 6 of the Bill impacts on the existing sentence in Scotland called an order for lifelong restriction. Can you tell us about that?
Jonathan Hall: Scotland has a unique sentence. It has a very respected body called the Risk Management Authority, and if a risk assessment is made under the auspices of the authority that shows that someone is a real risk, the High Court in Scotland can pass an indeterminate sentence with a punishment part, but with the consequence that someone is liable to be detained until they are safe enough to be released, when they are released but very carefully monitored.
I do not know whether this was intended or an oversight, but it seems paradoxical that, as things currently stand, if a judge in Scotland found that the criteria for a serious terrorism sentence were made out, he or she would have to pass a determinate sentence, if they did not otherwise pass a life sentence, even if ordinarily they might want to pass one of these orders for lifelong restriction. One would have thought that an OLR would provide more protection for the public than a determinate sentence. I do not know whether that has been dealt with in the amendments that have just been referred to.
Q
Jonathan Hall: It is the fact that risk changes. You want to make a decision about when someone is going to be released in the light of all the information at the point of time at which release becomes an issue. People might become more radical in prison, and it seems to me that allowing a body to make a decision on whether they are safe in the light of all the information is preferable to a decision to impose a determinate sentence taken by a judge, who does not know, actually, whether in the 14 years or 16 years imposed that person will be safe.
Q
Jonathan Hall: I think it is carried out not by the Risk Management Authority but by assessors who are certified by the authority. I am not a Scottish lawyer, but that is my understanding.
Q
Jonathan Hall: Yes, it is. One of the things that I discovered when I did my MAPPA review is that there is probably work to be done to ensure that where a dangerous offender is considered by a Parole Board, whether in Scotland or in England and Wales, all the information relevant to the question of risk—including, in certain circumstances, sensitive information—is brought to the attention of the Parole Board. There are ways and means of doing that. So there are certainly improvements that can be made about the way in which the Parole Board can operate, but yes, that is right: the Parole Board would have a role.
Q
“It would be preferable if Clause 6 was disapplied where an Order for Lifelong Restriction is passed. This also raises the question of whether a more flexible indeterminate sentence, such as the Order for Lifelong Restriction, is not preferable generally to the inflexibility of a serious terrorism sentence.”
Those are your views. Have you seen anything to change your mind since you wrote the note?
Jonathan Hall: No, those are my views. It is obviously for Parliament. As I say, I do not know whether the position with orders for lifelong restriction was an oversight in the drafting of the Bill. In Northern Ireland, there is something called an indeterminate custodial sentence, and certainly that can be passed in priority to a terrorism sentence. On the question whether a lifelong restriction is better in principle, I have made my views known. The reason, in a nutshell, is that it is a very difficult to judge risk at the point of sentencing.
Q
Jonathan Hall: I do not think I can comment on that.
Q
Jonathan Hall: I have obviously had discussions, but I have not been able to identify a cogent business case. Reference has been made to reducing the administrative burden. I do not fully understand that point because, as I said in my note, there are cases in which what you might call a new variant or a light-touch TPIM has been made. The courts have yet to say that those are not an acceptable way of proceeding, so it seems to me that there are options already on the table.
Q
Jonathan Hall: No. What has been communicated to me is that this is something for the future. There is a phrase that counter-terrorism officials like to use: “having a tool in the toolbox”. You could probably summarise this by saying that it will be another tool in the toolbox. They cannot necessarily say when they would use it, but it might be beneficial in the future.
Q
Jonathan Hall: I should start by saying that when the control order regime was in force, and the standard was reasonable grounds to suspect, that was not found to be unlawful. I cannot and do not put forward the suggestion that this change would be unlawful; it is a legislative choice.
As far as safeguards are concerned, you will probably have seen from my notes that here you have a double whammy. It is not just reducing the standard of proof but allowing TPIMs to endure forever. Something that was proposed by my predecessor, which would be an option for Parliament, is to say that if it were right that a TPIM should continue beyond two years, at least at that stage the authorities should be able to say, on the balance of probabilities, that the person really is a terrorist. That is an example of a safeguard.
Turning to the question of enduring TPIMs, another safeguard could be to ensure that a judge would have to give permission—in other words, to treat going beyond the two years without any additional proof of new terrorism-related activity as requiring a higher threshold, or some sort of exceptionality or necessity test, as a further safeguard for the subject. Again, I do not think the authorities will be unwise in the way that they use that, but there is a risk that people will be on TPIMs for a very long time indeed. As you say, they have not been prosecuted, and it seems to be right in principle and fair that there should be some additional safeguards for those individuals.
Q
Jonathan Hall: As things currently stand, yes.
Q
Mr Hall, thank you for the very thorough online report. It is over 200 pages, and it is obviously a very thorough piece of work. I want to ask a general question from the perspective of one of my constituents. Looking at the overall measures that the Bill would bring in, you must agree that they will make the average citizen safer.
Jonathan Hall: I think some measures certainly will. For some measures, I am less clear in my mind that they will. It would be going too far to say that some of them would have a negative effect, although there is always a question about whether people being in prison for longer will make them safer when they come out.
Something that I was struck by, when I started doing this job, was that most terrorism sentences are quite short. The reason for that is that counter-terrorism police want to go in early and stop attack planning. They may go in when they have intelligence, but before the evidence is really there. They may have secret sources that they cannot use in court. That often results in finding things on phones or computers, which results in lots of convictions for having attack manuals, but not many convictions for attack planning. In practice, that means that most people convicted of terrorism offences will come out after a period of time.
The police and MI5 are always thinking, “How can we make the risk as low as possible when that person eventually comes out?” Obviously, one of the issues that one has to confront is that prisons do not always end up making people more safe. Extending their time in custody for a bit makes someone safer in the sense that they are off the streets for that period of time, but it does not necessarily mean that they are safer when they come out.
All I would say is, yes, there are some bits that are definitely to be welcomed. Anything that allows additional monitoring, that increases licences and that allows the police more monitoring powers is to be welcomed. Some of the things I am less sure about.
Q
Tim Jacques: I do not want to dodge the question, but these people will come out of prison at some point. My understanding of the measures in the Bill is that they will come out later, rather than sooner. We have to manage and mitigate the risk as and when they come out. We have to manage them when they come out, and they are going to come out at some point. That is the point for us.
Q
Tim Jacques: I do see his point, yes. The new variant, as Jonathan describes it, is about using fewer measures and can include, of course, not relocating the subject, which was a matter of discussion earlier. Because each measure has to be justified as necessary and proportionate to the Home Secretary and then approved by the court, of course each one of the measures and the case for each one of the measures can be, and very often is, challenged on behalf of the subject. In simple terms, the fewer measures there are, the less opportunity there is for challenge and the less need for administrative work to deal with that. That is where that comes into play. It is MI5’s view that potentially there is further opportunity for them to get engaged in that if there is a lower standard of proof, and for disclosure of sensitive material potentially.
Q
Tim Jacques: Well, a TPIM is a TPIM. We have the option of a TPIM to manage that case, yes, as it currently stands. MI5 has pointed out that there is no case thus far where the standard of proof has been a blocker.
That is quite an important statement: there is no case so far where the current standard of proof has prevented an application for a TPIM. Thank you.
Q
Tim Jacques: Absolutely. Sadly, we have seen—you have mentioned the case that is within my background knowledge—very recent examples of very young people who pose an extreme risk to the public. It is sad, but it is real and it is true.
I would like to add to what Julie Marson said. I do not think we can say often enough how much we and our constituents appreciate the risk that police officers put themselves in. You are there for us. I think all political parties would want to associate themselves with that. Thank you.
Tim Jacques: Thank you.
On a point of order, Mr Robertson. Given that the Government have tabled 17 pages of amendments to the Bill, would it be in order for us to invite Mr Jonathan Hall to provide a further note on the Bill?
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill (Second sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateJoanna Cherry
Main Page: Joanna Cherry (Scottish National Party - Edinburgh South West)Department Debates - View all Joanna Cherry's debates with the Home Office
(4 years, 4 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
Peter Dawson: There are two aspects in particular. One I have spoken about: the absence of a process for some of the people affected. There is probably nothing more to say on that.
The second is probably rather more controversial because it is about the length of sentences. The Government, in explaining the Bill and justifying a 14-year minimum, say that that gives time for work to be done with the offender during the sentence. That is much longer than is needed for that work to be done. The difficulty with very long sentences, across the board, is that they destroy what is known in the trade as protective factors—they destroy the things that are most likely to help someone out of crime in the future.
Relationships are an obvious example. For somebody who is convicted in their late teens or early 20s and who is not released until their mid to late 30s, the opportunity to build a life that is worth living, in which they can contribute to or play a part in society, has very often been destroyed. All of the things that the rest of us do during that period in our lives have not happened and may not happen once that person is released. It is a disgruntling process. Long sentences are justified for the most serious crime, but the longer we make them, the more harm we do and the more difficult it is for the person to live the rest of their life in the way that we all do.
Q
Peter Dawson: It is essential. We know that there is no evidence of any deterrent effect with long sentences—they are not protecting in that way; they only have a protective impact by taking that particular person off the street for that length of time—but people are going to be released, and that is when the risk arises, so I would say rehabilitation is absolutely essential for public protection. You cannot trade off one against the other. If you remove incentive—if you destroy all the things that keep somebody interested in a life without crime—then you are just delaying risk for when the moment for release comes.
Q
Peter Dawson: Well, I draw on it heavily. Once somebody is in prison, you have this enormous acreage of time to fill. People struggle to adjust to prison. People often have a tremendous sense of grievance in the early years of a long sentence, and very often a sense of grief as well, and very often remorse. There is a sort of teachable moment when someone may change their behaviour, but that [Inaudible] if there is nothing after that moment.
People are completely subject to the authority of the system. They are very sensitive to whether the system plays fair by them. If the system invests in their rehabilitation, but then does not follow through, and all they have ahead of them is time that serves no purpose, which is simply time to fill, then grievance grows. Once somebody has a legitimate grievance in prison, the chance of them engaging with anything more constructive reduces dramatically. In terms of managing difficult people in prison who can be very dangerous, this is a dangerous problem.
The other thing I would say, and I say this as someone who governed prisons and had responsibility for the safety of everybody in the prison—staff, prisoners and visitors—is that crime happens in prisons too. Prisoners without hope and prisoners with a sense of grievance are dangerous to the other prisoners and the staff around them as well. We have seen the homicide rate in prisons rise in recent years and at the same time the number of people serving very long sentences or sentences with no release has also risen.
Q
My final question relates to polygraphs. You mentioned the importance of evidence, and later this afternoon we are seeing a professor who is an expert in this area, as far as evidence is concerned. Would you agree that where polygraphs are used just to provide a bit more background information and perhaps prompt further investigation, rather than being used to have a biting and binding consequence, there can be some value in that, as part of a holistic assessment to work out where more work needs to be done? Nobody is suggesting that it would lead to a direct, binding consequence. Does that give you any assurance?
Les Allamby: It gives me, I have to say, a rather limited measure of reassurance. I say that because it seems to me that if that is the case, then frankly that ought to be written into the Bill. It ought to be clear that the outcome of a polygraph test on its own should not have any adverse impact.
If you are going to introduce polygraph tests, you really should pilot them. I will quickly give you an example. It may seem a slightly odd analogy, but I used to sit on the Social Security Advisory Committee, and I remember being told many years ago by the Department for Work and Pensions that it was looking at voice recognition, as a way of starting to tell whether somebody might be telling the truth or not. Great play was made about that approach as a possible way forward in fraud detection, etc. It unravelled as the evidence became clearer that there were significant flaws in using that technology for making assumptions about whether individuals were telling the truth.
I cannot draw any objective scientific comparison between voice recognition and polygraphs, but it is a cautionary tale of rushing into using technology without piloting it and really considering what other safeguards you should have before using it.
Q
Les Allamby: Yes, certainly. One concern is the relative absence of safeguards around extending it beyond two years. I think there ought to be additional judicial safeguards. There ought to be a test, if you are going to extend beyond two years, as to whether there is a compelling basis for doing so.
I have concerns that the loosening of the test from the balance of probabilities to reasonable suspicion. I note that we have slalomed, going back to control orders, as to what the required burden of proof is. I note the issues David Anderson raised. I also noted that the European convention on human rights memorandum issued by the Department suggested that things had changed between 2015 and 2020, but I am unsure whether that change is sufficiently compelling to reduce the test from balance of probabilities to reasonable suspicion.
TPIMs are used in a very small number of cases. They are oppressive. None the less, they are utilised on a sparing basis. But you need additional safeguards, if you will extend them beyond two years. Two years is a significant period of time in someone’s life to restrict their freedom of movement and their liberty, to the extent that TPIMs currently do, bearing in mind some of the additional provisions that will now be contained in TPIMs.
Q
“New subsection (5) establishes that statements or physiological reactions of the offender in polygraph sessions cannot be used as evidence in proceedings for an offence against the released person.”
Does that provide you with the comfort you were seeking?
Les Allamby: Yet again, it provides me with a very limited measure of reassurance. It is absolutely right that you should not be able to take someone back to court to suggest a new offence has been committed on the basis of the polygraph, so that provides a measure of reassurance.
But I am mindful that if, for example, you are released on licence and you fail a polygraph test, it can be used to revoke your licence and place you back in prison. That is a pretty severe consequence for technology that has not been piloted. The reassurance is welcome in those terms, but you have to understand where else the ramifications of—
Q
Michael Clancy: Yes, I believe so.
Q
Michael Clancy: I found Mr Hall’s analysis of the issue of orders for lifelong restriction very compelling. As he points out, this is a unique type of sentence, imposed
“for serious violent offences if certain risk criteria are met”—
for example,
“where the offender would otherwise seriously endanger the lives, or physical or psychological wellbeing, of members of the public at large.”
Therefore, I think we should view Mr Hall’s evidence carefully. He points out in his note:
“An Order for Lifelong Restriction is an indeterminate sentence comprising a stated period of detention or imprisonment (called a punishment part) during which the offender cannot be considered for release, followed by the continued incarceration of the offender unless and until the Parole Board for Scotland is satisfied that the offender no longer”
carries such a risk. That implies a paradox: the 14-year sentence plus the extended sentence might be a shorter period in prison than one under an order for lifelong restriction, so we have to be careful about weighing Jonathan Hall’s evidence against the provisions in the Bill. I hope that answers your question.
Q
Michael Clancy: Yes. Well, I do not pretend to know the mind of Scottish Ministers as to why they have not introduced polygraphs in Scotland. I suspect that they think the jury is out on that question, because of the variable opinions about the value of polygraphs.
Q
Michael Clancy: That is true: they are not.
Q
“responsibility, organisation, funding, monitoring and training”.
Can you elaborate on that?
Michael Clancy: It would be a significant step, because there has been no prior consultation to discuss the appropriateness of the use of polygraphs, how that would be implemented and whose responsibility it would be to arrange for polygraphs to be used in Scotland. Those are the kinds of issues that need to be explored quite carefully. It would also be important to know how they will be resourced. We are going to enter into a period of extraordinary public expenditure difficulty in the next few months and years, so introducing something that would be a significant expense in terms of their usage, the training of the operators and such, would be something one would want to look at very carefully.
Q
Michael Clancy: Before I answer that, could I add a small coda to the provisions about polygraphs? Under clause 33, a new section is inserted into the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993, which provides that
“Scottish Ministers may…specify a polygraph condition”.
The emphasis of that discretion in the Bill is an acknowledgement that this matter would be within the devolved competence of Scottish Ministers to be talking about and implementing legislation for. It would therefore be a question to ask Scottish Ministers, as to what their views are about the implementation of polygraphs in Scotland.
Going back to the standard of proof—
Q
Michael Clancy: Yes, that is correct.
Q
Michael Clancy: Again, we set out some views in our memorandum. Moving from a position where it was on the balance of probabilities to a reasonable suspicion is a significant drop. It is even a drop from reasonable belief, which was a prior standard used in the old control orders that preceded TPIMs. We take that as being something that is problematic. It certainly indicates a lower standard, but that is about as far as I would put it at the moment. It is within the range of civil contemplation. We have got to be cautious about what we actually mean by reasonable suspicion. The balance of probabilities means satisfaction on the evidence that the occurrence is more likely than not. Reasonable suspicion is simply, “Have I got any basis for thinking that this is the case?”
Q
I have one final point. You mentioned concerns about renewal. Of course, renewal, under these proposals, would take place annually. And you mentioned a few moments ago judicial oversight as a concern. Of course, the subject of the TPIM can at any time bring a legal challenge against the use of the TPIM if they feel that it has become unfair. Does the availability of that mechanism to bring a challenge give you reassurance that the subject of the TPIM does have recourse to the courts, and can be protected by a judge, if he or she feels that that is necessary?
Michael Clancy: Well, of course, yes, it gives me some reassurance. I am glad to hear you make such a clear statement of the interpretation of the Bill. Certainly, the TPIM is reduced for one year, but it is capable of being made indefinite. If one were to take action—as you have suggested someone who is subject to one of these orders might take action—it might be the case that the judge would only be able to quash the TPIM rather than make any variation. That might be a solution that we would mutually accept, but there may be implications from that I suppose.
Q
Michael Clancy: I have no evidence. As I have said, the important thing would be to see how this change to the legislation works and then, in a shortish period of time—between two to five years—think in terms of having some kind of post-legislative review, which would enable us to see whether this legislation had functioned properly and had met the objectives that the Committee has been discussing this afternoon of making people safer and protecting them. Then we can come to a view as to whether or not that change in the standard of proof was the right one.
Q
Michael Clancy: Yes.
Q
Michael Clancy: As far as I know. I have not actually seen a statement by Jonathan Hall about the burden of proof, but I am sure that you are leading me to the conclusion that there is one.
Yes. He has given us evidence this morning and provided a note to that effect, but, as always, you are being scrupulously fair.
Absolutely. Are there any further questions? In that case, Mr Clancy, thank you very much for giving your evidence today.
Michael Clancy: Thank you, Mr Chairman. It has been a pleasure, a rather disembodied pleasure, but a pleasure none the less.
Examination of Witness
Professor Donald Grubin gave evidence.
Q
Professor Grubin: I was a member of a risk management authority for a number of years, so I know how they work and what they look at. When you talk about piloting, are you looking to get disclosures that will have the same levels of accuracy? There is no reason why a Scottish offender should be any different from an English or American one. The polygraph should work in the same way. There is a lot of experience now on how to implement. From my point of view, this is one of the few things where we have been able to scale up from pilot studies to actual implementation and to continue to keep its integrity and keep it working. I do not see why any of that would be any different in Scotland. I appreciate there are resource and training issues, but that would not be a reason not to pilot it. That would be a reason to get the training and implementation issues in place.
Q
Professor Grubin: Yes.
Q
Professor Grubin: No wiggle room.
Q
Professor Grubin: They are not under the conscious control of the subject. We know that. Also, you get those responses not just from being deceptive; there is a range of things that can cause that response. In a polygraph test, somebody does not just walk into the room, get hooked up to a polygraph and then get asked questions. It is a fairly lengthy process. It takes at least an hour: typically two or three hours for a polygraph test. Most of that is spent in a pre-test interview where you go through information with the examinee with the aim of making sure that, if he is responding, he is responding because he is being deceptive and not for some other reason. That is where are lot of the training comes from and that is what differentiates a good polygraph examiner from a bad one: the way they have approached the interview and the test means that those responses are seen because of deception. It doesn’t always happen, which is why we get the one in five, one in 10 error rate. What you are looking for is physiological responses associated with deception. They can be associated with other things as well, but the aim of the polygraph test is to try to make sure it is because somebody is being deceptive.
Q
Professor Grubin: It is not valuable at all. You cannot use polygraph testing as a means of testing intentions. The polygraph is looking specifically at behaviours. Your colleague referred to concrete, very narrow questions of the type, “Have you done this?” They can be screening-type questions, or they can be very specific, such as, “Did you rob the bank?”, “Did you shoot the gun?” or whatever. It is not a tool for eliciting intentions or validating responses to those sorts of question.
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill (Seventh sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateJoanna Cherry
Main Page: Joanna Cherry (Scottish National Party - Edinburgh South West)Department Debates - View all Joanna Cherry's debates with the Home Office
(4 years, 3 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI accept what the hon. Gentleman says and the evidence given by the assistant chief constable. However, the assistant chief constable acknowledged that all of those circumstances currently exist, and that there has been no case where an application for a TPIM has not been granted. I think he was saying that shifting from the balance of probabilities to reasonable suspicion would inevitably make it easier, but he had not experienced, nor did he envisage, any circumstances where that practically had happened or would happen.
As I said at the outset, we come to this wanting to assist and support the Government, but we need to hear a little more justification for this measure in terms of its effectiveness and the reason for it. We will not seek to divide the Committee on the amendment. I tabled it to raise our concerns and those of groups in society, to give the Minister the opportunity to address some of those concerns, and to explain why we not only in principle but now clearly in practice support much of what the Government are trying to do.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Robertson, and to follow the hon. Member for St Helens North. Before I speak to the specifics of amendment 58, which I do not intend to press to a vote—it is very much a probing amendment—I will reiterate the position of the Scottish National party on the Bill.
We recognise that it is the duty of any Government to keep their citizens safe and secure, and all who serve in Parliament have an obligation to assist in that endeavour. We have already given the Government our assurance that we will attempt to be as constructive as possible, to ensure that the challenge of terrorism is met and that we keep people in all communities across these islands as safe as is reasonably possible. However, we are also mindful of our duties as parliamentarians to uphold the highest standards of human rights protections.
I thank the hon. and learned Lady for her constructive tone. Before she gets into the detail, will she tell us whether the Government in Holyrood will grant a legislative consent motion for the Bill?
As the Minister knows, discussions about that are ongoing. He may take it that the constructive approach that I am indicating on behalf of the Scottish National party applies across the board, including the party in government in Scotland. He is aware from our discussions that there are certain concerns the impact of aspects of the Bill on devolved matters. They were addressed last week by my hon. Friend the Member for East Lothian in respect of the order for life-long restriction and the question of polygraph testing. We wish to be constructive on those matters, and that will be the approach of my colleagues at Holyrood.
Today I am focusing on TPIMs, which are a reserved matter. It is fair to say that my colleagues in Holyrood and Humza Yousaf, Scotland’s Justice Minister, have expressed some of the concerns that I am about to elaborate on. Like the hon. Member for St Helens North, my essential concern is that we have not yet seen the case for change—the case for lowering the standard of proof. We do not believe the Government have made that case, and in so saying we are in good company.
Our amendment 58, like the official Opposition’s amendment 69, seeks to raise the standard of proof, albeit it using a slightly different formulation. It is a probing amendment, but in truth, we believe that the standard of proof should stay as it is, because we do not think a case has been made out to change it. We also believe that that is where the balance of the expert evidence that this Committee has heard lies.
It is important to remember that, as has been alluded to, the changes in the Bill align the TPIMs regime more closely with its predecessor, the control orders regime. It is also important to remember that the concerns about control orders were widely shared across the House by Members from all parties. Those concerns are legitimate, because TPIMs restrict some of our most fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and freedom to have a private and family life. All these fundamental freedoms are restricted when somebody is sent to prison and convicted, but with a TPIM the person involved does not need to have been convicted of any crime for those freedoms to be restricted.
A TPIM is really just a step away from imprisonment, and depending on the package of restrictions, it can amount to a deprivation of liberty for the purposes of article 5 of the European convention on human rights, which for the time being at least is still a part of our domestic law. As none of the exceptions to the right to liberty in article 5 is applicable to the TPIMs regime, if the package of restrictions around a TPIMs regime amount to a deprivation of liberty, article 5 of the ECHR is breached. It is vital, therefore, that the TPIMs regime remains subject to the strictest of safeguards.
The current safeguard whereby a TPIM can only be imposed on the balance of probabilities is something that the Government are seeking to reduce considerably. We are concerned that the low threshold is disproportionate, and we do not think the Government have made out the case for lowering the threshold. It may well be that lowering the threshold would ease the administrative burden on the Government in terms of the evidence that is required for an application for a TPIM to be granted, but easing administrative burdens is not a sufficient reason to lower the standard of proof so drastically.
As I said, I will not push amendment 58 to a vote today, but if the Government continue to fail to deliver any compelling justification for their action, I anticipate that when the Bill returns to the Floor of the House, similar amendments will be tabled and there may even be a vote on whether this change should be made. The concerns that I am expressing are widely held. The hon. Member for St Helens North has told us that they are shared by the official Opposition and by the respected bodies that he listed. I know that some Conservative Back Benchers also share these concerns. Indeed, the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member, is anxious, regarding this change as a lowering of the safeguards in relation to TPIMs. I am indebted to that Joint Committee for assisting me in my understanding of these issues.
Perhaps the most significant evidence this Committee has heard was from the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall QC. He has said that
“there is reason to doubt whether there exists an operational case for changing the TPIM regime at this point in time.”
I would submit that, notwithstanding the intervention on the hon. Member for St Helens North, we have heard nothing in evidence that has convinced Mr Hall QC otherwise. I asked him whether the Government had given him a business case or a justification for lowering standards of proof. He replied:
“I have obviously had discussions, but I have not been able to identify a cogent business case.” ––[Official Report, Counter-terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 15, Q31.]
That is what is missing here.
The lack of cogency or reasoned argument for the need for change mirrors the lack of appropriate evidence or justification that was presented to the House on Second Reading. If we look at the impact assessment, we see that certain questions are posed, such as:
“What is the problem under consideration? Why is government intervention necessary?”
However, the answers given to such questions relate solely to convicted offenders, with only a later reference to the policy objective to “better protect the public” and a link to the issue of
“individuals of terrorism concern outside of custody.”
Then, there is a vague explanation that the Bill will allow for more effective intervention when that is required. On the changes to TPIMs, the impact assessment says that they
“will enhance the ability of operational partners, such as counterterrorism policing, to manage the risk posed by individuals subject to TPIMs.”
It says that the change to the standard of proof will simply
“help ensure that operational partners are better able to impose TPIM notices on individuals where there is a requirement to protect national security.”
No further justification is given.
The hon. and learned Lady seems to be arguing for not reducing the burden of proof at all, but the amendment in her name suggests changing “suspecting” to “believing”. “Believing” would still be a reduction from the current standard of proof, so does she accept that there is potentially a halfway house, or is she arguing for no reduction at all?
My primary position is that there should be no reduction at all. That is why I have gone to some lengths to set out the lack of a cogent business case for any reduction. The purpose of the amendment is very much like that of the amendment from the hon. Member for St Helens North: to suggest a halfway house and to probe whether the Government can come up with the business case. I will not push the amendment to a vote.
I end by reiterating what the hon. Member for St Helens North said, which is that it does not seem to be the case that the current standard of proof has been an impediment to the security services. We have had no evidence that it has prevented the security services from seeking a TPIM where they considered it necessary and appropriate to do so. To use the words of Jonathan Hall, until we have that sort of cogent business case, I do not think the Government have made their case for reducing the standard of proof.
I will not press my amendment at this stage, but I expect to see similar amendments when the Bill returns to the Floor of the House. Without such amendments, I would suspect that clause 37 would face a challenge on the Floor of the House.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Mr Robertson. I have listened very carefully to hon. Members. I appreciate the comments, concerns and the constructive way in which they have made their arguments. I support the Government, and I support the principle of TPIMs and of using every tool that we have in our armoury to protect the public, which I know is a concern for hon. Members.
I would like to try to put this into context, which is important, today of all days. Today is 7 July—7/7—and the 15th anniversary of one of the worst attacks that this country and this city have ever faced. It is an important reminder of why we are here doing this and why the Government want to bring in this legislation to protect the public.
With the indulgence of the Chair and the Committee, I would like to talk about my friend Louise—I will not get emotional. Fifteen years ago today, my friend Louise was on a train from Aldgate to Liverpool Street. The night before, she had had a great night out. She had been in Trafalgar Square, celebrating the fact that London had just won the bid to host the Olympics.
It was a very busy train. She was standing when the train was rocked by an explosion in the next carriage to her. Louise’s carriage filled with smoke. The lights went out and the train screeched to a juddering halt. She says her heart was beating so much she thought it was going to come out of her chest, but she fought to keep calm amid the screams and the panic around her.
Some people managed to control their panic and started helping each other. They were calling up and down the train for doctors and nurses—anyone who could come and help. Some people had fallen. Some had hit their heads. It was chaos. Some people tried to get out. They were trying to get out of the windows between the carriages. They tried to prise the doors apart. None of that would work. Someone cried out that there was a body on the track.
They waited in the dark. Some emergency lights were going on, but it was mainly dark, for over an hour, until Louise says she saw the top of a policeman’s helmet outside the tunnel. From that moment—seeing the policeman—she felt safe. All of a sudden, she felt that she was going to get out and that everything would be all right.
They could not open the doors, so those who were able to moved out of the way to make way for the injured to be carried or to walk past them. They were bloodied, black, bewildered. Many of them were bandaged with commuters’ possessions, like belts and scarves and ties. After what seemed like forever, Louise was able to get off the train, but she had to walk past the bombed carriage. She said it looked like it had just been ripped apart like a can of Coke.
She passed two bodies on the track, covered up by a fluorescent transport worker’s jacket. She saw a man who was badly injured being tended to by paramedics. He was barely clothed and was propped up against the tunnel wall—his entire body blackened by bomb blast.
She said it was very surreal to come from that black, hellish atmosphere into the light, where it was light, there were helicopters above, there were blue lights and sirens, and there was a triage unit on the pavement where people were being treated. Quite surreally, she was told to give her details to the police and she walked off into London, trying to find her husband and blackened by soot. She said she just wanted a cup of tea, very weirdly.
The “Sliding Doors” moments, and the fear, panic and shock, came later. The overriding feeling she was left with was why did she get into that carriage, why did she not get into the next carriage and why did she survive, when so many others did not. She was determined not to change her way of life, so she got straight back on the tube and went straight back to work. I think she personifies bravery, and what we always say, that in the face of terrorism we just get on with it and we will not let our way of life be changed.
Today, 15 years to the day afterwards, Louise will be leaving flowers at Aldgate, as she does every year. Many of her fellow passengers and other victims who were affected by the incident have never been back on a tube. Some are still suffering from anxiety and depression, some suffered life-changing injuries, some lost a loved one and some will never see the light of day again. Over the weekend, I asked Louise what she would say to the Committee. This is what she said:
“Terrorism is the biggest threat we face to our way of life. I have so much faith in our intelligence and security services. I feel they should be given whatever powers and resources they need to fight it. Whilst there will always be those who slip through thej net, especially the lone wolves, we need to feel safe and learn lessons, and let our police and courts have the authority to act and protect us.”
Today I wanted to talk about Louise and pay tribute to her, and all of those affected, not just in that incident but in others. My belief is that the best tribute we could all pay is to pass this Bill.
I will elaborate on the questions a little further. Question 50 was specifically about TPIMs and the burden of proof. To clear that up, I will read question 50 in full—it is not very long. “For those three reasons”, which I will go through in a moment,
“you are being categorically clear with this Committee and with Parliament that the proposed lower standard of proof”—
which we are now discussing—
“would be a benefit to the police and the security services, and that it would make the public safer.”
I was expressly referring not just to TPIMs but to the standard of proof. Assistant Chief Constable Jacques replied:
“That is the view of the security services…that is their clear view.”—[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 22, Q50.]
He was answering specifically on TPIMs and on the burden of proof in question 50.
If the evidence of the assistant chief constable and the three examples are so central to the Government’s business case, why were they not in the impact assessment and why were they not mentioned on Second Reading, when others and I were probing the Minister? For instance, the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst, who is Chair of the Justice Committee, asked for the justification for the change. It seems to me the Government are seizing on this now as a justification. If it is the justification, flesh it out, put it in a business case but also, answer the question: why was it not there originally as a justification?
I thank the hon. and learned Lady for her intervention. First, some of the details I am about to take the Committee through were mentioned on Second Reading. My right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) and I expressly mentioned the possibility of people returning from conflict zones such as Syria. In response to repeated interventions from the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), I gave the justification in general terms, which have been borne out subsequently by the detailed evidence.
The problem of people returning from Syria, which I accept, is a significant one that has existed for a number of years. Is the Minister saying in terms that the current TPIM regime—the current standard of proof—has prevented the security services from dealing with the problem of people returning from Syria? If that is what he saying, he should say so in bald terms, rather than seizing on something after the fact to justify this significant change.
I will finish dealing with the hon. and learned Lady’s previous intervention and then I will answer her second one. She was asking why the case was not made more fully on Second Reading. I said it was made in general terms and the example of Syria was given. I will come on to that in a moment. The reason we have witnesses appearing before Public Bill Committees is precisely to serve this purpose: to bring out the detail and let them give their testimony to the Committee and the House. The detailed testimony given by Assistant Chief Constable Tim Jacques on the morning of 25 June is precisely why we have witnesses. It is serving the function it should have done, which was to give the Committee and the House the details they asked for on Second Reading and which hon. Members are asking for today.
I turn to the detail of Tim Jacques’s testimony and give the specific and precise reasons why he and the security services believe this is important, one of which is the Syrian example, which I will elaborate on in just a moment. Assistant Chief Constable Jacques’s first reason for why the lower standard of proof is necessary to protect the public is that we may find that there are individuals whose
“risk profile is rapidly increasing”—[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 20, Q49.]
If someone’s behaviour is quickly changing they may go from posing a potential threat to an actual threat to actually offending very quickly. He says that it is that rapid change of circumstances that necessitates a lower burden of proof. He then goes on to give a second reason, which was mentioned by the hon. and learned Lady a moment ago, which is the threat of somebody returning from overseas. He says that where someone has been overseas—for example, in Syria—it is extremely difficult, as one can readily imagine, to gather evidence that would meet the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Clearly, if someone has been operating in Syria, there will typically be no signals intelligence or eye-witness testimony, because it is very hard to get witnesses from Syria to come here, and there will be no results of other forms of surveillance: all the evidence that would normally be presented in a criminal prosecution enabling somebody’s guilt to be established beyond reasonable doubt. It is difficult—impossible, I would say—to achieve that when someone is returning. That is why, in those thankfully relatively rare circumstances, we might need to work to a lower standard of proof and reasonable suspicion in order to protect the public.
The hon. and learned Lady essentially said that people have been going to Syria for five years now, and indeed returning for four or five years. We heard in evidence from both Jonathan Hall and Tim Jacques that, historically, there have not been any examples where a TPIM was desired but not obtained owing to the burden of proof. In fact, that observation applies more generally and not only to the Syrian example. Let me directly answer the criticism immediately.
It is true, I accept, that there have been no occasions historically when a TPIM was desired but not granted owing to the burden of proof that currently exists. However, we are not seeking simply to cater for circumstances that occurred historically; we seek in this legislation, and as parliamentarians, to cater for risks that may arise in the future that may not have arisen in the past. The absence of such risks having happened in the last five or six years does not establish definitively that they will not happen in the future—such a risk might arise in the future. Indeed, the assistant chief constable effectively said that he thinks that is possible, which is why he is advocating for the lower burden of proof.
We must cater for risks, not historical certainties. That is why the evidence of the assistant chief constable is so important and why the Syrian example is a good one, even though historically we have not been inhibited. We might be in the future. A few moments ago, we heard a powerfully eloquent description of the devastating consequences that follow when the public are not protected.
Assistant Chief Constable Jacques laid out a third reason in his evidence concerning sensitive material—material that is gathered covertly, or the disclosure of which might prejudice investigations or the security services:
“The disclosure of sensitive material would potentially compromise sensitive techniques and therefore make our job and that of the Security Service harder”.––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 21, Q49.]
He says that, with a lower standard of proof, that disclosure would be required less frequently so there would not be such a requirement to disclose sensitive information.
In answer to a question posed by both Opposition Front-Bench shadow Ministers, Assistant Chief Constable Jacques laid out the business case powerfully in those three examples that I have just taken the Committee through.
I have the greatest respect for the assistant chief constable and for the assistance he was able to give the Committee, but in a court of law we would call that hearsay evidence. He is not actually dealing with seeking TPIMs. The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, who is charged by the Government with the responsibility of overviewing all this, said that there is no cogent business case.
Can the Minister explain why the independent reviewer is not convinced by the assistant chief constable’s three examples? Mr Hall said that he has had discussions with the Government—presumably the Government have put those examples to him if they are so central to the business case. Can the Minister explain to us why the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation is not convinced that there is a cogent case?
I was not present at those meetings, so I cannot comment on what was discussed. However, the hon. and learned Lady has herself already observed that Assistant Chief Constable Jacques’s critical testimony was ventilated in such details—publicly at least—for the first time in his evidence; of course, Jonathan Hall gave evidence just before Assistant Chief Constable Jacques. As I say, I was not privy to the conversations that took place between Jonathan Hall and my colleagues in the Home Office, so I do not know what case was presented to him, but I do know that the case presented by Tim Jacques was, at least in my view, compelling.
The assistant chief constable said:
“That is the view of the security services. We are not the applicant, but that is their clear view.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 21, Q50.]
Although he was not applying for TPIMs, he is a senior police officer involved in counter-terrorism policing, he had been briefed by the security services before giving evidence, and he is responsible for monitoring and managing TPIMs subsequently. To dismiss his evidence as hearsay—the hon. Gentleman did not, but the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West did—is rather unfair, given that he had the briefing from the security services in front of him when he gave evidence and given the close role he and counter-terrorism police play in managing and monitoring TPIMs.
There is no insult in saying that someone’s evidence is hearsay; it is simply that they are giving evidence about what someone else has told them. I am not undermining the witness in any way, but he is only giving evidence about what he has been told. Let us look at what he said at question 58, when I said:
“So where there is a rapidly escalating situation or where there is a need to manage sensitive material, we already have available to us the option of a new variant TPIM without changing the standard of proof.”
He responded:
“Well, a TPIM is a TPIM. We have the option of a TPIM to manage that case, yes, as it currently stands. MI5 has pointed out that there is no case thus far where the standard of proof has been a blocker.”—[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 23, Q58.]
As I said to him, that is an important answer, albeit that it is hearsay. He is telling us that MI5 has said, in respect of two of the examples that the Minister is giving us as a justification for this significant change, that in no case so far has the current standard of proof been a blocker. Does that not perhaps explain why we have three distinguished Independent Reviewers of Terrorism Legislation supporting the existing standard of proof, rather than this Government’s variation?
I have already accepted, a few minutes ago, that there have not been any historical examples. That was clear from the evidence. I also said, in response to an earlier intervention on Syria, that just because there have not been any historically—we are talking about very small numbers—does not mean to say that there will not be such a situation in the future. We need to guard against potential future risk. That is what we seek to do.
Let me go on to the second plank of my rationale for why this proposed burden of proof is appropriate. It is because there are significant mitigants to any risks of abuse of process, miscarriages of justice or inappropriate behaviour. I rest my case for those mitigants on two legs or stands.
The first is that we do not need to hypothesise about how a Government—any Government—might behave with access to TPIMs, or control orders, with a lower standard of proof. As the hon. Member for St Helens North pointed out, we had control orders, passed by then Labour Government in 2005, which had the lower standard of proof—the reasonable suspicion. Those persisted for approximately six years, from 2005 to 2011. During that period, 52 control orders were issued. On the morning of 25 June, I also asked Jonathan Hall whether he was aware of any misuse in that six-year period—I said seven then, but it is six—when the lower burden of proof prevailed. He said:
“I am not aware of any misuse”.––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 7, Q9.]
I also asked him whether he was aware of the Government ever having misused the powers or used them without care and circumspection; I actually asked whether, as far as he could see, the Government had used the powers “with care and circumspection”. He said:
“I am quite satisfied that the Government are doing that.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 6, Q5.]
So the control orders, as they were then, operated with a lower standard of proof for six years with no abuse or misuse identified.
The hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West raised a question about ECHR article 5 compliance and whether the lower burden of proof would potentially infringe that. I checked that during the debate. During the six years when 52 control orders were used, at no point, despite some challenges, were they found to be not compliant with the ECHR. The Committee can satisfy itself that when they operated previously, they did so without abuse and were not struck down as an instrument as a whole by the court.
The second set of mitigants is to be found in the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, in which the Committee probably knows there are five conditions, labelled A to E, that have to be met for a TPIM to be granted. We are seeking to amend only one of those five conditions, condition A, which pertains to the burden of proof in so far as it touches on terrorism-related activity.
The four other conditions still have to be met and are not being changed by the Bill. For example, condition C requires the Secretary of State to reasonably consider “that it is necessary”—I labour that word “necessary”—
“for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism”.
The Secretary of State must be satisfied that there is necessity. It must not be done on a whim or because it might or may be required. It must be necessary. That is in section 3(3) of the 2011 Act, which is not being amended.
In section 3(4), condition D makes a similar point that the Secretary of State must reasonably consider
“that it is necessary, for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity”.
Again, it uses the word “necessary”—not “possible”, “maybe” or “might”, but “necessary”. It is a very strong word.
Moreover, in section 3(5), condition E says that the Secretary of State must seek permission from the court, as described further in sections 6 and 9 of the Act. They must go to a court of law and make sure that it feels it is reasonable that a TPIM should be granted. At the outset, there is judicial oversight of the process. The Home Secretary cannot, just by a stroke of a pen, give out a TPIM and thereby restrict someone’s liberty. That is a serious matter, as the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West has already said. There is judicial oversight of the process. I say again that four of the five tests laid down in section 3 of the 2011 Act are not changing. They will stay the same.
Moreover, those subjected to a TPIM have a right of appeal against it. The 2011 Act, which, again, is not being amended, provides that they can go to a court if they feel that a TPIM has been unreasonably imposed, unreasonably varied or unreasonably extended. They can ask a court for relief and the court proceedings can carry on according to the principles used in judicial review. Beyond the simple question of burden of proof around terrorist-related activities, there are those further protections in the Bill and from the courts.
I will conclude, Mr Robertson—always welcome words during one of my speeches—by saying that the powers are used sparingly. There were 52 of the old control orders in total over six years, but at any one time no more than 15 were ever in force. As the shadow Minister has said, as of November last year there were five TPIMs in force, although I think that we heard in evidence that the number might subsequently have gone up to six.
We use such powers very sparingly, for the reason that the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West mentioned: they touch on an individual’s liberty. However, they are occasionally, in the words of the Act, “necessary”—necessary to protect the public, necessary to protect people such as Louise who might otherwise be killed, injured or traumatised and necessary to protect our fellow citizens. It is for those reasons of necessity that I respectfully say that the clause as drafted is an integral and an important part of the Bill.
Allow me to explain why the current two-year maximum does not work from a security services perspective. As matters stand, if a TPIM comes to the end of two years and thereby automatically lapses, a brand-new application has to be made, requiring completely fresh evidence, without simply reusing the evidence used at the outset. New evidence must be obtained, which takes some time, particularly if during the two-year period of the TPIM, the subject has been careful to behave themselves, which is the purpose of the TPIM in the first place.
We have had examples of a gap caused by the renewal requirement. Jonathan Hall acknowledged that in answer to my question in his evidence on 25 June,. I asked him about gaps when TPIMs had expired and he said that he had found a couple of examples. He added:
“In one case it was a gap of a year, and in the second it was a gap of 16 months.”
In response, I said:
“It is fair to say that the risk would have existed in that 12 to 16-month period.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; Q2, c. 6.]
I was not asking about things that had actually happened; I was asking about risk—what might have happened. In response to that point, Jonathan Hall replied, “Yes.”
I went on similarly to ask Assistant Chief Constable Jacques whether a risk might exist in that gap. He said:
“Because we jointly manage TPIMs once imposed, I can speak on this. Yes, we do see an increase in the threat if that gap occurs, and that gap has occurred, as Jonathan has pointed out previously.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; Q51, c. 21.]
We therefore have clear evidence, from both the independent reviewer, Jonathan Hall, and counter-terrorism expert Assistant Chief Constable Jacques, telling us that the gap that follows the two-year expiration of a TPIM poses a risk to the public. It is right that in the Bill we seek to close that risk by allowing for carefully considered annual extensions.
In terms of protecting the subject and ensuring that the extensions are not used unreasonably, let me make the following comments to reassure the Committee and, I hope, the whole House. First, the old control order regime did not have the two-year limit. In the period when the control orders introduced by the Labour Government in 2005 were enforced, 30 lasted for two years or less, eight lasted for between two and three years, four lasted for between three and four years, and only three lasted for between four and five years. The clear majority lasted for less than two years. Only a small number—15, according to the figures that I have—lasted for more than two years, and the bulk of those lasted for three or four years. Once again, when the powers are available, they are used circumspectly and sparingly.
Further protections are laid out in statutory provisions in the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, which will continue. The first is found in section 11 of the Act, which requires the Secretary of State to keep TPIMs under review, in particular conditions C and D, which I mentioned earlier. That is given practical effect via a quarterly review process, once every three months, in which the security services and counter-terrorism police participate. Secondly, there is an ongoing right of appeal by the subject laid out in section 16 of the 2011 Act. Section 16(1), which will continue in force, says that if
“the Secretary of State extends or revives a TPIM”,
the right of appeal will apply, so every time a TPIM is extended, the subject, if they think the extension is unreasonable, has the right to go to court to seek protection.
Given that the current gap is posing a risk to the public, as Jonathan Hall and Assistant Chief Constable Jacques very clearly said, and given that there are good and strong safeguards in place, I believe that the provisions in clause 38, allowing considered, thoughtful annual extensions, serve the purpose of protecting the public.
I am not going to speak to amendment 64, but I will speak in support of Labour’s amendment 61 when we get to it.
I beg to move amendment 61, in clause 38, page 34, line 31, at end insert—
“(za) for subsection (3)(a), substitute—
‘(a) may be extended under subsection (2) only if—
(i) the Secretary of State believes on the balance of probabilities that the individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity;
(ii) conditions C and D are met.’”
This amendment requires the standard of proof for renewing a TPIM notice beyond two years to be “on the balance of probabilities”, where no new terrorism-related activity can be demonstrated.
Thank you, Mr Robertson, for your gentle guidance in navigating our way through the numerous amendments. Although they are linked, it is important that we examine them on their own merits. At its core, amendment 61, like the amendment we have just discussed, is about securing strong and robust safeguards, which, as I said, we should use the Bill as an opportunity to promote rather than jettison. We should show confidence in the process and procedures that we are introducing to keep the public safe.
The prospect of a TPIM notice enduring for a prolonged or even indefinite period deserves scrutiny. It is important to remember what a TPIM can involve: overnight residence requirements, relocation to another part of the country, police reporting, an electronic monitoring tag, exclusion from specific places, limits on association, limits on the use of financial services, limits on the use of telephones and computers, and a ban on holding travel documents. Even in the dying part of the Labour party that is the traditional old right, I balk a little at some of that. I accept that it is necessary to monitor very dangerous individuals and keep the public safe, but these are some pretty fundamental liberties that we are talking about denying people. There is a responsibility on all of us to acknowledge that, and to make sure that we give it proper scrutiny. These are, rightly, robust measures, and to reiterate: we do not believe there should be impediments in cases where a longer TPIM notice that would genuinely be in the interests of keeping the public safe and secure, which is of course our first priority, should be extended. It is also important to say that these sanctions, effectively, are imposed on people who have not been convicted of any crime, and that they are being taken in addition to the lowering of the standard of proof and the extension of the period without, it appears, due oversight needs to be properly looked at.
The other point is that TPIMs are resource-intensive instruments. Assistant Chief Constable Jacques clearly said that additional resources would need to be provided. It would be good to hear a commitment from the Minister that that would the case and that, whatever law enforcement would need, and notwithstanding that a spike in TPIMs is not envisaged, the extension thereof and any addition to the current number will be properly and fully resourced.
As the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West said earlier, there is testimony not just from the current reviewer of terrorism legislation, but also from previous ones. Someone as respected as Lord Carlile, for example, said that a differentiated standard of proof, effectively, would be created for extending a TPIM beyond the two-year point. That would add another layer to the complexity of what proof is required at what point, and to what extent. Jonathan Hall also noted on 5 June that that would be the case.
As I said previously, not a single TPIM measure has been rejected to date based on insufficient evidence of the higher standard of proof, so the safeguard would not operationally hinder the TPIM regime, which we agree needs to be strong and flexible. We need to ensure that those TPIMs extended for prolonged periods are subject to an extra level of scrutiny and oversight and that they are applied in reasonable and proportionate terms, fundamentally in keeping with the thrust of what they are designed to do, which is to keep the public safe.
I am grateful for the opportunity to speak in support of amendment 61, and to remind hon. Members of what the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation said in his evidence to us. I will look in particular at his response to my question 33, when he said that the combination of clause 37 and clause 38 is a “double whammy”,
“not just lowering the standard of proof but also allowing TPIMs to endure forever.”—[Official Report, Counter-terrorism and Sentencing Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; Q33, c.15.]
Indeed, he suggested the very safeguards set out in amendment 60 and 61. I support to amendment 61 for that reason. I take hon. Members back to what he said in response to my question 33. I said:
“What about looking at balancing out the changes made in this Bill to TPIMs by introducing some safeguards to ensure that TPIMs do not breach the human rights of a subject of a TPIM? Have you thought about that? We should always remember that the subject of a TPIM has not been convicted of any crime.”
He answered:
“As far as safeguards are concerned, you will probably have seen from my notes that here you have a double whammy. It is not just reducing the standard of proof but allowing TPIMs to endure forever. Something that was proposed by my predecessor”—
he meant Lord Anderson, as the hon. Member for St Helens North said—is that
“if it were right that a TPIM should continue beyond two years, at least at that stage the authorities should be able to say, on the balance of probabilities, that the person really is a terrorist. That is an example of a safeguard.”
He went on:
“Turning to the question of enduring TPIMs, another safeguard could be to ensure that a judge would have to give permission—in other words, to treat going beyond the two years without any additional proof of new terrorism-related activity as requiring a higher threshold, or some sort of exceptionality or necessity test, as a further safeguard for the subject.”
Again, in fairness, he also said:
“I do not think the authorities will be unwise in the way that they use that, but there is a risk that people will be on TPIMs for a very long time indeed. As you say, they have not been prosecuted, and it seems to be right in principle and fair that there should be some additional safeguards for those individuals.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; Q33, cc. 15-16.]
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill (Eighth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateJoanna Cherry
Main Page: Joanna Cherry (Scottish National Party - Edinburgh South West)Department Debates - View all Joanna Cherry's debates with the Home Office
(4 years, 3 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI am grateful to the Minister for reminding us about those different cohorts and how they have been dealt with. Of course, the Opposition very much supported the provisions that were introduced earlier this year. As for this particular cohort, although I still think it is regrettable that there is no role for the Parole Board in working with some of our most dangerous offenders, I see no sense in pressing the clause to a vote. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 5
Review of effects on children and young offenders
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within one year of this Act being passed, lay before Parliament a review of the effects of the provisions of this Act on children and young offenders.
(2) That review must detail any differential effects on children and young offenders in—
(a) sentencing;
(b) release of terrorist offenders; and
(c) the prevention and investigation of terrorism.
(3) The review must consider the impact of imprisonment under this Act on the physical and mental health of children and young offenders.
(4) The review must consider the influences on children and young offenders who commit offences under this Act, including but not limited to—
(a) the internet;
(b) peer-pressure; and
(c) vulnerability.
(5) When conducting a review under this section, the Secretary of State must consult with Scottish Ministers.
(6) The review may make recommendations for further changes to legislation, policy and guidance.
(7) For the purposes of this section, young offenders include adults aged under 25.”—(Joanna Cherry.)
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to review the effects of these measures on children and young offenders. It would also require the Secretary of State to consult with Scottish minister when conducting the review.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe. I apologise if I am interrupting the flow of the hon. Member for Stockton North as we go through the new clauses, but I suspect that he will sympathise with this one, which I move on behalf of the Scottish National party. I remind colleagues that sentencing is a devolved matter, and that there will have to be a legislative consent motion in relation to the Bill, but clearly the Bill has implications for sentencing across the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland.
New clause 5 would require the Secretary of State to carry out a review of the effects of the provisions of the Bill on children and young offenders, to lay that review before the House within one year of the Bill being passed, and to consult with Scottish Ministers when conducting it. The clause reflects concerns already expressed by the hon. Member for Stockton North and by some of our witnesses about the impact of the legislation on children and young people. In support of it, I will refer to four aspects of the evidence that the Committee has received in writing or orally.
The first relates to evidence from the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall, which we heard on the first day of evidence, 25 June—in particular, his responses to questions 15 and 16, which were asked of him by the hon. Member for Stockton North in reference to one of several notes that Jonathan Hall has prepared on the Bill. The hon. Gentleman asked him about point 10 of the first of those notes, titled “Note on Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill: Sentencing Reforms (1)”, in which Mr Hall says:
“The requirement of a minimum mandatory sentence for all adult offenders, however young, puts in doubt whether judges can properly reflect the fact that an adult of 18 years and one month may not be any more mature than a child of 17 years and 11 months”.
Of course, those sentences are not available for a child, but they are available for those defined as over 18. Mr Hall went on to say:
“Age may or may not result in ‘exceptional circumstances’ being found, which is the only basis on which the 14-year minimum can be avoided.”
The hon. Member for Stockton North put it to Mr Hall, in question 15, that that struck him as a cautionary note, and he invited him to elaborate upon it. Mr Hall said:
“I have identified what is really a policy choice for Parliament. As a matter of fact, I can say that an increasing number of quite young people are being caught up in terrorism, including new forms of terrorism—not just conventional Islamist, extremist or right-wing terrorism, but other new emerging forms, such as the incel movement or even things at the very boundaries of what you might consider terrorism that are very violent. It is not impossible that young people will be caught up in this.
The point I am making—I have referred to an authority from England and Wales and I think I have also referred to the approach in Scotland—is that there is recognition that people who are young and immature are probably more susceptible to change than adults. I suppose it is a choice for Parliament, but the age for a mandatory minimum sentence—meaning no prospect of early release, and effectively putting to one side the possibility of reform—might be raised to 21, rather than that being for those in the 18-to-21 bracket. I understand that in Scotland there is a debate over whether it should be as far as 25.
All I can do is identify the choice that has been made and point out that when it comes to sentencing, traditionally it is recognised that people are not necessarily that different when they are one month over 18 as opposed to one month under 18.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 10, Q15.]
The hon. Member for Stockton North said:
“But the bottom line is that with young people, perhaps, there is greater change. You have said that there may be greater opportunity for reform there than with those who are considerably older.”
Mr Hall replied:
“That is what judges are increasingly finding.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 10, Q16.]
The hon. Member for Stockton North has mentioned this afternoon that there might be a greater opportunity for young people to reform their ways and be deradicalized than there is for middle-aged and older people.
My second piece of evidence is Mr Hall’s third note on the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill, which deals specifically with the effect of the proposed changes in sentencing in Scotland and Northern Ireland. In particular, in paragraphs 21 to 26 Mr Hall talks about children and young people, and states:
“Striking features of the proposed legislation concern its application to children and young offenders.
The proposed application of the serious terrorism sentence to offenders aged 18 to 21 in Scotland raises starkly the question of whether there is a bright line between offenders above and below the age of 18. This is because the Scottish Sentencing Council is currently consulting on its third draft guideline, ‘Sentencing Young People’ and proposes that special sentencing principles should apply to offenders up to the age of 25.”
Paragraph 23 of the note states:
“Even if the Sentencing Council guideline does not ultimately go as far as 25, the application of the minimum mandatory sentences to those in the 18 to 21 bracket, and even more so the removal of the role of the Parole Board…for dangerous serious terrorism offenders for both adults and children, appears inconsistent with the distinct youth criminal justice regimes which have developed in each part of the United Kingdom.”
Mr Hall says:
“The current trend in Scotland is towards a welfarist approach to youth criminal justice, reflected in the Scottish government’s Youth Justice Strategy in June 2015. In Northern Ireland, following a recommendation by the Criminal Justice Review…the Youth Justice Agency was established to administer youth justice in Northern Ireland.”
He continues:
“There is a risk in Northern Ireland, as elsewhere, that young offenders may be manipulated by terrorist groups or other unscrupulous individuals operating in the real world or online.”
He concludes at paragraph 26:
“As part of my role I receive regular briefings on counter-terrorism detention. I am aware of children, including quite young children, being arrested and detained for serious offences. Age does not necessarily inhibit capability (particularly technical capability) and intent. The internet, peer-pressure, and vulnerability are all significant factors in the types of offences committed and ideologies espoused. I question whether children who receive extended sentences for serious terrorist offences are so different from children who commit extended sentences for other serious offences, as to justify removing the Parole Board’s role.”
That is a fairly detailed exposition of the concern that the Independent Reviewer of Terrorist Legislation has about the impact of the Bill on children and young offenders.
My third piece of evidence is the written evidence from the Law Society of Scotland. On page 6 it echoes the concerns of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, and draws attention to the fact that the Scottish Sentencing Council is currently consulting on sentencing young people and considering changing the definition of a young person by raising the age to 25. That consultation opened on 28 February and will close on 21 August. Views are being sought on the sentencing of young people, with a recognition that that is complex and challenging and a suggestion that the sentencing of young people requires a more individual approach, with a need to take the unique circumstances of the young person into account.
The Law Society of Scotland states in its evidence that the
“introduction of mandatory minimum sentencing gives rise to concerns about the effect on young persons”,
because, as Jonathan Hall has said, they are more responsive to internet peer pressure and more vulnerable—those are significant factors in their offending.
Peter Dawson, the director of the Prison Reform Trust, has extensive experience of working in the system as a governor and deputy governor. In his oral evidence session, I asked him to elaborate on something that he had told the Minister at the beginning of the session:
“You said that some aspects of the Bill may undermine public protection. Can you summarise what you meant by that?”
Mr Dawson replied:
“There are two aspects in particular. One I have spoken about: the absence of a process for some of the people affected. There is probably nothing more to say on that.
The second is probably rather more controversial because it is about the length of sentences. The Government, in explaining the Bill and justifying a 14-year minimum, say that that gives time for work to be done with the offender during the sentence. That is much longer than is needed for that work to be done. The difficulty with very long sentences, across the board, is that they destroy what is known in the trade as protective factors—they destroy the things that are most likely to help someone out of crime in the future.
Relationships are an obvious example. For somebody who is convicted in their late teens or early 20s and who is not released until their mid to late 30s, the opportunity to build a life that is worth living, in which they can contribute to or play a part in society, has very often been destroyed. All of the things that the rest of us do during that period in our lives have not happened and may not happen once that person is released. It is a disgruntling process. Long sentences are justified for the most serious crime, but the longer we make them, the more harm we do and the more difficult it is for the person to live the rest of their life in the way that we all do.” ––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 34, Q78.]
I then asked Mr Dawson:
“How important is rehabilitating terrorist offenders for the ongoing protection of our constituents and the public at large?”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 35, Q79.]
He said, “It is essential.” I read from that that Mr Dawson was drawing on his long experience to say that we are potentially creating real difficulty for ourselves by applying minimum mandatory sentences to children and young people. Those who are convicted in their late teens and early 20s will not get out until their mid to late 30s. During that time, most of us are maturing, learning how to participate in the labour market, forming significant relationships, and possibly having children or taking on responsibility for children in our wider family and friendship circles. Those convicted young people will be unable to do any of those things, which may prevent their deradicalisation.
Drawing on the evidence from Jonathan Hall, the Law Society of Scotland and Mr Dawson, I think that there is real and well-founded concern about the potential impact of minimum mandatory sentences on children and young people, which happens against the backdrop of divergent approaches to youth justice across these islands—I have explained what is happening and is being contemplated in Scotland, and what is happening in Northern Ireland. It is against the backdrop of those—in my submission—well-placed concerns that I seek to amend the Bill to mandate the Government to carry out, within one year, a review of the effect of the provisions on children and young offenders.
We would probably all accept that children and young people are different from middle-aged and older people and that we perhaps have a special responsibility towards them. In this context, with particular regard to the evidence given by Mr Dawson and Jonathan Hall, we have a responsibility to the public to try to rehabilitate children and young people who become involved in terrorism. There seems to be strong evidence that there is more chance of rehabilitating them than there is with older people.
There are two good reasons to have this review: our responsibilities to children and young people in general and, perhaps more importantly, our responsibility to the public, and British citizens at large, to do what we can to try and deradicalise convicted terrorists. We know we are much more likely to be able to do that with children and young people. I will be interested to hear what the Minister has to say in response to my new clause.
I appreciate the hon. Lady’s intervention and the sentiments behind it, but I am not sure I entirely agree that this very small number of offences can be compared with the theft of apples. We are talking about a tiny handful of people who have committed the most serious offences where multiple people could have been killed and where the judge has found that the offenders are dangerous. Had they simply been misled, or coerced even, it might be open to interpretation as an exceptional circumstance, although we expect the exceptional circumstance derogation to be extremely rare—as the name implies, it is truly exceptional. Should truly exceptional circumstances exist, there is that opportunity open to the judge, but it would have to be truly exceptional.
To emphasise again how small the numbers are, the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton North, reading out my letter when we debated a previous clause, said that, last year, in 2019, of the 22 people convicted of terrorist offences, only four were aged between 18 and 20, and not all of those would meet the criteria for the serious terrorist sentence that we are talking about, so the numbers are microscopically small, thankfully, for those aged between 18 and 20. There is also the exceptional circumstance override, and we are talking about offences of the most serious kind, which have to pass three or four different hurdles before qualifying for the assessment that we have just described. In that context, where the offending is so serious and the risk so grave, the approach being taken is a reasonable one, but I accept the more general point about maturity in other, less serious contexts.
On the question of a review, given that the numbers are so very small, I am not wholly convinced that a bespoke review is the right thing to do, but, of course, there will be a regular review, as I might say frequently in the coming clauses, at the three-year mark, where it is right that the matter gets considered.
The hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West raised some points that will require consideration. It might well be that nobody at all aged 18 to 20 ends up being affected by this measure, in which case it will be a pretty short consideration. Mandating it by statute is not necessary. There are other review mechanisms. As we saw when we debated the Prevent review earlier, if we have too many statutory reviews, we end up tripping over our own shoelaces by failing to meet all the deadlines that we have created.
The questions are serious. I understand and respect them. We will need to debate them in future, quite properly and rightly, but putting this measure in the Bill is a step that we do not need to take this afternoon.
I thank the Minister for taking on board some of the points that I have made. In response to his points, first, I accept that this is only for the most serious terrorist offences. I completely accept that, and I accept that the numbers of children and young people who are so sentenced may be very small, but the important thing is that, if we have a young person or child convicted of a serious terrorist offence, and given the evidence we have heard about the opportunity to deradicalise and rehabilitate, there is all the more reason to try to make sure that that opportunity is taken.
All we are asking for is a review. If it turns out that the numbers are small, as is expected, it will not be a complex or time-consuming review. Although I am not going to push my new clause to a vote, I anticipate bringing it back to the Floor of the House. I would appreciate it if the Minister, in the spirit in which he responded, could take the evidential concerns away and consider what could be done specifically to measure the impact of this legislation on children and young offenders across these isles. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 7
Review of legislation: Northern Ireland
“(1) On an annual basis from the day of this Act being passed, a report that reviews the application of the provisions of this Act in Northern Ireland must be published and laid before both Houses of Parliament by the Secretary of State.
(2) Annual reports under subsection (1) must be produced in consultation with the Northern Ireland Minister for Justice and the Northern Ireland Executive —(Conor McGinn.)
This new clause ensures that all measures in the Bill as they pertain to Northern Ireland shall be reviewed annually with the Northern Ireland Minister for Justice and the Northern Ireland Executive, and a report shall be published and laid before both Houses of Parliament.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, that the clause be read a Second time.
I will not detain the Committee too long. I have much sympathy with what the Minister says about the number of reviews that have been called for, but I hope, similarly, that he might have some sympathy with those of us on the Opposition Benches. While he, in government, gets to do, all we can do at the minute is ask to review. I hope that position might change after the next election.
On Second Reading, a number of hon. Members from Northern Ireland raised the critically important point that this legislation is clearly of great significance to that region. I think we would all wish to acknowledge that so many people there have lived and continue to live with the devastating consequences of violence in their communities. It is only following concerted efforts for peace and reconciliation, which remain so vital that, we see some of those scars starting to heal.
The Minister rightly said that the Bill was designed to deal with terrorism in all its forms and was a UK-wide Bill. However, given the unique and long-standing circumstances in Northern Ireland and the hard work done to build the Good Friday and subsequent agreements and the Northern Ireland Executive, it is important that we do not risk any unintended consequences from measures in the Bill, which could have an effect in Northern Ireland and could have damaging consequences.
To that end, on behalf of the official Opposition, I am tabling new clause 7 to ensure that all measures in the Bill, as they pertain in Northern Ireland, will be renewed annually with the Northern Ireland Justice Minister and the Northern Ireland Executive and that a report is published and laid before both Houses of Parliament. The Minister will know that the Justice Minister in Northern Ireland, with whom he and I have had extensive discussions, has herself expressed some concerns about the extension of provisions in the Bill to Northern Ireland, and has raised some potential inadvertent and unintended consequences that would be undesirable.
It is vital to the success of the legislation in performing and fulfilling a UK-wide function that we seek the benefit of her expertise—or that of whoever holds that post—and continue to monitor the legislation’s implications in Northern Ireland. The structure of sentences in Northern Ireland, for example, differs from that in the rest of the UK, and there are special and unique circumstances there that mean that we ought to ensure we legislate specifically and responsibly. For example, post-sentencing regimes work in prisons for paramilitary prisoners and those in prison for reasons related to terrorist offending, and in terms of an approach to deradicalisation and the points made by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West about young people. Just as the polygraph section of the Bill has been crafted to be permissible but not mandatory in Northern Ireland, so it is right that all aspects of the Bill should be subject to review through the unique prism of Northern Ireland.
As we heard in the evidence sessions, the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission set out a number of concerns about the legislation, including the retrospective nature of some provisions, both in terms of sentencing and release, the polygraph test, as has been mentioned, and the impact of provisions on those under the age of 18. I will not revise all those arguments here—they are known to members of the Committee—but it does seem obvious to me that it would be more advisable for the Government to work constructively with the Minister for Justice, rather than to risk legal or human rights challenges down the line. We spoke about that earlier in the Committee.
Well, this is what happens when you follow someone else’s damned notes. It does not say his name here, but who I am to argue? I call Alex Cunningham.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
If the hon. Lady would like to deliver my speech, I would be quite happy to sit down and shut up. I think she suggested earlier that I was talking a bit too much.
Oh, never? Well that is fine. Maybe it is because we share the same accent and she feels at home when she hears me speak, although I think there is a certain anglification in my accent these days.
I am very relieved to hear that, and I am sure that, as a fellow Scot, you will also appreciate it, Mr McCabe.
The new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission a review and publish a report on the effectiveness of the agencies working to manage offenders who have committed offences under the provisions in the Bill. I know how fond the Minister is of my reviews, and this one would consider the effectiveness of the transition when an offender is transferred from the responsibility of one agency to that of another; the procedural safeguards that are in place to ensure an effective transition; and the processing and transfer of information and intelligence from one agency to another.
Tackling and responding to crime is not and cannot be the responsibility of a sole agency. The police do not arrest, convict, sentence, look after, monitor and assess people, and nor should they. Different agencies with different responsibilities working together are a key part of our checks and balances. By not giving anyone so much responsibility that they cannot fulfil their obligations, we ensure that they can perform their role in the system to a high standard. To ensure that there is a seamless transition from one agency to another, and that organisations are fully aware of their responsibilities, there needs to be effective communication.
The purpose of the new clause is to find out how agencies communicate with each other and how effective those methods are. We would like to know if there are communication issues between the agencies; we have already seen the horrific consequence of communication breakdown, when crucial information is not properly shared. We also need to find out what problems the Secretary of State can act on to rectify. We cannot afford to get this wrong. If there are failures in communication, it can fail the whole process—the justice system itself fails.
Further to that point of order, Mr McCabe. I would like to reflect what the Minister has said and, first and foremost, thank you and Mr Robertson for conducting our proceedings professionally and getting us through the business quickly.
I also specifically thank the Clerks to the Committee. They understand the things that I am trying to say and they can put them into the jargon that is required to appear on the amendment paper. I am very appreciative of that. I have come to the realisation that they understand more about what I am trying to get across than I do myself.
I thank Committee colleagues for some robust debate and a few corrections along the way. I thank the staff who had to work over the weekend. I pass on my thanks to them and I am sorry if I was the cause of all that additional work. At least we had reasonable responses from the Minister, and I welcome that. With that, I will simply sit down.
Further to that point of order, Mr McCabe. I will not detain people for long, other than to add my words of thanks to those that have been given already. I would particularly like to thank the Clerks to the Committee for their assistance in framing amendments. I thank the Whips for the assistance that they have given me and a third party in relation to this.
I acknowledge the powerful and moving speech we heard earlier. When I woke up this morning, the first thing I remembered was that that event was 15 years ago, but the way in which we were reminded of that as a Committee was particularly powerful and very personal. I thank the hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford for that.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill, as amended, accordingly to be reported.
Joanna Cherry
Main Page: Joanna Cherry (Scottish National Party - Edinburgh South West)Department Debates - View all Joanna Cherry's debates with the Home Office
(4 years, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberWe are talking about issues of maturity here, not when somebody can be an elected a Member of Parliament. I think that Members can be elected at the age of 18 now. I do not see the point that the hon. Lady is making.
Looking at the evidence that we heard during the Bill Committee, am I right in understanding that the greater possibility of rehabilitating young people is what is being looked at here? It is about where we define youth. Does it stop at 18, or 21, or—as we are now looking at in Scotland in our consultation—25, in terms of not maturity generally but the ability to rehabilitate?
I am grateful to the hon. and learned Lady, who has explained that far better than I could ever hope to; I very much appreciate that. Perhaps there are some MPs who need rehabilitating as well, Madam Deputy Speaker, but that is another matter.
Is it right for a person, even if they are young, who has committed a serious offence to be put in prison for a particular period of time to protect the public, without their age being considered? We have to balance this properly. How long is long enough for punishment for a young person, and how long is too long to prevent the individual being effectively rehabilitated? Those who commit serious offences will be released from prison at some point. Surely the Minister agrees that we can lessen the time that an individual spends in prison with the aim of it being core to their rehabilitation; it is indeed preferable to a longer sentence, where hostility and deep-seated mistrust of the state simply develops and grows.
We know that this legislation cuts out the role of the Parole Board from any involvement with offenders sentenced under it. I think that it is lamentable that this also applies to young offenders, who, if involved with a specialist group of experts, could benefit tremendously from that. It is not straightforward when dealing with young people, and we should not pretend it is. We need to be smart, cautious and measured. Sadly, there are always some people, young or otherwise, who will never respond to a second chance, and the judges in their cases will act accordingly, but I want the judges to be better equipped than they are at present so that when they see there is a chance that a long fixed sentence for a young person is not appropriate and does not offer the best chance of rehabilitation, they have the flexibility to do something else.
As I said in my opening remarks, there is a need for specific requirements for Northern Ireland, but I will content myself with a few short remarks on new clause 7. My hon. Friend the Member for St Helens North (Conor McGinn) has been speaking in detail with the Northern Ireland Justice Minister, Naomi Long, and all the Northern Ireland parties about how we ensure that the measures in the Bill are compatible with the unique and well-established practices in terrorism-related sentencing and policing in Northern Ireland and, as we all know, are particularly sensitive to the political dynamics in Northern Ireland while ensuring that people in that part of the UK are kept safe and secure.
The mechanism proposed in new clause 7 would give some measure of assurance to the devolved institutions that their views are being heard by the Government. The Minister was reluctant to accept this amendment in Committee, but I hope that he will look at it much more closely.
Throughout the proceedings on this Bill, I have been very grateful to have formal and informal discussions with the Minister and to receive letters clarifying some of the issues raised in Committee. Last week, in response to my query about a technical amendment relating to section 61 of Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 and sentences served in young offender institutions, the Minister confirmed to me and the Bill Committee that there were no plans to change the way young adults were accommodated in the prison estate. That I very much welcome, and I would be bold enough to ask him to reiterate his guarantee that section 61 will not be enacted.
As I said at the outset, I have, throughout the Bill’s progress, talked about young people being different and the need for them to be dealt with appropriately, so I was very surprised to have it confirmed to me by the Minister that some 18, 19 and 20-year-olds were not only in the same prison as older offenders but on the same wing and sharing the same social spaces. I am assuming that this mixing does not apply to terrorist offenders, but even if it does not, that practice is totally unacceptable. I would welcome news of a plan to deal with that very real issue, which today is putting younger prisoners at considerable risk.
In conclusion, I reiterate our support for the Bill and hope that the Government will act to address the very real issues that colleagues and I have raised.
Colleagues will be aware that there are a number of speakers who want to get in this afternoon. Sir Robert Neill has withdrawn, so I will go straight to Joanna Cherry, but after that, if colleagues speak for about five minutes, that will enable us to make some progress.
I will start by apologising to you, Madam Deputy Speaker, for being slightly tardy in taking up my seat for this debate. No offence was meant. It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham). As well as sharing our country of birth, we share many of the same views about the Bill.
I wish to speak to new clause 6 and amendments 35 and 36, which are tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for East Lothian (Kenny MacAskill). I will also speak to amendments 52 to 60, which have been tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman). She chairs the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and the amendments reflect some concerns held by that Committee, on which I also sit, about our duty to consider the human rights aspects of any legislation that passes through the House.
The SNP has made it clear from the outset that we recognise it is the duty of any Government to keep our citizens safe and secure, and all who serve in Parliament have an obligation to assist in that endeavour. I and my colleagues in Edinburgh have assured the UK Government that we will attempt to be as constructive as possible, to ensure that the challenge of terrorism is met and that people across these islands are kept as safe is as reasonably possible. SNP Members are also mindful of our duty as parliamentarians to uphold the highest standards of human rights protections, and we have accordingly tabled a number of amendments to address the devolved aspects of the Bill, and raise some concerns about civil liberties.
Counter-terrorism is a reserved matter, but sentencing is not. The Scottish legal system, including policing, sentencing and parole, and the management of the Scottish prison service are devolved matters, and elements of the Bill that touch on those things will require a legislative consent motion. The Minister accepts that, and there are ongoing discussions with my colleague, Humza Yousaf, who is the Scottish Cabinet Secretary for Justice. Until those discussions have been resolved to the satisfaction of the Scottish Government, SNP MPs cannot give the Bill their unqualified support, but we will continue to work constructively with the Government.
We are particularly pleased that the UK Government have addressed an issue that I and my hon. Friend the Member for East Lothian raised in Committee—namely, the interplay between the new sentencing regime proposed in the Bill and the existing sentence of an order for lifelong restriction in Scotland. That unique sentence is imposed not so much for the crime committed but because the offender poses an ongoing risk. It was designed to deal with high-risk violent and sexual offenders rather than terrorists, and its purpose is to ensure that those people are not released until they are rehabilitated, and that even then they are subject to a risk management plan for the rest of their natural life.
I welcome Government amendments 9 to 16, which have been tabled to address the interplay between the new sentence and the order for lifelong restriction. As I understand it, they will ensure that an order for lifelong restriction will remain available to the Scottish courts when they are considering sentencing someone for a serious terrorist offence, provided that if an OLR is imposed instead of a serious terrorism sentence, the person sentenced must serve at least 14 years. I am pleased that the Government have taken our concerns on board, and we hope that the outstanding discussions on the legislative consent motion will have the same fruitful outcome.
It is a pleasure to follow such considered comments from the hon. Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson). I want to start, unsurprisingly, by commending the Government for bringing forward this vital legislation. I also want to pay my respects to all those who have lost loved ones and the survivors of terrorism, for whom this legislation is a form of justice—particularly those who lost loved ones in the attacks at Fishmongers’ Hall and in Streatham.
While the United Kingdom should be rightly proud of our record in combating radicalisation and terrorism, it is clear that more needs to be done, and that is what the Bill seeks to do. Many of us have rightly said that the first job of any Government is to keep their people safe. It is clear that that was at the top of Ministers’ minds when they drafted this. While I disagree with the Opposition on many points made today, I welcome the overall collaborative spirit that has emerged across the House. I note, for example, that many of the Opposition amendments—particularly the first five in the group—deal with questions about the effectiveness of the legislation. I am glad that the Opposition care so much that the Government’s priorities are implemented effectively.
I also welcome the Government’s considerations relating to lifelong restrictions for terrorist offences. Their work with Scottish MPs on that is a clear example of the Government working with Opposition parties to achieve the best results for all. For that reason, I welcome Government amendment 8. It is also right that the Government have tabled amendment 9, to ensure that a serious terrorism offence is convictable on an indictable offence. That is in line with ensuring that serious offences of any kind are included in the thrust of the Bill’s provisions. I also want to express relief that the Opposition have not sought to water down in any significant way the thrust of this legislation, because it is what the country wishes to see.
Prior to becoming an MP, my career was dedicated to our national security, specifically counter-terrorism, so I want to address some of the comments of witnesses. Jonathan Hall QC described the reforms as “pessimistic”. These reforms are not pessimistic; they are realistic. When people are radicalised, they are not half radicalised, or radicalised on a Monday, a Wednesday or a Friday; it is an enduring process that sticks in hearts and minds for a long time. Deradicalisation and rehabilitation are not quick, easy or straightforward. Indeed, I would challenge whether anyone can ever truly be deradicalised.
To be clear, that is the comment not of a politician who wishes solely to sound tough on crime, but of a politician who has sat in the same room as former terrorists who had been willing to blow up people in this room, and when I say that people cannot be rehabilitated, I am talking about the ones who claim to be. The psychological drivers that drew them to terrorism remain for life, so it is right that when we do this, we be very careful about the legislation we put in place.
Even with all the resources of government, which I have personally seen brought to bear, this process takes significant contact and monitoring—I would argue lifelong monitoring. The Government must have the time and the framework necessary to minimise the risk to our nation. This is not some scientific experiment conducted in an empty, tightly controlled space, but a highly individualised series of one-to-one interactions. When you engage with someone, you have to work with them on what makes them specifically vulnerable; there is no solution, there is no silver bullet, this is not straightforward. I do not accept the idea that any individual is ever truly deradicalised.
On that point, I take issue with the Opposition’s criticisms of the UK’s counter-radicalisation and rehabilitation work. I do not think they have the same understanding of exactly what the Government do to keep us safe. Whether in the middle east, in Europe, at home, or anywhere in the world—I have worked in many of those places—the UK is recognised as a global authority on anti-radicalisation work. We are a world leader on counter-terrorism, and the Bill will help to cement that further.
I want to talk specifically about young people and culpability, and the idea that under-18s or under-25s should be more stripped of their agency or personal responsibility for their actions. I would cite an example that has been in the media recently: that of Shamima Begum. I was working at the Foreign Office on counter-Daesh operations when she went to fight. She travelled after the beheadings of aid workers. She travelled knowing full well that a Jordanian pilot had been burnt to death. Many Members may not know that Daesh practised the burning of Jordanian soldiers seven times before they eventually put him in a box and burnt him to death.
This moves me because I had to watch that video. I spent years of my career watching brutalities carried out by people aged 16, 17, 18 and, undoubtedly, 20 to 25. I have held the hands of people who had been whipped by Daesh members who were 17 years old, and I have held the hands of British citizens whose loved ones were lost in Iraq and Syria and against whom known crimes had been committed by people aged 18 to 25, so I refuse to accept that those people cannot be held culpable. According to our law, criminal responsibility can be put back to 12. I made the rather blasé comment earlier about there being Members of Parliament who are under 25. Are people that age less culpable for the decisions they make?
I hear what the hon. Member is saying, and clearly I respect her experience, but does she accept that we are not seeking to raise the age of criminal responsibility? We are simply suggesting that the age at which an extended determinate sentence can be imposed should be raised. There is no question of raising the age of criminal responsibility.
I accept that point, but I fundamentally believe that public protection trumps rehabilitation, not least when evidence of rehabilitation is wishy-washy at best. Those individuals are just as culpable. I would never turn to a constituent whose son or daughter had been murdered by a 17-year-old somewhere in Rutland or Leicestershire and say that person was less guilty because they were 17. It is the same as with terrorism. It is the most heinous crime, and criminal responsibility changes for the most heinous of crimes.
I also cannot agree that 25-year extended licences are excessive or too costly. The Government must have the tools to be vigilant and aware of the threats from those who have been convicted of the worst offences. That is why I strongly recommend and welcome the provisions to allow extended sentences for offences with a terrorism connection, and it is entirely fitting that this be recognised in clauses 2 and 15, among others, which will enable a variety of offences, from kidnapping to weapons training, to be recognised as potentially having terrorist intent and offenders to receive either serious terrorism sentences or extended determinate sentences. Too often, in my experience, for those who go on a weapons training event—something delightful to talk about when they are playing some game like “Fortnite”—it is the start of a journey that leads to far worse.
I also want to touch on the role of the Parole Board, which I know was a matter of significant debate for the Committee. Terrorism radicalisation necessarily involves national security and long-term strategic debate. The Committee heard from witnesses that the Parole Board was not philosophically or organisationally best suited to dealing with terrorist offenders and that the Government should use a multi-agency approach when considering these risks. I fully agree, and I am glad that the Bill recognises that, too. We can do it and, as we are global leaders in this regard, our security staff are second to none.
That is a very helpful reassurance for today’s purposes, and I am grateful for the spirit in which the Minister said that. It is an important point, and I am glad that he takes this on board. Sometimes, for the best of reasons, there can be a mission creep with these measures, which could lead to a broader spread of their use in the criminal justice system, and that would be a matter of concern. If he says that the use is very specific, I accept his word on that, but it is important that we continue to keep this under review and do not have unintended mission creep. As we all know, it is often easy to present perfectly benign and reasonable reasons for doing something that departs from the normal checks and balances, but it then becomes entrenched and permanent and spreads.
In that spirit, I take the Minister’s assurance, but he will understand why it is important that that issue is debated and that reassurances are given that the overall integrity of the justice system will not be affected by these changes. That has dealt quickly with the issues that I sought to raise. It was perhaps a record brevity, but I hope that brevity does not reduce the import of the issues raised.
It is a real pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), and I endorse his concerns about the provisions in relation to TPIMs. My hon. Friend the Member for East Lothian (Kenny MacAskill) and I have tabled amendments 39 to 41 in relation to the proposed changes to the TPIMs regime. I am also speaking in support of amendments 46 to 51 and 59 to 61, tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman), the Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and signed by me. I will try to keep my comments brief, because I went into these issues in some detail on the Bill Committee and I want to allow others who were not on that Committee to speak.
First, I want to say something about the Prevent strategy review. I endorse what the hon. Member for St Helens North (Conor McGinn) said about that. It is important to remember that it was a recommendation by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and a successful amendment to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, which imposed a requirement on the Government to initiate an independent review of Prevent. It has been delayed for reasons that we have heard a lot about, and I think the delay is most regrettable. Clause 47 of this Bill removes the time limit for conducting the review. We in the Joint Committee on Human Rights have concerns about that and we would like there to be a time limit, hence the amendments we have tabled. I am happy to associate myself with the date suggested by the official Opposition.
I note in passing that the delivery of the Prevent strategy in Scotland is devolved, and that although national security is a reserved matter, the Scottish Government’s delivery of the Prevent strategy reflects a rather different procedure. I will not take up too much time with that.
Does the hon. and learned Lady agree that the delay of the review has caused quite a lot of concern in many communities who want better terrorist prevention legislation? Unfortunately, Prevent has demonised Muslim communities and put unfair duties on teachers and NHS workers. All those individuals want better terrorism prevention, but they will not get that if the review is delayed further.
I endorse what the hon. Lady says. It is important to remember that black, Asian and minority ethnic communities—particularly the Muslim community —need the Prevent strategy as much as the rest of us, but they must not be demonised by it. That is why I referred to what has happened in Scotland. The Scottish Government, working closely with the Muslim community in Scotland, have managed to avoid that degree of resentment. This review is important for all communities in England and Wales, where unfortunately the same thing has not happened.
I turn to TPIMs. The Scottish National party and the Joint Committee on Human Rights are concerned that a case has not been made out for the changes that the Government wish to make. Others have referred to the views of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall QC. In the detailed evidence that he gave to the Bill Committee, he described the combination of clauses 37 and 38 as
“a double whammy…not just reducing the standard of proof but allowing TPIMs to endure forever.”
I asked him about the possibility of safeguards, and he suggested the very safeguards that are set out in amendment 46, which is in my name and that of the Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham. Jonathan Hall said that
“if it were right that a TPIM should continue beyond two years, at least at that stage the authorities should be able to say, on the balance of probabilities, that the person really is a terrorist. That is an example of a safeguard.”
He went on to say:
“Turning to the question of enduring TPIMs, another safeguard could be to ensure that a judge would have to give permission—in other words, to treat going beyond the two years without any additional proof of new terrorism-related activity as requiring a higher threshold, or some sort of exceptionality or necessity test, as a further safeguard for the subject.”—[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 15-16, Q33.]
I urge the Government to consider incorporating into the Bill safeguards similar to those suggested by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation and set out in amendment 46.
As has been said, the problem with the change in the standard of proof is that no operational case has been made for it. I will not anticipate what the Minister will say later, and I may intervene on him if we have time. The independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall, who is appointed by the Government and charged with looking at these matters, has said that
“there is reason to doubt whether there exists an operational case for changing the TPIM regime at this point”.
I suggest that the Bill Committee heard nothing in evidence to challenge that. He said that he had had discussions with the Government but had not been able to identify a cogent business case. That is what is missing here. Although this affects only a small number of people at present—of course, it might affect more if the standard of proof is lowered—these are people who have not actually been convicted of any offence, so if the Government want to make such a significant change, it is really important that they bring forward a clear case for doing so.
I am interested, as someone from a business background, to hear the hon. and learned Lady refer to business cases. We always have facts and figures that we can look back on historically. Is not the challenge for Government always to anticipate risk that has not happened? We are forever looking behind us, and the consequences are so great when those risks are missed, but this is actually the perfect opportunity for a Government to look forward and anticipate those risks. The risks might involve someone who has been active in Syria, for example, where we do not have that proof, where someone can perhaps take an opportunity for two years to bide their time, knowing that at the end of that period, they might be subject to a higher burden of proof, or just go off the radar.
I hear what the hon. Lady says, but that is what the current TPIM regime is designed to do—to anticipate risk and to keep a close eye on people who have not committed an offence yet in a way that could mean that they are prosecuted, but who may be a risk to our safety. She gives, for example, the problem of people returning from Syria. That is clearly a significant problem, but it has existed for a number of years, and the Committee did not hear any evidence that the security services are unable to deal with the problem of people returning from Syria because of the current standard of proof. I use the words “business case” loosely; an “operational case” might be a better phrase. We need an operational case based on examples to justify why this change is needed.
All of us here care about having a TPIM regime in place that does the job. There is no suggestion that the current one is not doing the job and no clear operational case for it to be changed. We would be failing in our duty as Opposition parliamentarians if we did not test this in the way that we are, and I will leave it at that for now.
I will speak briefly. As I did on Second Reading, I would like to associate a lot of my comments with those of my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), who again outlined with clarity some of the main issues in the Bill that I think will be challenged in another place. I hope they are to a degree and that the tyres are kicked a little harder.
We need a little more clarity from the Government on why we are moving to this much lower standard of proof. However, I am particularly pleased that the Minister has given clarification on the issue of the polygraph test. On time restrictions, I totally understand what my hon. Friend was saying about sleeper agents. Over the last few months, we have seen people going to ground for perhaps several months, or even years, and then re-emerging, but I think that there has to at least be some oversight of that and of the use of TPIMs.
Finally, I support Government amendment 18 and amendment 50. I do not see why it would be unreasonable for drug testing to be part of the TPIM regime. I generally welcome the legislation, and I hope that the Minister will be able to respond to some of these points at the Dispatch Box.
The Minister anticipates my objection, so perhaps I can refer him to what the assistant chief constable said in response to me during the evidence session on 25 June. I asked:
“So where there is a rapidly escalating situation or where there is a need to manage sensitive material, we already have available to us the option of a new variant TPIM without changing the standard of proof.”
and he replied:
“Well, a TPIM is a TPIM. We have the option of a TPIM to manage that case, yes, as it currently stands. MI5 has pointed out that there is no case thus far where the standard of proof has been a blocker.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 23, Q58.]
As I said, I accept that. There have not been any historical cases where the standard of proof has been a blocker, but we have been categorically advised by the security services, speaking through Assistant Chief Constable Jacques, that it might occur, and that these proposals will make the public safer. He said that categorically, and I do not think that the House could, or should, disregard such clear advice. In relation to Jonathan Hall’s comments, I suspect that he may not have heard the evidence that I read out. He gave evidence to the Committee immediately before Assistant Chief Constable Jacques. His evidence was new to the House and to Parliament, and we did not have it on Second Reading. We do have it now, however, and we should have careful regard to it.
A number of Members raised questions about civil liberties, and not wishing to intrude on an individual’s freedom, and I will directly address those points. I will do so with reference to the original Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011. By lowering the burden of proof, we are changing only one of five limbs. The other four limbs remain exactly as they are, and one of those, laid out in section 3 of that Act, states that the Secretary of State must reasonably consider whether the TPIM is “necessary”—I use that word carefully—for purposes connected with protecting members of the public. Subsection (4), condition D, states that the Secretary of State must consider whether a TPIM is
“necessary, for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual's involvement in terrorism-related activity,”
That test of necessity goes far beyond the reasonable suspicion referred to in the first limb. The requirement for necessity is unchanged.
The hon. Member for St Albans said that this measure could be introduced on a Minister’s whim, and that a Minister could impose a TPIM with the sweep of a pen. I say to her gently, however, that that is not the case and there are judicial safeguards in the 2011 Act. For example, section 6 of that Act states that when a TPIM notice is given, the Secretary of State must go to the court and make an application, and the court has to verify or validate that the TPIM is reasonable, and certify that it is not “obviously flawed”. There is judicial certification.
Section 16 of the 2011 Act provides for a right to appeal. If the subject of a TPIM feels that they have been unfairly treated, or that the TPIM is unjustified, they can apply to the court in a process akin to a judicial review, and apply to have it overturned. There are judicial safeguards to protect individuals from unreasonable actions by the Government.
In the many years that TPIMs have been in operation since 2011, and in the six years when control orders were in place from 2005, the numbers used have been small. There were never more than about 15 to 20 control orders in force at any one time, and we heard evidence that as of today only six TPIMs are in force. That is a very small number, as they are used only in exceptional circumstances. When I asked Jonathan Hall whether he believed that any Government, including the previous Labour Government or the more recent Conservative Government, had ever abused the power provided by TPIMs or control orders, he answered that no, he was not aware of any such abuse. I would add that a former independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Lord Carlile, has expressed support for the measures in this Bill.
Let me turn to the issue of time and how extendable TPIMs are. They currently expire after two years. We propose to make them extendable in one-year increments, as were the old control orders passed by the then Labour Government and indeed supported by some Members in this House this afternoon. We heard evidence from Jonathan Hall that there was risk where a TPIM ended after two years, as there could be a gap. He knew of two real cases where that occurred, with a gap of one year in one case and a gap of 16 months in the other before a new TPIM could be obtained. That is because we have to get fresh evidence; we cannot rely on the old evidence and we have to wait for somebody to do something wrong again to give us the grounds to renew the TPIM. Max Hill, when he was independent reviewer of terrorism legislation in 2017, said that some terrorists were “biding time” waiting for the TPIM to simply time out.
In fairness to the last Labour Government, even though the previous control orders could be extended year by year, in practice most of them were not: 30 of them were for less than two years; eight were for between two and three years; four were for between three and four years; and only three extended for between four and five years. Again, the subject can apply for judicial review if they think the TPIM extension is unfair, so a judicial protection is in place.
I have two quick final points to make. In terms of prosecution, which my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst asked about, there is a duty under section 10 of the 2011 Act that requires the Secretary of State to seek prosecution where appropriate. On Prevent, let me say that the statutory obligation to carry out the Prevent review remains. There have been some delays, because the independent reviewer had to be replaced and then we had the coronavirus pandemic. Our commitment to do it remains in statute. Obviously, specifying a date caused a problem before, and we do not want to repeat that mistake. We hope and expect that this will be done by August of next year, but we feel that, given the experience of the recent past, putting that date in the Bill would simply be setting a bear trap. So I hope that I have laid out the case for resisting these amendments.
I will not speak for long, because I have already spoken at length this afternoon about issues of concern to the Scottish National party and the Joint Committee on Human Rights.
I commend the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), on his hard work to pilot the Bill through its stages so far, and on having an open-door policy to my concerns and those of my hon. Friend the Member for East Lothian (Kenny MacAskill) about matters pertaining to sentencing in Scotland.
I also thank the hon. Members for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham) and for St Helens North (Conor McGinn); I enjoyed working with them on the Bill Committee, and it is always my pleasure to work with the hon. Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds) and the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy). We have a good working relationship, and I would like that to continue on other Bills as this Parliament goes on.
As I said earlier, terrorism is clearly reserved. The position of the Scottish National party is clear: we want to work hard with the UK Government to make sure that all communities in these islands are protected from the horrendous consequences of terrorism, but sentencing is devolved, and it is important that that is respected. I am grateful to Ministers for taking on board the concerns that I and my hon. Friend the Member for East Lothian raised about the order for lifelong restriction, and for bringing forward amendments to deal with those concerns. I am also grateful that there are ongoing discussions about the rather more difficult issue of polygraphs. In Scotland, we do not use them at present. My friend and colleague Humza Yousaf, the Justice Secretary, is in correspondence about that matter.
I add my own plea that we do not forget about the importance of rehabilitation and deradicalisation. There is not really anything about those things in the Bill. As I said earlier this afternoon, it is particularly important, when looking at children and younger offenders, that we devote thought and time to deradicalisation.
I have already made clear the Scottish National party’s concerns about the lack of a clear operational case for the changes being made in relation to TPIMs, and I suspect there will be more debate about that in the other place. That is not just the view of the SNP; the concern is shared by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. I will leave it at that for now, but we will no doubt be revisiting matters if any amendments come back from the Lords.