European Union (Withdrawal) Act

Barry Gardiner Excerpts

Thursday 6th December 2018 Commons Chamber

[Barry Gardiner (Brent North) (Lab)]

I congratulate not only Members on my side of the House today, but all those who have spoken in this debate, because what we have shown is testament to the passion and the force of argument and rationality that Members can present the House with at times such as this. I also want to pay tribute to you, Mr Speaker, for the fact that you have shown leadership by staying in the Chair for the entire proceedings of this debate.

The person I wish to start by quoting is not one of my own side, but the right hon. Member for East Devon (Sir Hugo Swire). He said:

“No one ever said it was going to be easy.”

Actually, on 20 July last year, the Secretary of State for International Trade informed the country that an agreement with the EU would be

“one of the easiest in human history.”

[The Secretary of State for International Trade and President of the Board of Trade (Dr Liam Fox)]

If we are going to have a sensible debate and if we are going to use quotes, they should be accurate and in context. As the hon. Gentleman knows, the point I was making was that the trade element—the part we have not yet negotiated with the European Union—should be simpler than most, because we would begin, unlike in most trade agreements, with regulatory alignment and legal alignment in trade.

[Barry Gardiner]

I know exactly what the Secretary of State said. In the following sentence, he said this would happen unless

“politics gets in the way.”

Clearly, politics has got in the way, but it is not the only thing. Yesterday, reality got in the way, with the release of the Attorney General’s written advice to Cabinet. The implications of this legal advice are that we could be locked into a position where the EU negotiates a new trade in goods agreement that might be beneficial for the EU but deeply disadvantageous to the UK. This could be a deal where we have no say in the negotiations but where the UK could be obliged to open up our markets, perhaps to the United States of America, without any reciprocal right of access for UK manufacturers into that US market. I know the Secretary of State will have reflected carefully on that outcome. In fact, earlier this year in his Bloomberg speech, he presaged just such a situation. He said:

“As rule takers, without any say in how the rules were made, we would be in a worse position than we are today. It would be a complete sell out of Britain’s national interests and a betrayal of the voters in the referendum.”

But in a few minutes, he will stand at that Dispatch Box and urge hon. Members from across the House to vote for it. I can only admire his flexibility.

So how did this mess come about? The Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Hackney South and Shoreditch (Meg Hillier), excoriated the Government for their failure to prepare. My hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, West Derby (Stephen Twigg) focused on the rigidity of the Prime Minister’s red lines. Perhaps the most serious error, though, was, as my hon. Friends the Members for Ynys Môn (Albert Owen) and for Rutherglen and Hamilton West (Ged Killen) said, to try to exclude Parliament from the process. The Government tried to exclude us on the triggering of article 50, on the impact assessments, on the right to a meaningful vote on the deal and on the financial modelling, and of course we argued that Parliament had the right to see the full legal opinion prepared by the Attorney General. Their refusal was a blunder that resulted in an achievement unique in a thousand years of our history: a Government being held to be in contempt of their own Parliament—ironic, given that Brexit was supposed to be about the sovereignty of this Parliament.

It is hardly surprising, then, that now that the Prime Minister has finally brought her deal back to the House of Commons, it is a deal that Members on both sides believe is not in the best interests of the country. She used to say, “No deal is better than a bad deal”; now the motto seems to be, “Any deal is better than no deal.” In fact, the Prime Minister’s deal is not actually a single deal at all: it is a package, in which there is one deal with binding commitments by the UK on the things that the EU demanded that we settled before we leave—money, citizens’ rights and the Irish border—and another proposed deal, which contains only a wish list, with no binding commitments on the EU on all the things that the UK would like in terms of our future political, trading and security relationship. Both are packaged up with the transition period, during which the real final deal is supposed to be negotiated.

People have called it a blind Brexit, because we are unable to see what we will get before we leave the EU on 29 March, by which time we will have lost all further leverage. After President Macron’s comments, is there anyone present in the Chamber who thinks that it is mere coincidence that the final date to extend the transition period and avoid the backstop is exactly the same date as that for the ratification of an agreement on access to our waters and fisheries quota shares?

My hon. Friend the Member for City of Chester (Christian Matheson) pointed out that, although the Government say that the technology to avoid a hard border does not currently exist, in a staggering act of faith, they believe that it will be possible to achieve that by December 2020, when the transition period comes to an end. If the future relationship is not agreed by that date, the UK is faced with a stark choice: pay billions of pounds to extend the transition, or enter into the trade purgatory of the backstop arrangement.

Forty years of harmonisation of standards and regulations has resulted in UK companies being deeply embedded in complex supply chains. In the past few months, I have visited factories in all sectors. I have been to the ceramics factories about which my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent Central (Gareth Snell) spoke so powerfully when he told the House about the unions that he met and their fight. They are stressing that we must not have no deal, while not exactly being enamoured of the one that is on offer.

[Vicky Ford]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Barry Gardiner]

The automotive sector—[Interruption.] The hon. Lady will understand that the purpose of summing up at the end of the day is to respond to all the comments, including hers, that have been made during the debate. That is what I will try to do.

I visited the automotive sector with my hon. Friend the Member for Crewe and Nantwich (Laura Smith). I spoke to the management, the unions and the workers. Their sector represents £18 billion-worth of exports to the EU. It has benefited enormously from our EU membership, and particularly from the customs union, which has allowed companies to streamline their supply chains and employ just-in-time systems.

I am not a pessimist about the future of our country. I do not say that the UK will be poorer if we accept the Prime Minister’s deal. But I do say, with the support of both the Treasury and the Bank of England, that it will be much poorer than we otherwise would be, by approximately 4% of GDP. My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East (Mr Betts) spoke with clarity and passion about the differential impact that this would have on the poorest people and on the forgotten regions of our country, which need infrastructure investment.

Let us examine the potential upside: the new free trade agreement that the Secretary of State is so keen for us to do, particularly with our single largest bilateral trading partner, the United States. We have a trade surplus with the USA—a trade surplus that President Trump is determined to overturn. Last week, he suggested that a deal may now no longer be possible because of the way in which this deal proposes to align with the EU. President Trump made it clear that any trade agreement would involve aligning with American regulations and standards. Yes, of course, that means chlorine washed chicken, but it also means the US “Defect Levels Handbook”, which specifies the level of mice droppings or rat hairs that are permitted in our food—for example, 11 rodent hairs per 50 grams of cinnamon and 20 maggots per 100 grams of drained mushrooms. If anyone in this Chamber doubts it, they can read the handbook for themselves or they can see what is proposed by reading “Plan A+” launched by the original Brexit Secretary and by the hon. Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees- Mogg) just recently. It proposes to remove parity-pay for posted workers; end limits on the hours that people can be asked to work; end the precautionary principle; say yes to pesticide residues and yes to hormone-disrupting chemicals in genetically modified organisms. Such regulatory divergence from the EU would substantially impact our ability to trade with our biggest, closest market. It would increase the risk profile—

[Dr Fox]

rose—

[Barry Gardiner]

Of course, I will give way to the Secretary of State.

[Dr Fox]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. Is he aware that because of trade asymmetries—that is the way in which trade flows are measured transatlantically —the United Kingdom believes that we have a trade surplus with the United States, but the way that the US measures trade means that the US already believes that it does have a trade surplus with the UK. That rather undermines his case.

[Barry Gardiner]

Not at all. The Secretary of State will have read what President Trump has said recently. He knows that the President, as a protectionist, wants to put America first, not the UK.

That regulatory divergence from the EU would substantially impact our ability to trade with our biggest and closest market. The Minister for Trade Policy recognised the same. He noted that, “If we come out of alignment with EU regulations in this area, then there is a penalty to be paid in terms of frictionless trade with Europe.” That comes from the Secretary of State’s own team.

Even assuming that new trade deals are possible without these complications, what would these new agreements contribute to our GDP? The Bank of England has quantified any benefit at less than half a per cent—just 0.2% of GDP growth. The Government’s own assessment says that a no-deal Brexit would result in a reduction of 9.3% of GDP. Most MPs are clear: a no-deal Brexit cannot be allowed to happen. None the less, the Prime Minister is presenting her agreement as a binary choice between her deal and no deal. She urges MPs to vote for a deal that they firmly believe is not in the country’s best interest by threatening that if they do not, the consequences of no deal would be even worse. That is not an argument; it is blackmail. Most importantly, it is a false choice.

Earlier today, my right hon. Friend the shadow Chancellor set out an agreement that respects the key reasons why many people voted to leave—namely money, borders and law—and also ensures that we continue to have frictionless trade that protects our manufacturing industry’s just-in-time supply chains and the integrity of the United Kingdom.

We are at a critical point in our history and business needs certainty and stability. Our children need an optimistic future. Our country is deeply divided. I started by quoting the Secretary of State and remarking how flexible he has been in acquiescing to this deal. I conclude my remarks, exhorting him to be yet more flexible still and to recall his own words, which were quoted in The Mail on Sunday on 16 September 2012. He said:

“I believe the best way forward is for Britain to renegotiate a new relationship with the European Union—one based on an economic partnership involving a customs union and a single market in goods and services.”

The Secretary of State may not like it, but it sounds an awful lot like Labour party policy to me.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Fox]

Once we get out of the realms of fairy tales and consider reality, we see that the unemployment rate in the United Kingdom is 4.1%—almost exactly half the level in the eurozone, which is 8.1%. Our exports are growing faster than in most other countries in Europe, with the exception of Germany, and investment in our infrastructure is at record levels.

[Barry Gardiner]

rose—

[Dr Fox]

Now that the hon. Gentleman wants to come into the debate, I welcome him.

[Barry Gardiner]

As, indeed, I twice welcomed the Secretary of State. Will he confirm whether he has seen Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs statistics on regional trade in goods for the third quarter that were published this morning? They show that all regions of the United Kingdom are importing more than they are exporting, and we therefore have a large balance of trade deficit.

[Dr Fox]

I hate to bring this to the hon. Gentleman’s attention—it will no doubt come as a shock—but we have had a trade deficit since the 1980s. In fact, one of the few times when we have not was in February this year, when the UK became a net exporter for the first time in some time. The hon. Gentleman will no doubt be overlooking those facts because they do not suit his narrative.

Trade Bill (Third sitting)

Barry Gardiner Excerpts

Committee Debate: 3rd sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 25th January 2018 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Thank you. I invite Barry Gardiner to begin the questions.

[Barry Gardiner (Brent North) (Lab)]

Thank you, Mr Davies. May I wish everyone a very happy Burns day? So that our Welsh colleagues do not feel left out, I understand that it is also St Dwynwen’s day—I hope I pronounced that correctly—so let me say a very happy St Dwynwen’s day, too.

[The Chair]

You have the tie as well.

[Barry Gardiner]

Indeed.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Order.

[Barry Gardiner]

Q 151 Let me begin with Sarah Dickson. In your association’s view, does the Bill set out the consultation and scrutiny processes that you would like? Does it set out proper processes for the conduct of our international trade? Did the way the Government prosecuted the lead-up to the Bill—the way they took on board the representations of your industry and the wider business community—engender trust?

Sarah Dickson: For us, transparent and participative trade policy is really important. As an exporting organisation, we have been dealing with trade policy decisions in countries around the world for many years. We find that the best way to make trade policy is to involve people, consult them in that process and gather views, because you will find that some people will do better out of an agreement than others, and decisions will need to be made. Only by having a wide consultation on that and involving people in the process do you really get to a good outcome that it is then possible to implement and pass.

The Trade Bill as written at the moment—we do not know if there is more legislation to come—does not really cover that point in a statutory way. Of course, you do not have to consult and use statute to do that, but it concerns us that trade policy has been with the EU for many years and the UK has not done it. When it comes to having confidence—it is about confidence, rather than trust—in what the process is and when you would get input into that to have your say, we would be encouraged if we had more detail in a statutory instrument.

[Barry Gardiner]

Q Do you have that confidence yet?

Sarah Dickson: Not at the moment.

Gary Stephenson: I see the Bill as a sort of framework for future implementation of more specific regulations. I think the challenge is in the detail. If we look at key sectors such as animal-derived products, which represent 70% of the food exports from Scotland, there are some specifics there that will be required, on, say, animal health, protection and regulations in regard to which countries are permitted to export to different markets. There is registration for different markets. There are export health certificates and border inspection posts for imports of those materials. All that is fairly complex and detailed. We would hope that we would be consulted on any more specific legislation. It is difficult at this stage to say whether it is heading in the right direction or not. It depends on that ability to consult. There will need to be consultation in the devolved Governments, as well as with the UK.

[Barry Gardiner]

Q So to put that same final question, do you have confidence yet in the framework that the Government have set out?

Gary Stephenson: I am an optimist, so I would like to think that I have confidence that we would be engaged in consultation, yes.

Elspeth Macdonald: From Food Standards Scotland’s perspective, the part of the Bill that engages most with us relates to implementation of trade agreements going forward. If current trade agreements between the EU and third countries are carried over in their current form, that may not change matters significantly. If those trade agreements down the road start to change, or there is a desire or a wish to start to change them, the transparency on how that would happen is not yet evident. Overriding all of that, of course, in the devolved context, is the issue about the constraints in competence that the Bill would bring on Scottish Ministers and the Scottish Parliament, and therefore on ourselves, to be able to provide assurances to consumers in Scotland about standards, and assurance in relation to international trade.

[Craig Whittaker (Calder Valley) (Con)]

Q I want to ask each of you whether you think that the Bill is sufficient to do what it needs to do, bearing in mind that it is not about future trade deals, but is about facilitating the carry-over of deals that are already in place?

Gary Stephenson: It is difficult to tell with the Bill as it stands, because the devil is in the detail. There are 40-plus EU free trade agreements. Some are very small—economically they are not too important—but there are some very big free trade agreements within those. Clearly, we cannot do them all at once, and the key bit will be whether there is some sort of Government prioritisation of those agreements, perhaps from the standpoint of size of markets. There are some very big ones in there: Japan, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, Ukraine, Turkey and Egypt are very large markets that are certainly important for UK-Scottish producers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Iain Stewart (Milton Keynes South) (Con)]

Before I ask my question, can I just point out an important error in some of the official documents? Whisky is spelled with an “e” on some of the documents, and that is a very different product from Scotch whisky. On Burns night, I thought it was appropriate to point that out.

[Barry Gardiner]

The Government cannot be trusted.

[Iain Stewart]

Q I would like to get a sense from the witnesses of what the impact would be on the food and drinks sector, particularly in Scotland, if this Bill did not happen and we left the EU without the carry-over of the existing EU free trade agreements. Have you quantified the value of transferring over what we already have into our domestic legislation?

Sarah Dickson: For us, 10% of our exports go to those countries and benefit from them. I cannot give you an overall figure, but obviously, if you are not paying the tariff, you are not paying the tariff and you do not have that cost. It would make a difference to about 10% of our exports, and our exports were £4 billion in 2016.

Elspeth Macdonald: I do not have figures in front of me, but I think the document the Scottish Government published recently, “Scotland’s Place in Europe”, about business, jobs and the economy, touched on exactly those issues and put some economic analysis around some of that in terms of trade.

Gary Stephenson: All I can say is that I think about 37% of exports of food from Scotland are to non-EU countries, but we have not quantified exactly what the impact would be and how much of that is going to countries with a free trade agreement. I cannot give an exact answer, but it will have an impact.

--- Later in debate ---

[Judith Cummins]

Q Can I quickly return to geographical indications and ask Ms Macdonald a question? Given the ambiguity of the Government’s position to ensure that GIs are awarded to UK producers in trade agreements—they did not list a single one in the comprehensive economic and trade agreement—what are your concerns about the representation of your interests in trade agreements?

Elspeth Macdonald: Our interests in terms of geographical indications are that consumers know what they are buying and that, whatever system is in place—the Government’s stated intention is that things will be the same after exit—people can have confidence that products are not being misdescribed in terms of their geographic origin. There is confidence in the current system because it is a robust and well-regulated system that is set out in statute. Our particular interests are ensuring that, when businesses trade and when people buy products that are advertised and described in a particular way, those claims, whether they are about origin or anything else, are accurate.

[Barry Gardiner]

Q I want to marry up two things that Mr Stephenson and Ms Dickson said. I was struck by your phrase, Mr Stephenson, that there will be no “lift and shift”. In that context, looking at the way the existing agreements have to be transposed into corresponding agreements, I wonder whether you might comment on the Government’s ability to do that, given their red lines with the Norwegian agreement and the Turkish agreement. One of those currently involves the European economic area and free movement of people, and the other involves the customs union.

I want to marry that up with what you said, Ms Dickson, about the roll-over of terms. When you were asked about South Korea, you did not actually narrate the history of your association’s difficulty with South Korea, which of course was very resistant to the geographical indicator when you presented it on behalf of the Scotch Whisky Association. Do you think there is a possibility that South Korea might use this opportunity to reverse the progress that was made? There is one question for each of you.

Sarah Dickson: I would love to be in the head of the South Korean Government and to know quite where they will take this process. The conversation between the EU, the UK and the South Korean Government will have to be for them. Is it impossible that third countries might try to use this opportunity to reopen agreements? It is not impossible, but I hope that is not the case. When the UK has left the EU and is having its own bilateral trade policy conversations with third countries, we will undoubtedly get into these conversations about what they might want to change.

[Barry Gardiner]

Q Why would the South Koreans not use this opportunity, while we are under pressure to do things within a limited timescale, to negotiate better terms, as they see them? They tried very hard to negotiate those terms with the EU in the first place, did they not?

Sarah Dickson: The flipside is what South Korean businesses are saying to them about the benefits they gain from the trade deal. That is the judgment in all trade deals: who is benefiting, how much they are benefiting, and whether the things they do not benefit from outweigh the benefits they get. As I said, that is really a judgment for the South Korean Government. That is partly why we are trying to protect our GIs as best we can in addition to agreements.

Gary Stephenson: I will build on that. You are exactly right: there is an opportunity for them to renegotiate, and the UK, given the set-up it will be in, will be in a weaker position to defend against that. It would be ideal if the transition were just an extension of article 50, but we know it will not be. We will be out of the EU and trying to negotiate in a transitional period in which we are not supposed to be negotiating and are not supposed to have a final agreement, we want to get things delivered on time, and we do not have all the necessary resources. How do we prioritise everything? I think there are a lot of things rolled into your scepticism, but I share that scepticism.

[The Chair]

Order. That brings us to the end of the time for questions. May I thank the witnesses, on behalf of the Committee, for your evidence? We are very grateful.

Examination of Witnesses

Gordon MacIntyre-Kemp, Jonathan Hindle and David Scott gave evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Can I also ask the witnesses to speak up? We seem a long way away back here. I invite Barry Gardiner to begin.

[Barry Gardiner]

Q I seek your thoughts on what seems to be an increasingly complex part of international trade agreements. As we have seen with Canada, negotiating partners are increasingly demanding that any potential difficulties with implementation, when devolved competence matters may be involved, are dealt with up front—for example, in the Canadian situation, the provinces were engaged right at the beginning of the process—and that there are assurances that the final agreed text of any agreement may be delivered. With that being the case, what is your view on the important role of consultation prior to agreements? Do you believe that the Bill sets out a suitable framework for such consultation? In addition, what would the implications be if the devolved Administrations had some measure of consent reserve that implied a veto on the implementation of our internationally agreed obligations? That is quite a complex question in two or three parts, but your response will be of considerable interest to the Committee.

Jonathan Hindle: I certainly do not feel qualified to be commenting on devolved Administrations—it is not part of my remit or where our industry is particularly clustered, so I do not feel qualified to answer that. I defer to the two gentlemen beside me, who probably know more.

David Scott: I am not convinced I am able to answer either, but the consultation is definitely a good thing. There is a voice that needs to be heard and various parties look for representation, not necessarily to veto anything, but certainly to ensure that the best interests of all parts of the UK are represented.

Gordon MacIntyre-Kemp: Business for Scotland was founded in 1996 to campaign for devolution and to set up the Scottish Parliament, so protecting the powers of devolution is one of our key remits. It is an area we have been investigating. This is one part of the whole Brexit process. The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill centralises about 100 Europe-influenced powers in Whitehall after Brexit, even though many of those cross over with the responsibilities of the devolved Parliaments and Assemblies. The deadline to amend clause 11 of the withdrawal Bill was missed, and that means we are sitting here without proper protections in place. The Trade Bill seems to suggest that it puts the power to act almost unilaterally in the hands of a single Minister—a single Minister who has what has been labelled a “hard Brexit agenda”—without clear protections on the public right to consult, scrutinise or stop trade deals.

At best, that means that a great deal of confusion remains over how trade negotiations will be handled where they overlap with the devolved Assemblies and Parliaments, and that is damaging to business. At worst, it looks like a deliberate attempt to delay the transfer of EU-held powers in particular to the devolved Parliaments until after the UK Government has had free rein to agree deals that you could say run roughshod over the devolution agreements that currently exist in these islands.

To give a key example, if we are going to do an instant trade deal, which we want to do with the Americans and which has to be the highest priority, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is a great guide to what we can do with them. It is quite progressed; the key reason that TTIP did not make progress in the EU was that the EU wanted to put in protections to allow Governments to maintain public services such as the NHS, and our NHS is something that the United States is very likely to want to have access to.

I do not know much about trade negotiations, but I was trained in negotiation by a FTSE 100 company and by an American top 500 company, and the very first rule of negotiation is, “Make sure the person you’re negotiating with has the ability to say yes to the deal you’re presenting.” If we have devolved Parliaments who have control over the NHS, the Americans will look at that and say, “Well, you don’t have the ability to agree a trade deal with us,” so devolution is ipso facto incompatible with rapid trade deals, especially done under a World Trade Organisation agreement. I see that as being a problem and potentially creating constitutional issues not just in Scotland, but particularly in Northern Ireland.

[Barry Gardiner]

Thank you. That was an extremely interesting response, and I am sure one that will help our deliberations this afternoon, when we come to the first set of amendments. You have raised a number of very serious constitutional questions. It may be that the Minister has clear answers to them, but I think we will all be keen to hear what they are.

[Martin Vickers (Cleethorpes) (Con)]

Q Mr Scott, in the notes we have been provided with, there is a section titled “Your views on the Bill”. It says that you recognise that

“the government is committed to maintaining the existing trade relationships, effectively preserving the status quo.”

You go on to say:

“It therefore seems that there is the potential to spend a significant amount of time, effort and expense to deconstruct the current processes”

and introduce a new process to bring us back to the same place. The way I read them, those two statements are somewhat contradictory. Surely what we are looking at in the Bill is the provision to ease that transition to provide the status quo?

David Scott: From my perspective—I speak for my company, which has 60 individuals in Scotland working in the pharma services sector—there are established regulations and ways in which we currently work with the European Union and with global pharmaceutical companies. The Bill would suggest that, while we seek to maintain those, we reserve the right to deconstruct them and come back to the same position. That is how I read it; I may be wrong, and I do apologise if I have misconstrued that. It is important, from my business perspective, that we maintain our relationship as it currently is, because that is a major way in which we trade with European countries on behalf of the pharmaceutical industry.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Western]

Q Finally, would you very much like your sector to be involved in any TRA?

Jonathan Hindle: Very much so, yes. We would certainly welcome having someone on that TRA that understands our sector and all the nuances and complexities that have been alluded to—absolutely.

[Barry Gardiner]

Q Very briefly, Mr MacIntyre-Kemp, I understood your example about chlorinated chicken not to be because you did not realise that this Bill was not about doing a trade deal with America, but to be talking about the need for the devolved Administrations to be involved in determining what are in those trade agreements, because of the way in which they may impact upon the implementation of what are devolved competencies. Do you believe—and do you believe that it is the Scottish Government’s position—that there should not only be consultation but consent at that level for the trade agreements before they are implemented?

Gordon MacIntyre-Kemp: Yes, exactly, and as food safety is a devolved issue in Scotland—

[The Chair]

Order. I apologise to the hon. Member, but we have come to the end of the time allotted to the Committee for questions. May I thank the witnesses on behalf of the Committee for your evidence today? The Committee will meet again at 2 o’clock this afternoon in Committee Room 12.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Craig Whittaker.)

Trade Bill (Second sitting)

Barry Gardiner Excerpts

Committee Debate: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 23rd January 2018 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I do not know whether you have a thought to do so, or would like to do so, but you would be more than welcome to make a short introductory statement if you wish. If not, we will move straight on to questions, starting with Barry Gardiner.

[Barry Gardiner (Brent North) (Lab)]

Q I suppose what I would like to try to get out of this session is whether you feel that any lacunae have been created by Brexit in our system, whether there is appropriate scrutiny and transparency, and whether you feel that there are shortcomings in the Bill that need to be filled. May I start by asking the panel, perhaps beginning with Dr Hestermeyer, for examples of deals that will be the same, and of deals that may be different? Are they simply roll-over deals or are they substantively new, distinct legal entities?

Dr Hestermeyer: The first thing to note—in fact, it is even in the Government’s comments on the Bill—is that the deals will be technically new international agreements, so they will be technically separate. As to their content, first, there are the technical details that will need to be changed—for example, rules of origin, which define when a product benefits from a trade deal. Those are quantities, so they will say, “50% of a car has to be from the EU.” That, of course, no longer fits; it will have to be the UK, and the numbers will have to be changed too, because a UK car is substantially now 44% UK-content. We will not benefit from the deals if we do not change the numbers. Those are technical issues, but they are vital.

There are some deals that are structurally so different that, quite frankly, I wonder whether we really want to reproduce them one-on-one. For example, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein are in the European economic area—as was recently explained, in the sidecar to the single market. Do we really want to reproduce those deals by statutory instrument? It seems peculiar to me that we would want that. Turkey, for example, is in a customs union with the European Union. Do we want a customs union with the European Union? We might say yes or no, but I wonder whether a statutory instrument is really the way to take those decisions. Switzerland has a whole number of agreements, some of them linked by what is called a guillotine clause, free movement. Do we want that? That probably could not be reproduced even if we did want it, so that is also a no.

You might say, “All this is insignificant,” but if you add up the numbers, the EEA is 2% of UK trade, according to the Government’s assessment of the Bill; Turkey is 1.3% and Switzerland is 3.1%. That amounts to roughly half the trade we are talking about, or half the 15% that the Government assessment arrived at for those agreements. I do not think that will be rolled over, because I am not sure we would want it, quite apart from the technical issues that will arise and the question of whether other states and our partners will say, “We also want something.”

Dr Bartels: I would rather focus on the implementation aspects. Obviously, the question of which agreements the Government choose to roll over is a political decision; it depends on negotiations and so on. My reading of the Bill is that it talks about the implementation of those agreements. What is important there is to identify the scope of the agreements that can then be implemented.

One point of interest is that the Bill extends to agreements that have been signed but not ratified as of Brexit day. I think we can safely say that that is likely to be the comprehensive economic and trade agreement with Canada, the agreement with Japan and others as well; and if the EU agreement is provisionally applied at the same time, some might think that they are in force and ratified. In fact, I found the language in some of the documents around this area blurred the point a little bit, but there is a fundamental difference in international law between a signed and provisionally applied agreement and a ratified agreement. The Bill is quite extensive when it comes to signed agreements.

There are other points to do with the definition of the sorts of agreements that are covered here, such as a free trade agreement, which is here defined to include a free trade agreement and a customs union agreement by reference to World Trade Organisation definitions. Then, interestingly, we have in clause 2(2)(b),

“an international agreement that mainly relates to trade, other than a free trade agreement.”

I do not know whether you would like me to say anything about that now. It could be quite broad. I noticed one idea in some of the amendments, which was that it could be further defined as including a strategic partnership agreement, the language used for the framework agreement sitting on top of CETA, and mutual recognition agreements.

I must say that I think the amendment is very comprehensive; for a start, the strategic partnership agreement is not even tangentially about trade, so it could not really be described as an agreement about trade. The point of it is political and human rights conditionality and so on. In that sense, the definition is over-inclusive. It is also under-inclusive, in the sense that mutual recognition agreements are only one type of agreement relating to trade that one might legitimately want to include here. For instance, one would also have customs co-operation agreements as an obvious agreement that should be rolled over and implemented.

The broader point is that, despite what I said about the strategic partnership agreement, it is an outlier in this respect. A lot of agreements have to do with trade. Environmental agreements have trade aspects; the Montreal protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer is all about banning trade in ozone-depleting substances. The convention on international trade in endangered species is all about trade in endangered species.

Therefore, I think the definition is a little bit unclear. One could say, “Well, it’s agreements that just liberalise trade,” but that is a problem too, because FTAs do not just liberalise trade. They have intellectual property provisions, which might arguably in some way promote trade, but more likely investment. Certainly, they are not the first thing that you think about when thinking about a trade liberalising agreement. There are provisions in the FTAs in addition to intellectual property: competition law, labour and environmental protection provisions are in all the modern EU agreements that we have talked about. Essentially, this gives the Government the ability to implement labour standards provisions, which include not exactly sanctions, but obligations that need to be performed. Frankly, these two Bills strike me as very old-fashioned; they do not seem up to date with the reality of modern trade agreements.

Jude Kirton-Darling: I will follow on directly from that last thought, from my experience inside the European Parliament as an MEP, scrutinising trade policy at EU level. Of course, our MEPs have done that job for the last few decades. From our perspective, what really is missing from the Bill is the parliamentary scrutiny dimension. No-one on the panel has mentioned that so far. In terms of process, compared with the parliamentary scrutiny powers that British MEPs have today in the European Parliament, the Bill is an enormous step back in democratic oversight of trade agreements.

To add to what has already been said from a legal perspective about what these trade deals are, any kind of roll-over is likely to come up against the offensive interests of our trading partners. We have already seen that what was supposed to be quite a technical question of the division of tariff-rate quotas going to the World Trade Organisation has turned into an enormous political issue, with countries who supposedly are our friends and allies defending very actively their offensive interests in relation to tariff-rate quotas.

Once we start opening trade deals up to technical tinkering, whether that is a number here or a point there, our trading counterparts will also use that opportunity to try to get a bit more leeway for their interests. It is likely that these deals will be very different at the end of the process from what we have at the beginning. That parliamentary scrutiny—the role of MPs in ensuring that there is democratic oversight—is absolutely crucial but entirely missing from the legislation.

Dr Fowler: If the question is which of these agreements will change significantly, my answer is, we do not know that. Other people who are much more expert than me in the details of trade agreements would have better sight of that, but as someone who looks at what is coming to and through the Westminster Parliament, we simply do not know at the moment. On that basis, I make two points.

First, Parliament needs to be happy that it has procedures in place to deal with agreements that might be changed significantly. Even the Government have indicated that that is a possibility—they use language about substantive change in the Bill documents. Secondly is the point about transparency and possibly some kind of reporting function, which does not have to go into the Bill; it could be done through other means. However, I feel that, given the number of these agreements that have to be dealt with in the amount of time that we are talking about, some kind of regular reporting transparency about exactly what is going on would be useful to Parliament.

[The Chair]

Thank you; that was very useful. It is not necessary for all four members of the panel to answer all the questions. You may want to target them, because we have half an hour left and we want to make the best use of our time.

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[The Chair]

We have 45 mins to hear from you, starting with Barry Gardiner.

[Barry Gardiner]

Q Perhaps I could start by asking Professor Winters about the economic partnership agreements that the EU has with developing countries. They are in the list of those that the Government are seeking to replicate. Do you believe that replicating those agreements and creating EU-UK equivalence is the best way forward in our engagement with the developing world? Are they models that the economic partnership agreements countries themselves would wish to see replicated?

Professor Winters: In general, they have been a pretty poor piece of policy. As far as the UK is concerned, I would suggest that we might want to consider rolling them over for two or three years, but I would hope that that two or three-year period was then used to try to devise a more satisfactory regime. They encourage distortions in the developing countries. The developing countries are put through the agony of trying to negotiate together, which is very costly and time-absorbing for them, and rather ineffective. What we need to do is to try to find a much simpler way of allowing developing countries access to the British market than the current EPAs.

[Barry Gardiner]

Q Given that there is this renegotiation going on, do you feel that those countries might seek to use the occasion as a means of bettering the current agreement in some way? Or would they feel—if they are being told, “You will not get a trade agreement unless you do this quickly”—that they are being bullied into doing it against their will?

Professor Winters: By and large, countries find it very difficult to resist the offer of tariff-free access to a market. If they were put in a position where they were told it was the equivalent of the EPA or nothing indefinitely, my guess is that most would shrug and accept the EPA, but given one quarter of a chance, they would want to talk to us about a more reasonable and satisfactory—and in the end more efficient—process of market access.

[Mr Prisk]

Q Professor Winters, we have before us in part 2 a broad legal framework for a future remedies authority. In your view, is it robust enough? If not, what should we be thinking about amending?

Professor Winters: The Trade Remedies Authority is something we clearly need. Without seeing a lot more details about exactly how it operated, I would not want to say whether it is robust, but I would like to emphasise three things about it. One is, I understand, Government policy; I think the others are not.

The so-called lesser duty rule is important for safeguards and anti-dumping. That is essentially the rule that says the duty you put on goods that are allegedly dumped is the lower of the amount of dumping—the dumping or injury margin—required to make good the British industry. That is a good rule to have.

The two things I am less clear are there at the moment are, first, a very strong degree of transparency. Its operations need to be, with the exception of commercial confidence, pretty much out in the open. The second is that experience through decades in nearly every country suggests that these trade remedies are captured by producer interests. They are complex, they are triggered by the producers complaining that they cannot manage or that they are being cheated, and the whole process essentially favours them.

The really important thing is that, exactly like the House of Commons, you need an opposition. I would urge that we try to supplement the Trade Remedies Authority with an officially sanctioned and resourced group to represent the consumer interest, to do the analysis and actually have the right of audience at the TRA to make the case.

George Peretz: If I may add to that, of course the trade remedies provisions are spread across this Bill and the customs Bill. If one looks at the customs Bill to find out where the appeal mechanism is—as a barrister, my first thoughts go to what the appropriate appeal mechanism is—all you find is a power of the Secretary of State to make appropriate regulations.

It is my personal view that that is somewhat unsatisfactory. There are a number of important questions that arise about appeals, one of which is very important, and that is what the appropriate standard of review is. Is it a merits review, which enables a specialist appeal court to correct the decision maker on questions of fact as well as questions of law, or is it simply a judicial review mechanism, where all the court is doing is saying, “Is this a reasonable decision, whether it is right or wrong?”? It is a very important decision to make and it seems to me that that is one that ought to be made by Parliament in primary legislation and not by the Secretary of State or the Executive in a statutory instrument. That is a decision for you.

The appeals mechanism is important. I said slightly flippantly that it was because I am a barrister, but it is the experience of all regulatory processes that what actually happens at the regulatory stage is often very conditioned and influenced by the form of an appeal. Any sensible regulator will, during the process, have their eye on what the appeal route is, who can appeal and what the level of scrutiny of their decision is going to be.

If you have a very robust form of appeal mechanism, which is open to both parties— the complaining industry but also a range of interest groups whose interests might be affected by the imposition of duty—and if they are allowed routes to appeal that will encourage the regulator, in this case the TRA, to take robust decisions. That is robust in the sense of fully reasoned decisions that will sustain detailed scrutiny, to ensure that all parties are properly heard so that they are fully aware of where the objections to what they are proposing to do are and can properly evaluate them. You get better decision making out of all of that.

I sent the secretary to this Committee a copy of a briefing paper I did for the UK Trade Forum website, which is there if any of you want to read it. It expands a bit on that point but I would emphasise the appeal mechanism. There are other issues about the trade remedies. I have probably spoken for long enough but if people have other questions they could ask about them.

Michael Clancy: I read your blog; it is very good. The other thing that I would say is that the tenure should be made more independent by having term limits. That is quite important in reinforcing independence and impartiality. We have had experience in Scotland of the whole system of judicial appointments being reworked for temporary sheriffs because they did not have a stated term and were subject to the whim of the appointing Ministers. That would be my addition to this discussion.

George Peretz: The provisions for the appointment of members of the Trade Remedies Authority are very similar to the provisions for appointments to the Competition and Markets Authority, which as anyone who has watched the press this morning knows takes very important decisions about the economy. There is a difference with the Trade Remedies Authority, and the argument why you might need a more constraining set of rules governing whom the Secretary of State might appoint. At the moment the Secretary of State appoints the majority and the rest are staff members. There may be an argument for a more constraining set of rules, particularly if the Trade Remedies Authority is—as the customs Bill contemplates—itself given the remit of applying a wide range of economic interest tests as the trade remedies body. That means that even if the TRA accepts that there is a legal basis for opposing a trade remedy, then as a matter of economic interest to the UK it is able to say, “We are not going to do so here because, for example, the consumer interest outweighs the interest of the particular producers affected.”

That seems to me to be a political position: it is balancing the interests of jobs in a particular area of the country against the interests of consumers across the country, to put it crudely. If the TRA is, as the customs Bill contemplates, itself going to be taking that kind of decision, then there is a case for saying that its composition ought to be balanced by statute and that it ought to reflect a variety of different perspectives. In that sense its role is much more political than that of the Competition and Markets Authority.

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[Faisal Rashid]

Q Thank you. According to the Queen’s Speech last June, the Bill is meant to set out the legislative framework for our independent trade policy. Do you believe that it establishes a proper framework to deliver what was promised?

Professor Winters: I would not hold myself up as an authority on exactly what was promised, but it does not deliver a satisfactory framework for negotiating new trade agreements. There are many different models, but experience from around the world suggests that one needs a good deal of consultation, input and legislative oversight of trade agreements. You cannot have a position where Parliament can unpick a trade agreement that has been concluded. If Parliament claimed that right, no one would negotiate with us. That means that Parliament and the devolved Administrations need to have an important role in setting mandates, and there need to be consultation and information during the process. Civil society would certainly claim that it, too, ought to be consulted, and I would advocate that, to the extent that one can generate one, there should be a discussion publicly.

Trade policy comes along in treaties. It is intrusive. It affects people’s livelihoods. It is a very good thing that we are talking about trade policy now in a way that we have not for decades—since before the EU existed, in fact.

George Peretz: I would add as a footnote that one of the best short things I have seen written about this is a piece by Stephen Harper, the former Prime Minister of Canada. He is not generally known as a politician who always wanted to do everything by consensus, but it is simply an explanation of how the Canadian side prepared itself for the CETA negotiations. It very much emphasises the need to consult with everybody in Canada, to bring the provinces together as well as all industry, trade unions, all the political parties and other actors to try to get as much consensus as possible on what Canada was trying to achieve at the outset of the process, before it started. It is a very good piece from somebody whose perspective on it is interesting.

[Barry Gardiner]

Q Picking up on both what Professor Winters said about not unpicking—Parliament should not be able to unpick a trade agreement—and what Mr Peretz said about Canada, Mr Clancy, once the UK Government, rather than the EU, set international trade agreements in place, what would be the implications if the devolved Administrations had a consent reserve and could implement some form of veto on internationally agreed obligations? How do you get that whole-of-governance approach where the consensus Mr Peretz was talking about is achieved so we know that what is agreed can ultimately be delivered without introducing an ex post facto power of veto that would stop it being implemented?

Michael Clancy: That is a very difficult question to answer without getting into uncomfortably hot waters.

[Barry Gardiner]

You could write to the Committee.

Michael Clancy: Let’s give it a shot, shall we? The important thing is that the UK Government are the negotiator of these international agreements. Parliament is the body that then ratifies agreements made by the sovereign power, exercised by Government. Therefore, in that sense, it is quite difficult to see how the devolved Parliaments would be able to exercise any form of consent reserve in respect of the making of an agreement and the ratification of an agreement.

The issue is that the parliamentary oversight of the agreement is deficient in this place and it is even more restrained when it comes to the devolved legislatures. That is the issue I would like people to focus on. Clearly something needs to be done to enhance oversight here. Earlier, we heard Brigid Fowler explain that the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 provisions are inadequate. Why are they inadequate? Because they have only got this perpetualisation of the 21-day period, and this Bill does not allow for any form of implementation order other than a negative procedure order. Therefore, there is an issue about that.

The read across to the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill and the sifting procedure that the Procedure Committee advanced and had accepted into the Bill—Mr Walker’s amendment last week or the week before—raises issues about what the relationship is between orders under this Bill and those under the EUWB. Why does this Bill amend the EUWB? Why not have amendments brought forward for that Bill, reflecting this Bill? I am sure that parliamentary draftspeople have an amour propre in respect of such things, but an ordinary individual—a rather rustic lawyer like myself—is not going to catch it immediately. These are the issues we ought to look at: parliamentary oversight, extending across these islands, and how we write something that attains the intention of Parliament.

If I might just cross over, I do not think the Bill is meant to implement new agreements; it is meant to transpose existing agreements. That is quite an important facet to dwell on. Although, if one scoots to the explanatory notes, one sees in paragraph 44 that there may be

“technical changes to the agreement”

and in paragraph 53 it says:

“It may also be necessary to substantively amend the text”

of the provisions. The question, therefore, is what is an existing agreement and how far does it have to be changed for it to change from being an existing agreement to a different agreement. That is a question that I do not care to essay on at the moment.

[The Chair]

We are grateful for that.

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[The Chair]

Perfect. I call Barry Gardiner. [Interruption.] Well, failing that, I call Mark Prisk.

[Barry Gardiner]

rose—

[Mr Prisk]

rose—

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[Mr Prisk]

Q Is that specifically the national interest?

Tom Reynolds: There are really four points. The public interest test and the economic interest test is of concern because, as Gareth has already pointed out, the lack of detail means it could operate in any number of ways. Our fear is that it might include an over-simplistic cost-benefit analysis that appears very seductive in its indication that the benefit for producers may be outweighed by the damage to the consumers, when it does not show the full story and perhaps the long-term impact to the consumer that removal of a competitive environment for domestic producers creates if the trade remedies are insufficient to keep production here in the UK.

A big concern for ceramics—the country of concern that is dumping into the European Union at the moment is China—is how you calculate the dumping margin in instances where the domestic price cannot be used because it is subject to such state distortion. That detail is crucial to the effectiveness of the trade remedies system.

There are other issues, such as the lesser duty rule—it was touched on earlier. For the proper operation of the lesser duty rule, we would need to see the detail and how you calculate injury. That is crucial. Pushing all of this into the long grass just adds a lot of uncertainty and concern for producers.

Cliff Stevenson: Because the Bill is simply setting up a framework for the TRA and not really having anything more substantive than that, there are only small points that you might look at, but there are some important points. For example, the composition of the members of the TRA is critical because trade remedies is a highly political area of policy where there are very different views. Some see trade remedies as purely protectionist and would abolish them completely, and some see trade remedies as an essential competition policy-type tool to correct multilateral distortions.

I am in the second group. I believe that, in the absence of multilateral competition rules, trade remedies are the only thing we have that allows state distortions and other unfair practices to be addressed. Within the EU, we do not need anti-dumping or anti-subsidies law because we have really good competition and state aid law.

What we want from this legislation—you have to see the two Bills together—is a coherent, robust system that could redress those problems. In terms of this Bill, the composition of the members is very important to look at because, if all the members thought trade remedies were protectionist, we would never get any trade remedies through—or all members might believe that trade remedies were essential. You would want to ensure that there is some balance in there.

There are some other smaller issues that could be significant. For example, regarding the provision that the TRA should report to Parliament annually, I think there could be a little bit more detail on what it might report on, so that, if the TRA was being biased one way or the other, by being obliged to provide certain statistics, such as number of cases opened, measures adopted and so on, it could be assessed.

[Barry Gardiner]

Q Picking up on your last point, Mr Stevenson, in the EU, the Commission is obliged to report to the European Parliament on trade events, so there would be an annual production of just such statistics. There is a lacuna in the Bill in that there is no provision to make such a report to Parliament and to aid parliamentary scrutiny on trade remedies in that way. Is that something that you and the trade remedies alliance would seek to redress? Would you like to see introduced in this Bill some way in which a report ought to be made—an annual report perhaps—to Parliament?

Cliff Stevenson: Yes, what would definitely be of importance is to have a substantial report submitted to Parliament on an annual basis. In the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Bill, there is a provision on reporting. There is already a proposal for there to be an annual report. The EU anti-dumping regulation is quite specific about what the European Commission must report to the European Parliament in terms of the statistics it must provide. A little more detail ensuring that certain things were provided in this report would be useful.

Tom Reynolds: The question about Parliament’s ongoing role with the Trade Remedies Authority is an interesting one, but so is Parliament’s role in setting up the rules for the system. The point made by Jude Kirton-Darling earlier on about the level of involvement of MEPs in scrutinising and offering amendments on, for instance, the new anti-dumping methodology and the TDI modernisation, which was mentioned, has been integral in improving that legislation from the Commission’s original proposals. I would be more comfortable if there was a more rigorous approach for parliamentarians to get involved in the setting of the rules for the system as well.

[Bill Esterson]

Q Can you describe what you think the authority should be comprised of? Who do you think should be on it?

Gareth Stace: Do you mean the board?

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[The Chair]

Welcome back. We are going to change the order of questioning slightly, because Mr Stace has to go and give evidence to our sister Bill Committee.

[Barry Gardiner]

Q Picking up on something you said earlier about the importance of not having a weak trade remedies regime, in your view would it be a mistake to think that such a regime, which did not protect producers’ interests, might encourage other countries to do easier, quicker trade deals with us? Would it be a mistake to use that in some sense as a bargaining chip to get a trade deal?

Gareth Stace: I think it would. You are not going to say to the USA, “Hey look, can we do a really great free trade agreement with you? Look, our trade remedies is really weak and yours is really strong so can you weaken yours and then we will do a great deal?” They will not do that. They will keep their regime and hope that ours is weak, and they will then see more trade coming from them to us.

It is the same when we think about the zero tariff for steel with developed countries. When India exports steel to the UK, it is at zero tariff; when we supply steel to India a tariff is applied. So when we say to India, “Can we do a free trade agreement with you? Hey, you know, we could do zero tariff”, India will say, “We already have zero tariff, so why would we want to do anything else?” What would add something would be having a strong trade remedies regime in place.

If we had a weak regime, what would that mean? We talked about that before. It would mean a loss of jobs, and in the steel sector I do not want to talk about loss of jobs, because we saw a lot of that in 2015-16. But we would also see a rapid rise in imports. In rebar—reinforcing bar that goes into construction—in one year China had zero per cent. of the UK market. It did not import anything, and within four years, because there were no duties in place, China had 43% of the UK market. Then, once duties came in, the percentage went back to zero.

I know I have to go, but I want to make just one point about the lesser duty rule, which I am sure will be raised later. I know it is not in the Bill but it is very important, in that there is talk that if we did not have a lesser duty rule prices would rise and the consumer would be disadvantaged. Let me put that into context. In the hot-rolled flat case we had recently, the injury margin was 17.5% and the dumping margin was 29%. There is a difference there of 11%. If we think of a luxury car priced at €45,000, not applying the lesser duty rule in that case would increase the price of that car by a whopping €16.50. Everyone is saying that if we did not apply it in the UK it would be dreadful—consumer prices would rise and it would be awful—but €16 is all it would increase the price of a €45,000 car by.

[The Chair]

Mr Stace, thank you very much indeed for doing two Committees in one afternoon. That is very noble work. Thank you for your evidence to us. I think someone is going to escort you off to the other Committee.

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[The Chair]

Q I welcome and thank all four of our witnesses and particularly our former colleague, Mr Bain; we are glad to see you back here. I am sorry to be tough and difficult, but thank you all very much for taking time out to come and give evidence to us this afternoon. Perhaps you would like to introduce yourselves for the record, starting with Mr Bowles.

Edward Bowles: I am Edward Bowles, managing director at Standard Chartered Bank.

Stephen Jones: I am Stephen Jones, chief executive of UK Finance.

Anastassia Beliakova: I am Anastassia Beliakova, head of trade policy at the British Chambers of Commerce.

William Bain: I am William Bain, international trade and Europe policy adviser for the British Retail Consortium.

[Barry Gardiner]

Perhaps I can kick off with—sorry, is it Mr Jones who is from Standard Chartered?

[The Chair]

No, it is Mr Bowles.

[Barry Gardiner]

Mr Bowles is from Standard Chartered and Mr Jones from UK Finance. Is that right?

Edward Bowles: Correct.

[Barry Gardiner]

Q I will kick off, then, with the British Retail Consortium. [Laughter.] I am just keeping you on your toes!

The BRC has identified, among others, the agreements involving Norway and Turkey as the most significant of our EU FTAs. Of course, the Government have already indicated that there will be an end to free movement, which rules out simply replicating the Norway model, and that we will leave the customs union, which rules out simply rolling over the Turkish model, so what elements of the agreements—not just those two, but the others—do you consider it most important to replicate on substantially the same terms?

William Bain: The key provisions are those on tariffs, because if the UK leaves the European Union, it is not part of the EU’s common external tariff system, and we could then face higher tariffs on imported goods. A great deal depends on the kind of transitional arrangements that are adopted, but the kind of additional MFN tariffs that would apply would be 12% in relation to clothing from Turkey, 13% in relation to soft fruit from Chile and Peru and 27% on imported processed canned tuna from the Seychelles. Those would, I think, lead retailers and consumers to face considerable price pressures, so the main element that we would want to see is replication of the zero-tariff or low-tariff provisions on imports.

The other key areas that are very difficult in terms of replication and, we believe, may require a degree of assistance from the European Union are in relation to rules of origin. For example, with the Canada trade agreement, there is a complex rule of origin. The same is true in relation to South Korea. I think that diagonal cumulation is involved in the rules of origin in respect of the CARIFORUM trade agreements.

These are areas where it seems that time is running out, the clock is ticking, and a solution needs to be found if British business and British consumers are not to face a large cliff edge in March 2019.

Anastassia Beliakova: Absolutely. Rules of origin are a headache for businesses, and if we consider that there is the likelihood, in the roll-over of existing trade agreements, that they may have to comply with tougher rules of origin or that some of the benefits that they currently get by counting both EU and UK origin as single origin might be lost, that is very concerning. For about one in seven of our members, the existence of a free trade agreement is the determining factor in whether they export to or import from a country. I urge the Government to give stronger assurances for those agreements, as Mr Bain has mentioned, that already provide for, or have clauses mentioning, diagonal cumulation, but also to look at all the EU trade agreements and particularly those that have the greatest economic significance for the UK, and open up those discussions to provide for that as they are rolled over into UK-third country FTAs.

[Iain Stewart]

Q I would like to put to the panel the same question I asked the previous panel about part 3 of the Bill, which relates to trade information and the collection of exporter information by HMRC in particular. Are you content with the content of the Bill in this part? Is there anything missing or do you foresee any practical difficulties in HMRC collating this information?

Anastassia Beliakova: Not at first glance. However, the wider picture around trade data is that trade data is imperfect. It is particularly lacking when it comes to services, of course, and when it comes to intra-EU trading data. That is where we currently have significant gaps. If, in the future, there can be a more robust collection of data and stronger assessments of UK-third country trade, that would be helpful.

Stephen Jones: I have nothing to add.

Edward Bowles: Obviously, the collection of data is largely in respect of goods that cross borders. It is very difficult to do that for services, so I would have thought that a way of more robustly measuring cross-border flows of services would be quite an important thing to look at, so that you can get a better grip on revenue as much as anything else. Largely, it is more on the goods side than it is on the services side.

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[Bill Esterson]

Q Do any other witnesses want to pick up any of those points?

William Bain: The nature of the transition impinges on terms in the Bill, and the retail industry is keen to have a standstill transition in all elements—in terms of the current customs rules, the current tariff rules and the current SPS rules—but it also applies to the trade facilitation that we get from the bilateral trade agreements, which fit into part 1 of the Bill. I cannot stress how important it is to the retail sector, which imports products from countries like Chile, Peru, South Africa and Turkey, that we do not have a discontinuity in our trading arrangements at any stage after 29 March 2019. There are some connections and points of commonality with the kind of transitional deal that is done, but in a sense this is a slightly separate question. It really demands clear attention from the Government in order to get the job done by 29 March next year.

[Barry Gardiner]

Q I want to pursue what Mr Jones said. We have got away from the initial question of the sift Committee. You stressed the urgency of this and the need to try to get things through as quickly as possible, and you adopted an approach to delegated powers and Henry VIII powers of, “Well, maybe they’re necessary in the circumstances”. However, it was your organisation that recommended that there should be a sift Committee in the EU (Withdrawal) Bill. Would that not be an appropriate way of trying to say, “What we’re talking about here is a minor change to an existing agreement, but this is actually a major change”?

We are talking about 100 separate agreements between the EU and Switzerland alone, some of which include free movement of people. There are going to be some major changes, such as those we talked about with Turkey and the customs union, and with Norway, free movement of people and the four freedoms. Do you not think, given that you have already recommended a sift Committee in one form, that a similar sort of mechanism for trying to distinguish between what is and what is not vital, and what should have parliamentary scrutiny, is a sensible way to proceed?

Stephen Jones: Yes, sorry; forgive me for the lack of clarity. My reference was really to the existing provisions between the UK and the EU in relation to financial services. In my assessment, for the purposes of transition and of business services in financial services, the chances of change, and therefore of the need for sift, are zero. There just is not the time. In the context of other areas, where there is an assessment that change is possible, the sift Committee strikes me as a very sensible mechanism to prioritise and assess those changes and the degree of scrutiny that is required.

[Mr Prisk]

Q Mr Bain was very clear about the importance of continuity to business. Can I ask the chambers of commerce in particular, but also other witnesses, about that issue? Clearly, the Bill is about the continuity of existing arrangements. How important is that principle of continuity to your members?

Anastassia Beliakova: It is absolutely critical. Our members are operating on the assumption that during a transition period there will be continuity in our trading arrangements not just with the EU but with all the other markets with which we have a trade agreement of some sort. The working assumption is that they should not be making any changes currently or planning for significant changes in trading conditions in March 2019. Of course we are still waiting for greater clarity from the EU on this over the coming months, but I cannot stress enough that in the immediate future the continuity in our trading relationship with the EU during transition is critical. Our continuity, looking further ahead, with the other markets, is also something that our members want to count on.

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[Judith Cummins]

Q Mr Bain, to accompany the release of your report “The Bilateral Trade Deals that Matter to Consumers”, you note the importance of the Government replicating the trade agreements that the EU currently has with third countries to ensure that consumers do not see a rise in prices as a consequence of imposed tariffs and so on. Your report notes that 6% of retailer imports are covered by all EU bilateral agreements. Could you identify the particular countries that your members are concerned about?

William Bain: Indeed. There is a good quantity of imported fish, from Norway and Iceland, that UK consumers buy. In particular, there is South Africa in terms of products like wine and some citrus, Chile and Peru in terms of soft fruits, and Morocco in terms of fruit, vegetables and some clothing. And there is principally Turkey in terms of clothing. There are many members of the BRC that source clothing in Turkey, which can be given to consumers for sale in this country on good terms. One of the fundamental issues is that, at the moment, that is under a customs union: is there going to be a functioning customs union between the UK and Turkey on 30 March 2019? I think that speaks to some of the process issues that come up in part 1 of the Bill. We know that there will be an interaction between the CRAG process of bringing a concluded treaty before this House, then interacting with the processes that have to be gone through in part 1 of the Bill.

Unless we have things like letters of intent ready to be signed at 11.1 pm on 29 March 2019, and unless we have the EU involved—what seems on the face of it to be bilateral is, in many cases, a trilateral negotiation—we will have a gap. That gap will cause uncertainty for business. Ultimately, it could cause gaps on the shelves and a lack of choice and availability. It is a serious issue for investment and for consumers.

[Barry Gardiner]

Q To follow up, I want to ask you all a question as business people. If someone introduced a break clause in a contract with you or one of your businesses, would you not take the opportunity to renegotiate the deal? Given all that you have said about the importance of clarity, stability, understanding and certainty about the future, which we entirely agree with you on—that is why we need a Bill to do this—do you not think that, if we were seeing changes introduced by these countries because of this opportunity, and some of the changes were substantial, and changed that clarity and certainty, then actually there should be a process of parliamentary scrutiny looking at them?

At the moment, we may not be in control of that process. We know that we would like it to be very simple, but it may not be. Given that, should the scrutiny not be in place for Parliament either to assist procedure or, using some other mechanism, to say, “Yes, this is important, and we need to make sure that we, as Parliament, deal with it in the appropriate democratic way”?

Edward Bowles: I would say be careful what you wish for, and I do not say that completely comedically. It would very much depend upon the scale of the market that you are interacting with, and the significance of it. The experience that I had of TTIP was one where the lack of initial transparency, of engagement with civic sector societies, and of disclosure of the mandate for the first 15 months of the negotiations very much allowed the debate to be run by outside interests that felt disenfranchised. Effectively, that stymied the political will to take the negotiation further forward even before the new President was elected.

It was absolutely clear that there are lessons to be learned from a negotiation of that scale, ambition and impact for the UK’s economy, to make sure that you have the right level of engagement, transparency, scrutiny and so on in an ongoing manner. For a much smaller market, I dare say that, given the time involved, it may not necessarily warrant a full-scale similar application of scrutiny because, frankly, the relative impact for the UK economy, and therefore for consumers, healthcare and so on, would be much less. Judge each of them on their merits.

Anastassia Beliakova: To follow up on what Mr Bowles said, the TTIP example certainly shows us how critical it is to have appropriate stakeholder engagement mechanisms. At the moment, the Bill is meant to deal just with continuity of existing agreements that have already had the relevant scrutiny from the European Parliament and have passed through the European Scrutiny Committee here. However, if there are very substantial changes or if we are talking about completely new agreements, provisions certainly need to be made for appropriate scrutiny in Parliament, and for stakeholder engagement for business, civil society and non-governmental organisations. It might make sense for that to have some form of statutory underpinning so that there is input that is not contingent on the political environment, which may change. As has been said, negotiations take a long time, sometimes even up to a decade, and during those negotiations you still need to be able to test both the public views and the impacts. I would urge for these kinds of mechanisms to be put in place where new agreements are implemented.

[Faisal Rashid]

Q I will put Barry’s point in a different way. You mentioned continuity, which is absolutely fine—the industry needs continuity. You also mentioned that you do not want to see any change, but the Government have already noted that these agreements will be legally distinct and are likely to be different to the corresponding EU trade agreements. Do you believe that it is appropriate for any changes to be waved through using Henry VIII powers? That is one question. For British Chambers of Commerce members, how important is consultation on any elements that might change in these agreements?

Anastassia Beliakova: Consultation is absolutely critical. If there are changes through these agreements that would alter the benefits that businesses currently see, our members would want to be consulted. At the moment, there is a question as to how the UK will set out on having an independent trade policy. We are conducting a study with the London School of Economics on that topic, which I would be happy to share once it is published.

There is a balance of interests between continuation—ensuring that there is no gap between the current benefits and some new measures that will be implemented—and appropriate scrutiny. That has to be considered on a case-by-case basis when it comes to the existing agreements. For any new negotiations, however, there needs to be a more clearly set out process.

William Bain: There are two important points to make. First, if we look at the guidelines adopted by the European Council on 15 December and the drafts that are circulating in Brussels for the draft directive to be adopted next Monday, it is very doubtful that the EU will permit the UK to vary these agreements at all. It will basically be small changes that will require the UK to still be subject to its current obligations under these agreements. That is all that the EU will be prepared to accept.

Another important point is that if the mechanism for the transition is that the UK is under the common commercial policy and the EU common external tariff, the UK will be applying all the EU’s external tariffs vis-à-vis third countries. That means that Canada and South Korea will get the advantage of relatively low-tariff trade into the UK market, but unless we get the EU on board to help us with the transitioning process, we will not get the advantages of access to the Canadian and South Korean markets. That is the absolute imperative of why this task has to be completed—so that we can have certainty and continuity for business.

The Economy and Work

Barry Gardiner Excerpts

Thursday 26th May 2016 Commons Chamber

[Barry Gardiner (Brent North) (Lab)]

There are measures to like in the Queen’s Speech. I argued for a soft drinks industry levy 15 years ago, although I warn the Government that it makes no sense to tax sugar while simultaneously cutting funds for sport in schools. Obesity must be tackled first and foremost through exercise, not through stand-alone measures like the sugar tax. The prison and courts reform Bill, if it is a genuine attempt to turn what is currently a penal system into a correctional and rehabilitation system, will certainly have support, and will bring about a much-needed transformation.

So there are measures to like, but beware: nothing shows the weakness of an Administration more than a failure to include big, controversial Bills in a Gracious Speech. This Queen’s Speech certainly contains policies that are wrong. The education Bill, for example, with its academisation programme and its national funding formula, marks an appalling return to the old obsession with structures rather than standards. The formula will take £18 million from schools in Brent, and will call that fair. We have reception classes with 29 children speaking 21 different mother tongues, and an 8.6% per pupil spending cut for them is not fair. It is wrong.

My point is that the Government have run out of steam or are too insecure about getting support from their own Members to risk big controversial measures. So perhaps in a spirit of mendacious assistance, I shall set out the Bill that I believe the Government could and should have placed at the heart of the Gracious Address. A green growth Bill would set a clear trajectory for the UK to lead the world in today’s low carbon industrial revolution just as we did 250 years ago in the coal-powered industrial revolution. Such a Bill would deal with energy, land use, water resource, transport and green city infrastructure in an integrated and sustainable way.

A green growth Bill would also transform the Treasury model from its current fixation on GDP growth to one that focused on wealth maximisation. To understand that GDP and wealth are not the same, one only needs to recall that the 2013-14 floods were the single biggest contributor to GDP in 2014 while simultaneously ruining thousands of people’s lives. GDP measures productivity, not wealth. A green growth Bill would make our country focus on what really mattered.

Businesses currently extract an estimated $7 trillion globally from the environment each year. This is in the form of free non-renewable goods and the equally free renewable services that they utilise. However, that $7 trillion does not appear on balance sheets; these are free goods—or externalities, as classical economics prefers to call them. No Government account exists to chart their contribution to the national wealth, yet they represent the annual income from a gigantic asset base that is quite simply the precondition of all other economic activity. What sort of economic managers do we have who fail to quantify an asset base of this magnitude and importance?

A green growth Bill would establish natural capital accounting so that by measuring nature we could make its contribution to our economy visible and allow for effective decision making. Such a Bill would appoint a Chief Secretary to the Treasury equivalent who would examine not just departmental resource and departmental expenditure limit budgets but their natural capital and ecosystem services depletion as well. Our natural capital debt is arguably a much more urgent issue than our financial debt, yet our Governments are failing spectacularly to reverse the decline in that asset base.

Budget Resolutions and Economic Situation

Barry Gardiner Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd March 2016 Commons Chamber

[Barry Gardiner (Brent North) (Lab)]

Let me begin like this.

“My husband was diagnosed with oesophageal cancer and has not been able to work since. We are now reliant on the ESA he receives. There is nothing more that either of us want than for life to somehow return to normal and for him to be able to return to the job he loves. We did not choose these dreadful circumstances—the benefits system is intended to protect those in society as much as possible when things go badly wrong. Forcing people in very difficult circumstances into poverty seems an outrageous way for any government to behave.”

That is a letter from one of my constituents, and she is absolutely correct. More than 9,000 Brent residents rely on ESA to live independently and with dignity. Their income has been cut by £30 per week, and the cut in the PIP would have caused 640,000 disabled people to lose up to a further £3,500 a year by 2020. It is therefore with great relief that many of them will have watched the Government’s U-turn on the proposed £4.4 billion cut. However, disabled people in my constituency have already suffered real hardship under this Government as a result of the bedroom tax, the benefit cap, the benefits uprating policy, the scrapping of disability living allowance, and the 12-month time limit on contributory ESA.

Yesterday the new Secretary of State for Work and Pensions said in his statement that the Government would not be making further cuts in to the welfare budget, but that gives the Chancellor a serious problem. He has a fiscal charter which enshrines in law that he must achieve a budgetary surplus by 2020. Last Wednesday, he believed that in order to meet that fiscal charter, he had to make £4.4 billion of cuts affecting the most vulnerable people in our society, because he wanted to cut corporation tax and capital gains tax and to raise the higher-rate income tax threshold to benefit the very richest. If he is genuinely not seeking to identify other cuts in services to offset that £4.4 billion, it is essential that we are told how he does propose to balance the books. The choice is simple: he must make further cuts in services, increase taxes, or fail to meet his own fiscal charter.

The inescapable facts of the Chancellor’s record will come back to haunt him. In 2010, he promised to balance the books by 2015. He did not. This year, he has a deficit of £72 billion. He has a debt-to-GDP ratio of 83.7%, and productivity failure means that manufacturing still lags behind its 2008 level. This is the failing Budget of a failing Chancellor who lacked the courage to come to this House and explain its collapse yesterday. That failure branded him a coward. Today he came to the House, but his failure to apologise to the most vulnerable in our society has branded him a nasty coward.

Budget Changes

Barry Gardiner Excerpts

Monday 21st March 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Gauke]

Forty-five, 40, and about 4 million.

[Barry Gardiner (Brent North) (Lab)]

Does the Minister agree that it would have taken real courage for the Chancellor to come here today, and that in failing to show that courage he has shown he is not fit to lead his party? His failure of courage is not only that, however. It is a discourtesy to this House that renders us incapable of properly examining the Budget, because we do not know how the Chancellor proposes to meet his fiscal targets.

[Mr Gauke]

With the greatest of respect to the hon. Gentleman, that is a load of pompous nonsense. The Chancellor of the Exchequer will respond to the Budget debate, the first time a Chancellor has done so since the 1990s.

Spending Review and Autumn Statement

Barry Gardiner Excerpts

Wednesday 25th November 2015 Commons Chamber

[Barry Gardiner (Brent North) (Lab)]

This morning, the Government released the figures for the highest number of excess winter deaths this century—43,900—yet, in his statement, the Chancellor has cut the ECO budget, which was designed to improve home insulation, by 60%. How does he reconcile those figures?

[Mr Osborne]

We are ensuring we have an efficient home efficiency scheme, and at the same time we are cutting the energy bills for families. I remember the Labour party in the last Parliament—it did not do Labour Members any good in the end—campaigning to freeze energy bills. They should be welcoming this cut in energy bills.

Greece

Barry Gardiner Excerpts

Monday 6th July 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

Of course, we have a very small direct exposure as our banking system has greatly reduced its Greek liabilities. We have four pretty small Greek branches and one subsidiary. We are not directly exposed to loss and although we are a member of the IMF, no country has ever lost money supporting the IMF. Of course, people ask what might happen to Greece should it leave the euro, but I think we can leave that for another day.

[Barry Gardiner (Brent North) (Lab)]

Will the Chancellor remind the House of the amount of money that this country made available to the IMF as part of its assistance package to Greece? He has reasserted today that no country has ever lost money by lending it to the IMF, but of course the IMF has said that it believes that a serious restructuring is required for Greece to get through its current difficulties. That implies that the moneys owed to the IMF will not be repaid.

[Mr Osborne]

The IMF has existed since it was created out of the Bretton Woods conference and, by definition, it exists to support countries that are in very real financial distress. That is its business: lending to countries that are having real problems managing their debts. It is important to say again, however, that Britain and other members of the world community that support the IMF have never lost money in this way, because the IMF holds contingency reserves. It is also the preferred creditor. Frankly, I do not think that the prospect of us losing money through the IMF is that strong.

Royal Bank of Scotland

Barry Gardiner Excerpts

Thursday 11th June 2015 Commons Chamber

[Harriett Baldwin]

I thank the hon. Lady for her warm words. The Government noted the points made by HSBC in its report this week. We are proud of the fact that the UK remains one of the most attractive and competitive places in which to locate a financial services company and a bank. It is essential, in making us fully competitive in that regard, that we take the steps we are announcing today.

[Barry Gardiner (Brent North) (Lab)]

I, too, congratulate the hon. Lady on her appointment. She said in her statement that the Government were not responsible for the bail-out of RBS, but does she not agree with the Governor of the Bank of England that public ownership

“prevented enormous financial contagion at a time when the UK financial system was extremely fragile”?

Will she also confirm that the Chancellor is on record as insisting that the money spent on saving RBS from collapse would be recouped in full? Can she explain why he has changed his mind, by telling us how the perceived public benefit from the sale to which she referred will exceed the £7 billion quantified loss that has been calculated in her own report?

[Harriett Baldwin]

The hon. Gentleman has failed to apologise for the regulatory system that allowed us to get into this position in the first place. The letter from the Governor of the Bank of England is on the record. The hon. Gentleman must accept that this is part of the improvement in the overall long-term economic outlook—[Interruption.]

Budget Resolutions and Economic Situation

Barry Gardiner Excerpts

Friday 20th March 2015 Commons Chamber

[Hilary Benn]

No, I will not. I have answered the hon. Gentleman’s question.

There is another policy that the Government—actually, the Conservative party—have said that they will put in place if they are re-elected, which is to sell homes at 20% off. To go back to the chairman of the Conservative party, he was recently asked several times on Sky News how exactly that would be funded. He was not able to reply, but others have said that it will be done by exempting such sites, first, from the requirement to build social housing, and secondly, from the zero-carbon homes standard. I would tell the Secretary of State that the consequence will be that other people have less of a chance of getting a home they can afford, and people who move into houses built to a lower energy standard will end up paying higher bills than they otherwise would.

I have another question for Ministers. In talking about that plan, the Prime Minister said the homes

“can’t be bought by foreigners”.

I would be grateful if the Minister who responds clarified what exactly the Prime Minister meant.

[Barry Gardiner (Brent North) (Lab)]

They’ve gone very quiet.

[Hilary Benn]

Indeed. Suddenly silence falls on the Chamber.

Does that mean that EU citizens will be barred from buying one of these homes at 20% off? I think we should get an answer. The truth is that home ownership—[Interruption.] Well, I would give way if someone could give me an answer, but I do not suppose that I am going to get one. Home ownership is now at its lowest level for 30 years, and there are those with no home at all. Since 2010, homelessness is up by a quarter and rough sleeping is up 50%.