Domestic Gas and Electricity (Tariff Cap) Bill

James Heappey Excerpts

2nd reading: House of Commons
Tuesday 6th March 2018 Commons Chamber

[Greg Clark]

The hon. Lady makes a very important point. The statutory instrument that will allow that data sharing will be tabled shortly, before this Bill, which we hope will make rapid progress, receives Royal Assent. She is absolutely right.

I was explaining that the original RPI minus X model, which required annual reductions in prices by incumbents, was followed around the world, but with new developments in technology and practice, it is vital to keep our regulatory system up-to-date. In recent years, it has become more and more possible for suppliers to have extensive information on the habits and behaviour of individual consumers—often more information than the consumers know about their own habits, which are studied so minutely. Incumbent suppliers can identify which of their consumers do not respond to higher prices and instead display loyalty to what they might think of as a long-standing and trusted supplier. They can then penalise those customers with ever higher prices.

The CMA identified the problem and recommended that certain consumers, those on prepayment meters, should be protected from such pricing behaviour. It also recommended measures to drive up the rates of switching. The roll-out of smart meters in particular can make information that is currently only available to the incumbent supplier available to other potential suppliers, with the customer’s permission, which is what everyone wants to be able to drive up competition.

In its report, the CMA was in two minds about whether that action was sufficient, and a minority report thought that such remedies, including smart meters, would not come soon enough to eradicate this detriment quickly enough. The minority report said:

“The harm which is presently inflicted on households…is very severe…the remedies proposed for the large majority of households will take some time to come into effect. That is why…they must be supplemented by a wider price control designed to give household customers adequate and timely protection from very high current levels of overcharging”.

[James Heappey (Wells) (Con)]

I agree with the report that the march of technology was not correcting the market quickly enough, but there is no doubt that the arrival of all this technology in the energy system is creating a market that will benefit consumers in the future. Can the Secretary of State reassure us that while the Bill provides a temporary measure to correct the current market, it will in no way impede the arrival of the digitised market that will be so greatly to consumers’ advantage in the future?

[Greg Clark]

My hon. Friend has captured the position very succinctly. That is exactly the point. These remedies will introduce more competition based on technology, allowing consumers to have access to the data that will drive it. However, it will take a few years for that to come into effect, so the Bill is doing what my right hon. Friend the Member for Preseli Pembrokeshire (Stephen Crabb) advocated—it is addressing the current problem with greater agility than the regulator has shown.

In 2016, the CMA’s minority report stated:

“These customers are exposed to the prospect of excessive prices on a scale which might amount of many billions of pounds of harm over the next four years”.

Experience has shown that the CMA was right. In the last few years, prices for customers on the standard variable and default tariffs have not declined; in fact, they have continued to increase, in some cases by double digits. There has certainly been no change in the behaviour of many of the companies.

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[Greg Clark]

The capacity auction arrangements that have been pursued over the last few years have been very successful. We have had a higher margin this winter than last, and the prices of securing that capacity for future years have fallen in successive auctions. My right hon. Friend is right to raise the question, but the framework is actually delivering more resilience than has been delivered in the past.

[James Heappey]

My right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (John Redwood) made a good point, but does the Secretary of State agree that it is not just additional capacity that is required, but more flexibility in the system so that we can make existing capacity work better?

[Greg Clark]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. We have already had the pleasure of debating that issue. The hon. Member for Southampton, Test (Dr Whitehead) has spent many hours in Committee scrutinising the Smart Meters Bill, which will contribute to making the energy system more interactive and therefore more resilient.

The Bill follows precisely the advice to set a non-renewable price cap for a short period while competition increases. Address the problem was one of the commitments made by the Prime Minister when she entered Downing Street. I recognise the important campaigning work done by my hon. Friend the Member for Weston-super-Mare (John Penrose) and, indeed, by the right hon. Member for Don Valley (Caroline Flint).

The Bill comes to us today having been scrutinised in draft by the Select Committee on Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. I am very grateful to the Committee, and to its Chair and members, for their swift yet thorough scrutiny. The Committee took evidence from a wide range of stakeholders and produced a well-considered report. It agreed with the CMA’s minority report and with the Government’s proposed approach.

The Bill has been supported by consumer groups and, indeed, by many energy suppliers. Citizens Advice has said:

“We welcome the…Bill, which will prevent loyal customers being ripped-off”.

Octopus Energy, one of the newer and more innovative entrants to the market, has called the Bill:

“A crucial step towards a fair energy market in which energy suppliers compete to offer their customers the best value and service”.

The Bill constitutes a sensible intervention to address a specific problem in the market. The Government are not setting prices, and this is not a price freeze. Such a freeze could disadvantage consumers by leaving them stuck on high prices when underlying costs fall, or force energy suppliers to face the entire risk of international commodity markets. Subject to parliamentary approval, the Bill will require Ofgem to cap domestic standard variable and default tariffs until 2020. It will be for Ofgem to decide the methodology and the level of the cap, as appropriate. The cap will stay in place until the end of 2020. Ofgem will then be required to assess the conditions for effective competition in the market and make a report and recommendation to the Government, which I am sure the House and its Select Committees will consider as well.

The price cap can be continued for one year at a time up to the end of 2023, when a sunset clause will come into effect. The Government have no wish for the price cap to become a permanent feature of the landscape. The inclusion of the sunset clause relates directly to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Taunton Deane (Rebecca Pow) that we need to address the problem by increasing competition. Ofgem currently has the power to impose a cap for vulnerable consumers, and is taking steps to do that. When consumers make an active choice to opt for green standard variable or default tariffs, they will be able to continue to pay extra for such tariffs if they choose, to prevent unintended consequences. That was a very helpful recommendation from the Select Committee, and I can confirm that all of its recommendations have been accepted in full and are reflected in the Bill before the House today.

The Government want the market to thrive. We continue to promote competition as the best driver of value and services for consumers.

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[Rebecca Long Bailey (Salford and Eccles) (Lab)]

I am pleased that the Bill is before the House today, but I must express my exasperation that it has taken so long to get to this point. The 2017 Conservative manifesto committed to implementing an energy price cap that would protect 17 million households. The Government then repeatedly rowed back on that promise, passing responsibility to Ofgem, which made it clear that legislation was required. After months of to-ing and fro-ing, the Prime Minister reintroduced her commitment in her conference speech, and finally, on 11 October, a draft Bill was published. That Bill was then passed to the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee for pre-legislative scrutiny, which, due to the thorough work rightly done by colleagues, was not completed until mid-February. At the same time, a leaked conversation between the civil service and an energy investor seemed to suggest that the Government had no intention of seeing through the legislation. So yes, I was relieved last week to finally see the Bill introduced to Parliament, and I welcome the Government’s foray into a policy that they previously denounced as Marxist, but it remains the case that, as a result of this Government’s inaction, millions of households have been left to scrape through the winter facing a choice between cold homes or astronomical bills.

As all hon. Members will be aware, the UK experienced one of its coldest periods for decades over the past week, with the Met Office reporting that the UK had officially broken its record for the lowest March temperatures in a 24-hour period on Friday. As a result of this Government’s dithering and delay, the 4 million households currently living in fuel poverty, 1 million of which include a disabled person, will be receiving whopping bills at the end of the month. Startlingly, the latest figures from National Energy Action for the winter of 2016-17 show that excess winter deaths were 39.5% higher than in the year before, with an estimated 34,300 excess winter deaths in England and Wales.

[James Heappey]

The hon. Lady underlines the fact that the harshness of the recent weather will have increased energy bills for millions of people. Was she therefore as impressed as I was by the speed at which emergency payments were made to the most vulnerable to help them with their additional heating costs?

[Rebecca Long Bailey]

The emergency payments were certainly welcome—I thank the hon. Gentleman for his comment—but the fact remains that this price cap should have been in place this winter and it was not.

National Energy Action also found that each year an average of 9,700 people die due to living in a cold home. That equates to 80 people per day, the same number of people who die from breast or prostate cancer each year. It has been Labour party policy since 2013 to introduce a price cap on consumer energy bills, and although the principle of this Bill is positive, I remain concerned that, as drafted, it does not go far enough.

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[Rebecca Long Bailey]

The hon. Gentleman makes an important point, and I will refer to this later in my submission. The Bill does not provide an answer to the broken energy market; it is simply a sticking plaster while the energy market is reformed. We would not expect the provision to be in place for a prolonged period. We are not openly against sunset provisions, although we might dispute how they are drafted, which we will explore in Committee.

In considering the cap removal, I must raise an issue that was highlighted recently by the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee. It found that vulnerable and low-income people were especially affected by poor-value tariffs, with 83% of those living in social rented housing, 75% of those on low incomes, 73% of those with no qualifications and 74% of disabled customers on a standard variable contract. It was clear from the Committee’s findings that, even with the advent of smart meters, those groups will still require protection from overcharging. I therefore urge the Government to consider representations by charities such as Scope, which has called for clause 7 to be amended to ensure that Ofgem, when it considers “effective competition”, has regard to the impact of removing or extending the cap in relation to vulnerable and disabled customers.

Finally on the drafting of the Bill, I am concerned that there is no guarantee that the price cap will be in place this winter, despite the Secretary of State’s earlier assertions. The Bill states that Ofgem must introduce a cap “as soon as practicable” after it is passed, but Ofgem has already said that it would take around five months after a Bill receives Royal Assent to enact a price cap because it has a statutory duty to consult power companies. This morning Ofgem has said that it

“will look to set the level of the cap over the autumn and bring the cap into effect at the end of this year”.

It therefore seems that the cap will not even be in place when the weather turns in autumn this year. I think that the Bill would be greatly improved by the inclusion of a hard deadline by which the cap must be in place, and Labour will be seeking to include such a deadline in Committee.

Given that the Government have already set the date for Committee consideration as 15 March, it would be encouraging if they provided a clear date for cap implementation because, even accounting for the relevant consultation periods set out in the Bill, it would be possible to introduce the cap earlier than next winter. Indeed, my advice is that including such a date might even lay to rest suggestions in some press reports that the big six, and indeed some members of the Cabinet, have been lobbying the Secretary of State to procrastinate or even drop the Bill entirely.

[James Heappey]

The shadow Secretary of State is kind to give way to me a second time. Does she agree that another option she might consider to help to introduce the cap as quickly as possible would be for her party to pledge its full support in helping to get the Bill through the House and the other place as quickly as possible?

[Rebecca Long Bailey]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that very helpful comment. I have not opposed the Bill in any of my comments so far; I am providing helpful advice. We support the principle of a price cap and want it to be introduced in the most efficient and detailed way possible.

I think that there is consensus across the House that the energy price cap is no more than a sticking plaster, and that much deeper problems within the UK’s energy market need to be addressed. The market is fundamentally broken. Electricity bills soared by 20% between 2007 and 2013, while in the past year alone, every household in the UK paid £120 for dividends to energy company shareholders. Over the past few months, report after report and news story after news story have detailed the unfairness of the current system, but it must be noted that the final bills that consumers face are not simply a consequence of manipulation by some supply companies. As the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee has highlighted, network costs make up the second highest element of a duel fuel energy bill.

The Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit found last year that the six distribution network operators made an average profit margin after tax of 32% a year between 2010 and 2015, equating to £10 billion over six years. At the same time, shareholders received £5.1 billion in dividends. In a subsequent report, the ECIU calculated that electricity network companies’ exceptionally high profits are set to add £20 to household energy bills this year. Moreover, analysis by Citizens Advice last year calculated that network operators, including National Grid, had made £7.5 billion in unjustified profits, which it thinks should be returned to consumers. Quite frankly, that is the exploitation of a natural monopoly. It is not a market and there is no effective competition, and I want to hear how the Minister will deal with competition within this element of the energy market.

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[James Heappey (Wells) (Con)]

This is an important Bill that comes from a very good manifesto commitment. Our energy market is undoubtedly broken, with millions of consumers stuck on the most expensive tariffs. Many are taken for granted and, arguably, even exploited for their loyalty, and it is right that the Government have intervened to protect them.

In many ways, in delivering this cap we have accepted that we failed over the last few decades to create the culture of switching that we hoped for. That is not to say that impressive progress has not been made; it has been, and we have seen further progress in the last few months, but even if that recent improvement in progress were to continue, we would still have far too many people—disproportionately concentrated among the most vulnerable and the lowest income consumers—left on the most expensive tariffs.

We should also note that some of the biggest energy suppliers have changed the way they operate SVT-type products over the past nine months, which is very welcome. One suspects that they saw what was coming down the tracks. None the less, I know that they will feel aggrieved by the Bill after voluntarily acting to tackle the problem of those stuck on rip-off SVTs.

The progress on switching and the improved behaviour of the big suppliers underlines why the cap need only be temporary. My hope is that the Secretary of State will encourage the industry to respond quickly to the cap so that tariff structures become fairer for the most loyal consumers. Clear criteria for ending the cap would be most welcome. While the cap is in force, let us not take our foot off the accelerator in encouraging more people to start switching. In short, the cap must be regarded as a means to an end, not—I suspect this is the view of some Opposition Members—as an end in itself.

[Bim Afolami]

Does not the Bill show the Government’s general approach to intervention in markets, which we have heard a lot about this afternoon, which is about markets not as a means in themselves, but as a means to an end, which is good, cheap and reliable energy for the British people?

[James Heappey]

My hon. Friend is indeed right. To resort to my former career as a soldier, I hope that the Government see this as a raid into the energy market, rather than an occupation.

In her opening remarks, the shadow Secretary of State made the important point that an amazing energy future is emerging in the margins of our current broken market, although I disagree with her analysis that the Government are not embracing that, because the clean growth strategy is a passionate embrace of those opportunities. Insurgent companies such as Octopus Energy are relishing bringing the new time-of-use tariffs to the market, giving consumers the benefits of fluctuating wholesale energy prices. Others are looking at how localised generation or aggregated shifts in demand might allow consumers to access cheaper energy or monetise their flexibility. Others still are looking at delivering heat and power as a service, often enabled by clean tech provided by the supplier for free, with the supplier then monetising the customer’s flexibility in order to make their margin. These and countless other innovations are accelerating our decarbonisation, increasing system flexibility—and therefore our energy security—and will mean lower bills for consumers.

We must also create an energy system that allows the full price-reducing power of clean technologies to bring down prices for the consumer. This will require significant regulatory change in order properly to unlock storage, demand-side response and the advantages of generating and consuming energy locally. We must also encourage the deployment of more renewables, no longer because they are the cleanest method of generation, although they still are, but because they are now so obviously the cheapest.

[Rebecca Pow]

My hon. Friend has great knowledge of this subject. Will he comment on the fact that we need to concentrate not only on energy efficiency, but on cutting energy waste, particularly in our domestic systems, because there is a lot of great new technology that could be harnessed?

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[James Heappey]

I very much agree. Let us be clear that energy efficiency measures are no longer simply barrier technologies—in windows, walls and roofs—but digital technologies that ensure that we use less energy, or that devices immediately stop working when we no longer need them, rather than being left on unnecessarily.

Ofgem has a key role in delivering the Bill, but that work must be no more of a priority for it than ensuring the much-needed regulatory change that will be delivered through the unlocking of wholesale disruption of our energy system and market. Let us be clear that the real prize is not the correction of the old, analogue, broken market system of today, but the arrival of a digitised, decentralised, dynamic and disrupted energy system with a market that allows consumers to benefit fully from the price reduction that these technologies will deliver. A cap that saves consumers £100 or £200 is very welcome, so I support the Bill wholeheartedly, but not at the expense of the much greater savings that await consumers with the green, clean energy system of tomorrow.

Domestic Gas and Electricity (Tariff Cap) Bill (First sitting)

James Heappey Excerpts

Committee Debate: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 13th March 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Vicky Ford]

Q The approach of making sure that Ofgem, the regulator, has to consult before making the decision.

Juliet Davenport: I would agree on that.

Hayden Wood: This Committee has an opportunity to help 12 million homes that are currently languishing on standard variable tariffs and massively overpaying for their energy, and help them to reduce their bills. If we allow a loophole such as this into the legislation—let us say that it is Ofgem’s responsibility to manage that loophole and to keep it closed—we open it up to being manipulated or lobbied on or people working around it. We saw how the retail market review regulation years ago led to some unintended consequences in how the energy market is structured, and we now suffer from this “tease and squeeze” problem, which others on the panel have described. We would propose completely removing clause 3(2) of the Bill to eliminate any issues with unscrupulous suppliers introducing non-green tariffs and removing the effect of the cap.

[James Heappey (Wells) (Con)]

Q I wonder whether the panel shares my concern that this also allows green tariffs to be seen as a premium product. To achieve our decarbonisation goals, what we actually want is for green tariffs to be seen as the norm. Therefore, to allow them to be sold as a sort of premium rather defeats that long-term aim.

Hayden Wood: I completely agree with that. It perpetuates the myth.

Juliet Davenport: My view is that you can have cheap greenwash tariffs alongside genuine innovative tariffs and you can have a differentiation. You have to focus on the big six and make sure that there are not any loopholes, but most of these companies have had people come to them as a choice. What is great about this market is that we do have choice. We have the cheap greens, and we also have the more innovative products such as us. Why would you close that down? You can see that we have been leading this market and making changes in it. We support about 140,000 homes who generate power in their own house. Those are the kind of innovations that we want to continue to do. To be honest, if you price-cap us, we are going to have no investment left for that kind of innovation.

I completely agree that we should have a differentiation and we should have products that are cheaper green. I met one of Bulb’s customers at the rugby the other day who was very enthusiastic. She was so excited by the fact that she is going on a green journey. I think that is brilliant, and that is what we should embrace in this. We should not try to close it down to be one thing or another. We should allow innovation within the marketplace.

[Alan Brown (Kilmarnock and Loudoun) (SNP)]

Q On the cap mechanism, there has been debate about absolute versus relative, and I think there are split views across the panel. Why would we go with one versus the other? Some models are clearly more favourable to a relative cap, and others to an absolute cap. Why choose one over the other? The Government have come down for an absolute. I think that has almost got the majority view, but is it possible to find a cap level that is fair to everybody? Is there any trade-off between short-term customer needs and the long-term competitive market that we are trying to achieve? I will just throw that open.

Greg Jackson: That is the most important issue to address during these conversations. An absolute cap, as per the Bill, will provide a decency level beyond which no default customer will be charged. That is a good thing. However, at the moment, a loyal customer of, for example, one of the big six is paying £250 a year more than the price that the same company advertises openly to new customers. When I say “openly”, of course, you still have to type in 25 sets of details to see that price, because energy is too complicated. Under an absolute cap, we think that might fall to £200. It is still not going to create an effective market in energy, where competition thrives, if we do not do something about those tremendous differentials. That loyalty penalty is by far the biggest barrier to true competition in the energy industry, so we would propose that, with the protection of an absolute cap, it is the perfect time to bring in a simple limit on the difference between the cheapest and most expensive tariff offered by a supplier, to prevent it hoodwinking its customers into overpaying for loyalty.

The only reasons given during the Select Committee hearings not to have a relative cap were a concern that large suppliers—existing former nationalised suppliers—would raise their prices to fit a relative cap. The absolute cap prevents that being a concern. Bringing in the absolute cap provides the perfect opportunity to generate real competition underneath it by a simple limit on the loyalty penalty. If you do that, I think we will find a price war among energy companies, equivalent to that in supermarkets, where everybody sees the same price. In supermarkets, you do not need to switch, because the threat of some people switching forces supermarkets to bring prices down for everybody. That will be the effect of a relative cap underneath an absolute cap. It is one line of additional rule in the statement of a price cap that would enable this. I think that what you would find, when you take away the absolute cap, which is defined to be a temporary measure, is that you would have a truly competitive market in energy for consumers.

It is worth noting that we are all challenger brands. We have to fight for every single customer from scratch. Eleven challenger brands favoured a price cap, and split roughly equally between absolute and relative, with a lot favouring the combination. We are one of those companies, and that is because we know that will generate the most competitive market for the benefit of consumers.

Juliet Davenport: This is not a position, so much as I just want to add in the risks that we need to be aware of with the absolute price cap, just to see whether there is anything else we can think about in terms of softening those risks.

One risk with an absolute price cap that I am concerned about is that Ofgem will be setting the prices. There is no downside to Ofgem with getting that wrong; if Ofgem sets that price incorrectly—I know you are seeing Dermot after this, so you can ask him the question—what are the sanctions against Ofgem for getting that price wrong?

And it is really difficult to set prices at the moment. I could ask my colleagues about the unidentified gas charges that we have just seen go from 0.6% to 2% of gas bills. This is a post-charge that we were not aware was coming. We knew there was some discussion of it, but it has been charged in arrears. How does Ofgem factor some of those things into its price? Does it put a risk in the price? That would be one question.

The other question is, because we set the price cap at a particular time of year, we will get everybody forward-contracting with their hedging position at the same time of year. The concern I have is that we might see some distortion within the wholesale market. Can we keep an eye on the wholesale market? I do not know whether that means that we have to ensure that there are extra powers to ensure that the wholesale market does not try to spike at exactly the time that everybody will be forward buying their power.

Those are the two risks that I am concerned about with the absolute cap. That is not to argue against it, but those risks are there and they need addressing whether in the Bill or in guidance from Ofgem.

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[Bill Grant]

Thank you, we will leave it at that. It was my misinterpretation.

[James Heappey]

Q You have the Minister to your front and the regulator behind you. What does the end-state look like? Is this price cap to repair the current market, or to deliver something new. If new, what is it?

Greg Jackson: You now have a market of 70-odd companies, mainly vying it out in a 20% churning area. If we get this right, you will be able to let loose the competitive efforts of companies like ours and 68 or however many others to bring prices down for everyone. Getting it right involves the decency cap or the absolute cap and finding a way to tidy up the entirely unjustifiable hundreds of pounds of difference between the cheapest and most expensive tariffs from each supplier. At that point you can let loose our competitive efforts to bring prices down for everyone.

[The Chair]

Order. I am ever so sorry about what I am about to do, but I am required to do it. I am afraid that has brought us to the end of the allocated time to ask questions. I thank all the witnesses. It has been a very good session. Thank you very much. I now call the next panel.

Examination of Witnesses

Dermot Nolan and Rob Salter-Church gave evidence.

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[Claire Perry]

In other words, reimburse customers who would otherwise be overcharged if for some reason the energy companies delayed the introduction of the cap through any form of legal challenge.

Dermot Nolan: First, before coming back to that, I want to reiterate again that we want the cap in as quickly as you do. There will be no drift; we will make sure that we meet that timeline. I absolutely say that as clearly as I possibly can. So we will bring in the cap.

At that point, the cap would apply to all energy suppliers. If they were in breach of it, they would be in breach of their licence obligations and potentially they would be subject to fines, and ultimately to losing their licence. So, it is almost inconceivable to me that, if the cap was in place, a supplier was not in compliance with it. We would obviously use every single power we had at that point in time.

[James Heappey]

Q On the last panel, Dermot, the price spike of two weeks ago come up. So, to follow on from Vicky’s questions, first, against your modelling, what event did we see two weeks ago? Was that a once-in-five-years event or a once-in-10-years event, in terms of the price spike it generated? Secondly, how do you model against the reality that there will occasionally be those price spikes, but at the same time that we will all urge you to take as much risk as you are willing to, in order to make the price cap a meaningful cap? It would be interesting to know how you strike that balance between the variability in the wholesale market, albeit that it happens very infrequently, versus our wish that you are as bold as possible with the cap.

Dermot Nolan: Absolutely. Two points on that. First, regarding, the events of last week, it is difficult to be precise. I would say they are more the type of once-in-five-years spikes. I will note that, if I may sound very gnomic, there are spikes and spikes. This was quite an acute spike in the gas price, and then there was a spike in the electricity price, but it was not that long-lived. Forward prices for four or five days did not change dramatically, so it was an abrupt spike but a short one.

The whole point of how to set the cap, and over what time period, is a fundamentally important one. The Bill suggests that the price cap must be updated every six months or less. There is an inherent trade-off. One of the things I particularly want to hear about from consumer bodies is over what period people want their prices to change. All the evidence we have in many ways suggests that people like smooth energy prices. They do not like spikes in their own bill. If the cap is set every six months, and a one-week spike is smoothed out over that six months, there is an appeal to that—you get relatively sure prices over a six-month period.

At the same time, you find that if there have been spikes of whatever form during a six-month period—if there has been, say, a fall in energy prices after two or three months—people say, “Why is this fall in wholesale prices not being reflected in my bill? Why do I have to wait six months for it? Why can I not have it after three months?” If we did a three-month price cap, that would ameliorate that issue, but we might be a little bit more vulnerable to spikes and changes in prices. How we balance that is not straightforward and is one of the things that we would particularly want to hear from consumer groups on during a consultation.

[Michelle Donelan (Chippenham) (Con)]

Q On that point, do you think six months is right? I know you have just described the trade-off between a three-month and a six-month period. Do you believe six months is the correct period? There are people that are concerned about flexibility and fluctuations. In the last panel, we heard that if everybody started buying their energy in advance, it could inadvertently cause a spike. What do you believe?

Dermot Nolan: I think six months is the maximum. If the Bill goes through as is, we will consult on it. I honestly cannot say what we would ultimately pick, because it would be an open consultation. Certainly, I cannot imagine, at this point in the way the energy market is, having prices change every week or month. I think it would be a consultation along the lines that I have already mentioned. There is no perfect number though. We would want to try to hear from consumers what they thought was best and what reflected their preferences.

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[Stephen Kerr]

Q Tell us again how you will know that they are working. What are the features of a market to which you will say, “Yes, this is a competitive market.”?

Dermot Nolan: Last year we published a response to the Competition and Markets Authority—which, going forward, will form the core of our report to the Secretary of State, as envisaged under the Bill—that we called a state of the market. It was a detailed look at the state of competition in the retail sector. It will look at a number of indicators; it will be on the basis of this suite of indicators—there will not be one perfect one. It will include the numbers switching, but also survey evidence, levels of satisfaction in the market, whether people feel more trust in the market, and whether the vulnerable, in particular, feel empowered to switch or still feel disengaged. We will focus on and continue to develop a suite of indicators that will form the basis of a report to the Secretary of State, which, as envisaged in the Bill, we will make on a yearly basis.

[James Heappey]

Q I am keen to understand what you think a good market looks like. In a lot of other markets, we would consider happy customers who think that they are getting good customer service and a good deal to be a good thing. In the energy market we seem to be quite aggressively pursuing the absolute opposite. We seem to think that a good market looks like lots of people who are moving constantly to find a better deal.

I wonder how we do something in this price-capping process that, when energy companies go to war with one another over price, ensures that all of their consumers, including those who are loyal and seeing the benefits of good customer service, get rewarded, rather than simply perpetuating this view that a good energy market is one in which everybody is moving constantly and there is no incentive for companies to deliver good service.

Dermot Nolan: Absolutely. When I talked about a suite of indicators earlier, I think one should not over-concentrate on switching. It is perfectly possible, as James Heappey has said, to have a market that is functioning relatively well, but, actually, observed levels of switching are slow. What is important is that the customer must have the ability to switch if treated poorly.

In that sense, what we have seen, particularly in the energy market over the past two years, as we have seen in other markets, is a divergence of outcomes—£200 or £300 between people’s bills. Some—not all, because more than 20% of our domestic residential customers now come from small suppliers—have the disengaged feeling of, “I don’t feel comfortable switching and don’t feel protected.” The reforms that I mentioned in the last question are about trying to create a situation where we go back to the engaged customer—in some sense protecting the disengaged—with less variation between the engaged and the disengaged as a result and with people feeling, “I don’t need to switch, because I am not going to get charged £300 or £400 more by my own supplier if I don’t switch.” That is the kind of market that we would revert to. I think the reforms that we have set out will get us in that direction.

[James Heappey]

Q That is exactly the point. When Tesco and Sainsbury go to war with one another, they might compete over the price of Hobnobs, and that might make a small number of people switch their supermarket, but everybody who shops in those supermarkets gets the benefit of that price reduction. That surely must be the market that we are seeking to design.

Dermot Nolan: That must be the market we are seeking to design. I would say more generally that new technology, through which we are buying goods and services in many areas, is such that that old area is, to some extent, breaking down. I do not want to go beyond the topic, but you will see people paying different prices buying online, and that is good in many ways, but it also has public concerns more generally. One thing about the energy market is that it will clearly not be successful if we are still seeing observed differentials of £300 in two or three years’ time.

[Alan Brown]

Q You have already said that when the absolute cap ends, you still think there needs to be protection for vulnerable customers. Does that not suggest that the Bill is not doing enough to protect vulnerable customers? What protection do you think they need going forward?

Dermot Nolan: I think there are already 5 million people who are vulnerable under price cap protection. If the Bill was not going forward, we would have extended that, anyway, to another tranche of vulnerable customers. Regardless of whether there is a price cap or not market-wide, the regulator is likely to have price caps for vulnerable customers going forward. I might be wrong on that, but it will be an absolute priority for the regulator to do that, which we believe we can and already are doing under our own powers. Obviously, I want as much protection as possible for vulnerable customers. Any regulatory body, given the statutory duties that it has, will take on that itself. If it does not, it will be messing up. So I feel there will be protections there from the regulator in any case.

--- Later in debate ---

[Michelle Donelan]

Q You would say that getting this entire process put through simply will foster competition, and that is one of the goals you believe should be in the Bill.

Dermot Nolan: I think it will have an effect. We have a prepayment meter cap already. I said that switching is only one aspect of competition; I want to be clear on that. After the prepayment cap, we saw that some of the cheaper deals left the market, but not all of them did. Some stayed, including from existing suppliers, and there were still cheaper deals from some of the smaller suppliers. I think that is likely to occur. There might be a measured drop in switching for a period of time, but as long as the mechanisms are put in place, this can facilitate competition over the medium and long term.

[James Heappey]

Q This is similar to the question I asked at the end of the previous session. What does effective competition look like to you as the regulator? Are you looking at measuring this in terms of engagement within the market and net fall in the number of SVT customers? Is it based on some differential between SVTs and introductory or promotional prices? Alternatively, is this an opportunity for transformation? We bring in the price cap, but in the process we look at what has been wrong with our old energy system and what the innovation and disruption is likely to be that leads to something for the future, and whether this is your opportunity to deliver that.

Dermot Nolan: I think it is an opportunity for transformation. I have talked about some of the short to medium-term things we will do. Over the period of the price cap—this would probably be a legislative thing, working with the Department and ultimately with Parliament—it represents a chance to perhaps radically recast the supply market.

The supply market has become quite complex. I am not saying that the system of suppliers acting as vehicles for delivering the various obligations has not worked—in many ways, it has—but we see a situation in which a host of new suppliers will be entering the market in three to five years. These might be quite large ones that do not currently provide energy, and they could come in selling energy in a bundled product with other goods.

We will see electric vehicles being rolled out, and a price cap will have to deal with issues such as electric vehicle charging and how people are charged for them. I see a situation in four to five years’ time in which the energy market could have changed radically. The key point of the price cap is that it has to be flexible to any changes and fulfil its basic role of protecting consumers. With great respect to the suppliers in this room and suppliers already out there, I would hope that we could see radically different sets of people providing energy in five years’ time.

[Alex Norris]

Ofgem said to the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee when this was being considered that the cap ought to be temporary. How do you feel about 2023 as the sunset clause? What should Members in 2023 have seen to be assured that the cap would be unnecessary?

Rob Salter-Church: It is right that everyone is focused on what happens at the end of the price cap. It is important to us that if the price cap is removed, then all consumers get to benefit from the new competitive market that we are seeking to create.

We are comfortable with how the Bill is currently drafted. It requires us to have a comprehensive report from 2020 on the state of competition, and whether we believe that the conditions for effective competition that benefit all consumers are in place. Every year, we will be providing recommendations to the Secretary of State.

We are confident that, as the Bill is drafted, there is sufficient opportunity for the Secretary of State to determine whether there is a future role for an overall price cap, or whether there are things within our powers that we should be doing. Earlier on, Dermot mentioned the likely ongoing need for vulnerable consumer price protection. More broadly, we will be able to report on the progress made by us in creating what is ultimately a more effective form of competition where everyone benefits, whether you choose to switch or whether you choose to stay with your current supplier.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alan Brown]

Q Are there any improvements needed to the Bill? I have a couple of suggestions and considerations. We have already heard the merits of trying to introduce what is called a relative cap to work underneath the absolute cap, and we have spoken about vulnerable customers. Are there any improvements that could be made to the Bill to protect vulnerable and disabled customers?

Peter Smith: I will try to be a bit more concise than I was earlier. Clause 2 needs to be amended specifically to ensure that the safeguard tariff is considered when setting the SVT-wide cap, and Ofgem needs to have a duty to consider that. In clauses 7 and 8, we need to include customer engagement, particularly vulnerable customer engagement, as part of that overall assessment of competition and of whether it is working effectively.

I could give you a couple of examples, but perhaps they are best fleshed out in some further written evidence. They would include online access. For instance, we know that households that are offline do not benefit from the considerable discounts for online deals and from paperless billing discounts, and they do not get to apply to the warm home discount scheme. Cumulatively that could be up to £300. Things like that need to be considered when we make that overall assessment.

Rich Hall: From our perspective, we are broadly comfortable with the Bill in its current form. In the area of providing enhanced assurance that vulnerable customers’ circumstances are being improved, we think that is something that should be captured within the annual assessment by Ofgem and by the Secretary of State. We are reasonably comfortable that that is implicitly delivered through the Bill, but I can understand that there are arguments that there might be benefits in it being explicitly delivered on the face of the Bill.

In terms of there potentially being a relative cap underneath the absolute cap, I have some similar views to Dermot on that, in that it is an idea that has been floated only really in the last few days and weeks, possibly by people who would prefer a relative cap and who are now trying to use absolute plus relative as an alternative vehicle to reintroduce that approach.

We have some concerns about the relative cap approach. Because the large incumbents have so many sticky customers, in comparison with the relatively small number of customers they could pick up through any promotional campaign, if they were to seek to hold their line on their acquisition prices, that would make the cost of acquiring new customers punitively expensive. Because of that, we think it is more likely that the large incumbents would simply exit the acquisition market, which would neither help their SVT customers, who would continue to pay the same prices, nor improve pressure in that market. There is a risk that a relative price cap could backfire and be worse than the status quo, so we see the decision on absolute versus relative as not simply a choice between a good model and an excellent model, but as a choice between a good model and an unworkable model.

Pete Moorey: I would not add anything to what Rich said, but in terms of other changes to the Bill, there could be some changes to ensure there is more transparency and accountability of Ofgem, in terms of setting the cap. We would like to see changes so that Ofgem are required to set out clear criteria for monitoring and evaluating the success of the cap. We wanted to see a requirement to review the price cap every six months. It may well be that the evidence you have just heard from Dermot Nolan suggests that they will be reviewing it anyway every six months and that the bar could be set lower. It may well be that that is unnecessary in the Bill itself, given that it seems likely from what he said this morning that we will have a consultation on that as well. I think Ofgem should be required to publish reports on the impact of the cap on a regular basis and on how they would take any action if the cap was having any negative impacts.

[James Heappey]

Q Some of the big six, in particular, have tried to head off this legislation by, apparently, removing people from their SVTs already. I wonder whether you have made any analysis of the sort of tariffs they have been transferring people on to and of whether that represents genuinely better behaviour, or are they just getting ripped off in a different way?

Rich Hall: We do not have any analysis on that to hand, but it is a crucial issue, in that the problem with SVTs is not their name, but their characteristics; it is the fact that they are extremely poor value products that exploit consumer inertia. If the replacement products simply have the same characteristics, and they are benchmarked to a similar level of pricing, that is simply an attempt to get around the intent of the Bill rather than to reduce the detriment that those customers see. That is an area where we, Ofgem and others will need to improve our monitoring in the coming months, as we see more of those tariffs in the market. At the moment, it is still fairly soon after the launch of these approaches by three suppliers, so it is a bit too early to say, but it is a genuine issue.

[Vicky Ford]

Q Just to come in on this issue of reviewing every six months, that is of course in the Bill.

Pete Moorey: That is good news.

Domestic Gas and Electricity (Tariff Cap) Bill (Second sitting)

James Heappey Excerpts

Committee Debate: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 13th March 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 3, in clause 1, page 1, line 3, leave out

“after this Act is passed”

and insert

“and no later than 30 November 2018”.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms McDonagh. Let me start us off this afternoon with what I hope will be the first of many amendments that the Minister and other Conservative Members think so reasonable and constructive that they feel impelled to accept them.

Amendment 3 relates to our consensus that an energy price cap needs to be agreed across the board and brought in as soon as possible. Without presuming to speak on behalf of all Committee members, I believe that we are all united in our support for a temporary cap to allow the market to be set right. We hope that by the time the cap comes to an end, we will be reasonably assured that the market is working much better and that the circumstances that led to the cap’s introduction will not be repeated further down the road.

The Committee is united on our endeavour this afternoon. We want to finish our deliberations, get the Bill passed as speedily as possible, and have it on the statute book by the summer—hopefully the early summer—so that Ofgem can execute it. We heard this morning from Ofgem’s chief executive, Dermot Nolan, about the processes that Ofgem will be required to undertake to ensure that the price cap is properly implemented. The Bill requires it to have regard to a number of concerns, which I am sure we will discuss in our deliberations.

Essentially, Ofgem has the task of ensuring that the provisions in the legislation for the implementation of the price cap are legally waterproof, that the measures in the Bill around Ofgem’s responsibility for having regard to those various pillars are properly carried out, and that Ofgem has the arrangements in place that it will need to look periodically at what is happening to wholesale prices and to produce reports and proposals for how those wholesale price changes can be taken into account under the umbrella of the cap. Ofgem has to get a whole range of things right before the cap is properly in place. It is proper and right that Ofgem takes a reasonable amount of time to ensure that happens.

We heard this morning that Ofgem already has some consultations and discussions under way in anticipation of the Bill shortly being on the statute books, but there are a number of statutory things that it has to do and a number of further consultations that it has to undertake. We were told this morning that all this is about five months’ work as far as Ofgem is concerned. In principle, if we assume that the Bill will be on the statute books by the end of June, the five-month timescale that Ofgem has set itself would mean that the cap could be effective by the end of November this year.

Pretty much everybody associated with this Committee and the passage of the Bill has said that they fervently want to see this legislation enacted and a proper price cap in place before winter this year. By that, I am sure they do not mean when a cold snap takes place next February and looks a bit like winter, but the onset of winter—about the time people get their winter fuel allowances. That will ensure that the price cap is in place and benefiting customers in advance of the bills they face over winter.

To get this price cap in place not just over winter but as winter comes in—absolutely on the nail, given the time that Ofgem says it will need to get this Bill into shape and to get an operational cap—we will clearly want to ensure that that timetable is adhered to as closely as possible. That is why I asked Dermot Nolan this morning whether he thought the five-month period was an exact period, a maximum period or an approximate period. What was his view? He said that they would do their best to ensure it was within that five-month period. However, I did not get the impression from that evidence this morning that Ofgem was saying to us, “We can absolutely stand by the idea that there is a maximum possible period of that amount of time for us to do our work.”

[James Heappey (Wells) (Con)]

My reading of Mr Nolan’s evidence this morning was somewhat different. I thought that he very much felt this could be delivered within five months. The only note of caution he sounded was over a legal challenge. I am not sure that any timeline that we prescribe in legislation would prohibit such a legal challenge from one of the current large suppliers.

[Dr Whitehead]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. If there do turn out to be legal challenges, despite our best efforts in this Committee to ensure that the Bill is as watertight as it can be, it is conceivable that the whole timetable of a price cap could be seriously derailed—I think we have all understood that, as far as the process is concerned. Indeed, one reason there is legislation, rather than Ofgem going down the road of a price cap under its own steam, which it has been claimed at various times could have been the case, is to ensure that, as far as possible, the proposals and what Ofgem puts in place around them, are legally watertight. That comes in two parts. First, there is the question of ensuring that the legislation is as watertight as possible, but there is also a duty on Ofgem to ensure that, in translating the instruments in the legislation into a workable price cap, it takes measures that are also legally watertight, so that it does not slip up after we have done the good work in Committee of making the legislation as watertight as possible.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

My hon. Friend makes a powerful point. Today, thinking about the cap, we are not in such a position that we can look back with complete equanimity and say, “Actually, everything that could have been done to hasten the cap, once it was decided that there should be a cap, has been done over that period.” There has been quite a bit of equivocation since, for example, the suggestion at the time of the Conservative manifesto for the last election that there should be a cap. It made an appearance but then went through a period when there seemed to be some resiling from that particular commitment.

As hon. Members will recall, there were indeed suggestions and discussions that Ofgem, in its own right, could and should undertake a cap: a cap would need no legislation from Government, so Ofgem could go ahead and put one in place. Indeed, as I recall it, a letter to Ofgem from the Secretary of State during the summer in effect said that. At the time, as hon. Members will also recall, Ofgem came back fairly publicly to say, “We are not convinced that we have the powers to do this,” or rather, “We may technically have the power to do this, but we wouldn’t be proof against legal challenge were we to go ahead and introduce a price cap administratively without the back-up of legislation from Parliament.”

As hon. Members will again recall, it was at that point—I think it was at the Conservative party conference—that the Prime Minister reasserted the fact that she wanted a price cap. Perhaps we will come on to what she said about the consequences of that price cap in a moment, but she certainly said at Conservative party conference that she wanted a price cap and that, in effect, legislation was to be introduced to produce one. So, arguably, we could say that, had we got on with legislation from the moment that the idea that there should be a price cap was put forward, we would not be sitting here today. Instead, we would be contemplating a price cap having been introduced, probably this autumn.

[James Heappey]

The hon. Gentleman makes his case well, but I remain to be convinced that putting in a deadline makes a difference. The biggest pressure that Ofgem will be operating under once we clear the Bill through Parliament—surely the biggest variable in the whole process—is an enormous amount of political pressure. Given that the hon. Gentleman does not propose a sanction against Ofgem should it miss the deadline, one would imagine that the political pressure Ofgem will be under from both sides of the House to deliver the cap is more than enough to deliver it very quickly. He will remember that the last time that there was a notice of insufficient margin, with the price spike that it brought, was in the middle of November 2015, so a date of the end of November seems somewhat arbitrary. We want it done as quickly as possible.

[Dr Whitehead]

The hon. Gentleman’s point about the amendment not suggesting any sanctions on Ofgem is an interesting one. Were that suggestion put into operation, it would require about six more pages of amendments to secure a sanctions regime against Ofgem, but that is not how Ofgem works. In effect, Ofgem has a requirement to do things—in its charter of existence, in legislation—and it is instructed by legislation and not, by the way, in final and legal terms by what a Minister may or may not write to it on a daily basis. It is supposed to go along with what is in legislation. That was the problem that arose with the letter from the Secretary of State to Ofgem when the idea of a legislatively based price cap appeared to be up in the air.

Ofgem made the point that it would prefer, or that it thought it necessary, to have some kind of legislation on the statute book to guide and advise it—or, more than that, to be a framework for its carrying out of its responsibilities. The Bill requires Ofgem to do all sorts of things but contains no sanction. It does not set out what would happen to Ofgem—whether Dermot Nolan would be taken out, and something would be done to him—if it did not do all that is specified. The point is that there are requirements on Ofgem under its charter from Government.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

The hon. Lady has a point, but if hon. Members read amendment 4 and clause 1(6) reasonably carefully, they will see that

“the need to ensure that customers on standard variable and default rates have their annual expenditure on gas and electricity reduced by no less than £100 as a result of the tariff cap conditions”

would be a consideration—I emphasise the word “consideration”—that Ofgem needed to take into account.

[James Heappey]

I am afraid that I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford. A number of the larger supply companies have already sought to get ahead of the Bill by transferring their most loyal, or “sticky”, customers from what used to be called SVTs—standard variable tariffs—to other tariffs that are called something else but may be just as expensive. My concern is that the hon. Gentleman’s amendment is overly prescriptive and might allow the energy companies to get round what we seek to achieve.

[Dr Whitehead]

I do not think the amendment would allow energy companies to get round what we seek to achieve, although I accept the analysis that it may produce more work for Ofgem. I based amendment 4 on what the Prime Minister said. One could argue that she was being overly prescriptive—I do not know.

--- Later in debate ---

[Claire Perry]

That is a very important point, and the hon. Lady is extremely knowledgeable in this area. She brings me to the second part, when I will hopefully address her point.

The safeguarding tariff came into force in April 2017. That perhaps gives the lie to the idea that the previous Government did nothing; this was all part of the pressure that we put in place. The tariff initially affects people who are on prepayment meters, who are often exactly as the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun described—perhaps living in fuel poverty. That tariff is put in place by the CMA—it is nothing to do with Ofgem—and it will run until 31 December 2020. We have seen Ofgem extend that to this additional group—those who have claimed warm home discount—as the hon. Lady quite rightly said. She raises an interesting point, and we should take a look at it to ensure the maximum number of people are capable of achieving that safeguarding discount.

I asked the team to look at the impact on the bills of customers on these tariffs. Before the safeguarding tariff came in, the PPM average standard variable tariff was about 5% more expensive than the average standard variable tariff. Now, those who are on the PPM and vulnerable tariff pay on average 8% less than those on standard variable tariffs. That is absolutely working, independently of the Bill, to deliver the savings that we want to see for vulnerable and disabled customers. Those caps will continue to be in place, and it is very important that both are in place and that the Bill does nothing to remove eligibility for them.

I want to talk about some of the other duties on Ofgem, which are already covered in clauses 1(6), 7 and 8. They require Ofgem to protect all existing and future domestic customers, including vulnerable and disabled customers, and to consider whether effective competition is in place for the domestic energy supply as a whole. When effective competition is considered, it has to apply for all customer groups, including vulnerable and disabled customers.

[James Heappey]

Before the Minister gets too far from the issue of vulnerable customers and the cap, I thought National Energy Action’s evidence this morning was interesting. It is probably premature to react to that evidence by enacting the Opposition’s amendments. Could the Minister confirm that she will go back and look at whether the evidence provided this morning warrants some action, perhaps before the Bill comes back on Report?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

Yes, I certainly do. If one first agrees that this particular provision should be made, the question of tightening it is quite an important aspect of the Bill.

I am sure that hon. Members will be aware that the draft Bill, when it first appeared, had a much wider and I think much less satisfactory definition of the circumstances under which an exemption could be made. The Select Committee that considered the draft Bill and produced its excellent report singled out this particular clause as one that should be strengthened, as my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate has pointed out. It thought it should be strengthened on the basis that a number of stakeholders viewed the Bill as then drafted as allowing for

“unscrupulous suppliers to game the system and avoid the cap by moving customers on poor-value tariffs onto loosely-defined green tariffs.”

It recommended:

“The Government should work with Ofgem to strengthen the definition, standards and checks for electricity tariffs with environmental claims so the system cannot be gamed in this fashion and undermine the success of the cap.”

That concern was absolutely right. Regrettably, it is the case that throughout the present tariff offer a number of tariffs are in place that purport to be green tariffs, but when we drill down to what they consist of, they are pretty much not green tariffs. They may have a part of renewable energy in their make-up. It may be claimed that the company is advantageously purchasing renewable energy as part of its overall purchase arrangements, but of course we know in terms of today’s energy mix that it is fairly difficult to rigidly remove oneself from purchasing any renewable energy in the portfolio of purchases for tariff purposes.

[James Heappey]

I have huge sympathy with the point that the hon. Gentleman is making. My concern is that we risk letting the perfect be the enemy of the good. There may well be tariffs that are 95% or 99% green that really should be supported, but would not be under his amendment. The wider issue of greenwashing is a matter for the regulator more generally, rather than specifically a matter for this Bill.

[Dr Whitehead]

I take the hon. Gentleman’s point. I have tried to think about this point precisely on those sort of lines. It is difficult, in looking at such tariffs, to see the circumstances under which a company offering not a wholly renewable tariff is protected from a slippery slope—from going right down that slope and saying, “Well, as long as there is something in there that is renewable, we can call it a renewable tariff.”

I was about to make a point about the circumstances under which companies trade. Normally, because of the extent of renewable penetration into the energy system, most companies will come across a renewable supply as part of their trading arrangements. As I said, it is pretty difficult to avoid that, so we can imagine how relatively easy it is in principle for someone sitting in a company boardroom to say “How can we produce a tariff that looks like a green tariff but does not give us any sort of problem in producing it? Why don’t we just set aside what we have come across by chance, as far as our energy supply is concerned, say that it is our green purchase and put it in a tariff? Then we will have a green tariff and will be fine.” No work would have been done to distinguish that tariff from anything else, and the company would have no intention of doing anything within their tariff offer but trade in the ordinary way. That is a worry.

[Dr Whitehead]

The point that my right hon. Friend makes is, I think, taken into account by the circumstances that now apply across the board for energy sourcing. As she and I know, having talked about this for years, the process of the renewables obligation did impose a particular obligation for a proportion of energy purchased to be green. Then there was a system of trading those obligation certificates. Those people not directly purchasing green energy would have to purchase certificates, which could be traded from those who had actually traded in green energy in the first place, so that those involved had, in one way or another, carried out their obligation. The overall design of the renewables obligation system was to encourage the production of green energy, because the beneficiaries of the certificates when they were traded in cash would be the producers. That was a system that very much incorporated in it an incentive to trade in green energy in the first place.

Now, of course, the renewables obligation is no more. It continues as a ghost trade system and will continue on a declining basis, I think, until 2027, but as of March 2017 no more renewables obligation certificates are being issued. They are being replaced by the contracts for difference system, which does not impose an obligation to purchase green energy in the same way as the renewables obligation system did. The prospective system does not, as my right hon. Friend suggested, provide a universal underwriting of green energy production. She is right, of course, that the system overall encourages renewable energy production, but not in the same way as the renewables obligation.

I do not think that that particularly detracts from my right hon. Friend’s fundamental point, but it puts us in a position where we can properly consider the idea that a number of energy companies might accidentally, as it were, purchase green energy that does not, otherwise, have an obligation attached to it, and introduce it as part of a green tariff that is not really a green tariff. I suggest that companies wholly in the business of producing renewable energy, or those that produce it from their own sources or sources guaranteed through a power purchase agreement, or something similar, with the operator, are in a different category. I want to emphasise that difference with respect to the purpose of the amendment.

[James Heappey]

I think the point made by the right hon. Member for Don Valley was really about the existence of clause 3(2)(b) in the first place. I have a lot of sympathy with that. I think it is unhelpful to mark out green tariffs as a premium product—that is counter-intuitive to the wider effort we are making. However, if clause 3(2)(b) must remain, I am not convinced that the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test is necessary. I encourage him to consider again whether where we all agree is that Ofgem might take a much more robust view on the practice of greenwashing and that that is the actual challenge that we want the regulator to close with, not necessarily an amendment to the legislation this afternoon.

[Dr Whitehead]

I would say that the essential point is how far up the beach and close to the walls the greenwashing actually goes. Can we conversely say that we can put greenwashing into a particular box and say “That looks like greenwashing”, but as we move up the scale of more and more renewables in the system, the greenwashing ceases and therefore can we say that this really is a renewable product and is something we can apply special exemption arrangements to? That is the nub of the debate.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Heappey]

It is useful that the Minister will go away and make an analysis of the green products that are already on the market. I wonder whether she might also, with the evidence from Octopus and Bulb ringing in her ears, go away and ask the Department to go for just one more lap on whether or not this exemption is necessary all together, or whether it might do more harm than good when it comes to promoting green energy and the way that consumers regard green tariffs.

[Claire Perry]

I am sympathetic to my hon. Friend’s point; he is extremely knowledgeable in this area. However, as we have been through, particularly in the draft scrutiny process, we genuinely do not want tariffs that customers actively choose to be on, and which support the welcome development of creating demand for the renewable market, to be captured, as it were. The hon. Member for Nottingham North made the point about unintended consequences, and that is why word-by-word scrutiny is so important. The BEIS Committee supported that view, and I think the legislation has been substantially improved by that process. I am therefore less inclined for the proposal to be withdrawn completely, but I want to talk a little more about the point that the hon. Member for Southampton, Test made. I have talked about publication transparency. To me, transparency—having Ofgem look at these tariffs, probably for the first time—is an important part of establishing that this is a credible part of the market.

--- Later in debate ---

[Claire Perry]

Again, the clause outlines the final part of the licence modification process that Ofgem must undertake to impose the tariff cap—this is the actual modification of the licence conditions and implementation. It, too, sets out the statutory steps that Ofgem must go through. Ofgem must set out how it has taken account of representations made during the consultation specified under clause 4. As we heard in the evidence session this morning, it must set a date that the modifications will take effect from, which must be after a period of 56 days beginning on the day when the notifications are published.

The clause also sets out that the appeal mechanism is via judicial review, rather than through an appeal to the Competition and Markets Authority. We have had a conversation about that—certainly during the very good Second Reading debate—which is primarily because we want nothing to get in the way of implementing the temporary price cap. The CMA’s powers are used exclusively where there is a permanent control mechanism, but we and the Select Committee have taken substantial evidence to suggest that judicial review gives all interested parties an adequate means of address. A court has sufficient expertise to hear an appeal. A court is likely to be able to hear a matter more quickly than the CMA, which reduces the possibility of the implementation route being delayed.

[James Heappey]

I am keen to ensure that I understand the measure correctly. There is a 56-day period ahead of any modification being published, but presumably there is also a 56-day period for the initial implementation of the cap. Are we clear that Ofgem is content about being able to publish its cap within the five months—actually, eight weeks ahead of that five months?

--- Later in debate ---

[Claire Perry]

The hon. Gentleman again puts forward a sensible probing amendment that it is a pleasure to think about and speak to, but I will chance my luck and try to persuade him to withdraw it.

The hon. Gentleman is right that the review is a crucial part of the Bill’s effectiveness. Is the cap set at the right level? Is the ability to change the cap clear? Have we set out the conditions under which the cap must apply? We will get on to the conditions as to what success looks like. Is the cap dynamic enough to make a difference in the market?

If I read clause 6 carefully, two words precede the hon. Gentleman’s one-number intervention. In terms of reviewing the cap, the clause uses the phrase:

“The Authority must, at least once every 6 months”.

When we had this conversation on Second Reading, I said, correctly, that the opportunity is there for Ofgem to review this cap more frequently than that, should it choose to do so. It can review it on a weekly basis or a three-monthly basis, but it must review the cap every six months. That is consistent with the reviews of the prepayment meter cap, which is already delivering savings of up to £120 a year, as we talked about, and which is what the excellent Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee report recommended. I think that the flexibility the hon. Gentleman is seeking is covered by the words “at least”.

Yet the hon. Gentleman raises an important point: what happens if there are suddenly wild fluctuations in the energy market, which we want consumers to benefit from, and particularly if there is a sustained price fall? I have looked at this a bit. It is a bit like the mortgage market: unless someone is on a tracker rate, changes in the wholesale prices do not always feed into the retail prices. Indeed, these companies make an art, or a science, of hedging their supplies so that they bake in what their margins look like on a future basis. Any sustained price fall would take its time to feed through to those companies’ overall cost of energy provision.

Indeed, companies change their SVTs only once or twice a year, even though those are standard variable tariffs. We had a very interesting conversation this morning in Committee about whether that was a rather benign description—maybe we should be looking to tighten up the language a bit. These variable tariffs vary only once or twice a year. There is an argument that giving Ofgem a statutory duty to review this at least every six months provides an opportunity for the market movement to be greater than it is under the SVTs. I feel that with the words “at least” we have provided in the Bill for Ofgem to react to market movements or any other structural changes that would affect consumers. That flexibility is there.

As always, the hon. Gentleman has thought about these things carefully. As he alluded to, there is a risk that by specifying every three months, given that this is a short-term cap—it will apply for a minimum of just over two years and a maximum of just over five years—we would perhaps create an unnecessary process burden. We want Ofgem to continue to regulate this market well; we want it to continue to bring forward initiatives such as the cancellation of billing backwards for more than 12 months and the work it has announced it wants to do in the wholesale energy markets to ensure that returns are proportionate. I am persuaded that by changing the period to three months, we would create a potentially unnecessary burden that does not deliver anything more than we have already allowed for with the wording of clause 6(1).

[James Heappey]

I got there in the nick of time. While the Minister has been speaking, I have been looking at Ofgem’s tracker for wholesale energy prices. It is clear to me that in the first quarter of each calendar year, prices are particularly volatile and disproportionately higher than in the remainder of the year. In his evidence, Dermot Nolan said that, over six months, those midwinter peaks are ridden out. That means we should defer to his judgment that six months is the right unit, not quarterly.

[Claire Perry]

My hon. Friend again brings assiduous online research, which is marvellous, and his knowledge of this market, to support the point that Ofgem believes that six months is a proportionate time. The Bill does allow Ofgem—should it be required to do so by market movements, and that volatility persists over a period of time—to make the necessary adjustments. I know that I am on a winning trend, which may not last, but on that basis, I hope the hon. Gentleman is persuaded once again to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

I hope to receive an explanation as to why everything is all right in the world of the Bill as far as Ofgem is concerned and to hear that my fears are entirely imaginary and that the out arrangements for the cap are in perfectly good hands, so I need not worry myself at all. However, I fear I may not. I hope the Minister will have a very good attempt at persuading me. This matter is really important, and we ought to take it seriously.

[James Heappey]

I rise to speak briefly. I know exactly what the shadow Minister is trying to achieve with the amendment, and I agree with him that the cap must be a temporary measure. On Second Reading, I answered an intervention by saying that this should be a raid into the market, not an occupation. It is very necessary indeed to set out clearly the terms on which the cap will come to an end.

Having said that, my concern with the amendment is that whereas the Bill as drafted refers explicitly simply to progress with smart meter deployment—it quite reasonably leaves the regulator and the Minister to work out what progress is being made on the remainder—the hon. Gentleman’s list is so lengthy as to be overly prescriptive. Some measures in his list, such as improving efficiency in suppliers’ business models, are not the business of the regulator at all. I rather think that suppliers will be driven to find efficiency by the creation of competition, rather than needing to have it required of them. That is what the market does.

The hon. Gentleman is an enthusiastic fellow traveller on the route to a decentralised, digitised, dynamic energy system, so I wonder why his list does not include half-hourly settlement or the universal application of demand-side response, why he does not require the market to be electric vehicle-ready, why he is not concerned about transmission costs as well as distribution costs, why he does not seek signals from the regulator about the readiness of the market to manage a decentralised energy system given all the price advantages that might bring, and why he is not enthusiastic about a code review or embedded benefits, or about looking at what energy-efficiency measures have been made or at whether we are ready for a data-heavy digitised market.

As well as all those things, there is the unknown scale of the renewable deployment that might come our way, alongside the flexibility that storage and demand-side response will bring with them, and what impact that might have on price variability over the course of a year. There are so many unknowns, and the pace of change in the energy system is such that being as prescriptive as the hon. Gentleman desires at this stage would risk hindering progress in the system. It would shape the way the market worked towards achieving the end of the price cap, rather than allowing it to be disrupted in the way that I know he and I genuinely hope it will be.

[Alan Brown]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[James Heappey]

I was done, but I am happy to give way.

[Alan Brown]

I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point about other factors that may ultimately influence the retail energy market, but why should progress with smart meter installation be the one thing we tell Ofgem it must measure in its review? It seems to me a bit strange to specify that criterion but say that we do not want all the other important criteria that the hon. Member for Southampton, Test laid out.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Heappey]

I suspect that the Minister is much better placed to answer that than I am, but I guess—I would support this wholly if it were the case—that we have done a lot of work with carrots when it comes to smart meters and we are starting to get into stick territory. If we want the new digitised market to really work—I know that almost everyone here is passionate about achieving that—smart meters are no longer optional: they are a necessity. To use that as a metric of success seems very reasonable to me.

[Claire Perry]

I want to try to address two of the main points that came up: what “good” looks like, the conditions for success and how far we should specify them in the Bill, and why progress with installing smart meters is the only explicit condition. Ultimately, this is the nub of the whole Bill. We are all here because we believe that the conditions for effective competition are not in place and that the Bill will assist the market towards that evolution. I suspect that we all believe in well regulated, competitive markets delivering the best value and service for consumers, and if we see a regulatory gap—a place where the regulator needs new powers to deliver that—it is only right that we fill it. That is what we are doing.

Once again, I have great sympathy with what the hon. Member for Southampton, Test set out. I feel sometimes that we are a bit like Eeyore and Tigger: he is always looking for the very worst outcome and I am always very optimistic about the future. Perhaps it is good that we often meet in the middle. The challenge, as my hon. Friend the Member for Wells set out, is that the list that the hon. Gentleman has put forward is very sensible. I am sure that we could all come up with further factors that we thought would indicate that the market was acting more competitively.

Domestic Gas and Electricity (Tariff Cap) Bill (Third sitting)

James Heappey Excerpts

Committee Debate: 3rd sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 15th March 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Whitehead]

I thank my right hon. Friend for that encapsulation of how the pool works and for her important point that a pool system would allow independent generators to trade on exactly the same basis as those vertically integrated generators, and, equally importantly, independent retailers bidding into the market would be able to bid in transparently, on the basis that they would know what the price was at that particular point. There would be hands on the table and the price would be clear for everybody. The whole trading process would be thoroughly transparent, to the particular advantage of how the market works in its new incarnation as a large number of independent retailers and generators operating alongside the more integrated generators and those large inheritors of customers from, essentially, the days of the Central Electricity Generating Board.

[James Heappey (Wells) (Con)]

I am not sure that I am that enthusiastic about this idea for further intervention, on two grounds. First, the big six are increasingly separating out their supply and generation businesses, because it makes commercial sense for them to do so, and I am therefore not sure that we are tackling a problem that will continue to exist. Secondly and more importantly, in one of the most successful green finance models that is coming through the cheapest cost of capital tends to be when generation is built with a contract directly to a supplier. I wonder if the hon. Gentleman has considered what impact this measure might have on that very cheapest cost of capital that seems to be available for quite significant amounts of generation capacity coming onstream.

[Dr Whitehead]

I will make two points in response. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will be enthused by the merits of the pool when he looks into it—knowing, as I do, how deeply he does look into these matters on a regular basis. Although it is true that a number of companies are dividing themselves in different ways from the model that there used to be, it is by no means clear that in the complete vertical integration of those companies those divisions all face in one direction. In some instances, such as the recent merger of SSE and Innogy, retail has been put together in one company. In other instances, companies are breaking themselves up into what might be called a good company and a bad company, in terms of the different forms of generation, without distinguishing between vertical integration and generation. Indeed, there are further moves abroad. For example, E.ON in Germany has effectively taken over elements of Innogy, which may have effects back on SSE and Innogy in the UK. A variety of things are happening in the market, some of which point towards different forms of vertical integration and some of which, as the hon. Gentleman says, point in the direction of demerger.

That is not necessarily the central point about how a pool operates. Even if there are circumstances under which there is rather less vertical integration, the fact that the pool is bringing complete transparency on all trades to the table means that everybody in the market is absolutely on the same level as far as both those trades and the retail element, whereby people are bidding in, are concerned. As the hon. Gentleman knows, a number of newer companies will largely be bidding into the day-ahead market. They may be considerably disadvantaged in not knowing what has happened with trades down the curve when bidding into that market. Having that transparency right across the piece is, in principle, a very powerful lever to ensure that the market works well regarding retail trading.

Secondly, the pool system is not a fanciful notion that some people might think is a good idea but that has never worked in practice. Probably the most successful trading arrangement in Europe at the moment is Nord Pool, which does precisely this across the whole of Scandinavia. It does not have the negative effects that the hon. Member for Wells suggests it might in terms of cost of capital and investment, but stabilises that market across the whole of Scandinavia and produces transparency across borders.

In any event, a pool system is something that this we ought to look at for this country. What this amendment does is rather less than that. It asks whether the Minister thinks that, under circumstances in which it has not been possible to frank the market for returning to competitive purposes by 2023, other instruments should be introduced to get us beyond the end of the temporary pool and out of that temporary price cap, which is what we all want. That will be on the basis that we between us will have not just done a good job of running a cap but changed how the market works, so that the cap does not have to be in place subsequently and we do not need to return to the idea of one in the future.

That is what the amendment intends to do. I think it is a relatively modest ask of the Minister. I am sure that, if she is not promoted, she will be in her post in 2023—if there is a Conservative Government. At that point, she would simply have to produce a small report setting out how the pool system might work. Then we will look to see whether we can take that forward at that point as a key measure, to ensure that competition returns to the markets after the end of the temporary price cap.

Domestic Gas and Electricity (Tariff Cap) Bill

James Heappey Excerpts

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Monday 30th April 2018 Commons Chamber

[Dr Whitehead]

I thank my hon. Friend for that important observation about what one might describe as one of the current market anomalies. It is not just about the differentials between the different ways that one can secure a tariff; it is about the issue of prepaid metering and the differential between the bills of people who are in fuel poverty or are vulnerable in other ways and the bills of those who have more resources. Indeed, some of the amendments that we have tabled—and one in particular—would secure firmly in the Bill matters that Ofgem and the Minister would be required to take into account when considering the introduction of the price cap and the period after which it ends.

Amendment 5 would start the process of strengthening the Bill by ensuring that the cap takes effect within no more than a known period that is stated in the Bill. That is because we want the cap in place for this winter. We know that the equivocation on the cap has lost valuable time. The Government introduced it as a manifesto item before the last election, but then apparently went cool on the idea, before suggesting that it was the administrative responsibility of Ofgem. Only then, after a pause of a number of months, was it actually introduced as legislation, and we are now rushing to get the Bill on the statute books so that the cap can be in place this winter.

[James Heappey (Wells) (Con)]

The shadow Minister has brought forward his definition of winter from 30 November in Committee to something that is hopefully a bit sooner. Does he still not agree, as we discussed in Committee, that setting a date for the Bill to be implemented may mean that we rush Ofgem in a way that may not prove to be helpful? Indeed, if Ofgem exceeds our expectations and gets this done quicker, we may be giving the energy companies a target by which to raise their prices. It might be better to let Ofgem go away and prepare the cap as quickly as possible, and act as soon as possible thereafter.

[Dr Whitehead]

Indeed, the hon. Gentleman has a point, which is why now—on Report—the amendment would put a maximum number of months, not a specific date, in the Bill. One might say that hon. Members listened to each other in Committee regarding possible future amendments, which is why I tabled amendment 5 in this manner. However, the fundamental point of the amendment is still to get the Bill working, so that the cap is in place before the winter. Ofgem has said that it thinks it can have a cap up and running in five months, as we have suggested in the amendment. We therefore want the maximum timeframe of five months to be reflected in the Bill, so that the cap is guaranteed at around the time when people get their winter fuel allowance, not when winter returns, as it seems to do these days, in the middle of next spring.

Amendment 6 seeks to quantify the saving that customers might expect as a result of the cap, but we do not wish to make up a figure in so doing. We want to take the Prime Minister’s word on this, when she specified that customers would save £100 as a result of the price cap that her Government were about to introduce. To be precise, The Sun of 27 February this year had the splendid headline “Millions of Brits in line for £100 as Theresa May delivers on energy price cap promise”. This was just one of a number of sources reporting the Prime Minister’s price save promise, but The Sun went further, stating:

“Government insiders say the cap should save at least £100, potentially rising to £300 a year with increased competition and faster switching.”

Now, I do not know whether there are any Government insiders in the Chamber—or, indeed, whether the Minister is one of those cited—but we can assure them that we will take the conservative route on this occasion and propose only that the Bill will do what the Prime Minister says it will.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

The Bill says that what needs to be done to modify licences to bring the cap about, among other things, has to be done by Ofgem as part of its implementation process. The question of legal challenge to Ofgem concerns, at its heart, what Ofgem does over whatever period may be specified to ensure that the implementation of the cap does not deviate from what is set out in legislation. That is the clear basis on which the cap should be undertaken, and that is the responsibility of Ofgem.

The second issue is the time within which Ofgem considers that it can introduce that cap in the way that the right hon. Gentleman has described, given its workload and capacity to do so. Indeed, Ofgem is on the public record, through the evidence that it gave to the Committee—he will know that that has some weight through being a public statement in Hansard—as saying that it felt that it could do it within five months. The amendment merely tries to tidy up the process by putting that timeframe into the Bill, while not in any way detracting from the strength or otherwise of what Ofgem is required to do in acting to implement the cap in a way that is both effective and legally watertight.

I am not sure that I can go too much further with the right hon. Gentleman’s point. I am happy to take it up with him separately if he wishes. However, I have explained where we are in seeking a combination of watertightness in the Bill and clarity that the wishes of this House can be undertaken in through the price cap coming in during the period when it is supposed to come in.

Amendment 7 relates to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow West (Gareth Thomas) about vulnerable customers and people who are not in a position to take advantage of all the devices that other, less vulnerable customers would be able to take advantage of—that is, customers protected by the existing tariff cap in particular. In our view, it is important that those who are protected by the tariff cap do not lose that protection as a result of the overall cap being introduced. It would be helpful if the Minister, even if she is not minded to accept the amendment, put it beyond doubt that that is the Government’s intention and that they will not seek to lose the current safeguard tariff as the overall tariff cap comes in.

[James Heappey]

Clearly amendments 7 and 9 both have real merit in getting the protection of vulnerable customers right, which is important, but why does the hon. Gentleman feel that his amendment is better than amendment 9?

[Dr Whitehead]

I am afraid that I cannot give the hon. Gentleman that assessment, because I think that both have equal merit in dealing with very similar issues.

[James Heappey]

In a slightly different way.

[Dr Whitehead]

Indeed, but both have equal merit, and I would not want to distinguish between them in what they would add to the Bill. They both have the central concern that vulnerable customers should not be treated adversely as a result of the overall tariff cap coming in. That is the point that I wish to pay attention to. I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds West (Rachel Reeves) will also want to do so when she speaks to amendment 9.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Penrose]

There is now a whole range of underlying pro-competitive reforms—I am not normally one to give Ofgem a vast amount of credit, but it really deserves some in this case—that are needed in this market. Renaming the default or standard variable tariff may not have a huge effect, but it might have a positive effect. There is a series of other things, some of which are even more important, that must happen. It is crucial—I agree with the Labour spokesman about this, as I think we all would—that we do not waste our time and that Ofgem continues to reform the market while this temporary price cap is in effect because, when the price cap comes off, we will want the market to have been sufficiently reformed that no further price caps are necessary, because it works like a normal market in which the customer is king. If we have not done that, we will have wasted our time and everybody else’s.

I was talking about the complications and the hideous complexity of Ofgem’s proposals, but if all that inflexibility and complexity has not put Members off already, they should have a look at the bureaucracy. Pretty much every free market economist will agree that the best way to discover a price is not through a committee that meets every couple of months, but with a genuinely competitive market in which supply and demand are matched from moment to moment all day, every day. Fortunately, we just happen to have one of those handy. The switching market is full of deals on which energy firms compete like mad for business. It is innovative; it has razor-sharp prices; and it takes changes in wholesale energy costs in its stride every day of every week. The customer is, in other words, genuinely king or queen.

That is, as we have just discussed, exactly what we want to see in the rest of the market, so why are we ignoring it? Why go for a far less competitive version that is inflexible, hideously complicated, bureaucratic and committee-based when we could simply tie rip-off default tariffs firmly to the switching market and go down the pub for a drink? The mechanism, as we have heard, would be simplicity itself: a maximum mark-up between each energy firm’s best competitive price and its default tariff—we would cap the gap. Unlike with the arrangements in the Bill, there would be just one decision for regulators to take: the size of the gap. Everything else would be taken care of by the link to the competitive switching market.

[James Heappey]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend—my neighbour—for giving way. Has he given any thought to what a relative cap would do for time-of-use tariffs, the arrival of which we should surely be encouraging? They rely on a big differential from free or negative pricing to the most expensive prices, which disincentivises energy use at peak times. Is he concerned as I am that what he proposes might discourage the arrival of such tariffs?

[John Penrose]

Much would depend on the size of the cap on the gap proposed by Ofgem, and much would depend on the rest of the pricing structure of the energy firm in question with regard to where it chooses to put its default tariff. Many of these things are, as my hon. Friend points out, yet to arrive. They are starting to be introduced, but they are a relatively new innovation, with small but growing penetration. He is absolutely right that we need to make sure that we do not disincentivise such tariffs. They certainly will not be to everybody’s taste, but they may be to the taste of an increasingly large number of people.

I would prefer to start from a simple cap—capping the gap—and then have to make a couple of adjustments, rather than making even more complicated something that is, as I have described, already hideously complicated. If we manage to take care of all the complexity and bureaucracy by establishing a link to the competitive switching market—hey presto!—we will have driven a stake through the heart of the rip-off tariffs. Switching supplier would still be worth while, and there would be far fewer jobs for bureaucrats, lawyers and lobbyists. The customer would be king.

My amendments would make a relative cap either possible or required, depending on which version was chosen. I do not expect or intend to press the amendments to a Division, but I want everybody to realise that there is a more competitive, more flexible, less bureaucratic, more customer-friendly and generally better alternative, and that at the moment we are not taking it.

It is not just free market Tories such as myself who think that capping the gap is the right way to go. The Labour Front-Bench team, as we have heard, have tabled an amendment that proposes something similar. They might disagree with my description of it, and they have a fancy-schmancy name for it, but, broadly speaking—as my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) pointed out earlier—the wording is very similar and the amendments would effectively do the same thing.

Labour Front Benchers and I disagree over timing, however. The effect of their proposal would be permanent, whereas ours would be temporary while we fixed the underlying anti-competitive problems in the market. There is, none the less, clear cross-party consensus on the principle, at the very least, so why does the Bill ignore this cross-party opportunity? Why are a notionally pro-competition Conservative Government choosing the less competitive, more bureaucratically inflexible and more complicated version instead? Why are we snatching defeat from the jaws of what ought to be a famous free market victory? I look forward to hearing the Minister’s answer.

--- Later in debate ---

I hope that in most circumstances, good, competitive markets would work in the consumer interest, but energy is not like other products that we buy. It is essential to life. Frankly, ever since privatisation, the energy market has been a managed market. If the companies and their managements were doing what they say they should be doing, we would not be having this debate today. It is sad that it has come to this, but I hope that the fact that it has means that we can draw a line in the sand and that this will be my last appearance on this subject.

[James Heappey]

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Don Valley (Caroline Flint), with whom I agree on the risk to green tariffs and on making sure that we do not perpetuate the belief that green tariffs are a premium product. We want them to become the universal norm.

Generally, the Bill is a necessary evil. Interference with the market is not our first choice of action, but it is the consequence of a market that has stopped working and is exploiting customers, especially those who are least engaged in it. The Bill’s key point is its temporariness. I know that the Minister shares my strong belief that temporary should be as temporary as it absolutely can be. It therefore becomes essential that once the Bill is passed—it is good to see the Opposition’s continued support—Ofgem moves very quickly not only to come up with a mechanism for price capping, but to consider what sort of market transformation it can deliver as it changes the regulatory framework in the market, so that we end up with something that is markedly better than what we have now. The big savings come not from a cap that cuts bills by £100 or more, but from the delivery of an energy market that is digitised and cheaper because we have facilitated the disruptive powers of all the new suppliers that are coming in, which in turn will encourage the current large suppliers to change their ways to do business better.

I intervened on the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Southampton, Test (Dr Whitehead), about his amendment 5, so I will not say anything more about that. The purpose served by amendment 6, as we discussed in Committee, is to say to the energy companies that all they need to do is save customers £100—so they will just save customers £100. I passionately believe, therefore, that we should not tell them just to save customers £100. Instead, we should deliver the biggest saving that we reasonably can through whatever device Ofgem delivers, but the moment that we put a figure on it, lo and behold, that is exactly what all the energy companies will deliver.

The hon. Gentleman has made some changes to amendment 7 since Committee stage. He knows I share his concerns about vulnerable customers and possible unintended consequences from the Bill, and I know the Minister will be keen to reassure us that the Government have got this covered, but I prefer amendment 9, tabled by the hon. Member for Leeds West (Rachel Reeves), which has the support of many on the Select Committee and is well worth considering. The Government have looked at the vulnerable customer issue since Committee stage, and I wonder, given today’s very sensible amendments, if they might run one more lap on this between now and consideration in another place.

On amendment 8, which we also discussed in Committee and which the hon. Gentleman has also come back with, my concern is that the list could be much longer. If we are to specify all the circumstances, why not designate another dozen or two dozen things that we could legislate for, if we absolutely had to? I am not convinced it is necessary.

I also have a problem with new clause 1, because the Bill needs to be temporary. As I said either on Second Reading or in a Westminster Hall debate, it needs to be a raid into the energy market, not an occupation. New clause 1 is a raid with a few troops left behind thereafter, which I am not sure I like very much. We want to ensure that Mr Nolan and his team at Ofgem can, in delivering the price cap, facilitate a transformation in the market that makes such legislative provisions redundant. The consumer-friendly, disrupted, digitised market that awaits will be so much cheaper that we will be glad to have made this slightly un-Conservative, temporary raid into the market, to deliver something on the other side that is much better for consumers.

[Alan Brown]

The Bill is designed to intervene in the energy market and correct market failure, which is why it has cross-party support, but not surprisingly, because it is a reaction to market failure, there are nuanced differences in how people think that can best be dealt with. One good thing is that everybody seems keen to protect the most vulnerable customers. The question is: what do effective competition and a fairer market look like?

One fundamental still being debated is whether the cap should be a relative or an absolute cap. The hon. Member for Weston-super-Mare (John Penrose), who has been absolutely consistent in his belief that it should be a relative cap, should be commended for sticking by that, although obviously that does not mean I agree with him. As I mentioned in an intervention, one concern about a relative cap is that, because of the bunching effect, we might lose the competitive tariffs at the bottom end. We heard evidence of that in Committee. Some of the newer energy companies argue that they could deliver the lower tariffs even if there were a relative cap, but these companies appeal to those who switch regularly. He says the switching market works really well. Well, it does for those who switch regularly, but we are trying to protect those who do not switch and are stuck on these rip-off tariffs, which is why I agree with an absolute cap.

That brings me to new clause 1, tabled by the Labour Front Benchers. I am struggling to get my head around this. Labour says it does not believe in a relative cap but it believes in a relative tariff, and it would not be a cap but somehow it would work better being relative. It is too big a contradiction for me. I am not sure new clause 1 would work in the way suggested, and for that reason, if it goes to a Division, I will not support it, although I appreciate what the hon. Member for Southampton, Test (Dr Whitehead) is trying to achieve.

Let us look at who supports a relative cap versus an absolute cap. Ofgem, the regulator that will have to implement it and Citizens Advice are in favour of an absolute cap. Citizens Advice is a third sector organisation that works for the most vulnerable in society on a daily basis and often has to deal with those bearing the brunt of the Government’s austerity agenda, and if it says it is in favour of an absolute cap, I think we should listen. Now let us look at the company the hon. Member for Weston-super-Mare keeps. Signatories to his amendments include the hon. Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) and the right hon. Member for Wokingham (John Redwood)—two of the most right-wing, free-market capitalists in this place. That helps me to make up my mind.

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[Patricia Gibson (North Ayrshire and Arran) (SNP)]

I am delighted to support the Bill, and I am glad to have worked with the hon. Member for Weston-super-Mare (John Penrose), who was instrumental in its introduction and in pushing for the cap. It is disappointing that Ofgem required five months in which to implement it, but at least we shall have it in time for winter 2018.

The amendments to support and protect vulnerable and domestic consumers during the cap’s implementation are of course welcome, and it is right for the Minister and Ofgem to take account of the distinct needs and circumstances of vulnerable consumers when setting the cap, but since entering the House I, like the hon. Gentleman, have developed a healthy scepticism in my opinion of the way in which regulators, including Ofgem, go about their business—or not, as the case may be.

More than a quarter of households that contain a disabled person—27%, or about 4.1 million—spend more than £1,500 a year on a year on energy, and 790,000 of those spend more than £2,500. In my constituency, consumers are overpaying for electricity by £5.5 million a year. There is no denying that high energy costs have a serious impact on disabled people’s financial resilience. They limit those people’s ability to access employment and training and savings, and their ability to participate fully in society. Vulnerable and disabled consumers face higher energy costs than any other consumers, and that must be factored into any consideration.

As we heard earlier, the amendments that are intended to establish either an ongoing tariff differential or a relative cap are simply not robust enough to ensure that consumers would ultimately benefit from them. There is a risk that both the relative tariff differential and the relative cap could trigger unintended consequences, such as energy companies’ raising their minimum tariffs to meet the required difference from their maximum tariffs. That poses a series of questions about consumers’ interests. Indeed, stakeholders such as Ofgem, the Government and Citizens Advice have warned that a relative cap would not prevent overcharging and might simply result in price increases for the best-value tariffs. There is widespread agreement that an absolute cap is the best option if overcharging is to be prevented. Moreover, a relative cap might decrease the number of people switching providers or tariffs, which would clearly not be in the interests of consumers.

We need to know more details of the criteria that Ofgem must follow when conducting its review of competition for domestic supply contracts under clause 7. Those criteria are set out in amendment 8. It is essential that the Minister and Ofgem are as transparent as possible when setting the targets, so that the price cap does what it says on the tin. The hon. Member for Wells (James Heappey) spoke about time of use tariffs. I am extremely suspicious of those, because they will inevitably penalise families with children, who have little flexibility when it comes to controlling when they use their energy. I do not think any of us want that.

[James Heappey]

The hon. Lady makes a good point, but I think that there will automatically be technology in white goods, for instance, that will allow people to shift their demand to take advantage of time of use tariffs. Most families will save significantly as a result.

[Patricia Gibson]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that clarification. I appreciate that such tariffs will benefit some consumers—I do not think anyone would deny that—but I question whether the system would be flexible enough to benefit all families with children, and others whose energy use cannot be as flexible as they might like.

The amendment to ensure that customers must benefit from the cap by at least £100 seems very arbitrary and risks unintended consequences. I agree with the hon. Member for Wells about that, and with my hon. Friend the Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun (Alan Brown). There is widespread concern that the big energy companies will use exemptions and green tariffs to ensure that they meet the target.

It is essential that the Bill delivers for consumers and that the period of the cap is used to deliver a fairer, more competitive market for consumers. It must deliver a change for consumers who have been overcharged for too long. There is consensus that the energy market is broken and needs to be fixed, which is why the Bill was introduced in the first place. It enables us to begin to do that, but we must ensure that we get it right and that there are no unintended consequences for the very consumers whom we seek to protect and assist. I know that the Minister will be mindful of that. We need to ensure that consumers benefit from action on this issue after the tariff is lifted in 2020 or 2023.

The launch of the independently chaired commission for customers in vulnerable circumstances by Energy UK in January will report on its findings and recommendations on energy companies, the Government, regulators and consumer groups towards the end of this year. I hope that the Minister or the Secretary of State will note that as we approach the end of the tariff cap, so that the voices of consumers can feed directly into the process of ensuring that they are offered as much protection as possible as the broken market is improved to become more fair and transparent.