Trident

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Wednesday 7th December 2011 Westminster Hall

[Jeremy Corbyn]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her point. Not only is she a CND stalwart, but she has great responsibility, for she is a member of the CND national council, as I am. I am pleased that she is a member as well. She is quite right—many in the defence community express horror at equipment shortages of all sorts, the privatisation of air and sea rescue, and all those kinds of things that are planned, while at the same time someone is going ahead and planning to spend and spend on replacing Trident, a massive vanity project; that is what it is. It does not seem to bear any relation to any foreign policy strategy or to British membership of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, which requires clearly under article 6 that the five permanent members of the Security Council, which are also the five declared nuclear weapon states, take steps towards nuclear disarmament. Britain is not taking steps towards nuclear disarmament—it is reducing the number of warheads, but the capability is to be increased. Any Government, whether this one or a future one, could increase the number of warheads.

When the National Audit Office looked at the matter recently, in November this year, it cited problems with the Astute class submarines currently being built. They are now expected to cost £6.67 billion, a full £1.47 billion more than anticipated when the project was approved. Apparently, it is also running five years and one month late. Also, a report, “Looking into the Black Hole”, states that

“spending on the successor programme will rise sharply, probably reaching a peak of around 30% of the new equipment budget by 2021-22 or 2022-23”—

exactly the point made by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas)—

“when the first-of-class begins production. It is likely to remain close to this level until after the planned delivery of the first submarine in 2028.”

I want to turn to the issue of transparency—

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Jeremy Corbyn]

There is no finer person to be transparent than the hon. Gentleman.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I know that I am going to get one shot at this, and I thank the hon. Gentleman for his great courtesy. I would like to remind him that there was a parliamentary debate and a vote in, I think, the spring of 2007. It is not as if Parliament has not had one vote on the matter, and it will have another one. Does he agree that the cost overrun for the Astute class submarine was so great because of the gap that had been allowed to develop between the completion of the nuclear deterrent submarines of the Vanguard class and the initiation of the Astute class? By ensuring that the next generation of boats follow closely on from the Astute class, any such increase should be avoidable. There is precedent for that, because both Polaris and Trident came in on time and on budget.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

There is a precedent for this debate, which was the full debate that was held four years ago in 2007, in which a significant number of MPs from my party—100—voted against the replacement of Trident. Every other debate was initiated by Back Benchers, some of whom are present today. That is the function of Parliament, and I hope that, when the Minister replies, he will be able to assure me that there will be regular statements to update Parliament.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Peter Luff)]

Mr Gale, without wishing to trivialise this very important subject in any sense, I had intended to begin my remarks by a reference to that famous line of Captain Louis Renault about rounding up the usual suspects at the end of “Casablanca”, but the number of usual suspects seems to have expanded today to a rather larger number than I had expected. I had imagined that only the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) and my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) would be in Westminster Hall today, but I welcome the larger group of actors.

I am delighted to be in Westminster Hall once again to explain to the hon. Member for Islington North why we are right to proceed with our plans to maintain the security of our nation and why I think that he made a number of serious misinterpretations of the facts—let me put it that way—during his speech.

The Government have been clear that the safety and security of the UK is our first priority, and although we are facing difficult economic circumstances and a challenging inheritance from the previous Administration, our security must be seen as a long-term issue.

At the outset and on behalf of the whole House, I want to pay tribute to the professionalism of all those Royal Navy and civilian personnel who answer this country’s call to operate and support this vital national capability. Having visited HMS Vanguard at sea and HMS Vigilant in refit, I have met some of our dedicated service personnel who support Operation Relentless, which is the UK’s mission to maintain continuous at-sea deterrence. I was deeply impressed by their commitment and I am very grateful to them; I think that we should all be grateful to them. It is important that hon. Members remember that, even as we speak, those men are out there somewhere in the oceans providing Britain’s ultimate national security guarantee. They and their predecessors have maintained a 42-year unbroken chain of continuous at-sea deterrence, keeping all of us and our allies safe.

In many respects, we face a more dangerous situation now than we have done for several decades. There are substantial risks to our security from emerging nuclear weapons states. Consequently, although we are committed to the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons, as we all are in this place, we believe that we can best protect ourselves against those threats by the continued operation of a minimum, credible nuclear deterrent. [Interruption.] Others might find that funny, but I do not find it funny at all. Maintaining that deterrent is a very serious judgment that is shared by all three major parties in the House. It is important to remember that the alternative study, which I will return to later, which has been promised to the Liberal Democrats and which is proceeding, only considers the delivery platform and not the alternative to a minimum credible national deterrent programme. All three major parties are committed to such a programme.

The UK has a strong record on nuclear disarmament. We have continued to work with other nations to achieve our goal of a world without nuclear weapons. In addition to the well-documented commitments in the strategic defence and security review, I draw the attention of the hon. Member for Islington North to the statement in June that we have already begun to implement the reduction in warheads that are carried on our submarines. In addition, earlier this year, the permanent members of the UN Security Council met in Paris to take forward the action plan from the 2010 non-proliferation treaty review conference. We agreed to work together on a number of initiatives and Britain has taken the lead by agreeing to host a meeting in early 2012 to discuss the lessons that have been learned from our bilateral work with Norway on the verification of nuclear weapon dismantlement.

Having set out the Government’s fundamental policy, I want to address one further issue before I turn to the specific details of Trident’s costs. One theme that frequently emerges—it emerged again today in the hon. Gentleman’s speech—is the engagement with Parliament on the replacement of the nuclear deterrent. The hon. Gentleman’s colleagues in CND often accuse the Government of having a culture of secrecy with regard to the deterrent.

Clearly, there are aspects of the programme that are sensitive and that must remain classified for national security purposes. I will also discuss the Trident alternative study in that regard. The Government have received many requests, including from the hon. Gentleman in his speech, for information on the Trident alternatives study. The nature of that study, which is led by the Cabinet Office, requires highly classified information to be analysed. Indeed, only a small number of people in my Department and in the Cabinet Office can see that information. Therefore, Members will appreciate that we will not be able to publish the study itself, as doing so would be irresponsible and put national security at risk.

No decisions have yet been taken about what it might be possible to say without compromising national security, and as the report to the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister will not even be concluded until late 2012 or early 2013, it would be premature at this stage to commit to any specific course of action; for that reason, I will not be doing so today. I have no doubt that the public would understand that we want to take great care of those secrets, but we have nothing to hide except that which it is essential to hide for national security. Where we can, we have explained as clearly as possible what we are doing and why we are doing it, and I will do so yet again today for the hon. Gentleman’s benefit.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

Before my hon. Friend the Minister moves on to the question of costs, I want to make a point about the alternative study. In response to the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), who has secured this debate, it is presumably reasonable to assume that, at the very least, a list of those alternatives to Trident that were considered and dismissed, as well as a rough idea of the reasons why they were dismissed, will be published even if technical details cannot be released. Does the Minister accept that, when the hon. Gentleman talks about nuclear weapons killing millions of people if ever used, surely the response is that they are being used every day, because their use lies in the prevention of the use of similar weapons against this country and our interests?

[Peter Luff]

I note my hon. Friend’s powerful argument. I am sure that it will be borne in mind closer to the time, but at present I can make no commitment about what will happen at the end of 2012 or in early 2013, when the report is due to conclude.

I note that this is the third time that I have debated this issue in this place. We also covered the topic extensively during the strategic defence and security review debate last year. Since assuming Government, my Ministry of Defence ministerial colleagues and I have answered about 180 parliamentary questions on nuclear issues, not to mention a significant amount of public correspondence. In May this year, we published a comprehensive report on the initial gate decision for the successor submarine. We have recently repeated an earlier commitment to make an annual statement on progress to Parliament, and I think that that frequency strikes the right balance. We have published the costs of various aspects of the nuclear programme, such as the Atomic Weapons Establishment, on numerous occasions. Moreover, in May last year, we announced for the first time the overall size of our nuclear warhead stockpile, giving the deepest ever transparency of our nuclear capability. That is hardly a culture of secrecy or sleepwalking.