Iain Duncan Smith
Main Page: Iain Duncan Smith (Conservative - Chingford and Woodford Green)Department Debates - View all Iain Duncan Smith's debates with the Cabinet Office
Tuesday 13th June 2023
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Procurement Act 2023 View all Procurement Act 2023 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 13 June 2023 - large print - (13 Jun 2023)
Alex Burghart
I thank my right hon. Friend for the constructive conversations that we have had in getting ready for today’s debate. He is slightly pre-empting some remarks that I will come to later. I hope that he saw the announcement that the Government made the other day. It is in the nature of the work that we are doing that, first, we wish to remove devices and components that pose a security risk to sensitive sites—I will say more about the timescale for that later. Secondly, we intend through the use of the unit and the provisions in the Bill to prevent similar devices and components from entering our sites in future. It is a two-part process: first, get rid of what is already there and, secondly, prevent other such services from coming in in future.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)
The Minister has mentioned sensitive sites. I do not quite understand what that phrase means—I am hoping that we will get a proper explanation in due course—but what I would observe is that, as far as I can see, every single Government site is by nature and definition sensitive. The Department for Work and Pensions is very sensitive because any disruption of its payments would render the UK in a terrible state. Is it not the case that all Departments of central Government are by nature sensitive sites and, therefore, should take upon themselves the reality that they must all rid themselves of these things?
Florence Eshalomi
The hon. Member is absolutely right: those SMEs will work with local councils in a local area, and they know the local area. In some cases the contracts that are outsourced are not value for money. This is about ensuring that, in public contracts, public money is spent in the right way. If we are to lower the risks faced by SMEs seeking to enter the supply chain, it is vital that the measures in the Bill have an impact.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
One of the biggest problems during the pandemic, which came out of China and became a global pandemic, was the question of everybody scraping around trying to find PPE, most of which was manufactured in China. Is it therefore part of the hon. Lady’s argument that we should have strategic manufacturing of PPE—either here or certainly in democracies that we can trust—to which we get earlier access, or will we just leave it to be produced somewhere else?
Florence Eshalomi
I agree with some of the amendments the right hon. Member has tabled on the issue of China and national security. Throughout the Committee stage, we argued consistently for removing risks from countries with a high national security risk, but we have concerns about the approach of naming specific countries in the Bill. It is important that we work with the whole House to get the right framework. I urge the Minister to consider our amendment 17, which is a careful mechanism for assessing the impact of the new rules that he is championing.
Throughout the passage of the Bill, national security has been an issues of extreme interest to the House. On Second Reading, we heard a tour de force from the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the hon. Member for Rutland and Melton (Alicia Kearns), on national security. In Committee, I raised multiple concerns with the Minister about the place of national security as a discretionary exclusion ground and its role in the debarment system. I am pleased that the Minister was listening to all those points, and we welcome amendment 57 and similar Government amendments, which we believe will address many of the concerns raised in Committee. I welcome the amendments originally tabled by the hon. Member for Rutland and Melton, which will establish a list of high-risk suppliers as part of the Bill. Our amendment 15 would exclude suppliers identified as a security threat from public contracts. Although that offers some benefits over alternative proposals, there is a balance, so we are not minded to press amendment 15 to a Division.
Procurement practices affect not only our services, but the many workers who rely on procurement-related roles for their jobs and livelihoods. Public money, and the jobs that will create, should not be given to those who treat their workers unfairly. Our amendment 18 would give contracting authorities the power to exclude suppliers that have significantly and repeatedly breached the rights of their staff. It would affect only those who have not taken self-cleansing measures to correct their conduct and the causes of breaches. The amendment would ensure that authorities have the right to turn away the worst offenders on workers’ rights, and would ensure that publicly funded jobs are protected jobs.
It can only be right that those seeking public contracts in the UK are transparent about where they pay their tax. The public would not expect their hard-earned money to go to those seeking not to pay into the system themselves, but a study from the Fair Tax Foundation found that, between 2014 and 2019, one in six public contracts were won by companies with links to tax havens. Our new clause 10 would mean that multinational companies bidding for large public contracts need to provide information about their tax arrangements in the UK. That would be open to the public and create greater transparency on how public money is spent. Amendment 16 would create a discretionary exclusion ground for suppliers that have violated UK sanctions or export controls, ensuring that authorities have the power to exclude from the procurement system those who continue to profit off businesses in places such as Russia. New clause 11 would require authorities to undertake a public interest test whenever deciding to outsource public services, to ensure that it truly offers value for money. Finally, new clause 14 would allow public authorities to choose not to buy goods or services from countries on the basis of their human rights records. That would give authorities the power to set clear policies, not to hand public funds to those committing atrocities around the world.
I pay tribute to members of the Committee for their engagement on this very long Bill. We have definitely shone a light on it, and had many discussions about paperclips. In particular, I thank my hon. Friends the Members for Birkenhead (Mick Whitley) and for Brighton, Kemptown (Lloyd Russell-Moyle), who embellished the Committee with a wealth of examples of procurement practices from their constituencies. I hope the Minister will listen to us on why additional amendments are important to strengthen the Procurement Bill in the interests of all taxpayers across the country, and I look forward to hearing from other Members.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
I rise to speak to the amendment in my name and those of 26 others in the House of all parties.
The real issue here is the existence of a specific law in China that makes pretty much all companies in China, but particularly those involved in technology, a public risk in procurement to the United Kingdom. Article 7 of the People’s Republic of China national intelligence law 2017 states:
“Any organisation and citizen shall, in accordance with the law, support, provide assistance, and cooperate in national intelligence work, and guard the secrecy of any national intelligence work that they are aware of.”
In other words, under the Chinese national intelligence law, they must completely comply with all demands and requests for information in the business they are in, and deny they have done that to any other country or authority that asks. We have had Chinese companies coming to the House and lying to Select Committees about what they are doing, all saying that they have no obligations under the national intelligence law. They do have obligations under that law and they will lie for their country as a result.
We need to start by understanding the problems, and I thank my hon. and right hon. Friends on the Front Bench for having listened to the arguments and changed the terms, first by referencing the national intelligence law, which is very important, because many Departments will play fast and loose unless what they must do is made very clear. We have been encouraging the Government, who came out with views on Hikvision, Dahua and other companies supplying surveillance equipment to the UK, knowing that they are a surveillance risk not because they are cameras in a particular fashion but because what they glean is available completely to the Chinese authorities under the national security laws.
We have heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely) about the small devices—a growing threat that I have not referenced but which also gets caught by the national intelligence law. China is leading in this technology, which is one way in which it can keep track of its own people, but they are now using it more broadly. I had a suspicion and heard that the cars that my hon. Friend was referencing were Downing Street cars. There is a very good chance that the Prime Minister and others may have been tracked by the Chinese Government without our knowledge.
We must therefore remember that first and foremost China poses a significant threat to us, our interests and the way we live our lives. Until we all agree and come to those terms, we simply cannot move on; that is the key. Government Departments and the Government have dragged their feet over this because we do not want to upset the Chinese—but it takes a lot to upset the Chinese because they carry on as before. The amendment is intended to get the Government to accept that we should reference the national intelligence law because that defines all Chinese business and companies and therefore they are a threat.
There are other Chinese companies that are a problem that will not be named, and surveillance cameras are part of this. I must confess that when my brother-in-law went around an area of a farm looking at the surveillance cameras, he spotted that they were Hikvision cameras—they are not listed in the contract because the contract provider is a UK organisation, but we discovered that they are everywhere.
Once I heard the news that the Government clearly wanted Departments to get rid of those cameras, I made a set of freedom of information requests to all Departments about whether they had cameras, where they were, whether they were on their buildings, and what plans they had to get rid of them, having spotted that a lot of Departments still had them, including the Ministry of Defence. All Departments—bar I think the Wales Office, which came clean and said it did not have any or was getting rid of them—claimed that, under section 24 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, they did not have to answer because it was a security risk. The security risk is having the cameras, not answering the damned question! Excuse my language, Mr Deputy Speaker. It is all about where the cameras are and what they are doing, and that is the point of the amendment.
I hope that Ministers will take this matter forward and tell Departments to stop obfuscating. If they are asked a direct question they should tell the honest truth and explain that under the new rules under the Bill they will be getting rid of those cameras, which is absolutely critical.
Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)
The right hon. Gentleman makes an excellent point on national security, particularly the risk posed by this equipment. I credit him and others across the House who have worked to encourage the Government to move on this matter. As well as the national security issue, does he share my concern that companies such as Hikvision are involved in human rights abuses in China, for example with the Uyghur Muslims?
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
I did not send the hon. Lady a copy of my speech but I am glad she has jumped into this because I want to move on to that point now.
Finishing on the point I have been making, however, it is good that the Government are moving on this, but I do not think they have moved enough because I am very worried about the word “sensitive”, which the Minister is talking about. I will come back to that, but this move will begin to bring us into line with the United States, who moved on this under their Hikvision Act, which banned it back in 2019. It is worth reminding colleagues, too, that the European Union is also ahead of us on this now, because the President has said that they must do some “de-risking” on the issue of threats from China. So we are coming back into line on doing that and the west is waking up to this threat.
It is not just about all the threats that are clear under the obligations and the data China collects—it data-harvests, by the way. When the Government said that they were banning TikTok from Government telephones, I made the observation that that is not enough because people might still have TikTok on their own phones. Having run a Department for six years, I know that Ministers’ telephones sit on their desks next to their Government telephones, and therefore the Chinese will be data-harvesting on the back of that. One of my Government colleagues said that he wants to get in touch with the younger people; fat chance they are going to listen to a word they are saying. The truth is he should get rid of TikTok like the rest and be real about it. We must now make it clear that Government telephones and the telephones of Ministers should no longer have TikTok.
Damian Green
I am glad that my right hon. Friend has moved this amendment, which as he knows I strongly support. To return to my point about timescale, security cameras are normally replaced every five to seven years. Does he think we have five to seven years in which we can leave these cameras in place in public sector buildings, or would he like their removal to be accelerated?
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
The Cabinet Office must now decide the pace of this change. I hear that it is talking about six months and will come forward with a clear and explicit decision. In line with what my right hon. Friend has just said, it ought to explain the timescales for how Departments are going to take them away and how quickly, and an endpoint. That is critical, because otherwise, as I saw with the FOIs, Government Departments will do whatever they can not to do this because they are frightened and they say it will cost them extra. What really costs us is if they fail to do it.
John McDonnell (Hayes and Harlington) (Lab)
On telecoms, not TikTok in this instance. According to reports last week, the UK telecoms arm of CK Hutchison, 3 mobile, is merging with Vodafone. Vodafone is extensively involved in Government contracts and evidence by Unite the union published this week is basically saying that CK directors supported the suppression of democracy in Hong Kong. In fact, the chair of the company, Victor Li Tzar-kuoi, is adviser to the Hong Kong Chief Executive. The right hon. Gentleman knows that John Lee, the Chief Executive, has been involved in the suppression of protests and in the arrest of trade union colleagues of mine, members of Unite. Does he share my concern that people linked to this company now are going to have access to Government contracts in the UK?
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
That is not the subject of the amendment but I will touch on it briefly. I have already spoken to the unions on this and I am very much in line with their position. The Government need to look very carefully at what has taken place, particularly because it reduces competition in the market. The links to the authoritarianism of the Chinese is one of the big worries, so I suggest that the Government have a serious look at that.
Returning to the point made by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman), these cameras are also being used in internal suppression in China. We know about the suppression of the Uyghurs; that is a genocide that is taking place. Even though the Government will not say it is genocide, everybody else believes it is: Parliament here has said it; the Americans have now said it; and so, too, have many other countries. I do not know why we cannot say this is genocide, but that is a question for another debate. The fact is that many of these instruments are being used as part of that suppression in the camps as well as to watch carefully so that suppression can take place. Right now, forced labour, forced sterilisation and re-education in camps are all taking place in China.
The hon. Member for Vauxhall (Florence Eshalomi) referred from the Dispatch Box to the Opposition’s amendments. It is worth reminding her that China poses a risk in just about every single area with its human rights abuses and abuses of workers’ rights, yet so many of our companies want to ignore that.
While I welcome much of what the Government have done, I do not plan to move new clause 1 today, but only because I want more from the Government. I think they understand that.
I come back to the “sensitive” point. The truth is that, by definition, all Government Departments must be sensitive. As I said, I spent six years in charge of the DWP, and what I know is that there is arguably no more sensitive Department, because stopping payments for one or two days from the DWP would wreak havoc across the United Kingdom. People would not be able to get money to pay their rent, to buy their food or to live—all those things of vital importance. So a foreign power might be able to use information to target a Department such as the DWP that is not on the list because it may not appear as sensitive as the Ministry of Defence, GCHQ or—God bless us—the Foreign Office, when in reality, it is much more sensitive.
When we try to use a word like “sensitive” to give ourselves a little bit of a break, the problem becomes: who defines sensitive, and how often we will redefine it? I recommend that the Government describe all Departments as sensitive or else get rid of the word. That would put the onus on the Departments to come to the Cabinet Office to say, “We need an exemption for a period” or, “We can’t do this as fast.” The current wording means that they will not have to do that if they are outwith the term “sensitive.”
The reality is that we have had a number of Dispatch Box commitments from a load of Government Ministers about interpreting these things, but they never come to fruition. We were promised guidance in the other place on slavery during the passage of the Nationality and Borders Bill, but that was never put in. We really want the Government to commit at the Dispatch Box to changing what they are doing with “sensitive” when the Bill goes to the other place. “Sensitive” is too weak a position. It lets Departments off the hook and will put all the onus on the Cabinet Office. That must be reversed to ensure that this removal gets done.
Kirsty Blackman
I really appreciate the right hon. Member giving way again. Would he consider asking the Government for removal from all sites and, when they produce their timeline, to have them say, “These are our priority sites, which will be done first, but there will be removal from all sites off the back of that”? That would cover removal from all sites but allow the Government to prioritise if they cannot do things overnight.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
I agree that that would be the common-sense way of doing it; I think we are all on the same page on this one.
The thing about our new clause is that, without the word “sensitive”, the position is simple. The new clause uses the same language as the Cabinet Office’s announcement in November, which recommended the removal of Chinese CCTV from sensitive sites. Now, that was the wording. Okay. But when we ask, “What has happened? How many Departments have felt under pressure to do that?”, we start to discover that they are not doing it because it is too difficult, and they want the requirement to go away. My answer is: do not use the word “sensitive” in that respect. It is about national security law, and Government Departments must either be completely defined as “sensitive”—if we want to use that word—or be bound to rid themselves of all companies obligated under the national security law. If they are unable to do that, they must make their case so that we can question that publicly and comment about what is going on.
I conclude on this simple point. The new clause is there to try to make it clear that we face a most significant and dangerous threat from the Chinese Communist party in control of China today. It is everywhere. It is using slave labour to produce polysilicon to collect solar rays. We all beat our chests proudly and proclaim that we are heading towards net zero, but on whose backs is that? It is people working in slave labour conditions to produce these things, people under surveillance, and people taken away on genocides. A Government already doing this internally are now referring it out to us. We must make it clear beyond peradventure that Government Departments must now rid themselves of equipment and never place contracts with other companies on equipment that comes under the rule of the national security law. I am looking for commitments from the Government today that, by the time the Bill gets to the other place, that will finally be resolved. If so, they will have my approval and that of many others in the Chamber.
Apsana Begum (Poplar and Limehouse) (Lab)
I rise to speak in favour of a number of new clauses and amendments to improve transparency and accountability regarding public procurement and providing value for money for the taxpayer, including those tabled by Labour Front-Bench Members. The House will be aware that trade unions and others have long raised concerns that existing procurement policy pushes public authorities to privatise and marketise public services, including through private finance initiative contracts, which allow private consortiums to make high profits out of public assets—often far above the true value of the asset.
A particularly controversial element of procurement policy has been the use of private finance initiative regimes in NHS contracts. The evidence is clear that many of them have left NHS trusts heavily in debt owing to the need to repay private companies for capital assets, with high repayments meaning that some NHS trusts pay 12 times the initial sum borrowed, giving some investors profits of 40% to 70% in annual returns. Indeed, the poor performance of many of the private outsourcing and consulting companies brought in at significant cost to the taxpayer to provide parts of the covid-19 response stood in stark contrast to the consistently proven effectiveness of our publicly run NHS, for example, but that did not stop more and more contracts being awarded to those seeking to make money off the back of our country’s worst health crisis. Amendment 2, which would prevent VIP lanes by ensuring that any contract awarded under emergency provisions or direct awards should include transparency declarations, is therefore critical.
Bob Seely
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Poplar and Limehouse (Apsana Begum), and I think that some of the things she said will be echoed on the Government Benches.
I want to speak, in the time I have, to new clauses 1, 13 and 16, and I will try to theme them. Before I do so, I want to thank the Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Brentwood and Ongar (Alex Burghart), for his excellent work on the Bill. People moan about Parliament, but we have a Government bringing forward this legislation and Back-Bench MPs from across the House trying to shape it for the betterment of the nation. There is a lot of good in the Bill and I thank the Minister for listening, as he has clearly and obviously done.
I want to talk about the strategic, political and human rights ramifications of supply chain dependency. I thank the Government for their excellent work and the fact that they are moving on this. We will have a national procurement centre, which will look at high-risk firms not only from China but potentially elsewhere. I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) and my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Melton (Alicia Kearns) on their really good work on this.
However, my criticism is that while the Bill is a start, the new clauses that I am speaking to would allow us to go further, and I want to explain why that is. We urgently need to understand the UK’s economic dependence on systemic threats or competitors—namely China, but not only China—and the political, economic and ethical ramifications and risks of that dependency. Not to do so is to betray our national interests. I am concerned at the lack of urgency on this issue, which has become significantly more pressing in the last five years. I thank the Government for focusing more on it, but more needs to be done. I think we are at the starting gate. The reality is that we have high levels of dependency and they are increasing, not decreasing.
Here are some facts. First, as an act of state policy, China is aiming to become less dependent on others, while encouraging others to be more dependent on it. It is decoupling from us, but making sure that we are coupled to it. The Made in China 2025 plan had the goal of raising the domestic content of China’s core components and materials to 70% by 2025. In 2020, it set a goal to become largely self-sufficient in technology by 2035. At the same time, the belt and road initiative means that China is now the largest lender to developing countries and is effectively encouraging debt dependency, which we have talked about in the past. President Xi, at the seventh session of the Chinese Communist party’s finance and economy committee, said that China must develop “killer technologies” to strengthen the
“global supply chain’s dependence on China”.
So this is not a case of, “Gosh, is this happening?” It is stated policy. We do not need to debate whether it is happening; we are being told by the leader of the Chinese state and the Chinese Communist party that it is.
China is already the largest importer to the UK and many other countries. We import more than 50% of our supplies from China in 229 categories of goods. Some 57 of those categories are in sectors critical to the UK’s national security. I therefore agree entirely with what my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green was saying only a few minutes ago. It is difficult to say what is strategic and what is not. In the US, it might be agricultural production. Here it might be the details of 20 million people on the DWP’s databanks. The 57 categories of goods cover communications, energy, healthcare, transport, critical manufacturing, emergency services, agriculture, Government facilities and information technology.
I do not care that we are 85% dependent on China for plastic Christmas trees—although, I do worry about the environmental impact—but I do care that we are 96% dependent on China for phenylacetic acid, which is a basic building block for many drugs; 83% dependent for TV receivers and decoders; and 68% dependent for laptops. China controls near 90% of rare earth processing, which we are now beginning to worry about. And the point about solar panels was well made.
I asked the Foreign Secretary yesterday about having an annual statement on dependency, not just on China but on states in general. He said that one was not needed. With great respect to the Foreign Secretary, I profoundly disagree. We argued during the passage of the National Security and Investment Act 2021 that we need an annual statement of dependency. New clause 13 is about establishing an understanding of the nature of our extreme dependency. I did a report with the Henry Jackson Society a couple of years ago. We found that although we are the least dependent of all the Five Eyes nations, we still have a critical dependency on China in 230 areas of our industry, manufacturing, information technology and so on.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
Just to add to my hon. Friend’s list, as we move to electric vehicles we are about to make ourselves even more dependent. Even battery factories in China are turning themselves into car factories selling to the UK.
Bob Seely
I agree completely and I thank my right hon. Friend for that point. I would not even like that dependency on our allies. Would I like that level of dependency on the United States? No. On Australia? No. But to have that level of dependency on a Communist dictatorship that is investing massively in AI and big data to spy on their own people and increasingly on us as never before, to threaten peace in the Pacific, and to have a stated aim of dominating while freeing itself from dependency on the west, is really an extraordinarily dangerous position for us to find ourselves in.
We know that Chinese Communist party companies such as Huawei actively seek to gain a monopoly position by systematically destroying economic rivals. That is not fair trade; it is trade as a weapon for a Communist party dictatorship. It did it with Huawei, undercutting and deliberately destroying rivals on price through cheap subsidies. It is now doing the same with cellular modules, seeking to dominate and take control of the market. It does that through IP theft, economic espionage, subsidy, access to super-cheap finance, shared technology and other forms of state support.
Companies such as Quectel and Fibocom—the manufacturers of cellular modules—will, like Huawei, claim to be private. They are not. Nothing is private, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green said, in a Communist state. It was profoundly depressing for me, a couple of years ago, to hear two former senior Conservative Ministers, who should know better, say that Huawei was a private company. That is a rather more serious way of accidentally misleading the House than whether somebody ate cake or not, but that is another matter.
What are the dangers? We know that the Chinese leadership see themselves as being in competition with the west. Why? Because they tell us. A 2013 “Document No. 9” concludes that western constitutional democracy and universal values were a fundamental threat to the PRC. Of course our values are a threat to dictatorships. Our values are always a threat to communists. Earlier this year, a work report delivered to the National People’s Congress set out the belief that
“external attempts to supress and contain China are escalating”,
and the term “self-reliance” appeared multiple times. Again, the idea is to create dependency on China for us, while at the same time freeing China from dependency.
What is the worst-case scenario? Frankly, it has happened in Russia, so we should at least be alive to the idea that the worst-case scenario may be happening in the Pacific.
President Xi has told his army to be ready to re-take Taiwan by 2027. As I said, let us please stop pretending that dictators do not mean what they say, because they have a depressing habit of meaning what they say. I wish they did not; I wish they would overpromise and underdeliver, but they tend to do what they promise.
Either the UK is militarily involved or it is not. Either way, an assault on Taiwan, either by slow strangulation—a sort of Berlin scenario—or direct invasion, would profoundly alter the state of the world. We would have to put on the mother of all sanctions. The minute we do that, we will risk not only a global economic meltdown, but an economic meltdown probably worse than covid. It will strain to breaking point our relationship with the United States, the European Union and Australia—and not just our relationship but the interdependent relationships.
I am not saying that will happen—although, I think we are heading in that direction—or that we should stop trading with China; I am saying that it makes a great deal of common sense, frankly, to know what our levels of dependency are. That is why I would love the Minister to commit to at least developing an understanding of what our trade dependency is.
There is another reason to be concerned about supply chains: what is happening in the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region, which other Members have rightly mentioned. A 2022 UN report found serious human rights violations in the region. They seem to be about the most significant human rights abuses currently happening in the world, whether we use the “G” word or not—genocide. The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps alone produces 8% of the world’s cotton. China overall produces 20% of the world’s supply of cotton. Effectively, this is a new slave trade in cotton, as shocking as that sounds. It is not happening 200 hundred years, in the 19th century, in the southern United States; it is happening now, in the early 21st century, in Chinese-controlled central Asia.
There are many other things coming out of the Xinjiang province that tell the story of using forced labour, as both Opposition and Government Members have eloquently spoken about. There is forensic technology available, which we could be using in this country, that can pinpoint the region of origin for items tainted by modern slavery, such as cotton. When it comes to new clause 60, on eradicating slavery and human trafficking in supply chains, I ask the Government to set an example by saying that we will, at the very least, commit—a good Government word—to bringing in that forensic technology within a period of time. That would enable us to understand whether western companies are using slave cotton—an incredibly horrible phrase to use in this age—in their manufactured goods.
Finally, we have spoken about Chinese surveillance technology, and I speak again in support of new clause 1. We have got to get this stuff out of the country for a start. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green says, with all the dual-use capabilities and new styles of conflict, not just in conventional military but in data domination, it is really difficult nowadays to say where security starts and finishes.
In summation, we need to understand, as a critical matter of national importance, our supply chain dependency on any country, but specifically China. I implore the Government to use the Bill, even at this late stage, to bring in a statement of dependency so that we can begin to understand and to take measures to work out not how to stop trading with China, but how to trade more safely. That way, if we need to take sanctions in future, and for the health of our relationship with that superpower, we can begin to work out how to diversify our supply chains in future and, at the same time, do something about the horrors happening in Xinjiang.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. May I return him to the procurement point about what is national security and what is not? He will know, as I do, that if we go to Hong Kong we can see that HSBC, for instance, is already, in a way, in league with the authorities. The changes it is imposing include freezing the pension funds of people who are over here under British National (Overseas) passports and, at times, freezing their bank accounts. It says that it has to obey the Chinese Government. Is that not what we are saying? There is no particular definition. They are all operating, once these companies are in China, under the rule.
Tim Loughton
My right hon. Friend is, of course, right. He and I and others in this place who have been sanctioned in China and beyond have drawn attention to how effectively respectable global British companies are becoming complicit in the suffocation of the democratic principles, freedoms, liberties and rule of law that we all take for granted, and they need to answer for it. Are they on the side of the rule of law, of international freedoms and liberties in all the areas we have described, or have they thrown in their lot for a mess of pottage—or whatever we want to call it—with the Chinese Communist Government, notwithstanding their complete abrogation of any pretence to democratic accountability and freedoms for the individuals who not only happen to live within its borders but against whom they are increasingly able to extend their tentacles globally, not least in this country?
Hikvision and Dalua are both subject to China’s National Intelligence Law, which stipulates that
“any organisation or citizen shall support, assist, and cooperate with state intelligence work according to law”.
The law also permits authorities to detain or criminally punish those who “obstruct” intelligence activities. The presence of vendors who are subject to extrajudicial directions from a foreign Government which conflict with UK law may risk failure by the carrier to adequately protect networks from unauthorised access or interference.
In the UK, Uyghur people face a sustained campaign of transnational repression in the form of threats, harassment, cyberattacks, and online and in-person surveillance. LBC and the Financial Times have recently reported instances of Uyghur people seeking refuge in the UK being offered thousands of pounds a month and blackmailed by Chinese security officers to spy on Uyghur advocates. In that context, the Government must take seriously the threat posed by the presence of this equipment to British national security and the safety of exiled and dissident populations seeking refuge in the United Kingdom. Without urgent action, the UK risks facilitating a system of surveillance designed to extend Chinese domestic policy across borders.
The evidence, which is presented by reputable sources such as IVPM, Axios, The Intercept, The Guardian and the BBC, is deeply troubling. These and other reports paint a harrowing picture of the situation in Xinjiang and provide substantial evidence of Hikvision’s involvement. IVPM’s investigation reveals that Hikvision, a leading provider of surveillance technology, has actively contributed to the surveillance state in Xinjiang, where more than a million Uyghurs are estimated to be held in what we now know to be internment camps. Hikvision’s technology is reportedly used to monitor and control the Uyghur population, facilitating its repression. Worse, it is credibly accused of constructing the surveillance state in Xinjiang in close partnership with the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, a report corroborated by The Guardian, which published leaked documents outlining Hikvision’s close collaboration with Chinese authorities in developing and implementing surveillance technologies in Xinjiang. The evidence suggests a concerted effort by Hikvision to profit from this oppression.
Axios, in its comprehensive reporting, explains that Hikvision’s surveillance cameras are integrated with sophisticated artificial intelligence systems to track, profile and identify individuals in Xinjiang. Let me be clear: this technology is trained to recognise Uyghur-looking faces with a view to profiling them, flagging them when they are doing things of which the Chinese Government do not approve, and then facilitating their persecution through mass surveillance and control with the aim of suppressing their cultural, religious, and political freedoms.
The scale and sophistication of Hikvision’s surveillance technology exacerbate the already dire human rights situation in the region. The Intercept’s exposé provides damning evidence that Hikvision’s technology has been directly used in the internment camps, enabling the Chinese Government to monitor and suppress the Uyghur population. One source revealed that Hikvision’s cameras were installed throughout the camps, capturing every move and expression of the detainees. This raises alarming questions about the company’s complicity in the perpetration of human rights abuses that our own Government have described as
“torture…on an industrial scale”.
The evidence leaves no room for doubt. Hikvision’s involvement in the surveillance and control of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang is deeply troubling, and, even without the security concerns so ably highlighted by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green, would warrant the company’s removal from our supply chains, consistent with our modern-day slavery commitments. We cannot turn a blind eye to the suffering of millions of innocent people, and help those who persecute them fill their pockets with public money.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
I am fascinated by the speech my hon. Friend is making, because he is right in one sense about this. We did a report at the Centre for Social Justice about four or five years ago where we looked at productivity. So often we make international comparisons, but the whole figure for productivity contains that which a country wants to put into it. For example, France does not put health or education into its productivity measures. Health and education have shocking productivity outcomes in terms of cost, which means that France is able to declare itself as having a higher level of productivity. London and the south-east have the highest productivity in Europe, but the real story is that the rest of the UK does not meet the average for the whole of the Europe, which tells us what our problem really is.
Danny Kruger
My right hon. Friend makes important points, and I recognise the difficulty of comparing our productivity figures with those of other countries. The comparison I am making is with our own recent history, but he is absolutely right in what he says. Indeed, the point about what is measured matters enormously. In our debates, we often make the mistake of thinking that the only things that matter are those that can be easily quantified. That is a great challenge we face, particularly in the social sector.
The Government are rightly committed to improving the efficiency and productivity of the public services—I absolutely support them on that—but we face another great challenge that does not get enough of a mention: the need to reduce demand on the system as a whole. We are spending so much not just because we are inefficient, but because the demand on the system is so high. I do not need to run through all the details of the enormous budgets we spend on social breakdowns and the consequences of social problems that we should have averted, in criminal justice, in the health budget, in what is called “social protection”. Some £150 billion is categorised under “social protection” in the public finances—not pensions, but paying for people who have tough lives. We should be seeking to reduce the cost of those budgets, because each one of those costs represents, in a sense, people in trouble. Both for financial and social reasons, we should be trying to reduce that expenditure.
How do we do that? We need social reform. I am not going to bore the House with long thoughts on that, but we need public sector reform, as has been mentioned a bit today, and that includes procurement reform. I acknowledge what Labour is suggesting in some of its amendments and in some of the speeches we have heard: an objection to the whole model of outsourcing. I recognise the objections to some of the failures of public service management—new public management—over the past generation, and some of the challenges of outsourcing and of competition in the public sector or for public services. However, I do not think insourcing everything is the answer. Reverting to a pre-1990 model of everything being delivered by the central state, as one of the amendments and Unison are championing, is not the right model. We need a better model of outsourcing that relies much more on civil society and, in particular, on the local, community-based services in which the UK is so rich and which do such a great job. We need to be able to measure their value properly and commission their services effectively. That is what this Bill aims to do.
I declare an interest, in that I set up and ran for many years projects working in prisons and with youth services. I have personal acquaintance with the challenge of EU procurement, not only social fund commissioning, but central and local government contracts. None of this is easy and I am familiar with all of that. I am familiar with the frustrations of getting on the frameworks; expressing interest; bidding through tenders; and being treated as bid candy on a long contract. I am also familiar with going through a pointless competition process where there is only one obvious provider—the one that helped to design the service—which still has to jump through loads of competitive hoops only for some other random provider to come in and swipe the contract; I speak bitterly from experience. The challenges that small social enterprises face are significant.
The difference between procurement and commissioning is not often acknowledged. We often have procurement departments doing work that is too complicated for them on their own. We need to have proper commissioning where people who are paying for a service work collaboratively with providers, stakeholders, service users and other parts of the system. Everybody needs to bring their assets, resources, skills and experience to co-design the service that is needed locally. The Bill brings us much closer to that model. I greatly welcome the measures that have been included, especially around the simplification of tendering. The single portal is an important development and it is good for transparency as well. The Tell Us Once registration is essential, as is the help that will be given to SMEs and social enterprises, including the active reduction in the barriers to tendering, lower reporting requirements and so on.
Most of all there is the shift from the most economically advantageous regime to the most advantageous regime. That small excision of the word “economically” is an important recognition of the point that my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) was just making about the need to go beyond a purely commercial estimation of the value of social projects. I would go further. In 2020, I wrote a report for the Government who were trying to maximise and sustain the enormous contributions that communities were making during the first lockdown. I suggested that we recognise and declare that the whole of Government commissioning—the whole of public service spending—is to deliver social value for the public. Essentially, that is what we all believe and it should be stated much more explicitly in my view. I just bring the House’s attention back to the Conservative Government’s Social Value Act 2012, which gets those principles right.
I recognise that we need to take enormous steps forward. I honour what the Government have been doing around national security. I also honour the steps that have been taken to ensure greater opportunities for SMEs and social enterprises, and I commend the Bill to the House.
Alex Burghart
It is a pleasure to wrap up a very interesting Report stage on this landmark piece of post-Brexit legislation that will allow our country to rewrite its procurement rules for the first time in decades.
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman), who had interesting reflections on the Bill. One could be forgiven for being able to listen to her remarks and not understand that the SNP has absented Scotland from the legislation. That is a great shame, and I believe that deep down she recognises the potential of the legislation. As the years go by, and small and medium-sized enterprises, and other businesses and contracting authorities in England, Wales and Northern Ireland benefit from the new regime, we will take pleasure in reminding businesses and contracting authorities in Scotland that it was the SNP that chose to keep Scotland out of it.
I touched on new clause 1, tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), in my opening remarks. I am grateful for his saying that he will not push the new clause to a vote today. In return, I am pleased to reaffirm what I said earlier: we are happy to talk to him and other colleagues who are concerned about the definition of “sensitive”, to ensure that it captures the issues about which he is concerned. We do not consider “sensitive” to attach itself just to sites of military significance or intelligence centres controlled by the agencies. It goes further, and we will take his points away regarding ministerial movements.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
May I be clear? On the question I was asking, and have been asking, the Government have moved, particularly in reference to the national security laws of China, but my key point is that the Government should consider that all Departments fall into that category. There should not be any “B” definition. It would be far better if everybody were incorporated into that definition by the time the Bill got to the other place. Supplication would then have to be made for a variation or change, which the Cabinet Office will make a decision about. Start with the power; then let them come and ask for it to be changed. That is the way to do it.
Alex Burghart
I thank my right hon. Friend for his comments. He will have heard me say earlier that we understand his views that “sensitive” could incorporate a broader range of assets, where information gleaned on the movement of officials and politicians could be detrimental to our national security.
I reaffirm our commitment to make a statement in the House within six months of Royal Assent, setting out the timeline for the removal from sensitive sites of surveillance equipment supplied by companies subject to the national intelligence law of China. I state again my gratitude to my right hon. Friend for his important work in this area and for the constructive dialogue that we have had with colleagues on the matter.
Amendment 3, tabled by the hon. Member for St Helens South and Whiston (Ms Rimmer), introduces a new ground for the exclusion of suppliers involved in forced organ harvesting. The amendment replicates an amendment made to the Bill in the other House, and subsequently removed by Committee of this House. I reassure her that the Government are not turning a blind eye to the extraordinarily important subject that she raises and highlights consistently.
We are in full agreement that complicity in the abuses associated with the overseas organ trade must not be tolerated. The Government have taken action to address that issue on a number of fronts. The Health and Care Act 2022 prohibits commercial organ tourism. I know the hon. Lady was involved in discussions leading to those provisions being included in the Act. The Government continue to monitor and review evidence relating to reports of forced organ harvesting in China, and maintain a dialogue with leading NGOs and international partners on that very important issue. I reassure her that forced organ harvesting is already covered by the exclusion grounds for professional misconduct. These grounds cover serious breaches of all ethical and professional standards—whether mandatory or not—that apply to different industries and sectors. The mandatory grounds in relation to corporate manslaughter and human trafficking are also relevant in this context. We have sought to limit the grounds—particularly those which, like this one, require an assessment of factual circumstances by the contracting authority—to those where there is a major and particular risk to public procurement. We are not aware of any evidence that a supplier to the UK public sector has been involved in forced organ harvesting, but I want to reassure the hon. Lady that the Bill will be able to deal with this horrendous practice appropriately.