(10 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberGiven how long I have been in this House, I really ought to know whether I should be thanking the Backbench Business Committee, the Government, the Chair of the Liaison Committee or you, Madam Deputy Speaker, for my securing the debate. Just to be on the safe side, I will thank them all, and especially you.
I apologise for interrupting my right hon. Friend so early in his speech, but he makes a good point. In the old days, we had regular, sensible defence debates throughout the year, but they are now at the discretion of the Backbench Business Committee, which is a retrograde step.
My hon. Friend makes a good point, but it rebounds slightly on the Defence Committee because we have been told that we are responsible for applying for such debates and, I have to confess, we have not done so in recent months, so perhaps we ought to revisit that.
The Defence Committee launched an inquiry into defence and cyber-security in January 2012, as part of a series of debates and inquiries looking into emerging threats. It was the first time the Committee had investigated cyber-security as a discrete topic, although in 2009 we had looked at Georgia and Estonia, and visited Talinn, as part of another inquiry. The UK Government had identified cyber-threats as one of four tier 1 risks to national security, and in November 2013 published a UK cyber-security strategy, updating their 2009 strategy and setting out four objectives: first, to make the UK one of the most secure places in the world to do business in cyberspace; secondly, to make the UK more resilient to cyber-attack and better able to protect our interests in cyberspace; thirdly, to help to shape an open, vibrant and stable cyberspace that supports open societies; and fourthly, to build the UK’s cyber-security knowledge, skills and capability.
The programme is to be implemented via a four-year national cyber-security programme costing £650 million, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced an extra £210 million investment after the 2013 spending review. The funding is shared between the security and intelligence agencies, the Ministry of Defence, the Home Office, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Cabinet Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, but most will be spent by the security and intelligence agencies.
During our inquiry, the Committee investigated whether the high profile given to the cyber-threat in the UK was matched by a coherent plan and a chain of command in the event of a major cyber-attack on our national infrastructure or our national interests. The complexity of the threat must be matched by an agile, many-layered response; accordingly, many different agencies are involved in the cyber-security effort, ranging across cybercrime, cyber-espionage and cyber-commerce. Cyber-security is therefore to some extent everybody’s responsibility, but we must avoid its ending up being nobody’s responsibility as a consequence. Someone has to be in charge.
Like my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr Brazier), the hon. Gentleman contributes effectively to the Defence Committee and makes an interesting point—one I had not heard before. That is the value of these debates. We will all have to think about that issue.
We must seek to defend ourselves, but we must also, as has been suggested, expect to develop a capability to respond to threats in cyberspace. When doing that, we face some of the same considerations as when developing conventional military capabilities. Where does the balance lie between international collaboration and sovereign capability, for example? What sort of international arrangements will best suit our aims?
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State also talked about how the UK was developing a full spectrum military cyber-capability, including strike capability. This is an interesting and novel declaration. Everybody knows it has happened but nobody has been prepared before now to announce it. Will this declaration act as a deterrent or will it make the UK a more likely target for hacktivists and foreign states? What about the legal implications of establishing a strike capability for the personnel involved? The necessary rules of engagement for cyber-attack need to be put in place, although of course we will not be told about them.
Some maintain that cyber is just another military domain and that we can expect to do everything in cyberspace that we do in the air, on land or at sea to prevent, deter coerce or intervene. But has the distinctiveness of the cyber domain been fully grasped? It is not clear, for example, that deterrence is a concept that can apply to a domain where there are real difficulties in discovering quickly who has perpetrated an attack and for what purpose, or even that an attack has taken place. Neither is it clear that everyone has grasped how important it is to avoid a silo approach to the cyberworld. It is essential to break down the dividing lines between civilian and military, among Government Departments, between Government and the private sector, and between our country and other countries, and therefore to approach the issue in an holistic way. Paul Dwyer of Mandiant came to brief the Defence Committee and told us that it takes a network to defeat a network.
Perhaps because the threat cannot be neatly categorised, it may be unrealistic to expect a neat categorisation of the responses. Everything we have been told in the UK emphasises that the armed forces have a very limited role, protecting their own systems and developing military cyber-capabilities. For other areas of activity, those in the lead are likely to be based elsewhere, particularly in the intelligence services. That is where the important point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury comes in.
My right hon. Friend makes a good point about the threat being so diverse as to be difficult to counter. None the less, the briefing we were given by Mandiant was very interesting: there are a large number of extremely serious attacks, not by a lot of people but by one or two groups. He even named Unit 61398 of the People’s Liberation Army as one of the main culprits. In other words, it would be reasonably easy for the British Government and the MOD to counter a specific attack such as that.
I am sure that my hon. Friend is right in saying that the Government are well aware of where some of these attacks are coming from. I do not agree that it would be relatively easy to counter them, because these threats are developing at a frightening speed, as the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock) said. The diversity and development of these threats is changing on a second-by-second basis.
I am pleased to say that the Government are taking action to make the UK more resilient to cyber-attacks. It has established a new computer emergency response team in early 2014, CERT-UK, to improve the co-ordination of national cyber-incidents and to share technical information among countries. The Government set up a new cyber-incident response scheme in GCHQ to help organisations recover from a cyber-security attack. They have extended the remit of the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure—the CPNI—to work with all organisations that may have a role in protecting the UK’s critical systems and intellectual property. They have agreed with regulators in essential services a set of actions to make sure that important data and systems in our critical national infrastructure continue to be safe and resilient. As I have said, responsibility for cyber-security rests principally with companies and organisations themselves. Government agencies’ roles will be limited by available resources and national priorities.
I welcome the chance to debate the UK’s cyber-security defence. Cyber-security is a particularly wide-ranging subject and cyber-attacks are a growing threat. Without stating the obvious, a cyber-attack could impact on everyone’s lives in many ways. We are now all very reliant on technology and the internet; without our mobile phones or when our e-mail goes down, we almost cease to function.
A major cyber-attack on any of this country’s main utilities, such as transport, energy or the banking system, would cause chaos. It would be, at the very least, very bad for the economy; it could, in the worst-case scenario—if we did not have the means to transport food and fuel, for example—cause social breakdown in a short time. South Korea, for instance, has suffered huge jamming attacks, launched by North Korea, against its GPS systems. They affected major airports and shipping lanes. The travel of more than 1,000 ships and 250 planes was disrupted by North Korean jamming attacks in 2012.
Cyber-security needs to protect us against many threats: criminals attacking personal data, small-scale political activists—or hacktivists, as somebody said earlier—and state-sponsored hostilities. The Government’s cyber-security strategy is along the right lines and has led to the national cyber-security programme, which has clear objectives.
Cyberspace is often compared to the wild west and thought by some to be beyond the rule of law. However, our Government have made it clear that it is not and they have encouraged law enforcement teams to use the existing legal framework to prosecute. When cyber-crime emanates from overseas, the Government are working with the G8, the United Nations, NATO and the European Union to help shape the standards and norms of behaviour for cyberspace. Obviously, the solutions have not all yet been found but the discussions are ongoing and the work is slowly evolving. I am pleased that the work has started in earnest.
Part of the solution is a normal, sensible protocol for cyber-security on the domestic agenda and it can be addressed through simple best practice. There is a knowledge gap and the Government are addressing it in the long term via the development of education in cyber-security: teaching materials on cyber-security are being produced for GCSE and A-level students. Academic centres for cyber-security have been set up in 11 universities. Investment in education are far-sighted and will position the UK with experts in the cyber-security arena.
The Government have also gone some way to engaging with industry by setting up the Cyber-Security Information Sharing Partnership. Furthermore, the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, or CPNI, is working with businesses to encourage them to make cyber-security a board-level responsibility. The current work on the development of an official cyber-standard will help stimulate the adoption of good cyber-practices among businesses. Given the risks to our infrastructure as a whole, the Government have highlighted the role of regulators in overseeing the adoption of robust cyber-security measures. The companies that supply essential services such as power, telecommunications, water, transport and banking, need maximum protection.
I praise the many organisations that are tasked with upholding the Government’s cyber-defence plans. However, as has been said, the threat is so great that I worry that as a nation we are not doing enough, fast enough. An industry study produced by BT last month found that British companies are lagging way behind rivals in other major countries in addressing cyber-security risks. The survey found that only 17% of UK businesses see cyber-security as a priority compared with 41% in the US. Nearly 90% of directors and decision makers in the US are given IT security training, but in the UK it is only around 37%.
On defence, our armed forces are among the most technologically advanced in the world, and I am sure we are all proud of that. In theory, that allows us to put fewer of our people in harm’s way and their lives at risk. However, as the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the hon. Member for Ludlow (Mr Dunne) said recently, it makes every aspect of our military capability vulnerable to cyber-attack. Obviously, there is no point spending millions on developing leading-edge technology without the cyber-security to stop it being felled by a single cyber-attack.
The Defence Committee noted that the Army has between 35% and 40% too few corporals and sergeants to man its cyber-capabilities. The Government have rightly set up a joint cyber-unit for the reserve forces, which was going well towards the end of the year, and others have said that the reserve forces will play a crucial role in our future capability. The Government have instigated broadly sensible long-term solutions such as apprenticeships to fill the staff-skills gap in industry and business, but how can we attract more trained staff immediately, especially in the defence reserve?
A further concern is that the threat is so wide and imminent that the command structure is not resilient. I understand that the global operations security control centre at Corsham has been empowered to take rapid action without direction from above to defend the MOD’s own networks from attack. That is great, but with the many groups set up to implement the UK cyber-strategy, how will one section know what the others are doing when an attack has happened?
We are all pleased to see my hon. and gallant Friend back in full working order. The GOSCC is in my constituency, and does an outstanding job in providing cyber-security for the MOD. Is he not concerned, as I am, that with the plethora of Government and MOD organisations with responsibility for cyber-matters, the expertise of GOSCC is being undermined by a variety of quangos and committees whose exact function is clouded in mystery?
I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention. He is absolutely right. Within the chaos of a potential attack, I am not sure how the disparate groups would communicate with one another, how there would be a uniform chain of command and how it would work in practice. GCHQ seems to be in charge, but in other countries the matter would fall under the Ministry of Defence. It is fine that the MOD seems to be still developing its own basic cyber-security techniques with the armed forces setting up separate units, but it is the responsibly of the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure to take the lead in co-ordinating a UK response to a major cyber-security incident.
An extremely clear command structure will be needed to deal with a cyber-attack, which may come from a political group such as the group that claimed that the Sochi games were being held on the graves of millions of people who had been murdered and that was, according to the US Government’s computer emergency readiness team, threatening companies financing or supporting the Sochi winter games with cyber-attacks.
The response would be different if an attack was state-sponsored, but it would be extremely difficult, especially in the first day or so, to determine where the threat came from and whether it came from an individual or a country. The internet is worldwide and even if we knew where the attack came from geographically, it would be difficult to identify who was behind it.
I will do my best, Madam Deputy Speaker.
I agree with the conclusion of the hon. Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon): this is an extremely important issue and addressing cyber-security rightly sits at the top of our national security agenda. Cybercrime and cyber-attacks are not only tomorrow’s dangers; they are a very real and growing threat today. As others have already made clear, Governments, business and members of the public come under sustained attack from cyber-criminals and foreign powers. There were an estimated 44 million incidents in 2011 alone.
As we become ever more reliant on the internet, our vulnerability increases. Cyber-threats take two primary forms—cybercrime and cyber-attack, although sometimes the distinction is blurred. Cybercrime was estimated by the Association of Chief Police Officers to have cost £57 billion globally back in 2009, while Detica estimated that the 2011 figure for the United Kingdom alone was £27 billion. It is difficult to believe that that there has not been a geometric increase since then.
Large-scale cybercrime is an issue of national security. Cyber-attack and cyber-espionage also present a serious threat both to the state and to the community, and the state should be acting to protect both. As we know, cyber-attacks have had real-world effects, as exampled by the denial-of-service attacks in Estonia in 2007 and the Stuxnet attack on Iranian nuclear development capability, although there appear to be disagreements about the degree of its effectiveness.
Cyber-espionage and theft of sensitive information is another major concern, so addressing the danger of cyber-threats today is real, not academic. The Security Service estimates that at least 20 foreign intelligence agencies currently operate to some degree against British interests. That threat merits our immediate and strong attention, which is why I welcome this debate and the attention the Defence Committee has given to the subject.
Given the amount of time I have left, I hope my hon. Friend will forgive me if I do not give way to him. If I have time at the end, I will come back to him.
What is being done and developed in the strategy? In 2009, the previous Government produced Britain’s first cyber-security strategy, which, though laudable for initiating a centralised approach to cyber-security, I as the then shadow Minister critiqued as being a shallow copy of the then American strategy. I said:
“Minimal or no attention is given to key areas such as co-ordination of the new cyber-structures with existing agencies, response to a cyber incident and information sharing between government, industry”
and international action. I also said:
“There is no consideration within the strategy of how we would respond to a cyber-attack. No mention can be found of a framework for response or who would lead it. There is no discussion of issues such as back-up communications networks for security and emergency personnel.”
All of those were given coverage in the United States review at the time.
Given the severity of the threat, the then Opposition felt that the strategy was an inadequate response, so before the general election we produced our own paper on cyber-security and keeping Britain safe in the digital age. I am pleased to say that much of it found itself in the Government’s 2011 cyber-security strategy, which is currently being co-ordinated by the Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance.
The strategy is far more detailed than its predecessor and offers a more thorough, co-ordinated and ambitious programme to enhance our cyber-security. The recent progress report from the Cabinet Office highlights the successes in implementing the strategy and the progress made towards achieving its objectives by 2015. I commend the strategy for its scope and ambition, incorporating everything from changes to law enforcement to greater co-operation and information-sharing with the private sector and enhancing our cyber-resilience. That the strategy also balances the attainment of security with civil liberties is reassuring.
Everything my hon. Friend says is absolutely right. The Ministry of Defence, of course, has no responsibility whatsoever for this. Is my hon. Friend therefore proposing that the things he is describing perfectly adequately should now become part of a defence cyber-strategy, or is he talking about something other than the topic of this debate?
My hon. Friend, in his usual perspicacious way, has identified precisely what I am moving on to, but before I finish on the wider cyber-security issue, I want to recognise the contribution made by the Baroness Neville-Jones in pulling this strategy together and much improving our country’s response.
No strategy, however, is incapable of improvement and the Government still appear to preside over a patchwork muddle of agencies and mandates responsible for cyber-security. In 2011, the Intelligence and Security Committee identified 18 different actors with responsibilities for cyber-security, which raises concerns about duplication, cost-effectiveness and confusion. I note the counterpoint expressed by the Minister for the Cabinet Office and Paymaster General, who said in evidence to the Defence Committee that although the arrangement is untidy, it is effective, given the need for a cross-Government approach. I must say that, in the absence of a personality as strong as Baroness Neville-Jones, there remain issues about co-ordination and leadership, as was also mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Filton and Bradley Stoke (Jack Lopresti).
We must recognise that the updated cyber-security strategy is a major step forward, but, as my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (Mr Gray) has made clear, defence is only one small component of the pan-Government effort and by no means the most important. I wonder whether the bracketing of cyber-security and defence is in fact wise, given the MOD’s relatively limited role. The MOD has only two formal responsibilities: to ensure that armed forces operability is maintained both at home and abroad by securing its networks, and to enhance military operations by developing future cyber-capabilities.
Cyber-capability is immensely important for the armed forces: it is a battle-winning asset. In the same way that military operations become difficult if not impossible without air supremacy, cyber-superiority if not cyber-supremacy is required. What differentiates cyber-security is that it also applies to nearly every aspect of modem civil life. Not many businesses need to worry about the effectiveness of the F-35 and the Eurofighter in their daily operations, but the defensive cyber-capability is a daily national necessity for our financial system. Defence against most high-end cyber-threats, including those to critical national infrastructure, is the responsibility of other Departments, not least GCHQ and the Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure. Given that fact, the conflation of cyber-security with defence is possibly misleading, in that it obscures a complex and much bigger picture. However, we are debating cyber-security in the context of defence, so I shall focus on that.
Other hon. Members have outlined the threat, so I simply want to say that the armed forces are increasingly vulnerable to highly targeted forms of cyber-attack, given the networked nature of modern military systems and the increased use of unmanned aerial vehicles and robots on the battlefield. Adversaries may seek signals interception to distort intelligence, disrupt logistical supply chains or, most worryingly, render major platforms and systems, such as ships and aircraft, dysfunctional. If we now regard cyber as a fifth domain of warfare, we must expect other countries to do so too. Britain is a world leader in defence technology, but we must expect emerging powers to be keen to shrink the development gap by stealing what they cannot easily or quickly develop for themselves. The need to protect the operability of our armed forces and the integrity of our defence establishment is thus abundantly clear.
Of the £650 million set aside to transform Britain’s national cyber-security capabilities over the next four years, the MOD will receive £90 million. That funding is not intended to secure MOD networks, because that is assumed to be business as usual, but I know that the Department is securing its supply chain against cyber-attack. The point has already been made about the importance of the need for a resilient industrial base, which must form part of the goal of the national cyber-security strategy. The MOD has responsibility to help to manage the security of its suppliers, and I note the work that has been done to that effect.
I also note the emphasis on reserve forces, which other hon. Members have mentioned, and I welcome the establishment of a joint cyber reserve unit. That is exactly the sort of imaginative use of civilian-qualified reservists in the armed forces that we will want in times of need, but we must bear it in mind that if the armed forces need them at a time of crisis, so will their host employers. On a separate point, I am encouraged by the assurance that spending on cyber will automatically be increased in the budgets of future programmes.
Cyber is part of how our armed forces will wage war in future, so the Department must be able to continue to enhance its military cyber-capabilities. I therefore want to touch briefly on cyber-attack. Inevitably, developments in technology will always be highly classified because the possessor of the latest technological advance is likely to have a battle-winning capability. I therefore understand why information in this area is restricted. However, I emphasise to the Minister that the military should understand that this House expects them to possess cyber-attack capability alongside the ability to defend their own networks from cyber-attack.
This area is highly sensitive because such technology can be applied against other states’ non-military assets in a way that makes it difficult to be clear about whether the laws of war apply. I will finish by discussing this international aspect. This area sits in the grey area between espionage and conflict. That is why, in 2009, I called for us to co-operate internationally on cyber issues to regulate the relations between states in respect of cyber-conflict. I am delighted that that is recognised in the 2013 statement on aspects of state behaviour in cyberspace. We must try to identify the future international rules of the road that will govern relations between states in this area.
I will end by reiterating three questions. First, by bracketing cyber-security with defence, are we in danger of misleading ourselves about where the main effort needs to be? Secondly, can the lead responsibility for cyber-security be made clearer? Thirdly, are we affording enough resources to research and development in this vital area?
The greatest threat of electronic attack continues to be posed by state actors. Russia and China are suspected of carrying out the majority of assaults, but other countries—North Korea, Iran and even Syria—run very effective attacks too. The targets are in Government as well as in industry.
Let me give an example of a cyber-attack. On 23 April 2013 the American stock market dropped 1%; it lost $136.5 billion in a matter of seconds because of a false tweet posted on the Associated Press Twitter account. That tweet apparently came from Syria.
Let me give another example of a possible danger to this country, and here I will use information from a paper written for the Defence Committee by the distinguished academic Chris Donnelly. Huawei, a Chinese company strongly suspected of having close links to the Chinese Communist party and Government, is now providing crucial equipment for our national telecommunications system. The company has been debarred from doing that in the United States because it could not prove that it did not have strong links to the Chinese leadership.
Chris Donnelly’s paper highlighted three areas where Huawei could present a security risk. First, the company could insert undetected malware into its equipment, either to disable the system at will or at least to monitor it. Secondly, there is a possible security risk from the Chinese managers and technicians who man the system. Thirdly, allowing Huawei to dominate the field takes away our sovereign ability to deal with matters ourselves. Recently, there has been growing concern that our national cyber-security systems might not be able to detect whether malware has been inserted into the system.
My hon. Friend is right to be concerned about the possibility that companies of all sorts might act against the interests of this country, but it is also right to record that Huawei is a major employer in the United Kingdom and is a multi-billion-pound multinational company. The suggestion that it is, in some way or another, an agent or a foreign force in the way he describes may of course be true, but it is worth saying that there is no evidence that that is the case.
I am sure that the whole House will wish to join me in recognising and thanking those members of the armed forces, both regular and reserve, who have been engaged in preserving lives and protecting property in those communities across the United Kingdom that have been struck by the recent storms and floods. They have provided very good service and we are immensely proud of them.
May I also welcome the hon. Member for Makerfield (Yvonne Fovargue) to the Dispatch Box? Although she has been on the Opposition’s defence team for a while, this is the first time we have debated together directly, so I would like to welcome her to her post formally. I will do my best to answer at least some of the questions she asked in her speech.
I would also like to thank my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot), the Chair of the Defence Committee, for introducing the debate so ably and the 11 right hon. and hon. Members who have taken part so constructively. I have read the Committee’s report, which was published early last year, and the Government’s response. I will seek to address some of the Committee’s concerns and report to the House on our recent progress in this important field.
It might interest Members to know that the term “cyberspace” is usually credited to the 1980’s science fiction writings of William Gibson. He used it as a buzzword to describe an all-pervasive virtual realm. Although there are many interpretations, we generally use the term to mean the interdependent network of IT infrastructures and the data that move therein. Cyberspace has become an essential part of most of our lives, from communications to shopping, and from life saving to war fighting. In 2013 some 21 million households in Great Britain had an internet connection. That degree of connectivity clearly has security implications that we cannot ignore.
Although the MOD runs its own cyber-defence programme—I will say more about that later—the defence of our national cyber infrastructure begins within central Government, with the Cabinet Office playing a key role, as it does with all potential crisis management situations. All public and private sector organisations have a stake in addressing the threat, across international and domestic boundaries. To co-ordinate that effort, the Government created the Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance within the Cabinet Office, which runs our national cyber-security programme. Alongside the Cyber Security Operations Centre, OCSIA works with other lead Government Departments and agencies, such as the MOD, the Home Office and GCHQ—the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood) rightly paid tribute to his constituents there and the skills they have.
The national cyber-security programme is backed up by £860 million of Government investment from 2011 to 2016. That comprises an initial £650 million allocated across Government at the time of the strategic defence and security review and an additional £210 million investment announced by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer following the 2013 spending review. Moreover, given the seriousness with which we treat the cyber threat, since the Committee’s report the Minister for defence equipment, support and technology, my hon. Friend the Member for Ludlow (Mr Dunne), announced in July 2013 that, on top of the money allocated to the MOD from the national cyber-security programme, the MOD has allocated a further £70 million over the next four years from within our own budget for improving our cyber-defence capabilities.
The MOD’s key priority is to keep our own networks and systems defended and operational, so that if a crisis occurs we can continue to operate with the same efficiency and professionalism required on the battlefield. That does not mean that we cannot help in other ways, but the situation prevailing at the time will dictate how, when and if military assistance would be called upon.
A number of hon. Members asked about MOD structures, as indeed did the Committee’s report, so perhaps I can provide some clarification. Since the Committee’s report was published, the Chief of the Defence Staff has issued direction to the four-star commander of Joint Forces Command to empower him as the defence authority for cyber. On a day-to-day basis, that responsibility is delegated to the three-star Chief of Defence Intelligence in his unifying role to plan and develop cyber capability. Under CDI sits the joint forces cyber group, stood up formally in May 2013 to deliver that capability. The joint forces cyber group plans and directs the activity of the joint cyber units at Cheltenham and Corsham, including the reserves.
The senior responsible owner for the defence cyber programme is the two-star director for cyber, intelligence and information integration, currently Air Vice-Marshal Jonathan Rigby, who gave evidence to the Committee’s inquiry in 2012, and remains accountable to the Chief of Defence Intelligence for those responsibilities. I hope that that helps provide absolute clarity about the chain of command.
Our armed forces use some of the most sophisticated equipment in the world. The downside of the capability we possess is the potential exposure to emerging threats from our adversaries. We have to see those as an intrinsic part of modern military operations and put measures in place to mitigate or deal with them. The Global Operations and Security Control Centre, or GOSCC, is a key part of that protection, with its mission to ensure that we can operate and defend our networks.
I was pleased to read in the report that the GOSCC’s performance impressed the Defence Committee, which said that it should be held up as “a centre of excellence.” I agree. I visited the centre recently and was struck both by the ability of the personnel and the interplay with the embedded industry professionals whom they work alongside.
The Committee also rightly identified the importance of promoting good cyber-security practice. I fully accept that technology is only one part of the equation; we need the right people to do the right things. As cyber professionals often say, the majority of the threat that we face could be overcome by good practice on the part of our people. That point was well made by my hon. Friend the Member for Filton and Bradley Stoke (Jack Lopresti); we Front Benchers are also pleased to see him back here on good form.
At the time of the Government response to the Committee’s report, we had already recognised the need for good practice and had included a specific cyber module in our mandatory training for defence personnel. Since then, we have gone further and developed a cyber primer—an easy-to-read, unclassified book that introduces personnel to the subject of cyber, particularly in a defence context, and is provided for all defence personnel to use.
In its report, the Committee noted the importance of exploring options to develop military capabilities. Since then, the Secretary of State for Defence has announced, on 29 September 2013, that Britain will build a dedicated capability to counter-attack in cyberspace as part of our full-spectrum military capability. As we set out in the strategic defence and security review, the UK views cyberspace as a domain in which we can carry out military operations to support national objectives, as we would on land, at sea or in the air. The hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney (Mr Havard) asked questions about the legality of that. I reassure him and the House that we are looking to develop a range of cyber capabilities that would be used in accordance with the well-understood laws of armed conflict and, more generally, would comply with domestic and international law. Any capability that we develop must be used legally. We are mindful of that.
The Minister is making an extremely interesting and useful speech. In the context of the offensive use of cyber, does he believe that there can be such a thing as deterrence in the cyber world? Is there a way of finding out who the enemy is and deterring them by threatening the use of cyber-warfare ourselves?
A complicating factor is that it is not always immediately apparent where an attack may have come from. Sometimes it is possible to establish that a little later, but it cannot always be done instantly. That needs to be taken into account. However, I believe that the possession of a cyber capability that allows us to strike back could act as a deterrent to potential adversaries—not only in cyberspace but potentially against more traditional threats.
A number of Members have asked about how industry fits in, including my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate (Mr Blunt) and the hon. Member for Inverclyde (Mr McKenzie). Private industry is and will remain a key partner in cyber-security. A secure supply chain is vital for the business of all public sector delivery, and that is no less the case in defence. Our armed forces depend on a wide range of equipment and services provided by industry. As part of the NCSP, the Government are working closely with industry to ensure that it is aware of the changing nature of the threat and has effective counters in place.
The hon. Member for Makerfield asked for something specific to the Ministry of Defence. I am pleased to say that in addition, in July 2013, the MOD launched the defence cyber-protection partnership. That bespoke initiative aims to meet the emerging threat to the UK defence supply chain by increasing awareness of cyber-risks among our contractors and suppliers, sharing threat intelligence, and defining risk-driven approaches to applying cyber-security standards. In short, we already have something that is designed specifically for military and defence contractors and they are entering that programme.
Technology is only one part of the equation. People are essential. We know that the number of deep specialists and experts in this field is limited, and that all organisations, both public and private, are looking to recruit from that supply. However, defence can offer an exciting opportunity for experts to put their skills to use for the nation through the formation of the joint cyber reserve. Some hon. Members asked about that, and I will provide an update.
Recruitment to the joint cyber reserve commenced in October 2013, and there has been healthy interest. I cannot tell the hon. Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon) how many of the applicants come from the Department for Work and Pensions, but I respect her assiduous work, as ever, in collecting statistics, and I have often been on the receiving end. I assure her and the House that we have recruited the first cohort of cyber reservists, and their training will commence in the spring.
On the basis of the healthy interest so far, we believe that within the next two years the cyber reserve will be fully operational with reserve personnel recruited, trained and operating alongside their regular military and civilian colleagues in the joint cyber-units at Corsham and Cheltenham, and in the information assurance units.
(10 years, 6 months ago)
Commons Chamber1. Whether the UK received advance notice of the recent deployment of Russian naval ships to the north of Scotland.
The Russian carrier Admiral Kuznetsov passed through the UK’s area of interest, en route to the Mediterranean, between 28 December 2013 and 10 January 2014. The carrier task group had openly declared its planned deployment on social media sites. Its progress was monitored from the point of its deployment from Russia, and it informed NATO before it commenced routine flying operations.
Once it became apparent that the task group was indeed likely to enter the UK’s area of interest, HMS Defender, as the fleet ready escort ship, was ordered to sail from Portsmouth to meet and escort the group through the UK’s area of interest. This was several days before the task group’s arrival to the north of Scotland. The Russian task group operated in international waters off the coast of Scotland and followed international protocols to arrange their flying exercises. Their contact with HMS Defender was highly professional and cordial throughout.
I am glad to be able to tell the House that the idea that we were caught unawares by this deployment is entirely false, as is any suggestion that there was some kind of stand-off between HMS Defender and the Russian vessels.
We are wholeheartedly relieved to hear that the episode passed off so peacefully and so cordially, and that the relations between the Kuznetsov and HMS Defender remain as strong as they are. Does the Secretary of State not agree in looking to the future—given that 48 ships have gone through the North sea shipping route to the far east this year, and that there is increasing fishing and increasing drilling for oil and minerals in the Arctic—that it is terribly important for our armed services to have first-class relations with those of Russia? I hope that this episode will be the beginning of such relations.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The fact is that we have very cordial relationships with the Russians and good working relationships with the Russian armed forces, but we should not lose sight of the fact that we cannot be confident that our strategic interests will always align with those of Russia. We should therefore engage and work together with them when we can, but, frankly, we should recognise that our strategic interests may differ at times.
(10 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy hon. Friend is obviously aware of the issues that are of concern to our Baltic and Nordic colleagues and the subject of Zapad 2013 did indeed come up. The stated intention of the Zapad 2013 exercise was to repel terrorists threatening Russia and Belarus. To that end Russia claims that it deployed 11,900 troops and 180 items of military equipment, including 10 tanks, 40 aircraft and 10 ships. Some of our Nordic and Baltic colleagues see that as a slightly excessive response to a terrorist threat exercise, but Members of the House will understand that the Baltic states in particular continue to express unease about a large-scale Russian exercise close to their borders.
If Zapad 13 was a great success, it was nothing by comparison with Steadfast Jazz, the NATO exercise that occurred at more or less the same time. Leaving aside the question of who thinks up these daft names, does the Secretary of State agree that security in the Arctic in particular is a matter of huge concern for the future and not one to which we have yet given a great deal of attention?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his question, and I have to agree with him on the names. I have always assumed that they are chosen by a computer—if it is a person, something should be done about it. He is absolutely right to identify that we have huge strategic interests in the Baltic and, in particular, the Arctic, because a significant percentage of the UK’s primary energy supply now comes from Norwegian territorial waters in the Arctic, where significant strategic issues will play out over the coming years and decades.
(10 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Aldershot (Sir Gerald Howarth), even if I do not agree with everything he says. I wish to speak in favour of new clause 6—in my name and those of the shadow Secretary of State, my hon. Friend the Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker), and others—and about our broader debate this afternoon.
It is worth reminding the Secretary of State and other right hon. and hon. Members that the British Army is of course Parliament’s Army; it is not the Crown’s Army. That dates back to the so-called Glorious Revolution, which is why we have to have an Armed Forces Act in every Parliament.
I am sorry to be a little outraged, but surely the hon. Gentleman would be the first to admit that it is not Parliament’s Army, but Her Majesty’s forces. It has nothing whatever to do with Parliament, although Parliament may deploy the forces on behalf of Her Majesty.
I have to disagree with the hon. Gentleman. Parliament must give permission for a standing Army in peacetime and, despite our actions in Afghanistan, we are in a time of peace. It is therefore specifically Parliament’s Army, not the Crown’s.
There we are: we see the opposing views of the two sides. All I ask is for the Secretary of State for Defence to be clear about it, and to continue to be clear about it. I find new clause 1 to be sensible; it has my complete support. New clause 3 posits some extremely interesting questions, and we have had a good debate about it this evening. However, I think that the point about the changing face of warfare is terribly important.
We have heard a lot of talk about cyber-warfare and other specialist forms of warfare. If we open our history books, we see that in the late 1920s there was a school of thought which held that the fighting of savage tribes could be done entirely from the air. That was tried by an emergent Royal Air Force in Wazirista, and it completely failed, because there were not the boots on the ground to support the Royal Air Force in the excellent work that it did.
Of course there are specialisations within the reserve forces and the Territorial Army which are desperately important, but what our regular forces depend on is a very high level of fitness, a very high level of training, and an ability to deploy instantly. One of my hon. Friends, who is no longer in the Chamber, observed that there was always a period of time before any reservist—any Territorial—was up to snuff. That is no criticism, but, as Members who have served in infantry battalions know, preparing an individual for combat is akin to training a professional athlete. The level of fitness is extraordinarily important. I challenge any civilian holding down a full-time civilian job—and I do not say this with any form of disrespect—to be at such a level of fitness for instant deployment.
What we want for the future is the ability to nip problems in the bud—to avoid confrontation and conflict—and we therefore require deployment that is instantaneous, or as near to that as we can make it. I must say, with the greatest respect, that no reservist can achieve that. It is not in the nature of reserve forces. The clue is in the phrase “reserve, not regular”. I say that with profound respect for all Territorials and all reservists, and for their naval and air force equivalents.
I broadly accept what my hon. Friend has said about fitness, but does he not accept that a significant number of Territorial Army regiments are absolutely ready for deployment in the way that he has described? I am thinking particularly of my own regiment, the Honourable Artillery Company, but I am also thinking of the TA special forces regiments, which are as good as their regular counterparts.
I accept that a very small number of Territorials are ready for instant deployment, but I have to say that the Territorial Army units that I have seen—none of which have been so-called special forces, and which I shall not name—have been a very, very long way from being ready for instant deployment. That is just my experience, but I fear that the Territorials who came to support me on operations were never up to snuff until we had given them concerted and extensive periods of training, including fitness training.
I think that if we wish to avoid trouble, it is quite wrong for us to reduce the size of our regular forces until our Territorial or reserve forces are fully in place, fully equipped, and fully trained to deploy. I understand that the standards are different, and I respect the fact that reservists need a period of training before they can deploy, but I think it irresponsible to allow our regular forces, with their instant deployment capability, to be run down before we have an adequate replacement.
It is a great pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer), and, indeed, rather daunting to follow so many right hon. and hon. Friends—some of them gallant—who have so much personal and very relevant experience and knowledge of this subject. My special interest is the relationship between the armed forces and employers, and I believe that the Bill presents an opportunity in that context.
With a more integrated role for reserves will come a more open and supportive relationship between armed forces and employers. A number of the new clauses refer to business, implicitly or explicitly, and would have an impact on it. That is why I was so keen to speak at this point. As a small business owner and as someone who has been in business for more than 20 years and has employed reservists, I understand that, for many of them, successful service in the military depends hugely on the support of their employers. That will become even more important given the increased role of reservists in the future armed forces, and it is right for us to recognise the valuable contributions that employers make to our national security by hiring them.
Equally, however, it is important that trained-up reservists are provided with accredited qualifications that the armed forces can provide, and these will give a real service to employers. We must recognise the skills employees will gain from reserve service and how that will benefit employers and society as a whole. Ultimately business needs one thing more than anything else: certainty. It just wants to know what is expected of it with sufficient notice and what it can expect in return. I am delighted that this Bill commits to providing employers with full information about what hiring a reservist entails.
Too many businesses currently have no experience of hiring a reservist and the establishment of a national relationship management scheme will strengthen the partnership between the armed forces and employer organisations, leading to a much more open and predictable relationship in which all parties are fully aware of what is required of them.
One of my concerns with new clause 3 is that it will provoke confusion. It will delay or prevent payments being made to small enterprises when their employees are mobilised. This extra finance for small and medium-sized enterprises, who find it most difficult to plug the gap when their employees are away, is vital. These firms do us a great service by employing reservists and it is only right that they should be fully compensated.
My other concern with new clause 3 is about the delay in the delivery of the transferable skills. This Bill does not just compensate firms; it provides them with real benefits for deciding to hire a member of the new Army Reserve. Time with the reserves can greatly enhance an employee’s effectiveness through high-quality training, leading opportunities and the chance to gain specific civilian-recognised qualifications while on duty. By accrediting reservists with recognised qualifications, we not only help them progress their careers, but provide real incentives for employers to take them on in the first place. Businesses will know that while their employees are away on duty they will not be engaged in unnecessary training exercises, but will be gaining tangible and valuable skills. This will also encourage more people to consider serving with the reserves. The fact that they will be able to make a genuine contribution to our national security while increasing their employability in their chosen career path will be a real pull, attracting high-quality individuals into the Army Reserve.
This will help more than just those who are currently employed, however. Reserve service can help provide people who are currently out of work with boosts to both their skills and their self-confidence, helping them on to the job ladder. Joint industry-led apprenticeships will provide unemployed young people with a trade and accredited qualifications, but, more than that, reservists will learn how to work as part of a team, how to solve problems and how to present themselves with maturity. These skills are harder to define than others, but are no less valuable
Time with the Army reserves is a great preparation for life in the workplace, enhancing employability skills and boosting self-confidence. It is excellent news that this Government will be placing clear emphasis on the development of reservists, and on building and maintaining an open and productive relationship between employers and the armed forces. We owe a great debt both to the individuals who protect our national security and to the businesses that employ our reserve troops. I am delighted that this Bill will make sure that we are repaying both those employers and the reservists themselves by providing them with the training and skills to flourish both in the field and in the workplace.
It is a great pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Gosport (Caroline Dinenage) both because I very much agree with her point about small and medium-sized enterprises and the Territorial Army and because it gives me an opportunity to thank her publicly for the superb work she has done as chairman of the royal naval section of the all-party group on the armed forces for the last three years. She has graced the position—both physically and intellectually, if I may say so—over that time and I am most grateful to her for it.
I did not intend to contribute to the debate, but I rise to speak briefly because I find myself in a difficult position. That difficulty has been highlighted by much of what has been said in the debate and in the media over the last 36 hours or so, and it is that, contrary as this may sound to our experience personally, most people observing, and taking part in, the debate are of the same, or at least a very similar, view. We all deeply regret the reduction in the Army from 102,000 to 82,000 soldiers. It is appalling; personally, I think it is disgraceful. I am extraordinarily concerned about the future of the globe if we have an Army of 82,000 soldiers and about the reductions in the RAF and Royal Navy. One or two of my colleagues have expressed that concern very well. This is a very uncertain world, and facing it with this reduced defence spending is extremely worrying. As a Back Bencher, I have no personal responsibility for these matters, but I accept that the financial position in which the Government found themselves when they came to power three years ago necessitated these cuts in defence spending, in the same way as they necessitated all kinds of unpleasant cuts in other Departments. None the less, I deeply regret them and am extraordinarily worried about them.
I commend my hon. Friend for all his good work on behalf of the regular armed forces in this place, but with the greatest of respect his point that the MOD budget has to be cut because of the financial constraints does not quite ring true because other Departments have escaped the cuts. It is a question of national priorities. Does he agree?
I always feel instinctively uneasy when anyone says, “With the greatest of respect,” because it almost certainly means, “With no respect at all.” Of course, I agree with my hon. Friend: of course, we would all love the budgets to be as they were; of course, many of us would like the aid or other budgets cut, possibly in favour of defence; of course, those of us who believe passionately in defence would like to see the defence of the realm maintained as it has been for the past many years; of course, we would like us to achieve the NATO target of spending 2% of GDP—or even the NATO target of spending 2.5%—of GDP on defence, but this is realpolitik and those things are not going to happen.
I will leave that to one side for a moment. We all start from the position of regretting the cuts but realising the reasons for them. On the reserve forces, we all hope the plans in place work. We are all committed to making them work and believe that the reserve forces have done a superb job. In recent years, and as long ago as the first world war, they have made a gigantic contribution to the defence of the realm, and we strongly support that. Everyone in the Chamber is deeply concerned about whether the 20,000 regular soldiers will be replaced by the increase in the TA that is posited. Of course, we are concerned about that, about the recruitment figures and about whether the Secretary of State’s plans will work out. Those are common positions. I suspect that not one person in the Chamber would disagree.
The disagreement arises when we consider what to do about it. The Regular Army is already at about 86,000 or 87,000. By early February, it will be at about 82,760. The redundancy notices have gone out. People are already on their leaving training and getting ready to leave the regular forces. We cannot reverse that. No matter what we do in the Chamber today, there is no magic wand that will reverse it. By the middle of January, the Army will be at 82,760 soldiers. Regret it as we may, we cannot reverse that. The second thing for certain is that, whether or not we have confidence it will work, we will have to set about increasing the size of the reserve forces, their training and their equipment so that they can replace the lost regulars. Those two things are certainties, and regret them as we may, they are going to occur.
The question, therefore, is: what do we do about it? That is the nature of this debate, and it seems to me that there are two possibilities. The first thing we could do, as my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) seeks to do—I have to admit that I signed his new clause 3—is to write our aims and concerns into legislation. In recent years we have done that in this House on a number of occasions—for example, with regard to the green carbon targets and reducing child poverty. In such cases, there is a law that says, “The Government will do this or do that,” and if it does not achieve those aims there will be some penalty to pay. It is therefore perfectly possible that we could do what my hon. Friend seeks to do by writing into legislation—the law of the land—something that says that the Government will improve our reserve forces in the way described. The alternative approach would be to do what we do with regard to every single thing in this place—to scrutinise what the Government are doing in questions and debates in this Chamber, in Westminster Hall and in Select Committees. We can do that in a variety of ways.
I am very encouraged by the fact that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State tells me that because of my hon. Friend’s new clause and this debate, he, the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Defence as a whole have been entirely focused on this matter for a number of days. That means we have achieved one of the things we wanted to achieve. We have said to the nation as a whole—it has been wall to wall in the media—that we are deeply concerned about these cuts in defence spending, about the fact that we have an Army of 82,000 that may not be able to do its job, and about whether the re-growing of the Territorial Army will actually occur. However, should we take the further step of writing those concerns into legislation?
Having talked briefly to my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr Brazier), I suggest that one way of helping to get everyone onside would be to have a report on the state of the Reserves produced quickly, before the Bill comes back to this House. My hon. Friend thinks, unless he shakes his head to indicate the contrary, that the people to do it would be members of the reserve forces and cadets associations. That could take the sting out of the tail very quickly.
My hon. Friend makes an extremely good point. There is an absolute requirement on the Government to come before this House and report on what they are doing about this, and I have every confidence that they will, whether through the all-party group on the reserve forces and cadets, chaired by my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury, the Defence Committee, Opposition days that the Opposition will no doubt call, Back-Bench business days or regular oral questions. I am confident that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State will be at the Dispatch Box day in, day out for the next two or three years answering difficult questions about recruiting in the Territorial Army. I pledge to him now that I will be his most difficult inquisitor. If he thinks that he is somehow going to get off the hook and that I am going to become a nice fellow and be gentle with him, he is completely wrong. I spent an hour in his study yesterday afternoon explaining these matters to him.
The question is whether it is right that our concerns about cuts in the Regular Army and our aspirations about improvements in the Territorial Army should be written into legislation. Having listened to the debate, I am sorry to have to advise my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay—if he were listening he would no doubt shake his head in disappointment—that I am increasingly convinced that it is not right to seek to write these things into legislation because they are political rather than legislative matters.
Two things greatly concern me about new clause 3, despite the fact that my name appears on it. First, it would have no effect whatsoever on the reductions in the regular forces that we are mainly concerned about. Secondly, if we had a pause to examine the matter and produce a report, one of two things would happen at the end of that pause. The report would be satisfactory to the House of Commons and the House of Lords, we would vote for it, and the plans would plough ahead as they were before, or the report would not be satisfactory to us and we would turn it down. If the latter were to occur, who knows what would happen? Presumably we would have to start again. The one thing that would not happen, even then, would be that somehow we magically grew the regular forces to fill the gap that had by then appeared. If I am right in thinking that the House would approve the report, what on earth is the point of a huge gap between now and then in producing it? We would end up with precisely the same plans that we have for the growth and retraining of the Territorial Army. I am not convinced that the pause that the new clause would write into legislation would necessarily help the situation.
We are all deeply concerned about what is happening, and I very much hope that we will not be back in the Chamber in five or 10 years expressing our regret about it, although I have a horrible feeling that we might be. However, I am by no means convinced that the new clause is the solution to our concerns. I pledge to give my right hon. Friends on the Front Bench as hard a time as I possibly can—probably even a harder time than I gave the Government when we were in opposition—in the Select Committee and in this Chamber, but I am not convinced that writing these concerns into legislation is the right thing to do. I therefore have to disappoint my hon. Friend and tell him that, despite having put my name to his new clause, I shall be unable to support him in the Lobby.
If the hon. Gentleman had not been absent, he would have heard the great deal of discussion that took place about the priority of defence in the nation’s schedule of priorities. If he had made that bogus, so-called point of order having been here, I would have had some time for him, but given that he did not even have the courtesy to listen to the debate before making it, it was unworthy.
The reality is that a nation gets the defence forces it is prepared to pay for and it can decide what level of services it will fund—whether that involves cuts in the Army, the Royal Navy or the Royal Air Force that could be avoided.
The next question is whether this scheme for the reserves was linked to the proposed cut in the size of the Army. As I said, if this scheme had been put forward on its own, I could have wholeheartedly supported it, but it was not. It was specifically put forward as a compensating factor for the Army’s regular strength being reduced by 20,000. We were told that that reduction would be compensated for by the 30,000 increase in reserves. Now we are told that that linkage no longer exists. My hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire asked what we will do if we find that in fact the reserve scheme is not working. If I understood him correctly—I think I did—he said that, by the time we discovered that we were not going to get the 30,000 reservists, it would be too late to regenerate any of the loss in the 20,000 regulars. [Interruption.] He seems to be indicating that I have understood him correctly. If that is the case, I take great exception to the fact that this linkage was ever made in the first place.
If we are to be told that we have to accept cuts in this country’s defence capability, we should be told that honestly. We should not constantly be confronted with shifting goalposts. If the recruitment of 30,000 reservists may or may not be achieved, and if the 20,000 cut in regulars will happen nevertheless and is irreversible, we should have been told that at the outset. [Interruption.] Somebody says, “We were.” Who said that?
I totally agree with my hon. Friend, who I know has spent a lot of time looking at the issues. The point I am trying to address is whether that situation will be repeated in the future. Will this House have an appetite to commit troops with boots on the ground or will it say, “What has it got to do with us? We cannot guarantee that we will vote on it”? We have to be prepared and ask ourselves what it is that our armed forces—[Interruption.] If hon. Members want to intervene, they may do so.
Does my hon. Friend not realise that people such as me, who were very cynical before this debate but who have been persuaded by the argument that it would be wrong to put the target in legislation and have, therefore, moved towards the Government’s side, are now being persuaded by his argument in favour of a smaller Army, which is actually against what he is trying to achieve?
My hon. Friend misunderstands me. I am not saying we should have a smaller Army; I am saying we should have faith in building up reservist forces with the capability to meet the challenges of the future. As a regular, I believe that the regular forces could easily adapt and be used in various situations, but I also have faith, as a result of the models we have seen in America and, indeed, Australia, that other skills sets can be used and that we can build the Territorial Army to match our requirements, not just for the security of our country and the protection of our overseas territories, or because of our NATO commitments, but because the conduct of war itself has changed. We need to consider that.
As a consequence of withdrawing from Afghanistan, we do not have one entire brigade training to go there and another recuperating after being there. The size of our armed forces needs to concertina. The new model army and the Glorious Revolution have been mentioned, but what happened to that army after the revolution? It was disbanded completely. This House needs to be able—very quickly—to expand and contract the size of the armed forces and be willing to do so as needs change. I do not believe it is right to have a massive standing Army when we are still uncertain about what we want it to do.
That is why I do not believe that the proposal in new clause 3 would be the right thing to do, because it would put a pause on developing the TA. It would stop us recruiting and building up the capability that we would be able to use in all the scenarios mentioned today. I urge hon. and right hon. Members to think very carefully about the damage new clause 3 would do and the message it would send if they vote in favour of it. It would be dangerous for the armed forces and dangerous for the Reserves.
(10 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe project that my hon. Friend describes is exactly the sort of thing that will engage people locally. We have to understand that different people will approach the events in different ways. Our overarching aim is to improve understanding of the causes, conduct and consequences of the war, but we really need to do that in ways that people will find approachable and non-threatening. The initiative that he has described will be interesting and inspiring for many, and I certainly look forward to visiting it.
I am afraid that some of our more shouty newspapers are salivating at the prospect of the Government attempting a grotesque impersonation of Basil Fawlty, in which we do not mention the war for fear of upsetting Germany. Disappointingly for those newspapers, the history is untweaked by the Government and will remain so. We are indebted to Sunder Katwala of British Future for commissioning YouGov to inform us of public attitudes to the centenary. The survey found that 77% of the public see it as an opportunity for reconciliation with former enemies. We know from comments made by Harry Patch—the “last Tommy”—in the final years of his life that he would agree with that wholeheartedly. The history stands, but the Government will of course seek reconciliation not only with the former central powers but with partners in Europe and the former empire, wherever we share a complex and nuanced history.
In the context of Germany, will my hon. Friend pay particular attention to the large number of German prisoners of war who died as a result of their wounds while imprisoned in England? Many of them were re-buried in Staffordshire in the 1960s, but there are currently no headstones to commemorate them. Will he look into whether that could be corrected?
My hon. Friend makes an interesting point. Perhaps that is something that we could usefully raise with the German Government, with whom we are of course in contact on these matters, as he would expect. There are Germans interred in the churchyard of Sutton Veny in my constituency, and their resting places are instantly recognisable by the nature of their markers. That is a positive suggestion, and I think that matter could reasonably be addressed with Germany.
John Morris said that all history is local. If ever we should respect that saying, it is during the commemoration of the great war.
Last weekend, I was asked by Andrew Hillier and David Swidenbank to visit my local museum in Porthcawl because it is facing closure. They showed me around rooms full of uniforms and artefacts that they had collected in preparation for the commemoration of the war. Sadly, the local council is facing £36 million of cuts over the next two years. There will be cuts to school transport and other essential services. Unfortunately, the museum also faces closure. I hope that the Heritage Lottery Fund will come to the rescue and that that tragic loss to the community of Porthcawl and the history of south Wales will be avoided.
The other reason I visited the museum was that Ceri Joseph, who was taking a history walk that weekend, had often been in touch with me. My inbox is full of communications from Ceri, who has a passion for history that is reminiscent of an amateur detective. I have talked to her over many years about the names on the Porthcawl war memorial. She has spent months and years researching the stories and uncovering who the people on the war memorial were. In the words of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, she has brought them “in from the cold”. Some of them were local and some had relatives who lived locally. It is not necessarily just local people who are named on war memorials, because anybody could put a name forward. Some people appear on several war memorials. The names of some local people who died do not appear at all.
What the hon. Lady is describing strikes a chord with the work that is being done by my constituent Richard Broadhead to research the lost dead of the first world war. About 60 men from Wiltshire and no doubt many from south Wales died shortly after the end of the first world war of wounds and other causes associated with the war, but are not commemorated on war memorials or on Commonwealth War Graves Commission headstones. That is something we ought to correct.
I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman has seen the information that has been sent out by the war heritage all-party parliamentary group this week, which identifies where there are war graves in our constituencies, but I have found it very moving and extremely helpful. I was grateful to be able to pass that information on to my local history society. The museum intends to do a lot of work with schools, present exhibitions around the town, and put together a world war one trench so that people can get some idea of what local people and volunteers experienced.
Ceri also helped me personally with my family history. I have lived all my life with two faded photographs of Albert Edward Ironside, my grandfather. Apart from a small pocket diary written during active service in France and Belgium, I have his “Soldiers’ Small Book”, the two photographs, his will, and the King George memorial penny that was sent to the families of those who served and died on the front line. My grandfather was a member of the Royal Engineers and responsible for providing signals communication. Ceri and her husband plan to visit all the graves of those from Porthcawl who died, and they have generously offered also to visit my grandfather’s grave. I, too, have visited that grave, mainly because I wanted to take my son and so that my grandfather would somehow know that his life had carried on with four grandchildren and, to date, eight great-grandchildren and nine great-great-grandchildren—none of them mine so far.
The first world war was declared on 4 August 1914. My grandfather left his wife and son—my father, then aged 18 months—and went to Ireland in preparation for the war as part of the British Expeditionary Force. On Thursday 13 August he embarked on the SS Matheson, and arrived in Le Havre on 14 August. The next diary entries for the next few days record lots of rain and a unique experience of the first train journeys to the front:
“Station platforms were all crowded with people to see us go by. We got chocolate and cigarettes in galore and splendid reception.”
On 23 August he records:
“We rested for the day. The war commenced around here at 12 o’clock, the firing was terrible to stand all day and all night. We are about 2 miles from the firing line. Saw 2 German aeroplanes above our head.”
This was the start of the first battle of Mons, and in the next few days the British Army was in retreat. He records:
“Passed through Mons at Bavay stayed at Wwaso for a rest, we were exposed to shell fire for 3 hours before we retired. The shells fell in the town as we were leaving it. We had to leave everything behind us, cables and communications lines as we could not pick them up on account of the closeness of the Germans. We were lucky to get away at all.”
Then the diary jumps.
(10 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe reconfiguration of the Army, including the changing role of reservists and the changing structure of the Army, are not simply about trying to recruit reservists to replace disbanded infantry battalions. Most of the reservists we recruit will be specialists, rather than having a light infantry role. The White Paper that I published earlier this year set out a plan to reverse the long-term decline of the Army Reserve, redefining its role and setting out details of improved equipment, training, terms and conditions. Under the plan, we will grow the Army Reserve to a trained strength of 30,000 by 2018. I can also tell the House that, although it is still early days, a snapshot of data for the recruiting campaign that started on 16 September is quite positive. We received 1,576 applications to join the Army Reserve during the first four weeks of the campaign, and 380 were received last week. It is very early days, but those early signs are quite promising.
I congratulate the Secretary of State on the encouraging early signs in the recruiting campaign. There will come a time when it will become plain either that he will have achieved the Future Force 2020 ambition of replacing regular soldiers with reservists or that he has not done so and will have to change his plan. When will that date be?
The Army is in the final stages of setting out a properly thought-through recruiting target set, defining the number of recruits needed during each period of time in order to deliver the trained output required if we are to achieve our 2018 target. As soon as I have those data from the Army in final form, I will publish them. They will set our target curve, and I expect to be held to account if we go significantly off it.
(10 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberI must say to my hon. Friend, with the greatest respect, that he has confused training with deployment. There is no argument in the House about the fact that reservists will be cheaper; the question is, how much cheaper will they be? When costs are rising, do we enter the terrain of false economies—which brings into doubt the whole question of value for money and whether the plan should have been instigated in the first place? I was talking about training. There has been a dispute about whether it costs more to train a regular, but my hon. Friend should know from the Green Paper that it costs more to train a reservist.
However, this is not just about the bits of the jigsaw that we have seen. We know that there are hidden costs further down the line. According to a recent report by the charity Combat Stress, reservists are twice as likely to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder as regular troops. We may be storing up a ticking time bomb for ourselves. The necessary support structures for reservists are not in place, and I should be interested to know whether there are any proposals in that regard.
May I ask the Minister how much of the £1.8 billion—spread over 10 years—has been set aside for the Government’s plans? We are told that that money has been set aside and all is well, but there are various reports that some of it has already been eaten into. Has any of it been spent, and if so, how much?
While I am on the subject of costs, may I question the Minister about the impact assessment, which attempts to take an overall view of the costs? Again, we are dealing with assumptions and projected usage rates, and not all the figures are on the table, but I think we can all agree that the assessment is very dependent on projected usage rates. The way in which the reserve forces are used will depend on assumptions about future costs.
Artificially low rates can create false economies. The central case in the document seems to be based on an assumption of 3,000 annual deployments. I must ask the Minister whether that projection is realistic, given the original rationale of the reserve reforms. We are meant to be replacing 20,000 regular troops with 30,000 reservists. If the central projected use is 3,000, something is not adding up on the terrain. We need to examine the facts very carefully, because, again, we may be creating false economies and the taxpayer may be presented with a much larger bill than was originally envisaged.
As my hon. Friend knows, I strongly support those who are concerned about a capability gap, but I am slightly worried about some of the figures that he has given. For example, the figure relating to the higher cost of training a reservist is correct on a per-day basis, but it is not correct overall. What worries me is that, if Members give incorrect figures, the Government will very quickly knock them back. Let us stick to the main thrust, which is our fear that there will not be enough soldiers to fight in any future deployments that may take place.
I am indeed very worried about the possibility that we shall not have enough troops to deploy. I refer my hon. Friend to the Green Paper, which states that it costs more to train a reservist than to train a regular. However, he has made a valid point about the manpower gap, which I think is a central issue of concern. Will 30,000 reservists be enough, even if they can be recruited? According to figures from the Ministry of Defence, the present TA mobilisation rate is 40%. In other words, for every 100 TA soldiers on paper, 40 are deemed to be deployable at any one time. That suggests that if we are plugging a gap left by 20,000 regulars, we shall need 50,000 reservists, not 30,000.
In response to a letter sent to him a while ago by 25 Conservative Members, the Secretary of State suggested a mobilisation rate of 80%. He said:
“The total strength target for the Army Reserve in 2020 is 38,000, in order to deliver 30,000 trained reservists.
May I ask the Minister what research, what study, what evidence justifies the claim that the MOD’s budgets will double the mobilisation rate? It is one thing to recruit 30,000 reservists, but doubling the mobilisation rate as well would require an extremely large investment. Many of us would be interested to know what evidence supports the claim that the £1.8 billion that has been put aside will achieve both those objectives. It is a very, very tall order.
My hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Mr Clappison) raised the issue of the capability gap, and he was right to do so, because there is a fear that the Government plans risk creating such a gap. The Army reforms were put together before the strategic defence and security review, and since then a string of events have changed the international strategic dynamic. The nature of conflict is changing. Previously, it was thought of very much in binary terms—there would be one bloc against another bloc—but more fluid geopolitical forces are now at play, both state and non-state. War is becoming more asymmetrical, and we need well trained, agile, regular forces at high readiness if we are to meet the challenges that lie ahead. There is no disguising among the military their frustration about the fact that they could not have been more supportive to the French in Mali. The penny may have dropped on that side of the channel, but it has not yet dropped on this side.
I must ask the Minister whether 40 days’ training is really enough. Let us be absolutely clear about this: the Government’s plans represent a step-change in our approach. We are proposing to deploy whole units of reservists into the field. We have got to ask serious questions about this. Some would say, “Well, it happens in the US with the National Guard,” but it is, perhaps, not fully appreciated that the US National Guard has its own bases and its own equipment and training programmes. They take it very seriously in the US; they throw a lot of money at it, and even then the National Guard units are not infantry units. That is the interesting thing: the National Guard units are not infantry units, despite the investment the US puts into it.
The figure comes from someone who knows more about this than me; it is contained in the National Audit Office report of 2010. I have only six minutes to speak. I will happily debate the black hole in the accounts and the whole of the debt that the previous Government left to this Government, but that is not really why I want to take part in the debate. I wanted to do so to pay tribute to our Ministers. We have an excellent Minister who has served in the armed forces and we are lucky to have him serving in this Department.
The longer this debate has gone on, the more it has become clear to me that something is going wrong with the implementation of the Government’s plan. I speak on these matters as a layman. I do not have any gallant service of my own, but as a Conservative I take an interest in our armed forces and the strength of our defence. I am not remotely qualified to judge the merits of the plan, nor the size of the Army, although I have some sympathy with what the hon. Member for Colchester (Sir Bob Russell) said about the size of our armed forces. Least of all am I qualified to judge the relative capabilities and costs of reservists as against regular soldiers. However, there is clearly common ground emerging that something is going wrong with the recruitment of reservists. My hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr Brazier), who has played a distinguished role in this regard, described it as “uneven”. Perhaps the Minister can put me right, but it seems that initial reports are not uniformly optimistic about the recruitment of reserves to take the place of our regular forces.
Let me put to the Minister the case that has already been put in a very distinguished way by my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron). If there is a problem with the recruitment of reservists, and those reservists are needed to make up for the capability lost through the loss of the five regular battalions, surely the Government should look again at the question of disbanding those battalions.
I give way to my hon. Friend, who is much more distinguished in these matters than I am.
I am not even slightly distinguished. I very much agree with my hon. Friend about the risk of there being a capability gap. Does he agree that, while the MOD may well hope that the TA recruitment figures will improve, there must arrive a point at which it will become obvious that that is not going to occur? We might therefore want to hear from the Minister a date or a time at which the MOD might be ready to admit that the bold plan in “Future Army 2020” has not worked and will think again about regular units.
I hope that the Minister has heard my hon. Friend. If I may, I would put it even more strongly. My hon. Friend mentioned hope. I would say to the Minister that, if there is even an element of doubt about the recruitment of reservists, the Government should put these plans on hold and look again at the whole question of disbanding the regular battalions. In saying that, let me make it absolutely clear that I mean no disrespect at all to the excellent individuals who serve in our Territorial Army and to whom we owe the deepest debt of gratitude, not least for the way in which they have performed in Afghanistan.
This is simply a question of whether the implementation of the plans as they stand will give us the capability that we require. I very much hope that it will not be part of the Government’s thinking or policy to say, “Here we have a plan which should meet our capability needs, and will also save us costs, but even if it doesn’t meet our capability needs we will go ahead with it none the less.” That is not a position in which a Conservative-led Government should find themselves, and I am sure that they will not under the watchful custodianship of my right hon. Friend the Minister.
Let me say a few words about our Navy, which is also encompassed by the defence reforms. The previous Government’s strategic defence review in the late 1990s concluded that Britain required a fleet of 32 surface ships, destroyers and frigates, in order to fulfil its capability needs. Now we have a fleet of 19 surface ships in the form of frigates and destroyers. I know that these ships have greater capability than ever before, but I would be surprised if they had acquired a capability proportionate to the loss of numbers that has been experienced since the defence review in the late 1990s. Even as an amateur strategist, I can understand that, as the noble Lord West, a former Sea Lord, has helpfully pointed out, a ship can only be in one place at one time. I doubt that there are fewer threats in the world today than there were in the late 1990s and that the world has become a much safer place since the turn of the last century. While other nations are responding to the world as it is by increasing the number and capability of their surface fleet, we are seeing a diminution in ours.
The hon. Member for Colchester mentioned Waterloo. Helpfully, next Monday is Trafalgar day, which used to be celebrated nationally and is still celebrated in our Navy. I was interested to find out how many warships the British Navy had at the time of the battle of Trafalgar, and my rather amateur research unearthed a figure of 950 warships in 1805, so we may not have had a very big Army, as the hon. Gentleman said, but we certainly had a very good Navy.
It is a pleasure to speak in your first debate in the Chair, Madam Deputy Speaker.
I speak as a former Territorial Army soldier, first in the Honourable Artillery Company and then in the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. I served for about 12 years in total. A great-great uncle of mine lost his life as a member of the 25th Battalion the Royal Fusiliers during the German east African campaign of the first world war.
My understanding of the objective that the Government have set for the reserve forces and the Army Reserve in particular is that they need to capture 0.15% of the working-age population. I do not think that that target is beyond us, because many of our closest allies, such as America, Canada, New Zealand and Ireland, all manage to achieve significantly better than that. If our neighbouring countries and closest allies can achieve that, we should have faith in the volunteer ethic in British society. It is also important to remember that we will still have a larger proportion of regular forces in our total military than many of our closest allies.
I give way to my hon. Friend, who, like me, is a former HAC soldier.
No dissent from other Members, please.
I agree with the optimism and hope of my hon. Friend the Member for South West Bedfordshire (Andrew Selous) that we can recruit a first-class reserve army to play the role called for by Army 2020. However, does he agree that the statistics so far are extremely disappointing to say the least? Does he think we will reach a point during the next year or two when it will become obvious that we will not be able to achieve the Army 2020 targets and we will have to think again?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his point. I have one or two positive suggestions on how we might be able to improve recruitment, based on what has worked in the past. I also have every confidence that our colleagues on the Front Bench want and need this to work. They are not stupid and I am sure they will make the necessary adjustments, if needed.
At present there are 19,000 people in the Army Reserve and the Government want 30,000, an increase of 11,000. To put that in round terms, that will be fewer than 20 recruits per parliamentary constituency, although I do appreciate the point that has been made about the fact that the Army Reserve is becoming slightly more regional than local.
Employers will play an essential role in this process. It is really important that the National Employer Advisory Board and Support for Britain’s Reservists & Employers do their job well and properly. I also want chambers of commerce, the Federation of Small Businesses, the CBI and the Institute of Directors—all the employers’ groups—to get behind the need to recruit and retain more reserves.
When I first joined the Honourable Artillery Company as a young man, I was working in the Lloyd’s of London insurance market, which had a reserve forces association. Many young underwriters and brokers joined the reserve forces. There was significant employer buy-in. We could talk about our weekend’s training when we got back on Monday morning. It was a normal and natural thing to do. There is no reason why clusters of employers could not copy that model.
(10 years, 11 months ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Instead of the normal pleasantries of wishing you well in chairing the debate, Mr Walker, may I express my particular thanks? Owing to the peculiarity of parliamentary procedure, I was told that I was chairing the debate this morning, but it would have been difficult to be in the Chair and making my speech at the same time. I am therefore particularly grateful to you for taking my place at this early hour in the morning. I am also grateful to many colleagues for turning up to discuss this extremely important subject. Indeed, I extend my thanks to Mr Speaker—I do not know whether he selected the subject for debate or it came about in another way—for making the debate possible.
It is often said that the first duty of Government is the defence of the realm, and that is absolutely true. The first duty of Parliament is to examine what the Government are doing in defending the realm. Over 25 years, the armed forces parliamentary scheme has played a significant part in helping Members of Parliament from all parties to examine what the Government are doing. I emphasise “from all parties”, because it is important for the Opposition to have the opportunity to find out more about the armed forces through the scheme. Frankly, however, Government Back Benchers do not have easy access to the armed forces, so using the scheme as a way of finding out what our people are doing on the ground and finding out a little more about defence is an extraordinarily important thing for Back Benchers of all colours to do. I have put myself carefully in a Cross-Bench position at the end of the Chamber this morning to illustrate that this is in no sense a party political matter.
For 25 years, the armed forces parliamentary scheme has done a fantastic job in enabling Back Benchers—and, indeed, on many occasions, Front Benchers—from both sides of the House to embed themselves with our armed forces in the Army, Navy and Air Force, and to find out what is happening on the ground. They are finding out not necessarily about strategic matters or ground defence, but about how our boys and girls, as we often call the members of all three of our armed services, do their work on the ground.
We are honoured to be joined in the Chamber by the Conservative Chief Whip. Not so long ago, when he was briefly the shadow Defence Secretary, he joined us in the armed forces parliamentary scheme. It is nice that he has been able to find time to join us in the Chamber this morning.
For 25 years, the scheme has enabled an enormous number of people—265, if my counting is correct—to find out what happens to airmen, and soldiers and sailors of both sexes on the ground. There is a third level to the scheme in the Royal College of Defence Studies, where those who have graduated from the lower levels can find out more about the grand strategy and the bigger defence picture. Largely, however, the purpose of the scheme is to find out precisely what is happening on the ground.
None of that would be possible were it not for the imagination, initiative and management over 25 years of Sir Neil Thorne, ably supported by his excellent wife. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] The approbation around the Chamber confirms that everyone this morning wants me to thank him extremely sincerely for all the magnificent work that he has done in setting up the scheme and making it work. It is completely out of order, Mr Walker, to call attention to anyone in any gallery attached to the Chamber, and I would not wish to incur your wrath by doing so, but were there anyone in the Public Gallery who happened to have the name of Sir Neil Thorne, we would be happy that he happened to be here and most grateful for everything that he has done. It has been a magnificent scheme for 25 years.
The scheme has operated at four different levels—perhaps three in future—and 265 people in total have gone through it. In the introductory course, people learn a little about what the armed services are doing in general terms. There is also a postgraduate scheme, the advanced postgraduate scheme and the even more advanced postgraduate scheme, as well as a number of other schemes, all of which, I am glad to say—call me an anorak—I have very much enjoyed doing. My interest and involvement in defence have come about largely as a result of the scheme, so it has been a superb way of learning about what happens on the ground.
About a year or so ago, the Lord Speaker, Mr Speaker and the Secretary of State for Defence decided that it was time to do two things: to re-establish the scheme as a charitable trust; and to do so within Parliament. Happily, we have been able to do that over the past year or so. Last night, in Committee Room 14, we relaunched the scheme under a new name, the armed forces parliamentary trust. It is to be run by nine trustees: two appointed by Mr Speaker, namely the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Ms Stuart) and me; two from the House of Lords, who I think will be Lord Wakeham and Lord Rogan; two from the Ministry of Defence, Air Vice-Marshal David Murray and Sir Bill Jeffrey, the last but one permanent secretary; and two from industry, Helen Kennett of Rolls-Royce and Bob Keen of BAE Systems.
I am delighted that Sir Neil Thorne has agreed to become the ninth trustee and that, in response to an invitation from Mr Speaker, he has undertaken to become the life president of the scheme. We welcome Sir Neil’s continuing involvement and interest. In all, that is a good group of people to set up a charitable trust—a charitable incorporated organisation, which is a kind of mini-charity under the charity commissioners—which will be entirely within Parliament. Only last night, Mr Speaker told me that he has found accommodation in Parliament for our staff of one person, to whom I shall return. The scheme will be wholly accountable and transparent, with annual accounts, annual general meetings and the rest of it, as we must have in modern times.
Having taken part in the old scheme and expressed a number of concerns about its corporate governance, I am delighted that the Minister and the Speakers have overhauled the scheme. Will my hon. Friend confirm that the new trust is to be properly accountable? Will it allow pesky Back Benchers, such as me, to ask all sorts of pesky questions without getting chucked out of it? Will the role of any corporate contributors be clearly defined and constrained?
I am most grateful to my hon. Friend for his support. The answer to both his questions is yes, on one condition: that he commits to take part in the scheme. We would welcome his contribution—he will be the lowest of the low, the most junior private soldier that it is possible to imagine, and we will put him through an absolute beasting, but I am happy to give him that reassurance. He has been a mild critic over the years, so it is useful and kind of him to come to the Chamber to offer his support this morning.
My hon. Friend asked who would be paying for the scheme, and it is worth expanding on that. Traditionally, it has been paid for by the defence industry, and there have been four main sponsors. One of the things that I have been doing over the summer is going round all the defence companies, and I have now secured promises from at least 10 and possibly 15 of them—all the majors, such as Rolls-Royce, BAE Systems and Babcock, as well as others of a similar nature—each paying a small amount of funding, which will be sufficient to cover our anticipated costs.
The reason why that is a better arrangement is because, with 10 or 15 sponsors, we can say that none is achieving anything. Indeed, my pitch to them has been to say, “I would like some money from you, please.” They have asked, “What do we get back?” and I have replied, “You get absolutely nothing in return whatever. This is CSR—corporate social responsibility—for the defence industry. You get no lobbying, no access nor your name on writing paper, unless we choose to do so, but you get the warm feeling, Mr Rolls-Royce”—for example—“ of knowing that you have helped with the education of Members of Parliament.” All of them accepted that.
I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing the debate. Does he recognise that one of the benefits that may come to the defence industry by helping the scheme is that Members of Parliament will be significantly better informed about the industry and the issues faced by our armed forces day to day?
My hon. Friend makes an extremely good point. There have hardly been any defence debates or oral questions over the past 25 years in which hon. Members have not stood up and said, “Thanks to the armed forces parliamentary scheme, I know a little bit more about the armed forces. Therefore, the following question comes from my experience in the scheme.” My hon. Friend is absolutely right; the defence companies do not want anything directly in return, but it is good for them to know that there is a cadre of people in Parliament who understand defence, are interested in and sympathetic towards defence, and who have some kind of expertise when we consider broader defence matters in future. No lobbying is involved, but there are advantages for them in having a group of people who are more attuned to defence questions. That is how the sponsorship will work. Everything will be listed, declared and above board with minuted annual general meetings and so on. My hon. Friend can be reassured on that point.
The scheme will continue the movement started by Sir Neil Thorne over 25 years ago. We believe that the ethos he established of embedding Members of Parliament with the three armed services is right. Last week, I was happy to visit to RAF Brize Norton with other hon. Members, but we wore suits, we were VIP visitors and we did not get together with people on the ground or learn what they were doing. The whole ethos of the scheme is to be there as one of them and fully involved as an ordinary individual with people of all ranks.
It is important to maintain that ethos and to do so in a similar way, with visits of up to 20 or 22 days. The trustees are considering whether 15 days would be slightly easier, but broadly speaking the visits will remain the experience that hon. Members have enjoyed over the past 25 years or so, and they will no doubt tell us about it. I say “enjoyed” intentionally because the scheme is not only educational and helpful to our defence industry and to hon. Members in defence debates but good fun. That is key. The visits are fantastic fun, and it is important that that ethos continues.
We are continuing the movement, as the military say, rather than starting something brand new. The organisation is wonderful, but it needs a bit of change and thanks to what Mr Speaker, the Lord Speaker and the Secretary of State for Defence have asked us to do, we are continuing the movement under a new guise. The transition to the new scheme has been helped by the Minister, who has handled negotiations with great care and tact, for which I am most grateful. He had a useful group of civil servants behind him, particularly Mr Roy Brown and Ms Anna Platt in his private office, who were immensely helpful with the process. We should pay tribute to them, and we should also pay tribute to Sir Neil’s private staff, who have been much involved over the years. It is great to thank them for all that they have done.
We are close to establishing the new trust. As of yesterday, we appointed a chief executive or chief clerk, Major Johnny Longbottom, a Territorial Army officer who has had similar roles in the Ministry of Defence. He served for six months in Afghanistan and is well qualified and well suited in every way to be the new chief clerk or chief executive—we will decide on the title later. Mr Speaker has provided accommodation in Parliament; funding is on its way; our application to the Charity Commission to become a charitable incorporated organisation is in hand, and I hope that that will be done reasonably swiftly. Most of the necessary practicalities to establish the scheme in its new guise are in hand, and I very much hope that when the House returns in October the first course will be ready to go.
At a meeting last night, there were many applicants wanting to join the scheme. They can do so in any of the three services at a junior or senior level, or they can go to the Royal College of Defence Studies, although that course is full at the moment. We are ready to go as soon as the House returns in October, the first major event being a two-day course at Shrivenham from 11 to 13 November. We should be in a good position to get going swiftly.
Other hon. Members want to take part in the debate, so I will not detain the Chamber unduly, but it is worth reiterating that the scheme has done great work. During the post-war period, plenty of Members were ex-military and there was a strong military ethos in Parliament, but 25 years ago, Sir Neil Thorne correctly identified that that ethos had disappeared and that knowledge of the armed forces had declined significantly. He put that right by establishing the scheme, and the fact that we now have such a good understanding of the armed forces and defence in Parliament is largely due to its introduction.
We hope that we are facing a time when, after Afghanistan, we will have fewer deployments and fewer soldiers, sailors and airmen on operations for many years to come. Again, there is at least a risk that interest in and knowledge of our defence capability will decline in the next 20 years. I believe that the continuing armed forces parliamentary scheme will play an important role in maintaining interest in the armed forces even when we are not engaged in kinetic warfare around the world. We have as huge a role to play in the future as we had in the past.
We must thank Sir Neil for the past 25 years. Thanks to the initiative of the Secretary of State, Mr Speaker and the Lord Speaker, we are establishing the trust as a way forward so that in 25 years when we in this Chamber will, sadly, no longer be here, there will be another debate in this same Chamber saying how well the scheme has worked in the interim 25 years. I am most grateful to Sir Neil and to all who have been involved, and I look forward very much to the great honour of chairing the armed forces parliamentary trust in the years to come.
Mr Walker, as a master of parliamentary procedure, you will know that when participating in a debate, one is not supposed to refer to the presence of anyone outside the confines of the Chamber. However, I am sure that you will allow me to say what a pleasure it is to know that Sir Neil and Sheila Thorne are present today to hear all the wonderful tributes to them and, as I am sure they would be the first to acknowledge, to hear the tributes that must be made to the civilian and uniformed staff of the Ministry of Defence over 25 years for their huge efforts in arranging the visits from the armed forces’ side.
It is a real honour to make the last speech by a Back Bencher in a debate about a scheme that has been an unalloyed and phenomenal success for a quarter of a century. I am delighted that this is one of those debates in which one can honestly feel that one agrees with every sentiment expressed so far.
The scheme has many things to recommend it, and I will pick up one or two of them in the time available. Both the Labour members of the Defence Committee, the hon. Members for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney (Mr Havard) and for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Ms Stuart), referred to the sense of involvement in and participation with the armed forces, and to the difference between visits to the armed forces wearing their civilian suits as Committee members and wearing whatever variation of military uniform they have been privileged to wear on their scheme visits. I know that lawyers have been taking a close look at that, but I assure hon. Members that if we simply revert to being civilians visiting the military, something very precious will be lost from the scheme. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] I am delighted that colleagues are endorsing that with various signals, and I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (Mr Gray) will do so explicitly.
May I take the opportunity absolutely to reassure my hon. Friend that we most certainly will not return to civilian dress during those visits? There is a debate about exactly what we wear, when and how we wear it and the legalities, but he is absolutely right to say that appearing on visits in some form of dress appropriate to the occasion is definitely what the future will hold.
I could not have expected or desired a more reassuring comment.
I now look for a second reassuring comment. I will not get it immediately, but I am looking to my old Front-Bench colleague of many years’ standing on the former shadow defence team—he is now, thank goodness, the Minister—to address what one might call the issue of trust. The reason why the scheme has worked so well is that people have been given privileged access to members of the armed forces at every level. There has been, as it were, an unwritten understanding that that privilege would not be abused. When one considers the very large numbers of colleagues of all parties who have been through the scheme, it is remarkable that there have been hardly any cases—in the low single figures—of raised eyebrows about someone going on the scheme and immediately tabling a raft of hostile questions on the Floor of the House.
That excellent outcome is very different from what might have been predicted at the start of the process. As something of an amateur military historian, I look forward to the day when I can go to the National Archives at Kew and look for the file of correspondence that must exist relating to the period in which Sir Neil originally approached the Ministry of Defence to propose that MPs have direct informal access to all ranks of the armed forces.
(10 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberI think we have to be clear in these matters. The British Government can speak for what Britain will or will not do; other allies have to make their own decisions, and just as we have asked them to respect our political processes and constitutional norms, so we have to respect theirs as well.
T8. Parliament as a whole owes a huge debt of gratitude over 25 years to the armed forces parliamentary scheme and its founder, Sir Neil Thorne. Under your instructions, Mr Speaker, and those of the Lord Speaker and the Secretary of State, the scheme will be relaunched next Tuesday at 5 o’clock in Room 14 under new management, and I am glad that Sir Neil Thorne has agreed to become life president of the new scheme. Will the Minister recommit the assets and determination of the Ministry of Defence to the scheme, and ensure it takes forward this brilliant opportunity of educating parliamentarians about the ways of the armed forces?
Absolutely, and I congratulate my hon. Friend on becoming chairman of the trustees. I know he has put a lot of effort into that, and it will be a great success. I add my tribute to Sir Neil Thorne, who has done a wonderful job over more than a quarter of a century in bringing together this wonderful scheme which so many right hon. and hon. Members have participated in and benefited from. The Ministry of Defence values that highly and will, of course, commit resources to ensuring it is a success. I am sure the House will agree it is important that the scheme should evolve, and right hon. and hon. Members will want the sort of transparency and governance arrangements that have now been brought in. I am clear that under the guidance of my hon. Friend and parliamentary neighbour, the scheme will go from strength to strength.
(11 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberI can tell the hon. Lady that I have already done that. For example, the Territorial Army centre at Caernarfon is to close and I have looked at the distribution of the home addresses of TA members serving at that base. The nearest alternative base where they would be expected to go is at Colwyn Bay and, in fact, the majority of them live closer to Colwyn Bay than they do to Caernarfon. So we would expect the majority of them to continue to serve at the Colwyn Bay TA centre.
I have to explain to the House that when I said in my statement that some of these small units are significantly under-recruited, I was not overstating my case. We have TA centres with six or seven people enlisted at them, and we have one where the average attendance on training nights has been one over the past year. This is not just a question of the careful husbandry of resources; it is also a question of delivering the kind of training that we have promised members of the Army Reserve. We cannot deliver effective training unless we have a critical mass at the sub-unit level, and that is the driver of all the changes we are announcing today.
I warmly welcome many of the detailed announcements that the Secretary of State has made this afternoon about the way in which both regulars and civilians will be incentivised to join the TA and how employers—small and medium-sized enterprises, in particular—will be able to look after their employees. Nevertheless, is he not concerned that there will be a time gap between a large number of regular soldiers, sailors and airmen being made redundant, which is happening at the moment, and having the 30,000 fully trained TA members that he intends to have in place? What is he going to do about the time gap?
Of course, as my hon. Friend correctly presents, it will take us until 2018 to have achieved a 30,000-strong trained Army Reserve. We are seeking to capture as many ex-regulars leaving the regular service as we possibly can, and we expect that the £5,000 transfer bounty, together with the streamlining of the procedures for transfer from the regular to the reserve, will have a significant impact. He rightly says that there will not be a smooth trajectory between now and 2018—some of the measures we have to take will have short-term negative impacts before they deliver long-term positive gain—but we are clear that this is the right path to adopt.