(11 years, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberI understand why the right hon. Gentleman finds our position frustrating, but we cannot give a specific figure because it depends entirely on what price the bidders tell us they can do it for. I can tell him that the cost of providing for the additional 50,000 offenders will be covered by the savings that we make through competition. Opposition Members who dislike the idea of competition in this field must tell us whether they support the extension of the provision to short-term offenders. If they would not pay for it through competition, how would they pay for it?
Will my right hon. Friend tell the House what he considers to be the most intolerable aspects of the United Kingdom’s current relationship with the European Union?
(11 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberThat is a fair point. I think we need to look at the individuals asserting a right. They might say “I have established a family; I have a right to family life” and we say, “Yes, family life is important and it does matter”. In view of the fact that someone else’s family life has been taken away, however, how could anyone stand on that right? How can that be right? A key part of my Bill is that anyone who asserts a right cannot just stand on that right and say “That’s my right”. The courts need to look at the wider circumstances of the case, including at the person’s conduct, to establish whether they come to justice, as it were, with clean hands themselves. Their own conduct should be examined and taken into account. We need to assess whether it is in the interests of justice in the round for those people to be able to assert that right.
I wholeheartedly agree with what my hon. Friend has said and I congratulate him on bringing this Bill forward. He refers to the common law principle of equity, which has always been part of the English law. It means that people cannot expect to get a remedy from the courts if they do not come before it with clean hands. Does my hon. Friend believe that that is the essence of what we are talking about—restoring the principles of equity?
I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend who makes a characteristically forceful argument. For too long, human rights have been interpreted under the convention in what lawyers have called an “objective test”. It asks people “Do you have a family?” and “Do you have a right to family life?”—and if the answer is yes, end of story. The British common law way, however, asks people “Do you have a family?” and if the answer is yes, it says it is important to preserve it, but it also asks whether they have acted in such a way according to a subjective test to establish whether that right should be allowed as far as that person is concerned. That is a key point, which goes to the heart of why human rights are in such crisis in Britain today, and it is a key plank of the change I am seeking to make through the Bill.
There are more cases. A Pakistani man was found by the deportation tribunal to be an al-Qaeda operative who posed, and still poses, a serious threat to the national security of the United Kingdom, and another man was found to be willing to participate in the former man’s plans for a mass casualty attack in the UK—in other words, these people were plotting terrorism. The man could not be deported back to Pakistan because of the risk that he would be maltreated by the Pakistani intelligence service.
I do, because I believe that we need to deal with the margin of appreciation and proportionality. The European Court in Strasbourg has taken a disproportionately narrow view of the idea of the margin of appreciation, and so this is a key change that we should make. We should not be shy in doing this if we are to get the right settlement for the UK.
Since its entry into force, section 3 of the Human Rights Act has had a far-reaching effect on how British judges apply legislation in the UK. Before that provision, the British judiciary’s interpretation of an Act of Parliament centred on the ordinary meaning of the Act’s words when viewed in their context, taken together with the intention of Parliament when enacting the words. However, in his opinion in the leading case on the application of section 3—Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza—Lord Nicholls stated that
“the interpretative obligation decreed by section 3 is of an unusual and far-reaching character. Section 3 may require a court to depart from the unambiguous meaning the legislation would otherwise bear. In the ordinary course the interpretation of legislation involves seeking the intention reasonably to be attributed to Parliament in using the language in question. Section 3 may require the court to depart from this legislative intention, that is, depart from the intention of the Parliament which enacted the legislation.”
That is a crucial point in terms of how Acts of Parliament are interpreted. I think they should be interpreted in line with what Parliament intended, not with what a group of judges from overseas might seek to rule.
Another impact of section 3 is that the courts are empowered to strike down what the HRA classifies as “subordinate legislation”—what we call secondary legislation or statutory instruments—if it is not possible to read this legislation as being compatible with ECHR rights, and the primary legislation under which it is made does not prevent the subordinate legislation’s incompatibility from being removed. Under the HRA, subordinate legislation includes most legislation that is not in itself an Act of Parliament but is made under the authority of an Act, including much legislation approved by resolution of each House of Parliament. That position is a concern and we should change it.
Section 6 of the HRA obliges all public authorities in the UK to act in compliance with European convention rights in the HRA, except where an authority cannot act compatibly because of a provision of primary legislation or where the authority is giving effect to a provision of and made under primary legislation that cannot be interpreted in a way that is compatible with convention rights. In other words, this reaches into not only our legal system, but our public authorities, as an obligation that they need to follow. We can see that the HRA has been incredibly far-reaching.
On that note, I want to deal with the key changes that I am seeking to make in this Bill to address the mischief that I have described. We need to restore balance in this entire area, so the Bill would repeal the HRA and replace it with a new settlement, which would draw on the framework of the HRA but vary it in relation to the key concerns that have arisen. There are 10 pillars to the reform I am proposing. First, the UK Supreme Court should be the final court of law for human rights matters.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention and I associate myself with his comments. The whole House is indebted to them for their work and diligence in putting together this Bill. I might not agree with every particular of it, as my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset has just said, but that is not the point. The point is that the House has been given an opportunity to debate a matter that is of great consequence and concern to our constituents.
We must not forget the manner in which my hon. Friend the Member for Dover managed to obtain the slot for the Bill in the first place. As Members might be aware, I am a member of the Procedure Committee, along with my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset. We had the pleasure of listening to my hon. Friend the Member for Dover when he came before us to give evidence as part of our inquiry into the private Members’ Bills procedure. My hon. Friend regaled the Committee with the manner in which he obtained the slot to introduce the Bill as a presentation Bill—I think that is right, and he is nodding in assent. He slept overnight outside the Committee Room—in the corridor, I understand—with little by way of sustenance. I think he mentioned that he might have slipped out for the odd beer, which is quite understandable. He stayed in the corridor overnight to ensure that he was first in the queue the next morning to secure a slot and have first pick of the dates for Second Reading. It is as a result of his hard work and diligence on that occasion that we are here today. The whole House should be grateful to my hon. Friend for that. He has done us all and the country a great service.
Looking at the Bill, one can see that it is no ordinary private Member’s Bill. Such Bills often run to just one or two pages, but this is a substantial Bill, which runs to no fewer than 21 clauses and has a schedule of several pages annexed to it. That gives some measure of the work that has gone into preparing it and bringing it before the House this morning. It should have been introduced as a Government Bill. Had a majority Conservative Government been formed after the last general election, perhaps it would have been. On page 79 of the Conservative manifesto at the last general election the following commitment was made:
“To protect our freedoms from state encroachment and encourage greater social responsibility, we will replace the Human Rights Act with a UK Bill of Rights.”
We all accept, of course, that the Conservatives did not win that general election and it is therefore understandable that the Government, being a coalition Government, have not introduced a Bill that was foreshadowed only by the Conservative manifesto. The coalition agreement provides for a commission, about which we heard this morning, to be established to look into the appropriateness of replacing the Human Rights Act with our own UK Bill of Rights.
My hon. Friend echoes the views of many millions of our constituents across the country. Hirst submitted a claim to the European court based on article 3 of the first protocol—the right to free elections—which states:
“The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.”
The wording of article 3 does not actually confer individuals with a right to vote. When the Grand Chamber gave its judgment, it stretched a point; the court had already decided in the case of Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium that article 3 included an individual’s right to vote and to stand for election.
It is illuminating to consider how Hirst built on the previous Mathieu-Mohin case. It shows how rights are developed incrementally, case by case, salami-slicing common sense and gradually moving away from what most people would think article 3—in this case—actually meant. As was discussed during our debates on prisoner voting, the Court ruled that this issue had not been considered here. I submit that it was considered in section 3 of the Representation of the People Act 1983. It may not have been debated specifically—I was not here at the time—but presumably that was because both sides of the House took it for granted that prisoners would not have the vote. That was accepted by the whole country and the whole House.
Is not one of the most critical issues the way in which the Court interpreted the amendment through the protocol, which was contrary to the rules of interpretation of the Vienna convention? If we had stuck to those strict rules, we would not have got into the difficulty we are in at the moment.
I bow to my hon. Friend’s greater knowledge of these matters, and I am sure that he is absolutely right. We have allowed ourselves to stray from the original meaning of the article.
I will not detain the House for much longer on the prisoner voting case, but it strikes at the heart of the issue. The Court is, in effect, saying that this House cannot decide for itself what to do and who it can allow to vote in our elections, and that somehow people such as Hirst, a convicted axe killer, should be allowed to vote and decide who has the right to sit in this Chamber. Most of my constituents would say, without hesitation or doubt, that that cannot be right, and it is because of such cases that it is right for us to consider the Bill promoted by my hon. Friend the Member for Dover.
One problem with the European Court of Human Rights is that 47 nations—it is not the same as the European Union, which has 27 members, shortly to be 28—have signed up to the European convention on human rights. With a population of some 800 million, any one of whom can choose to bring a case at any time, it is unsurprising that an avalanche of cases has been brought before the Court. The evidence of the Court’s statistics calls into question how genuine some of those cases are. I looked briefly at the Court’s website, which lists what it calls “rule 39 requests” granted in the past five years for all 47 countries. That gives us an idea of how many countries out of the 47 did not have any cases against them at all. One would have thought that, if the convention were really dealing with serious breaches of human rights, the odd case might be brought before the Court from somewhere in Europe, bearing in mind that all the countries concerned are democracies that operate under the rule of law. One might expect the odd case, here or there, to be brought before the Court.
In fact, only Andorra and Montenegro had zeros beside their name on that list. At the other end of the scale, the United Kingdom soared up to the top with 5,176 cases. Using that yardstick, one would assume that we had a worse human rights record than any other country, but that makes no logical sense. I believe that those figures are, in fact, attributable to the assiduity of our human rights lawyers in bringing cases to the attention of our courts and then taking them to appeal in Europe, particularly since the passage of the 1998 Act, rather than to any failing on the part of our Government or, to be fair, the last Labour Government. Yet anyone glancing casually at those figures might assume that those Governments had been going around inflicting atrocities on people.
Mention was made earlier of the Brighton declaration, and I believe that the Government have done good work in that regard. It was entirely right that we should use our presidency of the Council to try to bring some common sense to the system and to reform the way in which the Court operates, but I am not sure that that endeavour has met with a great deal of success. I looked at the latest figures available, which represent a snapshot taken on 31 January this year. That makes them quite up to date in terms of Government and international statistics. They showed a total of 126, 850 outstanding applications to the Court, including 3,250 from the United Kingdom. We were not top of that particular chart; other countries had far higher numbers than us. Russia, for example, had 27,450 pending cases. This demonstrates the fact that, with 800 million people entitled to bring their cases before the Court, there is a huge backlog.
One advantage of my hon. Friend’s Bill for the British people is that, by effectively repatriating these powers back to the United Kingdom, it will make things far easier for anyone with a genuine grievance, and who genuinely feels that their human rights have been infringed, because their case will be dealt with entirely within this country.
My hon. Friend the Member for Dover has done a wonderful job. Much more could be said on this issue, and I fear that the time available today does not enable us to do it proper justice in many respects. I would have liked to deal with how we could withdraw from the European Court and the European convention and to explain why I believe that even if my hon. Friend’s Bill, which has much to commend it, were to become law, all we would be doing—unless we withdraw from the convention, as my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley said in an intervention some time ago—is creating another hurdle. As long as we are signed up and as long as people have the ability to go to Strasbourg, we will not solve the problem. Equally, as long as we are members of the European Union and as long as it has the desire to sign up to the European convention of human rights and to build on what it calls fundamental rights under the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, which we briefly discussed here a few days ago—and make no bones about it, this is where the leadership of the EU would like to go—we will not, frankly, solve this problem.
Let me finish with two points. First, in yesterday’s by-election, the majority of votes were cast, if not for parties, for candidates who believe as I do that we would be better off out of the European Union. Part of the reasoning is that we would free ourselves from the risk of being tied in to the European convention on human rights by the back door that would result from our membership of the EU. Finally, one problem with having this debate today is that it is the final Friday for private Members’ business in this Session. I only wish that this Bill had been able to be considered on the first and not the last Friday, so that it would genuinely have stood a chance of having further consideration in Committee—a Committee on which I would happily have served. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Dover for bringing the Bill forward and look forward to hearing the remaining contributions to the debate.
I welcome this opportunity to make a short contribution to the debate, not least because I have the privilege of being chairman of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Council of Europe. We deal on a regular basis with the subject that has been debated today. I have also recently been appointed as the rapporteur with responsibility for drawing up an opinion from the parliamentary assembly on proposed protocol 15 to the convention on human rights.
I should like to begin by commenting on the Minister’s typically generous and reasonable speech. He talked about the universality of human rights, and about how we must concentrate on defending the most vulnerable people in our society. In relation to the Commission on a Bill of Rights, he argued that the time was not now right for this measure. However, I do not see any great distinction between the views being expressed in Scotland and those in the rest of the United Kingdom on this issue.
Bearing in mind what the Government are doing on prisoner voting eligibility, there is a strong case to be made—especially in the light of the Bill, into which my hon. Friend the Member for Dover (Charlie Elphicke) has put so much work—for saying that the Government should introduce a draft Bill, perhaps along the lines of the proposals for prisoner voting, in which the different alternatives put forward in the commission’s report could be set out. It could then be submitted, in the form of proper legislation, to scrutiny by a Joint Committee of both Houses. We would then be able to make some progress.
One of the messages from yesterday’s by-election result is that there is an enormous amount of public cynicism about the lack of progress on issues such as these. The public are concerned about abuses of human rights legislation and the perverse judgments being implemented, and they want the House to take action in those areas and others.
As the hon. Gentleman has mentioned the by-election—and my “I like Mike” lapel badge—will he allow me the privilege of being the first Member to congratulate Mike Thornton on his imminent admission to the House as the new Member of Parliament for Eastleigh? Perhaps the hon. Gentleman would like to reflect on whether the historic victory of the Liberal Democrats in Eastleigh—we are the first party in government in at least 30 years to defend successfully a marginal seat in a by-election—can be attributed to the fact that we have not displayed the same kind of ideological disunity over issues such as human rights and international development that he is demonstrating right now from the Conservative Benches.
To reinforce the point I was making, the complacency that flows through every word that the hon. Gentleman has uttered will be seen as anathema to the majority of people who voted in the by-election in favour of Eurosceptic parties who want a completely fresh look at our relationship with the European Union.
I am obviously happy to congratulate anybody who has been elected to this House, and I hope in due course to have an opportunity to meet the new Member representing Eastleigh. That does not mean, however, that we should ignore the importance of the issue before us today, and I suspect that a majority of the people who went out to vote yesterday would have been in favour of the Bill on the grounds that something has to be done about abuses of human rights legislation and the Court’s perverse judgments.
The Brighton declaration is being carried forward by means of draft protocol 15 to the European convention on human rights. From my perspective, one of the most important parts of that draft protocol will be its amendment to the convention’s preamble, emphasising the importance of having a system that introduces proportionality as well as subsidiarity into the Court’s decisions. But if I look at the opinion of the European Court of Human Rights on draft protocol 15, I detect a lack of enthusiasm for the part of the protocol that will mean changing the wording of the preamble. I hope I am not being unduly sceptical in wondering how keen the Court is on the principle of emphasising the subsidiarity and the doctrine of the margin of appreciation, as reflected in the outcome of the Brighton conference.
In that context, some people believe—I have heard judges of the Court themselves expressing this opinion—that it does not make a ha’porth of difference what is in the preamble, as it is only the actual text of the treaty that makes a difference. That reminds me of the importance of how these treaties are interpreted. One problem at the moment is that the treaties are being interpreted by the Court in a way that is out of tune with the specific wording in the Vienna convention, which says that there should be a strict interpretation of treaties rather than allowing them to be interpreted in an expansive way over time.
The way to change the wording of a treaty, as is now being proposed, is to introduce a protocol to that treaty. The way to introduce a requirement that there should be prisoner voting would be to amend article 3 of protocol 1 rather than to try to do it by the back door by using judicial legislation—effectively what the Court has been doing. This is where the great frustration arises among the public when they see human rights that they all believe in—the right to life, the right not to be tortured and so forth—losing direction under the Court. The universality of human rights is important, as reflected in the debate between two Old Etonian Members earlier. We should be talking about the universal declaration of human rights, rather than trying to use the European convention and the EU legislation that incorporates it as a means of trying to impose on individual sovereign Governments and Parliaments a set of rules that do not accord with the culture of those individual countries.
Let me end by reiterating my thanks and congratulations to my hon. Friend the Member for Dover. Unlike many Members who present private Members’ Bills, he put a great deal of personal effort into the drafting of his Bill. Presenting legislation, especially private Members’ legislation, is an iterative process, and I hope that in the next Session of Parliament, either my hon. Friend or a colleague who is successful in the ballot will present the Bill again—perhaps taking into account some of the points made by the Minister—so that by the time of the next general election, Conservative Members are clear about where we want to go and what legislative change we want to make. We shall then be able to respond to public concern, rather than saying that it is far too early to do anything and giving every reason under the sun for not being able to make up our minds. My hon. Friend has done a great service to the House and the country in concentrating minds on this important issue.
(11 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash), who does such sterling service to the House in his capacity as Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee. I think I am the first person to speak in this debate, apart from the Front Benchers, who is not a member of that Committee, and I pay tribute to its members, who have ensured that we have the opportunity to hold the Government and the European Union to account in tonight’s debate and on subsequent occasions.
I shall confine my remarks to the aspect of the Bill dealing with the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. You will remember, Mr Deputy Speaker, that when the Lisbon treaty was being discussed, our Government said that they were against the Fundamental Rights Agency because they thought it completely superfluous and unnecessary. They said that all it would do would be to duplicate the work of the Council of Europe. That is exactly what it has set out to do—to usurp the Council of Europe and duplicate its work.
I am disappointed, given that the Government are newly playing hardball in Europe, that we are not taking on the agency and saying, “Hold on a minute, why are you expanding your ambit of activity? Why have you got a substantially increased budget?” My hon. Friend the Member for Daventry (Chris Heaton-Harris) referred in his excellent contribution to the agency’s budget having risen to €21.3 million a year. Only a few years ago, it was hardly €100—it was a small, miniuscule budget. A lot of that budget is being wasted, and I will give the House an example.
About 18 months ago when I chaired the committee on migration, refugees and displaced persons at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, I was lucky enough to be invited by the Fundamental Rights Agency to address a conference in the centre of Warsaw. To my incredulity, I found that a whole 40-storey hotel in the centre of Warsaw was taken up with guests of the Fundamental Rights Agency who, on inquiry, had all had their expenses paid by that agency and had come from all over Europe, and beyond, to discuss issues relating to fundamental rights. That seemed an unnecessarily extravagant way of getting information—the Fundamental Rights Agency is to provide expert advice and support to European Union institutions and member states, not to give jollies to people from non-governmental organisations who want an outing to Warsaw at the expense of the European taxpayer.
When I read the brilliant research paper from the House of Commons Library and saw some of the background on how the Commission reached its conclusion, I was a little dubious. It states that on 13 December,
“the Commission proposed a new Multiannual Framework…and consulted the Management Board of the Fundamental Rights Agency”.
In other words, it consulted the producer interests and received a preliminary contribution. The paper went on:
“The Management Board consulted the Agency’s Fundamental Rights Platform (a network of cooperation with civil society)”.
I suspect that most of those in the hotel I described were members of the agency’s fundamental rights platform. Unsurprisingly—such people are used to receiving that sort of indulgence at the expense of the European taxpayer—they were in favour of expanding the ambit of the Fundamental Rights Agency, as set out in the revised multi-annual framework. What an extraordinary state of affairs. I am surprised that the Government have not played a harder ball on the issue, although I am sure we will have the chance to focus on it by tabling an amendment to delete that provision when we discuss the Bill in Committee or on Report.
When commenting on the results of the consultation to which I have referred, the European Parliament stated:
“One hundred and eight organisations took part in the consultation process. Most organisations support the Agency’s work in the current areas, and would like it to continue…particularly in the areas of…asylum and migration.”
There was a lot of support for extending the work of the Fundamental Rights Agency, and I am not surprised.
If we must have such an agency, it would be better if it stopped duplicating the work of the Council of Europe. All members of the European Union are also members of the Council of Europe, but the Council of Europe’s budget is not going up because its European Union members say that we cannot afford to spend more money on it. The costs of the European Court of Human Rights continue to increase, but the Council of Europe’s budget is being squeezed in all other areas, including research. Meanwhile, such research is increasingly being done by the Fundamental Rights Agency with money that should rightfully be contributed to the Council of Europe.
In a sense, I am disappointed that the Government seem to go along with the expansion of the Fundamental Rights Agency. How does that fit with the policy of this Government and this Parliament of trying to reduce the size of the European Union budget? The challenge given to those of us who want a real-terms reduction in that budget is always: “What are you going to cut?” Well, expenditure on the Fundamental Rights Agency is one thing we could cut, and we could do it by cutting that agency’s wings in the multi-annual framework that started this January and continues for the next five years. If we had not agreed to the expansion of that framework and had instead insisted on it being reduced in scope, we would have secured real savings and contributed to the genuine reduction in the European Union budget that everybody—certainly on the Government Benches—wishes to see.
I praise my hon. Friend for his work in establishing the budget of this new organisation. Since the Council of Europe gives the European taxpayer such good value for money in having its budget reduced each year, instead of having a new agency, why not give all its functions to the Council of Europe? In that way, we could reduce the European budget.
I think that is a brilliant idea, and for a long time I thought that was the policy supported by the Government. It is certainly supported by almost every member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, including many from core European Union states who regard themselves as being Europhiles in the extreme, but even they ask what the point is of duplicating the functions of the Council of Europe with those of the Fundamental Rights Agency. I hope my hon. Friend will take that idea forward.
If we are to have a Fundamental Rights Agency with a multi-annual framework, as stated in the Bill, why not concentrate on one or two areas with an obvious need for further work? At the moment, the management board mentions “thematic areas”, which include:
“Immigration and integration of migrants; visa and border control; asylum”,
and the European Union is fundamentally failing in that area at the moment.
The week before last I was in Greece where I visited the Greece-Turkey border and received briefings from Greek Ministers and the Hellenic coastguard about the problem of illegal migrants coming into Greece, mainly from Turkey. One problem in Greece that contributes to the
“racism, xenophobia and related intolerance”—
that is thematic area (j)—is that it is virtually impossible for Greece to return illegal migrants to the countries from which they came.
Let me give the House an example. When visiting a detention centre in Athens, I went up to the wire fence and asked whether anybody spoke English. To cut a long story short, I started a conversation with a person who said that he had arrived in the detention centre having set out from Afghanistan—he is an Afghan national—and that he had paid smugglers $8,000 to get across Iran and Turkey. He wanted to go from Turkey across the Aegean sea and on to the Italian eastern seaboard so that he could make his way to the United Kingdom. I inquired about that and asked why he wanted to go to London. He replied that it was because he had been there for five years until a few months ago, and that he had lots of friends in London who had paid the $8,000 for his return trip. He had been deported from the United Kingdom after playing our system for about five years, and within a few weeks of getting back to Afghanistan this wholly undeserving case was presenting himself in a Greek detention centre.
Unfortunately for that man, the boat from Turkey foundered—I suppose it is fortunate that the Greek coastguard rescued him and he was not drowned—and he found himself in the detention centre, but the Greek authorities had no way of returning him back to Afghanistan, because Afghanistan does not accept anyone in Greece who emanated from Afghanistan. If he is detained in Greece for the maximum of 18 months, he will be released and will join all those other people in Greece—this also happens in Italy—who do not belong or do not necessarily wish to stay there, which contributes to feelings of racism and xenophobia on the part of the indigenous population. Something like 60% of people in Greek prisons are non-Greek nationals.
If there is a need for the Fundamental Rights Agency, it should deal with that sort of thing rather than mess around with the other expanded areas to which hon. Members have referred. For example, if the FRA looked at the inability of people to claim asylum in Turkey because it has opted out of many Geneva convention provisions, it might help to focus attention on the need to strengthen the Turkey-EU border.
Is my hon. Friend conscious of the fact that, in the explanatory memorandum of 10 January 2012, Lord McNally, the Justice Minister, gave an example of a useful tool in measuring the impact of European legislation on fundamental rights in Europe? He cited
“a comparative legal analysis of the position for gay, lesbian, bisexual and transsexual people across EU States which has provided useful data in an area where there is little research”.
Is my hon. Friend aware that that criteria was chosen by the Justice Minister?
I was not aware of that and am grateful to my hon. Friend for pointing it out. As hon. Members often say, it is an issue of priorities. People and organisations must be judged on the priority they give to different issues. In the light of the enormous crisis in Europe and on European borders, it is odd that that should be a priority as opposed to the problems to which I have referred.
The debate gives us an opportunity to go into many other aspects of asylum and border control, but I will not do so. I have highlighted why they are important. If the organisation has to exist, it would be better if it got on with dealing with serious issues rather than trying to expand its remit.
To whom will the FRA be accountable? Who will set its agenda and control its budget?
Order. We could always continue the debate in the Tea Room if we are getting frustrated with the rest of the Chamber. I am sure that is not the case.
In that case, Mr Deputy Speaker, I shall raise my voice to make it obvious that this is not a private conversation. My hon. Friend the Member for The Cotswolds (Geoffrey Clifton-Brown) would like to have this conversation on the record—it certainly would not be on the record if it took place in the Tea Room. The short answer to his question is that we have a great opportunity, because the FRA has its multi-annual framework approved every five years. If we believe it has the wrong priorities, this is the moment to change it. The Bill could be amended to reflect the concerns of this Parliament.
I will talk directly to you, Mr Deputy Speaker, but also to my hon. Friend on my right flank. It would be impossible to amend the framework. As my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) said, what hon. Members say will have little impact on the final decision.
I assure my hon. Friend 100% that, if this House, in its sovereign right, decides to repeal the European Communities Act 1972—we entered on a voluntary basis in that year—or any provision that emanates from section 2, by, for example, using the “notwithstanding” formula, we are entitled to do so. Nobody can do anything to stop us doing so. Whether the Whips would allow it is another thing.
Order. I have been very generous in allowing hon. Members to drift all over, but I am not going back to 1972. I want us to stick to Second Reading. We have a bit of time and a bit of latitude has been given, but I do not want to go to the complete ends of it.
As you know, Mr Deputy Speaker, the fact that time is available does not mean we have to use it all. Other hon. Members may wish to participate in the debate. Some might regret that they missed the opportunity to participate when they look at the record. Some of us hope we will catch Mr Speaker’s eye in tomorrow’s debate, and might do our prospects some damage if we speak in extenso this evening.
This is a worthwhile debate and it is fantastic that we have the opportunity to discuss the Bill. I disagree with the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood), who is no longer in his place. He said that the relatively low attendance shows a lack of interest, but many hon. Members have looked at the issue and we are discussing it, and we look forward to the Minister’s response.
Obviously, most Europe debates from now on—for the next several years—will be preparatory to that great referendum. I would like the Government to start work on drawing up an audit of the costs and benefits of our EU membership. In the context of the Bill, they could do a lot worse than draw up an audit of the costs and benefits to this country of the work of the FRA compared with the work that is already being done in the Council of Europe—the Council of Europe’s work is being duplicated by the FRA.
I will not vote against the Bill, but I hope that, in due course, we have the opportunity to discuss amendments to it.
It is a great pleasure to take part in this wide-ranging debate on the Bill. Two of the three measures we have considered are fairly uncontroversial. The Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice has rightly said that the changes are not far-reaching and are largely technical. However, as was pointed out by the hon. Members for Daventry (Chris Heaton-Harris), for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood) and for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg), and my hon. Friend the Member for Luton North (Kelvin Hopkins), the third proposal—on the number of European commissioners—is more controversial and significant. I will come to that measure in due course.
The draft decision to give legally binding effect to the online version of the Official Journal of the European Union—notwithstanding the necessity to ensure that arrangements are in place for an electronic signature to be added to the online version to ensure authenticity—has come quite late in the day. Given that we are well into the 21st century—even if some hon. Members might wish to dispute this, or wish to go back in time—and given that the Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice reminded us, with a little help, that there are 27 member states of the EU and 23 official languages published on a daily basis, the proposal for an online legal version might have been made earlier. We welcome the decision and support the Government in signing up to it. We are sure that it will facilitate a more efficient and economical legal publication and communication of legislation, other adopted Acts, information and notices, European Court of Justice judgments and invitations to tender for contracts. Given the climate change legislation we passed in government and the EU targets we have signed up to, I hope that printing fewer paper versions of the Official Journal will go some way to contributing to reaching those targets.
Before I attended this debate, I thought the draft Council decision to establish a new multi-annual framework for the EU Fundamental Rights Agency for the period 2013-17 was relatively uncontroversial. Labour Members, at least, think it is a sensible way forward. The hon. Member for Christchurch (Mr Chope) mentioned the issues drawn out by the explanatory memorandum from the Justice Minister, Lord McNally—I tend to agree with him—who said that the agency
“provides a useful tool in measuring the impact of EU legislation on fundamental rights across Europe including, as appropriate, in candidate countries”.
The Council of Europe is not required to take on that role. The hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash) cited the example of the FRA’s comparative legal analysis of the position for gay, lesbian, bisexual and transsexual people across EU states. This is a serious issue and a useful report. You will not be surprised to hear, Mr Deputy Speaker, that I am not in agreement with either the hon. Member for Stone or for Christchurch.
I do not know how familiar the hon. Lady is with the Council of Europe and the work of the Parliamentary Assembly, but it comprises 47 countries. All the applicant states for membership of the European Union are members of the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe staff are currently dealing with all the issues she has described, but they do not have the extra resource that is now being put into the FRA.
I assure the hon. Gentleman that as the shadow Minister for Europe I am well aware of the Council of Europe and its composition of 47 members, and I am well aware of its work. I will say again to the hon. Gentleman that I disagree with him. The Council of Europe does not have a role in measuring the impact of EU legislation, something I was just pointing out. If he checks the record, he will see that that is fact, not opinion.
The third draft decision is more controversial and relates to the number of European Commissioners. I agree with the hon. Member for Stone that this issue has been debated over and over again, not least during the most recent treaty change. It is an issue of great sensitivity for both small and large member states. The Lisbon treaty provided that from 2014—in other words, from the next European Commission—the number of European Commissioners should be two thirds the number of member states. That was the position we came to at the end of the negotiations on the Lisbon treaty. However, as we know, Ireland asked for a change to this provision, and a guarantee that each member state would keep its commissioner in the years to come.
As hon. Members have said, there are two sides to this argument. Some argue that it is too cumbersome, unwieldy and inefficient to have one commissioner per member state, especially given that the EU is now composed of 27 member states—soon to be 28 later this year. Arguments have been put forward, particularly powerfully by smaller member states, that having one commissioner for each member state is the only way to secure equality. That is the Republic of Ireland’s position. As the Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice said in his opening speech, there is a case for looking at the possibility of introducing some degree of seniority in the college of commissioners. We have also advocated the creation of a Growth commissioner in the Commission. As the explanatory notes set out—this relates to the intervention made by the hon. Member for The Cotswolds (Geoffrey Clifton-Brown)—the draft decision will not apply beyond 2019, and will cease to apply if the EU reaches 30 or more member states, whichever comes earlier. My best guess is the former.
The issue is certainly still live, sensitive and controversial. I am sure it will be the subject of ongoing debate in years to come, so I do not think today’s debate in this House is the end of the matter. We will have to see which direction the debate takes. There are two sides of the argument and we want to respect the sensitivities of smaller member states. That being said, I met the Danish ambassador earlier. She reminded me that Denmark’s position during the Lisbon treaty negotiations was that although it preferred to have its own commissioner, it was willing to give that up—not permanently, but on a rotating basis—if that meant that the European Commission and its college of commissioners could operate in a more efficient manner. I therefore think that this will be considered before we get to the 30th member state or beyond, as the hon. Gentleman mentioned.
We support the Government’s intention to approve the three draft decisions, and we support the Bill’s Second Reading.
(11 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberWe have different rules for those convicted of electoral fraud, who are banned from voting for an extended period. The Government have no plans to change that, but the issue will be discussed as part of the review process and we will see the will of Parliament. I do not believe that that is necessarily the same legal issue as the broader one about the availability to prisoners of the right to vote.
I congratulate my right hon. Friend on emphasising the importance of parliamentary sovereignty. In that context, will he assure us that this is not an area in which the European Union and the fundamental rights agency have any competence whatsoever?
I wish I could give my hon. Friend that complete assurance, but there is another case pending on the right to vote on European elections, rather than national elections, that will be heard in our Supreme Court next summer. That is another thing that is not entirely welcome, but we will have to see what the judgment is when the time comes.
(12 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberWe are taken to the Court much less than other members and we lose only about 2%. Sometimes that 2% includes cases where there is widespread support here for the decision, such as the holding of DNA and other information belonging to people who have never been convicted of a criminal offence, which was a recent judgment. The convention still has a very important role to play across Europe. It is hugely significant in the 47 member states and it enables standards to be applied in places all the way from Russia, Turkey and Azerbaijan across to us and Iceland. We have always been subject to the rule of law. We have always bound ourselves under the convention to accept the judgments. These are the standards that we all agreed upon after the second world war, which were not challenged in this country till 10 or 15 years ago, when some judgments here began to annoy sections of the media.
Will my right hon. and learned Friend take this opportunity to congratulate Mr Paul Mahoney on his election as the UK judge to the European Court of Human Rights, and does he share my satisfaction that the new judge is committed to ensuring that the principles of subsidiarity are held high in the Court—for example, in relation to the right of individual countries to decide issues relating to national religion?
I personally disapprove of a parliamentary vote on the appointment of judges, but that is the system that has prevailed there since 1947. Fortunately, the British put forward three excellently qualified candidates for the judgeship, so I congratulate Mr Mahoney on his election and I am sure he will make a very considerable contribution.
(12 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberThis country is a great advocate of human rights throughout the world, and should continue to be so. The Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and I have confirmed in recent speeches at Strasbourg our commitment to the European convention on human rights and our desire to see human rights maintained all the way from this country to the Russian Federation, which is the furthest-east member. However, we seek to strengthen the Court by making it operate properly. It should concentrate on the important cases and those that raise serious issues of principle obtaining to the convention. At the moment, it has 150,000 cases in arrears. It takes years to get them heard, and it sometimes gives judgments despite the whole issue having been properly considered by national institutions and national courts.
Will my right hon. and learned Friend be visiting judges in the European Court of Human Rights to explain the agenda for the British chairmanship of the Council of Europe? When our right hon. Friend the Prime Minister visited Strasbourg—very successfully—last Wednesday and gave a brilliant speech, delegates expressed concern that he did not have time to visit the Court itself.
First, I am delighted that my hon. Friend and I agree that the Prime Minister gave a brilliant speech in Strasbourg last week. It went down very well there. Yes, I meet judges. As I mentioned in an earlier answer, I hold discussions with judges. There is widespread acceptance in Strasbourg of the need for reform, so long as people are satisfied that we will continue to uphold the convention and we regard the Court as the right forum in which to consider serious issues of principle in all 47 member states. I am sorry that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister was unable to meet judges, but I am sure that I can facilitate the opportunity for him to do so, if he or the judges wish it. However, the Foreign Secretary, the Attorney-General and I are in touch with the judges and our opposite numbers in all the relevant countries.
(13 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy hon. Friend is making a good point. Does he share my concern that if someone is arrested and they wish their identity to be revealed, we would be interposing an enormous bureaucratic burden on them before it could be revealed?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. I do not know whether it is envisaged that reporting restrictions would be lifted in most cases. If so, would it not be more sensible to have a legal framework in which there is a presumption that everything could be published and in which people could apply for their details not to be published in exceptional circumstances? That would be a more sensible way forward than doing it the other way round. The proportions in the Bill are the wrong way round. My hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe might be right to say that some cases involve particular issues, but it is those cases that should be treated as the exception, rather than the vast majority that take place without incident. The Minister will know the figures better than I do, but let us think about the number of people who are arrested in this country every year. How many of those cases give rise to concern? It seems completely disproportionate to make a presumption that reporting restrictions should apply in all cases and that people would need to apply for an exemption. All the evidence suggests that it should be the other way round.
Does my hon. Friend know whether the Contempt of Court Act applies throughout the United Kingdom? Even if it does, Scotland has a different system, whereby the Advocate-General for Scotland is responsible for enforcing the Act there, and the Attorney-General is responsible for enforcing the Act here. There is already that distinction.
My hon. Friend is right. There is the added complication that the law might be applied differently depending on the characters of the individuals who happen to hold the positions, so there is scope for tension.
My hon. Friend made a very good point about the case in Bristol. As I said at the beginning of my speech, I am not claiming—and I do not believe that anyone is claiming—that the media are without flaw, and never make mistakes. The media have made some horrendous mistakes, as they themselves will accept. We need only consider the case of Madeleine McCann. The press made some horrific mistakes in their reporting of that case, and I think that they would be the first to acknowledge it.
No matter how hard my hon. Friend tries, we will never have a system in which the media are perfect, and everything that is reported is accurate and for the public good. There will always be instances in which the media make mistakes, and we make mistakes. We all make mistakes in life. The only people who do not make any mistakes in life are those who do not make any decisions. Anyone who makes decisions makes mistakes, and the press are just as liable to make them as the next person—as are politicians, I might add. The thrust of my argument is about the bigger picture: a free and open press and an open justice system are far more worth while than attempts to try to restrict them, no matter how good the motives behind that restriction.
My hon. Friend is entirely right. There are a number of examples of people being appalled by an event in a certain part of the country. We have rushed to do something about it with a general feeling of “Something has happened; the Government must do something about it.” As a result, we have introduced laws that, with hindsight, were rushed and, from a wider perspective, did not serve any particular good. The thing that those cases have in common is that they are all well intentioned and are all based on highlighting a real or perceived problem that matters to many people.
I return to the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe has hit on something about which many people are concerned, and which they regard as a problem. I therefore commend her on opening the debate. We are all interested to hear the Minister’s reply, so I do not intend to detain the House any longer. Whatever the merits of my hon. Friend’s argument and the problems that are out there, whether perceived or real, we should tread very carefully indeed, because we restrict the freedom of the press and the information that we give the public at our peril. I hope that the Minister will show caution in his response to the Bill, and it would be far better if my hon. Friend went back to the drawing board and returned with something much more limited in scope that might be more acceptable to all concerned.
(13 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberB would be able to do that, although our law clearly states that one cannot refuse part of an inheritance—it is all or nothing. Once the decision is made, one cannot change one’s mind, unless others have not acted on one’s initial decision, in which case one can. The son would be at liberty to accept the inheritance and then give it away—indeed, he could give it to the church of which he was a member.
Stranger things happen where there is a will. If someone decides to give up something that they have been bequeathed in a will, what happens depends on the wording of the will. Such cases would need individual consideration.
I apologise to my right hon. Friend for not being here at the outset of his remarks, but I have indicated to him informally my concern that that particular aspect of his Bill may have the unintended consequence of creating a loophole, whereby people can avoid inheritance tax. In the example that he gave, the money would go directly to the grandchildren as a result of his Bill, which means that by disclaiming, B would be able to pass the money on to the next generation, whereas normally he would be able to do so only by incurring a potential inheritance tax liability, if he did not survive for seven years after so doing.
Under our existing law, there are various reasons why people may disclaim an inheritance, and reducing one’s tax liability is already one of them. For example, someone might decide not to accept an inheritance, where it involved taking on a property that was subject to a long lease that included expensive repair covenants.
Many people in the world, as well as in this country, seek to reduce the amount that they pay in tax. Some seek to do it by concealing their wealth, lying to the authorities and completing inaccurate and misleading tax forms. They are tax evaders—they break the law, and when they are caught, they are properly punished. Others seek to lower their tax liability by making perfectly lawful decisions affecting their own position, which is called tax avoidance rather than tax evasion. There is nothing unlawful about tax avoidance, and I am surprised that my hon. Friend, who is a Conservative Member of Parliament, feels that it is somehow inappropriate.
If a person who is on their deathbed inherits a legacy, and they are worried that by accepting the money, which they will not have time to spend, they will incur a greater inheritance tax bill, I see nothing wrong with such a person disclaiming. If my Bill were law, disclaiming would mean that person’s disclaimed money going to their children, which would be all the better. That person would have reduced their tax liability in a perfectly lawful way, and what is wrong with that? I hope that on reflection my hon. Friend will decide that his point, which he might initially have thought was a good one, is not actually a good one.
I accept that point absolutely and completely. The effect of the law does not produce the outcome that the intestate person in most cases would have wished anyway, and my Bill seeks to correct that anomaly.
There are a number of ways in which the state can and should seek to dissuade teenage pregnancies, but using the law of intestacy should not be one of them. I am not convinced that after a night out at a disco or bar, just before the moment of unprotected sex—perhaps in the back of a car—two young teenagers are going to feel in any way dissuaded from having sexual relations, and possibly thereby conceiving a child, by the expectation that they may die before reaching 18 or marrying, and thereby disinherit an unborn child that they might or might not be about to create. I absolutely agree with the comments made by the Chair of the Justice Committee.
We hope that most children are brought up in a loving relationship. Let us think of the poor child, who has an unmarried mother who is killed before she reaches the age of 18. What does the state say to the child? “Because of these circumstances, you will not be helped; you will not be able to inherit money that you would have inherited from your grandparents if your mother had reached the age of 18.” Clause 3, therefore, inserts new subsections (4B), (4C) and (4D) into section 47 of the 1925 Act. I remind the House that that Act lists what happens on intestacy. The subsections inserted by the clause deal with the situation of the young child of an intestate who dies under the age of 18 without having married or formed a civil partnership. As C is a minor at the date of Y’s death in the example, his or her interest in Y’s estate will be held in the statutory trusts imposed by the 1925 Act.
On commencement, clause 4(4) provides that only deaths occurring after the commencement of the Bill will be covered by it. Knowing, in this cost-conscious age in which we live, my hon. Friends’ concern about the financial implications, I draw their attention to the fact that the implementation of the Bill is not expected to impose any additional burden or to increase any other public expenditure.
My understanding is that the Bill incorporates part of the recommendations of the Law Commission, which were going to be legislated for by the Government, but the Government decided not to legislate for those because they said it would be too expensive to do so. How is that action by the Government consistent with what my right hon. Friend says—that nothing in the Bill would add to the costs to the public purse?
My Bill is not precisely the same as the Bill proposed by the Law Commission; I have made a number of changes to it. I stand by what I just told the House. I am sure the Minister will deal with this point in further detail if it is felt that I am incorrect, but I suspect that the reason my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch (Mr Chope) is confused is as follows. The Law Commission suggested that special trust provision for minors in forfeiture cases be set up, and when the Ministry of Justice consulted on the special trust provision proposals, which may have played a part in the issue of cost, several criticisms were made of them. Some consultees doubted that they were necessary, and I understand that the Ministry of Justice—I stand to be corrected by the Minister—re-examined those proposals with the Law Commission, and they both then changed their mind and agreed that the proposals were unnecessary. I have not suggested otherwise because I take the view that the law already provides protection for minors’ inheritances. That may answer my hon. Friend’s point.
I am doing that for the simple reason that I have confidence and trust in the coalition Government and I saw no reason to seek to override them on so footling a matter. If the Minister tells the House that he supports the Bill—which I hope he will in a moment—I expect him in good faith to see that the Bill is brought into effect as soon as is reasonably possible. Because I have confidence, particularly in this ministerial team, I decided to leave it to the Government to make that decision.
(13 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberBecause of the system that we have inherited, the criminal injuries compensation scheme will have to be re-examined. It simply has not received adequate funds in each year’s budget to keep up with the level of claims. We will have to establish how we can produce a system that works more efficiently, is affordable, and does not depend entirely on huge delays before payments are made because no one has been allocated any money to settle all the outstanding claims.
There is quite a lot behind the hon. Gentleman’s question, but of course everything possible is being done to provide the compensation due to people as quickly as possible. Obviously I cannot comment on the assessment of damages in individual cases, but I note the hon. Gentleman’s remarks about the disappointment that some have felt.
T7. As part of his efforts to save money by reducing the workload of the magistrates courts, will my right hon. and learned Friend make it his policy to decriminalise the non-payment of the BBC television licence fee, so that the BBC, like every other organisation, must recover its civil debts civilly rather than through the magistrates courts?
I am not sure that that is my responsibility at present; I will consult my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Culture, Olympics, Media and Sport. I can only say that the last time I can remember a Government attempting to do that, the idea was not met with a great deal of favour by the BBC—but I shall find out exactly where we are now.