Ajax Programme

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Wednesday 14th January 2026 Westminster Hall

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the future of the Ajax Programme.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Stuart. This debate has been a long time coming. Such is the Kafkaesque procedure for selecting debates that this application was granted only at the eighth time of asking; I had first requested a debate on this subject on 1 September 2025—over four months ago. Since then, the Ajax programme has gone from on track to throwing a track, and the outlook for the programme and our armoured capability, the future of armoured infantry as a concept and the current deployability of 3rd (UK) Division are now all very much under the microscope.

In this debate, I am not seeking to apportion blame, point fingers at individuals or orchestrate a witch hunt. It is clear that the Ajax programme has been failing for a number of years, although I will go on to question some of the recent specific decision making regarding the programme. Accountability sits with successive Ministers. The slow progress on delivery appears to be an issue between the Army, the Department and General Dynamics.

We can skip over the potted history of the Ajax programme—others will cover that—but, to paraphrase Rodgers and Hammerstein, “How do you solve a problem like Ajax?” Although it was based on an existing General Dynamics platform, the Army made so many additions and revisions to the existing capability that it is now considered to be bespoke technology. We are talking about a staggering 1,200 capability requirements for each of the six vehicle types under the Ajax umbrella.

The March 2022 National Audit Office report on the Ajax programme details the fact that neither the Department nor General Dynamics fully understood some component specifications or how they would be integrated on to the Ajax vehicle, leading to consequential changes to the overall design, disputes between the Ministry of Defence and General Dynamics and, inevitably, programme delays. Both the MOD and General Dynamics have been criticised for underestimating the scale of the work, the technical challenge and the sequencing of the work. General Dynamics blamed the MOD for not having fully defined acceptance criteria; the MOD blamed the General Dynamics safety documentation. The contingency within the programme was quickly used up and the programme was suddenly four years behind schedule.

Noise and vibration issues were recognised in mid-2020, with a stop notice issued in June 2021. All dynamic movement and transition activity was halted while the programme underwent a significant reset. The Army resumed training on Ajax in 2023, but paused again in November 2025. The programme’s issues from 2020 to 2021 are well documented. Those issues are a failure to establish effective governance, complex assurance arrangements, high turnover of senior staff, an ineffective programme board, weak project controls—the list goes on. The most stark, however, was

“an over-emphasis on achieving its IOC”—

initial operating capability—

“target date, which meant that it prioritised time and cost over capability. As a result, it pressed ahead with the programme without resolving performance issues.”

Given what we know now and the issues encountered less than three weeks after IOC was declared, I would like to hear an assessment from the Minister as to whether he believes that that is still an issue today.

Initial operating capability for the Ajax programme was declared on 5 November 2025 by the Government; I stress “by the Government”, because several stages to that process were not made public until last month. The Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry confirmed to me:

“All criteria for Ajax Initial Operating Capability…were met on 23 July 2025 and following a period of review, IOC was declared by the Army on 15 September 2025.”

We know that only because it was written on a cake in a General Dynamics promotional video of the Minister’s visit to Merthyr Tydfil. Additionally, he confirmed:

“Before declaring Initial Operating Capability, I received written assurances from the Chief of the General Staff and the acting NAD”—

national armaments director—

“that the vehicle was safe to operate. Within the letter note AJAX the vehicle was described as ‘demonstrably safe to operate’.”

The Minister added that

“prior to Ajax Initial Operating Capability being announced, I sought assurances in writing from the Chief of the Defence Staff and the National Armaments Director that the system was safe to operate, which I received.”

[Stuart Anderson (South Shropshire) (Con)]

I thank my hon. Friend for initiating this important debate. Does he agree with me that it is important for the Minister to set out that in 2022 I and colleagues on the Defence Committee went to Merthyr Tydfil, did a review and clearly stated that IOC was nowhere near deliverable in the timeframes proposed? Does my hon. Friend think it is worth the Minister setting out what checks against the Defence Committee report were done when looking at IOC?

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

I thank my hon. Friend for that excellent point. I was not going to cover it in my speech, so it is definitely worth adding to the record for the Minister to address in his response.

The interim National Armaments Director, the new National Armaments Director, the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Defence Staff represent our most senior leaders within defence. It is hard to believe that they all would have signed off a vehicle platform that was inherently unsafe or where it was a sketchy 50:50 decision. How did we reach a point where four-star senior officers and equivalents had the confidence to sign off the vehicle’s initial operating capability, which then received ministerial approval, only for it to blow up in everybody’s face weeks later like a Wile E. Coyote Road Runner trap?

The March 2022 National Audit Office report states:

“The Department believes that the contract also incentivised GDLS-UK to prioritise production milestones over the quality and performance of the capability.”

It goes on:

“The contract incentivised GDLS-UK to achieve production milestones resulting in it continuing to manufacture vehicles while technical issues remained unresolved.”

Can the Minister give any clarity on whether that is still the case today, given that General Dynamics signed off achieving all the criteria required to meet initial operating capability, only for the entire programme to collapse less than four months later? Initial operating capability was also signed off by the Army on 15 September, before ministerial sign-off was granted on 5 November.

Last year, the then Minister for Defence Procurement and Industry stated that

“The Armoured Cavalry Programme (Ajax) is projecting the delivery of over 180 operationally deployable platforms by the end of 2025.”

Despite the various travails of the Ajax programme, production has continued throughout the training pause. As a result, we know that the Army has received just under a third of all Ajax platforms across all variants. It should be noted that the 2022 National Audit Office report highlighted that the compressed programme schedule flagged that there would no longer be time to validate the design of capability drops 3 and 4 before manufacture. Given that we are now in capability drop 3, can the Minister confirm whether the designs were validated before these vehicles were assembled and delivered last year?

The Minister also confirmed that

“It is anticipated that a further 110 platforms will be delivered in 2026, with the remaining 297 platforms delivered by 2028.”

With 180 Ajax platforms delivered, a similar number still to be accepted by the Army and all 589 hulls having now been completed in Spain, on current timelines the complete production run will have been completed by mid-2027. I believe that includes bringing all vehicles up to capability drop 4 standard.

Assuming that any resolution to the current training pause does not involve the mother of all factory recalls, there could potentially be an idle factory in Wales. What plans are there for the Merthyr Tydfil factory beyond the middle of next year? With only 18 months’ work left to complete, can the Minister assure General Dynamics employees in Wales that they will have a job once Ajax production is complete? Can he assure those employees that there will be no redundancies, given that we have no plans to purchase any more vehicles and that export plans are yet to materialise? While I appreciate that UK Defence and Security Exports sit within the Department for Business and Trade, can the Minister confirm what progress UKDSE has made regarding any potential export sales?

One of the main reasons why we are debating this topic today, and the reason for such media interest, is the social media content that has emerged from the factory and from Army personnel regarding the workmanship on the vehicles. To that end, I would like to recognise the efforts of Alfie Usher, aka Fill Your Boots, who has been instrumental in putting heat and light on this issue on behalf of service personnel. For obvious reasons, I am no trade unionist, but he has been the unofficial secretary-general of the unofficial armed forces union for some time.

I know that the Armed Forces Minister has previously liaised with Alfie on issues, and—I say this only partially in jest—perhaps the Government should reconsider his application to be the Armed Forces Commissioner. The Government are struggling to fill the role. Alfie’s application got binned back in August, but he has been doing the job unpaid since then anyway.

For those who do not follow Alfie’s account—any politician with an interest in defence really should—I should say that between the exposés and topical memes, Alfie has been the bête noire of General Dynamics and the Army, operating as chief whistleblower and ensuring that the voice of those on the ground can be heard. There have been multiple examples of concerns shared by him via social media on behalf of service personnel tasked with prepping newly delivered vehicles. A variety of issues have been highlighted and I ask the Minister, if he has not done so already, to include Alfie within the scope of the ministerial-led review to ensure full transparency and the inclusion of service personnel. They are the end users of this vehicle, and too often we ask our personnel to put up and shut up. An organisation that dines out on moral courage and pretends that it values 360° feedback should make sure that it listens to our soldiers, irrespective of how refreshingly blunt their views might be.

The evidence shown by Fill Your Boots has put heat and light on the production and assembly issues upon which blame has been placed. During the first pause in 2021, the MOD and General Dynamics did not agree on whether the levels of noise and vibration of Ajax vehicles breached contractual requirements. Given that the same noise and vibration issues potentially remain unresolved six years later, can the Minister clarify what does constitute a contractual breach?

Through 2020-21, General Dynamics undertook a supposedly in-depth review of the Ajax programme to confirm the root cause of noise and vibration issues, identify solutions and then validate them through extensive testing. They identified that noise and vibration issues were caused by the track, suspension and running gear; the engine and its mounting in the vehicle; quality issues including bolting, cable routing and welding; and performance and integration of crew headsets. The vehicles were thoroughly assessed using a noise and vibration calculator, whatever that is, to determine

“the safe operating envelopes for the platform across different speeds and terrains.”

The noise and vibration calculator provided by General Dynamics did not measure noise and vibration, which the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory raised concerns about. It estimated the maximum safe exposure time on Ajax vehicles for given conditions based on measurements from early trials. In August 2020, the first noise-induced hearing loss symptoms were reported by soldiers. In September 2020, DSTL discovered an error in General Dynamics’ measurements, which meant that vehicle crews might have been overexposed to noise and vibration. The Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry has told me:

“Whole Body and Hand Arm Vibration Levels were well understood, and effective mitigations were in place.”

But they cannot have been effective, or why would personnel still be suffering from noise and vibration-related sickness? Will the Minister confirm that any analysis of the root cause of the current noise and vibration sickness does not use the General Dynamics noise and vibration calculator, and instead seeks to use a metric that does not raise concerns with DSTL?

The measures implemented by General Dynamics included the implementation of an effective hearing protection and combined communication system, an improvement to the overall Ajax build quality, a review and amendment of build tolerances for key crew interfaces, changes to seat structures to provide greater vibration attenuation—that sounds very much like new seat cushions—and improvements to track tensioning procedures to ensure correct track tension, which reduces vibration.

On the track tension, I am aware that composite rubber tracks are now mature enough to be viable for a vehicle the weight of Ajax. Although there are still issues regarding track replacement, given that the whole track has to be replaced rather than a single track link, I note that the General Dynamics Ajax Blackjax demonstrator vehicle at DSEI had this fitted. I ask the Minister what assessment his Department has made of the feasibility of switching to composite rubber tracks as a potential solution going forward?

The 2022 National Audit Office report outlined that there were 27 limitations of use on Ajax vehicles in September 2021; 22 were safety-related and 11 were critical to achieving IOC. Can the Minister give the House assurances that those 11 limitations were resolved prior to initial operating capability being declared in 2025? Could the Minister also confirm what contractual payments were made to General Dynamics on the achievement of the criteria for initial operating capability in July 2025 or the formal declaration of initial operating capability on 5 November 2025? What is the total amount paid to General Dynamics as of today, and how much still remains to be paid? What delivery milestone will trigger the remaining payments?

With those resolutions to the previous issues identified in mind, we know that three exercises took place between IOC criteria being achieved on 23 July and ministerial IOC declaration on 5 November. We have not heard of any instances of noise and vibration sickness occurring among vehicle crews during those three exercises. Will the Minister confirm that there were no noise and vibration sickness issues among crews during those three exercises?

I asked the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry what discussions his Department had had with General Dynamics, the senior responsible officer and the British Army regarding the Ajax programme between 23 July and Exercise Titan Storm in late November. Instead of a response, the Minister told me:

“I have directed a Ministerial review that covers elements of his question. I will update the House in due course.”

The Minister was happy to tell me that he met with key stakeholders, including meeting General Dynamics after the programme was paused, but, much as I have tried, the Government have scrupulously avoided disclosing any information about what ministerial discussions have taken place with stakeholders between 23 July and 5 November.

On 1 January, I asked a named day question for answer on 7 January 2026. I asked:

“how many noise and vibration injuries were sustained…between 23 July 2025 and Exercise Titan Storm”.

Strangely, I have not received a response yet, a week after one was due—it is almost as if this is an issue that the Government do not want to disclose. Will the Minister clarify the answer to written question 101920 and put on the record how many noise and vibration injuries were sustained between the achievement of initial operating capability criteria by General Dynamics and the start of Exercise Titan Storm?

The March 2022 National Audit Office Report states that the Department

“knew of noise and vibration issues before soldiers reported injuries but was not aware of the severity of potential problems. Reporting of issues identified in trials was limited and slow, meaning that safety concerns were not shared or escalated by the Army or…DE&S”.

Has that culture been addressed? Concerns were first raised about noise and vibration by the Army trials team in late 2019, but did not appear in quarterly programme reports until March 2021. To what extent have we seen the same issue repeat itself last summer?

In December 2025, the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry confirmed to me that

“Of the 61 vehicles of all AJAX types involved in the exercise, 23 AJAX Vehicles were linked to soldiers suffering from noise or vibration injury.”

I would be grateful if the Minister confirmed where those 61 affected vehicles were manufactured. Were they part of the first 100 Ajax vehicles manufactured and assembled in Spain, or were they later vehicles whose hulls were manufactured in Spain but were assembled at the Merthyr Tydfil facility? Can he also confirm whether the early production vehicles from capability drop 0 to 2, which were identified as not being fully compliant with requirements, have now been retrofitted and what capability drop are they currently equipped to?

The Minister also confirmed that

“On 22 November…during a routine training exercise, around 30 soldiers operating in Ajax reported being affected by noise and vibration exposure.”

For 30 soldiers to be affected by the same noise and vibration sickness, with identical symptoms, as a result of a known issue supposedly resolved by 2023 is simply unacceptable. It is incredibly important that we are able to understand whether there were any instances during the three exercises prior to Titan Storm and indeed to identify whether there have been any instances of General Dynamics employees affected by noise and vibration exposure during the same period, prior to or after the 23 July IOC criteria achievement milestone.

In November, I asked the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry how many compensation claims related to noise and vibration symptoms incurred during the use of Ajax variants had been made since the start of the armoured cavalry programme. The Minister informed me that it would take time to collate and review the information needed to answer the question, and that he would write to me. It is now mid-January and I would appreciate it if the Minister could provide that information in his response. It should not take two months to work out how many compensation claims have been made relating to Ajax. If I were Minister, I would have a close eye on the running tally, particularly in preparation for this debate.

On 8 December the Minister confirmed:

“We are currently undertaking reviews into the medical injuries sustained by Ajax crews, and more details on the findings will be published in due course.”

Will the ministerial-led review he has commissioned or the report from the Defence Accident Investigation Branch contain the details of those findings? In that review, will he confirm how many service personnel are undergoing treatment or have been diagnosed with hearing loss following audiometry protocols after operating within an Ajax variant?

Regarding when the vehicles will be able to recommence training, any decisions on the pause are to be made by Ministers after the investigations by the Defence Accident Investigation Branch have concluded. That suggests that the pause will be lifted after the investigation but before the conclusion of the ministerial-led review. Will the Minister clarify the timeline for the investigation, which he previously stated would take at least two weeks and so should be approaching conclusion, and the ministerial-led review, for which we are yet to see the terms of reference, which were due before Christmas? I appreciate it will still be autumn until the defence investment plan is published in March. Will the pause on the use of Ajax be lifted before the conclusion of the Minister’s review, given that the noise and vibration issues may not have been identified, let alone resolved?

This debate is about the future of the Ajax programme. Although the near future revolves around the resolution of the immediate issues that followed Exercise Titan Storm, beyond that the programme will need to achieve full operating capability, but crucially, it will be the tip of the spear in our armoured doctrine. So, a good start would be to have an armoured doctrine that is coherent.

In 2014, we ordered 589 vehicles out of an optional 1,328—below the Army’s required fleet size at the time of 686. Although that was not necessarily a defining error at the time, subsequent decisions, even as recently as last summer, have compounded the issue, bringing us to a situation where our armoured fleet is now completely unbalanced—increasingly so given the evolution of modern conflict since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the ubiquity of drones at all levels, and the current global arms race.

When Ajax was commissioned, we were still undertaking combat operations in Afghanistan. Since then, we have had multiple defence reviews, and changed our focus to the Indo-Pacific and now to the High North, and now we are talking about putting troops in eastern Europe as a deterrent to a belligerent Russia. The irony is that we still have much of the same armour designed to do that job the first time round.

The original plan was for Ajax, alongside Boxer and Challenger 3, to provide the backbone of the Army’s armoured capability within Integrated Force 2030. March 2021’s “Defence in a Competitive Age” outlines how the Army would use Ajax in its two close-combat armoured brigade combat teams, and as part of its deep reconnaissance strike brigade combat team—formations that are now putatively in place.

We cannot discuss the future of the Ajax programme without discussing how the Army plans to use Ajax within those brigade combat teams. As somebody with a background in armoured infantry, who formerly held an admittedly niche specialisation in anti-tanks, I have more than a keen interest in the future of our armoured capability. Being something of a tank-spotter, I note some glaring capability gaps based on the information provided by Ministers over the past year or so.

Let us start with the basics. In December 2024, the right hon. Member for Liverpool Garston (Maria Eagle), the then Minister of State for Defence Procurement and Industry, stated in a written answer to my question:

“On current plans, Boxer will be delivered to four Heavy Mechanised Infantry Battalions and Divisional Enablers.”

Seven months later, however, on 15 July, she stated:

“The Army intends to reorganise its Heavy Forces units in 3 Division, such that all four would become Armoured Infantry Units based on the Ajax and Boxer family of vehicles.”

She subsequently went on to state:

“The Army intends to equip the Regular Infantry Units within 3 (UK) Division with Ares in the infantry troop carrying role: 1 Mercian, 1 Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, 1 Royal Welsh and 5 Rifles.”

What happened between December 2024 and July 2025 that saw such a fundamental change to the future of the infantry, and indeed our entire armoured capability? The number of Ares platforms to be provided has not changed since 2014: just 93. For reference, the current land equipment table shows that we currently have 604 Warrior. Ares’s role was originally “protected mobility reconnaissance support” and latterly to “deliver and support specialist troops”. It has never once been earmarked as an infantry-fighting vehicle.

The present Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard), then gave this written response to my question:

“The Ares variant of Ajax is designed for mounted close combat and is being delivered to the Field Army. The decision to field Ares with Infantry Battalions was taken after a considerable assessment programme.”

I would be interested to know whether the aim of the Ares assessment programme was simply to justify the existing total of 589 vehicles, or actually to highlight the capability required, because whichever question the Army asks, the answer always appears to be 589 Ajax vehicles. I asked to see the outcome of that assessment programme but was told that its disclosure would

“be likely to prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of the Armed Forces”.

I suggest that, given the enemy knows that Ares does not have any armour-defeating weapons capability, the issue around prejudicing capability lies elsewhere.

Let’s walk that back a step. In my opinion, the Ares variant is not designed for mounted close combat. It is equipped with a remote weapon station that can mount a 50-calibre machine gun at the heaviest. As someone whose specialisation in the Army was armoured infantry, I know my way around a 30 mm canon. A 50-cal cannot defeat armour; it is no substitute for 40 mm APFSDS, which is the round that its Ajax brother uses.

In September, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport stated in a written answer that Ares would be,

 “used to deliver and support specialist troops across the battlefield. The term ‘specialist troops’ is used informally, and in this context refers to Anti-Tank Javelin Teams, Snipers and Support Troops.”

But by November that had changed again, with the same Minister contradictorily stating:

“Anti-tank platoons within Armoured Infantry units will be equipped with Boxer variants”.

So which is it: Ares or Boxer for Javelin platoons? Will armoured infantry battalions be tracked or a mix of wheeled and tracked, with the logistical implications of that? Will Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers light aid detachments have both Ajax and Boxer repair and recovery variants? Where are we going to keep the additional vehicles? What is the training burden of mixed armoured fleets, thereby doubling driving cadres, maintenance training, and vehicle commanders’ courses? Have we even bought a recovery variant of Boxer yet? The Army’s own website suggests it is not one of the variants within the 623. This approach is incoherent and suggests that the Army does not really know what to do with the capability it will shortly have.

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. On Boxer specifically, just before Christmas I received an answer to a parliamentary question from the Department, saying that it now will not give the initial operational capability date for Boxer, and that it is subject to the long-awaited defence investment plan. Does my hon. Friend agree that Boxer has already slipped by years, and that we cannot let it slip any further?

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

I absolutely concur with my right hon. Friend that Boxer is a vital capability—even more so, given the training pause that we are now encountering with Ajax—and we need to get Boxer into service as quickly as possible. I welcome the speeding up of that process overall.

Meanwhile in October, the then Minister for the Armed Forces had stated:

“Currently ARES will be fielded to Training Regiments, Armoured Cavalry units and Armoured Infantry units.”

As I said, we have ordered only 93. For reference, in order to reflect the establishment of an armoured infantry battalion, we would need 45 Ares to replace the capacity of the Warrior FV510, notwithstanding how many Athena variants we would need to cover the 511 command variant. Where is the capacity to have vehicles at training regiments and armoured cavalry units? There is no redundancy built into the current vehicle fleet.

The 93 Ares platforms equate to just 23 per battalion with no spare capacity, which is not even enough to replace three rifle companies’ worth of the Warrior FV510 variant. Can the Minister explain what the future establishment of these armoured infantry battalions will be? I appreciate that he will not have that information to hand—I do not think the Army knows yet—but will he write to me and explain how an armoured infantry battalion will be structured using Ares and Boxer?

The demise of Warrior leaves a yawning capability gap that will be difficult to adequately replace without a new IFV. The then Minister for the Armed Forces stated that,

“there is no direct replacement for Warrior”,

and:

“There are no plans to extend the out-of-service date for Warrior beyond 2027, and as such an extension is not under consideration.”

The then Minister also stated:

“As the ARES platform is delivered into service, tactical doctrines will be reviewed accordingly.”

I do not expect the Minister to answer the question or to know the ins and outs of armoured infantry doctrine, but he should raise the question with the Land Warfare Centre, and with the infantry battalions that will receive Ares, to ask them how the platform will be used and what capability will then be lost.

By removing a main armament from the armoured infantry’s firepower we fundamentally change the way that the vehicle is fought. It changes the way the vehicle can move cross-country, effectively removes the option to move in bounding overwatch, and means it can never engage enemy armour. Doctrinally, it turns the armoured infantry into mechanised infantry.

Doctrinally, Ares is more akin to the Mk3 Bulldog. Despite that, the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry this week informed me that Ares

“is more suitable to be employed in the direct battle, rather than in the close support role”.

Given the glaring absence of a main armament on Ares, I would dispute that assessment, which seems convenient rather than well thought through. Bulldog itself is due to be replaced in 2030, so what progress has been made in procurement of the Patria 6x6?

Crucially, in December, the same Minister stated:

“There are no other platforms within the Army’s armoured fleet which can fulfil the armoured reconnaissance role; Ajax has been specifically designed for this purpose.”

With that in mind, and given that the entire Ajax fleet is grounded for an unspecified length of time pending an investigation by the Defence Accident Investigation Branch, with support from the Army Safety Investigation Team and General Dynamics, can the Minister state how the armoured reconnaissance capability of the British Army is currently being provided given that statement, and therefore what is the deployability of 3rd (UK) Division without any formation or armoured reconnaissance capability, or even the deployability of an armoured battle group from within 3 Div?

The parlous state of the British Army’s armoured capability is on the cusp of being thrust into stark relief by the Prime Minister’s announcement last week that we had committed troops to the multinational force for Ukraine. While any detail on that force structure is currently pure speculation, it was reported by The Times that those troop numbers would not exceed 7,500. On a three-form cycle, that is circa 22,000 troops—the majority of the field army. If they are to be more than a speed bump for the vanguard of the Guards Motor Rifle Brigade, they will need capability that they simply do not have today.

Challenger 3 has no timeline, with manufacturing due to commence only once the tank’s performance has been proven in the demonstration phase. It is not going to appear anytime soon. The Government have no plan for the remaining 140 Challenger 2s that are not due to be upgraded, and not even a promise that the plan will be outlined in the mythical defence investment plan. That is against the backdrop that the defence investment plan is unfunded, with a black hole of somewhere around £20 billion, give or take an Ajax programme budget. There will be cuts, and there will be delays. Out-of-service dates are going to be stretched to their limits. Bulldog is already 63 years old, and I am sure that it is no coincidence that it will be 67 when it reaches its out-of-service retirement date.

The Chief of the General Staff wants to implement the 20-40-40 land warfare concept, of which Ajax is a key part, working in tandem with Project Asgard. That is the capability that could and should provide a continuous on-land deterrent along the eastern flank defensive line, reduce our sensor-to-effector time, and achieve the nebulous tenfold increase in lethality by reducing the kill chain to well inside the sub-seven-minute timeframe that defines the current frontline in Ukraine.

Ajax cannot be scrapped. The Army needs it. There is no plan B, and given that it is a fixed-price contract, scrapping it will save no money anyway, despite Ministers confirming that the Government have sought legal advice from the Government Legal Department. The Government have not even considered a viable alternative option in CV90, and starting that process from scratch will take the best part of a decade before we even see a vehicle, based on current queues.

Put simply, Ajax needs to be delivered, primarily because the Army needs to restore its armoured reconnaissance capability. Additionally, there is a second order effect: confidence. The British Army badly needs to restore faith in Ajax as a platform. For all the negative stories and press, the Army and the Government must work out how to rebuild confidence in their ailing platform. I know what it is to be given kit that I do not have confidence in, and to have to use it on operations and wonder whether it will let me down, or worse. I know that the Minister can sympathise with that view. We must restore faith in the platform, not only for the soldiers expected to operate with it, but for its appeal from an investor and export position.

The long-term future of Ajax depends on the ability of General Dynamics to sell it overseas. The most advanced armoured fighting vehicle in its class should be an easy sell to the nations currently in the process of rearming and upgrading. We have a history of exquisite sovereign capability that nobody else really wants: Challenger 2, Warrior, even the SA80. Each of those has suffered from a lack of development over its life cycle, too often a day late and a dollar short.

[Mr Francois]

I thank my hon. Friend for his generosity in giving way. As well as the delays to Boxer, there are now strong rumours about further delays to the upgrade of Challenger 2 to Challenger 3. As Rheinmetall BAE Systems Land is responsible for both programmes, does my hon. Friend agree that it really needs to sort itself out and get on with it?

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

I thank my hon. Friend again, and I absolutely concur. With the delays to Ajax, we can no longer afford to fail to upgrade Challenger 2 to Challenger 3. The fact that the timeline of that has slipped to indefinite is a serious concern for our armoured capability.

A successful export programme would fuel development of the platform and allow it to improve over multiple iterations. It would enhance our own capability, and allow us to benefit from the first-mover advantage of adopting a common vehicle platform that can be expanded with the addition of an IFV and a mortar variant, putting us in the vanguard of armoured development in the drone age. But that cannot happen without the vehicle proving its capability—first with the soldiers, then with our allies. In a crowded field, that should be a top priority.

In “The Iliad”, Ajax loses a competition to Odysseus and, distraught by the result and conquered by his own grief, plunges his sword into his own chest, killing himself out of shame at his own failure. The irony should not be lost on any of us. Fix Ajax, and fix it quickly. There is a war coming.

[Graham Stuart (in the Chair)]

I remind Members that they should bob if they wish to be called. We are looking at around three and a half minutes each.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

I thank everybody who participated in this very detailed debate. The Welsh Members who spoke represented the workers at the factory in Merthyr Tydfil extremely well; it is important that their voices are also heard in this debate. From my perspective, it is very important that we focus on how to deliver Ajax as a capability. I appreciate everything that the Minister said about the changing character of conflict and the changing nature of warfare. Ukraine has certainly moved the dial, particularly on armoured warfare and the survivability and lethality of armour going forward, and I know that the Chief of the General Staff has a very detailed view on how he wants to progress our lethality across the Army, particularly with regard to what that looks like going forward.

Ajax is in danger of being superseded by events; indeed, there is a potential that it is almost out of date. It is important that we consider how to make it relevant for the future, given that it has had a significant investment. Yes, it is late, but we can still utilise it, if we can harness its capability. I spoke to soldiers who have used the platform successfully—there are some—and they were positive about the capability of the vehicle. The wider issue is that we do not have an armoured capability that backs that up. It is the tip of the spear, but the handle of the spear is not up to standard. There are some serious concerns around how we maintain the capability of Challenger and what the armoured infantry looks like in the future. I would like to thank everybody for participating in the debate.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House has considered the future of the Ajax Programme.

New Medium Helicopter Contract

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Monday 12th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Luke Pollard]

The hon. Gentleman is certainly right that it is really important to have an industrial base that can build autonomous helicopters and autonomous lift, and a number of players are already developing in that space. I want to be able to provide certainty to the workers at Leonardo on the future of the NMH, and that decision will be made in the DIP.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Rotary is obviously a vital element of military logistics. I know from my own experience in Afghanistan how much operations can be hampered by the inability to field a full suite of rotary assets in order to move troops around. With that in mind, and following the retirement of Puma for obvious reasons, can the Minister outline the rotary requirements for the armed forces at present and confirm whether the new medium helicopter is still a military requirement?

[Luke Pollard]

The hon. Gentleman comes from a background of knowledge in this respect. As part of the defence investment plan, the military have set out their needs, and they are being matched against the funding of the platforms that we have and the platforms that we want to purchase. As part of that, he will be aware of the SDR objective to move to greater autonomy in our platforms; indeed, a number of projects—including ones by Leonardo—are working to build that up. The new picture of crewed and autonomous platforms will be published as part of the defence investment plan.

Ukraine and Wider Operational Update

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Wednesday 7th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[John Healey]

I warmly welcome my hon. Friend’s support for the statement and the wise words that she has set out for the House. She speaks with great authority and great strength for her home city, and I think the House will have welcomed her words.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

I start by recognising the US service personnel from my constituency, who played a part in the co-ordination of the interdiction operation to seize the MV Bella 1 via the joint intelligence analytics centre, Europe at RAF Molesworth, which is part of the US-European command.

I am slightly worried that this might be a moot point, but turning to the coalition of the willing, the presence of boots on the ground in Ukraine was a red line for Putin, and potentially it might be a stick that he beats us with in order to push back on any peace deal. If we workshop that idea, with a force of 7,500, as is being reported in the press, we clearly cannot realistically maintain a deterrence force posture, which underlines the paucity of our anti-access and area-denial options. That would also explain the commitment to military hubs, and I would appreciate clarification as to what exactly they are. With Ajax off games for the foreseeable—maybe for years—and no viable recce-strike capability, what assessment has the Secretary of State made of the urgency to bring forward the next iteration of Project Asgard from quarter 2 to quarter 1, given its urgent requirement as a force multiplier on the eastern flank defensive line?

[John Healey]

The hon. Gentleman is quite right to point to the importance of Project Asgard. It is breaking new ground. It is demonstrating new technologies and new military techniques. It is Britain at the forefront of creative military innovation and technology, and we are determined to accelerate it. On the wider question of the peace negotiations and red lines, the nature of any negotiations is always that declared initial positions are tested. If a successful process of peace negotiations is secured, we want to be ready, and we are ensuring that we are ready, to play a role in securing that peace for the long term through the multinational force for Ukraine.

Northern Ireland Troubles Bill: Armed Forces Recruitment and Retention

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Monday 5th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Given the concerns that have been expressed about this Bill and protections for our veterans, what assessment has the Minister made of the forthcoming Haddon-Cave inquiry and the impact that could have on the retention of personnel, given the cohort of people affected are likely either still serving or are of the same era as veterans in this Chamber?

[Al Carns]

The Haddon-Cave inquiry is an independent inquiry established by the last Government, and we must allow that to continue. We are focused today on ensuring that the correct protections are in place and written into law to ensure that no veteran who served so valiantly in Northern Ireland has any concerns about the Northern Ireland legacy Bill as it progresses in terms of their involvement in that operational context.

Defence

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Thursday 18th December 2025 Written Corrections

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Last week, the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry told me:

“There are no other platforms within the Army’s armoured fleet which can fulfil the armoured reconnaissance role; Ajax has been specifically designed for this purpose.”

Our commitment to NATO includes two divisions. The first includes three manoeuvre brigades, with armoured and mechanised capabilities. With Ajax undeployable, we have no formation reconnaissance capability and therefore no deployable armoured brigade, thus we are not currently meeting our NATO obligation. Will the Minister clarify whether we still meet his NATO test without Ajax, whether we meet our NATO obligation more broadly, and, if he thinks we do, how?

[Al Carns]

As the hon. Member will recognise, a review of Ajax is under way. However, Ajax has been overspent and the key user requirements have changed and oscillated from left to right for the past 10 years. We have now taken this on and we recognise that we have to secure the capability to provide our armed forces with the very best. The reality is that Ukraine is teaching us that war is being fought very differently. It is not just about armour; as the hon. Member knows, it is about a mix of uncrewed systems and armoured systems, not one over the other.

[Official Report, 15 December 2025; Vol. 777, c. 612.]

Written correction submitted by the Minister for the Armed Forces, the hon. Member for Birmingham Selly Oak (Al Carns):

Ukraine

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Thursday 18th December 2025 Commons Chamber

[Luke Pollard]

In the spirit of Christmas, may I thank the hon. Gentleman for his support for this effort? It is so important that we can, as much as possible, present a cross-party, unified voice. The steps that he has taken, especially to address the pollution of Russian bribes in his own party, are important steps forward. Hopefully, Russian bribes will never, ever again be taken by people in his party or anyone else’s.

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to raise the issue of frozen Russian assets, and it is important that the UK moves with our international allies in this respect. That has been our approach from the start. I hope that we are nearly at the point where progress can be made. He is right to say just how important it is to use those assets as leverage in peace, as well as to use the value of those assets, and the interest from them, to support Ukraine in the fight against Putin’s illegal invasion.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

May I start by associating myself with the remarks from the hon. Member for Portsmouth North (Amanda Martin) regarding the loss of Lance Corporal Hooley this Christmas? Given the situation in Ukraine and the possibility of a Russian redeployment and reconstitution of its forces in the event of any peace settlement, the Schwerpunkt of any future Russian belligerence may be more difficult to fix than to strike. We clearly require some sort of continuous on-land deterrent to ensure that we maximise our sensitivity to effect opportunities across all domains, including space. What progress has he made in digitising our kill chain, developing our AI solution, getting inside Russia’s OODA—observe, orient, decide, act—loop, and ensuring the effectiveness of the eastern flank deterrence line? When will we see a tangible output?

Oral Answers to Questions

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Monday 15th December 2025 Commons Chamber

[Al Carns]

Let us be really clear, for 14 years—[Interruption.] For 14 years, we have not seen defence spending going up. As shadow Ministers sit on the polished Opposition Front Bench criticising the individual Ministers speaking on behalf of the Government, I am the one who, collectively with others, had to put up with poor recruitment targets, terrible morale, and poor equipment and capability. For the first time in a generation, this Government are increasing defence spending for a long time, so that everybody in uniform will be able to look forward for the next 10 years and see that defence spending is going up. Well done.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Last week, the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry told me:

“There are no other platforms within the Army’s armoured fleet which can fulfil the armoured reconnaissance role; Ajax has been specifically designed for this purpose.”

Our commitment to NATO includes two divisions. The first includes three manoeuvre brigades, with armoured and mechanised capabilities. With Ajax undeployable, we have no formation reconnaissance capability and therefore no deployable armoured brigade, thus we are not currently meeting our NATO obligation. Will the Minister clarify whether we still meet his NATO test without Ajax, whether we meet our NATO obligation more broadly, and, if he thinks we do, how?

[Al Carns]

As the hon. Member will recognise, a review of Ajax is under way. However, Ajax has been overspent and the key user requirements have changed and oscillated from left to right for the past 10 years. We have now taken this on and we recognise that we have to secure the capability to provide our armed forces with the very best. The reality is that Ukraine is teaching us that war is being fought very differently. It is not just about armour; as the hon. Member knows, it is about a mix of uncrewed systems and armoured systems, not one over the other.

Ajax Armoured Vehicle

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Monday 8th December 2025 Commons Chamber

[Luke Pollard]

My hon. Friend is right to talk about the staff. They can play an important role in helping us to understand what happened to the vehicles and why it happened. As a Government, we are committed to the defence sector in Wales. Indeed, we are in discussions with the Welsh Labour Government about a defence growth zone for Wales, which will take a share of £250 million. There are opportunities in south Wales, in particular using some of the floor plates and infrastructure around the General Dynamics site. I am happy to talk to her more about that.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

The Minister knows that, as a former armoured infanteer, I have a keen interest in this topic, but I want to touch on the wider issue of Ajax as it relates to 3rd (UK) Division. If Ajax cannot be fixed, then potentially we will not have a formation recce capability. As it stands, we do not have one, because the vehicle is not deployable. If it cannot be fixed later on, that will be a longer-term issue, particularly as Scimitar is now out of service. Warrior goes out of service in 2027, and Bulldog goes out of service in 2030, with no replacement identified. The Ares platform is fundamentally not an infantry fighting vehicle, and although the Minister has assured us before that he is restoring the armoured infantry capability to 3rd (UK) Division, it is not a like-for-like replacement. Will the Minister look at the current ORBAT—order of battle—for an armoured infantry battalion and how the Ares cannot replace Warrior? A non-stabilised .50 calibre machine gun does not replace a 30 mm cannon. This urgently needs to be looked at, because the Army seems to be chopping and changing its mind and not to know what it wants from its armoured capability.

[Luke Pollard]

The hon. Gentleman does himself a disservice by saying that he has only a keen interest. He is by far the best parliamentary questioner of the Ministry of Defence, and that keen interest is felt upon my desk with 30 parliamentary questions every single day. I appreciate his keen interest in the area. He raises a serious issue. In reshaping the Army’s capabilities to increase its lethality, as the Chief of the General Staff is seeking to do, there is a necessity to replace old platforms with new and to adjust how the Army fights. That is in particular using a greater combination of deeper fires, drones and other capabilities. There is a role, though, for armour and the different variations of armour from light to heavy, and that will be what we buy, as will be set out in the defence investment plan that will be published in due course.

Russian Ship Yantar

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Thursday 20th November 2025 Commons Chamber

[Al Carns]

That is a really useful point. Individually, we are strong. Collectively, we are united. It is really important that we double down on our allies and partners to collaborate—whether that is with NATO, the joint expeditionary force or some of our European or international allies. This is all about our being stronger together, whether that is the UK Army, Navy, Air Force and intelligence partners working to expose the Yantar’s capability, or collectively, working with all our like-minded allies to make sure that we are mapping and tracking its capability. Should there be a disruption in critical national infrastructure, we can then expose it and attribute it as fast as possible.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Everyone in this House should be concerned by the increase in Russian sub-threshold activity, and this certainly is not the first time we have found ourselves in this House discussing the Yantar specifically. The use of lasers against an operational P-8 very much pushes the boundaries of what we could consider to be sub-threshold activity.

I want to ask the Minister a question that is very much within his bailiwick. I do not expect him to be able to comment on whether we have deployed any elements of the Fleet Contingency Troop to HMS Somerset, which is tracking the Yantar, but under what circumstances and geographically whereabouts within our waters would the Yantar need to be in order for us to apply some maritime interdiction via the Fleet Contingency Troop?

[Al Carns]

I thank the hon. and gallant Member for his point. As someone who used to be in that part of the organisation, I am sure there are lots of people who are champing at the bit to get involved. We must adhere to the international rules of the sea, but let me be really clear for anyone listening to this today that we know exactly what Russia is up to—without a shadow of a doubt, we know what it is up to—and should there be a connection between understanding our cables or undersea infrastructure and disruption, individuals, units, organisations or countries will be held accountable.

Typhoon Fighter Sovereign Capability

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Wednesday 12th November 2025 Westminster Hall

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Christopher. I welcome Turkey’s order for 20 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft. I appreciate that it is good news for the UK, good news for the workers at Warton and Samlesbury and good news for BAE and the future production of GCAP. The Government have confirmed that the Turkish jets are tranche 4 aircraft, with the first of the order due to be delivered to the Turkish air force in 2030. The Government refuse to disclose the number of aircraft that will be delivered each year, but have confirmed that it will not impact our ability to conduct the RAF Typhoon phase 4 enhancement programme or, at the back end of that process, the manufacturing of GCAP.

I recently asked the Government what estimate the MOD has made of the contribution of Typhoon jets to GDP. The Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry told me:

“The biggest contribution of defence to GDP is peace and security.”

While in abstract I share that sentiment, it was not really the answer that I was looking for. Typhoon has been one of the UK’s most successful defence export programmes in recent years, with £1.4 billion in export contributions annually and over £30 billion of value to the UK economy, which is more than double the £12 billion initially invested. The programme contributes around £1.6 billion to the UK economy and helps to preserve our sovereign fighter jet manufacturing capability.

Under the NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency, the industrial subsystem production and workshare agreements across the partner nations arrangements dictate that the UK leads on manufacturing the front and rear fuselage, windscreen and canopy, fin and rudder, engine bay doors, foreplane and a range of major avionics systems, which make up 37% of each Typhoon aircraft. For both UK aircraft and UK-led export orders, final assembly takes place at Warton, where the major equipment components, which have been manufactured in Samlesbury by BAE Systems, are ultimately assembled. To that end, it would be good to know how much the order of 20 Turkish jets will create, given the satellite industries that orbit the final assembly and certification processes. Including the Turkish order, there are 154 Eurofighter Typhoons awaiting delivery across the partner nations of Germany, Italy, Spain and Kuwait. How many of those planes will receive final assembly at Warton?

What is the plan to ensure that there is no skill fade in the intervening years? While it would be nice to imagine a Kanban-style lean manufacturing process that sees Typhoons rolling off a production line every few days, these jets take several years to construct. What steps will the Minister take to ensure that those responsible for airworthiness testing and certification are kept current and competent between now and 2029, when the first Turkish jets will be approaching completion?

Beyond the order, it is worth addressing what assurances the Turkish have been given about the longevity of the jets. The Turkish air force will not receive the last of the jets until 2035, but the out-of-service date for the RAF is 2040. How will the jets be upgraded after we retire them? How will upgrades be delivered at the Warton and Samlesbury plants when they are focused solely on GCAP? The Typhoon is scheduled to remain in service with air forces across Europe and the middle east until the 2060s.

Our four remaining tranche 1 aircraft are based at the Mount Pleasant complex in the Falkland Islands, and I had the pleasure of visiting No. 1435 Flight earlier in the year to better understand their role in air defence and quick reaction alert for the south Atlantic islands. However, the handful of remaining tranche 1 Typhoons have an out-of-service date of 2027. Can the Minster confirm whether these will be replaced with tranche 2 or tranche 3 aircraft? If so, which other squadron will lose a flight?

As I mentioned, the current Typhoon fleet—our 67 tranche 2 and 40 tranche 3 planes—has an out-of-service date of 2040, but in a written answer to me on 24 September, the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry stated:

“Typhoon will continue to serve as the backbone of the UK’s Combat Air Force until at least the 2040s.”

Can the Minister confirm whether the out-of-service date of Typhoon is 2040 or well beyond that?

I recently asked the Government about the scope of the planned upgrades for Typhoon, specifically with regard to the mark 2 European common radar system, defensive aid suites, avionics and weapons. The Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry confirmed that those would be outlined in the forthcoming defence investment plan, which it is rumoured will not be published until December.

The upgrade programme is due to take place over the next 15 years—coincidentally, the same as the aircraft’s remaining lifespan. The Minister has previously informed me that the phase 4 enhancement—P4E—upgrade programme is in the system definition de-risking phase of activity, following the system definition contract last year. The full scope of the P4E capability package has not yet been agreed, and without that agreement the programme cannot progress on to the design, development and demonstration phase. With that in mind, it appears unlikely that the P4E programme can be accurately outlined in detail in the defence investment plan.

With the best will in the world, we know the Government are not about to pull the trigger on a domestic Typhoon order. We cannot afford them, and they clearly do not fit into the combat air succession plan. Having read the strategic defence review, it is clear to me that Typhoon is seen as an integral part—the backbone, in fact—of our combat air capability, but the MOD clearly wishes to pursue exquisite capability, irrespective of the opportunity cost.

The current plan sees a mixed fleet of Typhoon and F-35B. I stress the “B” because, frankly, the announcement on the F-35A is a red herring. We are yet to receive the remaining F-35Bs of the current tranche. The remainder are set to be delivered by March 2026, taking our total to 47, with one written off having fallen into the sea. The mooted 12 F-35As are a straight swap for 12 F-35Bs from the next tranche. Those F-35As were pitched as dual-capable aircraft, and would therefore form part of the NATO nuclear mission. If that is the case, why will the F-35As be assigned to 207 Squadron’s operational conversion unit? Using the planes as a training fleet workhorse does not scream nuclear readiness. How many of the jets will be held at readiness?

[Mr Calvin Bailey (Leyton and Wanstead) (Lab)]

Does the hon. Gentleman recognise that the highest echelon of pilots—those who are best trained—will be the operational conversion unit instructors? Therefore, the 12 aircraft allotted to the nuclear mission will be the leading edge of the force’s capability, so it makes eminent sense for that part of the force to deliver it.

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

I bow to the hon. Gentleman’s expertise in this field, being the decorated RAF pilot that he is. However, I also take that as Government confirmation that the OCU instructors will potentially form the backbone of our NATO dual-capable nuclear readiness force. Can the Minister confirm that when he sums up?

I know this is a trick question, as the Minister probably does not know what the nuclear readiness plan is, and I do not think the RAF knows either, given there is currently no timeline for gaining nuclear certification. At this point, it is worth noting that, in February, the US Marine Corps—by far the biggest user of the F-35B—changed its programme of record to more than double its order of the carrier variant, F-35C, while reducing its F-35B order by the same amount. Our carriers are not equipped with cats and traps, so the F-35C variant is a non-starter, but we should note the direction of travel of the US Marine Corps, given the combined arms nature of its brand of expeditionary warfare.

The Government have stated that the introduction of the F-35A variant will support the stand-up of a third frontline F-35B squadron, but the F-35A variants will not enter service until the 2030s—we have not even ordered them yet—and that is quite aside from the certification of nuclear capability. When will we achieve initial, and then full, operating capability for the F-35A with nuclear certification?

Crucially, our F-35s are not capable of conducting missions alone. It is not often discussed, although we have already mentioned it here, but the F-35 cannot yet carry the Meteor missile, MBDA’s beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile. The Government have previously confirmed to me that the current estimated timeline for the Meteor’s in-service capability is the early 2030s. Our top-of-the-range jet fighter currently has no stand-off air-to-air missile capability. It is effectively unarmed in the face of a near-peer aerial adversary against which we cannot expect to have day one air superiority.

In July, the previous Minister for Defence Procurement, the right hon. Member for Liverpool Garston (Maria Eagle), told me:

“Block 4 modernisation will include the integration of UK-unique weapons and upgrades to air-to-surface and air-to-air weaponry.”

That would appear to be an aspiration, not a guarantee. Options for future Meteor development are still under consideration by the Meteor partner nations of France, Germany, Spain, Italy and Sweden, and the aim is to have reached consensus by the end of the year. Can the Minister provide an update on the progress made at the recent working-level discussions in September and October?

This issue was also recently identified by the Public Accounts Committee in its excoriating report, “The UK’s F-35 stealth fighter capability”, which highlighted:

“The Joint Programme Office…has invited the UK…to include a UK weapon in its so-called digital accelerator which it hopes will speed up delivery. In the meantime, the Department told us that as part of its Defence Investment Plan it is considering buying other weapons that are already available and integrated.”

In his response, can the Minister outline what off-the-shelf weapons the Government are currently considering buying as an interim solution to this problem? How do they intend to integrate an interim stopgap weapon?

At present, the solution is actually Typhoon. Yes, in order to use our very expensive, top-of-the-range, invisible-to-radar, fifth-generation F-35s, we have to fly them alongside our not-very-invisible-to-radar, fourth-generation Typhoons, because only they can carry the payload to defend them in air-to-air combat. I am not sure this is exactly what was intended by the hybrid airwing outlined in the strategic defence review.

That is before we point out that an independent carrier strike group is irrelevant if we need a land-based plane to support our carrier-based capability, and that for the F-35B to be in range of a target, the carrier would have to be in range of hostile ballistic missiles that we cannot feasibly protect them against. The future air dominance system, which will be its primary air defence shield, comes in the form of the Type 83 destroyer, for which the final business case is not due to be submitted to the Treasury until 2028—the 2035 initial operating capability for Type 83 already looks ambitious. I digress, and discussions on the limitations of designing our military strategy around our capability, rather than the other way around, are for another day.

The F-35’s out-of-service date is 2069, by which point some of our 138 airframes will be over 50 years old—older than any combat jet the RAF has ever had in service. What will be the final fatigue index of those airframes by then? Given the rapid development of uncrewed platforms, are we really going to rely on an ageing crewed jet as the backbone of our combat air capability in 2069?

Having covered a fair amount of ground, I close by reiterating that the recent Typhoon deal with Turkey is a good thing, but I fear there are an awful lot of unanswered capability questions regarding our air power. While the answers to all these questions are for the next month, when they will be published in the defence investment plan, the Minister knows well that I will circle back on every single one of those points—he probably suspects I have a tracker monitoring their status.

With that in mind, we need a clear and concise air power strategy, because talk of autonomous collaborative platforms and hybrid air wings is premature. It should be noted that the Chief of Defence Staff, in his previous role as Chief of the Air Staff, stated this summer that the RAF has

“no major equipment programmes planned for the next 15 years. We have what we have for the near and medium term.”

The question is not when the defence investment plan will be published, but whether it will have anything in it when it is.