(2 weeks, 2 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Good morning, everyone. I will highlight two key points about new clause 28, which concerns what happens when companies that have gone into special administration come out of it. Subsection (1) refers to considering
“the merits of changing the law to provide that a water company exiting a special administration regime becomes a company mutually owned by its customers.”
Subsection (2) states that that would involving considering
“the general merits of mutual ownership of water companies in such circumstances, and…what model of mutual ownership would be most suitable.”
We are not saying that companies have to be this or that; we are just advocating considering this possibility. Private companies have made an absolute mess of our water sector, have added no value over the past 36 years and have ramped up nearly £70 billion of debt. When the companies come out of special administration, we have an opportunity to do something different and not to repeat the mistakes of the past. I want the Committee to take that on board. We are not asking for a commitment; we are just asking for consideration. Hon. Members all know how badly the private companies have treated us, our rivers and our communities.
These companies are monopolies, so they have absolute power. Unfortunately, our regulators have completely failed in their task. If they have failed in the task, and if we do not have absolute confidence in the regulators—I do not think that anybody who will be voting today does—we must not give water back to the private sector.
Globally, this is standard. It is what the rest of the world does with its water sector. Even in the US, the vast majority of the water sector is mutually or municipally held. Chile may be the one shining example of private capitalism that we can point to in this regard, but there are almost no other countries in the world that do as we do. We are asking the Committee to do what is standard, rather than what is unusual.
The Under-Secretary of State for Business and Trade, the hon. Member for Harrow West (Gareth Thomas), has written about the benefits of the mutual ownership model, which he states forces water companies
“to operate in the interests of consumers; where environmental considerations such as disposal of sewage would take precedence over profit.”
That is our request. I rest my case.
For several decades, the water companies have been able to profit from failure. There is a strong groundswell of opinion among the public, across political persuasions, that real action must be taken and that if there has been real failure, water companies must not just be allowed to carry on operating in the private sector. I welcome the hon. Member’s amendment; mutual ownership is clearly one alternative model. Does he agree that full public ownership is another option that should be investigated in these circumstances?
What I really like about our proposal is that the companies are coming out of special administration, so it does not cost anybody anything: the equity of the shareholders has been written off. We often hear that it would not be a good idea, because it would cost too much to buy the companies out. Under our proposal, we would not need to buy them out, because we are advocating this only where companies are going into special administration. We are advocating a mutual model and—I say respectfully to the hon. Member—only that. That is what is on the table today, and that is what we are after.
Does the hon. Member agree that it is lucky that within six months we will have the Cunliffe review, which will look in great depth at ownership, regulation and everything to do with the water industry? Maybe this is something that we could take further at that stage.
That may be a chink of light, because all I have heard from the Government so far is “Only private companies welcome here.” My understanding is that the Cunliffe review’s remit purposely excludes ownership. If that is now on the table, it is great news, because it is one of the fundamental problems in the water sector. If the commission’s remit now includes ownership structures, I am delighted. I would love the Minister to clarify the point.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairwomanship once again, Dr Huq. As promised, I have provided a fact sheet on the use of special administration. All Committee members should have received it by email, but hard copies are available on the table for their convenience.
Welcome to the last day of Committee.
We all welcome one another, but I meant the fact sheet. I really appreciate your going to the trouble of putting it together; I thank your team as well. I have read it diligently and done my best, but I have a quiz question for you. The first bullet point refers to giving
“the power to recover HMG funding should there not be sufficient funds to pay HMG back at the end of a SAR.”
Then, under the heading “Context”, the penultimate bullet point states:
“If this shortfall occurred, and Ministers decided to use this new power, the Secretary of State and Welsh Ministers must launch a consultation prior to this power being used. This will ensure that those affected (e.g. water billpayers) are able to provide their views. It will also ensure that the shortfall recovery mechanism is implemented in a way that means costs are recovered fairly.”
To me, that completely confirms paragraph 69 of the explanatory notes published by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, which says that the Government will make the bill payers, as opposed to the creditors, pay for the costs. Please confirm, if you could.
I am happy to hear that mutual ownership is being considered. I am very grateful for that.
I will take my chances and try to clear up one point. I completely agree with what the Minister read out from the last page of the fact sheet:
“Would the shortfall recovery mechanism be used to compensate financial creditors or shareholders following a SAR?
No.”
Absolutely, but my point is not remotely about that. I am not asking about compensating creditors.
Let me take the Committee back to the first paragraph on page 1. Where there is a recovery to be made, who pays for it? We are not talking about compensating creditors; we are talking about taking money off them. Rather than the money being taken from the customers, which is exactly what the bullet point that I read out three minutes ago states, we believe that it should be taken from the creditors.
It is not about compensation. I am surprised that there is confusion on the point, because that is not where I am coming from. It is about the shortfall and who pays for it. It is clearly stated twice—both in DEFRA’s explanatory notes and in the bullet point, which I can read out again as desired—that the bill payers will pay for it.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 32 is about procurement. I will read out the key point:
“The Authority must issue rules requiring relevant undertakers to use competitive procurement processes in respect of procurement relating to water infrastructure.”
What are we getting at here? There is an unholy trinity that is causing trouble inside our water sector: too much debt, regulatory capital value—a concept that is misfiring big time—and the ownership model. I hope that the Government will take on that unholy trinity and find a stake.
The new clause addresses RCV, because it is not working in the water sector. I touched on that in our last sittings, so I will not drag the Committee through it again. Regulatory capital value encourages as big an asset base as possible, which gives water companies an incentive to source product as expensively as possible—to pour really expensive concrete. It has been going on over the last few decades, so I am not pinning the blame on this Government, but I am asking for their help to stop it.
It is not in the customers’ interests for us to continue to have faulty procurement processes that encourage water companies to buy things expensively. With new clause 32 the Liberal Democrats are trying to highlight that problem and address it. I suspect that the provision will not be passed, but I am going to be talking about it. RCV is the issue, and I am interested to see if the Government will recognise it as such and look to address it.
I thank the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale for the intention behind new clause 32. On a personal level, I welcome the scrutiny and the level of detail that we have gone into. As the Bill started in the other place, there was a lot of cross-party work and the Government have taken onboard some of the recommendations. I gently push back on the idea that this is not a necessary or valid way to examine legislation.
The Government agree that competitive procurement can be a successful way to provide better value for money for consumers, and greater innovation within major infrastructure projects. In the 2019 price review, Ofwat developed the direct procurement for customers approach, or DPC, building on the success of the Thames tideway tunnel. The DPC allows the water company to competitively tender for services in relation to the delivery of major infrastructure projects. At price review 2024, Ofwat noted that, by default, all projects with a total life cost of over £200 million should be delivered through a DPC. Following final determinations in December 2024, Ofwat announced that 26 major water company projects would be delivered by competitive tendering processes, including a DPC, with a total whole-life cost of almost £50 billion.
Two-hundred million is a really big number. In my patch in Witney, we have sewage treatment works as far as the eye can see that are undercapacity and are leaking sewage all over the place—at Bampton, Cassington, Carterton, Witney, Milton; you name it. It is awful, and I am sure that is the case in other constituencies, too. Two-hundred million pounds is miles higher than any of their spend, so—correct me if I am wrong—all those sewage treatment works are going to carry on without the new procurement processes because they are below the £200 million threshold.
The point is that competitive tendering processes were introduced back in 2019, including looking at where money is being used and how that money can be used most effectively. As I have just mentioned, we have £50 billion-worth of competitive processes in the next price review determination. Water companies are already actively using competitive procurement processes. This is something that Ofwat already encourages through the price review process. I therefore hope that the hon. Member is content that this amendment is unnecessary.
We will not put this to a vote, but I will continue to highlight the point that £200 million is too high a benchmark and we should drop it, because that would serve us all, and our customers, better. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 33
Responsibility in relation to planning issues
“(1) The Water Industry Act 1991 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 37 (General duty to maintain water supply system etc), after subsection (1) insert—
“(1A) When participating in a planning consultation, or when otherwise providing advice in relation to a planning matter, a water undertaker must provide—
(a) full and accurate information, and
(b) an honest assessment,
in relation to its current and future ability to fulfil its duties under subsection (1).
(1B) An undertaker which fails to provide information required under subsection (1A) will be subject to such penalties as the Authority may impose.
(1C) Where, in providing information required under subsection (1A), an undertaker expects not to be able to fulfil its duties under subsection (1), the undertaker must establish a plan to meet its requirements by a relevant time.
(3) In section 94, after subsection (2) insert—
“(2A) When participating in a planning consultation, or when otherwise providing advice in relation to a planning matter, a water undertaker must provide—
(a) full and accurate information, and
(b) an honest assessment,
in relation to its current and future ability to fulfil its duties under subsections (1) and (2).
(2B) An undertaker which fails to provide information required under subsection (2A) will be subject to such penalties as the Authority may impose.
(2C) Where, in providing information required under subsection (2A), an undertaker expects not to be able to fulfil its duties under subsections (1) and (2), the undertaker must establish a plan to meet its requirements by a relevant time.
(2D) An undertaker which fails to carry out a plan established under subsection (2A) will be subject to such penalties as the Authority may impose.””—(Charlie Maynard.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
There are only three new clauses to go; I will highlight the key parts of new clause 33. Subsection (2)(1A) states:
“When participating in a planning consultation, or when otherwise providing advice in relation to a planning matter, a water undertaker must provide full and accurate information, and an honest assessment, in relation to its current and future ability to fulfil its duties under subsection (1)”
Subsection (3)(2C) states:
“Where, in providing information required under subsection (2A), an undertaker expects not to be able to fulfil its duties under subsections (1) and (2), the undertaker must establish a plan to meet its requirements by a relevant time.”
What does that mean? It means that if an undertaker does not have sewage treatment work capacity, they must commit to draw up a plan to install it by a relevant time. The “relevant time” means that if 200 or 2,000 houses are being added and the sewage treatment works do not have sufficient capacity, then the undertaker will be saying, “By the time those houses are occupied, we will have increased capacity by the amount required.”
This is all very common-sense, but many hon. Members will have been district councillors in their time—I currently am one—and I am sure they will have seen it happen time and time again in planning committees where, guess what, the response from the water utility is: “Fine, no problem. Hook ’em up.”
Is it not the case that the water companies used to have more power to object? Did they have a veto which the previous Government removed? Do they now have to cope with whatever the planning authority decides?
I thank the hon. Member for that intervention. I do not know when that changed. [Interruption] In 2015, was it? There we are: maybe it was changed in 2015. Perhaps all of us, or most of us, recognise that is not a good situation. Time and again—I have seen this in Witney, Ducklington, Bampton, Aston and Carterton—this is just waved through. When I quiz people from Thames Water about why they have waved it through, they say, “We have a duty to connect.” They do have a legal duty to connect, which they take seriously, but they take their duty to add capacity to match that increase much less seriously.
This is a request for information on my part. In my conversations with Anglian Water, one of its key asks relates to the imbalance in which the company has a legal duty to connect any planning application that is passed, yet it is not a statutory consultee. It is therefore not required—not able, in fact—to take part in the planning process. Until the companies are made statutory consultees, all this is irrelevant, so should not the new clause focus on their becoming statutory consultees?
While I am on my feet, I have a query about the drafting. The hon. Gentleman defined a “relevant time”, but I do not see that definition in the new clause. Is it contained somewhere in the draft legislation? If it is not, what might the effective definition be?
The point about “relevant time” is fair and deserves to be clarified. I completely agree on the issue of statutory consultees and have no issue with that either—that would make much more sense, because there is a real failure in that regard.
I will go a step further—I have lived experience in this regard—and give a special shout-out to Thames Water employee Richard Aylard, who for two years dutifully showed up every six weeks with West Oxfordshire district council to hash through these issues. I learned a lot from him and am grateful to him, as well as to Jake Morley, Lidia Arciszewska, Phil Martin, Laurence King, Alaric Smith and Alistair Wray. They sat through all that, and we all learned together. It is important that everybody knows what came out of those meetings. When sewage treatment works’ capacity is calculated—they are very much under-capacity in my patch and, I am sure, in those of other hon. Members—there are four criteria. The first is the population or population equivalent, which is normally optimistically understated. The second is per capita consumption. Thames Water has a high per capita consumption when it suits the company and a low per capita consumption when it suits the company, so again that is understated.
The third is the Environment Agency multiplier, which is typically 3.0, and is discounted far too often. When there is a known record of spills, Thames Water is still allowed to discount the EA multiplier, often from 3.0 down to 2.4; that is a 20% cut, which means that the capacity can be 20% less. That is a real problem, and it is being done repeatedly on sewage treatment works that have dumped sewage left, right and centre for years.
The fourth criterion is infiltration. Some 47% of the capacity of west Oxfordshire’s big nine sewage treatment works comes from infiltration. That means that our pipes are leaking. There is not enough science on this matter. If we were to put in flow meters, we would have the information, but it seems that we Lib Dems are the only team in the room, alongside the hon. Member for Waveney Valley, that advocates flow meters. If we want to solve these problems, we have to get serious about the information.
I thank the hon. Member for the new clause. We all recognise the situation he describes. In East Anglia, planned housing growth over the coming decades outpaces available water resources. In my constituency, we already have a water resource zone in Hartismere where business operations and planned business growth are being restricted by the water available. He is addressing some of the important points about water companies’ being able to take responsibility, but do we not also need a joined-up approach? The planning system must be used to address the issues by means of stricter water efficiency requirements, sustainable drainage systems and housing plans that are realistic given the available natural resources. Is there not a problem with just putting the ball in the water companies’ court, rather than taking a more joined-up approach?
I completely agree with the hon. Member. Using West Oxfordshire as an example again, we have installed Grampian conditions, which I encourage other Members to look into, where we have said, “You may not occupy this house.” We could not stop the houses being built by arguing that there was insufficient capacity, but we could put a Grampian condition in force that says, “Those houses may not be occupied. Any buyer knows this, so they will not buy them.” It is flagged to any buyer so that they do not buy a house they cannot occupy, which will continue until the capacity has been added. That puts some heat underneath the water companies to get on and increase their sewage treatment works capacity. I really encourage the Government to look into those. We have vast amounts of housing that will be built, and under the current law, they will be steamrolled through and the capacities will not keep up. That is a real problem for everybody, and it puts more pressure on our rivers.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for giving way, and I have a lot of respect for the new clauses that he has tabled to put pressure on water companies to provide more information at critical stages. The Opposition have tabled amendments requiring water companies to publish data on their websites to enable citizen science, so I respect what he is saying. I guess some of the issue is in the detail of the wording of the new clause. I am sure we are all in agreement about water companies providing information, but proposed new section 37(1A) says that we want them to be “full and accurate” and “honest”. I guess the devil is in the detail. How will that be judged? If this new clause were to come into play, how will people judge that? Is an “honest assessment” whether something is not false, or whether something is complete or incomplete? There is an element of challenge that could be put in. I understand the sentiment, but the devil is in the detail of the wording as to how this could actually work.
I thank the hon. Member for his kind words, and I look forward to his support in some of the votes at some point. In the meantime, if he has recommendations on the wording that he would like to put forward, I ask that he please do so. These new clauses are already in place, so maybe that is impossible, but let us by all means try to improve them.
I will say a brief word on the new clause. This is important, and I would like to add to the detail that my hon. Friend the Member for Witney has set out. Essentially, we have two problems here, one of which is that water companies are not statutory consultees, and they should be. I take the point that it could be more clearly stated, but the new clause does say “When participating” more than once, not “If participating”.
Without pointing fingers—well, maybe a bit at water companies in certain parts of the country, including mine—the key thing is that there is an incentive for a water company, when giving its advice to a planning committee, whether it be in the national parks, the dales, the lakes or a local council, basically to say that everything is fine, and why would it not? If a water company says, “We have no capacity issues. You can build those 200 houses on the edge of Kendal and it won’t cause any problems for our sewer capacity,” two things happen, do they not? First, the water company is not conceding the need to spend any money on upgrading the sewerage network. Secondly, it is guaranteeing itself 200 households that pay water bills, in addition to the ones it already has, so it has a built-in incentive—maybe not to be dishonest, but to not really give the fullest and broadest assessment of the situation.
I thank the hon. Member for the intervention; I am sure that is the case, and the two are not mutually exclusive. I want to see houses built. The great frustration in our communities in the lakes and dales and just outside is that we desperately need homes that are affordable, and we want homes to be zero carbon. We want to be in a situation where the local community is able to hold developers to account. The danger is that developers who are going to build stuff on the cheap that is not affordable to potential buyers or renters are able to get themselves off the hook because the water companies will not really test the resilience of the existing infrastructure.
It is true that both things can happen. We feel that this is about giving planning authorities the power to say, “The developer is seeking to do this, but the community as a whole does not have the resilience or the capacity to cope with 200 extra bathrooms; so what resources will the developer or the water company put in to ensure that the facilities are upgraded to make that possible?” This is about ensuring that planning does its job.
I thank the hon. Member for Monmouthshire for her excellent point. It is very interesting that a mutually owned water company is taking that very sensible decision and approach. It highlights that that is a benefit. They are not trying to make money hand over fist. They are trying to do the right thing.
With your indulgence, Dr Huq, I will clarify something that I should have mentioned in the previous debate. Ofwat reserves the right to explore the use of DPC for major projects below the £200 million threshold where it offers value for money for customers. I just wanted to put that on record.
I thank the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale for tabling new clause 33, which would increase the responsibilities of water companies where they participate in the planning process. As we all do, I genuinely recognise the intent behind the clause and where the hon. Member is trying to get to. We absolutely recognise concerns surrounding water and sewage companies’ ability to keep pace with the needs arising from new property developments.
Conversations are ongoing, but I would not want to pre-empt their results. I recognise from previous conversations that this is a concern for the hon. Gentleman.
The Government consider that the Bill is not an appropriate vehicle to resolve this issue. It should be addressed through measures such as the water resources management plans or draining and waste water management planning. As was mentioned earlier, it is our job as legislators to ensure that we draft the right amendments to the right Bills in order to achieve the aims we are seeking.
Water companies already account for local plan growth forecasts in their water resource management plans. These plans for water provision over a five-year period with a forward look over 25 years provide for a development outline. We recognise the need for stronger and earlier join-up between local planning authorities, regulators and water companies. As I mentioned, work is under way to consider such questions and to ensure timely and mutual understanding of water resource requirements at a local scale to support sustainable development. That work includes the independent commission on the water sector regulatory system, which will provide recommendations for the roles and responsibilities of the water industry regulators that govern the water industry model and strategic planning.
As such, it would be premature to legislate in this area or to impose any additional responsibilities for regulators until the commission has concluded its review, but I reassure hon. Members that the Government recognise the need for water companies and local planning authorities to co-operate effectively in considering the water infrastructure requirements that will underpin development plans, housing growth and sustainable development. The proposed new clause is unnecessary, and I ask the hon. Member for Witney to withdraw it.
We wish to press the new clause to a Division.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 35
Companies to be placed in special measures for missing pollution targets
“In section 2 of the Water Industry Act 1991, after subsection (2D) insert—
‘(2DZA) For the purposes of ensuring that the functions of water and sewerage undertakers are properly carried out, the Authority must establish—
(a) annual, and
(b) rolling five-year average
pollution targets which must be met by water and sewerage undertakers, and the penalties to be imposed for failure to meet such targets.
(2DZB) The performance of a water or sewerage undertaker against such targets must be measured through independent analysis of monitoring data.
(2DZC) A timetable produced under subsection (2DZA)(b) must require the following reductions in the duration of sewage spill events, using the annual total hours’ duration of all sewage spill events recorded by Event Duration Monitors, based on an average from the last five years, as a baseline—
(a) a 25% reduction within five years;
(b) a 60% reduction within ten years;
(c) an 85% reduction within fifteen years; and
(d) a 99% reduction within twenty years.
(2DZD) A water or sewerage undertaker which fails to meet pollution targets set out by the Authority will be subject to such special measures as the Authority deems appropriate, which may include—
(a) being required to work on improvement projects with or take instruction from the Authority, the relevant Government department, or such other bodies or authorities as the Authority deems appropriate; and
(b) financial penalties.’”—(Charlie Maynard.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
This is a big one: companies to be placed in special measures for missing pollution targets. I will read out the key bits:
“(2DZA) For the purposes of ensuring that the functions of water and sewerage undertakers are properly carried out, the Authority must establish…annual, and…rolling five-year average pollution targets which must be met by water and sewerage undertakers, and the penalties to be imposed for failure to meet such targets.”
On the five-year average, obviously we have wet years and dry years. We cannot just have flat numbers. We have to take an average. The new clause also states:
“A timetable produced under subsection (2DZA)(b) must require the following reductions in the duration of sewage spill events, using the annual total hours’ duration of all sewage spill events recorded by Event Duration Monitors, based on an average from the last five years, as a baseline…a 25% reduction within five years;…a 60% reduction within ten years;…an 85% reduction within fifteen years…and…a 99% reduction within twenty years.”
What are we trying to get at? Clause 2 is about pollution incident reduction plans. That is about specific events, so it is at a micro level. We have a national problem and need to think about things at a national level. We have a lot of data already. I think it was Peter Drucker who said, “If you can’t measure it, you can’t improve it.” We have been advocating for measuring it; we have had that debate. The good news is that we already have one metric of measurement—event duration monitors—that tells us how many hours of sewage are spilled per year. EDMs are a long way from perfect in two respects. First, we do not know the volumes going out or how much of that is actually sewage, as we have discussed at length. Secondly, a lot of EDMs are sub-par. I will give a shout-out to Professor Peter Hammond, who has highlighted some essential messages about that. However, that is still the best dataset we have, and we should all take the view that we should not let the perfect be the enemy of the good.
As soon as we put in flow monitors and quality monitors—I know the Government do not support that—we will advocate using those as a metric, but we do not have those now. However, we do have EDM data, so I am advocating that we use that metric. We already know how many hours are spilled by operator. We can take the five-year average and start setting out targets.
Businesses like knowing where they stand. I am a naive politician who is only six months into the job, so there is an awful lot I do not know. I probably committed a key error here by putting in numbers, so some smart politician could come along and say, “That is an incredibly generous number. We’ll go lower than that.” Fine—I do not really care if someone wants to play that game. I want our rivers fixed, and we get our rivers fixed by setting targets, telling the water companies that we want them to meet those targets and giving them sticks, and possibly carrots, to meet them.
We are missing an opportunity—respectfully, I feel that we have missed a lot of opportunities. We did not have to have this Bill now, but we do have it. We ought to be going for the wins now, but every single amendment has been rejected regardless of which party tabled it. That is a loss for our rivers as much as for hon. Members present. However, this new clause provides an opportunity to set some targets. Whether it is today—although this new clause will almost certainly fail because we will not push it to a vote—or in the future, I encourage the Government to take the metric they have, which is hours of sewage spilled, set benchmarks against which to measure water companies and set out bad news or good news depending on whether they miss or hit them. If we hit those targets, we are seriously getting closer to fixing our rivers. Without them, we are not.
I echo my hon. Friend the Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale in saying that I have really enjoyed most of the three days of this Committee. I appreciate the courtesy and generosity in the answers. I thank the Chair, the team of Clerks, who have been so helpful, and the DEFRA team.
I would like to thank, as I have before, all the environmental groups and activists up and down the country who do so much to champion cleaner air, rivers, lakes and seas for us all. I look forward to seeing hon. Members on Third Reading and Report.
As I did before, I will gently push back and say that the Government did work collectively and cross-party in the other House and brought in compromise amendments before the Bill came here. It would be slightly disingenuous to imply that the Government have not accepted amendments or worked with other parties on the Bill.
I thank the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale for tabling new clause 35. We must ensure that companies accelerate action to reduce pollution to the environment, halting the unacceptable harm they have caused in recent decades. That is why we have introduced a new requirement for water companies to produce annual pollution incident reduction plans and the accompanying implementation reports through the Bill. Again, I gently note that the implementation reports and the strengthening of that provision was done cross-party in the other place.
The plans will need to set out the actions that water companies intend to take to reduce pollution incidents, and an assessment of the impact that those actions will have. Companies must then report on the progress they have made with measures they committed to in the previous year, and must clearly explain the reasons for any failures to implement their plans and set out the steps they are taking to avoid similar failures in the future.
In addition to the new requirements that increase accountability for pollution incidents, the Government are committed to acting as fast as possible to reduce sewage pollution in our waterways and upholding stringent performance criteria for water companies, as evidenced by the significant forthcoming programme of investment in price review ’24. A delivery programme of this scale, improving thousands of storm overflows with billions of pounds of investment, requires clear and robust regulation. The new clause as drafted would unfortunately undermine that.
The Government’s storm overflows discharge reduction plan sets stretching timebound targets to eliminate ecological harm from all storm overflows by 2050, and for water companies to significantly reduce harmful pathogens from storm overflows discharging into bathing waters by 2035. This is supported by an ambitious backstop target. By 2050, no storm overflow will be permitted to spill more than 10 times a year on average. Those stretching targets are informed by detailed analysis and extensive engagement. They will drive £60 billion of investment between 2025 and 2050—the largest infrastructure programme in water company history. Almost £12 billion of that investment will begin this year, improving over 2,800 storm overflows by 2029-30.
Those targets bolster underpinning legislative requirements to limit pollution from storm overflows. The Environment Agency monitors and enforces against breaches of environmental requirements, utilising monitoring data to support its investigations. Where breaches are identified, it has significant powers to ensure enforcement orders and financial penalties, and where appropriate, to pursue criminal prosecution. The measures in the Bill will further strengthen its powers, including by introducing automatic penalties.
These timelines are too slow. Setting the date at 2035 for monitor installation will mean that this is done at a much slower rate than the rate over the last seven years. That is disappointing. Targets set for 2045 and 2050 are too far away. We do not need to, and should not, move that slowly. We must do better.
I think when we had this debate, it led to the first of the fact sheets that we produced for the Committee. The hon. Member is talking about the speed of installation, and we highlighted that we will double the rate of the previous Government. We also highlighted that some of the improvements involve engineering and work. That is why we think that with £12 billion of investment, we are improving things, and I mention again the 2,800 storm overflows by 2029-30. So in the next few years, there will be billions of pounds-worth of improvements.
We all want opportunities to go quicker—everybody would want everything to be done quickly. As a Government, there is always a balance between making promises we cannot keep—which is never the best way to go—and being stretching and ambitious. I feel that we are being stretching and ambitious while also ensuring that we do not make promises we cannot keep. Obviously, however, if there was a way to go faster, everybody would accept that.
The Environment Agency is currently consulting on proposals to add new spill frequency thresholds to storm overflow permits. That will maintain the performance of storm overflows that have undergone improvements, and make it easier for the Environment Agency to act quickly if storm overflow performance deteriorates. Ofwat sets specific performance targets for water companies in the five-yearly price review. Ofwat is expanding those performance commitments for price review ’24, to include an ambitious storm overflow spill reduction target, which, if achieved, would see average spill per storm overflow reducing by 45% by 2029, compared with the 2021 levels across the industry. Where the commitments are not met, companies must reimburse customers, holding water companies to account to deliver outcomes.
I am sorry, but with spill per overflow, I again think we are drinking the water industry’s Kool-Aid. We are doing its metrics, and that is not doing anybody any favours. We are talking about spill per overflow; what we should be talking about is how many hours. We have that information. Why are we not saying how many hours? Let us think about it. We could have a spill for one hour or a spill for a month. That is just one, in that metric. It is missing a huge amount of what is going on. Please can we move away from these metrics towards spill hours, at a minimum?
Again, I recognise the intent behind the hon. Gentleman’s comments. Whichever way we want to address this, talk about it or set targets, ultimately what we want from a Government is less sewage going into our rivers, lakes and seas. If we can find a way to all agree on the best way to move that forward, that is something we can unite behind.
As I mentioned, the Government cannot accept the new clause, but I recognise the intent behind it. It would cut across the existing targets that I have set out, creating confusion and uncertainty about which water targets the companies should meet. That would risk undermining the extensive forward investment programme that is already under way and is essential to delivering the changes that we all want. For those reasons, and for the last time, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw his new clause.
We will not press this new clause to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the Chair do report the Bill, as amended, to the House.
It is a great pleasure to again serve under your chairship today, Dr Huq. May I first, on behalf of the Opposition and, I hope, colleagues from across the Committee, give a vote of thanks to everyone involved in this process? I have a list here, and please shout out if I miss anyone out.
First, I thank the Chairs—Dr Huq and Mr Vickers—for guiding us through the process. I thank all the Bill Committee staff—the Clerks and officials—for their assiduous, thorough work, which keeps us on message as Members of Parliament scrutinising this legislation. We thank them for that. Dr Huq, thank you—I will use the word “you” for you. I thank the DEFRA officials for all their hard work on this and for engaging with the Opposition as well. I very much appreciate the Minister allowing the officials to do that.
I thank the Doorkeepers and Hansard. I do not think I have missed anyone in the room except the public. This gives me the chance to thank the members of the public who have come in and watched our proceedings, as well as people who have watched online from afar. There are also, as the Minister said, the stakeholders: the environmental groups, the volunteers and the experts who have fed into this Bill and the water debate that we are having and who are helping legislators across the House to improve and refine legislation. We thank the public very much as well.
We have had a very interesting few days. It has shown us that there is a lot of cross-party consensus on what we are trying to do to improve our water quality. There is some disagreement about how best we do that, but this Committee has shown the House that, actually, there is a lot of agreement about the scale of the problem and the fact that we need to address it.
I respectfully say that I am disappointed with the comments from the third-party spokesperson, the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale, about the Bill Committee stage being a charade. I do not think that line-by-line scrutiny of Bills is a charade. Yes, there is a process as to how Committees are populated, but that is democracy. I would have thought that that particular party, given its title, would respect election results. That is how democracy works. We have seen that they have had some disagreement among themselves about some of their votes as well, but I will leave that point there.
We have had some interesting discussions, and it would be remiss of me not to talk about teeth. We have had dental analogies aplenty: we are wanting to give more teeth to the various regulators. Finally, I think I did detect—we will have to check Hansard—the Minister using the word “Ofwet”. When this matter goes to the commission, “Ofwet” might be an interesting term for a new body that might be set up, but I will leave that with the Minister.
(2 weeks, 4 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI am pleased that hon. Members have echoed my support for the DWI. This clause is specifically about how it can recover some of its costs. It is estimated that the increased cost to householders will be only 2p a year, so it is very good value for money.
The wider issue of regulation and regulators will be covered by the water commission, which is looking at the entirety of regulation. That is out of the scope of this Bill, although the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale has made those points a number of times, and I have heard them each time.
This measure will cost customers about 2p a year. This is a much-needed clause. The Government maintain that it is important that the Drinking Water Inspectorate is remunerated for its security and emergencies work and is able to design a more equitable fee structure. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 11 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12
Modification by Secretary of State of water company’s appointment conditions etc to recover losses
I beg to move amendment 11, in clause 12, page 16, line 11, leave out from “to” to “such” in line 13 and insert “recover from its creditors”.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
Amendment 12, in clause 13, page 18, line 31, leave out from “to” to “such” in line 33 and insert “recover from its creditors”.
Clause 13 stand part.
I will speak about clauses 12 and 13 together, with clause 12 covering England and clause 13 covering Wales. Clause 12 relates to the Secretary of State’s ability to recover losses incurred by the state in a special administration regime—many Members might know that as bankruptcy. What is being proposed by the Government is set out in the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs’ explanatory note 69:
“The modifications can require a water company to raise amounts of money determined by the Secretary of State from its consumers”—
I repeat “the consumers”—
“and to pay those amounts to the Secretary of State to make good any shortfall and may include a requirement that amounts be held on trust pending payment to the Secretary of State.”
What we are talking about here are costs associated with a bankruptcy and the Government want to make good those costs. There is no issue with any of that. What I find completely extraordinary is that a Labour Government are proposing that the consumers pay for that rather than the creditors who put us there in the first place. The management and the creditors are the people who are responsible for the mess that we find ourselves in in the water sector.
The hon. Gentleman says it is the creditors who put the undertakers in the position that they are in, but surely that cannot be right. Creditors are the people who provide services for a fee to the undertaker—they will not be the organisations that put the undertaker into that position. Surely the hon. Gentleman agrees that if he were to replace the consumer or any other body with recovery from creditors, that would be meaningless unless Government debt was placed above those of other creditors. How would that be fair to the providers of services to water undertakers?
I thank the hon. Gentleman—I think he jumped in before I had finished the sentence, which was on the creditors and the management. Who is responsible for this? Yes it is the management, yes it is the regulators and prior Governments, and yes it is the creditors who have provided the debt—they have gone into that with eyes and ears open and they have made that decision to provide that debt willingly. Therefore, they have put that money at risk and they have to take responsibility for that. That is what debt is.
I am not talking about Government debt, but about a loss and who is making good that loss. The Government are proposing that all the consumers pay for that—in other words, the bill payers. That is wrong. The bill payers should not be paying for this; the creditors should be, because they have put in, in Thames Water’s case, £17 billion—soon to be £20 billion very likely—which has saddled those companies with vast amounts of debt. More than a third of the bills of the bill payers of Thames Water is just being spent on paying interest on that debt.
The hon. Gentleman is conflating the term creditor with debt provision, but actually there is a plethora of suppliers to any large organisation such as a water undertaker. They are creditors—that is just how they are defined. His clause would cover small and medium enterprises that are providers of services, and in fact any provider of a service who would be a creditor of such an organisation. How does he propose that his clause only affects debt provision, which I understand is the direction he is trying to focus the clause on, and does not cover all creditors as it is currently drafted?
The change in wording would mean that the clause states:
“The Secretary of State may make modifications of the conditions of the company’s appointment so that they include conditions requiring or enabling the company…to recover from its creditors such amounts as may be determined by or under the conditions”.
Let us talk through the special administration regime and what happens. I would like this to already have happened but it has not When a company is put into special administration—I would like this to already have happened, but it has not—a court appoints a special administrator. A special administrator looks at the creditors. It looks at the debt and the other creditors involved, and it will prioritise, according to the seniority of that debt and those creditors, who is senior to the other. Suppliers will be a lot more senior.
Well, compared with the creditors, but I am advocating that the debt providers take the hit.
The hon. Gentleman will perhaps know that under current insolvency law, there are secured creditors. There is a hierarchy of debt, and the least protected—not the most protected—are suppliers. Does he envisage changing the rules to give additional protection in this process to unsecured creditors and essentially reverse the security of credit? That would be an odd thing to do, but I understand why he might need to do it to make this process effective.
We are seeking for the debt providers to take the hit. They have gone into this process and been part of the problem that has led to the state of our rivers today. They should be taking the hit ahead of the customers. That is our direction of travel, and I think that is fair and reasonable. What the clause does is the opposite, and that is what we are going after.
We fully support the losses being recovered by the administration process—we have no issue with that—but if we support the clause as drafted, we will find a very large bill on the customer’s account. That is something we want to avoid. I am keen to hear the Minister’s view as to why it is reasonable for the customer to be paying rather than the lenders.
On clauses 12 and 13, the Opposition tabled amendments 7 and 8 to remove them. They provide the Government with the power to issue special administration orders to water companies that face financial difficulties.
I put on record my thanks to my Conservative colleagues in the other place for sounding the alarm on this issue when the Bill came forward. They made the case that the measures in clauses 12 and 13 could put the very people we want to protect in such legislation, namely the consumers, at risk. The moral hazard has been explicitly set out by my colleagues in the other place, but I will attempt to summarise it so that we are clear what the problem is. As it stands, the clauses will give the Government the power to recover any losses they make through placing a company in special administration by raising consumer bills.
The problem seems self-evident. If water companies, through their own failure, require the Government to place them under special administration, why should consumers be expected to foot the bill for those failures when they had no particular responsibility for them? It runs contrary to the nature of all the action that has been taken in recent years to try to improve our water quality, and companies that have failed to get their affairs in order must take responsibility.
I was on the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee in the last Parliament, and we spent a lot of time looking at the financial resilience and behaviour of the water sector in close detail. I know that the current iteration is continuing that work. It was concerning to hear about the financial resilience of the sector at first hand in our hearings and meetings. As I said in a sitting of this Committee last week, the financial resilience of the water industry is not a hypothetical issue, but one of paramount concern right now.
We are all starkly aware of concerns surrounding the financial resilience of companies such as Thames Water. We heard about that in detail on the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee in the last Parliament. In November, Ofwat’s “Monitoring Financial Resilience” report identified 10 companies that needed an increased level of monitoring and/or engagement concerning financial resilience. Three were placed in the highest category of “action required”, which means that action must be taken or is being taken to strengthen a company’s financial resilience challenges and that there is a requirement to publish additional information and reporting on improvements at a more senior level with Ofwat.
As well as sending out the opposite message to the companies that Ofwat is working so hard to scrutinise and regulate to protect consumers, clauses 12 and 13 send out the wrong message to consumers themselves. Consumers were recently told that they can expect their average bills to rise by a minimum of about £86, at a time when no doubt some of them have concerns about how to afford their existing bills, along with wider cost concerns. I say gently to the Government that the recent Budget did not help the situation for people’s household budgets. How can it be fair that as a result of these clauses the Government may lead consumers to pay more at a time when many are finding it difficult to pay their bills and do not feel that they are getting the clean water that they deserve? It will potentially add insult to injury when many people are all too aware that they could face higher prices on their water bills because of the Government’s moves.
Shareholders and water company bosses used to be able to receive dividends and bonuses despite polluting our rivers and seas and failing to do the right thing to tackle it. Although reforms have been made to ensure that water company bosses who are not doing their duty with regard to our waterways are forbidden from claiming excessive bonuses, the sting will remain for many people when they keep in mind the prospect of paying higher bills to bail out companies for their poor financial performance.
To water companies, these clauses will send out a signal that they do not have to worry about incurring the consequences of financial irresponsibility, as the Government will have a mechanism to bail them out and consumers may indirectly have to fork out the costs. Nobody is being required to take accountability or face the consequences of the decisions that have caused the failure, but those who have no responsibility or influence are being forced to pay an unfair price increase.
Worse still, the clauses fail completely to specify how much they can require companies to raise from consumers or how much consumers could have to pay in increased costs as a result of the Government’s imposition of these conditions on water companies. That means that any announcements of price changes to water bills, such as those announced by Ofwat, could give no indication at all of how much consumers could end up paying on their water bills. To compound the higher prices even further, consumers may end up facing higher bills to solve special administration financial issues for companies by which they are not even served.
Under clause 12, proposed new section 12J(4) of the Water Industry Act states that “relevant financial assistance” in subsection (3) can include
“any other company which holds or held an appointment under this Chapter and whose area is or was wholly or mainly in England.”
Companies that do the right thing could be forced to pay up, or make their consumers pay up, for the mistakes of those who have failed to do the right thing. As my noble Friend Lord Remnant put it:
“It is the debt and equity investors”
in a company that has failed to do the right thing
“who should pay for these losses in the form of lower proceeds from any eventual sale. Why should a retired police officer in Yorkshire or a hard-working nurse in Cornwall lose out to a hedge fund owner in New York trying to make a quick return?”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 20 November 2024; Vol. 841, c. 293.]
Although in the other place the Government attempted to explain away concerns by suggesting that they do not think that they will have to use the power except as a last resort, and that the bar for special administration would be extremely high, the fact that on more than one occasion the Government could have accepted amendments to remove proposed new subsection (4) must mean that they expect that on at least some occasions they will require its use. The time taken to defend the measure and oppose reforms suggests that this is no mere formality in the wording of the Bill, but something that the Government may put in place.
The Minister in the other place said that the Government would seek to exercise the power in proposed new subsection (4) only if Government bail-outs to water companies could not be financed for the duration for which a company is in special administration—that is, during the shortfall. If that is the condition the Government are setting for the measure—if we have to have the measure at all—could they not have set it out explicitly within the Bill? At the very least, that would have provided clarity about how far the power should be permitted to go.
Clause 13 will provide the Welsh Government with the same powers as those in clause 12. Although the powers in clause 13 are independent of who occupies the offices of the Welsh Government, it should be noted that the Welsh Government who would currently be expected to exercise the powers do not have the most brilliant track record on the water industry, to say the least. Under the Welsh Labour Administration, the average number of spills from storm overflows in 2022 was two thirds higher than in England. That record suggests that the Government in Wales leave much to be desired when it comes to the competence of the water industry, and there is evidence for concern when it comes to exercising the clause’s powers.
Regardless of the specifics of the subsections and of who holds the powers contained in clauses 12 and 13, they are, as they stand, completely against the principles of improving the water industry. I urge the Minister to consider those points and to remove the clauses. Accordingly, we will seek a vote to remove clauses 12 and 13 from the Bill.
If the hon. Member does not mind, I would like to finish my remarks, and then I am sure we will hear from him again.
Although I have outlined some of the merits of clauses 12 and 13, I would like to stress again the importance of including them in the Bill. A SAR will ensure the continued provision of essential public services and is the ultimate tool in Ofwat’s regulatory toolkit. There is therefore a high bar for the use of a SAR. A water company can be placed into special administration either on insolvency grounds, where it is unable to pay its debts, or on performance grounds, where it is in such serious breach of its principal statutory duties on enforcement order that it is inappropriate for the company to retain its licence. That includes consideration of a company’s environmental and financial performance. Although the Government have had the powers to place water companies into special administration for more than three decades, it is important that we regularly update legislation to reflect the modernisation of law and experience in other sectors.
Clauses 12 and 13 are essential because if a SAR occurs, Government funding could be provided to cover the cost of special administration. In the unlikely event that the proceeds of a sale or a repayment agreed as part of the rescue at the end of a SAR are insufficient to cover repaying Government funding, there is risk of a funding shortfall. I really am at a loss to understand how this has suddenly become about the Government using customer money to bail out creditors. I am confused about how that started.
The money will be used to cover the cost of repaying Government funding in the risk of a funding shortfall. The DEFRA Secretary of State and the Welsh Ministers do not currently have the power to require this shortfall to be repaid. The shortfall, of course, is the money that the Government may have to provide in the event of a SAR. This is unlike other sectors such as energy, in which the relevant Secretary of State has flexible powers to recover a shortfall in funding. Without this power, there is a risk that taxpayers will foot the bill for costs usually contained within the water sector. Again, that has nothing to do with creditors; it has to do with the costs that the Government could have to pay for the SAR.
Clauses 12 and 13 will therefore introduce a new power for the Secretary of State and the Welsh Ministers to modify water company licence conditions to allocate costs appropriately should there be a shortfall in financial assistance provided in a water industry SAR. The power is designed to be flexible, allowing the Secretary of State or the Welsh Ministers to recover any shortfall in funding in a manner appropriate to the circumstances. The use of the power is also subject to public consultation.
The Secretary of State will be able to decide whether or not to use the power, and to decide the rates at which the shortfall should be recovered from customers. The shortfall that we are talking about is any cost that the Government could have during the time the company is in a SAR; it has nothing to do with shareholders and creditors. The decision will include the group of customers from which it should be recovered. For example, it could be recovered from all water companies’ customers—that is, those in England—or a subset of the sector, or only customers whose water company went into a SAR.
It is possible that a decision could be taken to spread the cost of a SAR across multiple companies, such as where spending benefits are coupled in another region due to shared infrastructure. There is a well-established practice of socialising costs in the energy sector. If a SAR occurs and this power is ever required, it will allow a decision to be made and consulted on as to what the fairest cost recovery option is, based on the evidence and the circumstances at the time.
I think the Minister is confirming that consumers will pay for that shortfall. We are advocating that the creditors should pay. We are not looking to rewrite the Insolvency Act. Whatever the special administrator decides in terms of the hierarchy, fine—that is up to the special administrator. I think the Minister has just confirmed what paragraph 69 in DEFRA’s explanatory notes says, which is that a company is required to
“raise amounts of money determined by the Secretary of State from its consumers”
—that is, the bill payers—for that shortfall, rather than the creditors. That is the bit that we are getting at. We think that the special administrator should take into account that hit that the Government have taken and take it out of the creditor’s pocket rather than the customer’s.
The hon. Gentleman has failed to acknowledge that, as I have just remarked, there is a hierarchy under the Insolvency Act when it comes to debt being repaid. The people he suggests that we take the money from might be people who, in fact, do not receive any money back. As I have already mentioned, the exact quantity of debt recouped by creditors or equity recouped by shareholders is a matter for the SAR. It is unlikely that all debt will be repaid at the end of special administration, and Government funding provided during a SAR takes priority over most creditors. In the event that there was a cost unable to be recovered from the sale of the company or from reprioritising its debt, the Government would receive their money back first and, therefore, this cost recovery mechanism for customers might not be provided before we reach some of the other creditors, and of course that is determined under the Insolvency Act. I am therefore at a loss to understand the hon. Member’s point. It would make sense if there were people who received their debt repayment before the Government, but that is not the case. There seems to be a lot of confusion about what is happening.
All that the Government are doing are providing that, in the unlikely event of the Government’s being unable to recoup costs that they could have paid during the time that a company is under a SAR, there are various mechanisms to have that repaid, all of which would be consulted upon. At the moment, as we know, that would come from the taxpayer. We are instead providing that, yes, we could still use the taxpayer to recoup that debt, or we could use the customers of that particular water company, of neighbouring water companies, or of all of England—and that would be consulted upon.
I think that the hon. Member’s confusion emanates from his being under the impression that, at the exiting of the SAR, creditors would skip off into the sunset with all the money and the Government would take money from customers. That is not the point I am making because, as I have already said, it is unlikely that all debt will be repaid at the end of a SAR and there is a specific order of priority for repayment. I will make the offer—as I did last time and made good on—to provide a fact sheet on exactly how a SAR would work so that there is no further confusion as we progress through the Bill.
I hope that the Committee agrees that the power is essential to protect taxpayers’ money in the event of a SAR.
We are going backwards and forwards. I have made my point. The note here is clear—the Secretary of State is looking for moneys from the customers. I think the special administrator should follow the insolvency rules, but that the hit should come from the creditors, not the customers. I will park it there. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
New clause 31 would make the process of putting a company into special administration much easier and clearer. There are two steps in the provision: making it easier to apply for special administration and giving more guidance to judges on whether to grant special administration.
Proposed new section 24(1B) of the Water Industry Act 1991 states:
“Where a company which is a qualifying water supply licensee or qualifying sewerage licensee…is required, as a condition of its licence, to maintain two Issuer Credit Ratings which are Investment Grade Ratings from two different Credit Rating Agencies, and…fails to comply with that requirement, the Secretary of State must make an application to the High Court by petition under this section.”
That states that if a company does not have investment grade credit ratings, the Secretary of State will apply for special administration.
Proposed new section 24(2)(ca) of the 1991 Act states that special administration may be granted if a company
“is required, as a condition of its licence, to maintain two Issuer Credit Ratings which are Investment Grade Ratings from two different Credit Rating Agencies, and…has failed to comply with that requirement.”
That gives guidance to the judge. It says, “You’ve got to have those credit ratings. If you don’t, special administration is much more likely to be granted.”
At the moment, we have some bizarre situations. Thames Water, which I will use as my standard example, has £17 billion of debt and cash flows of £1.2 billion; its debt is 14 times higher than the cash flow it generates every year. By financial standards, that is somewhere between ludicrous and ridiculous. In an unregulated sector, the company would have gone bankrupt long ago. I believe—people may contest this—that our Government are keeping it alive because they are worried about being sued by the bondholders if they put it into special administration, because the criteria are not very clear.
If we are serious about fixing our rivers, we have to deal with the debt. We cannot spend the money our rivers require if we do not fix the debt, but we are still digging. Thames Water’s proposed £3 billion of special restructuring is going through the courts right now, so we are adding even more debt—an even bigger millstone around that company’s shoulders. Its debt will go from £17 billion to £20 billion. The Government have the opportunity to say, “That is the last Administration’s trick. We are going to do something different,” but at the moment they are not saying that. I really hope that we will change course. If we do not, all we will do is add more debt on to these companies; that will keep them alive for another 12 or 18 months, but we will be back in the same place again. Customers in Witney and in every constituency are paying through the nose just to cover the interest expenses.
Ofwat has just thrown Thames Water the great big juicy bone of a 35% price increase. That is great news for lenders, but not such great news for customers. It means that instead of 46% of my bill covering the lenders’ interest expenses, it will be only 38%, but I will be paying 35% more. I do not believe that is helping, so the purpose of the new clause is to make it easier to get water companies into special administration.
I emphasise to Committee members that special administration is the ultimate regulatory enforcement tool; as such, the bar is set high.
To respond to new clause 1, tabled by the hon. Member for Waveney Valley, and new clause 31, tabled by the hon. Members for Witney and for Westmorland and Lonsdale, a water company can already be placed into special administration on performance grounds where it is, or is likely to be, in serious breach of its principal statutory duties or an enforcement order—in other words, where it is inappropriate for the company to retain its licence—as set out in section 24 of the Water Industry Act 1991.
The Secretary of State and Ofwat will consider all aspects of a company’s performance and enforcement record, including environmental and financial performance, when considering whether to pursue an SAR on performance grounds. Licence breaches, such as the loss of an investment-grade credit rating, are considered as part of that holistic review of a company’s performance. Ofwat will consider the circumstances around any loss of an investment-grade credit rating to identify the actions that the company must take to address associated licence breaches.
Regulators have a range of enforcement mechanisms to ensure the delivery of performance, including environmental performance. Water companies can also be required to make clear plans to address failures. I gently point out that this Bill does an awful lot to give more powers to address environmental performance. As we have discussed, our pollution reduction implementation plans address some problems relating to pollution.
Special administration must be a last resort, as it has significant consequences for a company’s investors. If special administration could be triggered without allowing a company to rectify performance issues and licence breaches, investors would have low confidence and would not provide the necessary funding. That could create instability in the market, potentially affecting the entire sector.
Although we recognise the concern behind these new clauses and others tabled by the hon. Gentlemen that highlight concerns that the system is not working, they address the symptoms rather than the underlying causes. In October 2024, the Government announced an independent commission that would be the largest review of the water sector since privatisation. That commission has a broad scope and will consult experts in areas such as the environment, public health, engineering, customers, investors and economics.
The governance of companies and regulatory measures to support financial resilience will be covered, including the operation of existing tools, such as the special administration regime. The review will report by quarter two in 2025. The UK and the Welsh Governments will respond and consult on proposals they intend to take forward. We expect those to form the basis of future legislation to tackle the systematic issues to transform the water sector fundamentally. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Member is content to withdraw the proposed new clause.
(2 weeks, 4 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesWith respect, I feel that we are living in parallel universes. I will take Thames Water as an example, whose debt is 14 times the level of its cash flows. The Minister is saying that financial resilience could be threatened, but I spent 25 years in finance, and that ratio is very threatening. Is Ofwat closely monitoring that? Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s have put Thames Water into junk bond ratings—seven ratings under the investment grade—and we are pedalling on regardless. Could the Minister give a view on Thames Water’s levels of debt, and whether they are threatening to the company?
I hope that the hon. Gentleman has not misunderstood. There is certainly no desire from me to keep pedalling. Instead, what we want to do is look at the entire financial situation of companies—he knows that we have had that conversation outside this room. We need to look at some of the longer-term reform options for how companies are structured financially, which is why we have the deputy governor of the Bank of England leading our review, and using his knowledge and expertise to look at how companies are structured.
I do not think that the new clause is the appropriate place to pre-empt the outcome of the commission before it has had an opportunity to report, or even to listen to the hon. Member for Epping Forest through the call for evidence that is yet to be announced. I want to stress that I support sentiment of the hon. Member for Witney, but I express caution around the risks of putting through changes of this magnitude without giving full and proper consideration. We believe that the commission is the appropriate way to do that.
I am not entirely reassured but I am partially at least and we have no desire to push this new clause a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 11
Duty to publish maps of sewage catchment networks
After section 205 of the Water Industry Act 1991 insert—
“205ZA Duty to publish maps of sewage catchment networks
(1) Each relevant undertaker must publish a map of its sewage catchment network.
(2) A map published under this section must illustrate any relevant pumping stations, pipes, and other works constituting part of the undertaker’s sewerage network.
(3) Maps published under this section must be published within 12 months of the passing of this Act, and must be updated whenever changes are made to the sewage catchment network or the components listed in subsection (2).
(4) Maps published under this section must be made publicly accessible on the undertaker’s website.”—(Charlie Maynard.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
This is a very nuts and bolts thing. I believe we are here to try to make a better water sector. I will rattle through the clause, which would mean that each relevant undertaker
“must publish a map of its sewage catchment networks”,
and that maps published under the provision
“must illustrate…pumping stations, pipes and other works constituting part of the undertaker’s sewerage network…must be published within 12 months of the passing of this Act…must be made publicly accessible on the undertaker’s website.”
I am a district councillor as well as an MP and in my ward of Standlake Aston and Stanton Harcourt, parish councillors, members of the public and campaigners have grappled for information and failed to find it. Many people do not know how to do a freedom of information request. This means that people do not know where the sewage is going from and to, and that leads to confusion and means that the problems are further away from us.
Putting these maps in the public domain, making them easily accessible and making sure that not only the pumping stations and the treatment works but the pipes connecting them all—which are not automatically clear —are always in the public domain and always easily accessible means that we are getting to a solution quicker. That is all this new clause is about. I am probably going to get a response saying, “We have to wait for the water commission”, in which case I would express some disappointment, because these things do not cost any money and they mean we move quicker to solve problems. I would really like a culture of, “If that’s a good idea, let’s do it”.
I understand the intent of new clause 11. The location and health of a water company’s assets is key to ensuring their maintenance and improvement. Under section 199 of the Water Industry Act, companies are required to keep records of the locations of many of their sewers, natural drains or disposal mains. Members of the public are able to request this information from water and sewerage companies in map form. Furthermore, the Environment Agency hosts a public register of information relating to all sites and assets permitted under the environmental permitting regulations. As of 1 January—this month—all water companies are required to publish discharge data from their storm overflows. Water UK’s centralised map shows that near real-time data for water companies across England in a publicly accessible format.
Frankly, it is pretty worrying that we do not have maps of sewer networks around the country. That is a pretty fundamental thing that we would want a water utility company to have. I acknowledge that they do not, though, and nowhere in the new clause am I proposing that the network is mapped. I am simply saying that we should take the existing maps and get them into the public domain by default. Currently, it is necessary to make a freedom of information request to access them.
I suggest that the Minister might be being a little disingenuous in saying, “We’re just being asked to monitor, but we want to act.” The Government can do both. It is not the case that if we are monitoring, we are not acting; there is plenty to be acting on and plenty to be monitoring. Also, when I hear, “If we put in flow monitors then we would need to cover the quality,” I think, “Yes—all of it. Let’s do it now.” It is not an either/or, and I do not like the occasional suggestion that there may be an either/or.
Having said all that, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 12
Environmental duties with respect to chalk streams
“(1) The Water Industry Act 1991 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 4, insert—
‘4A Environmental duties with respect to chalk streams
(1) Where a relevant undertaker operates, or has any effect on chalk streams, that undertaker must—
(a) secure and maintain high ecological status of such chalk streams, and
(b) clearly mark chalk streams which are of high ecological status.
(2) In this section “high ecological status” relates to the classification of water bodies in The Environment (Water Framework Directive) (England and Wales) Regulations 2017.””—(Tim Farron.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 23—Ofwat to publish guidance on debt levels after administration—
“In section 2 of the Water Industry Act 1991, after subsection (2D) insert—
‘(2DZA) For the purposes of ensuring that relevant undertakers are able to finance the proper carrying out of their functions under subsection (2A)(c), the Authority must establish guidelines to be followed by relevant undertakers who have been in special administration.
(2DZB) Guidelines produced under subsection (2DZA) must—
(a) set out a maximum level of debt which can be accrued by the undertaker;
(b) set out a process for agreeing capital expenditure necessary for service improvements, bill increases, and changes to operating costs while the undertaker is subject to the Special Administration Regime;
(c) state the penalties which will be imposed for breaches of such guidelines, which may include –
(i) financial penalties;
(ii) prohibitions on the payment of dividends or other bonuses; or
(iii) such other special measures as the Authority deems appropriate.’”
I will speak first to new clause 19, which has three parts. Proposed new section (2DZA), which I will cover very quickly, essentially ensures the financial stability of water or sewerage undertakers. I think we discussed that at length in the debate on new clause 4, which I will not rehash, as I think we all know each other’s views.
Proposed new section (2DZB) has two subsections, (a) and (b). Subsection (a) is
“a prohibition on water or sewerage undertakers having offshore holding companies”.
Why would a UK-regulated water company need an offshore holding company? Maybe to dodge some tax? Maybe to make it as untransparent as possible? I would like a straight answer as to why we are not going to kill this possibility off today. Do we really need to push this out another six, maybe 12 or maybe 24 months—until maybe never—with the water commission? I do not know. I think each of us could just find our way to saying that offshore holding companies are not good for our rivers, our citizens or our country. I really hope we get there.
It is getting a bit late, but there is something I would really like Members to engage their brains on. It is a difficult and complicated subject, but it is the key to understanding what is going wrong with our water companies. It is called regulated capital value. What is in proposed new section (2DZB)(b)? It would introduce
“a requirement that the Regulated Capital Value for each undertaker is annually reconciled against the market values of the undertaker’s equity and debt.”
What on earth is regulated capital value? The key thing to remember is that it decides how much money the water companies make, so a higher regulated capital value is good for water companies.
The bizarre thing is that regulated capital value has not really been a proxy for enterprise value, which basically means the equity value of the company—what the shareholders’ value of the company is worth—plus the net debt. That was set up—this is really one of the original sins—back in the mists of time, around 1989 and beyond, when the companies were originally privatised. It has been carried forward every year: “Take last year’s, and add a bit for inflation and a bit for capex. Never, never, never reconcile it with reality.” That is what has gone on for decades.
Now we have this thing called regulated capital value, which is the critical thing the water utility companies are focused on: “This is how we make money, so we want this number as big as possible.” What we are advocating here is taking that apart, because of the reality on the ground. I will take Thames Water as my usual guinea pig. Many, many of Thames Water’s equity shareholders have declared that their holding in Thames Water has no value. That includes OMERS—the Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System—and the UK’s Universities Superannuation Scheme, and I think the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority may have done it as well. They have said, “Our equity is toast. It’s written off.”
The debt is not that hard to calculate either, because people can just look at what Thames Water is trading at; these are bonds, and people can see what discounts they are trading at. People can add that up, and they have a number that is much, much smaller than the regulated capital value of Thames Water today. But if it is a water company or Ofwat, they say, “Let’s just put a big pair of mufflers on and ignore that fact,” because it is safer to be in fantasyland.
This is a genuinely interesting point. I know it is late, but I would be grateful if the hon. Member could expand in further detail. While he is referencing regulated capital value and the difference between what is on the sheet and what is reality, could he explain in a bit more detail, for the benefit of the Committee, what that means in reality? If there were to be a rebase of regulated capital value, what would be the practical impact of that?
I question what value regulated capital value, given how completely out of whack it is with reality, is bringing to the table. I do not have all the answers, but I question whether this has any utility to the conversation. What is happening here is that a business is generating £1.2 billion of cash flows, and it has this enormous balance sheet and this enormous regulated capital value. Because of those essentially false premises—I believe that we do not actually have assets of that value—regulated capital value is essentially a figment. We are grappling with things that have no basis, and we would do well to reconcile and to look at the facts—at what these assets are actually worth—and then to build out from there.
One possible reason why regulated capital value is important is that the assessment of whether bills are reasonable or not relates—in part, at least—to what is considered to be a reasonable return on capital. Does the hon. Member agree that if one’s regulated capital value has depreciated to zero, there might be an adverse knock-on impact on what is considered a reasonable bill, to take account of the debt and the capital investment? Does he think that that might be something to do with it?
The whole thing is reverse engineered—I am completely in agreement on that—and that is not necessary or useful in terms of where we are getting to, and that is causing a lot of the trouble. I would like to find a way out of that, and I would really recommend that the water commission digs into this to find a way out. I am on the Business and Trade Committee and I will be asking the Financial Reporting Council, which oversees the accounting body, to ask these accounting firms whether they actually think those numbers—those incredibly slow depreciation periods of 150 years—are valid and, if so, why.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for allowing me another intervention, this time on proposed new subsection (2DZB)(a), which refers to
“a prohibition on water or sewerage undertakers having offshore holding companies”.
He referenced some of the international investors who have holdings in Thames Water, and perhaps in the majority of the other water companies. Access to international markets is very important for raising investment into our water utilities. Does he accept that using offshore holding companies might be a mechanism that allows for easier transfer of funds, easier investment and easier access to international finance, and may therefore have a benign rationale? We always assume that offshore holding companies are somehow suspicious, or that their motivation is tax avoidance, and I believe that the hon. Member referenced that earlier. That might be the case—in which case, they should not be encouraged—but with his 25 years’ experience in finance, which he referenced, does he think that there is an argument for saying that offshore holding companies make it easier to access international investment?
I have the name of one here: Thames Water Utilities Cayman Finance Holdings Ltd. Why Cayman? If I say “Cayman”, people say “tax haven”. That is why it is there. We should be doing our best to stop that. Last I looked, London was still a financial capital, and equity and debt could still be raised in this country, and I sincerely hope that remains the case. So I do not see a good reason to have holding companies offshore. Hon. Members might be happy to hear that that was all I wanted to say on new clause 19.
New clause 23 is also being considered in this tranche, and I will highlight proposed new subsection (2DZB)(b), which refers to
“a process for agreeing capital expenditure necessary for service improvements, bill increases, and changes to operating costs while the undertaker is subject to the Special Administration Regime”.
We have to spend a huge amount of money on our water utility companies, because they have not been spending enough over the last decade or two. When a special administrator is appointed in such instances, the goal is to ensure that the special administrator takes that future spend into account in considering how much debt needs to be cut. We do not want to come out of special administration with debt that is still high, which will prevent the investments from being made that will be required over the next. That is the goal of the new clause.
I thank the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale for the intent behind new clause 19. As highlighted, it seems in parts to contradict new clause 18, which was also tabled in his name.
It is important to highlight that Ofwat already has a core duty under section 2 of the Water Industry Act 1991 to ensure that water companies are able to finance the proper carrying out of their statutory obligations. Ofwat already monitors information it receives about companies and their financial positions on an ongoing basis. That includes carrying out a detailed review of the financial information published by companies in annual performance reports, statutory accounts, interim accounts, investor reports and other sources. Ofwat also directly engages with companies where it sees an increased level of risk. Additionally, Ofwat has recently updated water company licences to require companies to take account of service delivery for customers and the environment, as well as financial resilience when deciding whether to pay a dividend.
More broadly, the independent commission into the water industry will look at long-term, wider reform of the water sector, as I have mentioned. Company financial structures are one of a number of areas that could be explored under the commission, and we do not want to pre-empt the outcome of the commission through this new clause. The former deputy governor of the Bank of England, Sir Jon Cunliffe, chairs the commission. As mentioned, he has decades of financial, investor and regulatory experience. His appointment demonstrates the Government’s ambition to fix the foundations of the industry. As I have mentioned previously, there will be a call for evidence, and the hon. Member will be able to make his points to Sir Jon Cunliffe and the commission. Given the existing monitoring of the financial resilience of the sector and the forthcoming recommendations of the independent commission, we do not believe that the new clause is appropriate, and I ask the hon. Member to withdraw it.
Turning to new clause 23, which was also tabled by the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale, a special administration regime enables a company that provides vital public services—water, energy or rail—to be put into administration in certain circumstances to ensure that the public service will continue to be provided pending rescue, via a means such as debt restructuring or transfer, via a sale, to new owners. There is no need for a company exiting a SAR to be placed under an enhanced regime regarding its debt levels. Water companies are allowed to raise debt to fund the delivery of their services, and it is for companies to decide their financial structures. I will resist the urge to repeat my previous comments about the water commission looking at the financial structures of all the water companies, and I hope the hon. Member will take what I outlined previously as read.
In relation to capital expenditure during a SAR, it is not necessary to establish a statutory process for agreeing that expenditure, as that would be agreed under a court-appointed special administrator in the lead-up to a SAR. The Government can provide funding support to a special administrator. Any company under a SAR will still be subjected to the same regulatory regime and expected to meet its statutory obligations.
I hope the hon. Member understands why we cannot accept his new clauses, but I repeat the offer made: he will be able to talk to Sir Jon Cunliffe and present to him the evidence he has just presented to the Committee, so that he can consider it as part of the wider evidence gathering. I therefore ask the hon. Member not to press his new clauses.
It is very kind of the Minister to have so much faith in, and be so charitable towards, Ofwat, given its record over the last decade or two, particularly with regard to its management of water companies’ financials. We will not press new clause 23, but would like to call a vote on new clause 19.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 29—Ofwat consideration of pollution targets for price reviews—
“(1) The Water Industry Act 2011 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 17I insert—
‘17IA Duty to have regard to pollution targets in carrying out price reviews
When carrying out a periodic review for the purpose of setting a Price Control in respect of one or more relevant undertakers, the Authority must have regard to the performance of the relevant undertaker or undertakers against pollution targets across the previous five years.’”
I will be brief. We just want to highlight the five-year price review and the shoehorning in of that time period. It might have worked for Lenin—maybe not—but we do not think it works well in the water sector, so we want to see whether we can release ourselves from it. We will come to new clause 35 later, but in certain situations we will all be better off if we look over a longer time period. We have some really big problems and we need to think about reducing them not just over the next five years, but over a 10 or 15-year period. We need to work towards some really big fixes over a longer period. If we are always locked into these five-year cycles, we are not serving ourselves well. That is the point of new clause 21.
New clause 29 states that
“the Authority must have regard to the performance of the relevant undertaker or undertakers against pollution targets across the previous five years.”
At the moment, how companies do is not very well linked to their reward. Most of the time, with water companies, everybody is thinking about sticks—I certainly am—but we ought to think a little about carrots as well. Let us say that ultimately we do good things such as setting pollution reduction targets. If companies beat those targets, we should work towards a solution whereby they do well out of that. They could have a carrot as a reward for doing well, as opposed to endlessly being given the stick. That is the point of new clause 29. We will not push either new clause to a vote.
I thank the hon. Members for Witney and for Westmorland and Lonsdale for the intention behind their new clauses. The water sector is facing multiple challenges and growing pressures. Resolving them will require transformational change.
The Government agree that it is crucial to conduct a fundamental review of the water industry regulatory system. We want to ensure that we have a system that supports strategic planning and investment, with fairness to customers and environmental improvement at its core. I reassure the hon. Member for Witney that such a review is already under way—I might have mentioned this once or twice before—through the independent commission, led by Sir Jon Cunliffe. That comprehensive review is addressing the three elements that the new clause raises: planning, financing and investment. It is taking a holistic approach to assessing the system, and it will make recommendations to ensure that the water sector is better equipped to ensure clean rivers, lakes and seas and a sustainable water supply for the future.
The commission will report to the Government by the second quarter of 2025, ahead of the timeframe recommended in the new clause. I trust that the hon. Member for Witney is reassured that the requirements of the new clause are already being addressed through the work of the independent commission.
On new clause 29, which was also tabled by the hon. Members for Westmorland and Lonsdale and for Witney, I reassure them that the Government are fully aware of the scale of damage that pollution is causing to our waterways. We are committed to working with the water industry regulators to address that.
As a regulator, Ofwat has a range of primary duties, including ensuring that companies properly carry out their functions and can finance the delivery of their statutory obligations, including environmental obligations. Ofwat sets the total spending envelope for companies through its price review process and it reviews company business plans to ensure compliance with statutory obligations. I am pleased to inform the Committee that Ofwat published its final determinations for the 2024 price review on 19 December, which included confirmation of £104 billion-worth of expenditure over the next five years. That is the highest level of investment in the water sector since privatisation and will fund reducing the number of spills from storm overflows by 45% through upgrading 2,800 storm overflows.
In addition, companies will improve river water quality by improving more than 1,700 waste water treatment works. Furthermore, Ofwat has increased the number of outcome delivery incentives against which companies must deliver, including targets on reducing serious pollution incidents, such as a reduction in storm overflows and operational greenhouse gas emissions. That means that serious pollution incidents will lead to clear and robust financial penalties for companies. I trust that the hon. Member for Witney is reassured that his new clause is not required, as pollution targets are already closely factored into the current price review model, and I ask him not to press it.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 22
Prohibition on bail-out of water company shareholders and creditors
“(1) The Secretary of State and His Majesty’s Treasury must not directly or indirectly discharge, assume, or guarantee any debts of legal entities in any water company group subject to proceedings under section 24 of the Water Industry Act 1991 (special administration orders made on special petitions), except in accordance with subsection (2).
(2) The special administrator of a water company may reduce the debts owed by the regulated entity to its creditors by up to 100 per cent, taking into account the future forecast expenditure over the short, medium and long term and subject to the administrator’s confidence in the company’s ability to accommodate this spending.
(3) The prohibition set out in subsection (1) and the reduction of debts set out in subsection (2) must not include pension, wage and other obligations owed to employees, excluding any past or current member of a board of directors, within the water company group.”—(Charlie Maynard.)
This new clause aims to allow up to 100% of debts to be cancelled in the event of special administration proceedings, taking into account the scale of investment required to hit the future targets established by the Authority.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
We have covered this already, so I will be brief. I highlight subsection (2):
“The special administrator of a water company may reduce the debts owed by the regulated entity to its creditors by up to 100 per cent, taking into account the future forecast expenditure over the short, medium and long term and subject to the administrator’s confidence in the company’s ability to accommodate this spending.”
We have already discussed this. I am not going to go through it further, and I am not going to push it to a vote, so I will leave it at that.
I thank the hon. Members for Westmorland and Lonsdale and for Witney for tabling new clause 22. As the hon. Member for Witney says, we have already had a debate on this issue. I hoped that we had made the situation quite clear about what the special administration regime is and what it is not, but here we go again.
I must reject the new clause, because it would jeopardise the main purpose of the water special administration regime: the continued provision of vital public services. The role of a special administrator does not include a power to cancel debt, and the purpose of the administration is not to bail out water company creditors or shareholders. The new clause is therefore unnecessary. It would divert from long-established insolvency principles of treating creditors equally according to their rights as commercial entities. When a water company enters special administration, creditors are unable to enforce their debt repayments unless they seek leave of the court or receive permission from the special administrator. When a water company exits from special administration either by rescue, such as debt restructuring, or by transfer, such as a sale, the special administrator determines the level of repayment to credits. That will be calculated according to the statutory order of priority.
It is very unlikely that all debt would be repaid at the end of a special administration, because of the order in which payments are required to be made. Debts can be cancelled only according to a restructuring plan or under court supervision. The Government do not directly or indirectly make any decisions relating to the exact quantity of debt recouped by creditors or equity recouped by shareholders.
I must reject the new clause, because the changes that we are making align the water industry special administration regime with regimes in other sectors. We do not intend to alter the regime’s relationship with the existing framework of insolvency legislation.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 26
Rules about performance-related pay
“(1) The Water Industry Act 1991 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 35D (inserted by section 1 of this Act) insert—
‘35E Rules about performance-related pay
(1) The Authority must issue rules prohibiting a relevant undertaker from giving to persons holding senior roles performance-related pay in respect of any financial year in which the undertaker has failed to prevent all sewage discharges, spills, or leaks.
(2) The rules issued under subsection (1) must include—
(a) provision designed to secure that performance-related pay which, if given by a relevant undertaker, would contravene the pay prohibition on the part of the undertaker, is not given by another person;
(b) that any provision of an agreement (whether made before or after the issuing of the rules) is void to the extent that it contravenes the pay prohibition;
(c) provision for a relevant undertaker to recover any payment made, or other property transferred, in breach of the pay prohibition.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (1)—
(a) “performance-related pay” means any payment, consideration or other benefit (including pension benefit) the giving of which results from the meeting of any targets or performance standards on the part of the relevant undertaker or the person to whom such payment, consideration or benefit is given;
(b) a person holds a “senior role” with a relevant undertaker if the person—
(i) is a chief executive of the undertaker,
(ii) is a director of the undertaker, or
(iii) holds such other description of role with the undertaker as may be specified.’”—(Tim Farron.)
This new clause creates a new section in the Water Industry Act 1991 to require Ofwat to ban bonuses for water company bosses if they fail to prevent sewage discharges, spills, or leaks.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I do not really want to press this new clause to a vote, but we tabled it because my noble Friend Lady Bakewell withdrew it in the Lords after being given assurances by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, for whom I have enormous respect and of whom I think very highly. It seeks to ban bonuses for senior company executives who have been found guilty of a category 1 or 2 discharge. It would prevent any loopholes such as pay rises and share options that might enable bonuses to be paid under those circumstances.
From the Dispatch Box in the other place, Baroness Hayman said:
“However, we are very aware that water companies need to attract investment so, as outlined in Ofwat’s consultation, the circumstances under which performance-related pay bans are being proposed represent very serious failures by a company. I reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, that this includes instances of criminal convictions, credit ratings falling below investment grade and Ofwat’s proposed metric for bonuses to be prohibited if a company has had a serious category 1 or 2 pollution incident in the preceding calendar year…I would like to be clear with all noble Lords that we are not asking companies to meet any higher or new standard than that which is already expected of them.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 20 November 2024; Vol. 841, c. 247.]
We were grateful for that assurance, but nothing of that sort has appeared in the Bill since. Will the Minister give me some reassurance as to why we should not press the new clause to a vote? I do not see anything in writing that gives us confidence, other than the words of the noble Baroness.
(3 weeks, 2 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesHappy new year to all colleagues. It is good to be in this place and it is a great pleasure to serve under your guidance as Chair, Mr Vickers. I put on the record my thanks to the Minister for her engagement, and to the Committee Clerks and the Minister’s team for being immensely constructive throughout this process.
My hon. Friend the Member for Witney will speak to amendment 22, and I will make remarks on amendment 18, which, with your permission, Mr Vickers, I will press to a vote if the Government are not minded to accept it. I will also voice my concerns about amendment 2 and I give notice that we will vote against it.
Among the challenges that we face is the complete and utterly justified lack of trust in the water sector—water companies in particular, but also the regulatory framework. Amendment 18 was tabled to ensure that some of the people appointed to the boards of water companies, whatever their structure otherwise, have a connection to the benefit and interests of the consumers within the region; will benefit the residents within the areas in which the undertaker—the water company—is operational; and are experts and campaigners on environmental and sewage policy matters.
I am sure that Members on both sides of the House have people in their communities equivalent to the ones I will briefly mention. People from groups such as the Clean River Kent campaign, the Eden Rivers Trust, the South Cumbria Rivers Trust and the Save Windermere campaign, in addition to citizen scientists and others who represent local interests and have great expertise, ought to be on the boards of the outfits that run our waterways in future, and that should be in the Bill.
The amendment would bring the expertise and accountability that we are seriously lacking, and it would build trust, which our water companies are also lacking. We think that the case for it is self-evident, because those bodies and others around the country self-evidently have the expertise, authority and tenacity to add huge value and to ensure that our water companies deliver for the communities they are meant to serve, not just their shareholders.
Government amendment 1 seeks to undo an amendment added by my hon. Friends in the other place. Our concern is that if the Government insist on it and we do not have a much tighter timescale, that will basically undermine the regulation and leave it open-ended so that we cannot be certain that we would be able to enforce the things that the Bill seeks to do in a timely fashion. To ensure that the Bill does what it is supposed to do, we should not cut the water companies any slack.
I rise to explain amendment 22. On 11 July, the Environment Secretary issued a press release on the reform of the water industry that stated:
“Water companies will place customers and the environment at the heart of their objectives. Companies have agreed to change their ‘Articles of Association’—the rules governing each company—to make the interests of customers and the environment a primary objective.”
However, that commitment is not currently in the Bill. The amendment simply seeks to bring that commitment into this legislation.
It is a great privilege to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Vickers.
On behalf of His Majesty’s Opposition, I rise to challenge the Government on their plans in Government amendments 1 and 2. Before I go into the detail, I will make some general comments about the clause that are pertinent to the amendments.
The Opposition worry that the Bill, rather than taking original and new measures to tackle these issues, is purely an attempt to copy and paste the work done by our previous Conservative Government. In fact, many of the measures have already been copied from previous measures that we introduced in government.
With the greatest respect, I sat on the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee in the previous Parliament, and we took evidence from the chief executive of Ofwat on some of the key measures that the Conservative Government brought forward. Our Government gave Ofwat teeth and powers, and we need to make sure it uses them.
As detailed in the explanatory notes, Ofwat already has wide powers to set the conditions of water company appointments and licences. The Conservatives worked hard to strengthen its ability and power to do that since this issue came to the fore in order to drive the regulatory change that was vitally needed to tackle the scale of the crisis that came to light.
I again remind Members on both sides of the House that when Labour left office in 2010, only 7% of storm overflows were monitored; when we Conservatives left office, 100% of outflows were monitored. We found the scale of the sewage problem and were the first party to start to address it. The Conservative Government’s Environment Act 2021 gave Ofwat the power to consider, when deliberating about dividends, the environmental performance of a company and its credit rating, whereby Ofwat could stop the paying of dividends if it felt that the firm faced financial risks as a result of its actions.
The hon. Gentleman said that 100% of outflows are monitored, but I am afraid that is not correct. In fact, 100% of the 14,000 storm outflows are monitored—he did not mention storm—but 7,000 emergency overflows are not currently monitored. On the other aspect that he just mentioned, Ofwat was entirely devoid of looking at the balance sheets of the companies under the Conservatives’ watch. That is the root of all our trouble, and it would be beneficial to acknowledge that.
If the hon. Gentleman checks Hansard, he will see that in my speech on Second Reading and just now I said “storm overflows”. I gently remind the third-party spokesman that in the coalition Government the Liberal Democrats had a Water Minister who did absolutely nothing on this issue.
I am pleased to see you in your place, Mr Vickers.
I am not going to speak to the Government amendments; I merely repeat the very good arguments put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest. At this stage, however, I will just express a couple of concerns that I have about amendment 18, tabled by the Liberal Democrats.
I understand the rationale or the intention behind amendment 18; we all want the water companies to pay closer attention to the interests of their consumers. I note in passing that they already have a statutory duty—a consumer-focused statutory duty—but the actions taken by the Conservative Government over the past 14 years to ask questions about the state of sewage discharges and to get information about them, so as to take effective action to bring them to an end, bring with them an additional need.
The hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale highlighted a loss of trust in the water undertakers, and I agree with him on that. There has been a significant loss of trust as their poor behaviour, which was uncovered by the Conservative Administration, has been met with considerable outrage—justifiable outrage—by the Government and by members of the public.
However, I fear that there will be some significant unintended consequences associated with the drafting of amendment 18, relating to the legal obligations of a board member. The hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale referred to those new positions being on the boards of companies. There are legal obligations that apply to all board members and I question whether the representatives of consumers and of the voluntary organisations that have been so active in this area over the past few years would really want to be exposed to the legal obligations of being a member of the board of a plc, because those obligations are significant and onerous.
It is fairly standard on boards today to have directors and officers insurance; indeed, all board members have it. What is the problem with the new people also having D&O insurance?
I am grateful for that intervention. However, it seems an odd way to proceed if it is recognised that there is a risk to voluntary members who join boards, exposing them to personal obligations, such as a fiduciary duty of care. There is also a legal duty of loyalty to the organisation, which such volunteers might find quite difficult to stomach. There is a duty of obedience to the organisation as well. It seems odd at this drafting stage to say, “We recognise that there is a risk, but don’t worry: you can take out insurance and you’ll probably be okay.” It seems odd to introduce an amendment in an imperfect form, rather than perfecting it.
First, it is up to each individual to sign up or not; they do so of their own free will. Secondly, this is standard insurance which almost all boards have in the UK and internationally nowadays, which protects board members. It would not be specifically for those board members; it would be for all board members. To say that that is a concern, and that we should not make this provision on those grounds, seems odd.
I have expressed my concerns. It would be perfectly possible to achieve the object, which I share, of improving the voice of the customer in water companies, or of improving the implementation of the existing obligation on water companies to take account of the consumer interest. I do not think that the current drafting is the best that we can do. I raise these concerns so that they may be properly considered.
I will make some progress, because I know that we need to make progress in the debate.
In conclusion, I thank the Minister for her work on bringing the Bill before the House so quickly. I know that this is just the start of the change that we need to deliver on our water companies. This Government are acting where the previous Conservative and coalition Governments failed, and are working to clean up our water system.
I have a question for you, Mr Vickers. This is my first Bill Committee and I am trying to understand how everything works. There are six amendments to clause 1, and our task is to do line-by-line scrutiny. My ambition is to understand why the Government support or reject each of those amendments. At the moment, in our debate of clause 1, we are swimming quite happily between those amendments. I would love your advice, Mr Vickers, as to how we work to understand what the story is on each amendment in turn, because I am not clear on that.
There will be an opportunity to force any amendment to a Division, if the hon. Member wishes. We are attempting line-by-line scrutiny—I think it is more like a debate on Second Reading, but that is by the way. Does that answer your question? The Minister will respond.
Perhaps, since I am standing, I will make the other two points I want to make.
We have touched on Government amendment 2 already, but I think it is important. I was very pleased to see the wording coming in about bonuses. Proposed new section 35B(3) of the Water Industry Act 1991 says:
“Rules made for the purposes of imposing the prohibition mentioned in subsection (2)(a) (“the pay prohibition”)”.
That is the ban on bonuses. While the explanatory statement says that it is to prevent the need for a statutory instrument—which the Liberal Democrats support and seek to do in further amendments—the impact of the Government’s change is also to remove the requirement for the rules to be published by Ofwat within six months. That we find very odd.
I take it in good faith that the Government are keen to have the measures implemented, so we do not understand why they would take the timeline out. The Government want to ensure that it happens, but as currently stated, they are removing the timeline. Taking it on good faith that Ofwat will publish the rules is less strong than keeping in that commitment to six months.
I will correct the hon. Member for Epping Forest on our amendment 21. Our amendment relates to the same aspect of the Bill as Government amendment 2. However, we want to retain the need for Ofwat to publish the rules on bonuses within six months but remove the option for that to be kicked into the long grass by requiring the Secretary of State to lay a statutory instrument to bring them into effect. By taking out that provision, we remove that risk. That is the purpose.
As a new Member, it is a privilege to serve on a Bill Committee under your chairmanship, Mr Vickers—I hope I will get all of it right. I felt particularly moved to speak on these amendments and clause 1, given some of the earlier comments. I was a bit worried that we had been transported by the Opposition back to a previous Conservative age, because we seem to be being told that water customers have never had it so good—as one of their predecessors said—because of all the action that was taken.
There has been a lot of talk about teeth. I ask the Minister to confirm that the Bill is about the dentistry that is needed to put more teeth into the water sector. When she responds, will she identify whether the clauses that the Government have tabled help to address some of the very real anger that my constituents feel about the way they have been ghosted and treated by the big water companies and the behaviour of some of the senior leadership? Representing a seat with Anglian Water, which I think applies to some other Members present, I place it on the record that there is real frustration at the performance and actions of such a large company when at the same time as more than 3,000 hours of sewage were being dumped into rivers around my area, the fens and John Clare county, we saw the Anglian Water chief executive receiving £1.3 million in a package of pay and bonuses, despite that poor performance. The anger and the desire and drive of this Government, but also the public, to see action is palpable, so I very much welcome the Bill and I seek clarity on that. It is absolutely right, as the Government have outlined, that we have a fast Bill to get these teeth and this emergency dental treatment delivered quickly, so that we can come back and put the braces on for the rest of the water sector—[Laughter.] I think I am running out of places where that analogy can go; it is getting very dangerous.
When we get the Cunliffe report and others, we will look at some of the bigger issues for the water sector, but I am very concerned by that £1.3 million. I serve as a member of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee and I share the concerns expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Hastings and Rye that when we directly asked Ofwat whether it had the dental tools to challenge and put the surgery on to the water companies, Ofwat was very clear that it did not. I specifically asked the chief executive and leadership of Ofwat about another bête noire of the debate, which is Thames Water. Up until March 2024, in those three months, the chief executive gave themself a £195,000 bonus. Since 2020, we have seen £41 million given to water company chief executives in bonuses and incentives, so can the Minister reassure this Committee that the clauses that the Government have put forward will help to restore trust and put in place initial measures so that we can get on with this, end the delay, take action and start to put right the problems that the Government have inherited, and then look at the wider issues when we get the report later in the year?
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Vickers, and if I may I will start by wishing everyone a happy new year. I thank members of the Committee for the engagement with the Bill they have shown, and I also thank all the environmental groups, everyone who submitted evidence, and Members in the other place for the work they did on the Bill.
I am pleased to be back debating this vital piece of legislation. As I set out on Second Reading, the Bill will drive meaningful improvements in the performance and culture of the water industry as part of wider efforts to ensure that water companies deliver for both customers and the environment and, as has been mentioned in the debate so far, act on the real anger and mistrust we feel towards our water sector at the moment.
However, the Bill is one part of the Government’s ambitious and long-term approach to fundamentally transforming the water sector. As Members will be aware, in October 2024 the Government announced an independent commission, which will be the largest review of the water sector since privatisation. The commission has a broad scope and will consult experts in areas such as the environment, public health, engineering and economics, as well as customers and investors. It will look closely at financial resilience as one of its key areas—I know we all care about that.
I reassure members of the Committee on the timeline; the commission will report to the Government by quarter 2 of 2025. The UK Government and the Welsh Government will then respond and consult on proposals that they intend to take forward, and we expect those to form the basis of future legislation.
We expect the commission to report to the Government in June. I reassure the hon. Member that when I respond at the end of every session, I will go through each and every amendment in turn.
I turn to Government amendments 1 and 2 to clause 1. The Government have carefully considered all non-Government amendments made in the other place and how they fit within the wider plans for reform of the water sector, including the amendments tabled by Lord Roborough and Lord Cromwell. I thank them, and indeed the other place, for their careful consideration of the Bill, particularly for the constructive way in which they worked with the Government during the Bill’s passage through the Lords. That collaborative approach enabled the Bill to be strengthened, for example, through the introduction of new requirements relating to the implementation of measures in pollution incident reduction plans. However, the Government have determined that the amendments from Lord Roborough and Lord Cromwell are not necessary and should be removed from the Bill.
Government amendment 1 concerns financial reporting. During the Bill’s passage through the other place, it was amended in such a way that required rules made by Ofwat under clause 1 to include reporting requirements on company finances. The Government strongly agree with the need to ensure water company finances are closely monitored, especially given the current financial issues experienced by some companies. However, having considered the Lords amendment in detail and having had further discussions with Lord Cromwell about the intent behind his amendment, we feel that it is duplicative of existing processes as well as conditions in water company licences.
Ofwat already has processes in place to monitor where a company may be heading towards financial difficulties. It is already a condition of water company licences that companies are required in their annual report to publish by a set date financial performance metrics, including interest on their borrowing, financial flows and analysis of their debt. Based on those reports, Ofwat sets out its observations on financial resilience across the sector in its “Monitoring financial resilience” report. Ofwat is also alive to the potential for financial engineering to occur outside of regulated companies and is thoroughly monitoring the financial position of all water companies. The Lords amendment would therefore duplicate existing requirements, with the potential to create confusion in what is already a complex regulatory landscape. This is important: we also retain concern about the potential for the Lords amendment to pre-empt forthcoming reforms following the independent commission led by Sir Jon Cunliffe. On that basis, the Government have tabled Government amendment 1 to remove Lord Cromwell’s amendment from the Bill.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Information will be coming out shortly about how each and every Member across the House can contribute to that review.
Government amendment 2 seeks to remove the amendment that requires rules made by Ofwat under clause 1 to be brought into force by statutory instrument within six months of the Act’s coming into force. Alongside my amendment, I will also address amendment 21—I thank the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale for tabling it—which is largely in line with the intention behind mine.
Although the Government understand the need to ensure the rules relating to remuneration and governance are subject to efficient scrutiny, this additional process risks compromising Ofwat’s independence, which must be protected. The necessary secondary legislation would be prepared by the Government, and therefore would represent significant Government interference in the independent regulatory process. That kind of interference has the potential to have adverse effects on investor confidence. The consultation requirement in clause 1 already provides the Secretary of State and other interested parties with the opportunity to raise major concerns with the regulator on the content of the rules. We are confident that Ofwat will continue to work constructively with the Government and other stakeholders to determine a robust and appropriate set of rules.
I will finish what I am saying. I might answer the hon. Gentleman’s question in my upcoming remarks—who knows?
The additional requirement for the rules to be confirmed for affirmative resolution statutory instruments could also risk delaying the introduction of the first set of rules. That is counter to the other aspects of Lord Roborough’s amendment, which requires Ofwat to publish the first set of rules within six months of Royal Assent. I reiterate that the Government expect Ofwat to have the rules in place as soon as possible. Indeed, Ofwat has already concluded its initial policy consultation on the rules, demonstrating its commitment to meeting the Government’s expectations. I highlight the fact that Ofwat today submitted to the Committee written evidence of its statutory consultation on the proposed timelines for introduction of the rules, demonstrating its commitment to getting this done as quickly as possible. I urge all hon. Members to have a look at that evidence.
I will just express disappointment. The Bill currently sets a deadline of six months, which is not exactly a moment in time; six months is a long time to get something done. I respect what the new Government are doing by trying to go after the bonuses and hold people to account, but to take a step back and say, “Actually, we are going to weaken the Bill”, which is what amendment 2 is doing—the Government are taking out the deadline—is retrograde and a real mistake.
I strongly disagree that this amendment weakens the Bill or is retrograde. Instead, it is doing things effectively. If we were to put a six-month deadline in the Bill and rush to get the rules done in that period of time and there were complications, we would risk leaving a loophole that could be exploited by companies that have exploited loopholes for an incredibly long time and become rather apt at doing so. With respect, I would rather do it properly.
(3 weeks, 2 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesOrder. We are debating amendment 13 specifically, so please restrict your comments to that. I call Charlie Maynard.
Amendment 13 is about volume. It would add volume to the list in clause 3, which includes
“the location of the emergency overflow…when the discharge began…when the discharge ended.”
The Liberal Democrats seek to add the volume of discharge to that list, and that is common sense. As many Members have said, we want to know how much sewage is coming out, and we are looking for help from all Members to get the amendment into the Bill. If we are serious about solving the problems in our rivers, we need to know how much sewage is coming down.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for giving way and for the conversation that we had over the lunch recess. One challenge with the measuring of volume is what we are measuring the volume of. The industry estimates that 97%-plus of volume from a storm event is water—it is just rainwater. How do these amendments address the measurement of what is being passed, and is this something on which we could co-operate?
Let us talk about the spectrum of information here. We have got the number of spills, where we have no idea how long those spills went on. We then have EDMs—event duration monitors—which count the number of hours of pollution. There is then the volume of flow, and then various iterations around measuring dissolved oxygen, or whatever it might be. I do not want the perfect to be the enemy of the good. We need to make progress. Thames Water is installing flow monitors all over its network, upstream of its sewage treatment works, but not downstream. That is because it is scared of actually having to count and have in the public domain the volume of sewage that it is dumping.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Eastbourne (Josh Babarinde) said, “If you have a coke bottle of sewage, and you don’t know how diluted it is, you still don’t want it in your bath.” Of course we want to know how diluted it is—that would be nice—but if we are serious about addressing these problems, we need to know how much is coming out of those overflows.
To quantify what has been going on over the last few years—I give the previous Government some credit—some 14,000 monitors have been installed in the last seven years, which is good news. The figure was less than 1,000, and 15,000 have now been installed on the storm overflows, but another 7,000 do not have monitors. Amendment 16 talks about where those locations are. We can have overflows at a sewage treatment works, at a pumping station or on the sewer network. I believe that everyone on this Committee wants to capture wherever that overflow is, which is what the amendment would do.
I will try to quantify some of the numbers, and I will talk about my favourite, Thames Water. Right now, Thames Water has 30 event duration monitors at inlet storm overflows at waste water treatment works. It has 183 EDMs on storm tanks at waste water treatment works and 137 EDMs at storm discharge overflows at pumping stations, and it has 320 storm overflows on the sewer network—not in a pumping station or at a treatment works. We are trying to capture all those areas, because we need to know what is going on. If we do not know what is going on, we cannot fix it.
Amendment 13 is on the volume of discharge. Amendment 14 concerns the same count, so I will not go into it in more detail. Amendment 15 relates to reporting on discharge from overflows and would add to existing stipulations about the form in which the information must be published. I will read it out: the information must
“be uploaded and updated automatically”.
Let us get rid of human involvement. We are in 2025—all this stuff can, and should, be automated.
Professor Peter Hammond has done some great research, and I am incredibly grateful to Windrush Against Sewage Pollution, which has been one of the drivers of information and campaigning in this space. Well done to Peter, Ash, Vaughan and Geoff; I give them many thanks. Peter spotted that when Thames Water monitors its sewage, it does so at the wrong times of day, when the level of sewage is at its lowest. We want to automate that so that it is monitored all the time. That means less human interaction and lower costs, and it is much more achievable.
There is a map that shows whether sewage has been dumped in the last 48 hours, is being dumped currently or has not been dumped in the last 48 hours—Thames Water was actually one of the first to put that in the public domain—but it does not give the historical information. We need the historical information in there and it needs to be downloadable, so that any citizen scientist can come along, pull the data off and act on it. Without amendment 15, we do not have that. These are very nuts-and-bolts, practical things that we want to head along.
On the questions that the hon. Gentleman is asking around the type of monitors we have on sewage outlets, is he aware that the Environmental Audit Committee looked at this very issue in the last Parliament? It recommended the approach currently being taken by the Bill, which is to look at monitors upstream and downstream that look at the water quality. The Committee regarded that as the best way to assess this issue.
I am very happy with looking at monitors upstream and downstream. That is fine, but I want them all to be in, and I want them done quicker. In the last seven years, 14,000 monitors were put in. As per the House of Commons Library briefing on clause 3, we are currently being signed up to a much slower installation of monitors—it does not matter if they are EDMs or flow meters. The briefing states:
“The reporting duty on discharges from emergency overflows would be phased in, with water companies expected to achieve 50% monitoring coverage by the end of the next price review in 2030 and 100% by 2035, the end of the following price review.”
Why would we go slower? That is a lot slower than what has been done over the last seven years. We should be moving much faster.
I find it rather depressing that I suspect this information came out of the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. Why is there this desire to slow the whole thing down if possible? We have a huge problem, so why are we not moving faster to deal with it? Frankly—I am not looking at the crew opposite—the DEFRA mindset is profoundly depressing. That’s that.
Amendment 16 covers the installation rate. What we are trying to do there is get the rate much faster. We have asked for 12 months, and I will try to quantify this; I have a business background. How much do flow monitors cost? How much they cost matters. Flow monitors are £500 to £2,000 per unit. We have 15,000 across the country, so we are talking £85 million or whatever it might be. That is if we have £2,000 as the unit cost. If we take the higher level of the unit cost and say that each of them will cost £2,000 to install, it is quite a lot of money. We did it much cheaper in west Oxfordshire and Witney. Well done to the Witney flood mitigation group. It got 10 installed for a fraction of that, so that is doable. Let us just talk £84 million. Does that sound like a lot of money? Frankly, it does not to me, and I will try to quantify that. The £84 million is between 10 or so water companies. Thames Water alone has £17 billion of debt. We are talking about £84 million. It is a fractional number, and if we are serious about fixing our problems, we have to go there.
I will start with the Liberal Democrat amendment to add volume measurers to storm outflows. I hope I made it clear in my earlier intervention that I am sympathetic to the amendment’s objective, but I have questions about whether the route that the Liberal Democrats have gone down is the right one. Legislating for another piece of kit—volume-measuring equipment, alongside the EDM—yes, would go some way to solving the problem, but it would not solve the real problem, which is that we need to know when a discharge is happening, the volume of the discharge, the level of sewage as opposed to water in that discharge, and the consequential impact on the watercourse into which it is being discharged.
I was grateful for the intervention of the hon. Member for Hastings and Rye, who referred to the water report of the Environmental Audit Committee, of which I was one of the authors. We took a lot of evidence on the issue and we had a trip to Oxfordshire, to the River Windrush. We met the leading citizen scientists in the area and took evidence from them there and in our more formal evidence sessions in this place. The hon. Lady was right that the outcome of the combination of evidence we received was that the most appropriate form of technical solution was a measurer of water quality upstream and downstream, and for that water quality measurement to be published timeously. For that reason, section 81 of the Environment Act 2021 requires automatic publishing within 60 minutes of an event happening.
That leads me to a question. The hon. Member for Witney referred to Thames Water choosing when to measure, but with respect to him, the clause is about emergency overflows, not about standard monitoring, and under the existing legislation, Thames Water or any other water undertaker has no option as to when it measures—the EDM is triggered by the emergency event. It also has no option as to when it can publish, because it has to be within 60 minutes of the event being notified.
Yes, of course, the EDMs are automatic; I was talking about the spot monitoring by individuals.
With respect, that is a separate point, because we are talking about amendments to clause 3, which is about emergency overflows. I accept the point. As with so many of our discussions this morning and this afternoon, we are all trying to get the right outcome, but this is line-by-line consideration of the Bill, which is rather boring and technical, but it is where we try to tease out some of the drafting issues and what can be improved. I am not sure that the problem that the hon. Gentleman is seeking to resolve sits naturally in this clause.
Moving on to amendment 15, again I highlight my fear that, given that the clause relates to emergency overflows, the amendment leads to a legal duplication of section 81 of the Environment Act. I do not want to do the Minister’s job for her, but from my perspective, that is a reason why we should look carefully at amendment 15 before we accept it. Of course, when I say that I do not want to do the Minister’s job for her, that is only pro tem—in the future, I definitely want to do this job for her.
The Liberal Democrats have not yet spoken in favour of amendment 16, so I will leave that until such time as they decide to. The hon. Member for Witney can come back to it.
Finally, on amendment 17, which the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale—
Mr Vickers, may I revert to amendment 16? I am sorry; I thought I had mentioned it. I will read it out:
“The undertaker must ensure that, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, appropriate monitors are installed to collect the information required”.
That point is 12 months, so that is holding people’s feet to the fire, but we have a massive problem. This is totally doable in terms of timeline. If the Government came back and said, “No, we want 36 months, not 12 months,” then fine, I have no problem with that, but I have talked about being depressed by the desire to slow things down, and about the House of Commons Library data on giving another 10 years to install these monitors. Why are we going slow? We all say to the public that we are really serious about it; let us be serious. I thought that I had covered amendment 16, but there it is again.
I now rise to talk about amendment 16. My primary objection here is the overarching one: I am not convinced that this is the right technical approach, for the reasons set out in the report of the Environmental Audit Committee, and also in the Environment Act 2021. However, if I am wrong on that, I am happy to support this amendment as a probing amendment and look forward to the answer that the Minister gives; but if it were to be taken to a vote, without further information about the practicality of being able to obtain the required tens of thousands of these machines, install them and have them operational and reporting in a 12-month period, I am not sure that I, as a responsible legislator, could support amendment 16. I would need further information on whether that was a practical option.
I thank all hon. Members for their thoughts on this set of amendments. I would also like to pay tribute to all of the citizen scientists—in fact, many Members have paid tribute to them—and the incredible work that they do as volunteers, going out there to discover the true state of many of our rivers, lakes and seas. I think we can all agree that it is vital to understand the scale and the impact of sewage discharges by ensuring that water companies install monitors on emergency overflows as soon as possible and by encouraging public access to emergency-overflow discharge statements. As the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham said, I think this is about us all trying to move in the same direction.
Just before I turn to the amendments, I think there may be some confusion in the debate today about the different types of monitors and the different types of discharges being discussed. There is a big difference between fully treated waste water being released from treatment outlets and the discharge of untreated sewage from an emergency or storm overflow. I am therefore very happy to share a factsheet detailing the differences in the different types of emergency and storm overflows to help inform future debates.
On amendments 13 and 14, tabled by the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale, clause 3 requires water companies to provide information on the frequency and duration of discharges from emergency overflows in near-real time. Combined with the equivalent duty for storm overflows, which has just come into force, that will ensure that all sewage overflows on the network are monitored. That will enable regulators and the public to see, in near-real time, when a discharge from any overflow has occurred, and how long it has lasted for. Water companies will use that information to prioritise investment to mitigate the impact of the most polluting overflows, as guided by the regulator.
However, the monitors required to measure volume are much more difficult and costly to install compared with those used to monitor discharge duration. By comparing that with the cost of installing flow monitors at waste water treatment works, we estimate the cost of installing flow monitors on all 18,000 storm and emergency overflow sites in England to be up to £6 billion. Network overflows are not set up for flow monitors to be installed, which means that the majority of overflows would require complex works, such as pipework modifications, in order for monitors to record volume accurately. We do not think this added cost is proportionate to the additional value that volume information would provide, especially given that volume information alone does not provide a comprehensive account of the impact of a discharge. For example, a very small volume of very concentrated foul water could enter our rivers, which would be very damaging, or a large volume of diluted rainwater overflow. Volume cannot give an accurate assessment of impact. The measurement of water quality, as the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham has said, is required.
Would the Minister be willing to give information on the breakdown of that £6 billion? That would be very helpful. Also, I think we are all in agreement and of course we want to know the quality. As has been said, if that is the case, surely the plan is to go there. By all means, have flow meters with the quality meters installed, rather than not going there. I think the Minister was proposing not putting in flow meters and not putting in any quality meters either, or is she planning on putting in flow and quality meters? If so, when and how?
I am very happy to give a breakdown of the numbers that we have worked out. To reiterate the point I made before the intervention, that is why the Government believe that it is the measurement of water quality that is required. Water companies have been instructed to begin installing continuous water quality monitors for storm overflows and waste water treatment works from April 2025 onwards, so they have been told to put in those water quality monitors from April 2025. That will provide further information on the impact of sewage discharges on water quality. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale will see that amendment 13 is not needed and feels able to withdraw it.
The Minister said from 2025, which is great, but over what timeline? Is that the Library’s 10 years, or is that another timeline?
I want to make sure that I am not giving the hon. Gentleman inaccurate information, so I will find out the answer to his question and return to it, if that is okay. I do not want to give him the wrong information. The main point we are making is that it is not the volume that is having the impact; it is the toxicity. We think that, by focusing on measuring water quality, we can accurately see the damage being done to our environment by what is being discharged, and I think that is the point. If we are choosing where to put the monitors, we think that focusing on water quality and how damaging it can be is more important than focusing on how much there is.
I think the hon. Gentleman is probably moving on to amendment 16 with his point about the speed at which these were being rolled out. We were discussing amendments 13 and 14. That is where the confusion lies in this conversation. I will address the points about speed when we move on to amendment 16 —it is all to come.
I turn now to amendments 3 and 15, which were tabled by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield and the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale respectively. Clause 3 already requires companies to publish information on discharges in a readily accessible and understandable format. That includes information on the occurrence, location and start time of the discharges, which must be published within an hour of the discharge starting. To meet this requirement, water companies will install monitors that have telemetry technology to communicate discharges as they occur. To the point the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham made, that information cannot be falsified. It is not based on someone coming; it is automatic communication.
Those requirements are the same as those for publishing storm overflow discharges, which is now a statutory duty enforced by Ofwat. Water companies have already published individual maps for their regions to show storm overflow discharges in near real time. In addition, Water UK launched a national storm overflow hub in November last year to centralise all discharge information from water companies on a single national map. We expect that a similar approach will be taken for emergency overflows. If further direction for companies on how to approach the duty is needed, that can be more appropriately addressed through guidance. Furthermore, validated historical information on discharges from emergency overflows will be available through annual returns published by the Environment Agency. Those will allow for long-term trends in annual data to be analysed. If there are any specific requests from groups or organisations about how they would like to see information, they are of course welcome to communicate that to me.
We are here for another week or so. I take the point about apples and pears, but if the information is already in DEFRA’s hands, would it be helpful, if DEFRA can move fast enough—I do not know whether that is possible—to have a little grid circulated to Committee members about storm and emergency installation periods, whether that is quality, flow or EDM? With that data we could talk about it decently and honestly.
I think that might be really helpful. It has been an interesting but slightly muddled conversation. We were going to produce a factsheet to explain the difference between emergency and storm. Maybe we can include as much information as we can for Committee members by the end of Committee or before Report, if that does not put too much on my hard-working officials.
On the annual data being analysed, the proposed amendments are unnecessary and I ask hon. Members not to press their amendments. On amendment 16, which was also tabled by the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale, and which is about the speed of delivery, the need to deliver the installation of monitors on emergency overflows must be balanced with practical constraints and with due consideration for the cost of rolling out so many monitors, especially as those costs are ultimately passed to consumers through water bills.
Water companies have been instructed to install monitors at 50% of emergency overflows by 2030. This represents a doubling of the previous Conservative Government’s target of 25% of emergency overflows monitored by 2030. The Environment Agency will agree with water companies which emergency overflows will have monitors installed over the next five years based on priority areas, such as those that impact designated bathing and shellfish waters. As set out in the impact assessment, we expect the roll-out of monitors at emergency overflows to cost £533 million over a 10-year period. We believe that pace of roll-out strikes the right balance of recognising the urgency—this Government are doing double what the previous Government promised—while ensuring that companies have the capacity to progress other improvements and balancing customer bill impacts.
To speak frankly, it is very important to monitor, but it is also very important to fix the causes of some of the problems that we see. There is always a balance between monitoring and fixing the problem, and we believe that we have got that balance right.
Requiring a faster roll-out of monitors could undermine the delivery of other improvements that water companies must make in price review 24—I would not want to be in a situation at the end of the price review where we monitor everything and fix nothing. That includes upgrades to wastewater treatment works and sewerage networks to reduce sewage discharges from storm overflows. Where companies can move further and faster to achieve the roll-out of monitors at emergency overflows, they will of course be encouraged to do so, but we cannot accept this amendment to require water companies to install all monitors within 12 months. I therefore ask the hon. Member to withdraw it.
I will keep this short. I am looking forward to the factsheet, but the Minister will note that new clause 25 focuses on overflows, not emergencies or storms. Frankly, it does not make much difference to a bug, a bunny or a bather whether they get whacked by an emergency overflow or a storm overflow—they are still getting whacked by the sewage. Trying to unify things and get all the issues into one table would be really helpful.
We have already been denied one amendment about flow; I recognise that and will not go on. But quality and flow are important. I am afraid that I find the Government’s position—“We really need to focus on quality, so let’s not talk about flow or install flow meters”—to be spurious. I mean no offence, but it feels like a real let-down that we are not going there now. I do not see any reason why we cannot; respectfully, I think the Government are being flim-flammed by the £6 billion figure.
We talk about sewage treatment works, pumping stations and so on. I have mentioned them already but really want to push the point home because we want to be capturing every overflow, wherever it is. Too often, people talk about works but forget pumping stations and the overflows on the network itself. We look forward to seeing that being covered in the legislation: overflows, works, pumping stations and the network. We will not press the new clause to a Division.
(3 weeks, 5 days ago)
Commons ChamberI thank my hon. Friend. I am sure her constituent has done an incredible job—the flood groups have done an amazing job—and I understand why she must be feeling so exhausted. We have mentioned the impact that flood events have on people’s mental health. We want to look at areas at risk of repeated flooding in the flooding formula review to make sure that those areas are getting the support they need. The immediate post-flood situation is of course for MHCLG, but if I can help in any way she needs only to contact me.
Many of us recognise that our drainage network is in disrepair in many places. Much of that stems from the Environment Agency’s main river designation; an enormous amount of bureaucracy is required in order to get permission to unblock what is nominally called a main river but to almost all of us is a ditch. These ditch networks are very broad; in Northmoor and Bablock Hythe in my constituency, virtually every ditch is a main river, which means that in one case we required about three years to get a permit from the EA. That makes things extremely difficult and nothing ever gets done. We have had five permits in five years from the EA throughout the West Oxfordshire district. Will the Minister please consider doing two things: making it easier to de-designate main rivers to ordinary watercourses; and simplifying the EA’s permit procedure, which is incredibly byzantine, so that people can apply for permits and be able to unblock their ditches?
I am incredibly interested in what the hon. Gentleman has had to say, because the last thing we want is it taking five years to deal with a problem when there is a simple solution for it. If unwanted bureaucracy is causing a problem, I would like to try and help. I ask the hon. Member please to send me all the information. I am happy to have that conversation with the EA, and let us see what can be done.
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberI have to say to the hon. Gentleman that there is very little point in monitoring sewage in the water if all you do is watch the sewage increase and keep on flowing into our rivers, lakes and seas. The Conservatives seem to be satisfied with the failure they presided over. The Labour party will fix the problem that they left behind.
If you find cracks in the wall of your house and ignore it for years, the problem gets worse and the cost of putting it right escalates. That is exactly what the Conservatives did to our water system. They refused to bring in the investment early enough, so ageing infrastructure crumbled even further and the cost to bill payers has rocketed.
We are about a month away from Thames Water signing up for another £3 billion of debt. If that happens, 46% of the bills of every customer in that catchment will be spent on interest expenses, and that is without even paying down the £20 billion of debt. How is that helping anyone?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. One of the reasons the Government commissioned a review into governance and regulation is because of the failure of the current system that the previous Government allowed to continue.
I share customers’ anger about the scale of water bill rises they seem likely to face. They are rightly furious at being left to pay the price of Conservative failure. I am grateful that the party opposite has indicated support for the Bill. It is just a shame its support has come so late. In December last year, while they were still in government, I called a vote on introducing a ban on unjustified bonuses for water bosses, but they refused to do it. They could have acted at any point over the past 14 years, but they would not do it. There have been many times in history when Labour has had to clean up the Tories’ mess, but rarely quite so literally as cleaning up the raw sewage polluting our country’s waterways.
I believe that this Bill is disappointing. It almost totally ignores the financials of the companies, and that is the root of the problem. Unless we fix the financials, we will not fix the problem. Thames Water, for example, has £17 billion of debt, and it is currently expected to have a further £3 billion of debt by the end of January. If that happens, it will cost Thames Water an extra £334 million a year, which means that 46% of the bill of every single one of the 15 million bill payers will be funding interest payments—before the £20 billion of debt that the company will have is paid down. How does that make sense? How do we get this working again? That is not the route to a solution.
The reason Thames Water is not in special administration is that, officially, it is unable, or unlikely to be able, to pay its debts. You do not need a GCSE in business to know that if a company currently has £16 billion of debt and £1.2 billion of cash flows, it is unlikely to be able to pay its debts. I believe that our Government are running scared. They are worried about being sued by big bad American vulture investors, and that is why they are not putting Thames Water into the special administration regime—a regime that was explicitly set up for exactly this purpose. I say to the Government, “Please, do not let Ofwat approve a price rise for Thames Water. Put the company into special administration and start to deal with the problems, because we will not be able to deal with them until we deal with the financials.”
I have one minute and 17 seconds in which to ask the Government to steal some of these ideas. Yes, they should reform the three regulators, by putting them all together. In respect of clauses 10 and 11, why should consumers pay for financial losses following Government financial assistance? Why should not creditors and shareholders pay for those losses? It seems pretty weird to me. Pollution baselines should be established for each catchment; we should get that straight. Environment Agency permits for individual sewage treatment works should be reset. The capacity for each STW should be established, and the agency’s Environment Agency 3.0 multiplier should be applied to every one of them. There should also be volumetric flow meters, for which clause 3 does not provide—we are not getting them. I invite Members to read clause 3 themselves. We are getting event duration monitors but not flow meters, and that means we are back in the same place where we have been for the last 14 years. We need flow meters, so please can we insist on that? Finally, we need to haircut the debt: we need to get that £20 billion down to £5 billion. That should be the key focus, because then we will be back on a stable footing and able to invest as we need to.
(2 months, 1 week ago)
Commons ChamberIt is always wise to follow the advice that is given for people’s safety. We are in regular contact with colleagues in the Department for Transport and other parts of Government to make sure that we are doing everything we can to keep people safe.
My constituency of Witney has the Windrush, the Evenlode and the Thames, all of which have really impacted constituents today. We have just lost out on some FiPL—farming in protected landscapes—funding to produce modelling of the Windrush, which is upstream of Witney, our key market town in the constituency. That means that we are unable to forecast how we can lower and slow the flood crest through Witney, which would make it safer. Will the Secretary of State please look into providing better funding or enlarging the funding for such modelling, so that we can keep towns such as Witney safe on rivers like the Windrush?
I recognise the hon. Gentleman’s point. We will make announcements on FiPL early in the new year.
(3 months, 1 week ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I am honoured to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale (Tim Farron) for letting me wrap up this debate, and I thank all the speakers who spoke so well and eloquently about the places they represent and love.
I am the Liberal Democrat MP for Witney and a West Oxfordshire district councillor. Our area is a ground zero for pollution. The Windrush flows through Witney, the Evenlode flows through to the north, and Shill brook flows to the south. All flow into the Thames. All are repeatedly and heavily polluted. I work closely with Windrush Against Sewage Pollution, one of the best advocacy groups in the country, to get to grips with this problem. I have learned a lot from that group and from many of the other parish councils and community groups that work so hard locally, and I am grateful for everything they have taught me.
I will focus on financial stability, or the lack thereof, and on Thames Water, as it is the largest and the most unstable of the water companies. First, I will give some context. Thames Water has six holding companies stacked one on top of the other. Some of them are offshore; some are onshore. The top holding company, Kemble, has £1.2 billion of operating cash flows—that is, money coming in—and £18 billion of debt. Roughly £13 billion of the £18 billion is held by class-A bondholders, and Members will hear a bit more about them. This debt is expensive, and more than a third of all our customers’ bills are being spent on servicing the debt.
In July, S&P and Moody’s cut the credit ratings of the class-A bonds to junk and two notches below that. That action put the company in breach of its operating licence. Ofwat waved some limp celery at Thames Water and did very little. That opens up moral hazard because it means that other water companies and other companies in regulated sectors can do the same. On 5 August, the Under-Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Haltemprice (Emma Hardy), stated in reply to my written question that Thames Water’s financial position “remains stable”.
In early September, it became public that various funds, including the notorious Elliott Management, which pillaged Argentina and Peru, had bought large amounts of class-A debt at very discounted prices. On 13 September, the Under-Secretary of State replied to me again, saying that Thames Water “remains stable”. She noted that special administration was an option if any of three conditions were met, with one of the conditions being if
“the company is or is likely to be unable to pay its debts”
—pretty simple. On 26 September, both S&P and Moody’s slashed Thames Water’s class-A debt again. It was already two notches below junk; this time it went down a further five and six notches respectively. The words “death spiral” spring to mind.
A week ago, it was reported that Ofwat is meeting a creditor group representing the class-A shareholders to discuss restructuring the company’s debt. The condition that
“the company is or is likely to be unable to pay its debts”
has most definitely been met. The company’s cash burn is faster than previously forecast, and the company as is will likely run out of cash by December. Its class-A bondholders are desperate to avoid special administration as that would crystallise their loss and result in much of their debt being written off. However, the creditors are now negotiating with Ofwat to inject a relatively small amount of new capital in, cram down the other debt classes, resulting in perhaps a 20% to 30% debt write-down, flip some of their debt into equity, and then sell the company on to another buyer within 12 months, making a huge profit.
If the Government allow such a restructuring, they are effectively rescuing a group of lenders, including vulture funds, not the company. Instead of the bondholders having to write off billions of pounds of worthless debts, the Government will be giving ownership of the company to the vulture funds, which will then flip it at a profit. Such a route is neither sensible nor equitable for the company, the Government or our country. It is a lazy, short-term fix from which the Government can repent at leisure over the course of the parliamentary term. No one will be fooled by the Government claiming that in the short-term the market has fixed it, and no one should be panicked by bankers claiming Armageddon but, in reality, just driving their own agenda.
The special administration regime was set up for exactly this scenario. The Government should make use of it and place Thames Water into special administration, allowing for an orderly restructuring and reorganisation resulting in the sale of a clean company on the open market; whether that is nationally, mutually or privately is, of course, up to the Government, but that will allow a clean company to be in place. To be investable again as a sector, we need a clear regulatory framework that is transparent and enforceable against, where companies that make bad decisions know they will have to take the consequences. That will allow investors to fund water companies’ balance sheets so they can handle the very substantial investment spend that will be required over the next 10 years.