Russian Drones: Violation of Polish Airspace

James Cartlidge Excerpts

Wednesday 10th September 2025 Commons Chamber

[James Cartlidge (South Suffolk) (Con)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the violation of Poland’s airspace by Russian drones.

[Mr Speaker]

Welcome to your new job, Minister.

[The Minister for the Armed Forces (Al Carns)]

This is my first UQ in the House, and this is a very serious topic to be discussing. Last night, as we know, Poland shot down multiple Russian drones that had entered its airspace. Poland stated that the drones were part of a co-ordinated Russian attack on targets across the border in Ukraine. The Ukrainians are subject to a barbaric attack every evening, but this is an unprecedented violation of Polish airspace; indeed, it went deep enough for Warsaw airport to be closed. I thank the Polish and NATO air defence forces for responding rapidly and effectively to protect the alliance. The areas affected were regions on the border of Belarus and Ukraine. Poland temporarily closed its airspace and some airports, and emergency alarms were issued for the regions affected, but airspace and most airports have now reopened.

Russia’s actions are absolutely and utterly reckless, unprecedented and dangerous. This serves to remind us of President Putin’s blatant disregard for peace, and of the constant bombardment that innocent Ukrainians face every day. In response, Poland’s Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, has announced that Poland will invoke NATO article 4, which allows any ally to consult others when it believes that its territorial integrity, political independence or security are threatened. The Prime Minister has been in contact with Prime Minister Tusk to make absolutely crystal clear the UK’s support for Poland, and that we will stand firm in our support for Ukraine. The Defence Secretary is meeting E5 counterparts today, and will discuss what additional support we can provide, including to reinforce Ukraine and strengthen NATO. We stand in full solidarity with our ally Poland.

We condemn this action. We say to Russia: “Your aggression only strengthens the unity of NATO nations. It only strengthens our solidarity in standing with and beside Ukraine. It reminds us that a secure Europe needs a strong Ukraine.” With our allies and partners, and through UK leadership of the coalition of the willing, we will continue to ramp up the pressure on Putin until there is a just and lasting peace.

[James Cartlidge]

Thank you, Mr Speaker, for granting this urgent question. May I begin by expressing our total solidarity with the people of Poland? The Opposition stand shoulder to shoulder with the Government in support of our strong NATO ally. Poland is a great nation, and a great friend of Britain. Our thoughts are with its people, and we fully support all efforts to rally our NATO allies and ensure that Poland’s invocation of article 4 is responded to as swiftly as possible. This is an unprecedented violation of Polish and NATO airspace that must be met with total condemnation and a robust response. So must the latest bombings of Ukraine, as Russia continues to target civilians and conduct an unprovoked war of aggression, without any regard for human life.

What, if any, judgment have the Government been able to form of the precise motivation for this drone incursion? If this was designed to test NATO’s resolve, will Putin not have already seen how strong the resolve is to stand united against this aggression? We understand that Dutch F-35s were directly involved in supporting the Polish military response, and that fighters from other NATO nations may have been scrambled. Is it not sobering that the F-35s from the Netherlands followed us in rotating air support for Poland, so if this incursion had occurred just weeks ago, RAF Typhoons could have been directly involved?

On the specifics of our joint NATO response, can the Minister say more about what invoking article 4 means in practical terms for the UK and our allies, and what the next steps are? Importantly, what discussions have the UK Government had with our US counterparts on these developments? Above all, given that this incident involved the use of lethal Russian drones against a fellow NATO member, what further steps are the Government now considering in order to constrain Russia’s ability to threaten our closest allies, and to provide further support to Poland? Finally, in the light of the Norway deal, the Minister will be aware that one of the largest ever defence export deals concluded under the previous Government was the sale of ground-based air defence to Poland. In the week of DSEI, does that not show why such industrial collaboration with our allies is important, not just economically, but when it comes to defending our close allies?

There are those who may question the nature of the Russian threat or the need to significantly increase defence spending, but these events should leave nobody in any doubt that the threat extends beyond Ukraine, and that we must therefore continue to stand shoulder to shoulder with Ukraine, Poland and all our NATO allies.

[Al Carns]

I thank the hon. Member for his response, and his bipartisan support on this really serious issue. What is NATO article 4? For clarity, article 4 is a consultation mechanism. If an ally perceives that its territorial integrity, political independence or security is threatened, it can invoke article 4. That is what Poland has done. Discussions will then take place in the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s senior political body, in which the UK will, of course, be involved.

I mentioned the status of the attacks. Poland stated that the drones were part of a co-ordinated Russian attack on targets across the border in Ukraine, but that does not in any way, shape or form excuse those attacks. They are an unprecedented violation of Polish airspace on an unprecedented scale.

I agree that our industrial collaboration with our allies and partners is essential, as we and NATO move forward, and as our partners and allies’ relationships move forward, to making sure that we are prepared in every way for an escalation, or an existential crisis, should it come.

In our response to Ukraine, we are doing a huge amount to lead our allies and partners. As we speak, the Secretary of State for Defence is with the E5, talking about the coalition of the willing, and he has talked to Polish representatives already. We are leading the way in that coalition—on its formation, structure and how it will deploy, should it need to, if peace ever comes to Ukraine.

Oral Answers to Questions

James Cartlidge Excerpts

Monday 8th September 2025 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Secretary of State.

[James Cartlidge (South Suffolk) (Con)]

I congratulate the hon. and gallant Member for North East Derbyshire (Louise Sandher-Jones) and the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard) on their promotions. I also send my best wishes to the right hon. Member for Liverpool Garston (Maria Eagle); it was always a pleasure to work with her.

On defence spending, can the Secretary of State confirm what percentage of GDP will be used to set the cost envelope for the defence investment plan?

[John Healey]

When we settle our defence investment plan and produce our annual report and accounts, the data that the hon. Gentleman seeks will be set out clearly and in the customary way to this House.

[James Cartlidge]

Interestingly, the answer is not 3.5%, it is not 3%, and it is not even 2.6%—those are the figures we declare to NATO; they are not from the Ministry of Defence budget. As the then armed forces Minister, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport, confirmed to me last week in a written answer, the amount we will spend on the defence investment plan comes entirely from the MOD’s departmental budget. Therefore, the actual figure for funding our future defence equipment is just 2.2% by 2027, with no funded plans to go any higher. Given the threats we face, is 2.2% enough?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Secretary of State.

[James Cartlidge (South Suffolk) (Con)]

Does the Secretary of State agree that recruitment to the armed forces must be based solely on merit?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Louise Sandher-Jones)]

We must recruit the absolute best to serve in the armed forces. As the hon. Gentleman will know, an intelligent strategy for recruitment will seek to reach every single community across these British isles. Perpetuating a narrative that women and those from ethnic minorities—many of whom have proven time and again on service that they absolutely deserve to be a part of our armed forces—are recruited because of some woke policy does them a huge disservice.

[James Cartlidge]

I totally agree, but is that not why we should be concerned that the contract for the new armed forces recruitment service

“includes Annual Mandated Performance Indicators focused on enhancing equality and diversity within the workforce”?

Those are to be annually mandated in the contract. My concern is that hardwiring the requirements into the contract risks distorting recruitment if the targets are not hit; we saw that with the RAF. Would it not be better to simply scrap the red tape altogether and focus solely on getting the best people into the armed forces, irrespective of their background?

[Louise Sandher-Jones]

I think the hon. Member has answered his own question. We are talking about indicators, and indicators are very different from targets. An intelligent recruitment strategy seeks to reach out to all communities across these islands, and we need to monitor how well our narratives are succeeding. If we are to have a truly professional strategy, we have to monitor its success in reaching different communities. That is why we refer to an indicator.

Defence Industrial Strategy

James Cartlidge Excerpts

Monday 8th September 2025 Commons Chamber

[James Cartlidge (South Suffolk) (Con)]

I am grateful to the Minister for early sight of both his statement and the hard copy document. Before I respond to the statement, may I express on behalf of the Opposition our wholehearted condemnation of the latest drone attack on Kyiv, the largest of the war, with small children among the dead? It is a reminder of why we need to step up and rearm at pace and scale, to strengthen our deterrence in a dangerous world.

The strategy’s statement of intent, published last December stated:

“The Defence Industrial Strategy will be developed at pace...and will be published in late Spring 2025”.

It is now autumn—it has been delayed when we need real pace from the Government, and that is part of a pattern. Some 26 times Ministers promised on the Floor of the House that the strategic defence review would be published in the spring, but it was published in the summer. The defence housing strategy was promised for the summer, and we now understand that it will be published as late as the Christmas recess. Can the Minister guarantee that the defence industrial policy will be published this year?

It is not just Labour’s reviews that are being published far later than promised. The SDR promised that a National armaments director would be in place from 1 April 2025. On page 6, and as the Minister just said, the defence industrial strategy states that

“we have created the role of National armaments director”.

If the Government have created the role, could they kindly tell us the name? Is Andy Start the interim NAD, or is he the new permanent empowered NAD? If so, is he on his previous salary, or the much higher one for the new role? Key appointments and strategies—months late. War is changing rapidly, but Labour is moving far too slowly.

On the contents of the defence industrial strategy, we welcome further measures to boost the skills base of our defence sector. While we will wait to see the full details of the growth deals, we strongly share the Government’s goal of spreading the prosperity benefits of defence around the United Kingdom. Can the Minister tell us when those will be up and running, and whether the £250 million investment represents new money that was not previously included in the MOD budget? I also welcome measures to boost defence exports, not least establishing a real Government-to-Government offer, and restoring the defence export team back into the MOD—that is something I was working on, and I am glad the Government are implementing it.

Our main concern about the strategy is that it lacks the ambition to fire up our defence industrial base at the scale and pace required, at a time when the threats we face are so stark. The blunt reality is that, for all Labour’s talk, actual procurement has been largely on hold since the election, with the now notorious written answer confirming in spring that the Government had purchased just three new drones since the election last July. Quite simply, they need to start signing actual capability contracts. Thousands of jobs are at stake in some of those major procurements that were meant to have been resolved in the SDR, but on which we still await a decision.

For example, on Friday I had the pleasure to visit Leonardo in Yeovil, the cornerstone of UK military rotary. It is clear that the New Medium Helicopter procurement is critical to its future. When I announced the NMH competition, I deliberately strengthened tender scoring to support defence jobs here in the UK. Are the Government still committed to NMH? If so, when will they give the green light? We hope that will be at the Defence and Security Equipment International. For that matter, when will we see further progress on Skynet, the Red Arrows replacement, M270 artillery and the many other key decisions that the industry is waiting on?

We want to see pace in procurement, not endless dithering and delay. However, we all know the reason why the waiting goes on for so many UK defence companies, large and small: the Government have not prioritised boosting defence spending meaningfully in the near term. Instead, they use smoke and mirrors to inflate what appears to be going into the MOD. For example, the Government reclassified the intelligence budget into defence, so that they can claim to be spending 2.6% by 2027, when the reality is that the MOD budget—that which actually funds the equipment plan—will be equivalent to only 2.2% of GDP in that same year.

While key procurement decisions continue to be put off, tomorrow Labour will plough on as fast as possible with surrendering sovereignty of our critical defence base on Diego Garcia at a cost of £35 billion. The first payment is of £250 million next year and I can safely say that, instead of giving that to the Government of Mauritius, we would spend the money on rapid procurement of drones and counter-drone tech for the British Army from our brilliant British defence SMEs.

That is what we wanted to see from today’s strategy—the delivery of a strong, sovereign drone industrial base, and the same for space, rotary, military vehicles and so many others, as well as artificial intelligence and tech. Warm words delivered late are not enough. We need to see a real-world ramping up of the defence industrial base, with serious investment and not smoke and mirrors, the prioritisation of UK defence companies, and a rapid boost in our ability to deter the rising threats we face.

[Luke Pollard]

I think the shadow Defence Secretary really wanted to welcome this strategy, but is finding it difficult, because the politics have got in the way. I will deal with some of that, but first let me say that I am grateful to him for his words about the attack in Kyiv. It is so important that, although we may disagree about some things across this House, there is strong cross-party support against Putin’s illegal invasion. That must never wane.

I suggest politely to the hon. Gentleman that the mess in defence procurement that we inherited was one that he was in charge of when he was in government. It is, therefore, a bit cheeky of him—though, generally speaking, I like cheekiness—to raise these questions. The platforms that he asked about should have been sorted out under his Government, but never were. He knows for sure that our investments will be in the defence investment plan we will publish later this year. He also knows that for the national armaments director, recruitment is well advanced—we have appointed Andy Start as the interim NAD, but it is important that we get the right person for the role. We will continue that process. The shadow Secretary of State also asked about defence growth deals, and that is new money. He also knows that we have signed 900 deals for defence procurement contracts since the election. We will sign more on the back of the defence investment plan later this year.

The hon. Gentleman also accuses us of dithering and delay, but I fear that that is political projection from the failures of his time in government. We have a clear increase in defence spending and a clear strategy published today that directs that increased defence budget at British companies, that backs British SMEs and that creates the skills that our industry needs. I know that he wants to back it. I know that he is passionate about drones, which is why I know that he will back our doubling of funding for drones and autonomous systems in the SDR. I say to him politely: this is a huge opportunity for British businesses up and down the country, in every single nation and region of our land, and the strategy sets out the objectives and opportunities. I hope that, on reflection, he will be able to welcome the strategy thoroughly and to give it full-hearted support, because our industry deserves the support of this House. It has the support of this Labour Government, and we will continue to increase defence spending, directing more of it at British businesses.

Use of Drones in Defence

James Cartlidge Excerpts

Wednesday 3rd September 2025 Westminster Hall

[James Cartlidge (South Suffolk) (Con)]

It is a real pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Lewell. I know you take a great interest in these matters because you served on the Defence Committee when I was a Minister, and I am sure you regard this debate with great interest.

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Biggin Hill (Peter Fortune) on introducing this debate, because the issue of drones is so timely, interesting and, I dare say, urgent for defence procurement, defence training and all aspects of defence. He made a brilliant speech. It was not only delivered well but made some important and substantive points on, for example, countering drones, which should be considered as important in this debate as the acquisition of our own strike-reconnaissance capabilities and so on. I am pleased that we have the Veterans Minister here, and I know he is also very passionate about this subject.

I quickly say, especially as the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) is here, that people are still the most important capability, despite everything we will say in this debate. I hope he will be as robust as possible in standing up for our veterans in the weeks ahead, because this stuff will come to a head. All of us who care about the British armed forces have to stand by those who served all those years ago, so that we do not undermine the morale of those who serve today.

On the key subject of drones, my main argument is that they are an amazing opportunity for the United Kingdom to fundamentally modernise its armed forces in a way we have not done for a long time. In many ways, we are quite lucky, because drones bring mass and lethality to our existing forces relatively cheaply and relatively quickly. Above all, and this is underestimated, we are in an amazing position to capitalise on that in many ways, for reasons that have not been fully shared with the public. I will now try to do that.

The day I became Defence Procurement Minister in April 2023, there was a vote in the House of Commons. People came up to congratulate me as I walked through the Lobby, and every other colleague said, “By the way, you’ve got Ajax,” which is what defence procurement was known for at the time. Two months later, I made a statement to the House about Ajax resuming field training with the Army and the Household Cavalry, and how it is a highly capable vehicle.

However, I had a sense, as Defence Procurement Minister, that there was a parallel universe. There was business as usual, with long procurement times and many delays under successive Governments—the old way. On the other hand, there was what we were doing in the MOD for Ukraine. It was like a parallel universe. We acted at pace for Ukraine with incredible scale and innovation. We got thousands and thousands of shells from around the world and delivered them to Ukraine. It was an incredible exercise, of which I am very proud. I am also very proud that the current Government have continued it.

Nowhere was this difference more striking than in drones. I would not quite call it an epiphany—I do not know the right word—but my most memorable moment as Defence Procurement Minister came in the autumn of 2023, when I visited an SME in the south of England. It had developed a drone—at the time it was highly sensitive, dare I say classified—that went on to be used in Ukraine. It was a highly effective long-range, one-way attack drone, now a matter of public record. This SME, not a big prime, had developed a drone relatively cheaply and very quickly, and it made an impact on the frontline against a peer military of Europe.

That was extraordinary. Revolutionary. I was so struck by it, but what really got me—the thing that is most important about the uncrewed area—is that the SME was getting feedback from the frontline within days, if not hours. It was using that feedback to immediately upgrade the capability by changing various important but relatively subtle parameters. I was immersed, as all Defence Procurement Ministers are, in the endless emails about delays to the latest big platform, or whatever it was, so I was struck that there is a different way.

What did I do about it? As my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty) and the hon. Member for Strangford said, I launched the drone strategy in February 2024. It was relatively simple. The Secretary of State always says it was only 12 pages, but the truth is that it was a lot shorter when it was first presented to me. I was pretty furious about that, because to me drones are a fundamental part of defence. The key point is that I wanted it to reverse the sense of living in a parallel universe. I wanted us to embrace what we were doing for Ukraine so that our armed forces could benefit in the same way. It is simple to summarise the strategy: to continue delivering drones at scale for Ukraine—thousands of them, as we did and as the current Government have done—but, in parallel, to develop our own SME drone ecosystem for the British armed forces. That is what I wanted to do.

In February 2024, I also announced the integrated procurement model, which I am very grateful that you mentioned in the recent Defence Committee debate, Ms Lewell. The key thing is that it was also relatively straightforward. Instead of these very long development times for new equipment, it is about setting minimum deployable capability—to get things into use as quickly as possible, where they can be used if the balloon goes up, to put it bluntly—and then to develop them spirally in service. That is how the modern world works, and it is how software companies have always sought to work: get it going, and then constantly upgrade. That is the only way to keep pace with technology. That procurement model went live in April 2024, and the general election was called in May, so it is fair to say that there was not a huge amount of time to introduce some of it, but we made some progress.

I now want to talk about some key points about how to ensure that the UK seizes this opportunity so that our armed forces are world leaders in the use of drones. The first point is the most important. This has not been a political debate, and I am not trying to play party politics, but I have also been a Treasury Minister. When I was the Minister for Defence Procurement, I was in all the discussions about how to get to 2.5%, so I know what it is like to deal with the Treasury. What happened is that when the new Government came in—they are not the first to do this—the Treasury put a clamp on procurement as a way of controlling in-year budgets. It is very common. The Treasury frequently tried to do it with us, but Ben Wallace and Grant Shapps, the Secretaries of State, always pushed back. I tried to work with the Treasury to find compromises and to prioritise the procurements that were most important to the Department.

The consequence is that, for months, there has been an effective procurement freeze. Defence companies tell us that they are waiting and waiting. They were waiting for the SDR, and now they are waiting for the defence investment plan, which will put in place the decisions of the SDR. They have been waiting for the defence industrial strategy. They have been waiting for the appointment of a national armaments director, who will come in as a great white knight and solve all these problems. By the way, when the problems are really tough, the companies will turn around to the Defence Procurement Minister, who earns about a thirtieth of what they do, and ask them to solve it because it is political, which it always ends up being.

In the meantime, we need to get on with it, so let me suggest an idea. My hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Biggin Hill said that when we tabled a written question asking how many drones have been ordered since the general election, we were told three, which is extraordinary. When I raised the matter with the Secretary of State, he said that it was a specific answer to a specific question. It certainly is, but it is still fairly shocking. What we have found, particularly when we talk to those in the Army, is that there are drones coming into their units, but they are, for example, through sports—they do drone sports. There is not yet a central push to transform the forces to fight with uncrewed systems.

So where could we get the money? My personal view is that the Chagos deal is basically bonkers. Next year, we as a country will spend £250 million leasing back a base that we currently own freehold—the islands too, of course. Half that budget could transform the UK drone ecosystem, because tens of millions of pounds would make a difference.

There is one risk: how do we buy drones when, in theory, they go out of date so quickly? There is no risk to what I would call a training order. We should buy enough drones from British companies so that the Army can start training with them at scale. But the crucial thing is not the manufacture or the initial buy; it is establishing the relationship between our forces and those SMEs so that they are constantly developing them in service. That is how new technology works. That is a relatively inexpensive step to take; it just needs leadership, and I know the Minister wants to make it happen.

Another key point is testing. In June 2023—two months after I became Defence Procurement Minister— I held a roundtable in Larkhill with what were then the main UK defence drone SMEs. It was a really fascinating meeting. I went round the table and said to all of them, “Name the one thing the Government could do to help you,” and they all came up with the acronyms CAA and MAA—in other words, the Civil Aviation Authority and the Military Aviation Authority. They all wanted it to be easier to test drones, particularly kinetic drones, in the UK.

I was encouraged recently when I attended the Royal International Air Tattoo and was told by a relatively senior military officer that there will be testing on the Outer Hebrides range—in Benbecula, I think, which I visited when I was a Minister—for firing what are still dummy drones, but testing them as far as we can in the UK. I fully accept that there is a limit to how we can test, particularly if the drones have explosives, but we have to be able to test more than we currently do.

It is not just testing for the SMEs. My team met some reservists recently who talked about the red tape and what they have to fill in even to be able to use a reconnaissance drone for Army training. As is so often the case in the MOD, others will assure us, “It’s all fine, Minister.” On the MAA and the CAA—we set up a working group with the Department for Transport—I remember being told, “Minister, it’s all sorted. It’s all fine,” but then the SMEs told me something different. We have to grip this competition because we want to win it and it is vital to our prosperity.

Colleagues talked about training. The hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell (Helen Maguire) made a very good point about making drone use part of regular training. This is not so much my area of expertise. The Minister obviously has great expertise in this area, and I hope he will touch on how we are bringing forward training in the use of drones at a unit level.

My hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon, having served in the infantry, obviously speaks with massive experience. He made the point that we need an Army that can fight with these things. It is all well and good talking about procurement, which is the side I have seen, but how do we get them into the Army to rapidly boost its lethality and survivability? That is what we all want to see, and it is what the new head of the Army, the Chief of the General Staff, will deliver.

My hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon raised an important point about GCAP. When I worked on GCAP as a Minister, it was primarily on the diplomatic side. [Interruption.] The roof is creaking slightly. Hopefully that is merely the power of my oratory and rhetoric, and nothing to be concerned about.

On GCAP, I will refer to a couple of points I made last September when we were invited to make submissions to the SDR. At the time, I was merely the interim shadow Defence Secretary while my party awaited a new leader. I do not know if anyone read our submissions—I think AI read a lot of the submissions—but my two points are still worth considering.

First, instead of focusing on 10-year equipment plans, which would become the defence investment plan, we need much more focus on a three-year war readiness plan in each of the forces. That is something that the Chief of the General Staff has, in effect, been talking about. If that were done with the RAF, it would be much harder for it to meld all the elements of GCAP into one. The other point I made is that we really need a two-pillar GCAP—a bit like AUKUS.

The first pillar is the platform, which is where the focus inevitably always is in defence—that is the old, platform-focused procurement model. Instead, we should have a second pillar with all the ancillary stuff. That would include, as my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon said, the “system of systems,” particularly electronic warfare capability and drones. That needs to come into service much faster.

The key thing to all of this is the threat. If the threat really is only two or three years away, we have to be stronger in two or three years. The aspects of RAF development that are to do with loyal wingman are about helping our current aircraft. Forget about the stuff that will arrive in 2040, important though that is; it is about the capabilities that can help the current Typhoon fleet and the F-35s to be even more lethal and capable. We know that drones can fly with them. We need to accelerate all of that.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Biggin Hill made an important point about the Red sea, which has also been a key testing ground for drones. The key point is that the drones were not only threatening Ukraine; they were threatening our own Royal Navy. HMS Diamond was attacked. As a Minister at the time, I had a real sense that this was a clear and present danger because the drone attacks had to be thwarted with much more expensive missiles, which is the key issue.

However, we know that Iran was supplying more and more sophisticated ballistic missiles to the Houthis. That is on public record. How could we defend against all those things? I therefore felt we needed to accelerate all ranges of technology that could help to intercept drones relatively cheaply, so that we could keep our missile stocks for the really exquisite threats. We need a balance between expensive and cheap capabilities, which is why DragonFire is a good example of something we should take forward.

All Members have focused on the counter-drone point. I cannot think of a better symbol of the parallel universe—the way we have delivered for Ukraine but not for our own armed forces—than the fact that, if we visit the Army today, its electronic countermeasures will be the box that was used in Afghanistan. That was very good at the time, but it is not up to date. Nevertheless, a British company has been delivering, in real time, countermeasure kits to Ukraine that have been incredibly successful and are saving lives on a real frontline. We should be buying those for our Army at the same time. That is why I say it feels like a parallel universe, which is what we need to break. I know the Minister understands that and is as passionate about it as I am.

The hon. Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross (Jamie Stone) spoke about how to defend against the drone threat, and he particularly spoke about armour. My hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon spoke about tanks and the need to protect their tracks. I do not have that level of battlefield experience, but it is true to say that we must move quickly on lasers, directed energy weapons and, particularly, sound weapons that use radio frequencies—they are currently a bit indiscriminate, but they have a lot of potential if they are refined. We have to go at these things as fast as possible. Britain has an amazing science base.

That brings me to my final point, which is about autonomy. This is really about technology and the need to outthink one’s opponent, as much as anything. If we are honest, we will never have every aspect of every drone made in the UK. The areas where we really need to lead are the brain—the science. Britain has an amazing science base. I always found the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory’s advice fascinating. The DSTL has huge experience and works well with the military. We could go further on the way in which DSTL and the defence science base link in with SMEs. There has been a lot of progress on that, but we can go further. Going back to the drone I was talking about, the company was successful because its link to the data really gave it the edge. That is what we have to do: we have to enable SMEs to come into Main Building or other secure environments and to be constantly fed the battlefield data—what is really happening in warfare—so that they can respond quickly.

This is really about autonomy. The hon. Member for Poplar and Limehouse (Apsana Begum) spoke about the situation in Gaza. I know that there are people who are worried about the ethics of the autonomous use of weapons, and I understand that. I appeared before the AI in Weapons Systems Committee in the House of Lords, where the Bishop of Coventry asked me some interesting questions about the ethics of all this. I would simply say—okay, this is a defence point of view—that we should be very wary of in any way tying our hands on the use of autonomy, because you can bet your bottom dollar that the Chinese and the Russians will not be doing that. We have to maintain our ability to compete with them.

Phalanx is the gun on the side of some of our ships. When it is on, it is effectively autonomous. If something flies into its sight that fits certain parameters, it will fire. No one presses a button. The point, though, is that there is a chain of command and a way back that will have been built by someone from a country with a democracy and so on. So it is the whole life cycle that we have to take into account. We should really invest in autonomy. We should back our science base, working closely with our SMEs.

I finish by saying to the Minister that we are all patriots here. We want to succeed. We want to have the world’s best armed forces. We want to lead in this. We know we can. We have done amazing things. When we supply Storm Shadows and leading drones to Ukraine, we are going to know a bit about how to use them. We have never been directly involved, but we have done so much that we are well placed to learn from it. I hope the Minister can drive this forward. He knows he has our backing in doing so, but we need to see greater pace and urgency and, ultimately, not just big defence documents, but kit in the hands of those who serve our country.

[The Minister for Veterans and People (Al Carns)]

I am truly grateful to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell. I thank the hon. Member for Bromley and Biggin Hill (Peter Fortune) for securing the debate—I genuinely believe that we are at a pivotal time, so having it today is poignant. The opportunity to discuss the critical importance of uncrewed systems to our armed forces and our national security is a continual requirement in this place.

It will not be lost on hon. Members that I am not the Minister for Defence Procurement, but I have a vested interest in this subject. I have been helping a cross-ministerial team to design our strategy as we move forward. Why am I passionate about this issue? Mentioned in dispatches, combat; Military Cross, combat; Distinguished Service Order, combat; OBE, combat—I spent a lot of time in combat. What we are seeing now in Ukraine gives the soldier, the airman or the sailor the ability to disengage from combat and to send technology forward. We are seeing a revolution in technological affairs in Ukraine, and it is of the utmost importance.

The devastation and horror of war provide an imperative for rapid innovation. Each side pitted, racing to gain decisive advantage by innovating faster than the other. These developments define an era of conflict and innovation. Think the Parthian shot, the longbow, the crossbow, the musket, the tank, the aeroplane and, as the hon. Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross (Jamie Stone) mentioned, the Dreadnought. They have all marked a pivotal moment in technological change. Today, I would argue that it is uncrewed systems. The lesson for the UK is that we must be a leader in the revolution in uncrewed systems—which has not changed the nature of conflict, as Clausewitz would say, but changed its character forever—or be left behind.

In no small part, this understanding motivated me to enter politics, and it was one of the key reasons I left the military: to galvanise change and to do what I could to safeguard this great nation, because I saw war changing the entire character of conflict itself. Today’s discussion addresses an existential challenge, which this Government, the Defence team, and I are absolutely determined to grip.

Uncrewed systems have fundamentally changed the character of conflict—fact. In Ukraine, thousands of drones fill the skies every day and night. On average, thousands of drones a day—up to 2,000 or 3,000, and, at the very height, 6,000—are being flown on the frontline. A division has hundreds of drones that observe every section of the battlefield 24/7 and cue strike platforms at a moment’s notice. Drones are 22 times more lethal and accurate than an artillery round. For the first time since the first world war, more casualties have been caused by a system other than artillery or offensive support—that is, drones. Not training our people in drones would be like not training our people in artillery prior to the first world war.

A year ago, I was quoted as saying that uncrewed systems represent

“a machine gun moment for the Army, a submarine moment for the Navy and a jet engine moment for the Air Force.”

I also said that the inclusion of data, AI and quantum would only deepen the effects of this revolution. I would say now, one year later, that we are at an inflection point similar to the moment when armies fighting in world war one realised the utility of airpower. We know what happened then: the “Top Gun” generation was born, and airpower changed every nation’s way of fighting.

We are approaching the 85th anniversary of the battle of Britain, which is a poignant reminder of the significant impact of cutting-edge technology, such as the Spitfire, radar, importantly, or our very first computers, on the defence of our nation. Unlike those previous advances, the impact of uncrewed systems across air, land and sea is simultaneous, undermining many existing, exquisite and expensive capabilities.

As I reflect over 24 years of military service, I recognise just how much of what I did could now be done by uncrewed systems. I mean that, because about 75% of everything I have done could be done by uncrewed systems. That would have made my life a lot safer, although it would probably have reduced the medal count.

We have seen this revolution shape Putin’s war of aggression. On land, surveillance and attack drones stalk the battlefield around the clock. Thousands of drones, whether FPV—first-person-view—drones, surveillance drones or long-range strike drones, dominate the battlefield. There is a dead zone on the frontline, about 30 km deep, where no one moves: small teams or individuals are the only ones who survive, and they do not survive for long. Interestingly—the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty) mentioned tanks earlier—tanks’ sustainability on the battlefield is limited. Not K-kills but M-kills—mobility kills, taking off the tank’s tracks, immobilising its engine, or immobilising the crew, the sights and the sensors—happen relatively quickly. Perhaps we can allude to what that will look like in the future later in the debate.

In the Black sea, we have seen a navy without a navy sink a navy—that is, Ukraine’s unmanned vessels have sunk or scattered Russia’s once all-powerful Black sea fleet.

[James Cartlidge]

The Minister is making a fascinating speech, and he knows that I am as interested in this subject as anyone. On the naval point, it was an incredible moment in May when a Ukrainian naval drone downed a Russian Su-30, I think. Does that not point to some of our looming procurements—for example, future air dominance, the Type 83, and all those things in the Navy’s assumptions about how we defend this island in the future? We are an island, so the potential for us to be protected by uncrewed barges and sensors carrying effectors way out in our ocean is an exciting development.

--- Later in debate ---

[Al Carns]

It is a combination of the two. Yes, it is a machine gun moment for the Army, but it is also an Air Force moment for the whole military, so we need careful consideration of how we will integrate this. The Ukrainians, for example, have combat companies who will fly 150 FPV drone strikes a day. They will do that with separate teams flying in support of infantry, much as we would have had close air support in the past. A drone team may fly 50 drone missions a day with 80% lethality and accuracy.

I will leave it to the generals, the admirals and the air vice-marshals to work out how they integrate the system. However, it must be integrated at the section and infantry level all the way to the division level in the Army; from the single ship all the way to the fleet level in the Navy; and from the single aircraft, if not major drone, all the way to fighting formations in the Air Force. That is the level of integration that will be required—it is pretty seismic.

We talked earlier about the high-low end mix. We will help to deliver Europe’s first hybrid carrier air wing. The hon. Member for Huntingdon mentioned, and I agree, that GCAP and the loyal wingman programme are sophisticated capabilities, but there is nothing to say that it is not—no pun intended—a Russian doll method where something releases something smaller that becomes more attritable and more mass-produced. That is probably where we are going with many of these systems.

We are also enhancing our uncrewed naval platforms. The patrol of the north Atlantic, protecting our continuous at-sea deterrent can adopt some of that technology. We will also, as the hon. Member mentioned, move towards a 20:40:40 capability mix for the British Army, which I think is essential, as is being proven in Ukraine at the moment. As he mentioned, that is 20% crewed, 40% reusable and 40% disposable uncrewed systems. I would like to see a lot of those drones used as ammunition so that, much as we would have down the range with a magazine and 30 rounds of ammunition, we should be able to go down the range with 10 drones, fly them down, use them, get proficient in that and ensure that we are as accurate and lethal with a drone as we are with a rifle, if not more so.

It is a move to help deliver our goal of increasing the Army’s lethality tenfold. I argue that we need to move on that as fast as is feasible. The critical component is our partnership with industry, and not just the big primes but SMEs are key to delivering those ambitions. That is why we have established UK Defence Innovation to connect with investors and get those SMEs, innovators and start-ups able to break into the defence market, which we know has been a problem in the past. That will ensure that we can rapidly identify and back innovative products that will give us a military, and indeed an economic, edge.

To integrate these new technologies across three military services—I think this is the critical component—we are creating an uncrewed centre of excellence, alongside a range and testing facility. It will be surrounded by SMEs and industry, with the people who know what they are talking about, because there is a lot of snake oil out there. We must put them in one place and then, as I mentioned, slow is smooth, smooth is fast. We must allow them to help the Army, Navy and Air Force to contract different hardware that has simultaneous and integrated software. That is how we will create capabilities that will be able to talk to each other in the future.

[James Cartlidge]

I called my reform the integrated procurement model, because I think the Minister is right: integration is so important, and it has been a deficiency of our bottom-down approach. However, does that not mean that we will need some kind of C2 system for our military? When I was in post, there was a lot of talk about ACCS, which was the system developed for NATO, but frankly was not fit for purpose. That would be a very significant investment. Is it something that the MOD is currently looking at?

[Al Carns]

In the SDR, there was a £1 billion investment in an integrated targeting web, and that is what ties all these systems together. The only way it will tie together is if the software is interchangeable. Indeed, if we were then to lay on AI in quantum, we would be taking it to the next step of starting to remove people further back down the chain. I believe we will always have to be in the chain, but we will move back. Our adversaries may not. That will be a pivotal change in the way of warfare again.

The uncrewed centre of excellence is one to watch within the SDR. It will be in place by February. It will provide centralised expertise, funding and standards. The Military Aviation Authority and the Civilian Aviation Authority were mentioned. The centre will help them to develop and get through some of the bureaucracies while remaining in line with the rules and regulations. It will help to develop skills across defence. For example, drone qualifications across the Navy, Army and Air Force at the moment are all starting to move in different directions. We have to synthesise them, and make sure that they are correct and that everyone is doing the same, so that we can swap and interchange people. That will help to deliver a regulatory framework in which our companies can succeed.

In June, we announced a landmark partnership with Ukraine to share technology, harness the innovation expertise from the frontline and increase our industrial co-operation, which is critical because innovation is moving at such a pace on the frontline. Our plans are a shot in the arm. We need to continue to push as hard as is feasible for what is already one of the leading uncrewed systems sectors in the world.

Ukraine

James Cartlidge Excerpts

Monday 1st September 2025 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

I call the shadow Secretary of State.

[James Cartlidge (South Suffolk) (Con)]

I am grateful to the Secretary of State for advance sight of his statement. I join him in paying tribute to the outgoing Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, who, as he says, has given such impactful leadership and support for Ukraine. I also send my best wishes to his successor as CDS, Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton. It was a privilege to work with both of them at the MOD.

Let me turn to Ukraine. It is being widely reported that in his speech to the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation summit today, Vladimir Putin said that the understandings reached at his meeting with President Trump in Alaska were opening the way to peace in Ukraine. How utterly cynical. What followed the summit in Alaska was not peace, but the brutal bombing of innocent civilians across Ukraine. In particular, just days ago, Putin unleashed the second-largest aerial attack of the whole war, killing at least 23 people, including four children, as the Secretary of State just confirmed.

Bomb damage included the British Council in Kyiv. We join the Government in utterly condemning the attack on the British Council and pay tribute to all its staff, who are playing their part in our national endeavour to support Ukraine. We pass on our best wishes to the member of staff who was injured in the attack. We note that the chief executive of the British Council, Scott McDonald, promised to continue operations wherever possible. Can the Secretary of State outline to what degree that has been achieved and what support the Government have provided to assist?

If Putin really wants to open the way to peace in Ukraine, as he said, he should recognise that the blame for this war lies squarely with his territorial ambitions, and that all the civilian and military bloodshed that continues is wholly the result of his unprovoked and illegal invasion. The reality is that Putin does not accept that basic fact. In his speech today at the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation summit, Putin is widely quoted as blaming others for the war, in particular his long-standing refrain that the war was caused by

“the West’s constant attempts to draw Ukraine into NATO.”

Without ambiguity, we and all our allies must see that the war in Ukraine is a question of a free and sovereign democracy invaded without provocation by a bullying dictator. That is why, when we were in office, it was right to provide such strong support to Ukraine from the outset of the invasion—indeed, even before it commenced —and why in opposition we stand shoulder to shoulder with the Government in continuing that policy. That is why we need to keep tightening the screws on Putin’s war machine. Moscow should be denied safe harbours for its tankers and profits, and Europe should ban Russian oil and gas sooner than its current 2027 deadline.

The Euro-Atlantic alliance must lead a new pincer movement to further constraint Russia’s energy revenues and stop Putin from getting his hands on military equipment, so I am glad that the Foreign Secretary will have more to say on sanctions very soon, as the Secretary of State for Defence said. Can he confirm whether the timeline is directly linked to US action? Would the UK go ahead with those plans for tougher sanctions if the US for some reason did not?

On any potential end to the fighting, we all desperately want to see peace in Ukraine, but we are clear that it must be a lasting, sustainable peace. That is why security guarantees are so important. The Secretary of State referred to President Trump’s commitment to make security guarantees “very secure” with the Europeans. What further detail is he able to share on the likely shape of any such US security guarantees?

The Secretary of State states that the coalition of the willing would

“secure the skies and seas”.

That seems to miss out the land force element. Does that mean that the Army would be sent to Ukraine only in a training role? He also said that he is

“reviewing readiness levels and accelerating funding to prepare for any possible deployment”.

Does he expect that funding to come from the Treasury reserve or the existing MOD budget? On reviewing readiness, what is the timescale of the review? Is it yet at the stage where urgent operational requirements are being considered?

Finally, I strongly welcome the news that Norway has selected the Type 26, which is made in Scotland, for its future fleet. That is a huge deal that will support thousands of jobs, but it has been many years in the making, with significant input and progress under the previous Government. In December 2023, I had the pleasure of visiting the Norwegian MOD in Oslo, and I assure the House that the Type 26 was very much at the top of the agenda. To remind hon. Members, that was in the same week we announced that Britain and Norway would lead the maritime coalition supporting Ukraine’s navy, underlining the strength of our naval alliance and our joint commitment to Ukraine.

It is clear that a key reason for Norway’s decision is that it faces the same Russian threat that we do from Russian submarines and wants the best possible capability to respond, maximising interoperability with the Royal Navy. However, that Russian threat arises entirely from Putin’s pursuit of aggression, rather than peace. Until that situation changes in reality rather than in rhetoric, we must continue to be robust in doing everything possible to support Ukraine.

[John Healey]

I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s endorsement of the success in securing the Norway deal. Groundwork was certainly done under the last Government, and he led a lot of that as the Defence Procurement Minister, but I have to say that we had a great deal more to do when we took over in July last year. Frankly, we had to reboot the campaign, which we did, and I am grateful that we have secured it, as it has huge military, economic and strategic importance.

I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s continuing support for the action we are taking to support Ukraine. He is absolutely right to call out Putin’s remarks at the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation council, and the pressure is now on Putin to prove that he wants peace and to do what he says he wants. While he has sat down to discuss peace with President Trump in Alaska, he has of course been turning up his attacks in Ukraine. He launched this war, and he can stop it tomorrow if he chooses.

The hon. Gentleman asks about sanctions and encourages us to take further steps. He will know that we have already introduced more than 500 new sanctions against individuals, entities and ships. We have sanctioned 289 vessels as part of the Russian shadow fleet, and very soon the Foreign Secretary will announce further UK steps.

On the security guarantees, the commitments we have secured already from many of those involved in the discussion are substantial. The discussions continue, and we look for contributions to be further confirmed. Much of the shape of any deployment of a coalition of the willing will depend on the terms of any peace agreement. At this stage, I certainly do not want to offer any more public details on that, because it would only reinforce Putin’s hand and make him and the Russians wiser.

Victory over Japan: 80th Anniversary

James Cartlidge Excerpts

Monday 21st July 2025 Commons Chamber

[James Cartlidge (South Suffolk) (Con)]

It is a great privilege to respond to today’s debate. I am grateful to all hon. Members for their contributions. As many have said, the Pacific campaign of world war two is often referred to as the forgotten war, but that is far from the case today. We in Parliament remember that epic and brutal theatre of operations, honour all those who served, and reflect on the terrible loss of human life—both military and civilian. It will certainly not be the forgotten war this summer as our nation joins in the commemorations.

As was frequently remarked when we debated the anniversary of VE Day on 6 May, such events to mark VJ Day will be even more poignant and important because the living link to that time is passing. That living link has been sustained through so many family connections, as we have heard today.

[Jim Shannon]

I want to put on record the contribution of those from Northern Ireland who served in the far east. I think of Johnny McQuade, who was an MP in this House for our party from 1979 to 1983. He was an inspiration to me as a young boy back in the ’70s. I think also of Richie, a sergeant-major in the Royal Artillery Belfast Battalion, who went to camp in 1939 for two weeks but came back in 1945 having served in the far east. Those are two examples of Northern Ireland’s contribution to the far east war.

[James Cartlidge]

I totally agree with the hon. Gentleman. I always make the effort to recognise the contribution of the whole of our Union to our armed forces on all fronts in the second world war and throughout the history of our military.

As I have said, many colleagues have spoken about their family connections. I was very moved by the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell (Helen Maguire), who spoke about her grandfather’s service at Kohima. That was a key battle in the Burma campaign, and it is from where we get the Kohima epitaph, which we all know:

“When you go home, tell them of us and say, for your tomorrow, we gave our today.”

Those are immortal words.

I understand that we are grateful to my right hon. Friend the Member for Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale and Tweeddale (David Mundell) for bringing forward this debate through the Backbench Business Committee. He spoke so vividly of the horror of the enslavement of POWs and, in his words, the “scars that never healed”.

Having said that, we also heard from the Chair of the Defence Committee, the hon. Member for Slough (Mr Dhesi), who reminded us that today we have a strong relationship with Japan through GCAP—I was proud to be part of the global combat air programme as a Minister in the MOD—and also with Italy, which was part of the Axis powers in Europe. We enjoy brighter relations now, even though, as the hon. Member for Tewkesbury (Cameron Thomas) pointed out, perhaps some in Japanese society have not fully come to terms with what happened in the second world war.

My hon. Friend the Member for Romford (Andrew Rosindell) spoke very movingly about the Burma Star Association. The hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Adam Jogee) importantly stressed the role that our veterans groups will have in these festivities in the coming weeks as we remember VJ Day. I note that the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington (Gideon Amos) spoke specifically about veterans and the issue of Northern Ireland veterans, which remains very important. We hope his speech indicates that, if legislation comes forward, he will vote in the appropriate way to stand by our veterans.

The hon. Member for Erewash (Adam Thompson), in an excellent speech, spoke very movingly of Donald Rose, who was 110 years old when he died and at one point the oldest person in the country. That was an extraordinarily brave tale, and I am grateful to him for sharing it with us. We heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer). No debate on the far east would be possible without mention of the Chindits, which I understand were formally known as the long-range penetration groups. He reminded us of the ravages of disease, which is the scourge of our forces in many ways. In that case it was malaria, but there was also dysentery, which we heard about from the hon. Member for Blackpool North and Fleetwood (Lorraine Beavers), and many other horrors were out there in the jungle during fighting.

The hon. Member for Birmingham Northfield (Laurence Turner) spoke about the Birmingham association for the Far East Prisoners of War, reminding us of the role of civic society in helping POWs to come to terms with the horrors that they experienced in the far east. We heard a number of colleagues speak about specific elements of our armed forces and their service. The hon. Member for Carlisle (Ms Minns) spoke movingly about the Border Regiment and described it fighting through monsoons. That was an extraordinary record.

The hon. Member for Portsmouth North (Amanda Martin) very proudly spoke about the Royal Navy. She is very proud to have a naval constituency, and she is absolutely right to stress the extremely important role of the British Pacific fleet. In fact, I believe it played a crucial role in those final months as US forces were heading towards the Japanese home island, using our own fleet to enable that military progress, which was incredibly important.

The hon. Member for Blackpool North and Fleetwood spoke of the horror of the Burma railway, which many of us have heard of. I had a great uncle who was involved in it, but he would never speak of it, so shocking was the reality, despite being such a gentle man. The hon. Lady spoke particularly about how emaciated the survivors were and how many died of starvation.

[Katrina Murray (Cumbernauld and Kirkintilloch) (Lab)]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that for many of the veterans who came back, the point at which they remembered and relived their experiences was later on in life, as they succumbed to dementia? They had to go through and relive the horrors of their war experiences at that time.

[James Cartlidge]

The hon. Lady makes an excellent point. We know that war leaves lasting trauma, PTSD and so on, but perhaps it was particularly intense in those cases. As I said, certainly in the case of my family member, he found it so harrowing that he was never to talk about it for the rest of his life. The hon. Lady makes a very good point.

We heard many in the VE Day debate talk about the role of other countries in supporting our forces, which is particularly true in the far east. The Chair of the Defence Committee, the hon. Member for Slough, as well as the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme and particularly the hon. Member for Aldershot (Alex Baker), spoke about the Gurkhas, reminding us that we had a multinational force. It was an extraordinary force, including 365,000 British troops, 1.5 million Commonwealth troops and, as has been said, the pre-partition Indian army of 2.5 million soldiers. It was extraordinarily diverse.

To conclude, VJ Day was not just the end of the war in the Pacific; in effect, it was the end of world war two itself, which was formally confirmed on 2 September 1945. It was a war of unbelievable savagery and suffering, in which it is estimated that between 70 million and 80 million people died, the majority of whom were civilians. As our direct, living link with those who served 80 years ago fades, it is right that we in this House play our part in commemorating this historic anniversary and publicly honouring the memory of all who served. Quite simply, we say thank you. We will always remember them.

Ukraine

James Cartlidge Excerpts

Thursday 17th July 2025 Commons Chamber

[James Cartlidge (South Suffolk) (Con)]

I am grateful to the Secretary of State for advance sight of his statement.

It was less than a month ago that the United States undertook a bombing raid on Iranian nuclear facilities—one of the most significant military actions undertaken anywhere in the world for years. With such developments understandably dominating the headlines, and almost three and a half years having elapsed since Russia first launched its unprovoked and illegal all-out invasion, it is right that the Government regularly update the House—as we did—on developments in Ukraine.

The reality is that there has been no let-up in Russian aggression. As the Secretary of State confirmed, 9 July saw the largest drone attack of the war by Russia, and there were reports yesterday of Russia using 400 drones to target energy infrastructure and cities across Ukraine. That indiscriminate barbarism has inevitably led to further civilian casualties, but on the military side, can the Secretary of State confirm that Russia has suffered by far the greatest losses? He confirmed that last month, Russian battlefield casualties surpassed 1 million. Does that not show the extent to which Putin has nothing but callous disregard for the human impact of his actions on either side?

I am proud of the decisive assistance that we provided to Ukraine when we were in office. We continue to stand with the Government in seeking to provide all possible support, but it is vital that all our allies play their part. On France, and what was previously called the coalition of the willing, I agree that we need to be ready for when that peace comes, so can the Secretary of State confirm how many other nations will provide fighter jets to the Multinational Force Ukraine? Can he confirm that there is no longer any planning for a land combat element to the MNFU?

We welcome the additional provision of military hardware by the US, but the Secretary of State said that

“we plan to play our full part.”

Will the UK therefore be purchasing military equipment from the United States to pass on to Ukraine? The Secretary of State did not mention potential sanctions or tariffs. It has been widely reported that President Trump is considering tariffs of 100% on goods entering the US from any country that imports any product from Russia. Have the Government discussed this plan with the US, and will the UK follow suit? The Times reports today that Andriy Yermak, senior adviser to President Zelensky, has stated that the imposition of secondary sanctions on nations buying oil and gas from Russia could end the war

“before the end of this year.”

Does the Secretary of State agree with that analysis, and again, would the UK join in any secondary sanctions policy directed against countries importing Russian oil and gas?

On Germany, we understand that the Prime Minister is meeting Chancellor Merz today. May I urge the Government to push their German counterparts on provision of Taurus missiles to Ukraine? Alternatively, given that the missiles are, we understand, compatible with Typhoon, will the Government backfill UK stocks to enable the provision of more Storm Shadow missiles?

Turning to the impact of all this on the UK, we understand that Germany will today sign an agreement with the Prime Minister to come to each other’s aid in the event of an attack on the other. Will the Secretary of State outline how that is different from NATO article 5? I have had recent discussions with senior German parliamentarians on the impact on our nations of supporting Ukraine, and the Germans believe, as has been widely reported, that drone overflights of their military bases were linked to nefarious Russian activity. In the context of recent threats to RAF bases, and drone overflights at Suffolk RAF bases and elsewhere last November, can he update us at all—I appreciate the sensitivity of this—on whether there is yet any indication of Russian involvement? In particular, will he update us on progress on the review of security at UK bases, which he launched last month?

When I was Minister for Defence Procurement, I stripped out a whole load of processes and red tape to bring forward the in-service date of our groundbreaking DragonFire anti-drone laser from 2032 to 2027. Given the extraordinary potential for directed energy weapons, will the Secretary of State accelerate adoption even further, and ensure rapid testing of anti-drone defences for our military bases?

On drones more broadly, in a written answer in March, Ministers confirmed that they had ordered just three military drones for our armed forces since the election. I have tabled subsequent written questions on progress, and Ministers are now saying that they cannot answer the question. What is the latest figure? UK small and medium-sized enterprises have provided some of the best drones and counter-drone measures used on the live battlefield in Ukraine, so why are we not ordering the same kit in parallel for our own Army, at scale and at pace, so that it can train today—not years in the future—in how war is fought right now in Ukraine?

After three and half years of war, we must keep reminding the British public of the most important point for our national interest—namely, that the best way to defend our homeland right now is to give all possible support to Ukraine, so that the democracy triumphs over the dictatorship, and to prevent Putin’s aggression from spreading westwards.

Afghanistan

James Cartlidge Excerpts

Tuesday 15th July 2025 Commons Chamber

[James Cartlidge (South Suffolk) (Con)]

I am grateful to the Secretary of State for advance sight of his statement and for receipt earlier this morning of a hard copy of the Rimmer review. I also thank the Secretary of State and the Minister for the Armed Forces for briefing me yesterday and other parliamentary colleagues today. Furthermore, given the nature of the super-injunction and the fact that the timing and nature of the statement relate entirely to the court’s lifting of that super-injunction, I recognise that it was entirely right for the Secretary of State to update the House at the earliest opportunity, and I welcome the opportunity that colleagues now have to scrutinise these matters.

Let me begin by declaring an interest. I was a Defence Minister in August 2023, when the Department first became aware of the breach, my main role being to chair one meeting on the matter in August 2023 because I was the duty Minister. Thereafter, however, as Minister for Defence Procurement and with this sitting outside my portfolio, I had relatively minimal direct involvement. That said, the Secretary of State has issued an apology on behalf of the Government and I join him in that, and in recognising that this data leak should never have happened and was an unacceptable breach of all relevant data protocols. I also agree that it is right for an apology to be issued specifically to those whose data was compromised.

It is nevertheless a fact that cannot be ignored that when this breach came to light, the immediate priority of the then Government was to avoid a very specific and terrible scenario: namely, an error on the part of an official of the British state leading to the torture, or even murder, of persons in the dataset at the hands of what remains a brutal Taliban regime. As the Rimmer review confirms, that scenario, thankfully, appears to have been avoided. Of course, we understand that the review was set up in January and reported to the Secretary of State in June.

I want to be clear that it is entirely appropriate that the Secretary of State has sought to update the Department’s understanding of the threat on the ground in Afghanistan that exists today, particularly for those persons in the dataset who had previously been considered to be at the greatest risk of reprisals. However, the House will appreciate that when Ministers became aware of the data breach in August 2023, we did not have the luxury of six months in which to assess the situation. As Rimmer says in paragraph 53:

“The review notes that the passage of time is particularly relevant.”

I know that my former ministerial colleague—the former Minister for the Armed Forces, James Heappey, who led the response to the leak—will have been focused entirely on what he saw as his duty of care to those at risk of reprisals, based on the threat assessment that pertained at the time. However, any threat picture is constantly evolving, and as I say, I support the Secretary of State’s decision to review the MOD’s understanding of the threat. Given the latest situation, as reported by Rimmer, we support his conclusion that the Afghanistan response route can now be closed.

Turning to the super-injunction, I entirely understand why this would be a subject of considerable interest, particularly to the newspapers and media outlets concerned. We have an independent judiciary, and it is not for me to comment either on the decision to grant the injunction in the first place or to lift it today, but it is surely telling that paragraph 56 of the Rimmer review states that planning at the time that the Government became aware of the breach in the summer of 2023 was based on a

“risk judgement that were the Taleban to secure access to the dataset, the consequences for affected individuals may be serious.”

Had that not been the case, no doubt the Court would have been less likely to grant the injunction, and certainly not a super-injunction.

On the leak, can the Secretary of State confirm that it was by a civil servant, and that Ministers at the time took steps to change the casework procedure by not using spreadsheets sent by email, but moving to a more secure system fully within the entirely secure network? Can he confirm that, although the dataset was of about 18,000, only a relatively small portion were identified as at high risk of reprisals, and only a small number had been settled here, which is why, as he stated, the cost is about £400 million, not the £7 billion reported elsewhere? Now that these matters are rightly in the public domain and given the reassessment of the threat in the Rimmer review, I agree that it would be wholly appropriate for the Defence Committee and others to look further into these matters.

Can the Secretary of State comment on one specific item being reported, which is that someone—I refer not to the person who made the leak, but another apparent third party who obtained some of the data—was engaged in blackmail? Did the original Metropolitan police investigation look at that, and if not, will he consider reopening it so that the police can look at that specific point, which has serious implications?

Although we must recognise the huge role played by Afghan nationals in support of our armed forces, any policy in this area must always be balanced against our own national interest. We support the Government in closing the ARR scheme, as we did with their decision to close the full ARAP programme.

[John Healey]

I welcome the tone in which the shadow Defence Secretary has responded, and I welcome his joining me in the apology on behalf of the British Government to those whose data has been compromised. I also welcome his acceptance that, as he put it, it was “entirely appropriate” for the Defence Secretary, as part of a new Government, to look to update the Department’s assessment of the threat. I am very pleased that, as the House will have noted, he supports Rimmer’s conclusions and my policy judgments that the Government have announced today. The shadow Defence Secretary is right that, in simple terms, Rimmer gives us a revised, up-to-date assessment of the risk—in particular, the risk to those individuals whose data may be on that spreadsheet. He does confirm that it is highly unlikely that their name being on the dataset increases the risk of their being targeted.

The shadow Defence Secretary asked me three or four specific questions. He asked about the official—it was a defence official. I cannot account for the improvements in data handling that previous Ministers may have made, but when I did his job in opposition, this data leak was just one of many from the Afghan schemes. I can also say that, in the past year since the election, the Government have appointed a new chief information officer, installed new software to securely share data and completed a comprehensive review of the legacy Afghan data on the casework system.

On the £7 billion figure, which I think the shadow Defence Secretary may have picked up from court papers, that was a previous estimate. It is related not simply to the Afghan response route but an estimate of the total cost of all Government Afghan schemes for the entire period in which they may operate.

On the significance of today’s announcement and the policy decisions that we have taken compared with simply continuing the policy and schemes that we inherited, the taxpayer will pay £1.2 billion less over the period, about 9,500 fewer Afghans will come to this country and, above all, proper accountability in this House and proper freedom of the media are restored.

UK-France Nuclear Partnership

James Cartlidge Excerpts

Thursday 10th July 2025 Commons Chamber

[James Cartlidge (South Suffolk) (Con)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the UK-France nuclear partnership.

[The Minister for Defence Procurement and Industry (Maria Eagle)]

The UK and France have a proud history of co-operation on defence nuclear matters. Alongside our conventional warfighting capability, the independent strategic nuclear forces of the UK and France contribute significantly to the overall security of the NATO alliance and the Euro-Atlantic. Since 1995, we have stated that we do not see situations arising in which the vital interests of one could be threatened without the vital interests of the other also being threatened. In 2010, both nations agreed to share research facilities and co-operate on nuclear technology under the Lancaster House treaties. In 2022, at Chatham House, the Defence Secretary set out the importance of rebooting Lancaster House and our defence relationship with France. That was reaffirmed in our 2024 manifesto.

Today, the Prime Minister and President Emmanuel Macron will agree to deepen their nuclear co-operation and work more closely than ever before on nuclear deterrence. That is an important step forward for the UK-France nuclear partnership, and reflects the significant improvement in the relationship between our two countries that this Government have driven. A soon-to-be-signed declaration will state for the first time that the respective deterrents of both countries are independent but can be co-ordinated. The declaration will also affirm that there is no extreme threat to Europe that would not prompt a response by both nations. As such, any adversary threatening the vital interests of Britain or France could be confronted by the strength of the nuclear forces of both nations. Co-operation between our countries on nuclear research will also deepen, while we work together to uphold the international non-proliferation architecture. Further details will follow today’s agreement.

In an increasingly volatile and complex global security environment, exemplified by Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine—a war on the European continent—the UK and France, as Europe’s two nuclear powers, are united in our determination to work closer than ever before on nuclear deterrence. That is a manifesto commitment, a promise made and a promise kept, and yet another example of how the Government are delivering for defence.

[James Cartlidge]

Thank you for granting this urgent question, Mr Speaker. I do think it is incredible that we have had to find out about such substantive matters overnight from the press and without a statement from the Government.

We Conservatives back our nuclear deterrent 100% and have never wavered on that. We support steps that boost the resilience of our nuclear enterprise, diversify delivery and, above all, help our core continuous at-sea deterrence to remain the cornerstone of our homeland defence against the most extreme threats. We also welcome steps to genuinely strengthen UK-French co-operation on defence, building on Lancaster House. In particular, having been the Government who first authorised provision of long-range Storm Shadow missiles to Ukraine, we recognise the urgent need to replenish our own Storm Shadow stocks, which is in the press release. Can the Minister confirm whether we are placing orders for new Storm Shadow missiles from MBDA or simply reconditioning existing stocks?

The nuclear aspect of this is by far the most significant. Can the Minister confirm where this will leave the operationally independent and sovereign nature of our existing Trident nuclear deterrent? The Telegraph quotes the declaration—which, of course, we have not seen—as saying that both nuclear arsenals

“remain independent but can be co-ordinated and that there is no extreme threat to Europe that would not prompt a response by both nations”.

Does this mean that our respective national deterrence will now be jointly operationally delivered, and how will that co-ordination take place in practice? Crucially, how does this new nuclear doctrine affect NATO and our very close co-operation on nuclear deterrence with the United States? Will France now be offering its nuclear deterrent to NATO, as we do? Perhaps most importantly, will France be joining the NATO Nuclear Planning Group?

On the matter of tactical nuclear weapons, I have previously asked about options other than US-controlled gravity bombs, with no reply. Given the announcement on Storm Shadow and MBDA, will the UK and France now be looking at co-operation on tactical nuclear delivery options via our shared complex weapons industrial base? A particular concern of the Opposition is that there appears to be a deep paradox at play here: talk of closer co-operation with France, but in the background, the Government still getting nowhere on access to hard cash from the European rearmament fund, despite having given up our sovereign fishing grounds.

To conclude, it is truly extraordinary that such significant defence developments do not warrant a Government statement, so the Minister must now be as transparent as possible in answering our questions—not least after weeks dominated by smoke and mirrors on defence spending and chaotic U-turns on welfare that raise the most profound question of all: where is the money going to come from?

[Maria Eagle]

There has not been a statement yet because the agreement has not been signed yet. In fact—

[Maria Eagle]

If the right hon. Gentleman would like to listen to the reply, the agreement has not been signed yet. I am sure that as soon as it is signed—

[James Cartlidge]

But it has been briefed to the press.

[Maria Eagle]

I am sure that as soon as it is signed—[Interruption.] The shadow Minister has asked his questions. I would like to try to answer them without him heckling me too much, although it is up to him how he behaves.

--- Later in debate ---

[Maria Eagle]

The steering group is about political policymaking rather than intelligence. I am sure that appropriate arrangements will be established if there is any such issue, but I do not anticipate that there will be a problem.

[James Cartlidge]

On a point of order, Mr Speaker.

[Mr Speaker]

A point of order relevant to this debate?

[James Cartlidge]

Indeed. May I seek your guidance on how to set the record straight? Following the question from the hon. Member for Brent West (Barry Gardiner), the Minister criticised the fact that I only partially referred to a quote from the declaration text. To be clear, I have not seen the declaration. It was leaked to the media overnight; that was all I could read from, and I am none the wiser from the answers we have just had.

[Mr Speaker]

Order. Please, we cannot keep the debate going. You have made the point and it is on the record—let us move on.

Defence

James Cartlidge Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd July 2025 Commons Chamber

[Luke Pollard]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that point, and I agree with what he says. It is precisely the reason that when the Defence Secretary was the shadow Defence Secretary, and when I was the shadow Minister for the Armed Forces, we had a position of cross-party support on defence matters. It is really important, I think, that we get back to that place. When our adversaries look at the United Kingdom, they should see strong cross-party support, as indeed I believe they do when we debate Ukraine. There is a strong set of plans in our strategic defence review, with increasing defence funding getting to 2.5%, a figure we have not matched in the past 14 years. There is a real opportunity to send a united message from this House to our adversaries and to our people who serve. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman’s colleagues on the Front Bench were listening to his comments as closely as I was.

Members have the opportunity to approve this order today, knowing that the Government are delivering on our pledge.

[James Cartlidge (South Suffolk) (Con)]

On a very serious note, the Opposition have been accused of being pro-Russia, pro-China and pro-Iran repeatedly by the Prime Minister, which the Minister has defended, because we dared to oppose the Chagos deal. If he wants unity, we need to see that on both sides of the House.

[Luke Pollard]

I think the unity we saw on the Chagos deal is that the Conservatives started a deal and we finished it; they agreed it was the right thing to start negotiations and held 11 rounds, and we agreed it was the right thing to complete that deal. We put our national security first in that respect, secured the future of the Diego Garcia base and won the support of our US friends, our NATO allies, our Five Eyes partners and India locally. It is up to the hon. Gentleman which side of the debate he wishes to be on—we choose the side of our national security.

Hon. Members can approve this order today, knowing that we are delivering on the pledge to rewrite the contract between the United Kingdom and those who serve in order to improve it. The Armed Forces Act—and, by extension, this order—underpins the very existence of His Majesty’s armed forces. It backs those who, like my old man—a Royal Navy submariner—and so many across this House, stepped forward to serve our country and protect our United Kingdom and our allies and partners in an era of global instability, to deploy globally in support of British objectives and to support our national security. With the consent of the House today, Parliament will acknowledge, pay tribute to and back their service.