Defence Budget and Transformation

Jeremy Corbyn Excerpts

Monday 14th May 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I can tell my right hon. Friend that work is in hand. A body within the Department is already sitting and considering issues that need to be brought to the fore and thought through for the next strategic defence review. The five-yearly cycle will allow us to look at the strategic changes during it, while making tactical decisions within the five-year period to manage the budget and the programme.

[Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)]

Now that the Secretary of State has finally got round to mentioning Trident, will he please say why he cannot give us some news in his statement on the expenditure of £1 billion on long-lead items for the reconstruction of the Trident system and the missiles that go with it, and why we are still contemplating spending £100 billion on a weapon of mass destruction that does not bring any security to this country, but merely a great deal of expenditure and danger?

[Mr Hammond]

The hon. Gentleman’s views on this subject are very well known, and I do not share them.

Oral Answers to Questions

Jeremy Corbyn Excerpts

Monday 26th March 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has already made the situation abundantly clear. The UK, together with the United States, seeks a peaceful solution to the Iranian crisis, but we are very clear that a combination of engagement and continued pressure is the way to deliver that. We look forward to the resumed E3 plus 3 talks, and we are also very clear that no option should be taken off the table.

[Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)]

Can the Secretary of State tell us on what British forces are engaged in the Gulf region at the present time, and what the rules of engagement are for naval vessels in the strait of Hormuz and surrounding waters?

[Mr Hammond]

I can tell the hon. Gentleman that we have naval vessels in the Gulf. I am not able to tell him from this Dispatch Box the details of the rules of engagement, for reasons that will be obvious to him.

Afghanistan (Civilian Killings)

Jeremy Corbyn Excerpts

Monday 12th March 2012 Commons Chamber

[Nick Harvey]

The ISAF strategy is kept under constant review. I can reassure my hon. Friend that it will continue to be so, but I do not think it would make sense for us to be in a great hurry this week, in the aftermath of these incidents, to spring into some fundamental review. I can assure him, however, that the temperature is read constantly and that progress is assessed all the time. We will take stock of everything that happens as we continue to plan on an international basis what we will do for the remaining two and a half years.

[Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)]

This is a terrible tragedy. It is not the first, and it will probably not be the last. Equal tragedies—such as the killing of wedding parties by drone aircraft, and so many others—compound the results of this the 11th year of the war. As neither the Minister nor his Secretary of State is able to say what success would be in Afghanistan, is it not time to bring forward the date of withdrawal, and to recognise that this has not been a profitable or a successful operation?

[Nick Harvey]

We are able to say what success would be. Success would be an orderly and successful handover of security to a competent and able Afghan national security force by the end of 2014. Many challenges will face us between now and then if we are to achieve what remains an ambitious target, but that is what success would look like, and that is the strategic goal in security terms towards which we are working. However, I repeat the point made by the former Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for South Shields (David Miliband): if there is to be a lasting peace in that part of the world, a political process is needed alongside the security strategy. Unless we have both, we will not secure the lasting peace that I think everyone in the House wants to see.

Oral Answers to Questions

Jeremy Corbyn Excerpts

Monday 19th December 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Robathan]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his pre-Christmas question. Unfortunately, we have a slight problem with paying for the number of warships. I am sure we will bear it mind, but I have to say that the reduction in the number of senior officers has been spoken about at great length, including in the recent report by Lord Levene.

[Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)]

5. What expenditure on the Trident replacement he expects to have incurred by 2016.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Peter Luff)]

We expect to spend £3.9 billion on the successor submarine programme by the maingate decision-point in 2016. We have deferred the decision on the future warhead until the next Parliament. We are spending around £900 million a year at AWE—the Atomic Weapons Establishment—on capital investment and running costs to ensure that we can sustain the capabilities to maintain the current stockpile. As a consequence of this sustainment, we will also have the capability to design and produce a new warhead, should that be required. We expect to spend around £8 million over the next three years to examine the condition of the physical infrastructure at the naval bases and current communications systems for the successor submarines.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

By the Minister’s own figures, the Government are proposing to spend £5 billion on the submarine replacement and the preparations for a new missile system from AWE Aldermaston, which means that after the next election the new Parliament will be confronted with the decision whether to renew the Trident system, having already spent £5 billion on it. Does the Minister not think that we are walking—indeed, sleepwalking—into a massive expenditure, after that, of £25 billion on a replacement, plus the running costs? Is it not time we brought this vanity project to an end and cancelled the Trident system?

[Peter Luff]

No, I do not think that at all. In fact, not spending that money would prevent us from preserving the option for the next Parliament to take the decision. The hon. Gentleman is fond of pointing out the problems in respect of the capability for the nuclear deterrent, but let me assure him that the work we are undertaking will have benefits for other classes of nuclear submarines in future— particularly in respect of the primary propulsion systems, for example with the PWR3. There are real benefits from doing this work—not just for the security of the nation in the short term, but for the long term as well.

Trident

Jeremy Corbyn Excerpts

Wednesday 7th December 2011 Westminster Hall

[Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)]

I am pleased that you are chairing the debate, Mr Gale, and that we have secured it. I regret that it will be only 30 minutes long, but we will do our best. A number of hon. Members want to intervene during my contribution, and I will be happy to take all those interventions, including from the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), who possibly will not agree with one word of what I am about to say. If he can just contain his disagreement until he reaches an appropriate point of disagreeability, I will happily give way to him.

First, I should declare an interest in the debate. I am chair of the parliamentary CND group and vice-chair of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament at national level. I have to confess to having first joined CND at the age of 15, and I remain a member, so it is a very short membership that I have had.

The subject of the debate is the cost of the Trident nuclear missile and submarine replacement. This is an issue of parliamentary accountability, costs and, of course, the relationship between vast levels of defence expenditure and our foreign policy. Huge numbers of figures can be cited, and I will cite some. Main-gate consideration of the replacement of the whole system has been delayed until 2016. By that stage, £4 billion will have been spent on the concept and assessment phases of the replacement submarine and £500 million on ordering long-lead construction items. Plans have recently been announced for spending of £2 billion at the warhead facility at Atomic Weapons Establishment in Aldermaston. That coincides with the suggestion in the recently available redacted value for money review that a decision will be taken on the warhead much sooner than previously anticipated.

This debate is therefore designed to point out the amount of money being spent, but also to ask very serious questions about when Parliament will be effectively able to scrutinise what are massive levels of expenditure on a weapon of mass destruction.

[Dr Julian Huppert (Cambridge) (LD)]

I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on securing this much needed debate. He talked about the 2016 main gate. Will he welcome the fact that that has now been delayed until after the next election and that that gives his party an opportunity to take the same view that he and I share about whether it would be desirable to go ahead with the main gate at all? Perhaps even the Conservatives might join us in a triumvirate of sense.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

I would be happier if we killed off the whole project straight away—but I suspect that that might not happen.

I also draw to the House’s attention the fact that the Secretary of State for Defence has announced that he has no plans to publish the Trident alternatives review, which was commissioned to please the Liberal Democrats, who went into the last election promising not a like-for-like replacement of Trident, but something different. We do not know what that something different might be. The review will not be published, which is astonishing. I hope that, when the Minister replies to the debate, he can explain why that is the case.

[Tessa Munt (Wells) (LD)]

As a Liberal Democrat, I remain absolutely committed to my belief that this is a ludicrous waste of money. I am boiling with anger at the fact that, despite an alternatives review having been commissioned, it will not be published. There is no basis for not publishing it so that people can at least consider the alternatives, although my personal preference is as I have stated. Does the hon. Gentleman not agree?

[Jeremy Corbyn]

I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention and the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) for his. They are both very sincere and very honest on the whole issue.

[Tessa Munt]

rose—

[Jeremy Corbyn]

I understand that the hon. Lady is boiling with rage. I, too, am boiling with rage, so we will boil together.

[Tessa Munt]

I apologise for not having declared that I have membership of CND at Mid Somerset level and I am vice-chair of that organisation. I should have said that earlier.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

I know from long experience with CND that nothing to do with CND can be counted as a pecuniary interest. Absolutely no one has ever made any money out of being a CND member. There is nothing financial to be declared, so I set the hon. Lady’s mind at rest. I thank her for her support and membership of CND and for the sincere work that she has done for a long time to try to rid the world of nuclear weapons.

Estimates of the cost of designing and constructing the Trident submarine replacement programme have grown significantly this year, with the MOD publishing figures in the May parliamentary initial gate report that represent a doubling of those in December 2005. The estimated submarine replacement cost has increased from between £11 billion and £14 billion to £25 billion. In addition, the Ministry recently announced significant spending plans for new warhead facilities at Aldermaston, despite officially not planning a decision on replacing or refurbishing the warhead until the next Parliament. That is the question.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Peter Luff)]

indicated dissent.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

The Minister shakes his head. It is his head, and he is allowed to shake it, but I hope that when he replies, he will be able to explain why Parliament has not been consulted on spending £2 billion on the Atomic Weapons Establishment in Aldermaston. If my figures are wrong, I am sure that he will put them right—that is the whole point of a parliamentary debate and of parliamentary scrutiny.

As I have said, the new figures announced this year for spending on replacing Trident are going up. The submarine will cost around £4 billion before the construction decision. As I understand it, it will cost £900 million on the concept phase before initial gate, which is from 2007 to 2011; £3 billion on the assessment phase between initial gate and main gate; and £500 million on long-lead items for construction. That will put the cost of the submarine replacement programme prior to main gate somewhat higher than what was spent on the Nimrod programme, which was cancelled in October 2010 after £3.4 billion had been spent on it.

Quite simply, we are moving to an enormous expenditure before a parliamentary vote in, presumably, 2016 or whenever, when all of us might still be Members of Parliament—or when none of us are. There will be a new Parliament, and a different Parliament will make that decision. I could write the speech for the Minister or his successor now. It will say, “We do not want to do it, and we do not like it. It is not good, but we have already spent so much money that it would be a shame to waste it.”

[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the eye-watering figures that he is describing are of concern not only to some of the CND stalwarts in the Chamber today—myself included—but to those who care about the MOD’s equipment budget, given that all that will amount to around 30% of the budget over the 2020s?

[Jeremy Corbyn]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her point. Not only is she a CND stalwart, but she has great responsibility, for she is a member of the CND national council, as I am. I am pleased that she is a member as well. She is quite right—many in the defence community express horror at equipment shortages of all sorts, the privatisation of air and sea rescue, and all those kinds of things that are planned, while at the same time someone is going ahead and planning to spend and spend on replacing Trident, a massive vanity project; that is what it is. It does not seem to bear any relation to any foreign policy strategy or to British membership of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, which requires clearly under article 6 that the five permanent members of the Security Council, which are also the five declared nuclear weapon states, take steps towards nuclear disarmament. Britain is not taking steps towards nuclear disarmament—it is reducing the number of warheads, but the capability is to be increased. Any Government, whether this one or a future one, could increase the number of warheads.

When the National Audit Office looked at the matter recently, in November this year, it cited problems with the Astute class submarines currently being built. They are now expected to cost £6.67 billion, a full £1.47 billion more than anticipated when the project was approved. Apparently, it is also running five years and one month late. Also, a report, “Looking into the Black Hole”, states that

“spending on the successor programme will rise sharply, probably reaching a peak of around 30% of the new equipment budget by 2021-22 or 2022-23”—

exactly the point made by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas)—

“when the first-of-class begins production. It is likely to remain close to this level until after the planned delivery of the first submarine in 2028.”

I want to turn to the issue of transparency—

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Jeremy Corbyn]

There is no finer person to be transparent than the hon. Gentleman.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I know that I am going to get one shot at this, and I thank the hon. Gentleman for his great courtesy. I would like to remind him that there was a parliamentary debate and a vote in, I think, the spring of 2007. It is not as if Parliament has not had one vote on the matter, and it will have another one. Does he agree that the cost overrun for the Astute class submarine was so great because of the gap that had been allowed to develop between the completion of the nuclear deterrent submarines of the Vanguard class and the initiation of the Astute class? By ensuring that the next generation of boats follow closely on from the Astute class, any such increase should be avoidable. There is precedent for that, because both Polaris and Trident came in on time and on budget.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

There is a precedent for this debate, which was the full debate that was held four years ago in 2007, in which a significant number of MPs from my party—100—voted against the replacement of Trident. Every other debate was initiated by Back Benchers, some of whom are present today. That is the function of Parliament, and I hope that, when the Minister replies, he will be able to assure me that there will be regular statements to update Parliament.

[John McDonnell (Hayes and Harlington) (Lab)]

There was a debate in 2007, which arrived at a vote—that is true. However, is it not true that, in every debate that we have had, the figures on the speculative development have gone up rather than down?

[Jeremy Corbyn]

Indeed. One of the facts of life is that for anything to do with nuclear weapons, nuclear equipment, AWE Aldermaston or submarines, the price goes up and up, whatever else happens.

The Liberal Democrats have called for a Trident alternative review—that is fine. The Secretary of State announced that the review will take place, fulfilling the coalition agreement by

“assisting the Liberal Democrats to make the case for alternatives.”

However, on 21 November, he said that he had no plans to publish the review. He said:

“In looking at alternative systems and postures, the review draws upon highly classified technical, intelligence and policy information covering extremely sensitive national security issues. There are, therefore, no plans to publish either the report or the information it draws upon.”

Regarding providing information for MPs to scrutinise the Trident replacement programme, the Secretary of State stated that he

“intends to provide an annual update to Parliament; the first of these was produced for the Initial Gate announcement in May of this year. The precise format and timing of subsequent statements is yet to be decided.”—[Official Report, 21 November 2011; Vol. 536, c. 34W.]

Today, the Prime Minister made a written ministerial statement on defence issues, called, “Strategic Defence and Security Review: First Annual Report”. It states:

“In addition, to assist the Liberal Democrats make the case for alternatives to the Trident system, the Government initiated a study into the costs, feasibility and credibility of alternative nuclear deterrent systems and postures. Progress has also been made on implementing the new nuclear assurances policy and the reduction in our nuclear weapon stockpile to no more than 180 warheads, both commitments set out in the SDSR.”

I find it strange that the Secretary of State would say that we in Parliament are not equipped to know the basis on which an alternative is being looked at. We are not allowed to see the information, because apparently it is all classified. We therefore assume that the alternative is simply never going to see the light of day. Despite the valiant efforts of a number of Liberal Democrat MPs to get that, on the Floor of the House, it will be extremely difficult. The Minister must explain exactly why Parliament is not equipped to know why such vast levels of expenditure are going ahead, and why an alternative is not going to be published.

[Tessa Munt]

I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will agree that the Minister will have to explain that in that case—it would seem to me—the costs are not known, and it is neither feasible nor credible for us to have the particular scheme.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

Absolutely. If we do not know the cost, if we do not know what the alternatives are and if we do not know the foreign policy considerations surrounding the alternatives, we move into the era—once again—where the Ministry of Defence basically does what it likes and Parliament endorses it at some later stage. So we are moving—sleepwalking, actually—into a massive level of expenditure. Never mind whether people like or dislike, agree with or disagree with, nuclear weapons—is that really a sensible way for this country to go headlong into spending £100 billion?

[Eric Joyce (Falkirk) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend think that, when the Government committed themselves to a review, they must have known what the nature of the review was going to be, so they must also have known at the time that they were never going to make the review public?

[Jeremy Corbyn]

Presumably, there were discussions in the MOD about exactly what the terms of the review would be, who would contribute to it and what desk research would be done. The MOD must have also decided, “Well, we’re not going to publish it anyway, so it doesn’t really matter what’s in it.” If I were a Liberal Democrat MP—I am not one, I have no intention of being one and I do not think that I ever will be one, so I am talking about a purely hypothetical situation—I would be very angry about that because, having negotiated that review into the coalition agreement, the Liberal Democrats are now being told that they are not even allowed to know what is in it.

Before I give the Minister sufficient time to reply—I am sure that he will be happy to take even more interventions than I have—I have a few questions to put to him. If the current Government are re-elected in 2015, will they provide a parliamentary vote on the Trident main gate? When will the format and timing of the annual update statements be decided, and what is the reason for delaying an announcement on those statements? To their credit, the Government have produced quarterly statements on the situation in Afghanistan, and frequent statements on the situation in the middle east and north Africa. I welcome those statements; they show openness, which is good. Consequently, those of us who take those matters very seriously can question the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence on them regularly in Parliament, and we know when those opportunities are coming up. That is what Parliament is for and that is the right way of doing things. The expenditure on Trident is so massive, the decision on Trident is so huge and the implications of Trident are so enormous that we need something more than an annual statement about it to Parliament. We need at least a quarterly statement on Trident from the Secretary of State for Defence.

My two final questions to the Minister concern work at Aldermaston, because it seems to me that there is something very murky going on at Aldermaston—something very murky indeed. A huge amount of money is being spent there and, as I understand it, a lot of preparation is being made there for warhead production. So we need to know what the nature of the work is to inform decisions on design of a successor warhead—work that is currently under way—and how much money is due to be spent on those studies in the current comprehensive spending review period? Also, what are the costs of the nuclear weapon sustainability programme at Aldermaston, and will the Minister make those costs public?

I will conclude with this point—I have set out my position absolutely clearly. I believe that nuclear weapons are immoral and wrong, and we have huge obligations and huge opportunities through the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, not only to rid ourselves of nuclear weapons but to promote a nuclear weapons convention that would bring the non-declared nuclear weapons states—Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea—into the discussions about ridding the world of nuclear weapons altogether. If we are serious about going down that road and achieving a nuclear-free world, we have to do something about it and set an example. It is a pretty strange example to deny Parliament the opportunity to discuss Trident in detail, so that it can know the expenditure involved, and to commit ourselves to this vast expenditure on a weapon of mass destruction that—if ever used—will indiscriminately kill millions of people on this planet. As I have said, nuclear weapons are immoral, wrong and dangerous, but we have a right to know the levels of expenditure on them. I hope that this debate is the start of many debates on this subject. Many of us who are committed on this subject will keep on raising it, so that we know the truth about the amount of money that this country is spending on weapons of mass destruction.

--- Later in debate ---

[Peter Luff]

I note my hon. Friend’s powerful argument. I am sure that it will be borne in mind closer to the time, but at present I can make no commitment about what will happen at the end of 2012 or in early 2013, when the report is due to conclude.

I note that this is the third time that I have debated this issue in this place. We also covered the topic extensively during the strategic defence and security review debate last year. Since assuming Government, my Ministry of Defence ministerial colleagues and I have answered about 180 parliamentary questions on nuclear issues, not to mention a significant amount of public correspondence. In May this year, we published a comprehensive report on the initial gate decision for the successor submarine. We have recently repeated an earlier commitment to make an annual statement on progress to Parliament, and I think that that frequency strikes the right balance. We have published the costs of various aspects of the nuclear programme, such as the Atomic Weapons Establishment, on numerous occasions. Moreover, in May last year, we announced for the first time the overall size of our nuclear warhead stockpile, giving the deepest ever transparency of our nuclear capability. That is hardly a culture of secrecy or sleepwalking.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

I am not quite sure why the Minister is getting into such a bad mood about Parliament asking questions to the Ministry of Defence. That is what Parliament is for; it is why we are here. Will he give us an accurate estimate of how much will be spent on the whole programme, on the initial gate and on the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston, before any decision is made in Parliament in 2016? Can he not revisit the idea of a quarterly statement on the vast expenditure that is going on?

[Peter Luff]

It is my intention to do that, but I am conscious of the time. I hope to be able to answer all the hon. Gentleman’s questions.

I should now like to turn to the specific costs of the current and future deterrent programmes. The simple fact is that being a responsible nuclear weapons state requires investment. Submarines and their ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads are extremely complex and require considerable skill and expertise to design, maintain and operate safely, and I make no apology whatsoever for taking seriously our responsibilities for the safe custody of these systems, nor for spending the money needed to do that. That is not to say that we have not closely scrutinised the costs of the programme. Indeed, Members will be aware that we announced last year as part of the SDSR a number of measures to do just that.

I should like to dwell briefly on the different elements of the nuclear deterrent programme. The White Paper highlighted three key areas: the platform, the infrastructure and the warhead. At 2006 prices—I emphasise that it was at 2006 prices—the Department estimated that the platform would cost between £11 billion and £14 billion, and each of the other two elements would cost between £2 billion and £3 billion. Separately, there are also the costs of maintaining and running the in-service deterrent—what we have at present—such as the facilities at the Atomic Weapons Establishment, which I will come to later.

If I may start with the platform—the boats—earlier this year “The Initial Gate Parliamentary Report” stated:

“assuming a four boat fleet, the replacement submarines will remain within the £11-14Bn estimate.”

We made it clear in the report and, indeed, in the White Paper itself that those values are at 2006-07 constant prices, and the report also indicated that, when we take into account inflation, the costs equate to £25 billion. Costs have simply not doubled, as reported on CND’s website; that is wrong. This misreporting of the true position is extremely misleading. Of the £25 billion, we expect to have spent £3.9 billion by main gate. That includes the costs of the concept and assessment phases, and the majority of that work is in the maturation of the design.

With regard to long-lead items, we have been clear that we have minimised spend as far as possible. Over the coming years, we will place orders for different specialist items, which take a number of years to be delivered, totalling some £500 million. That is just 2% of the total purchase cost. We plan to place the order for the specialist high-grade steel only in 2014, so that it is ready for manufacture and cutting in 2016 after the main investment, or main gate, decision. We will not procure any items for the fourth boat until 2016, when the build decision is made. Any accusation that, by purchasing those items, we will be locked into a particular strategy before main gate in 2016 is simply wrong. The simple fact is that these highly specialised components take time to be delivered. Identifying long-lead items is part of any well-run programme, and nothing that we are doing will prevent us from being able to make the right decision in 2016. I should like to explore that at more length, but I am conscious of the time.

With respect to infrastructure, the value-for-money review concluded that no significant investment was needed in the immediate future. To study the infrastructure requirements in detail, we will spend about £8 million over the next three years and will continue to look for opportunities to drive down running costs and the need for any new investment. Despite being at an early stage of the programme, we still expect to meet the White Paper estimate of between £2 billion and £3 billion.

On the third element, my attention was drawn recently to speculation that implied that we had already spent at least £2 billion on a new warhead. That is simply not true. We are investing at the Atomic Weapons Establishment to ensure that we sustain the capabilities that we need to maintain the current stockpile. It is true that that will give us the capability that we need to design and produce a new warhead if and when required, but that is not the purpose of the expenditure. We will take the appropriate decisions at the right time, and Members will recall the commitment in the SDSR not to take any decisions on a new warhead until the next Parliament. We expect a replacement warhead to meet the White Paper estimate of between £2 billion and £3 billion.

Ministry of Defence (Procurement)

Jeremy Corbyn Excerpts

Wednesday 19th October 2011 Westminster Hall

[Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)]

I am sorry that I was not present at the start of the debate and I will be brief because other colleagues wish to speak. I want to introduce a wider issue of defence procurement and I hope that the Minister will respond to my contribution. The issue concerns the large amounts of money that are being spent in advance of a parliamentary decision on the replacement of Britain’s nuclear weapon system. The Minister is smiling but I am not sure why—perhaps it is out of desperation at the amount of money flowing out of his Department and into the hands of contractors as we speak.

I would like the Minister to answer a number of questions about the costs of replacing our nuclear weapon system. The main gate decision on the Trident replacement is not due before the House until 2016. Out-turn prices were estimated in the initial gate report to be £25 billion for the replacement of the submarine, and costs for the successor system, including the warhead and infrastructure development, were between £30 billion and £32 billion. So far, £900 million has been spent on planning and replacement, and £3 billion is due to be spent on detailed design before 2016. The rest will be spent after the main gate decision in 2016.

A number of serious questions must be raised. This is not a discussion on foreign policy and we are not debating nuclear negotiations. Nevertheless, when we are faced with a massive deficit, and people in every community in the country are being told to make savings, why is the Ministry of Defence calmly ploughing ahead to get rid of £100 billion of public money on a nuclear missile system that many of us believe to be illegal, unnecessary and dangerous? All the money being spent is going into the pockets of various contractors around the world and not being put to any socially useful purpose.

Whatever choice is reached in 2016, major elements of the vessels will already have been ordered before Parliament has had a chance to debate the issue. That includes £380 million spent on the first submarine, £145 million on the second and £6 million on the third —those are the submarine costs alone. I hope that the MOD will be more open about what that expenditure is for and why it is necessary to make it ahead of any parliamentary decision. I was told by a Minister in another debate that such actions are the normal way of doing things in the Ministry of Defence, and that it does things on a sort of custom and practice basis. If it is custom and practice for the MOD to spend such sums of money without parliamentary approval, I suggest that that custom and practice needs to stop. There should be specific parliamentary approval for each element of expenditure, but that has not happened in this case.

Further spending is taking place at Atomic Weapons Establishment Aldermaston and Burghfield, and the full cost of project Pegasus—the proposed new facility for manufacturing enriched uranium components for nuclear warheads and reactor fuel for nuclear-powered submarines—was priced at £747 million when it received initial approval in 2007. I would be grateful if the Minister confirmed whether that figure is correct. If it is not, will he give the Chamber an accurate figure and state how much more money is expected to be spent on project Pegasus at AWE Aldermaston and Burghfield?

The relationship between the MOD and defence contractors is interesting. Poachers who join the side of the gamekeeper are obviously extraordinarily welcome, and the hon. Member for Sittingbourne and Sheppey (Gordon Henderson) brought a particular expertise to the debate. He seemed, however, to underline an issue that needs questioning concerning the close relationship between the MOD, defence contractors and the defence industry, and the large amounts of money being spent. Parliament exists to control what the Government do. MPs exist to represent their constituents and hold the Executive to account, and there are serious questions about the decision-making process surrounding the replacement of Trident, the purpose of Trident, and the vast expenses that are being undertaken without any parliamentary approval.

[Nick Smith (Blaenau Gwent) (Lab)]

I congratulate the hon. Member for Sittingbourne and Sheppey (Gordon Henderson) on securing this debate and I want to pick up the point about contracts and transparency in Government expenditure. The strategic defence and security review will lead to the renegotiation of many contracts, and that may lead to some savings or perhaps to an increase in costs. So far, the MOD has failed to provide the Public Accounts Committee, the parliamentary body that looks at value for money in defence spending—

[Nick Smith]

Thank you, Mr Hood. Does my hon. Friend agree that transparency is vital in cases such as that under discussion, so that Parliament can scrutinise expensive defence procurement issues?

[Jeremy Corbyn]

Absolutely. Parliament must scrutinise such expenditure. One of the greatest weaknesses of the British parliamentary system relates to its ability to scrutinise expenditure. We do not traditionally do line-by-line budget voting in this country, and although the Public Accounts Committee does a good job, it can look into only one theme or area of expenditure at a time. Perhaps we need tougher scrutiny, particularly where the Ministry of Defence is concerned and given the levels of expenditure being discussed.

I have two final points. Some colleagues present today represent constituencies that have embarked—or are likely to embark—on the manufacture and development of submarines and nuclear warheads, and some represent constituencies that have a big defence interest. I do not have a big defence interest in my constituency but I understand what the position of my colleagues may be. However, there are enormous skills in the defence industry in this country. We make planes, ships and all kinds of things very well, and we have a highly skilled work force. How much better would it be to have a longer-term trajectory for using those skills to make other things such as socially useful products that will develop, sustain and support people, rather than weapons of war or, in the case of nuclear weapons and submarines, weapons of mass destruction that can only kill large numbers of civilians?

Concerns have been raised that the cost of the Trident replacement programme puts significant stresses on the rest of the Ministry of Defence budget. I hear complaints from many people throughout the armed services that they are experiencing various shortages at present. All hon. Members in the Chamber will be able to relate to that. None of those shortages will be met while we continue with the massive expenditure on nuclear weapons and the preparation for replacing the submarines and missiles.

A document entitled “Looking into the Black Hole” by the Royal United Services Institute states:

“The largest, and politically most difficult, procurement programme over the next two decades will be the construction of a successor to the Trident nuclear deterrent submarines. The MoD is due to spend £7 billion over the decade to 2020 on the initial concept, design and development phases of this project, equivalent to around 11 per cent of the new equipment budget over the decade from 2011/12 to 2020/21. But the bulk of spending on the successor submarines, total costs of which are projected at £25 billion, is due to occur during the decade after 2020/21. The Main Gate decision, which gives permission for the Demonstration and Manufacture phase to begin, is due to be made in 2016. If this schedule remains, spending on the successor programme will rise sharply, probably reaching a peak of around 30 per cent of the new equipment budget by 2021/22 or 2022/23, when the first-of-class begins production. It is likely to remain close to this level until after the planned delivery of the first submarine”.

We are on a trajectory to spend a great deal of money before Parliament has even made the decision. I could write now the speech for the Secretary of State, whoever it will be, in 2016—“We’ve spent so much, done so much and made such preparations. Let’s spend another £60 billion on this project.” Why can we not have that debate, discussion and decision now, rather than leaving it for another five years, until 2016, when all this money will have been spent?

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I do not know whether you care to cast your mind back to May 1997, Mr Hood, but you drew the short straw of being the hon. Member who had to respond to my maiden speech. That speech was about nuclear weapons—Trident—and I fear that this one will be on the same subject. Indeed, I suspect that it will not be the last one that you or other hon. Members hear from me on the subject. I sometimes think that I should go into a sort of partnership with the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn). We have debated this subject many times over the years. He never changes his tune, and I never change mine, but the debate remains live. It relates to procurement, in addition to strategy and the ethics or otherwise of nuclear deterrence, because of course the procurement process for Trident has been much disrupted.

The hon. Gentleman made great play of the fact that Parliament has not yet had the debate. Well, excuse me, I think that Parliament did have a debate. If I remember correctly, it was in the spring of 2007, and both the Labour party and the Conservative party were wholly in favour of the next generation of Trident being constructed. I recall the then Leader of the Opposition—now the Prime Minister—to whose speech I had contributed, passing me an Order Paper on which he had inscribed the words “Julian gets his way”. Sadly, of course, there’s many a slip between cup and lip or, indeed, between a vote in Parliament and the deployment of a successor generation. The slip concerned came in the failure of the Conservative party to win an overall majority at the last general election. That ought not to have been a problem for the procurement process for Trident, given that the Labour party had gone into the election pledged to renew the nuclear deterrent and so had the Conservative party. Only the Liberal Democrats were opposed to that.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

I know that the hon. Gentleman loves the fact that the Conservatives are in a coalition Government with the Liberal Democrats—it is what gets him out of bed every morning and into work—but in his discussions with his Liberal Democrat colleagues, has he reached any conclusion about whether they do or do not want a nuclear missile or whether they want a different type of nuclear missile in the review that apparently is being undertaken?

[Dr Lewis]

I have to say to the hon. Gentleman—I am tempted to say “my hon. Friend”—that the Liberal Democrats really differ from both of us, because he knows where he stands on nuclear weapons and I know where I stand, but the Liberal Democrats stand firmly with a foot in both camps. They know that they do not want Trident, but they do not want to put themselves in his camp by telling the truth, which is that the majority of their activists are one-sided nuclear disarmers and do not want a strategic nuclear deterrent at all. Therefore, they come up with this fiction that it is possible to have a viable strategic nuclear deterrent with an alternative system to Trident.

That ought to have made no headway at all when the coalition was formed. The reason for that was that I and all the other Conservative Members of Parliament, who were being addressed by the Prime Minister-to-be at a meeting in Committee Room 14, were told what the terms of the coalition agreement would be, or some of the basic outlines of the terms. We were told that we would have to accept certain things that the Liberal Democrats wanted that we did not want, such as a referendum on the alternative vote, but that the Liberals would have to accept things that we wanted that they did not want, such as the renewal of Trident—that was the very example chosen. I remember my friend and colleague the future Chancellor of the Exchequer looking up at that moment, catching my eye—because at the time I was still the party spokesman on the Royal Navy and the nuclear deterrent—and nodding vigorously in confirmation of what the leader of the party had said. You can imagine, Mr Hood, my surprise and dismay—

--- Later in debate ---

[John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to speak under your chairmanship, Mr Hood. It is also a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis). My remarks will follow on neatly from his, as his did from those of my hon. Friend the Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn)—those who speak in debates on the deterrent are a kind of a parliamentary tag team. This is not the first time we have seen that, and I am sure that it will not be the last.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

It is an asymmetric triangle.

[John Woodcock]

Yes, that is quite possibly true, and I may say something about the fundamental importance of this debate for Opposition Members later.

I want to talk about the successor deterrent in the context of procurement and the critical issue of sovereign capability. Defence procurement is different from so much Government procurement in other Departments, because of the importance of Britain retaining capability in certain key strategic areas. Submarine capability must remain one of those, and British submarines defending British shores must continue to be built in Britain. It is a happy fact that the only place in Britain that can build them is in my constituency, and what an incredible engineering feat is achieved there.

It is important that procurement is undertaken in the most effective way. Gaps in construction could spell disaster for our capability to build submarines. Hon. Members will think back to the early 1990s, when the previous Conservative Government left a gap between finishing the Vanguard class submarines and starting the Astute class submarines. Ministers say—I welcome this, and we need to hold them to it—that they have learned from those mistakes and from the experience of how difficult it was to restart our capability in Barrow. In fact, the problems and cost overruns experienced with the new Astute class submarines came in large part from the fact that the people building them were learning their craft anew.

Given the constraints of sovereign capability and the fact that only one place in Britain will retain the skills to build submarines, it is critical that the Government do whatever it takes to ensure that the taxpayer gets value for money and that the country’s security is upheld. Conservative Members were hot on that in opposition, when they repeatedly pointed out the cost to taxpayers of delaying important procurement projects and of shifting timetables to the right. It therefore greatly concerned me that when they took office, they delayed the proposed in-service date for the successor deterrent submarines from 2024 to 2028, which necessitated a re-baselining of the Astute class submarines at an increased per boat cost to taxpayers and created the need for a costly refit of the Vanguard class submarines. In an answer to me on 8 November 2010, at column 5, the former Defence Secretary, the right hon. Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox), put the cost between £1.2 billion and £1.4 billion, which is the cost of refuelling alone aside from any other cost incurred in keeping the submarines going.

Apart from the increased cost, the changed in-service date has potentially stretched the safe life of the current Vanguard class submarine to its limit. Experts in the Navy, Barrow shipyard and the Government say that with the increased cost of the refit they think they can keep the Vanguard class submarines in service for the projected time, but their life will be stretched to the limit, and any further delay could compromise safety and radically increase the cost. I hope that the Minister will comment on that. It is important that we keep the project to time, but it has slipped in the past, and if it slips further, given that he has increased the risk to the project, what will happen?

I hope that the Minister will make it clear whether the new Defence Secretary intends to look at the issue afresh, and, if so, what that is likely to entail. Will he ring-fence the budget for Trident from the defence main budget, which has already been mentioned in the debate? Will he make clear the overall extra cost to the taxpayer from the political deal between the coalition factions, which the hon. Member for New Forest East has expanded on at length? That deal subjugated what was in the best interest of British taxpayers on procurement and the defence of the realm to political expediency in this Parliament.

--- Later in debate ---

[Caroline Dinenage (Gosport) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Sittingbourne and Sheppey (Gordon Henderson) on securing the debate, which he promised would be wide-ranging, as it has certainly proved. I want to make passing reference to some of his points about the waste of public money in various previous defence procurement contracts, which is particularly galling given how hard we are now sweating our military assets, working people and equipment to deliver incredible value for money. It is galling, too, because, representing a military constituency, I receive letters from wives in military families saying, for example, that their husband is about to be deployed for a second eight-month term with only a 10-week break, and will be away for a second consecutive Christmas. That puts incredible pressure on families, so it seems very wrong to throw money away thoughtlessly on ill-devised and badly thought-out procurement contracts.

I want, however, to talk about another matter, and that is the vagaries of a defence procurement process which puts obstacles in the way of good, efficiently run British companies—particularly small or medium-sized enterprises—winning contracts, creating jobs and earning the money to help the country grow out of its economic hardship. I know that the Government have always recognised the strategic and economic importance of the defence sector. I have six significant defence companies based in my constituency, so I have become increasingly aware in the past 18 months of the challenges that the industry faces. In the light of the forthcoming White Paper on defence and security equipment, support and technology, I urge the Ministry of Defence to deal with three areas of concern to the companies in my constituency: support for SMEs, greater long-term planning and a strategy for successful outsourcing to industry.

I have spoken before in the Chamber about the great importance of SMEs in all sectors. They are truly the lifeblood of the defence industry. In my constituency, SMEs such as Vector Aerospace represent vital links in the supply chain that allow our headline companies to succeed, and to be world beaters. Britain boasts more SMEs in its defence industry than France, Germany, Spain and Italy combined, and we must recognise and nurture those unique assets.

I welcomed the acknowledgement in the December 2010 Green Paper that SMEs are a vital source of innovation and flexibility. I now urge the Government to address the enduring challenges that SMEs face, as unreliable or slow acquisition processes continue to place unmanageable burdens on their cash flows. Requirements such as the framework agreement for technical support listing have also been highlighted by small contractors in my constituency as prohibitive to SMEs supplying the Ministry of Defence.

The forthcoming White Paper must deliver comprehensive support, through the procurement processes and supply chain management, for our SMEs, so that they can continue to be the pride of the British defence industry. Across all tiers, our defence companies provide jobs for more than 300,000 people and add £12 billion to the UK economy, but, despite the importance of that, the Government are right to prioritise the needs of our armed forces and the taxpayer above industry. We must always be clear that we are not in the business of artificial job creation through public sector procurement. However, the companies whose representatives I have spoken to in my constituency and beyond are not demanding protectionism. They want, for the taxpayer and for industry, an environment that delivers the best value for Government and appropriate support for British companies.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

In the hon. Lady’s dealings with local companies, which undoubtedly have very high skill levels, has there been any discussion or consideration of contracts outside defence, and in other areas, using those transferable skills?

[Caroline Dinenage]

Many do that, and many work in the defence of other countries outside the UK, but Vector Aerospace does repairs and servicing for many of the helicopters—Chinook, Sea King and Lynx—and the mainstay of its work is for the British military.

The White Paper must tackle two procurement challenges that have frequently hampered both industry and cost-cutting efforts. First, we must ensure that through-life capability management is fully considered in the procurement process. In many respects, the MOD is right to prioritise buying off-the-shelf products at the best value, but with acquisition representing only 15% to 20% of the lifetime cost of a programme, there can be significant cost implications to excessively short-term thinking. That has been all too apparent in the case of the Carson rotor blades purchased under an urgent operational requirement for helicopters in Afghanistan, which lacked a repair contract and so had to be ordered as new each time one broke. That is absurd and highly expensive, and we must seek to avoid that in future through greater scope in the procurement process for long-term thinking.

Secondly, the White Paper must ensure that the limited resources of the MOD are put to the best use through successful partnerships with industry. Representatives from Vector Aerospace, which I have already mentioned, have noted that the outsourcing of functions carried out by service personnel or civil servants can deliver significant savings to the taxpayer while continuing to support British industry. They have had incredible results by sending their own personnel to Afghanistan to service and repair Chinook helicopters. Their performance has always been described as exceptional.

We need to ensure that long-term thinking is built into our procurement process. I look with great anticipation to the publication of the forthcoming White Paper, and urge the Government to ensure that it sustains the strategic and economic importance of our defence industry through delivering a supportive and considered procurement environment.

Defence Transformation

Jeremy Corbyn Excerpts

Monday 18th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for his support and understanding on this issue and know that he will be disappointed that the units are being moved out of Arborfield. We intend to achieve that in a measured way by 2014-15. I am sure that discussions will be ongoing with the local authority on the financial implications he has pointed out.

[Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)]

Can I assure the Secretary of State that the views of my hon. Friend the Member for Newport West (Paul Flynn) are not necessarily those of a tiny minority or completely isolated? Does the Secretary of State not accept that it is time that this country took a reality check on the levels of global reach that the armed forces are expected to be able to undertake and the massive cost that we are bequeathing to future generations? Is it not time for a serious defence and foreign policy review on these matters?

[Dr Fox]

Only the hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for Newport West (Paul Flynn) could describe two out of 600-odd as not being a small minority. As a country, we have had a good debate about the defence review, and we think that we should be implementing its practicalities. The understandings and the strategic aim, as set out in the national security strategy, were broadly welcomed on both sides of the House. It is perfectly correct that we have a debate on the ways in which we carry it out, but there is not a huge debate in this country about the strategic direction that we and our allies are taking.

Nuclear Deterrent

Jeremy Corbyn Excerpts

Wednesday 18th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)]

This is a very depressing statement today. First, the Secretary of State gave us no indication of the long-term total costs of the system—he said only that £5 billion would be committed now. Will it cost £70 billon in total, or more? We should be told. Secondly, 184 countries manage without their own nuclear weapons, and most countries see no need whatsoever even to think about getting them. We are spending a vast amount of money on a status symbol that will make the world not a safer place but a more dangerous one. The Secretary of State’s arguments about deterrence are nonsense because those arguments could be used for any country in the world. Most choose to take active steps to bring about a nuclear-free world; this country should do the same.

[Dr Fox]

I appreciate the sincerity of the hon. Gentleman’s views; I just profoundly disagree with them. As I have said, we assess that the costs have not changed from the 2006 basic programme. I also said that, taking inflation into account, we expect them to be some £20 billion to £25 billion at out-turn. The hon. Gentleman is quite wrong: there is a growing nuclear threat in the world from such countries as North Korea and Iran. Who knows what other countries might be trying to develop nuclear technology and weaponisation? Those countries pose a wider risk and our nuclear deterrence is not just the UK’s independent deterrent but part of the wider NATO nuclear umbrella. It is important that the reductions that have been announced as regards warheads and stockpiles are not only within the letter but within the spirit of the NPT and set a clear direction for future Government policy.

Oral Answers to Questions

Jeremy Corbyn Excerpts

Monday 16th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Robathan]

I think the whole House would join me in paying tribute to those who served in the armed forces in the 1950s. Most of those involved were national servicemen and were doing their duty, as it was explained to them, by witnessing the nuclear explosions. We provide war pensions to anyone who suffers from an ailment that is linked to the service they underwent, such as watching nuclear tests, but it is necessary that we provide pensions and compensation only to those who were harmed by their service.

[Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)]

Does the Minister agree that this is a sad and sorry business? Those people suffered grievously many years ago and successive Governments have prevaricated and obfuscated on the matter. The nuclear test veterans need help, support and compensation, and above all they need an apology from successive Governments for the way they have been treated.

[Mr Robathan]

I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman. He says that people suffered grievously. Some people are of course ill, and some are ill because of their service. It is important that the Government should look to that. The previous Government did, as we do, through the war pensions system. However, there is no study showing that people who witnessed those nuclear tests have more cases of cancer than their cohort groups. We must base our response and expenditure of taxpayers’ money on evidence, not on emotion.

Oral Answers to Questions

Jeremy Corbyn Excerpts

Monday 14th March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

The White Paper was a thorough piece of work. It was the basis on which the House made a considered decision on the issue, and I still believe that for the long-term well-being and security of the United Kingdom, a continuous at-sea, submarine-based, minimum-credible nuclear deterrent in the form of the replacement for the Trident programme is the best way forward.

[Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)]

There seems to be a non-sequitur on the funding of the construction of this new weapon of mass destruction. In answers to me, the Secretary of State has pointed out that £300 million has been spent on advance orders for new steel and other things. In answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton West (Julie Hilling) a few moments ago, however, the Government talked of a figure of £25 million. Where exactly has the authority come from, other than the honeyed words “custom and practice”, for the expenditure of apparently up to £1 billion on preparation for the development of this new weapons system?

[Dr Fox]

On the broad picture, if we choose to go ahead on the dates set out since the White Paper—we have changed them slightly since coming into government —long-lead items need to be ordered. The Government have set out clearly that we believe that that is the best course for the UK. The main gate decision will be taken some time after 2015.