Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateJo Swinson
Main Page: Jo Swinson (Liberal Democrat - East Dunbartonshire)Department Debates - View all Jo Swinson's debates with the Department for Education
(12 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new schedule 2—‘Adjudicators: bankruptcy applications by debtors and bankruptcy orders.
Government new schedule 3—‘Adjudicators: minor and consequential amendments.
Government amendments 37, 41 and 44
As well as moving the new clause, I shall speak to new schedules 2 and 3, along with Government amendments 37, 41 and 44, the latter of which are consequential amendments on territorial extent and commencement.
These amendments will reform the process by which an individual may apply for his or her own bankruptcy. They will remove the existing requirement for the indebted individual to present a bankruptcy petition to court and replace it with a new administrative process. Currently, a person with unmanageable levels of debt who wishes to make him or herself bankrupt must petition the court—the local court—for a bankruptcy order. There is no dispute that requires a court to make a judgment on competing interests in these scenarios. The vast majority of such applications—last year there were more than 30,000—are accepted by the courts with very little scrutiny.
The amending provisions mean that instead of petitioning the court, applicants would submit their bankruptcy application to a new adjudicator. This proposal was consulted on by the previous Administration and was broadly supported by interested parties. I should say that the Government consulted on removing the court from a wider range of cases, but as significant concerns were raised, this amendment concerns only debtors’ own petitions.
The adjudicator will hold a new statutory office, which we intend to be located in the Insolvency Service. The adjudicator will consider each application, and will decide on an objective basis whether the criteria for the making of a bankruptcy order have been met. If they have been met, the adjudicator will make the order. The administrative process is similar to the way in which individuals enter bankruptcy in Scotland, and in some other jurisdictions throughout the globe.
Applicants for bankruptcy will no longer need to attend court. Applications will be electronic, which will deliver significant savings, and applicants will be able to pay the fees in instalments. Bankruptcy will none the less remain a serious step. It may be the right solution for some debtors, as it allows debts to be written off and a fresh start to be made; but, quite rightly, those advantages are tempered by the serious implications of a bankruptcy order. Bankrupts are subject to restrictions, their assets can be sold for the benefit of creditors, and a portion of their incomes can be used to help repay their debts. For many, other debt remedies will continue to be more appropriate. We will therefore encourage debtors to take independent debt advice before making their bankruptcy applications. We will work with the Money Advice Service and providers in the debt advice sector to ensure that all debtors have the information that they need in order to make an informed decision.
There will be no change in the process that takes place after the making of a bankruptcy order. When an order is made by an adjudicator, the present post-bankruptcy order procedures will continue to operate, and the serious consequences that apply to an individual who is made bankrupt will remain.
It is good to reach the Bill’s report stage following a mammoth session in Committee before the summer recess, and it is interesting to note that the Opposition made such a strong and determined case in Committee that no Ministers from the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills are left on the Front Bench.
The new clause amends the Insolvency Act 1986 and introduces an administrative procedure for debtor petition bankruptcies. It is extremely worrying that the number of people who find themselves caught in a spiral of debt is increasing, and that many are forced to declare themselves bankrupt as a result. The figures are stark. Citizens Advice has dealt with more than 2.2 million problems involving debt, and has received 131,000 inquiries about bankruptcy and 142,000 about debt relief orders. The issue is not just about financing and debt; it is about relationships and, in some cases, lives. Bankruptcy is all too often a stigmatising experience, and evidence shows that that applies particularly to men.
Although the number of people declaring themselves bankrupt has fallen, the number of those becoming insolvent has risen sharply, according to official Government figures. As the Minister said, there were more than 30,000 personal insolvencies in just one quarter this year. That is a staggering figure, which shows how many households need help with debt problems. Insolvency is a very difficult condition to have to face, and it usually comes at the end of a long struggle to deal with debt and other money problems. The leading debt charity Clarifi, formerly known as the Consumer Credit Counselling Service, has said that it expects the number of personal insolvencies to increase over the next year, and has warned that more than 6 million households are still living on the edge. It is therefore vital for those who are struggling to pay their debts, or even just worried about their debts, to seek free advice and support. Opposition Members believe that it is hugely important for the process of insolvency to be as swift as possible, and we welcome the initiatives that will speed up that process.
As the Minister will know, key stakeholders have broadly welcomed the proposals, but they have raised several issues that I hope the Minister will deal with. First, there is the issue of the establishment of the location and how the new administrative process will deal with bankruptcy tourism. Secondly, there is the issue of the qualifications of adjudicators, which has prompted concerns similar to those relating to the Government’s proposals in respect of the role of legal officers in the employment tribunal system, and has been raised on a number of occasions. It is important for adjudicators to be in a position to make crucial judgments not just about bankruptcies, but about referrals to court. They need both knowledge of insolvency law and experience of the court system. Given that the Secretary of State has the power to appoint adjudicators, may I ask what experience-related criteria they will have to meet?
Thirdly, there is the issue of fees. People who are struggling with debt often cannot afford the £700 that it costs to go bankrupt, even when bankruptcy would otherwise be the best way out of their problems. That leaves them in a financial black hole. The number of people using debt relief orders, one of the cheaper remedies, has risen sharply again. It seems slightly perverse that someone who is struggling with debts should have to find more money in order to petition for bankruptcy.
The Bill empowers the Lord Chancellor to be flexible in fixing fees. Given that the new streamlined system has the potential to be electronic, and to be simpler and cheaper, I wonder whether the Government will consider some remedies for the problem of fees, such as allowing people who are seeking bankruptcy to pay in instalments.
The Minister mentioned advice for debtors. There is a view that taking the bankruptcy system out of the formal courts process and making it more administrative will reduce the gravity of the situation in which people find themselves. It is important for bankruptcy to be seen as a last resort, but all possible advice and guidance should be given to those who seek to go down that route.
Finally, may I press the Minister on one of her great loves, the Post Office? It has been said that the new administrative task of filling out the bankruptcy forms in the prescribed manner could be performed through the Post Office by means of a passport-style “check and send” arrangement. That would also allow the Post Office to divert people to other forms of debt advice, including free advice.
We support the change to a more administrative bankruptcy system because it is one of the critical remedies for debt, but we should be grateful if the Minister could provide some comfort on the issues that have been raised.
I merely seek reassurance from the Minister. I can understand the need to simplify the bankruptcy procedure for those who, through no fault of their own, seek it because of their debts, and that is absolutely right. I am slightly concerned, however, that some companies shift money around and go bankrupt because it suits them to do so, taking other companies down with them. I want the Minister to reassure me that the adjudicator, or whatever he or she will be called, will have the powers to look into such cases so that it is not easy to go bankrupt when one should not. Such companies bring other good companies down with them.
I have appreciated the good but brief debate on this issue, on which there is clearly a degree of support on both sides of the House. That is always welcome and I particularly welcome the support for these measures from the hon. Member for Edinburgh South (Ian Murray) and the official Opposition.
I share the concern about the fact that too many people sadly need seriously to consider bankruptcy. We all know from our experience in our constituency surgeries the distress and heartbreak that can cause to the people who are contemplating such a measure. The impact of that decision on individuals is why it is absolutely right to do what we can to improve the process, to make it swift and efficient and, where possible, to prevent people from having to appear in court, which adds to the stigma that has been mentioned and is a distressing and difficult experience.
Bankruptcy should be considered as a last resort. A wide range of different measures are promoted and encouraged through people who give debt advice such as individual voluntary agreements, of which there are about 49,000 a year; debt management plans, of which 150,000 people take advantage each year; and the new debt relief orders for specific categories of very vulnerable and poor debtors, 29,000 of whom take them up every year. In that context, the 38,000 bankruptcy orders show that bankruptcy is not used by all the people who face such difficulties. Of course, the general advice to individuals in difficult financial circumstances is to seek advice early. The earlier the problems can be confronted, the more possible it is to avoid the worst consequences.
I am happy to address the specific issues raised by Members. The hon. Members for Edinburgh South and for Foyle (Mark Durkan) mentioned bankruptcy tourism, which is a practice whereby a debtor opts to access insolvency proceedings in a particular member state by relocating to that member state. That potentially enables them to seek a better outcome than might have been possible in their previous country. That is allowed for under the EU insolvency regulation provided that the relocation is genuine. For many individuals in such circumstances, the relocation might not be straightforward so it is perhaps unsurprising that the number of individuals from other EU countries who relocate to the UK for this purpose is very small. There is no evidence of widespread abuse, but the official receiver or a creditor can apply to court to annul the bankruptcy order if abuse takes place.
On the question about the adjudicator, the Insolvency Service is already looking at this for the debt relief orders that it administers and it will be able to do exactly the same in relation to the way in which adjudicators conduct their business.
On the qualifications of adjudicators, they will be making an objective decision by reference to prescribed criteria and there will be a right of appeal for an applicant if the adjudicator refuses to make an order. Obviously, they will need appropriate qualifications and experience to function effectively, and the Secretary of State will make sure that people appointed to that role are appropriately qualified. They will be based within the Insolvency Service which, as the House knows, is an executive agency of BIS, and will already have extensive experience of administering an electronic administrative process similar to the debt relief order regime. It is important to point out that adjudicators will not be able to be official receivers as well, as that would be deemed to be a conflict of interests so those roles will be kept separate.
I appreciate that for individuals seeking bankruptcy, the levying of fees on that is not straightforward. The administration fee will remain unchanged at £525, which is a significant sum for people in that situation. In the context of overall bankruptcy, where they will be expecting debt relief of at least £15,000, it is not as huge as could be imagined in the comparison.
What is important about the way in which the new system will operate is that it will take the courts away from a process in which they do not need to be involved. Where there is no dispute, where somebody wants to declare themselves bankrupt and nobody has a problem with that, there will be no requirement for that costly court process. That will generate significant savings so the application fee for the process is expected to be about £70, instead of the current court fee of £175. That will be helpful and of benefit to people applying for this option. It is estimated that overall debtors will save about £1.5 million. There is a saving for the Court Service as well, as this will be a more efficient process handled through the adjudicator, and individuals personally affected by bankruptcy will benefit. The suggestion from the hon. Member for Edinburgh South about paying in instalments is one that the Government have taken on board. It is part of the process and offers real advantages, compared with the current situation.
I was delighted that the hon. Gentleman mentioned the Post Office, which I, as the Minister responsible, am passionate about, as I know are Members in all parts of the House, who support their local community post offices. The Government are committed to ensuring that the Post Office can be an effective delivery mechanism for more front-office Government services. There is good news—last year, for the first time in a decade, the income stream that the Post Office received from Government services increased, so there is a positive story to tell.
The Post Office is looking at a wide range of ways in which it can increase its services and its revenue. Playing a wider role in identity checks, as was mentioned, is one of those. It is important to bear in mind that the Post Office will bid for such contracts on the basis of being able to provide an effective and efficient mechanism for doing so. It is a very good organisation that is able to provide such services and win those contracts on the merits of the bid that it submits.
On the issues relating to advice, there are examples of more credit union facilities and a wider range of financial services being able to be accessed through post offices. Access to financial services from that excellent network of 12,000 branches is of particular help to people in communities that do not have a local bank branch, perhaps because they are very rural communities. Now that 95% of bank accounts are accessible at post offices, the recent announcement from HSBC was welcome. The hon. Gentleman certainly raises an important point.
On the points made by the hon. Member for Foyle and my hon. Friends the Members for North Swindon (Justin Tomlinson) and for Tiverton and Honiton (Neil Parish), it is important to point out that the amendments relate to personal insolvency, not company insolvency, and were I to detain the House on company insolvency, Mr Deputy Speaker may have concerns. I hear Members’ concerns and I know from Members’ correspondence that people are worried about the procedures when companies become insolvent. The change of termination clauses in insolvency would have implications for the suppliers, so many demands need to be balanced, but I recognise the concerns and we are looking more widely at issues facing companies in insolvency. My officials have been engaging with interested parties and stakeholders and will continue to do so.
I think I have dealt with the various points made by hon. Members, so I commend the new clause and the amendments to the House.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 16 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Schedule 2
‘Adjudicators: bankruptcy applications by debtors and bankruptcy orders
‘Adjudicators: bankruptcy applications by debtors and bankruptcy orders
“Chapter A1
Adjudicators: bankruptcy applications by debtors and bankruptcy orders
263H Bankruptcy applications to the adjudicator
(1) An individual may make an application to an adjudicator in accordance with this Chapter for a bankruptcy order to be made against him or her.
(2) An individual may make a bankruptcy application only on the ground that the individual is unable to pay his or her debts.
263I Debtors against whom an adjudicator may make a bankruptcy order
(1) An adjudicator has jurisdiction to determine a bankruptcy application only if—
(a) the centre of the debtor’s main interests is in England and Wales, or
(b) the centre of the debtor’s main interests is not in a member state of the European Union which has adopted the EC Regulation, but the test in subsection (2) is met.
(2) The test is that—
(a) the debtor is domiciled in England and Wales, or
(b) at any time in the period of three years ending with the day on which the application is made to the adjudicator, the debtor—
(i) has been ordinarily resident, or has had a place of residence, in England and Wales, or
(ii) has carried on business in England and Wales.
(3) The reference in subsection (2) to the debtor carrying on business includes—
(a) the carrying on of business by a firm or partnership of which the debtor is a member, and
(b) the carrying on of business by an agent or manager for the debtor or for such a firm or partnership.
(4) In this section, references to the centre of the debtor’s main interests have the same meaning as in Article 3 of the EC Regulation.
263J Conditions applying to bankruptcy application
(1) A bankruptcy application must include—
(a) such particulars of the debtor’s creditors, debts and other liabilities, and assets, as may be prescribed, and
(b) such other information as may be prescribed.
(2) A bankruptcy application is not to be regarded as having been made unless any fee or deposit required in connection with the application by an order under section 415 has been paid to such person, and within such period, as may be prescribed.
(3) A bankruptcy application may not be withdrawn.
(4) A debtor must notify the adjudicator if, at any time before a bankruptcy order is made against the debtor or the adjudicator refuses to make such an order—
(a) the debtor becomes able to pay his or her debts, or
(b) a bankruptcy petition has been presented to the court in relation to the debtor.
263K Determination of bankruptcy application
(1) After receiving a bankruptcy application, an adjudicator must determine whether the following requirements are met—
(a) the adjudicator had jurisdiction under section 263I to determine the application on the date the application was made,
(b) the debtor is unable to pay his or her debts at the date of the determination,
(c) no bankruptcy petition is pending in relation to the debtor at the date of the determination, and
(d) no bankruptcy order has been made in respect of any of the debts which are the subject of the application at the date of the determination.
(2) If the adjudicator is satisfied that each of the requirements in subsection (1) are met, the adjudicator must make a bankruptcy order against the debtor.
(3) If the adjudicator is not so satisfied, the adjudicator must refuse to make a bankruptcy order against the debtor.
(4) The adjudicator must make a bankruptcy order against the debtor or refuse to make such an order before the end of the prescribed period (“the determination period”).
263L Adjudicator’s requests for further information
(1) An adjudicator may at any time during the determination period request from the debtor information that the adjudicator considers necessary for the purpose of determining whether a bankruptcy order must be made.
(2) The adjudicator may specify a date before which information requested under subsection (1) must be provided; but that date must not be after the end of the determination period.
(3) If the rules so prescribe, a request under subsection (1) may include a request for information to be given orally.
(4) The rules may make provision enabling or requiring an adjudicator to request information from persons of a prescribed description in prescribed circumstances.
263M Making of bankruptcy order
(1) This section applies where an adjudicator makes a bankruptcy order as a result of a bankruptcy application.
(2) The order must be made in the prescribed form.
(3) The adjudicator must—
(a) give a copy of the order to the debtor, and
(b) give notice of the order to persons of such description as may be prescribed.
263N Refusal to make a bankruptcy order: review and appeal etc.
(1) Where an adjudicator refuses to make a bankruptcy order on a bankruptcy application, the adjudicator must give notice to the debtor—
(a) giving the reasons for the refusal, and
(b) explaining the effect of subsections (2) to (5).
(2) If requested by the debtor before the end of the prescribed period, the adjudicator must review the information which was available to the adjudicator when the determination that resulted in the refusal was made.
(3) Following a review under subsection (2) the adjudicator must—
(a) confirm the refusal to make a bankruptcy order, or
(b) make a bankruptcy order against the debtor.
(4) Where the adjudicator confirms a refusal under subsection (3), the adjudicator must give notice to the debtor—
(a) giving the reasons for the confirmation, and
(b) explaining the effect of subsection (5).
(5) If the refusal is confirmed under subsection (3), the debtor may appeal against the refusal to the court before the end of the prescribed period.
263O False representations and omissions
(1) It is an offence knowingly or recklessly to make any false representation or omission in—
(a) making a bankruptcy application to an adjudicator, or
(b) providing any information to an adjudicator in connection with a bankruptcy application.
(2) It is an offence knowingly or recklessly to fail to notify an adjudicator of a matter in accordance with a requirement imposed by or under this Part.
(3) It is immaterial for the purposes of an offence under this section whether or not a bankruptcy order is made as a result of the application.
(4) It is not a defence in proceedings for an offence under this section that anything relied on, in whole or in part, as constituting the offence was done outside England and Wales.
(5) Proceedings for an offence under this section may only be instituted—
(a) by the Secretary of State, or
(b) by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.” ’.—(Jo Swinson.)
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Schedule 3
‘Adjudicators: minor and consequential amendments
‘Adjudicators: minor and consequential amendments
1 The Insolvency Act 1986 is amended in accordance with this Schedule.
2 In section 253 (application for interim order), omit subsection (5).
3 In section 255 (cases in which interim order can be made), in subsection (1)(b) for “petition for his own bankruptcy” substitute “make a bankruptcy application”.
4 (1) Section 256A (debtor’s proposal and nominee’s report) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1) omit the words from “unless” to the end.
(3) In subsection (3) for “petition for his own bankruptcy” substitute “make a bankruptcy application”.
5 For the heading to Chapter 1 of Part 9 substitute “The court: bankruptcy petitions and bankruptcy orders”.
6 In section 264 (who may present a bankruptcy petition), in subsection (1) omit paragraph (b).
7 For section 265 (conditions to be satisfied in respect of debtor) substitute—
“265 Creditor’s petition: debtors against whom the court may make a bankruptcy order
(1) A bankruptcy petition may be presented to the court under section 264(1)(a) only if—
(a) the centre of the debtor’s main interests is in England and Wales, or
(b) the centre of the debtor’s main interests is not in a member state of the European Union which has adopted the EC Regulation, but the test in subsection (2) is met.
(2) The test is that—
(a) the debtor is domiciled in England and Wales, or
(b) at any time in the period of three years ending with the day on which the petition is presented, the debtor—
(i) has been ordinarily resident, or has had a place of residence, in England and Wales, or
(ii) has carried on business in England and Wales.
(3) The reference in subsection (2) to the debtor carrying on business includes—
(a) the carrying on of business by a firm or partnership of which the debtor is a member, and
(b) the carrying on of business by an agent or manager for the debtor or for such a firm or partnership.
(4) In this section, references to the centre of the debtor’s main interests have the same meaning as in Article 3 of the EC Regulation.”
8 In section 266 (bankruptcy petitions: other preliminary conditions), in subsection (4) omit “, (b)”.
9 (1) Sections 272 to 274A (and the cross-heading immediately preceding those sections) (debtor’s petition) are repealed.
(2) In consequence of the repeal of section 274A by paragraph (1), omit paragraph 3 of Schedule 20 to Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (debt relief Orders: consequential amendments).
10 For the cross-heading immediately before section 278 substitute—A
Chapter 1A
Commencement and duration of bankruptcy”.
11 In section 278 (commencement and continuance), in paragraph (b) (discharge of bankruptcy order) omit “the following provisions of”.
12 In section 279 (duration of bankruptcy), in subsection (6) for “adjudged” substitute “made”.
13 In section 282 (court’s power to annul bankruptcy order), in subsection (2)—
(a) omit “, (b)”,
(b) after “section 264(1)” insert “or on a bankruptcy application”, and
(c) in paragraph (a) after “pending” insert “or the application was ongoing”.
14 In section 283 (definition of bankrupt’s estate), in subsection (5)(a) for “adjudged” substitute “made”.
15 (1) Section 284 (restrictions on dispositions of property) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1) for “adjudged” substitute “made”.
(3) In subsection (3) for “presentation of the petition for the bankruptcy order” substitute “making of the bankruptcy application or (as the case may be) the presentation of the bankruptcy petition”.
(4) In subsection (4), in paragraph (a) before “petition” insert “bankruptcy application had been made or (as the case may be) that the bankruptcy”.
16 (1) Section 285 (restriction on proceedings and remedies) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1)—
(a) after “when” insert “proceedings on a bankruptcy application are ongoing or”, and
(b) for “adjudged” substitute “made”.
(3) In subsection (2) after “proof that” insert “a bankruptcy application has been made or”.
17 (1) Section 286 is amended as follows.
(2) Omit subsection (2).
(3) In subsection (8), for “adjudged” substitute “made”.
18 In section 288 (statement of affairs), in subsection (1) for “debtor’s petition” substitute “bankruptcy application”.
19 In section 290 (public examination of bankrupt), in subsection (4)(a) for “adjudged” substitute “made”.
20 (1) Section 297 (appointment of trustee of bankrupt’s estate: special cases) is amended as follows.
(2) Omit subsection (4).
(3) In subsection (6) omit “(4) or”.
21 (1) Section 320 (court order vesting disclaimed property) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (2)(c) before “bankruptcy” insert “bankruptcy application was made or (as the case may be) the”.
(3) In subsection (3)(c) before “bankruptcy” insert “bankruptcy application was made or (as the case may be) the”.
22 In section 321 (orders under section 320 in respect of leaseholds), in subsection (1)(a) before “bankruptcy” insert “bankruptcy application was made or (as the case may be) the”.
23 In section 323 (mutual credit and set-off), in subsection (3) before “a bankruptcy” insert “proceedings on a bankruptcy application relating to the bankrupt were ongoing or that”.
24 In section 334 (stay of distribution in case of second bankruptcy), in subsection (2) before “presentation of the petition” insert “making of the application or (as the case may be) the”.
25 (1) Section 336 (rights of occupation etc of bankrupt’s spouse or civil partner) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1) for “presentation of the petition for the bankruptcy order” substitute “making of the bankruptcy application or (as the case may be) the presentation of the bankruptcy petition”.
(3) In subsection (2) for “adjudged” substitute “made”.
26 In section 337 (rights of occupation of bankrupt), in subsection (1)—
(a) in paragraph (a) for “adjudged” substitute “made”, and
(b) in paragraph (b) before “bankruptcy petition” insert “bankruptcy application was made or (as the case may be) the”.
27 In section 339 (transactions at an undervalue), in subsection (1) for “adjudged” substitute “made”.
28 In section 340 (preferences), in subsection (1) for “adjudged” substitute “made”.
29 In section 341 (meaning of “relevant time” under sections 339 and 340), in subsection (1)(a) for “presentation of the bankruptcy petition on which the individual is adjudged” substitute “making of the bankruptcy application as a result of which, or (as the case may be) the presentation of the bankruptcy petition on which, the individual is made”.
30 (1) Section 342 (orders under sections 339 and 340) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1) for “adjudged” substitute “made”.
(3) In subsection (5)—
(a) for paragraph (a) substitute—
“(a) of the fact that the bankruptcy application as a result of which, or (as the case may be) the bankruptcy petition on which, the individual in question is made bankrupt has been made or presented; or”, and
(b) in paragraph (b) for “adjudged” substitute “made”.
31 In section 342A (recovery of excessive pension contributions), in subsection (1) for “adjudged” substitute “made”.
32 In section 343 (extortionate credit transactions), in subsection (1) for “adjudged” substitute “made”.
33 (1) Section 344 (avoidance of general assignment of book debts) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1) for “adjudged” substitute “made”.
(3) In subsection (2) before “presentation” insert “making of the bankruptcy application or (as the case may be) the”.
34 In section 345 (contracts to which bankrupt is a party), in subsection (1) for “adjudged” substitute “made”.
35 (1) Section 346 (enforcement procedures) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsections (1) and (2) for “adjudged” substitute “made”.
(3) In subsection (3)—
(a) in paragraph (b) before “bankruptcy” insert “bankruptcy application has been made or a”, and
(b) in paragraph (c) before “on that petition” insert “as a result of that application or”.
(4) In subsection (4)(a) after “while” insert “proceedings on a bankruptcy application are ongoing or (as the case may be)”.
36 (1) Section 347 (distress, etc) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (2)—
(a) after “individual to whom” insert “a bankruptcy application or”, and
(b) before “on that petition” insert “as a result of that application or”.
(3) In subsection (3) for “adjudged” substitute “made”.
37 In section 348 (apprenticeships, etc), in subsection (1)(a) for “petition on which the order was made” substitute “application for the order was made or (as the case may be) the petition for the order”.
38 In section 350 (application of Chapter 6 of Part 9: bankruptcy offences), in subsection (1) after “applies” insert “—
(a) where an adjudicator has made a bankruptcy order as a result of a bankruptcy application, or
(b) ”.
39 (1) Section 351 (definitions for the purposes of Chapter 6 of Part 9) is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph (b) before “presentation” insert “making of the bankruptcy application or (as the case may be) the”.
(3) Omit paragraph (c), and the preceding “and”.
40 (1) Section 354 (concealment of property) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1)(c) before “petition” insert “the making of the bankruptcy application or (as the case may be) the presentation of the bankruptcy”.
(3) In subsection (3)(a) before “petition” insert “the making of the bankruptcy application or (as the case may be) the presentation of the bankruptcy”.
41 (1) Section 355 (concealment of books and papers; falsification) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (2)(d) before “petition” insert “the making of the bankruptcy application or (as the case may be) the presentation of the bankruptcy”.
(3) In subsection (3)(b) before “petition” insert “the making of the bankruptcy application or (as the case may be) the presentation of the bankruptcy”.
42 In section 356 (false statements), in subsection (2)(c) before “petition” insert “the making of the bankruptcy application or (as the case may be) the presentation of the bankruptcy”.
43 In section 358 (absconding), in paragraph (b) before “petition” insert “the making of the bankruptcy application or (as the case may be) the presentation of the bankruptcy”.
44 (1) Section 359 (fraudulent dealing with property obtained on credit) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1) before “petition” insert “the making of the bankruptcy application or (as the case may be) the presentation of the bankruptcy”.
(3) In subsection (2) before “petition” insert “the making of the bankruptcy application or (as the case may be) the presentation of the bankruptcy”.
45 In section 360 (obtaining credit and engaging in business), in subsection (1)(b) for “adjudged” substitute “made”.
46 (1) Section 364 (power of arrest) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1)(a) after “to whom a” insert “bankruptcy application or a”.
(3) In subsection (2) before “presentation” insert “making of the bankruptcy application or the”.
47 In section 376 (time limits), after “anything” insert “(including anything in relation to a bankruptcy application)”.
48 (1) Section 381 (definition of “bankrupt” and associated terminology) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1) for “adjudged” (in both places where it occurs) substitute “made”.
(3) After subsection (1) insert—
“(1A) “Bankruptcy application” means an application to an adjudicator for a bankruptcy order.”
(4) In subsection (2) for “adjudging” substitute “making”.
49 In section 383 (definition of “creditor” etc.), in subsection (1)(b)—
(a) after “to whom a” insert “bankruptcy application or”, and
(b) after “that” insert “application or”.
50 In section 384 (definitions of “prescribed” and “the rules”), in subsection (1) omit “section 273;”.
51 In section 385 (miscellaneous definitions), in subsection (1)—
(a) before the definition of “the court” insert—
““adjudicator” means a person appointed by the Secretary of State under section 398A;”,
(b) in the definition of “the debtor”, in paragraph (b)—
(i) before “bankruptcy petition” insert “bankruptcy application or a”, and
(ii) after “to whom the” insert “application or”,
(c) omit the definition of “debtor’s petition”, and
(d) before the definition of “dwelling house” insert—
“determination period” has the meaning given in section 263K(4);”.
52 In section 387 (meaning of “the relevant date”), in subsection (6)(a) after “after” insert “the making of the bankruptcy application or (as the case may be)”.
53 In section 389A (authorisation of nominees and supervisors), in subsection (3)(a) for “adjudged” substitute “made”.
54 In section 390 (persons not qualified to act as insolvency practitioners), in subsection (4)(a) for “adjudged” substitute “made”.
55 In section 415 (fees orders), after subsection (1) insert—
“(1A) An order under subsection (1) may make different provision for different purposes, including by reference to the manner or form in which proceedings are commenced.”
56 In section 421A (insolvent estates: joint tenancies), in subsection (9) in the definition of “value lost to the estate”, for “adjudged” substitute “made”.
57 In section 424 (who may apply for an order under section 423 in respect of transactions entered into at an undervalue), in subsection (1)(a) for “adjudged” substitute “made”.
58 In Schedule 4ZA (conditions for making a debt relief order), for paragraph 3 substitute—
3 A bankruptcy application under Part 9—
(a) has not been made before the determination date; or
(b) has been so made, but proceedings on the application have been finally disposed of before that date.”
59 (1) In Schedule 4A (bankruptcy restrictions orders), paragraph 2 is amended as follows.
(2) In sub-paragraph (2)—
(a) in paragraph (a), for the words from “petition” to the end substitute “the making of the bankruptcy application or (as the case may be) the presentation of the bankruptcy petition and ending with the date of the application for the bankruptcy restrictions order”, and
(b) in paragraph (j), for “presentation of the petition” substitute “the making of the bankruptcy application or (as the case may be) the presentation of the bankruptcy petition”.
(3) In sub-paragraph (4) omit the definition of “before petition”.
60 In Schedule 6 (categories of preferential debts), in paragraph 14(1) for “adjudged” substitute “made”.
61 (1) Schedule 9 (provisions capable of inclusion in individual insolvency rules) is amended as follows.
(2) After paragraph 4 insert—
“Adjudicators
4A Provision for regulating the practice and procedure of adjudicators.
4B Provision about the form and content of a bankruptcy application (including an application for a review of an adjudicator’s determination).”
(3) After paragraph 4B (as inserted by sub-paragraph (2)) insert—
“Appeals against determinations by adjudicators
4C Provision about the making and determining of appeals to the court against a determination by an adjudicator, including provision—
(a) enabling the court to make a bankruptcy order on such an appeal, and
(b) about where such appeals lie.”
(4) After paragraph 24 insert—
24A Provision requiring official receivers—
(a) to keep files and other records relating to bankruptcy applications, and
(b) to make those files and records available for inspection by persons of a prescribed description.”
62 (1) In the Table in Schedule 10 (punishment of offences), insert the following entry after the entry relating to section 262A(1)—
“263O | False representations or omissions in connection with a bankruptcy application. | 1. On indictment 2. Summary | 1. 7 years or a fine, or both. 2. 12 months or the statutory maximum, or both.” |
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 13—Equality Act 2010: obtaining information for proceedings.
Government new clause 17—Power to provide for equal pay audits.
Amendment 56, page 43, line 27, leave out clause 52.
Government amendments 35, 36, 45 and 47.
We come now to equality measures and various technical and consequential amendments relating to territorial nature and commencement. The new clauses relate to Great Britain’s legal framework on equality and human rights. New clauses 12 and 13 repeal provisions in the Equality Act 2010 that expressly place liability on employers for repeated harassment of their customers, and provisions related to obtaining information. New clause 17 enables Ministers to require employment tribunals to order equal pay audits where an employer is found to have broken equal pay and/or sex discrimination laws. Opposition amendment 56 seeks to remove from the Bill measures to improve the focus and effectiveness of the Equality and Human Rights Commission.
The Government’s amendments and clause 52 are necessary to clarify our legal framework on equality and human rights, and in doing so make it more effective. But they are also about laying the foundations for a sustainable economic recovery. In the current economic circumstances we simply cannot afford not to maximise the full potential of our work force. All hon. Members support making it easier for people to play an active role in our economy, and it is for that reason that I hope we can agree on the provisions. A vague legal framework, full of aspiration but lacking clarity, helps no one, and, worst of all, can hold people back.
The shadow Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills has described these measures as a sign of the Government rowing back on equalities. They are anything but. Rather they are a clear indication of the Government’s commitment to making a real difference on the ground. This is reflected not only in the legislative measures that we are debating today, but in what the Government have achieved since taking office in 2010. [Interruption.] The shadow Secretary of State asks what we have done for equalities. I will tell him.
We have established the first ever inter-ministerial group on equality and published the first ever cross-government strategy; legislated to allow civil partnerships on religious premises; published the first ever transgender action plan; introduced support for disabled people seeking elected office; launched “Think, Act, Report” to have gender equality reporting; established the Women’s Business Council, which is doing vital work to help identify the barriers holding women back in the work place; provided support for women to set up and grow their own businesses with more than 5,000 women mentors; and championed equality on company boards, with the number of FTSE 100 all-male boards halving and new appointments to boards rising from 13% women in the last year of the Labour Government to 34% under this Government. We have published the first ever sports charter aimed at combating homophobia and transphobia; all premiership and championship football teams are now signed up against homophobia and transphobia. We are of course consulting on equal civil marriage, something the previous Government did not do. We have also legislated to end age discrimination in the provision of goods and services.
The Minister is describing an onerous list of questions, so perhaps she can tell the House how few need to be answered in order for the information to be provided so that someone can get proper redress.
This is a procedure about obtaining information. There are clearly differences between different cases. However, it is also clear from the consultation that this is being used as a sort of fishing expedition whereby additional questions are asked in order to produce an undue burden on business and perhaps sometimes to encourage the idea that the process might be seen to be far too burdensome and that a settlement should therefore be reached instead, even where there may not have been a breach by the employer.
Can the Minister say what percentage of responding organisations supported her position, because I believe that 83% were opposed to it?
It is certainly true that a wide range of views were put forward to the consultation. Among business groups, there was a very strong view that this costs a lot of money, and I will explain why. Based on the sample, the five to six hours spent on each form at a cost of £160 equates to a cost to employers of £1.4 million a year, and it could be considerably higher because many employers may use more expensive legal advice.
If the Minister’s complaint is about the quantity of questions, then why not limit the number that can be asked? We are all limited in the number of questions that we can submit at the Table Office, so why not apply similar principles to this procedure?
I have already outlined various circumstances in which there is a range of questions with many sub-sections. We are saying that it is helpful for business and employees to discuss these issues and to be able to provide information. However, this provision is placing requirements and fears on businesses, and the disproportionate costs that they are facing in complying with it represents a total cost to business of nearly £1.5 million a year. That is a significant cost that we should not take lightly.
Individuals can seek information from an employer about an alleged breach of the 2010 Act without relying on this provision; they can request that information verbally or in writing. Of course, it is in businesses’ interests to respond to reasonable requests of this kind, because the courts would still be free to draw inferences from any employer or service provider’s refusal to answer questions or from answers that seem evasive.
I am sure the Minister would accept that in many businesses there is an imbalance of power between an individual employee, who might be in a non-unionised workplace—a small business—and the employer, who, after all, is paying that employee. The employee may therefore be reluctant to upset their employer, and the statutory questionnaire procedure at least means that the employee can look to a formal external process to try to elicit information.
What assessment, if any, has the Minister made of the costs and savings in court time? Notably, many of the 83% of respondents in favour of the existing procedure were members of the judiciary, presumably because it makes for a simpler court process when cases do go to tribunal.
I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention. Some of the previous Government’s reforms were introduced, ostensibly, to try to reduce the number of cases coming to tribunal, but they have not that effect at all. We have seen a mushrooming in the number of cases at tribunal, which has resulted in a huge backlog. That is no good for employers or for employees, as the stress of waiting for a tribunal preys heavily on people’s minds. The other measures in the Bill are taking firm and important steps to encourage conciliation at an earlier stage to try to reduce the number of tribunals, and to consult on ways in which we can have a rapid resolution so that fewer cases come to tribunal. Those things will do what she suggests is helpful; we all agree that we want to reduce the number of tribunals, but those are the right ways in which to address the concerns, rather than having lengthy and cumbersome questionnaires for businesses. We have therefore concluded that this obtaining information procedure is disproportionate, and our amendment would repeal it.
The Minister has said that this onerous, form-filling, information-gathering exercise costs £1.4 million, but she went on to say that the information can still be requested, verbally or in writing. Presumably a great deal of time will still be required by the employer to provide the information. So what net saving across the whole of business does she envisage? Is it a third of that figure—is it just over half a million pounds? What is the quantum in this?
As the hon. Gentleman says, there will clearly be some taking into account of and familiarisation with the new procedures, which will have a cost attached. The impact assessment therefore suggests that £800,000 is what business will save on an annual basis, and that is still a significant sum.
New clause 17 relates to cases where an employer has been found to have broken equal pay law or to have discriminated between women and men in non-contractual pay. It introduces a power to make regulations to require employment tribunals to order such an employer to carry out an equal pay audit. The pay gap between men and women stubbornly persists. In 2011, it was still more than 20%, having fallen only five percentage points in the previous eight years. That is why we are acting under the coalition commitment to promote equal pay. We have followed the lead of the previous Government in introducing a voluntary initiative, “Think, Act, Report”, to encourage employers to have more transparency about pay and other issues. More than 50 of Britain’s leading employers, covering hundreds of thousands of employees, are now supporting this initiative. They include Tesco, which publishes details of its gender pay gap, and household names such as BT, IBM, Fujitsu, Morgan Stanley and Unilever, which are all taking steps towards greater transparency. For those companies, which are doing the right thing, a voluntary approach is appropriate. I would argue that it is also often more likely to be successful, because of the genuine buy-in from senior management.
At the same time as we pursue that voluntary, positive action, we still think that it is right to introduce stronger legislative sanctions for cases where employers have been found to have broken the law. We know that many businesses agree with this approach. For example, in response to the “Modern Workplaces” consultation, a large organisation told us that equal pay audits could be an effective way to increase transparency where the law was seen to be breached. Representatives of one small and medium-sized enterprise said:
“For the sake of all those employers who do make huge efforts to have a fair pay system, if others can ‘get away’ with discrimination and generally provide women with lower pay, this is anti-competitive and a burden on ‘good’ employers. So a compulsory audit is entirely appropriate”.
Any regulations made under this power would affect only employers who are found to have broken the relevant laws. These regulations will: set out the content of an equal pay audit; outline the procedures for verifying that an equal pay audit meets an agreed standard; set out to whom and how an equal pay audit should be published; and specify the non-criminal sanctions that should apply where an employer fails to comply with an equal pay audit order.
I remind the House that the regulations will not be applied to micro and start-up businesses during the moratorium on new rules, which will apply until 2014. I assure the House that we will consult further on the practical detail before any regulations are introduced, and that they will be subject to an affirmative resolution of both Houses of Parliament.
What message does the Minister think this gives when one in two young black men, compared with one in four of their white counterparts, are unemployed? How can she justify this downgrading of the EHRC in such conditions?
I accept the hon. Lady’s genuine concern about the issue she has raised: there is far too much of an equality gap in our society and between young white and black men. Of course, the Government are committed to tackling that. However, I question whether she really believes that section 3 of the 2006 Act will do that. The message that this sends is that this Government are committed to equality but focused on really making a difference. [Interruption.] I hear the shadow Secretary of State, the hon. Member for Streatham (Mr Umunna), murmuring various things from a sedentary position, but if he really thinks that the EHRC, which was bequeathed to us by the previous Government, was functioning well and was effective, I do not know what planet he is living on. We should consider what has been said about the organisation’s effectiveness. Its accounts were not being signed off and it was wasting money; £866,000 was spent on a website that was never launched. It was not functioning well. It is important that we focus it on its specific duties, and that is what our amendments will do.
The hon. Lady has referred to the previous Government’s record. As deputy general secretary of Unite, I work very closely with the EHRC. May I give one example of effectiveness and ask her to comment on it? The commission conducted a ground-breaking analysis of the two-tier labour market in the supermarket supply chain, which causes division in the workplace and damages social cohesion. As a result, the supermarkets were brought to the table and told that enforcement powers would be used unless they changed the way in which they procured. Major changes were made as a consequence, so that all workers enjoyed equal treatment in the supply chain. Does the hon. Lady challenge that excellent example of the effectiveness of the EHRC?
I am not saying for a second that the EHRC did nothing right. We are committed to keeping it and refocusing it to make it more effective.
The general counsel said that
“other parts of the legislation provide sufficient clarity on what our job really is.”––[Official Report, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Public Bill Committee, 19 June 2012; c. 79, Q177.]
A raft of stakeholders has criticised how the EHRC was being run. Although it has done some good things, it was not being run in the efficient way that is required of an organisation with such an essential duty and such an essential role to play in the equalities and human rights make-up of our country.
I am very confused about the Minister’s statement that she will make the EHRC more efficient, when what she will actually do is to continue to cut its budget hugely. How can it be more efficient with a tiny percentage of the staff that it had? It will be unable to do the representative work that it used to do and a vast amount of the other work that it used to do. How will that make it more efficient?
The EHRC was not particularly efficient in some of the work that it was doing. For example, it cost its helpline far more to deal with cases relating to working rights than other Government and external providers. We are ensuring that the money is spent better. Opposition Members seem to forget that the financial situation left to this Government was an appalling mess. It does no good for equalities in this country not to have the effective use of public money. We should all want to see that. [Interruption.] I am answering the hon. Lady. We should all want to see the effective use of public money. It is wrong to suggest that there are no ways in which the EHRC could have been improved.
We have heard from various Opposition Members that the EHRC was functioning fantastically.
There are many ways in which the EHRC could improve. We are making a variety of changes to it, but we remain committed to this organisation and to improving it. Just this morning, we had the pre-appointment scrutiny hearing for the new chair, Baroness Onora O’Neill, which is a positive step. I am optimistic about how the organisation will move forward and improve its governance, which is badly needed.
The Minister is right that improvements were needed in the governance and management of the EHRC. Opposition Members have not disputed that. However, to confuse that with changing its legislatively provided remit is simply not being clear, as that is a very different point of principle. Nobody is saying that the organisation could not be run better. What Opposition Members are querying is the need to cut away the ground from under its feet by changing its very purpose.
I appreciate that Opposition Members are exercised about this issue, but it is not something that the organisation itself is exercised about, as is evidenced by the quotations from the general counsel in the Committee hearing.
A range of organisations responded to the consultation and gave their views on the change in the general duty. The Association of Chief Police Officers said that the general duty is
“broad in nature, open to wide interpretation and is more in the nature of a vision statement”.
The CBI said that it is
“too vague and creates unrealistic expectations”.
The Gender Identity Research and Education Society said:
“There is no essential specific legal function”.
I particularly like the way in which we managed to unite two organisations that are not usually in agreement—Stonewall and the Evangelical Alliance. The Evangelical Alliance said:
“It’s impossible to achieve and could lead to all kinds of unsatisfactory political interpretations”.
Stonewall said:
“We are not clear that the Commission has made a sufficient case for the retention of Section 3.”
I accept that many Opposition Members think that this change means that the sky is falling in, but the EHRC and its stakeholders do not concur with that viewpoint.
We are reducing the frequency with which the commission is required to publish reports.
I am sorry, but I want to make some progress. I have taken many interventions.
As a fellow Scot and in this week’s spirit of compromise and co-operation, I will give way.
I am not sure about compromise and co-operation. The Minister spoke about the repeal of section 3, but it is also the repeal of section 10 of the Equality Act 2006. Although it makes sense to make the EHRC more efficient and cost-effective, I am curious to know how removing the specific duty to promote good relations between different groups makes any sense, given her declaration that she wants the organisation still to function and do the good things it was doing.
The hon. Gentleman does not need to worry about that because under existing duties in sections 8 and 9 of the 2006 Act, the EHRC still has all the requirements and focus it needs. In the consultation, a range of stakeholders spoke about the repeal of the good relations duty in section 10, and whether it was the Association of Chief Police Officers stating that a greater emphasis on its responsibilities in regulating the new public sector duty is broadly supported, or Stonewall saying that the need for the good relations function has not been sufficiently demonstrated, a wide range of stakeholders did not seem to think that there was a problem.
We are reducing the frequency with which the commission is required to publish a report on progress from every three years to every five years, and by allowing a longer time scale between reports, we believe the commission will be able to capture more meaningful change over time. We accept, however, that seismic societal changes or developments do not always happen conveniently every five years, and there is no reason why the commission cannot report more frequently if it wishes.
I know that many Opposition Members have concerns about the repeal of the good relations duty in section 10 of the 2006 Act, but we are clear that a separate mandate is not necessary. The commission’s most valuable work in this area—for example its inquiry into disability-related harassment—can be carried out under its core equality and human rights functions, which we are not amending. That view is supported by the evidence I have outlined that was provided to the Public Bill Committee by the EHRC’s general counsel and other stakeholders.
We are repealing the power associated with the good relations duty in section 19 of the 2006 Act because other organisations gather the information that that legislation permits the commission to monitor. For example, since 2011, police forces in England and Wales have been required to collect data on suspected hate crime relating to race, religion or belief, disability, sexual orientation and gender reassignment. The commission will retain the ability to review and use those data under its existing equality and human rights duties which—I repeat—we are not amending. In Scotland, where the EHRC’s human rights remit is limited, the Scottish Human Rights Commission will be able to use its powers accordingly.
On the power to make arrangements for the provision of conciliation in non-workplace discrimination disputes, as set out in section 27 of the 2006 Act, unfortunately the commission has consistently failed to deliver a well-targeted, cost-effective service. The free conciliation service funded until March 2012 by the EHRC offered poor value for taxpayers’ money. Average costs were more than £4,000 per case, compared with £600 to £850 when going through the Ministry of Justice website, “Find a civil mediation provider”.
A good and effective conciliation service should—of course—be available to those who need it, to help people resolve disputes without recourse to the courts. Good quality, accessible and effective mediation is readily available at reasonable cost throughout England, Wales and Scotland through the MOJ’s website that provides access to a full range of civil mediation council-accredited mediators at set fees, and in Scotland through the Scottish Mediation Network’s “find a mediator” website. For that reason, we are repealing the commission’s power to make provision for conciliation. The new Equality Advisory and Support Service, launched at the beginning of this month, will signpost individuals with discrimination disputes to those alternative, more cost-effective, mediation services. In evidence in Committee, the general counsel of the commission agreed that it is not
“particularly important for us to provide the service for conciliation.”––[Official Report, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Public Bill Committee, 19 June 2012; c. 79, Q175.]
Contrary to accusations from the Opposition, these legislative measures do not represent an attack on equalities or undermine the commission’s important role. On the contrary, we believe that they will help the commission to become more effective in delivering its core functions of promoting equality of opportunity and human rights, and creating a fair environment for jobs and growth. I am therefore unable to support amendment 56, and I commend the Government amendments to the House.
I will speak first to amendment 56, which is my name and those of my right hon. and hon. Friends. We propose to remove clause 52 in its entirety. I shall then speak to Government new clauses 12, 13 and 17 and related measures on third-party harassment, discrimination questionnaires and equal pay orders.
Absolutely. That is also true in the public sector. In my constituency, a major public sector institution is even now working with the Equality and Human Rights Commission to marry up its human resources practices and its service delivery. That demonstrates exactly the kind of strong institutional body that we want and that we ought to be protecting and promoting today.
My hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington mentioned the concerns that Opposition Members have about the framework agreement that covers the operation of the commission, its relationship with Government and, crucially, its independence. There are worries that the combination of the changes to the framework agreement and the fact that it will report only every five years, as opposed to every three years, as now, will seriously weaken its independence and the balance between the independent commission and the Government Equalities Office, which I think is still within the Home Office, although I am happy to be corrected by the Minister if it has moved.
The Minister is indicating that it has moved. We are concerned that the balance of power and influence in determining strategy has shifted from an independent commission to an internal Government body. In the context of the international A-grade status, that is a cause of concern.
That is absolutely right. It is also important to recognise that in an employer-employee relationship, there is an imbalance of power, even in many of the smallest businesses. One thing that the statutory questionnaire procedure helps to do is redress that power imbalance—that has been specifically noted in European directives as one of the purposes of such procedures. It is a regret that Ministers have decided that that protection for employees should be removed.
The statutory questionnaire procedure promotes efficiency in the workplace—cases can be abandoned or issues clarified early—but the fact that the judiciary has come out in the Government’s consultation largely in favour of it suggests that it also leads to efficiencies in the courtroom and the tribunal, because the issues will have been well analysed and distilled. Given the many pressures being brought to bear on employment tribunals, I would have thought that the Government would want to give serious consideration to the cost-effectiveness of the statutory questionnaire procedure in respect of tribunals.
These highly regrettable measures have been thrown into the legislation at the eleventh hour. It appears that they are more a sop to the prejudices of a small number of business organisations rather than a recognition of any business hostility to legislative provisions that have existed for many years.
Finally, I should mention what is happening to the general landscape of places where people can go for redress and advice. My hon. Friends have mentioned the ending of the commission’s grants programme to the voluntary sector; changes to its helpline provision; and the ending of its ability to offer conciliation services in non-employment matters. As the Minister well knows, that is happening against a backdrop of swingeing cuts to legal aid funding and to local authority funding for advice organisations. Those who have suffered discrimination or injustice now have real difficulty even to get to the means of presenting and taking their case. I would understand it if the Minister argued that that is not exactly the EHRC’s core function if it were not for the fact that all other provision of such advice and information is being dismantled. It is extremely difficulty for the Minister to argue that there is no need for the EHRC to provide such a service when the same service is being removed from every possible place where people in need might look for it.
The Opposition are distressed and saddened by the proposals in the Government’s new clauses and amendments. We are concerned that they speak either to Government Members’ intrinsic hostility to the concept of equalities and the landscape to protect them, or to a casual dismantling of provisions that work extremely well. We are concerned that the signal sent to wider society is a negative one—the suggestion is either that equality is a job done, which it plainly is not, or that it is no longer important, even though there is agreement across the House that it is very important.
I hope the Minister takes the opportunity to think again this afternoon about some of the Government’s proposals, but I can absolutely assure her that if that does not happen, the subject will be a matter of live debate in the House of Lords. Their lordships take a great interest in equality and social justice and will be very concerned about provisions that appear to weaken the institutional infrastructure to protect and promote equality. I look forward to many more robust arguments. I hope that, in the end, the provisions will be seen as damaging and that they will be withdrawn, so that we will be able to move forward as an exemplar country in our commitment to equality and our determination to make continuing progress.
Although this debate has not been as consensual as the previous one on insolvency measures, I recognise none the less that Members have raised genuine concerns, on which I hope to reassure them.
Various Members referred to the Second Reading debate and, in particular, the question that the hon. Member for Stretford and Urmston (Kate Green) posed to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, who said that there were no proposals, at that point, to bring forward the measures in the amendments today. Of course, in June, when Second Reading was undertaken, a consultation was under way, so we did not have firm proposals at that point. My right hon. Friend said, though, that there was nothing to stop people proposing amendments, and since then, of course, the consultation has ended. In answer to the hon. Lady’s specific question about the consultation, I can say that the Government published their response on 10 October. She is right that the Government Equalities Office has moved, following the reshuffle, and is now housed in the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, where the Minister for Women and Equalities is also Secretary of State.
I can provide a range of clarifications. The shadow Secretary of State asked about the scope of equal pay audits, in particular, and whether they would apply only to private organisations. I can confirm that they will also apply to public sector organisations, so it will be the case for all employers, although we must bear in mind the moratorium on additional burdens on micro-businesses until 2014. It is certainly not our intention, however, to limit its scope to the private sector.
The hon. Member for Vale of Clwyd (Chris Ruane) made a helpful intervention pointing out the unfortunate increase in disability hate crime. It was helpful because it reminded us of the issue. I share his concern, and he should not be under the impression that such concern is limited to the Opposition.
I hope that the Minister noticed that I did not say “the Liberal Democrats”. I said “the Tories”.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that clarification, but given that I speak on behalf of the Government, it is only fair that I point out that many of my Conservative colleagues also share his concerns. Very often, on the issue of people with disabilities who require support, the reporting in some sections of the media leaves a lot to be desired.
Were the disability organisations right or wrong in their recent powerful report making a direct link between the tone set by the Government and the rise in hate crime?
Every organisation is entitled to put forward its views and concerns. It is important that language is used carefully, as has been pointed out by various Members. Whether they are a member of the Government or not, everyone needs to be careful about the language they use in these discussions. That is not to say, of course, that we should never make any changes to provisions affecting people with disabilities, but that debate should be conducted responsibly.
The hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) was rather dismissive of many of the Government’s measures on equalities, and said that there was much consensus in these areas. These are measures that the previous Labour Government did not undertake during their 13 years in power, so if there is such consensus, the question needs to be asked, “Why didn’t they get on with it?”
The hon. Lady completely misinterpreted what I said. I was not dismissive at all. I welcomed the measures and said that they were supported across the House. This measure, however, is one of the first steps on equality in nearly a decade that has not been taken consensually.
I take the hon. Gentleman’s point that there has not been a consensual debate today, although I do not think it would be accurate to say that there is a consensus on, for instance, the Government’s measures to tackle discrimination in the trans community or our proposals on equal marriage. I can say that as a constituency MP, and my mailbag, and no doubt those of others, would attest to it. The Government have a positive record, including on measures that the previous Government did not address.
On the reasons for new clause 12, the shadow Secretary of State gave a version of events that differed from mine in referring to the case in 1994. For the record, according to the GEO’s lawyers, the reasoning and rationale for bringing forward that provision is as I set out in my opening remarks. It is also worth pointing out that even though the 1994 case to which he referred happened before that provision was in place, those individuals rightly won their case. Ultimately, the important change is the change in definition, which took place as a result of the case, which I mentioned, in 2007.
The point is that after the 1994 case was won, the principal point of law that was the subject of the case was called into question several times and the law changed various times—I know that from my own practice—which is why we did what we did in the Equality Act 2010.
The change made in 2007 was made for the specific reason that has been mentioned, and that was what was replicated in 2010, but in any event, I reiterate what I said earlier about the fact that significant protections remain. This is not to say that by removing the three strikes test there is no remaining protection for people, so that employers do not have to have regard to ensuring that their employees are not harassed at work; rather, employers retain a common-law duty of care to their employees, and they will still need to ensure that they do not fall foul of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.
Let me turn to the Equality and Human Rights Commission. I am glad that we are not assuming, on both sides of the House, that the position was perfect under the last Government, and I welcome the comments that various Opposition Members have made to that effect. It is worth bearing in mind that we had significant concerns, as did many of the stakeholder organisations, about the EHRC’s ability to fulfil its core duties. On human rights, for instance, Liberty said:
“We have…watched the turbulent”
history
“of the EHRC with some disappointment…The EHRC has a vital statutory duty”
to defend human rights, and
“notwithstanding considerable staffing and other resources, this is a duty which it is yet to fulfil.”
The Equality and Diversity Forum expressed concern that the human rights inquiry was
“the only visible work EHRC has done that is explicitly concerned with fulfilling its duty to promote respect for human rights.”
The Public and Commercial Services Union listed human rights debates from which it said the commission was absent due to a
“failure to communicate its role effectively”.
In addition, concerns were expressed by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, so there was indeed a problem with the basic statutory duties that are the core functions of the EHRC not being properly undertaken previously. That is why our amendments seek to focus the duty and make it crystal clear that that is the priority.
The hon. Lady has mentioned a number of organisations and their concerns about how the commission was fulfilling or failing to fulfil some of its core responsibilities, but does she not accept that not one of the organisations she has named—neither Liberty, the Equality and Diversity Forum nor the PCS—has called for a reduction in the commission’s remit? What they have called for is improvements in governance and management, some of which, I accept, we are now seeing.
It is certainly the case that there is wide agreement that improved governance and management are necessary. Much of that has been happening, which is definitely to be welcomed. However, this comes back to whether we should have a legal duty—something that is tightly drawn and focused—or something that is more akin to a mission statement or vision statement. The purpose of a legal duty is about something being manageable and achievable, and although the duty that the shadow Secretary of State read out described what we would all want to achieve, it would be ambitious for a Government, with all the resources available to them, to say that they would achieve them, let alone for a solitary organisation to try to achieve such a wide range of ends, albeit good ones.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way to me again. We are not the only ones who have raised concerns about what she is doing to the commission in this Bill; they include members of her party, as I have said. Councillor Lester Holloway, the head of the BAME Councillors Association, has said:
“A combination of biting budget cuts and the stripping away of many of its powers threatens to turn the commission into little more than a glorified equalities thinktank.”
The head of the Ethnic Minority Liberal Democrats has said:
“I have heard the argument that if it wasn’t for the Lib Dems the Conservatives might have abolished the EHRC altogether by now. However that argument is unlikely to cut much ice”—
Order. Mr Umunna, when I say, “Order”, you sit down. I also need to remind you that interventions are supposed to be brief. I appreciate that you were using a quotation, but using several quotations is not in order.
I meet and speak to those Liberal Democrat colleagues regularly, and I spoke to Lester Holloway last week about these issues. Some of the points that have been made have been based on inaccurate information, such as that about black and minority ethnic staff in the commission. The commission has corrected a lot of inaccurate information and misunderstanding about the impact that the restructuring plans will have on its staff. Of course, diversity is taken very seriously in all public sector organisations, but in the EHRC perhaps more than most there is acute awareness of how vital it is.
The duties that will remain in sections 8 and 9 of the Equality Act 2006 are the core functions of the EHRC. Several Members referred to the Let’s Kick Racism Out of Football campaign, which was an excellent initiative but contained nothing at all that could not be done under section 8. It is a false argument to take something excellent that the EHRC has done in the past and say that such an initiative could not be taken in future because of the changes that we are making to section 3. It absolutely could be taken under section 8.
Several Members asked whether the changes to the EHRC were about growth. I am not going to pretend that making its remit more structured is specifically a growth measure, but that does not mean that it is not a helpful thing to do. I have outlined the impact that the provisions coming out of the red tape challenge will have on business. Business will welcome that, coupled with all the other measures that we are taking in the red tape challenge to bear down on unnecessary regulation.
Several comments have been bandied around that many Government Members wish to see the back of the EHRC and that the change is abolition by stealth. I hope that I can reassure hon. Members that that is not the case. We certainly have not heard any suggestions to that effect from Government Members. Perhaps if that was what they believed, they would have come to the House to say so today. [Interruption.] I am sure that if any of them had wished to say that, they would have done. Even if that were the case, it is not the coalition Government’s position. We recognise that the EHRC is an important institution and that equalities law is vital. It is vital to our economic recovery, because we need to ensure that we use the talents of all the people in our work force and potential work force. That is why we are ensuring that it is focused on what is most important. We want to focus the EHRC on its core functions and, as I have mentioned, strengthen its governance and accountability, in which we have already had some degree of success.
A few Members mentioned the consultation and suggested that there was not necessarily unanimous support for the Government’s measures. However, if we examine the responses that were received from individuals—for clarification, they were not Members of Parliament—we see that more than half advocated the abolition of the EHRC. Opposition Members should be slightly careful what they wish for if they urge Governments always to follow consultation results exactly. We obviously have to take views into account, but we must also ensure that important provisions and protections are not undermined. Even if there were to be a groundswell of support for doing such a thing, the Government would recognise the important protections that the EHRC ensures are in place.
The hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) asked questions about the equality advisory and support service helpline, which opened on 1 October. It has some advantage compared with the previous commission helpline. It is open for longer—from 9 am to 8 pm Monday to Friday and from 10 am to 2 pm on Saturday—and is therefore more convenient. It handles conversations that people might not want to have while they are at work, so having longer opening hours is helpful and makes the service more accessible. It is free to phone from landlines, and it will soon be free from most mobiles too.
The inaccurate suggestion was made that the helpline can be used only when there are referrals from other organisations. That is not the case. It is there to help people with discrimination problems, and there is nothing to prevent a member of the public from approaching the EASS directly, although we accept that most people probably will access it via a referral.
It started on 1 October and there are not massive advertising budgets at the moment, but—[Interruption.] The hon. Gentleman clearly wants some huge advertising campaign, but we do not have massive budgets available at the moment. It is important that the advice is out there, that referrals are there and that the information is available when people wish to access the service.
The hon. Gentleman also said that he was concerned about the zero-based budget exercise that was being conducted on the EHRC. However, I understand that that is now Labour party policy. At its recent conference, the shadow Chancellor said that
“the public I think would expect this, to have a proper zero-based spending review where we say we have to justify every penny and make sure we are spending in the right way.”
Perhaps the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington does not agree with the concept of a zero-based budget review, but his shadow Chancellor certainly does.
There is a difference between conducting a zero-based budget exercise when seeking to ensure the effective operation of an organisation and having one when 62% cuts have just been made and the Government are threatening to close it.
I can say from the Dispatch Box that there is no such threat to close the organisation. The EHRC is an important part of our equalities infrastructure and the Government are committed to ensuring that it is maintained—
The shadow Secretary of State might wish to let me respond to the point raised by the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington; then I will see whether I have an opportunity to hear from him.
The hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington mentioned the percentage of cuts and bandied about a figure of 62%. It is important to bear in mind that removing functions such as the conciliation service, which are now being provided elsewhere, will clearly result in a reduction in the number of individuals required. That service is no longer being provided by the EHRC. When we take into account the functions that have been transferred, the cuts that the EHRC is dealing with are broadly in line with other public sector cuts. Yes, it would be lovely to be in a situation in which we did not have to make any cuts but, unfortunately, the nature of the economic circumstances that we were left with in 2010 means that that is not possible.
I think it is fair to say that we remain deeply concerned about this matter. Will the Minister give us a guarantee now that, for the remainder of this Parliament, there will be no move to make any further changes to the statutory remit or footing of the Equality and Human Rights Commission?
The shadow Secretary of State does not surprise me greatly when he says that he is not convinced by our arguments today. This was never going to be the most consensual of debates. He is now asking me to look into a crystal ball, but I am clearly not going to make any predictions for the future. I will, however, say that the EHRC is a vital body that is hugely important to our equalities protection. We are conducting a zero-based review to ensure that it can undertake its functions in a more focused way, and that is what we will continue to do.
The hon. Member for Stretford and Urmston mentioned the potential risk to the A-rated status of the EHRC as a human rights body. We are in discussions with the international co-ordinating committee on this, and we want to address any concerns that it might have. We are determined to ensure that we have an A-rated and highly respected human rights body. The hon. Lady also asked about the framework document and suggested that it could undermine the independence of the institution. In fact, it has been agreed on between the commission and the Government, and it sets out specifically that the commission must be
“free to exercise its statutory functions free from ministerial interference or undue influence.”
I am grateful to the Minister, and I note that assurance, but does not the framework document imply that the function of the EHRC is to deliver the Government’s equality strategy? That does not exactly speak to its independence.
As I have said, the framework document is absolutely independent. The commission should be
“under as few constraints as reasonably possible in determining its activities, timetables and priorities”,
and it should not be regarded as the servant or agent of the Crown, or enjoy any status, immunity and privilege of the Crown. Those words are very clear.
I agree with the hon. Lady that there is much more to do on equality. This is in no way “job done”. She outlined the scandal of the remaining pay gap, which we are committed to addressing. I would point out, however, that we were left with a 20% pay gap in 2010 after 13 years of a Labour Government. So before the Opposition get too holier than thou, they should show a little humility. It was not “job done” after they had been in government. We need to work together to ensure that equalities are driven forward, and that these situations are improved. In addition, on the issues the hon. Lady raised around racial inequality, social mobility and the sort of action we are taking through the pupil premium will certainly help. I welcome her support for equal marriage, and I would note again that the previous Labour Government did not do anything about it for 13 years.
We are deliberately making sure that the EHRC is improved in respect of its management. We have made significant progress at the EHRC: we have a permanent chief executive appointed, and as I said, the pre-appointment scrutiny hearing took place this morning for the preferred candidate for its chair. Ministers will, of course, properly consider the report before formally deciding whether to appoint Baroness O’Neill. We have had two clean sets of accounts laid before Parliament—
With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment 33.
New clause 15 amends the definition of “estate agency work”, which determines the application of the Estate Agents Act 1979. This fulfils our commitment to introduce a measure on this issue following our recent targeted consultation, which was developed as part of the disruptive business models/challenger businesses theme of the red tape challenge.
New clause 15 extends a current exemption to that definition of estate agency work. Intermediaries, such as internet portals for private sales, will be out of the scope of the Estate Agents Act if they merely enable private sellers to advertise their properties and provide a means for sellers and buyers to contact and communicate with one another. Such intermediary businesses will therefore not be obliged to comply with requirements that are relevant to full service estate agency businesses, such as the disclosure of any self-interest in a property transaction and membership of a redress scheme for residential estate agents. These private sales businesses are not actively involved in property transactions, but offer a lower-cost alternative of enabling individuals to market their own property and buy and sell privately.
Those intermediary businesses will be able to provide a means for the seller and prospective buyer to contact one another, for example online; to provide a branded for sale board to the seller to assist this process; and to pass on to a prospective buyer solely the information provided by the seller in their advertisement, by whatever channel of communication. If, however, the intermediary offers any personal advice to a seller or a buyer, or other ancillary services, such as preparing property particulars or photographs or an energy performance certificate, the intermediary will be in the scope of the Estate Agents Act and bound by its obligations. The Estate Agents Act will therefore continue to apply to businesses that are involved in or have scope to influence property transactions.
The Government have found uncertainty and a range of views among stakeholders as to the application of the Estate Agents Act to intermediary businesses, particularly online. This is unhelpful to consumers who might wish to use an intermediary, and unhelpful to businesses, whether intermediaries or more traditional estate agents, or those interested in entering the market. Stakeholders are also concerned that consumers should be protected where they rely on a service provider in relation to a transaction as valuable and important as a house sale or purchase. Clearly, for most people it is the highest value and most important purchase they will make. The Estate Agents Act will continue to apply to businesses providing personal advice about a potential sale or other ancillary services.
For those reasons, this is a limited deregulation. It addresses the perceived uncertainty as to the scope of the Estate Agents Act and it brings benefits to consumers and to the industry, but, crucially, it does not unduly reduce consumer protection in relation to services that involve the service provider in the property transaction.
I thank the Minister for her helpful comments and I have also read her written ministerial statement to the House on this matter from 13 September. As she rightly says, Government new clause 15 updates and extends an exemption to the definition of estate agency work, as set out in the Estate Agents Act 1979. The legislation pre-dated the rise of the internet, and as the Minister rightly said, the world of buying and selling a house has been revolutionised by the internet. Buyers and sellers are now more likely to looking at the likes of Rightmove, Zoopla or PrimeLocation online than to be using a traditional high street estate agent, at least in the early stages of the process.
From the Minister’s comments I understand that some private sales internet portals may be exempt from the Estate Agents Act while others may be within its scope, depending on whether they provide advertising space or allow prospective buyers and sellers to match up via an online messaging board.
The Minister mentioned the Government’s report “Removing Red Tape for Challenger Businesses”. I was struck by a particular comment that is relevant to this part of the Bill. It states:
“Stripped-down business models, offering competitive prices to home buyers and sellers in exchange for limited, online services are caught by current legislation which applies a broad definition to ‘estate agency work’. Once legally categorised in this way, these innovative businesses are tied to regulation which can be disproportionate to the range of services they offer, and which may be inhibiting the growth of this alternative method of house buying and selling.”
The Opposition do not necessarily disagree with the Government’s approach to this, and we would certainly welcome innovation and improved competition to support, first and foremost, the consumer in what is, as the Minister rightly said, probably the biggest and most significant purchase or sale in his or her life, but we do have a number of questions that I hope the Minister will be able to address.
Discussions about amending the Estate Agents Act 1979 go as far back as February 2010, when the Office of Fair Trading reported on its study into home buying and selling. I fully appreciate that the study strongly stated that innovation could have an impact on the cost of buying and selling a home and that the current legislation might be hindering the emergence of new business models, but it also stated that overall satisfaction with estate agents had improved in recent years and that, where there were problems in the process, consumers on the whole did not tend to think that the estate agent was at fault. The OFT found the existing legislation to be both comprehensive and wide-ranging and that further regulation was unnecessary.
I appreciate—I say this before the Minister intervenes—that the amendment is deregulatory in nature, but the OFT report concluded that the focus should be on improving the enforcement of current rules to guard against serious breaches. That being the case, and notwithstanding my earlier, hopefully supportive, comments welcoming the introduction of a greater degree of innovation in the industry, will she go back to first principles and outline the specific benefits that the new clause will produce? What forecast has she made regarding how and in what numbers she anticipates new entrants will come into the market? What estimates has she made regarding cost savings to consumers? Has she been able to quantify the savings to business that such a deregulatory approach would produce?
For a Bill that purports to be all about enterprise, the theme of our deliberations during its passage through the House has been a spectacular lack of evidence to support its provisions, so it would be useful if she could provide some quantifiable and empirical evidence. What consideration has the Minister given to consumer protection in the light of the new clause? Is there a risk that people will not have access to the suitable, robust and—one would hope—impartial advice that could be provided by an estate agent? Has she thought about the potential risks to vulnerable people, particularly the elderly, some of whom might be susceptible to scare tactics and unscrupulous behaviour? What is in place to ensure that those people do not see a reduction in their consumer protection as a result of the new clause?
The Minister might also be aware of concerns raised by the National Association of Estate Agents about a potential breach of the UK’s anti-money laundering regulations as a result of the new clause. Estate agents are covered under the third money laundering directive, which I understand has been implemented in the UK through the Money Laundering Regulations 2007. The Minister referred to those regulations in her written ministerial statement last month, stating that the Terrorism Act 2000 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 incorporate the definition from the Estate Agents Act 1979 in applying particular standards to regulated sectors, which include estate agents. Can she therefore confirm that the new clause will deal with the risk of money laundering? Can she—for my purposes, rather than anybody else’s—clarify that those estate agents who will be taken out of the scope of the 1979 Act because they provide a slimmed down business model will still be seen as a regulated sector for the purposes of money laundering regulations? I hope that she can answer these questions comprehensively, but the Opposition can certainly support one of the things she proposes with regard to injecting a greater degree of innovation into the market and embracing new business models. I look forward to hearing what she has to say.
I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s general support for the new clause. He is right to point out that the world has changed since the current legislation on estate agents came into force and that the internet has been absolutely revolutionary in that regard. He mentioned a number of popular and well-known property websites. I just caution him not to conclude that those household names would necessarily be caught by this limited deregulation. That is not the intention of the new clause at all. To put it into perspective, there are currently about 14,000 traditional estate agent offices in the UK—virtually all of them also have an internet presence—but there are fewer than 30 private sales portals in the UK, all of which are small and medium-sized enterprises, so that is quite an undeveloped part of our market. As for how many property sales go through estate agents, in 2000 the figure was 87%, with only 11% sold privately. That compares with other markets where it is rather less than that; for example, in the United States about 20% of sales are undertaken privately.
The Minister will recall that I mentioned concerns about money laundering. Will she say a few words about that?
The companies covered by this deregulation would not be involved in the transaction of money, because if they were they would remain caught by the Estate Agents Act. We therefore do not need to worry about this in relation to making it easier to undertake money laundering. Of course the Government maintain their provisions to try to make sure that they enforce the existing rules against money laundering in an appropriate fashion.
I hope that in the absence of any other questions from Members we will be able to proceed with a fair degree of consensus on this useful, though limited, deregulatory measure.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 15 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 9
Listed buildings in England: agreements and orders granting listed building consent
‘(1) The Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990 is amended as follows.
(2) In Chapter 2 of Part 1, after section 26 insert—
“Buildings in England: heritage partnership agreements
26A Heritage partnership agreements
‘(1) A relevant local planning authority may make an agreement under this section (a “heritage partnership agreement”) with any owner of a listed building, or a part of such a building, situated in England.
(2) Any of the following may also be a party to a heritage partnership agreement in addition to an owner and the relevant local planning authority—
(a) any other relevant local planning authority;
(b) the Secretary of State;
(c) the Commission;
(d) any person who has an interest in the listed building;
(e) any occupier of the listed building;
(f) any person involved in the management of the listed building;
(g) any other person who appears to the relevant local planning authority appropriate as having special knowledge of, or interest in, the listed building, or in buildings of architectural or historic interest more generally.
(3) A heritage partnership agreement may contain provision—
(a) granting listed building consent under section 8(1) in respect of specified works for the alteration or extension of the listed building to which the agreement relates, and
(b) specifying any conditions to which the consent is subject.
(4) The conditions to which listed building consent may be subject under subsection (3)(b) in respect of specified works are those that could be attached to listed building consent in respect of the works if consent were to be granted under section 16.
(5) If a heritage partnership agreement contains provision under subsection (3), nothing in sections 10 to 26 and 28 applies in relation to listed building consent for the specified works, subject to any regulations under section 26B(2)(f).
(6) A heritage partnership agreement may also—
(a) specify or describe works that would or would not, in the view of the parties to the agreement, affect the character of the listed building as a building of special architectural or historic interest;
(b) make provision about the maintenance and preservation of the listed building;
(c) make provision about the carrying out of specified work, or the doing of any specified thing, in relation to the listed building;
(d) provide for public access to the listed building and the provision to the public of associated facilities, information or services;
(e) restrict access to, or use of, the listed building;
(f) prohibit the doing of any specified thing in relation to the listed building;
(g) provide for a relevant public authority to make payments of specified amounts and on specified terms—
(i) for, or towards, the costs of any works provided for under the agreement; or
(ii) in consideration of any restriction, prohibition or obligation accepted by any other party to the agreement.
(7) For the purposes of subsection (6)(g), each of the following, if a party to the agreement, is a relevant public authority—
(a) the Secretary of State;
(b) the Commission;
(c) a relevant local planning authority.
(8) In this section “specified” means specified or described in the heritage partnership agreement.
(9) In this section and section 26B—
“owner”, in relation to a listed building or a part of such a building, means a person who is for the time being —
(a) the estate owner in respect of the fee simple in the building or part; or
(b) entitled to a tenancy of the building or part granted or extended for a term of years certain of which not less than seven years remain unexpired;
“relevant local planning authority”, in relation to a listed building, means a local planning authority in whose area the building or any part of the building is situated.
26B Heritage partnership agreements: supplemental
‘(1) A heritage partnership agreement—
(a) must be in writing;
(b) must make provision for the parties to review its terms at intervals specified in the agreement;
(c) must make provision for its termination and variation;
(d) may relate to more than one listed building or part, provided that in each case a relevant local planning authority and an owner are parties to the agreement; and
(e) may contain incidental and consequential provisions.
(2) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision—
(a) about any consultation that must take place before heritage partnership agreements are made or varied;
(b) about the publicity that must be given to heritage partnership agreements before or after they are made or varied;
(c) specifying terms that must be included in heritage partnership agreements;
(d) enabling the Secretary of State or any other person specified in the regulations to terminate by order a heritage partnership agreement or any provision of such an agreement;
(e) about the provision that may be included in an order made under regulations under paragraph (d), including provision enabling such orders to contain supplementary, incidental, transitory, transitional or saving provision;
(f) applying or reproducing, with or without modifications, any provision of sections 10 to 26 and 28 for the purposes of heritage partnership agreements;
(g) modifying any other provision of this Act as it applies in relation to heritage partnership agreements.
(3) Regulations made under subsection (2)(a) may, in particular, include provision as to—
(a) the circumstances in which consultation must take place;
(b) the types of listed building in respect of which consultation must take place;
(c) who must carry out the consultation;
(d) who must be consulted (including provision enabling the Commission to direct who is to be consulted in particular cases); and
(e) how the consultation must be carried out.
(4) Listed building consent granted by a heritage partnership agreement (except so far as the agreement or regulations under subsection (2) otherwise provide) enures for the benefit of the building and of all persons for the time being interested in it.
(5) Subject to subsection (4), a heritage partnership agreement cannot impose any obligation or liability, or confer any right, on a person who is not party to the agreement.
(6) Section 84 of the Law of Property Act 1925 (power to discharge or modify restrictive covenant) does not apply to a heritage partnership agreement.”
(3) After section 26B insert—
“Buildings in England: orders granting listed building consent
26C Listed building consent orders
‘(1) The Secretary of State may by order (a “listed building consent order”) grant listed building consent under section 8(1) in respect of works of any description for the alteration or extension of listed buildings of any description in England.
(2) The consent may be granted subject to conditions specified in the order.
(3) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (2), the conditions that may be specified include any conditions subject to which listed building consent may be granted under section 16.
(4) A listed building consent order may (without prejudice to section 17(2)) give the local planning authority power to require details of works to be approved by them, and may grant consent subject to conditions with respect to—
(a) the making of an application to the authority for a determination as to whether such approval is required, and
(b) the outcome of such an application or the way it is dealt with.
(5) A listed building consent order may enable the Secretary of State or the local planning authority to direct that consent granted by the order does not apply—
(a) to a listed building specified in the direction;
(b) to listed buildings of a description specified in the direction;
(c) to listed buildings in an area specified in the direction.
(6) An order may in particular make provision about the making, coming into force, variation and revocation of such a direction, including provision conferring powers on the Secretary of State in relation to directions by a local planning authority.
(7) Nothing in sections 10 to 26 applies in relation to listed building consent granted by a listed building consent order; but that does not affect the application of sections 20, 21 and 22 in relation to an application for approval required by a condition to which consent is subject.
26D Local listed building consent orders
‘(1) A local planning authority for any area in England may by order (a “local listed building consent order”) grant listed building consent under section 8(1) in respect of works of any description for the alteration or extension of listed buildings.
(2) Regulations under this Act may provide that subsection (1) does not apply to listed buildings of any description or in any area.
(3) The consent granted by a local listed building consent order may relate—
(a) to all listed buildings in the area of the authority or any part of that area;
(b) to listed buildings of any description in that area or any part of that area.
(4) The consent may be granted subject to conditions specified in the order.
(5) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (4), the conditions that may be specified include any subject to which listed building consent may be granted under section 16.
(6) A local listed building consent order may enable the local planning authority to direct that the consent granted by the order in respect of works of any description does not apply—
(a) to a listed building specified in the direction;
(b) to listed buildings of a description specified in the direction;
(c) to listed buildings in an area specified in the direction.
(7) An order may in particular make provision about the making, coming into force, variation and revocation of such a direction, including provision conferring powers on the Secretary of State.
(8) Nothing in sections 10 to 26 applies in relation to listed building consent granted by a local listed building consent order; but that does not affect the application of sections 20, 21 and 22 in relation to an application for approval required by a condition to which consent is subject.
(9) Schedule 2A makes provision in connection with local listed building consent orders.
26E Powers of Secretary of State in relation to local orders
‘(1) At any time before a local listed building consent order is adopted by a local planning authority the Secretary of State may direct that the order (or any part of it) is not to be adopted without the Secretary of State’s approval.
(2) If the Secretary of State gives a direction under subsection (1)—
(a) the authority must not take any step in connection with the adoption of the order until they have submitted the order or the part to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of State has decided whether to approve it;
(b) the order has no effect unless it (or the part) has been approved by the Secretary of State.
(3) In considering an order or part submitted under subsection (2)(a) the Secretary of State may take account of any matter the Secretary of State thinks relevant.
(4) It is immaterial whether any such matter was taken account of by the local planning authority.
(5) The Secretary of State—
(a) may approve or reject an order or part of an order submitted under subsection (2)(a);
(b) must give reasons for that decision.
(6) The Secretary of State—
(a) may at any time before a local listed building consent order is adopted by the local planning authority, direct them to modify it in accordance with the direction;
(b) must give reasons for any such direction.
(7) The local planning authority—
(a) must comply with a direction under subsection (6);
(b) must not adopt the order unless the Secretary of State gives notice of being satisfied that they have complied with the direction.
(8) The Secretary of State—
(a) may at any time by order revoke a local listed building consent order if of the opinion that it is expedient to do so;
(b) must give reasons for doing so.
(9) The Secretary of State—
(a) must not make an order under subsection (8) without consulting the local planning authority;
(b) if proposing to make such an order, must serve notice on the local planning authority.
(10) A notice under subsection (9)(b) must specify the period (which must not be less than 28 days from the date of its service) within which the authority may require an opportunity of appearing before and being heard by a person appointed by the Secretary of State for the purpose.
(11) The Secretary of State must give the authority such an opportunity if they require it within the period specified in the notice.
26F Considerations in making orders
‘(1) In considering whether to make a listed building consent order or local listed building consent order the Secretary of State or local planning authority must have special regard to the desirability of preserving—
(a) listed buildings of a description to which the order applies,
(b) their setting, or
(c) any features of special architectural or historic interest which they possess.
(2) Before making a listed building consent order the Secretary of State must consult the Commission.
26G Effect of revision or revocation of order on incomplete works
‘(1) A listed building consent order or local listed building consent order may include provision permitting the completion of works if—
(a) listed building consent is granted by the order in respect of the works, and
(b) the listed building consent is withdrawn after the works are started but before they are completed.
(2) Listed building consent granted by an order is withdrawn—
(a) if the order is revoked;
(b) if the order is varied or (in the case of a local listed building consent order) revised so that it ceases to grant listed building consent in respect of the works or materially changes any condition or limitation to which the grant of listed building consent is subject;
(c) if a direction applying to the listed building is issued under powers conferred under section 26C(5) or 26D(6).”
(4) After section 28 insert—
“28A Compensation where consent formerly granted by order is granted conditionally or refused
(1) Section 28 also has effect (subject to subsections (2) and (3)) where—
(a) listed building consent granted by a listed building consent order or a local listed building consent order is withdrawn (whether by the revocation or amendment of the order or by the issue of a direction), and
(b) on an application for listed building consent made within the prescribed period after the withdrawal, consent for works formerly authorised by the order is refused or is granted subject to conditions other than those imposed by the order.
(2) Section 28 does not have effect by virtue of subsection (1) if—
(a) the works authorised by the order were started before the withdrawal, and
(b) the order included provision in pursuance of section 26G permitting the works to be completed after the withdrawal.
(3) Section 28 does not have effect by virtue of subsection (1) if—
(a) notice of the withdrawal was published in the prescribed manner and within the prescribed period before the withdrawal, and
(b) the works authorised by the order were not started before the notice was published.
(4) Where section 28 has effect by virtue of subsection (1), references in section 28(2) and (3) to the revocation or modification of listed building consent are references to the withdrawal of the listed building consent by revocation or amendment of the order or by issue of the direction.”
(5) Schedule [Local listed building consent orders: procedure] (which inserts Schedule 2A to the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990) has effect.’.—(Matthew Hancock.)
Brought up, and read the First time.