Human Rights Act 1998 (Repeal and Substitution) Bill

Damian Green Excerpts

Friday 1st March 2013 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice (Damian Green)]

I start by congratulating my hon. Friend the Member for Dover (Charlie Elphicke), not only on the powerful case he made in his introductory speech and on choosing such a central and serious issue for his private Member’s Bill, but on the depth of the Bill itself. My hon. Friend the Member for Bury North (Mr Nuttall) made the point that this Bill is different from some of those debated here on a Friday morning, in that a huge amount of thought has clearly gone into the detail. My hon. Friend the Member for Dover is to be congratulated on that and on framing his speech in the way that he did. It was instructive that his speech and this Bill provoked the speech made by my hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart) and the modern version of a Socratic dialogue between him and my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg). A Friday morning when this House is forced to confront the difference between deontological and utilitarian responses to the moral consequences of our actions cannot be described as a Friday morning wasted. I think we all felt better educated and informed at the end of that dialogue, and that was even before my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset added to the philosophical wisdom we had from my hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border with his own inimitable lecture on the history and the necessity of our being cognisant of the importance of history in all this House’s deliberations.

The Bill would make significant changes to the existing UK human rights framework to attempt to address a number of concerns that have been expressed throughout this debate. Those changes include: repealing the Human Rights Act; having the UK still bound by the European convention on human rights but with the convention no longer forming part of the UK legal system; and the creation of a new set of UK rights, which add to and alter the existing rights in the European convention. That would, for example, remove the possibility of using the right to family life as a means to avoid deportation.

It is probably sensible for me at the outset to set out the Government’s policy, as was requested by the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter), who speaks for the Opposition. I should congratulate him as well, because that was the shortest speech I have ever heard him make. [Interruption.] He says from a sedentary position that he was under orders. It is another unusual experience in this House to find someone under orders to speak for less time than they would like rather than for more, which is the normal Whips’ instruction, in my experience. Let me make it clear for him and for the House that the Government remain committed to the European convention on human rights and to ensuring that those rights continue to be enshrined in UK law.

However, we are also closely involved in the process of reform of the Strasbourg Court and we must ensure that it can focus more quickly on the cases that need its attention. I hope that there is agreement across the House on the need to reform the Court, and that the Brighton declaration, which I shall come to later in my speech, is testament to our hard-won efforts in realising the Government’s pledge to reform that Court. We must recognise that much more needs to be done, however. The achievement of the previous Lord Chancellor, the Minister without Portfolio, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), in bringing about that important reform and persuading many countries to go along with it is extreme, but there is still more to do.

I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Dover that one of the biggest problems is the misrepresentation of the Human Rights Act and public bodies misapplying the concept of human rights or using them as an excuse for bad decisions. That has been at the root of many of the problems in this country with judgments of the Court, some of which have been brought up in the course of the debate and with which I shall deal later.

The other main changes that the Bill would make include ensuring that legislation passed by Parliament can only be changed by Parliament and setting out in statute a list of individual responsibilities that would not impose direct legal obligations on individuals but would be taken into account when courts were considering the application of the new UK human rights. The issues raised by the Bill inevitably attract a wide range of views, although the House should note that most of the views expressed in the debate were supportive of my hon. Friend, and the debate has been helpful in airing them.

The coalition’s programme for government was clear about the importance we as a Government attach to the question of civil liberties. Human rights are an essential element of any wider consideration of civil liberties in a modem democratic society. My ambition in the course of the debate, which will clearly go on for a number of years and, conceivably, into future Parliaments, is to reclaim human rights from the position of being almost a “boo” phrase. There is something absurd about a situation in which people can regard human rights and support for them from Parliament or the courts as leading to bad consequences. Something has gone seriously wrong when we reach that stage and we need to reclaim human rights so that they are, as they ought to be, the motherhood and apple pie of politics. There is no reason for anyone to object to human rights being applied to as many societies as possible throughout the world. Nevertheless, we are where we are and the legislative framework for human rights in the United Kingdom is a subject on which there are strongly held and often conflicting opinions.

The programme for government recognised those opinions and contained a commitment to

“establish a Commission to investigate the creation of a British Bill of Rights that incorporates and builds on all our obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights, ensures that these rights continue to be enshrined in British law, and protects and extends British liberties.”

It also hoped to

“promote a better understanding of the true scope of these obligations and liberties.”

In accordance with that commitment, the independent Commission on a Bill of Rights was established in March 2011. The commissioners were experts who reflected the full range of views in the UK human rights debate, and included public supporters of all the main political parties.

The commission carried out two written consultation exercises and undertook a programme of seminars and visits to all parts of the United Kingdom in order to discharge its terms of reference. It reported to the Deputy Prime Minister and to the Secretary of State for Justice on 18 December.

I hope the House will agree that the commission’s final report was a thoughtful and detailed consideration of the key human rights issues and the human rights landscape in the United Kingdom today. The Government are grateful to the commission for the diligent way in which it discharged its terms of reference. Unsurprisingly, the commission’s report covers many of the issues and concerns that appear in the Bill. For reasons that I will set out later, the Government do not believe that now is the right time to decide on the changes proposed in the Bill, but if the House is minded to take the Bill into Committee, I will later set out a number of points that may assist the House in its further consideration. In doing so, I will make use of the very helpful work done by the commission, which is set out in detail in the final report.

Let me deal first with the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Dover in his introductory speech. He explained that one of the 10 pillars of his Bill is that freedom of thought, conscience and religion should be protected to a greater extent than they currently are. He further explained that this greater protection is necessary because of the attitude to religion and belief. I am sure many will agree with him on that. He may be aware that the Strasbourg Court recently gave judgment in four cases concerning article 9—the article that deals with freedom of thought, conscience and religion—and that in each of those four cases the applicant was Christian.

The outcome of those cases confirmed that, for example, our law allows people to wear crosses at work, and that British employers are generally very good at being reasonable in accommodating people’s religious beliefs. We welcome any reasonable steps that employers can take to accommodate the wishes of their Christian employees or of those who hold a different religion or belief. Under the Equality Act 2010, employees of all religions and belief are protected against discrimination. Employers can lawfully stop their employees wearing jewellery, including a religious symbol, at work only if they can show that their policy does not disadvantage people belonging to a particular religion or belief or, if it does, that it is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. There are obvious examples of health and safety reasons why a particular item might be thought to be dangerous.

Those decisions were widely welcomed. My hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset said that he could not remember any acclamation for a judgment of the Court, and he is of course right. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the response to that particular raft of judgments, which touched on one of the most sensitive areas involved in modern human rights legislation, were perhaps slightly grudgingly welcomed by those, particularly in the media, who would not normally think of themselves as friends of the Strasbourg Court.

My hon. Friend the Member for Dover raised a huge number of other important issues, including that of self-defence. It would be interesting—and perhaps for later discussions—to understand how the Bill’s additional provision in relation to self-defence is intended to relate to law in England and Wales or Scotland outside the Human Rights Act, in particular the provisions currently before the House in the Crime and Courts Bill.

[Charlie Elphicke]

I was pleased to serve on the Committee scrutinising the Crime and Courts Bill. The moves made in this area are welcome. My contention is that that should be far more fundamental to our way of life, rather than in a particular provision, which is why I tried to detail the articles in the Bill.

[Damian Green]

I am grateful and the House will be grateful to my hon. Friend for that important clarification. He also spoke, rightly, about section 2 of the Human Rights Act and the obligation for the courts to take into account Strasbourg jurisprudence. He entered the discussion that has been taking place for some time about what exactly that should entail. The Commission on a Bill of Rights noted that Lord Phillips, then President of the Supreme Court, said in evidence to Parliament:

‘If the wording “take account” gives a message at all, it is that we are not bound by decisions of the Strasbourg court as binding precedent.’

I think that many will welcome that clarification.

My hon. Friend the Member for Dover also mentioned the International Criminal Court and terrorist trials. Not only are there offences of universal jurisdiction—this was debated by my hon. Friends the Members for Penrith and The Border and for North East Somerset—but there are clearly offences, such as war crimes and genocide, that have universal jurisdiction and are of such seriousness that they can be tried anywhere. There have been trials in the UK for such offences, and indeed Parliament chose to extend the possibility for that in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.

My hon. Friend the Member for Dover also raised a point of debate—one of continuing importance—on the balance between rights and responsibilities, arguing that the possession of rights must inevitably entail some responsibilities. The commission had points to make on that as well. It concluded that rights should not be made conditional on the exercise of responsibilities. It concluded that a Bill of Rights may allow the courts, when awarding damages, to take into account the conduct of the applicant, but my hon. Friend’s Bill would go further in incorporating the notion of responsibilities in determining whether a right has been breached. It concluded that any provision on responsibilities should only be declaratory.

I would like to deal with some of the points my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North made in his thoughtful speech. He said that the Brighton declaration had not been successful, but I must part company from him on that, because I think that the declaration is a substantial package of welcome reforms. Their implementation is being negotiated in Strasbourg. No changes have yet been made to the text of the convention, but once the reforms are realised we expect their net effect to be that more cases will be resolved at a national level and fewer will go to Strasbourg. The European Court will be able to focus on the more important cases, which is what it was originally set up to do, and, equally importantly, to do so more quickly.

I am conscious that in previous debates on the subject, particularly those relating to individual cases, and often those involving extradition, including from this country to the United States, Members on both sides of the House have expressed understandable frustration about the delays in the legal process. That is because British citizens have been kept in British jails for many years not because of delays in the British legal process—of course, there are also delays in that process—but specifically because of delays in the European Court. The measures that will follow the Brighton declaration, which I think will lead in the long run to cases appearing before the Court more rapidly and, therefore, more rapid decision making, will have a direct effect on individual human rights, because they will mean people spending less time in jail.

[Mr Nuttall]

I must have inadvertently misled my right hon. Friend and wish to clarify my views on the Brighton declaration. I think, for the reasons he has just set out, that it is a step in the right direction. All I had intended to do was show that the most recent statistics bear out the need for what was agreed as part of the declaration to be brought into force as a matter of urgency.

[Damian Green]

I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s clarification. I completely agree with him that the sooner implementation can happen, the better it will be not only for us but for individuals.

My hon. Friend also made the point about rule 39 applications about the stay of deportation, and the UK’s supposedly very high numbers in this regard. Under rule 39 of the Strasbourg Court, the Court may, on application, advise a stay of deportation, for example. This is about indications, not violations per se, and the Court has become stricter about granting such requests. As a result, fewer than one in 20 requests made for interim measures against the UK are now granted. In real numbers, that is only about 30 or 40 requests a year.

Various hon. Members have talked about prisoner voting. I think that everyone would recognise that the strength of feeling in this country is clear, and we have been clear in our view that it should be a matter for national Parliaments to decide. The Government are under a legal obligation to bring forward legislation. We have therefore published a draft Bill that presents a range of options, including banning prisoners sentenced to four years or more from voting, banning prisoners sentenced to more than six months from voting, and reaffirming the current ban on prisoners voting. We have asked a Committee of both Houses to examine the Bill. In the end—the point made most eloquently, as ever, by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset—Parliament is sovereign and it will decide on whether to change the law, and the draft Bill is the first step in Parliament’s considering the issue.

[Charlie Elphicke]

I note that the draft orders for the Committee are on the Order Paper. Can the Minister tell the House how many proposed members of the Committee have legal training?

[Damian Green]

Off the top of my head, I do not know which of its members have legal training. As a matter of principle, however, I suspect that a Committee considering such legal matters would benefit from having a mix of legal experts and people who are not legal experts but are capable of asking simple but important questions. The interplay between legal expertise and the lack of legal expertise can often result in good and practical legislation. As a final thought on this, I should point out what my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General has said, which is very clear:

“Parliament is sovereign in this area; nobody can impose a solution on Parliament”.

There was an exchange between my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North and the hon. Member for Hammersmith about indeterminate sentences for public protection. The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 introduced a new legal framework for dangerous offenders which has now been commenced and which replaces the IPP with a new extended determinate sentence. However, prisoners currently serving IPPs will not be released unless the Parole Board authorises it on the usual basis of risk assessment. It is important to set that out.

Having dealt with some of the points made by hon. Members, let me deal with the Bill itself. It is unusually serious and detailed for a private Member’s Bill, and it deserves a detailed and serious response. The Bill draws on the structures of and mechanisms in the Human Rights Act 1998 but makes important variations, deletions and additions.

Clause 2 deals with the interpretation of the new UK rights set out in schedule 1. Under the Bill’s new framework, clause 2 would replace section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998, which deals with the interpretation of convention rights. Section 2 requires courts and tribunals, as I have said, to take into account rulings from Strasbourg when determining a question that has arisen in connection with a convention right. Clause 2(1)(a) to (c) lists a wider range of sources that the UK courts may take into account when determining a question that has arisen in connection with a UK right.

Further consideration needs to be given to whether the courts need to be conferred a discretion in legislation in order to take into account the sources listed in clause 2. Courts already cite judgments from other jurisdictions, such as Canada, when determining human rights issues. Paragraph (b) is unnecessary, because by repealing section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act, domestic courts would no longer be obliged to take into account Strasbourg jurisprudence.

Similarly, the Government are not certain that it is necessary to state in legislation that the ordinary rules of precedent continue to apply. Considering the obligations under section 2(1) of the Act, Lord Bingham held that courts should continue to follow binding precedent.

Section 6 of the Act makes it unlawful for public authorities in the UK to act in a manner that would breach a person’s convention rights and goes on to define what is a public authority for the purposes of the Act. Section 6 and the definition of public authority attracted a lot of comment and attention when the Commission on a Bill of Rights sought views on the existing legal framework. In the conclusions of its final report, the commission said of this important matter:

“The one area where we conclude that a case for change should certainly be considered is in respect of the definition of a ‘public authority’. In line with a majority of those respondents who expressed a view on this issue, we conclude that the growing prevalence of the outsourcing of once traditional publicly provided functions to private and third sector providers means that the current definition should be looked at again if a UK Bill of Rights were to be taken forward.”

Clause 7 of the Bill covers similar ground to section 6 of the Act, but it does not address the issue of definition directly. Instead, the clause’s focus, as described in the Bill’s explanatory report, is on ensuring that public authorities should not be penalised for applying legislation approved by Parliament.

[Charlie Elphicke]

I thank my right hon. Friend for giving way; he is being very generous in taking interventions. Does he recognise and accept that the majority of people in this country have lost confidence in the European Court of Human Rights and its judgment and that it should reassess its entire approach and look at striking a better balance in interpreting the convention rights?

[Damian Green]

My hon. Friend is right that many people in this country now have little confidence in the judgments of the Court. A separate issue has been raised by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset about the legitimacy of the Court whether we agree with individual judgments or not. As I have said, the Brighton reforms introduced by the previous Lord Chancellor are designed to remove one source of irritation with the Court, namely its current backlog, delays and concentration on the types of cases that I do not think its founders intended it to concentrate on. The Court was set up to deal with big, international human rights issues and to drive forward human rights in countries with no history of Parliament, courts or the free press—all things that we in this country should not, but perhaps do, take for granted. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Dover that there is widespread feeling that the Court has gone off-track. That is precisely why the Government set up the commission and why the commission’s report is so interesting.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood) made clear, there are no contradictions in the views of the two coalition parties on this matter. We simply disagree about how best to preserve and enhance human rights in this country. That disagreement will form part of the debate.

Clause 7 would introduce a new test, at least in terms of our existing human rights legislation, of whether an act of public authority could

“reasonably be regarded, in all the facts and circumstances of the case, as compatible”

with the new UK rights. The explanatory document on the Bill makes the point that that provision contrasts with the strict test under the Human Rights Act of whether an act is compatible with convention rights. The document goes on to explain that

“there are different precise interpretations of human rights, and if the public authorities are within the bounds of what a reasonable person could regard as satisfying the requirements of the UK rights, they should be allowed to get on with their job without being second-guessed by the courts”.

Deviating from the current supervisory approach of the courts would require significant further consideration before we legislated on this subject.

In a similar vein, article 20 of my hon. Friend’s Bill of Rights would ensure that nothing in certain articles of the rights

“shall be regarded as preventing restrictions on the political activity of aliens.”

Under that American usage, “aliens” means people who are not citizens, as was understood when the convention was drafted in 1950. However, that is not the current UK formulation and I suspect that we may wish to use different language if we proceed with the Bill.

One of the major issues raised by the Bill, and one that has been at the heart of our debate this morning, is our relationship with the convention. I understand that it is my hon. Friend’s intention that his proposals would sit alongside the UK’s obligations under the convention. Indeed, the Bill makes specific provisions in relation to the convention. However, it would be the effect of his Bill that the convention rights would no longer be directly effective in our domestic law. Our domestic courts would instead make their decisions under the new, adapted code of UK rights.

With that in mind, it would be helpful for the House better to understand the intention behind clause 9(4). If my hon. Friend’s intention is to sever the link with the convention, why does the Bill provide for our courts to continue to have regard to the scale of damages awarded by the Strasbourg Court?

[Charlie Elphicke]

I am happy to provide clarification on that. There is a history in our courts of granting damages that are entirely run-away. The one area in which most of us can agree with the European Court of Human Rights is in its more level-headed and sanguine awards of damages, because it is taxpayers who have to foot the bill. That is the one area where the jurisprudence of the European Court holds some water.

[Damian Green]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that clarification. He is right that the European Court might prove a better friend of the UK taxpayer than our courts in that regard.

That is not the only area in which it is possible to regard what comes out of the Strasbourg Court as more sensible than what emerges from our courts system. In my previous job as Minister for Immigration, I was struck that the Strasbourg Court had a more sensible test of what rights should apply when deciding whether someone should be removed from this country than was sometimes applied in our domestic courts. It may be unusual for a Minister to wish for European jurisprudence to take precedence over UK jurisprudence, but there were some cases in which I did so. My hon. Friend makes a good point about damages, but that is not a unique area in which the Court can be regarded as quite sensible.

It would be reasonable for the House to debate a number of other detailed technical issues, but I hope that over the past few minutes I have illustrated that, as one would expect, there would have to be significant scrutiny of large parts of this Bill were it to proceed further.

I wish to say a bit more about what will happen now because, as I have said, a twin-track approach is needed and we must know what will happen during the rest of this Parliament. As several hon. Members have said, the United Kingdom played a pivotal role in shaping the original human rights framework in which the rights were, literally, fundamental. Indeed, then hon. Members from across the House, including David Maxwell Fyfe and Hartley Shawcross, were architects of what was at the time a document that everyone in Britain was very proud of.

The convention was designed to address terrible abuses of human rights in a fractured continent. We have all read in history books about the state of post-war Europe, and it is important to put this debate into an historical context. Today we talk about European rows and problems, great though they are, but just 70 years ago—it is not ancient history—the continent was completely fractured. We now have a Europe in which we can argue about how human rights are best enforced, rather than a Europe in which we have to enforce basic human rights. The situation is immeasurably better now than it was, and that change has taken place during our lifetimes. We have come a long way from the time when the convention was absolutely necessary, but not everything has changed and our concern then—as now—was to give those who most needed protection from the excesses of state power a clear understanding of the rights and remedies available to them. That means that the human rights framework must be accessible and proportionate in its application.

The convention should be used to defend the most vulnerable, but because of the way some articles in the convention have been interpreted by the Court, people do not feel that that basic fairness is being applied any more. Indeed, the desire to ensure that the mechanisms in place to protect the most vulnerable exist for that reason and no other was at the heart of the programme of reform that turned into the Brighton declaration, just as it is at the heart of our calls now for further reform of the Court of Human Rights.

The Court is important for the protection of human rights from Iceland to Turkey, but as I have said it faces a huge backlog of nearly 130,000 applications. Some of those may include examples of the type of fundamental abuses that Maxwell Fyfe and others sought to remedy back in 1950 and in a very different world. However, if the Court is to retain its legitimacy—this point has rightly been raised in the debate—it must focus on its core functions. The UK helped draft the convention and there is no controversy about its values, which everyone still supports, even those most sceptical about the value of the Court. Many more people are extremely sceptical about the Court’s performance yet they nevertheless sign up to the basic values in the convention.

It cannot be repeated too often that the convention has contributed to important changes for the good in many countries across Europe; for example, the decriminalisation in many countries of homosexuality, or the recognition in former Soviet countries of religious freedom. Given our discussions today, and the frequent public discussions, about the necessity of protecting people’s capacity to express their religious views, it is worth remembering that in other countries the convention has been extremely helpful in allowing people to express their basic freedoms.

There are other examples. Legal systems and police behaviour have been improved by the convention in countries where the tradition of democracy and the rule of law is less than it is in ours. I hope we can all agree that the problem is not the convention itself, but how it is sometimes interpreted.

Our concerns about the Court bring us back to its fundamental role; it is supposed to focus on the most egregious violations of human rights throughout Europe. We might think that the UK would rarely, if ever, be found in breach, and I am happy to say that is the general situation. Last year, the Strasbourg Court ruled against the UK in only 10 instances. The underlying question we need to consider is whether those cases, and the apparent breaches, were of a magnitude that the founders of the convention would recognise. We have to ask ourselves what we expect of the Court today and how we can help to restore its legitimacy. Those are the questions we are dealing with now.

We would like the Court to have the following priorities, particularly after the Brighton declaration. First, it should not involve itself in cases that national courts have already decided properly. In this country, one would expect that to be so more often than not. Secondly, the Court should focus its resources on the most deserving cases; on the surface, a backlog of nearly 130,000 suggests that is not happening. Thirdly, the Court should not delve into our own legislation without very good reason. The margin of appreciation must be observed. Fourthly, judges adjudicating serious cases must be of the highest quality. Each of those priorities would involve a big programme of reform for the Court, but individually and collectively they are extremely important to ensure continuing support for the legitimacy of the Court. We may yet need deeper and more fundamental reform to preserve the role of the convention.

At the outset, I mentioned a Commission on the Bill of Rights, and I referred to its findings in relation to the provisions in my hon. Friend’s Bill. I remind the House of some of the commission’s key conclusions.

[Martin Horwood]

I am eager to hear the commission’s conclusions, but given the fact that the Government are opposing the Bill and supporting the next Bill we are to debate, which would reinforce the Government’s commitment to devoting 0.7% of our national wealth to international development, I hope the Minister will be able to share the commission’s findings with the House in writing rather than extending debate on the Bill unnecessarily.

--- Later in debate ---

[Damian Green]

I can only say that were I extending debate on the Bill unnecessarily, Mr Deputy Speaker would call me to account. I am dealing with the central issues that the Bill has raised, and I hope I am doing so in appropriate detail, as the measure is so serious and important. However, I take the hon. Gentleman’s point and I shall delay no further.

On the central question of whether there should be a UK Bill of Rights, a majority of the commission concluded that there is a strong argument in favour. That was on the basis that any such Bill would incorporate and build on all the United Kingdom’s existing obligations under the European convention on human rights, and that it would provide no less protection than is contained currently both in the Human Rights Act and in the devolution settlements. This was in line with the Commission’s terms of reference.

The majority saw the current lack of public ownership of the Human Rights Act and the European convention on human rights as the most compelling reason in favour of a new Bill of Rights. Indeed, my hon. Friend the Member for Dover made similar points in his speech. Some of those in the majority who favoured a Bill of Rights felt that any new Bill could usefully define the scope of some rights more clearly and adjust their balance. That is another point on which there is some concurrence between the Commission’s findings and the rationale behind the present Bill.

The two Commissioners in the minority concluded that the Commission’s two consultations and its deliberations had failed to identify any real shortcomings in either the existing Human Rights Act or how it is applied by the domestic courts. Although unable to reach agreement on all its conclusions, the Commission’s report identified issues that would need careful consideration before a Bill of Rights was introduced. Given the ongoing human rights debate, it is no surprise that the Bill also touches on some of these issues, for example, on what scope there is for more clearly incorporating the concept of responsibilities as well as rights in any new legislative framework. The Commission also proposed consideration of whether any new Bill of Rights in the future should include additional rights beyond those contained in the Human Rights Act, and my hon. Friend’s Bill addresses similar issues.

The Commission was also united in urging the Government to continue to pursue reform of the European Court of Human Rights. The Government agree to the importance of maintaining the report’s momentum. My right hon. Friend the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice recently appeared before the Joint Committee on Human Rights and made it clear that in his view there was a strong case for further reform along the lines that I have expressed today. He is working not just with colleagues in Government here, but in Strasbourg to secure an agreed approach to the longer-term future of the Court.

[Mark Hendrick (Preston) (Lab/Co-op)]

On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. The Minister has now been speaking for 45 minutes. Each Conservative Member who spoke in the debate did so for about an hour. Clearly, this is a tactic to stop us getting to the International Development (Official Development Assistance Target) Bill, which the Government supposedly support. Does using such tactics to stop the Bill being heard today not make a mockery of the Prime Minister’s attempts to try to detoxify the Conservative party?

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

That is not a point of order, but the hon. Gentleman has made his point in a forceful manner. Had I believed there to be a filibuster taking place, I would have intervened and prevented it from doing so. I have not heard a filibuster.

[Damian Green]

I am grateful, Mr Deputy Speaker. I understand the hon. Gentleman’s disappointment. I am happy that he has at least had the chance to express his support for the Government’s commitment to meeting their aid targets, which we have done more successfully than any other previous Government.

To return to the subject of the Bill before the House, most fundamentally, all Commissioners agreed that any debate on a UK Bill of Rights had to be fully alive to the sensitive issue of devolution and that, in itself, cautions against change at this time. Human rights are intricately woven into the existing devolution settlement, and as that settlement is to be reconsidered in the relatively near future, that argues strongly against any precipitate changes to the existing human rights framework in the United Kingdom. The Commission’s final report notes:

“As a matter purely of practicality all of us believe that, while we would not want to see an inhibition on further discussion in the light of our report”—

it is lucky that it said that, because there will not be one—

“it would be essential to await the outcome of the referendum (in Scotland) before moving towards final decisions on the creation of a UK Bill of Rights for the obvious reason that it will only be after the referendum that the future composition of the UK will be known.”

I hope that the House would agree that it is difficult to fault the logic of that conclusion, which provides a persuasive reason as to why now is not the time to embark on wholesale changes to the human rights framework.

In the context of the devolution settlement, and of the Commission’s comments, it is interesting to note from the report that the Commission’s findings revealed wide differences of opinion in different parts of the United Kingdom. Respondents in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland often argued that there was little or no call for a UK Bill of Rights among their populations.

My hon. Friend’s Bill is serious and detailed, and a huge amount of work has clearly been done on it by some very talented drafters and lawyers, but I hope that he will appreciate that it could be slightly premature to jump this particular fence at the moment. The whole House should express its gratitude to him, however, for bringing the Bill before us. This debate has given me a chance to thank him and the Commission on a Bill of Rights for their work, and to explain where matters stand following the publication of the report. I am happy to assure him that the report, the Bill and the points expressed in today’s debate by him and the other hon. Members who have spoken will continue to inform further Government opinion on this important topic.

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[Mr Chope]

To reinforce the point I was making, the complacency that flows through every word that the hon. Gentleman has uttered will be seen as anathema to the majority of people who voted in the by-election in favour of Eurosceptic parties who want a completely fresh look at our relationship with the European Union.

[Damian Green]

rose—

[Mr Chope]

I give way to my right hon. Friend the Minister.

[Damian Green]

rose—

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

Order. We are in danger of veering off piste in a big way. There is going to be a big post-mortem about what happened in yesterday’s by-election, but let us not start it in the Chamber right now. Does the Minister wish to intervene?

[Damian Green]

indicated dissent.

[Mr Deputy Speaker]

I call Mr Chope.