Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 29th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

My Lords, as I have listened to the debate today, I have been very much aware that noble Lords are seized of the fact that our role is to scrutinise legislation, not to rubber-stamp government proposals, as I think we are being asked to do by No. 10. This is our duty and I have no doubt that your Lordships will fulfil that duty with integrity.

Last week, we voted that the Rwanda treaty, on which the Bill relies for legitimacy, should not be implemented until the mechanisms and processes it establishes have been given effect. For the moment, they are aspirational. Anyone who has been involved in the process of establishing new systems and mechanisms knows that these things are not done properly, even in a country such as the UK, which has the advantage of a long-established judicial and criminal justice system and is familiar with accountability mechanisms. Rwanda is not that type of country.

I know that the Bill applies only to those who have come to the UK by unsafe and illegal routes, and that the destruction of the human trafficking business which facilitates access to the UK by these routes is a very necessary and desirable aim. That goes to the heart of the Bill.

Analysis and research led by the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law finds, inter alia, that the Bill and treaty would put the UK in breach of its obligations under Article 4 of the ECHR and Article 10 of ECAT: obligations to identify and assist every potential victim of modern slavery and human trafficking, regardless of immigration status or method of entry. The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission has said that the Bill

“will, deliberately, abdicate responsibility under the 1951 Refugee Convention, threaten the international refugee protection regime and risk the erosion of the UK’s standing and ability to collaborate in the multilateral system”.

We cannot by stating something make it a reality. If Rwanda is not safe for some people—many noble Lords have pointed out why and where it is not safe, and have pointed to the people who have been given asylum here from Rwanda—the question must arise: what does it mean to say that it is a “safe country”? As the Law Society of England and Wales said:

“Simply put, the Supreme Court found Rwanda to not be a safe country; legislating the reverse will not change the situation on the ground”.


We cannot by legislation make the statement in Clause 1(5) a reality. We have not been told what has changed since the Supreme Court judgment, apart from the making of the Rwanda treaty a few weeks ago—which, as I said, contains a range of aspirational measures that will require very significant work to become operational. As the Law Society also said, as the Bill stands, even if the court is presented with overwhelming evidence that Rwanda is not safe, it would have to ignore that evidence and treat Rwanda as a safe country.

Redress, which pursues claims on behalf of survivors of torture, makes a very important point:

“The Bill sends out a dangerous signal that the UK is willing to circumvent the rule of law, and so undermines the international rules-based order. The UK has historically led the way in establishing the rule of law and should not now contribute to the threats it faces internationally”.


But we know, because we have seen it in your Lordships’ House, that this Government are getting into the habit of disapplying their human rights obligations and undermining the rule of law. I point yet again to the legacy Act passed in Northern Ireland, which removes all rights to compensation under the civil law, to inquests and to prosecutions, except in very limited circumstances.

The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission advises that refugees and asylum seekers are protected by Article 2 of the Windsor Framework, and that rights particular to refugees and asylum seekers are within the scope of the Good Friday agreement by virtue, in particular, of the commitment to civil rights and to incorporate the European convention into domestic law. It cites many measures which are binding on the UK and which continue to set standards for human rights protection below which the law in Northern Ireland should not fall. Yet this Bill seeks to deprive individuals of that protection. It suggests that the current relationship between the UK courts, the UK Parliament and international law is balanced—but this Bill will create an imbalance.

We have heard so many voices articulating the dangers and, indeed, perils of this Bill. Undoubtedly, we have to find ways to resolve the problem that gave rise to the Bill and to dismantle, if possible, the highly lucrative businesses profiting from the plight of those who seek a safer and better life. I do not think that many of us could live in Syria, Afghanistan or anywhere else on a salary of about £10 a month, which is the average salary there.

This Bill is not the way forward. At the very least, until Parliament can be assured that the mechanisms and institutions of the Rwanda treaty are in place and that there is consideration of each asylum seeker and any particular vulnerabilities they may have, Parliament should exercise its sovereignty and decline to pass this ill thought-out Bill.

As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, pointed out, the Government have yet to respond to your Lordships’ decision on the Rwanda treaty, which is so fundamental to the Bill. This Bill does not stand alone. We will appear ridiculous if we pass a Bill saying that Rwanda is safe simply to overrule our independent Supreme Court, which said that it could not be considered a safe country.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am afraid I am not familiar with that part. However, I have just read out the relevant clause in the Bill that deals with specific individual circumstances.

Any person who has been relocated to Rwanda but who subsequently receives a court or tribunal order from the UK that they must be treated as a minor, and are therefore a child who is in Rwanda without a parent or guardian, shall be provided with suitable accommodation and support that meets all the requirements for families with children set out within the treaty under paragraphs 1.1 and 1.2.2 of Part 1 of Annex A to the treaty until the child is returned to the UK.

With regard to concerns about the impacts of the policy on children treated as adults, I reassure noble Lords that there are safeguards in place to prevent that happening. The Home Office will treat an individual claiming to be a child as an adult without conducting further inquiries only if two officers—one of at least chief immigration officer grade or equivalent—have separately determined that the individual’s physical appearance and demeanour very strongly suggest that they are “significantly over 18 years” of age. If doubt remains about whether the claimant is an adult or a child, they are treated as a child for immigration purposes until a further assessment of their age by a local authority or the National Age Assessment Board. This will usually entail a careful, holistic age assessment, known as a Merton-compliant age assessment. Only once this assessment is complete could the individual then be treated as an adult if found to be so.

Many noble Lords have asked whether this Bill will comply with international law. Its provisions are consistent with our international law obligations. They retain rights challenge based on compelling evidence of serious and irreversible harm in specific individual circumstances, which will arise in narrow circumstances.

In response to the points made by the noble Lords, Lord German and Lord Howarth, I say that the Bill makes it clear that it is only for a Minister of the Crown to determine whether to comply with an interim measure of the Strasbourg court. I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Wolfson and the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, for their comments on this.

I will not get drawn into speculation about hypothetical scenarios, but the internationally binding treaty agreed between the UK and Rwanda contains binding commitments to ensure that the scheme is compliant with international law, including the ECHR. It also makes it clear that domestic courts may not have regard to the existence of any interim measures when considering any domestic application flowing from a decision to relocate a person to Rwanda in accordance with the treaty.

The Permanent Secretary for the Home Office has confirmed that if we receive a Rule 39, instead of deferring removal immediately—as the guidance currently indicates—officials will refer the Rule 39 to the Minister for an immediate decision. To answer the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, I say that the Cabinet Office has confirmed that it is the responsibility of civil servants under the Civil Service Code to deliver that decision. Consideration will be on a case-by-case basis depending on the facts. I also remind noble Lords that, as the Government have set out, both the UK and Rwanda are committed to making this partnership work.

As my noble friend Lord Murray set out, the Section 19(1)(b) statement is not specific to one provision; it applies to the Bill as a whole. A statement under Section 19(1)(b) makes it clear, in this instance, that the Home Secretary is not able to state now that the Bill’s provisions are more likely than not compatible with convention rights. There is nothing improper or unprecedented about pursuing Bills with a Section 19(1)(b) statement. It does not mean that the Bill is unlawful or that the Government will necessarily lose any legal challenges on human rights grounds. Parliament clearly intended Section 19(1)(b) to be used as it is included in the Human Rights Act 1998. It is an important measure to safeguard parliamentary sovereignty. Section 19(1)(b) statements have been used by Governments of all stripes before. For example, the Bill that became the Communications Act 2003 included a provision banning paid political advertising on TV. The use in this case recognises the novel and ambitious approach taken by this Bill, and the fact there is room for argument both ways. We are testing the limits but remain satisfied that this Bill is compatible with international law.

The Bill allows decision-makers and the courts to consider claims that Rwanda is unsafe for a person due to their particular individual circumstances, as we have discussed. As the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London noted, the Bill does not disapply Section 4 on declaration of incompatibility, as this is the only substantive remedy against the conclusive presumption that Rwanda is safe. Retaining DOIs allows the courts to respond to changing circumstances and for this question to be brought back for parliamentary consideration. Of course, the final say on the matter will remain with Parliament and the Government because Section 4(6) of the Human Rights Act makes it clear that a declaration cannot affect the operation or validity of domestic legislation.

The effect of retaining this Section 4 is therefore beneficial in limiting domestic and international legal challenge and, crucially, does not undermine the operation of the Bill, and in doing so reaffirms parliamentary sovereignty. The court could not grant interim relief on the basis of a DOI having been granted because of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 4(6) of the Human Rights Act.

The noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, asked about the impact of the Bill in Northern Ireland. The Bill will apply fully in Northern Ireland in the same way as it does in the rest of the United Kingdom. This is explicit in the Bill and will always be the case, reflecting that immigration policy is a UK-wide matter. Nothing in the Windsor Framework, including Article 2, or the trade continuity agreement affects this. The Bill’s provisions do not diminish the rights and commitments we have made on the convention on human rights in the Belfast agreement. The Government remain fully committed to that agreement in all its parts. The Government are unshakable in their commitment to the Belfast/Good Friday agreement, and the Bill does not undermine this.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

Has the noble Lord actually read the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s advice on this matter? Has he taken cognisance of the number of measures he lists which are affected, and the fact it is an obligation under Article 2 of the Windsor Framework?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I have just set out to the noble Baroness, the Government takes a different view to those opinions.

The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, asked about the costs of this partnership. The spend on the MEDP with Rwanda so far is £240 million. Further funding will be provided to Rwanda once the partnership is operational. Costs and payments will depend on the number of people relocated, the timing of when this happens and the outcomes of individual cases. Spending will continue to be reported as part of annual Home Office reports and accounts in the usual way. Those focusing solely on the costs of this partnership are missing the point. It is incredibly frustrating for the British people and the taxpayer to spend billions to house illegal migrants in hotels. The daily cost of hotels for migrants is £8 million and the cost of the UK’s asylum system has roughly doubled in the last year; it now stands at nearly £4 billion. Criminal smuggling gangs are continuing to turn a profit using small boats. We must bring an end to this.

The Government recognise the extraordinary level of interest in this partnership, and we take our responsibility to be transparent seriously. However, that must be balanced with the nuances of managing our international relationships and respecting commercial sensitivities. We have said we will do what it takes to curb illegal migration and stop the boats. As we explore avenues of doing this, it would be against our direct interests to release all financial information. Costs and payments of course will depend on the number of people relocated, the timing of when this happens, and the outcomes of individual cases. Every individual’s needs are different, and funding will only be provided while an individual remains in Rwanda. Spending will be reported as part of the annual Home Office reports and accounts in the usual way.

I am getting to the end. Noble Lords have asked whether this Bill will, by disapplying international law, have a knock-on impact on wider international treaties and potentially worsen the UK’s relationship with the ECHR. We have a long and diverse history of freedoms in this country, and we are proud of the UK’s heritage and culture on human rights and democracy. But no country has all the answers to global human rights challenges. We continue to engage others about our ongoing journey on these issues—a point made by many noble Lords and emphasised by my noble friend the Foreign Secretary on 16 January.

I am again thankful for all the contributions made to today’s debate. It is absolutely essential that we tackle illegal migration, bring an end to such dangerous channel crossings and save lives. To the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, I say that the integrity of our border also matters. I therefore urge noble Lords to support the Government in delivering the partnership with Rwanda, and our wider plans to take control of our borders and stop the boats. These are difficult choices to make with regards to tackling this issue. That is what this Government are doing, and we will continue to do so. The Bill will enable us to stop the boats, and I commend it to the House. I invite noble Lords to reject the amendment standing in the name of the noble Lord, Lord German.

Asylum: UK-Rwanda Agreement

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Monday 22nd January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, for tabling these two Motions to allow your Lordships’ House to consider the Rwanda treaty before we have to consider the Rwanda Bill. As noble Lords have said, the treaty and the Bill are consequential on the Supreme Court judgment that Rwanda cannot be assumed to be a safe place. This is, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, indicated, an exceptional report. Its findings are very grave indeed. Next week, we will be asked in the Rwanda Bill to accept that Rwanda is a safe place, despite the fact that the evidence does not exist, as my noble friend Lord Alton just graphically illustrated.

The Home Secretary says in the Bill that he is unable to make a statement that the Bill is compliant with the Human Rights Act. That in itself should cause your Lordships alarm. We have obligations under not only the Human Rights Act but international legal instruments, and this is not the first occasion on which this Government have produced legislation which is not compatible with our international and domestic legal obligations. I think of the legacy Act currently being challenged in the High Court in Northern Ireland. Actions such as the introduction of the Rwanda Bill, which relies on a treaty which the Government have only just signed and which provides for a very complex structure of mechanisms to make it work at all, which will require the identification of personnel, accommodation, IT systems, training, new asylum law and many other processes, none of which exist at present, do further grave damage to the United Kingdom’s international reputation. What is so stark, on reading the report of the International Agreements Committee, is the manifest lack of ability, capacity and preparedness to make the provisions of the treaty operational in the near future, in addition to its other deficiencies.

That there is a problem of uncontrolled unlawful migration cannot be denied. However, the Government’s response over past years has been generally to reduce the number of staff employed to deal with asylum matters and the general resources provided for these matters, and above all, the failure, as my noble friend Lord Alton said, to devise a workable, human rights-compliant strategy to resettle displaced people and, more importantly, to work internationally to create levels of peace and prosperity in the countries from which so many of these migrants come.

We granted more than 500,000 asylum applications this year, 70% of the total number of applications. In contrast, some 25,000 illegal immigrants arrived in small boats last year. In future, we are planning to send such people out to Rwanda before their asylum status has been determined if they enter through what are called

“dangerous, illegal and unnecessary methods”.

Already this year, 614 people are reported to have arrived in 15 boats, which is about 40 people a boat. Their status is then to be determined in Rwanda and there is an agreement that they will not be deported by Rwanda unless the UK asks for them to be sent back to the UK. However, there is evidence that Rwanda has deported to Uganda people who arrived there under comparable arrangements. Moreover, if they are not granted refugee status in Rwanda, their future will be very bleak indeed. It will not be possible under the proposed processes to track and monitor what happens to them. The proposals for tracking and monitoring are time-limited and are currently an aspiration rather than a reality.

In a very unstructured and knee-jerk way, we are attempting to limit the number of people coming to our shores. In so doing we have spent hundreds of millions of pounds. We have paid many millions to France—I think it will be half a billion pounds over the three years ending in 2026—yet those seeking to come unlawfully to the UK are still able to set off from France, with an average of 40 people in a standard inflatable. Many of those inflatables have come under significant pressure, and people have died as a consequence.

Getting 40 people into an inflatable and setting it on course for England cannot achieved speedily. It must be possible for the French to do more in return for the money that we have given them. Through the use of drones or helicopters, allowing for intervention on French soil, a positive and proactive French response in this context would undoubtedly have a deterrent effect.

Moreover, we are spending millions on policing the channel. We no longer have the coastal vessels necessary for these channel operations, because their replacement was delayed by the Government; so we are now hiring private vessels to do the work, at a cost of £36 million in a year. Work to replace these vessels will not start for another two years and is not expected to be completed before 2028, so we will spend another £200 million picking people out of the Channel. That is in addition to the money we are spending each day on accommodating people and providing the necessary resources for their processing and appeals, et cetera.

The solutions proposed in this treaty, even if they were acceptable in human rights terms—and there is no evidence that they are so acceptable—have yet to be realised in any degree. The committee has identified very significant matters that require to be addressed before the UK can have any confidence that the structures will actually work, that Rwanda will be a safe place for migrants to be processed, and that the UK can be satisfied that migrants will not simply be deported to third countries, in breach of the requirements of the treaty.

If the UK has such difficulty in providing accommodation, education, healthcare and all the other services that are necessary, can the Minister explain how the UK can expect that Rwanda will be able to do so? Most particularly, to echo the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton, how can he assure the House that children and vulnerable adults will be kept safe under these arrangements?

The committee has said:

“The Government has presented the Rwanda Treaty to Parliament as an answer to the Supreme Court judgment and has asked Parliament, on the basis of the Treaty, to declare that Rwanda is a safe country. While the Treaty might in time provide the basis for such an assessment if it is rigorously implemented, as things stand the arrangements it provides for are incomplete. A significant number of further legal and practical steps are required under the treaty”.


The committee gives, as examples, the new asylum law that is required, as well as

“a system for ensuring that refoulement does not take place; … a process for submitting individual complaints to the Monitoring Committee”—

which is yet to get its support people—

“the appointment of independent experts to advise the asylum First Instance and Appeals Bodies; … the appointment of co-presidents of the Appeals Body; … the appointment of international judges; …training for international judges in Rwandan law and practice; … training for Rwandan officials dealing with asylum applicants; and … steps to ensure a sufficient number of trained legal advisers and interpreters are available”.

Can the Minister tell the House the timetable for the creation and establishment of all these structures and when they will be delivered in a way that will enable the House to have confidence that people who are sent to Rwanda will be safe? Even after all that work has been done, there will have to be further work to ensure that what has been established actually works.

Your Lordships have heard repeatedly that there is no evidence that Rwanda is currently a safe place. The structures provided in this treaty are, quite simply, not operational at present, and not capable of being operational. For that reason, I will vote to support the Motion that the Government should not ratify the treaty until the protections that it provides have been fully implemented.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I was just getting to that. As regards children where the age-assessment results are not conclusive, the Home Office will treat an individual claiming to be a child as an adult only after further inquiries by two officers, one of at least chief immigration officer grade or equivalent, have separately determined that the individual’s physical appearance and demeanour very strongly suggest they are significantly over 18 years of age.

The lawfulness of this process was recently fully endorsed by the Supreme Court in the case of BF (Eritrea) from 2021. If doubt remains about whether the claimant is an adult or a child, they are treated as a child for immigration purposes until a further assessment of their age by a local authority or the National Age Assessment Board. This will usually entail a careful holistic age assessment, known as a Merton-compliant age assessment. Only once this assessment is completed could the individual then be treated as an adult if found to be so.

Under the Illegal Migration Act, those wishing to challenge a decision on age will be able to do so through judicial review, although these challenges are non-suspensive and can continue from outside the UK after an applicant has been removed. The treaty provides for the return of anyone who is removed as an adult and later determined to be a child, and appropriate temporary care of such an individual.

A number of noble Lords have referred to the UNHCR report. The first thing to state is that the Government are not abdicating responsibilities, as alluded to by the UNHCR, and as suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. This is a partnership with Rwanda, helping to make the immigration system fairer and ensuring that people are safe and enjoying new opportunities to flourish.

As this Government have made clear, tackling the issue of illegal migration requires bold and innovative solutions, and our partnership with Rwanda offers that. Rwanda is a safe country that cares deeply about refugees and currently hosts over 130,000 asylum seekers. Indeed, the UNHCR has signed an agreement with the Government of Rwanda and the African Union to continue the operations of the emergency transit mechanism centre in Rwanda. By temporarily accommodating some of the most vulnerable refugee populations, who have faced trauma, detentions and violence, Rwanda has showcased its willingness and ability to work collaboratively to provide solutions to refugee situations and crises. This agreement has also attracted EU funding, which will support the continued operation of the ETM until 2026.

The Home Office has granted refugee status to nationals from Rwanda, as noted by the noble Lords, Lord Coaker, Lord Kerr and Lord Hannay, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. How then can we say Rwanda is safe? People from many different nationalities apply for asylum in the UK. They include nationals from some of our closest European neighbours and other safe countries around the world.

Each case is considered on its individual merits by caseworkers who receive extensive training. All available evidence is carefully and sensitively considered in light of published country information. Asylum decision-makers carefully consider everyone’s protection needs regardless of nationality by assessing all the evidence provided by the claimant, in light of the latest available country-of-origin information. Asylum claims made by persons from Rwanda will have an individual assessment made against the background of relevant case law, policy guidance and the latest available country-of-origin information. Paragraphs 339J and 339JA of the Immigration Rules require decision-makers to take into account all relevant country-of-origin information in making their decision.

The noble Lord, Lord Alton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, asked about the Home Secretary and the signing of the Section 19(1)(b) human rights statement. This does not mean that the legislation is incompatible with the ECHR. It means that the Home Secretary cannot say that it is more likely to be compatible than not. That is the consequence of this being an ambitious and novel Bill, which is what is needed to fulfil our commitment to tackle the small boats. There is nothing improper or unprecedented about pursuing ambitious and innovative ways of solving such endemic issues as migration. We believe that it is lawful and we are acting in compliance with our international obligations.

The Supreme Court’s judgment was made on the basis of the facts in June 2022.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

Before the Minister sits down, could he explain to your Lordships why, if the Government believe this Bill is lawful, the Minister is unable to say that it is lawful?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I think I just did. I will go over it again. As I said, the Home Secretary, cannot say that it is more likely to be compatible than not. That is not the same as the question that the noble Baroness just asked me. This is the consequence of it being an ambitious and novel Bill. There is nothing improper or unprecedented about pursuing ambitious and innovative ways of solving such issues. We believe that it is lawful and we are acting in compliance with our international obligations.

The Supreme Court’s judgment was made on the basis of the facts in June 2022 when the case was brought. It made clear that, while it had concerns about the arrangements in place in June 2022, changes to safeguard against risks “may be delivered in the future”.

The UK’s treaty with Rwanda responds comprehensively to the court’s concerns. It provides a binding guarantee in international law against refoulement and provides guarantees about the treatment of relocated individuals in Rwanda. It reflects the work that we and the Rwandan Government have completed in the 18 months since June 2022 and, once ratified, it ensures that no one will be sent into a position where they would face a real risk of harm.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, noted, it is unprecedented for the House of Lords to place conditions on an international treaty in this way. Never in the history of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 has either House forced a vote to try to delay the ratification of a treaty until its provisions have been implemented.

Police: Restoring Public Confidence

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Wednesday 3rd May 2023 Grand Committee

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, for securing this debate for us today. I declare my interest as a member of the independent steering group of Operation Kenova, which is investigating referrals from the chief constable of Northern Ireland and the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland on murders and other crimes committed by both republicans and loyalist paramilitaries.

My experience both here in the UK and overseas tells me that confidence in policing is the product of trust, and that trust exists when people know and understand why policing is conducted in the way it is. Governments and police forces have to be able to show that whatever is done is done with integrity and fairness and that it is compliant with the human rights obligations in domestic and international law. However, that is not enough.

No matter how well individual police officers conduct themselves, trust in what they do and how they do it will normally exist only where policing operates as part of a well-resourced, human rights-compliant justice system. All parts of that system are vital: the police, the IOPC, the courts and the prosecution service. If one part fails, the whole system, but particularly policing, falls into disrepute. Those affected by the failure do not discriminate between police failures and the consequential actions of prosecutors and the courts, so trust in the police will inevitably decline.

In Northern Ireland I have seen totally unacceptable delays in decision-making and consequential prosecutions by the PPS. I think of the admission by one UVF brigadier of over 200 criminal offences, and his conviction for murder, attempted murder, arson, extortion and kidnapping in 2018. It was anticipated that further trials would follow. There has been a deafening silence.

I think too of the submission by Operation Kenova of 36 files to the DPP in a range of cases, including the activities of the IRA agent “Stakeknife” and the murder of three young police officers, Sean Quinn, Paul Hamilton and Allan McCloy, who died in October 1982 when the IRA blew up their car near Lurgan. The DPP has yet to make a decision on these files. Suggestions have been made of a shortage of legal expertise to deal with them, but legitimate questions are being asked about why there is no decision. Is the hope that the legacy Bill will proceed into law and put an end to embarrassing disclosures in courts? That is what some people think, and it is axiomatic that the absence of prosecutorial decisions, et cetera, will contribute to a general distrust in criminal justice processes and a perception that in these cases the rule of law, which is fundamental to the operation of a trusted criminal justice system, is not being observed in Northern Ireland and throughout the UK.

Confidence in policing is dependent on the proper resourcing and operation of the wider criminal justice system, but what is it about the way in which policing is delivered that can generate trust? The MPS has been the subject of significant reports over the past few decades. I served in 2002 on an inquiry led by Sir David Calvert- Smith KC on racism in policing in all 43 forces in the UK. We found very significant problems and made 125 recommendations. This was 20 years ago; just a few short weeks ago, the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, published her report, in which she heard evidence very similar to that which we heard in 2002. There are yet more calls for change.

In 2021, the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel, which I led, published its report on the Metropolitan Police. This was an inquiry into the handling of matters following the murder of a private detective in south London in 1987. Over 34 years there had been multiple investigations, inquiries, et cetera. What we found was indicative of a culture within the MPS which did not prevent failure to investigate the original murder or the protection of those alleged to be involved in it. There were also many other failings and unlawful and unauthorised disclosure of investigation material and information—even about forthcoming arrests—to journalists and others over 30 years, including failure to deal with known police wrongdoing. We found failures of management and leadership and, above all, a determination to protect the Met. Our inevitable conclusion, in the absence of any reasonable explanation for the multiple terrible failures, was that ultimately there was a determination within the MPS to protect its reputation and to ensure that the failings were not made public.

That is not unique to the Met. If we are to grow confidence in policing, we must develop a much wider understanding of corruption than the traditional legislative definitions involving monetary benefit. The starting point is the identification of improper behaviour, by action or omission. So much wrongdoing is enabled by failure to deal with individual or collective wrongful acts; it creates a corrupt culture in which officers may calculate their odds of being able to get away with wrongful behaviour.

Looking at particular incidents can enhance understanding of how corruption develops and confidence diminishes in policing. When an officer, often a junior officer, consults police databases for personal gain or shares police information with an outsider, he or she will often be dealt with. However, in the Daniel Morgan case, it emerged that the senior investigating officer in the final police investigation, DCS David Cook, who retired in 2007 but moved to the NCA and continued to act as the senior investigating officer, had decided to write a book with journalist Michael Sullivan about corruption in the Metropolitan Police. He had removed vast amounts of confidential and secret materials from investigations in which he had been involved, other investigations and intelligence operations to, in his words, “set the record straight”.

Searches of his home uncovered enormous amounts of material belonging to the police and other criminal justice agencies. He had disclosed much of this material to journalists and others. He said that he had done so because, if he could not bring the murderers of Daniel Morgan to justice, he wanted to write a book to reveal evidence of corruption within alliances between elements of policing, private investigation and the media. He hoped to make money from the publication of the book and other associated activities. The matter was not effectively dealt with. Again, the imperative was in part to protect the reputation of the police, rather than to expend resources on dealing with the totality of the issues emerging.

Any serving officer with access to sensitive information has the opportunity to remove it and use it for unlawful purposes, whether for commercial gain or terrorist activities, for example. The failure of the Met to prevent DCS David Cook removing materials over such a protracted period continues to cause me concern about the message that such failure to act sends to other officers and about the extent to which such behaviour may be continuing within the police service, unchecked even today.

If the public are to have confidence in policing, they must be able to believe that internal wrongdoing—whether sexual assaults, homophobia, racism, theft of materials, interference with a case or any other form of misconduct or crime—is dealt with. If such matters are not dealt with, it may be because of laziness, lack of professionalism, negligence or deliberate decision. At the end of the day, motive is important in the individual case, but it is vital to know how it can happen. There is clear evidence of how senior officers can, by their acts or omissions, fail to identify and/or confront corruption; fail to manage investigations and ensure proper oversight; fail to learn from or admit mistakes and failings promptly and specifically; give unjustified assurances that all that could have been done has been done; and fail to be open and transparent.

The Daniel Morgan panel recommended the creation of a statutory duty of candour, to be owed by all law enforcement agencies to those whom they serve, subject to the protection of national security and relevant data protection legislation. That did not happen. The creation of such a duty could result in much enhanced confidence in policing, because people would know that, just as there is a statutory duty of candour in the health service, so also there would be a similar duty on policing generally. It is not enough to require individual officers to act with integrity; a statutory duty of candour is required.

What can generate confidence in policing? When the police embarked on their investigations of the abuse allegations made by Carl Beech, alerting the media to those investigations of people such as our late noble and gallant colleague Lord Bramall, whose desk sat opposite mine for many years when I came into your Lordships’ House, it transpired that there was no foundation to those allegations. This matter has been articulated at length by noble Lords. Yet the investigations continued, leaving those under investigation to carry the terrible burdens of suspicion and disruption to their lives—inevitable in such circumstances. When cases such as the murders of Stephen, son of the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, and of Daniel Morgan are not investigated properly for decades, trust in policing is inevitably damaged and diminished, even destroyed.

The actions of government can have the effect of enhancing policing, making standards clear and resourcing structures and processes properly. Proper modern policing costs money, and I welcome the recent announcement of the recruitment of 20,000 additional police officers in England and Wales. In Northern Ireland, however, police numbers are now way below what is required to provide an effective service and continue to diminish, despite a terrorist threat level recently raised to severe, meaning that an attack is highly likely. The budget has been reduced and police numbers will continue to fall. The circumstances of the very recent attempt to murder DCI John Caldwell, so terribly injured at a local football training session for young people, is indicative of the ease with which terrorists can strike.

We need only to look at the matters currently under investigation by former Chief Constable Jon Boutcher in Operations Kenova and Denton, which are dealing with the activities of loyalist and republican paramilitaries. From the Stalker/Sampson and Stevens investigations and my own work as police ombudsman, we know that the police, the Army and MI5 successfully infiltrated terrorist organisations. However, there grew a time when they allowed people to continue their terrorism to preserve them as agents. People died because of that; it should not have happened.

There is ongoing concern about the activities of informants across the UK today. It took decades to begin to call to account those whose wrongdoing cost lives. Eventually, we reached the point at which accepted mechanisms for accountability were established. That, all the research showed, enhanced confidence in policing.

Now the legacy Bill will terminate existing criminal investigations, civil actions from 17 May and Troubles inquests this month, and will grant immunity to terrorists. It gives extensive powers to the Secretary of State, who is even responsible for making decisions about memorialisation. The Bill has been rejected by everyone. The Government and the Bill have been seriously criticised by the Council of Europe, the commissioner for human rights, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers, the Irish Government, the US State Department, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and many others. It deprives survivors and victims of the Troubles of their fundamental legal rights. The Government’s legal obligations are being set aside in the Bill.

If we are to grow confidence in policing, the Government must withdraw the legacy Bill and revert to a process for dealing with the past which is legally compliant and can gain the support of all affected. By continuing to push the Bill, the Government are demonstrating their contempt for the rule of law. Our country and our police have operated for centuries in accordance with the rule of law. Confidence in policing can be promoted, but only if government itself operates within the rule of law.

Hillsborough Families Report: National Police Response

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Thursday 2nd February 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am sorry, but I am unable to go further than the Policing Minister in the other place.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

My Lords, it is more than 18 months since the Daniel Morgan panel, which I chaired, published its report. We recommended a statutory duty of candour to be owed by all law enforcement agencies to those whom they serve, subject to the protection of national security and relevant data protection legislation. The Government owe a response not only to the Hillsborough families who have waited so long but to the family of Daniel Morgan, who have waited a very long time. Is our recommendation for a statutory duty of candour, which would be binding on police and law enforcement agencies, part of the Government’s plan?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As part of the February 2020 integrity reforms, the Government introduced a statutory duty of co-operation for police officers, which provided clarity on the responsibility to participate openly and professionally as a witness in various circumstances, including in the misconduct of others. The noble Baroness is quite right to bring up the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel report, which obviously considers this matter fully, and the Government will take its recommendations into account.

Public Order Bill

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 22nd November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I rise to support the amendments standing in the name of my noble friend Lady Fox of Buckley and particularly the amendments that I have added my name to. These amendments go to the root of the problem with Clause 9—it is a very blunt instrument, which I think everyone in this House would accept. The amendments tighten up, very importantly, the definition of the phrase “interferes with” in Clause 9, so that it will conform to the principle of legal certainty, and the dictates of freedom of expression. It is very important that, at the moment, it does not distinguish between activities causing harm and activities with which people may disagree —and even disagree very strongly.

These amendments will remedy the obvious problems with how Clause 9 defines “interferes with”. As it currently stands, the definition, I believe, is so broadly worded that it can mean anything to anyone. Not only does that language make the law vague and ambiguous, but it also makes it practically impossible for the police to enforce the law. Phrases such as “seek to influence”, as has been mentioned, “advises”, “persuades” or “informs” can have as many meanings as there are people in the world; these phrases do not draw clear lines of criminality. The wording is so broad that individuals cannot know if their actions cross the threshold of criminal behaviour. With so many interpretations available, how can the police know when the threshold of criminality has been crossed? More to the point, is not the very purpose of freedom of expression and protest to “influence”, “advise”, “persuade” or “inform”?

We must not permit lofty aspirations to interfere with the basic freedoms safeguarded by the right to freedom of expression, nor must we allow a law to be so broad that it encompasses basic activities of everyday life. These amendments will help to properly restrain Clause 9, if it is going ahead in its entirety, so that it achieves its intended aims without running roughshod over the fundamental rights of ordinary citizens.

I emphasise that the Bill, as I understand it, is about public order, yet I believe that this clause is about political opportunism at the expense of fundamental freedoms. It is telling that the clause’s sponsor in the other place, Stella Creasy, voted against the whole Bill on the grounds that it went too far in policing legitimate protest but voted for a clause that introduced sweeping limitations on the right of freedom of expression for a select group of individuals, who often—I accept that there are some who will not—engage in peaceful, passive conduct and, predominantly in certain parts of Northern Ireland, in very deep prayer. There is already a law here to deal with those people who behave in a manner that we would all find abhorrent. I urge noble Lords to support the amendments in my name and those in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Beith, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, to ensure that Clause 9 goes no further than absolutely necessary.

Briefly, on Amendments 98 and 99 in the name of noble Lord, Lord Farmer, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, identified well that Clause 9’s fundamental deficiency is that it introduces wide-ranging law changes, which would set significant precedents in other areas of the public realm, without demonstrating evidence that such a change is needed based on empirical evidence. The noble Lord has spoken of stepping back and reviewing, and I think he is right. Surely the only responsible course of action for the Minister and the Government is to properly consult on these proposals before introducing such sweeping and, I believe, reckless changes to the law.

The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, would give the Secretary of State powers to introduce buffer zones around clinics only after a thorough consultation process has taken place and determined that there has been a significant change in the nature of protest since the last review, which took place only in 2018. I remind noble Lords that we have had two years of a pandemic and lockdowns since that review. As we have heard from many other noble Lords, at the time of that review the Home Office found that buffer zones would be disproportionate. At the very least, it is incumbent on Ministers to consult on what has changed since 2018 before introducing sweeping changes to the law in the way that Clause 9 will legislate for; that is very similar to what the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, said.

We do not need this whole Clause 9. However, if we are going to have it, no matter how supportive some Members of this House are of a woman’s right to choose, I believe that this is just not the way to go. In the long term, it will really affect freedom of speech and civil liberties in this country.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

My Lords, I fully support the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and the noble Lords, Lord Farmer and Lord Beith—with the exception of Amendment 99, because this is a matter for primary, not secondary, legislation. Others have addressed various of those amendments, but I will focus on Amendments 98, 92 and 85.

Amendment 98 seems to me a way forward in addressing concerns that do exist about the way in which people exercise their right to freedom of expression in the vicinity of abortion clinics in England and Wales. There has been no review, no consultation and no assessment of the impact of Clause 9, yet it will have a disproportionate effect—as noble Lords have said—by criminalising those who seek to provide in a compassionate manner counsel, support and assistance, including financial assistance, to mothers who fear that they cannot afford to give birth to the baby they are carrying or look after them after birth. Existing laws provide for offences in relation to the harassment of individuals; I spoke of those at Second Reading. We have been provided with no evidence to support the necessity or proportionality of what is proposed in this clause.

Amendment 98 provides for the carrying out of a review. This seems to me a proper manner of contemplating a change in the law, rather than the Bill, which will result in the inability of individuals to bring support to women at a time when they may most need it, in a manner which does not constitute harassment, and which may give a woman the choice and opportunity to give birth to her baby rather than to abort it.

Amendment 92 would maintain the ability to provide information so that women can make informed choices. The use of text and other information about the irreversible step she is about to take is an exercise of the right to freedom of expression. Of course, in the context of abortion, there may be disagreement about the use of some images, but there has been no consideration about how we define what is and is not acceptable. For example, would a leaflet showing a pregnant woman the support she could receive if she continued her pregnancy count as graphic imagery merely because it had a photograph of a baby on it? These are fundamental matters of freedom of expression.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Sugg (Con)]

I agree with the noble Baroness on her point about private dwellings. We have tabled Amendment 96, which will, I hope, deal with that. Will the noble Baroness support that amendment?

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

If I may continue, I have a simple example on private dwellings. A woman leaving her home on her driveway, which is adjacent to a public right of way within the 150-metre buffer zone, with her pregnant friend who is contemplating an abortion but is not quite sure about it, would commit a criminal offence by talking to her about her options.

We believe in freedom of speech. This clause is so completely disproportionate that your Lordships cannot accept it. After all, there has been no prior consultation about this complete restriction on the right to freedom of expression. The 2018 Home Office review—I am sorry; I know noble Lords have said we should not talk about this, but I think that it is important—said:

“There have also been reports of verbal and physical abuse by pro-choice activists against pro-life activists.”


Do noble Lords who support Clause 9 have a view on that and how the clause would address it? The failure to address this is one of the many failings in this debate.

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

If the noble Baroness were to listen carefully to what the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, said and to read the amendments that have been tabled, the clause is about any interference—no matter the motivation of it—within that 150-metre zone. It would apply exactly to the point she has just made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

I am debating the amendments to which I am speaking.

Clause 9 is unworkable in its current form. That is why I support these amendments and will vote for them should a Division be called.

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

My Lords, we need a little calm in this situation. I thought that the noble Lord, Lord Beith, made a very wise, temperate speech, and we would all benefit from reflecting upon what he said.

There is an extraordinary irony behind this. As this Bill goes through your Lordships’ House, we are also debating the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill. Only yesterday I noticed a very interesting account in the Times of what the retiring vice-chancellor of Oxford University had said about free speech. She said that her students—all students—must be able to listen and reflect upon things of which they deeply, instinctively disapproved. She made the point that if they did that, they could strengthen their own views or maybe, on occasions, change them.

This clause is disproportionate. We debated freedom of speech in your Lordships’ House when I raised it many months ago, when there was an attempt to muzzle Members of this House. People were complaining to the commissioner, and the commissioner, very rightly, discounted the claims. The committee led by the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, decided that we needed to tighten up the rules in our House to further protect freedom of speech. We must not claim for ourselves that which we would deny to others. It is important that freedom of speech is protected.

There are many laws that deal with those who abuse freedom of speech. One of my reasons for having doubts about the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill stemmed from the advice I was given by a wise parliamentarian who talked to me when I first came into the other place some 52 years ago. He said: “Before you form an opinion on any Bill, ask yourself if it is necessary.” I am not sure that this clause is, in any form, necessary. What certainly is necessary, however, is that, if the clause is included in the Bill—I hope it will not be, but if it is—it must be in a form amended along the lines advocated by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, in his very wise speech.

There is a danger—some of us are guilty of this occasionally—of indulging in slogans. A slogan is not the same as a principle. A slogan is not something that should drive Members of your Lordships’ House when we are jealous of our reputation of being able to scrutinise with objective care the Bills that are placed before us. In a way, the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins of Tavistock, was making a similar point in her brief speech when she said that we really had to reflect on what was being said. My own suggestion to the Minister, which I hope he might act on, is that he should invite in those who have tabled amendments—I am not seeking an invitation, but I would readily accept one—such as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, who made a very interesting and thoughtful speech in introducing this debate, and see whether there is not some common ground. My own recommendation would be that we remove this clause, have a proper conference on this issue, and see what is necessary to protect the proper freedom of women while not inhibiting freedom of speech, especially of those who have deep religious convictions on this matter.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

It is, because we are being asking what the evidence is. I was telling the noble Baroness that, when I was a Member of the Parliament, for a very long time, I was conscious of some of the abuse that was going on from speaking to people coming to my surgery. In the House of Commons, we get a reflection of the views of Members of Parliament who are encountering the same response from their own constituents.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

Is the noble Viscount aware of any statistics on the number of people now who are being prosecuted or who have been convicted of harassment of people at abortion clinics? I am completely unaware of that, and none of those who are promoting this clause has produced any such evidence.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

I am not, but what I am telling the Committee is that those who have a great many dealings with the public, particularly Members of the House of Commons, have passed by a very substantial majority the view that Clause 9 is necessary. That accords with my own personal experience, after 30 years or so in the House of Commons.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

We on these Benches accept that many people have strong views both on abortion and on this clause, on both sides of the argument, as reflected in our debate. I want to say two things at the outset. First, my understanding is that organisations that provide abortion services, such as the British Pregnancy Advisory Service, talk through the options available in the case of an unwanted pregnancy, including continuing with the pregnancy and arranging adoption or fostering, becoming a parent and ending the pregnancy with an abortion. The second is that it must be one of the most difficult, life-changing decisions anyone has to make.

To be subjected to one-sided opinions by well-meaning, passionate but in some cases fixated individuals at such a vulnerable moment cannot be right, whether outside or inside an abortion clinic. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, said, this is about targeting an individual seeking medical services. Many noble Lords have talked about free speech. There is a difference between offering advice and support, and forcing advice and support on those who do not want it. By all means, campaign, demonstrate and provide advice, help and support on the internet, for example, but not when someone is on their way to an abortion clinic.

What is said inside an abortion clinic is regulated and controlled; what is said outside by campaigners against abortion is not. There is a series of amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Fox of Buckley, supported the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey. Amendment 80 brings us back to the debate we had last week about “reasonable excuse”. I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, for that debate and for his contribution today.

This brings us back to the potential argument that the more important the issue, the greater the excuse to break the law. Last week, we debated whether anything could be more important than saving the planet from catastrophic climate change and therefore, there could be a “reasonable excuse” to do anything, however unlawful, if saving the planet was the intention. I am sure there are some who feel that nothing is more important, as they see it, than “saving the life of an unborn child”, so any means justify the ends. Such an amendment would render buffer zones ineffective.

Amendments 81 and 86 lead potentially to the whack-a-mole scenario—or, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee more eloquently put it, the displacement of protests from one clinic to another—whereby those wanting to get those wanting an abortion to change their minds at the last minute would travel around the country until every local authority had a buffer zone around every clinic. Either there is a right to abortion without last-minute interference, or there is not. I am not clear from the wording of Amendment 86 whether it would amount to a maximum of a two-year buffer zone, or simply the expensive and bureaucratic process of having to renew the buffer zone every year.

Amendment 82 introduces the concept of “intentionally or recklessly” interfering, which no doubt would result in endless arguments about whether the offering of advice, or whatever form the interaction takes, amounted to interference or not. Amendment 89, also supported by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, would allow “silent witness” by those who persistently, continuously or repeatedly picket abortion clinics. That sounds to me like quite intimidating behaviour, even if it is silent prayer. We cannot support these amendments. Either the Committee supports this clause or it does not; creating uncertainty about whether the interaction is reasonable, which clinics have a buffer zone or what amounts to interference is unhelpful.

On Amendment 94, I can understand why the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, has drawn a parallel with Part 3 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 and public space protection orders, but the latter refers to things like banning the drinking of alcohol in a local park—otherwise innocuous activities that are causing a particular problem in a specific area. This measure is about interfering with a person’s right to choose to access abortion services. They are very similar in terms of protecting public space, but very different in terms of the kind of activity they are trying to prevent.

We support Amendments 80A, 82A, and 82B in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Sugg and Lady Watkins of Tavistock, and my noble friend Lady Barker, which would bring the phrase “buffer zones” into line with similar legislation in other jurisdictions. We support the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, and my noble friend Lady Barker.

On Amendment 84, if we are going to have buffer zones, they need to be around every place where abortion services are provided. Amendments 87 and 91 helpfully clarify that the proposed offences apply only in relation to abortion services. Amendments 95, 96 and 97 also usefully exempt anyone invited to go along to the clinic with the person seeking abortion services, and anything said or done when all parties are in someone’s home or a place of worship.

We also support the clarification provided by Amendment 93A in the name of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, supported by my noble friend Lady Barker and the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg: that an “abortion clinic” should include places where advice and counselling related to abortions is provided.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

Is the noble Lord saying that we should have buffer zones outside every location at which somebody can get, for example, the medical intervention for abortion, such as Boots the chemist, or every facility offering counselling?

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My noble friend’s amendment is a probing amendment for the House to consider what sort of premises might be included in buffer zones to ensure that places where women go to get advice are included. The noble Baroness makes an important point, but this is a probing amendment so that the House can consider between Committee and Report whether an amendment in line with the wording that my noble friend has provided is right.

I understand the intention behind Amendment 85 in the name of my noble friend Lord Beith and supported by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, but I think it is now covered by Amendment 96. If someone decides to go into a place of worship on their way to an abortion clinic, that is their decision.

Similarly, I understand the intention behind my noble friend’s Amendments 88 and 90, supported by the right reverend Prelate and the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox of Buckley and Lady Hoey: they want to protect free speech. But freedom of speech is a qualified right, and this restriction of it applies only in this very specific and limited scenario in relation to abortion services and clinics. I am not a lawyer, but my understanding is that the European Convention on Human Rights contains qualified rights, as the noble Viscount said. If a country believes that restrictions need to be placed on a qualified right because there is a justification for it, it is open for it to do so—that is exactly what we are considering here. Whether something is clearly contrary to European Convention on Human Rights, as my noble friend suggested, will be for the courts to decide. I understand—not least following discussions with the Minister and officials—that there is an expectation that, if Clause 9 were passed in its original form, it may be subject to legal challenge. But that is the proper place for a decision to be made on whether the qualified right should be restricted by this clause.

There are other places and other times when those opposed to abortion can make their views known and can seek to influence others. If freedom of speech is to be protected at all times and in all places, why are only noble Lords allowed to speak in this debate? Advise and persuade someone not to have an abortion all you like—for example, by talking to the providers of abortion services to ensure that they include “pro-life” choices in clinics—but do not do so when someone has decided to go to an abortion clinic and is about to enter.

Similar arguments apply to Amendment 92 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey. Amendments 98 and 99, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, and supported by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, helpfully point out the Home Office review conducted in 2018, which many noble Lords have quoted. It concluded that buffer zones would be disproportionate, which is at least helpful in understanding the Government’s reluctance to support this clause, as it might be portrayed as yet another U-turn. The then Home Secretary explained his decision in a Statement about the 2018 review, which a number of noble Lords have selectively quoted from. He actually said:

“The review gathered upsetting examples of harassment and the damaging impact this behaviour has had on individuals. This behaviour can leave patients distressed and has caused some to rebook their appointments and not follow medical advice in order to avoid the protestors. In some of these cases, protest activities can involve handing out model foetuses, displaying graphic images, following people, blocking their paths and even assaulting them. However, what is clear from the evidence we gathered is that these activities are not the norm, and predominantly, anti-abortion activities are more passive in nature. The main activities reported to us that take place during protests include praying, displaying banners and handing out leaflets. There were relatively few reports of the more aggressive activities described above. Nevertheless, I recognise that all anti-abortion activities can have an adverse effect, and I would like to extend my sympathies to those going through this extremely difficult and personal process … Through the review, we also found that anti-abortion demonstrations take place outside a small number of abortion facilities. In 2017, there were 363 hospitals and clinics in England and Wales that carried out abortions. Through the review, we found that 36 hospitals and clinics have experienced anti-abortion demonstrations … Having considered the evidence of the review, I have therefore reached the conclusion that introducing national buffer zones would not be a proportionate response, considering the experiences of the majority of hospitals and clinics, and considering that the majority of activities are more passive in nature.”—[Official Report, Commons, 13/9/18; col. 37WS.]


Even if “passive activities” is not a contradiction in terms, passive activity can leave patients distressed and cause some to rebook their appointments and not to follow medical advice in order to avoid protesters.

Public Order Bill

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 1st November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

My Lords, there is no doubt that there has been a growing incidence of public order situations recently. We even had a demonstration in Central Lobby a week or so ago. What I have observed is that no quarter has been given by the protesters, even to those seeking access to hospitals, those trying to pick up their children from school, those trying to go to work to earn the money that keeps this country afloat, those trying to provide services to those who need care to stay in their own homes, and so many others.

Extensive criminal damage has been caused. Just a couple of weeks ago, we saw the spray-painting of the famous sign at New Scotland Yard. The clear message, in attacking this iconic sign at the headquarters of the Metropolitan Police, was that they can do what they like and there will be no real consequences. We have also seen attacks in art galleries and desperate members of the public trying to clear roads as police officers stand by. We have seen protesters jumping on to the roof of police vehicles as police officers stand by.

Such behaviour by protesters is in breach of existing legal provision on many occasions. As has been said, the organisation Justice helpfully provided a list of relevant statutes. The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, for example, creates a statutory offence of public nuisance and allows the police to impose conditions on processions and assemblies which are too noisy. The Criminal Damage Act 1971 created offences of unlawfully destroying or damaging property belonging to another intentionally or recklessly, being reckless as to whether any such property would be destroyed or damaged, intending to endanger the life of another or being reckless as to whether the life of another would be thereby endangered. The maximum penalty for conviction on indictment is a term not exceeding 10 years. The Police Act 1996 provides an offence of assaulting a constable

“in the execution of his duty”,

an offence carrying, on summary conviction, a penalty of up to six months in prison or a fine. The Highways Act 1980 provides that:

“If a person, without lawful authority or excuse, in any way wilfully obstructs the free passage along a highway he is guilty of an offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks.”


The Road Traffic Act provides further offences.

These are just a few of the options available to deal with behaviour such as that which we have seen recently. The Joint Committee on Human Rights observed in its June 2022 report that:

“The criminal law and the powers of the police already allow for action to be taken against violent protest and disruptive non-violent protest. We are unconvinced that additional offences are necessary or appropriate.”


Why create new offences which would add significantly to the burden of police services in providing training and guidance to officers in how and when to exercise these powers or initiate and manage necessary investigations with a view to prosecution? Why add to the range of offences which may be committed in public order situations in a way which may, as noble Lords have said, be in contravention of the rights which citizens have under Article 9 to freedom of religion, thought and conscience, under Article 10 to freedom of expression and under Article 11 to the right of assembly and association?

All these rights are ensured to us in the Human Rights Act. They are not absolute rights. We accept that there are circumstances in which the exercise of those rights may be limited, but they are rights which all our people have. In circumstances in which we are seeing the limitation of rights in Hong Kong, the US, China and Russia, it is profoundly important that we, as a democracy, protect those rights which are part of our ancient heritage.

The Equality and Human Rights Commission has published its views on some of the proposed offences. Referring to the creation of the new offences of locking on and being equipped for locking on and the obstruction of major transport works, the introduction of new serious disruption prevention orders, the extension of stop and search powers with and without suspicion, and the granting to the Secretary of State of new powers to seek protest-related civil injunctions, the EHRC has said that it considers these offences to be “inconsistent” with the right to protest, noting that the Supreme Court recently determined that this type of protest was protected by Article 11 and that there should be

“a certain degree of tolerance to disruption to ordinary life, including disruption to traffic, caused by the exercise of the right to freedom of expression or freedom of assembly”.

The JCHR has said that the locking-on offences

“risk criminalising actions that fall within the protections of Article 10 and 11 ECHR and contain inadequate safeguards against this”,

and that these clauses would allow the police to take pre-emptive action against people planning to engage in lawful protest, which it says would undermine the right to protest. It says that the provisions are

“broad enough to interfere with Article 8 right to privacy and Article 14 rights to freedom from discrimination.”

Clauses 17 and 18, which give the Secretary of State the power to bring proceedings and apply for injunctions could, the JCHR says,

“have a chilling effect on the right to protest”,

creating a significant risk that large numbers of protesters could be criminalised.

Finally, I will say a word about Clause 9, a late amendment to the Bill in the other place which seeks to create an “Offence of interference with access to or provision of abortion services” and would introduce 150 metre-wide “buffer zones”—also known as “censorship” or “safe” zones—around abortion providers. When “protests” take place, they are typically quiet prayer groups which occasionally display signs or placards. However, participants do not cajole or harass women. There is no interference with access to or the provision of abortion services. Approximately 90% of all clinics and hospitals have not reported either activity as ever having occurred, according to the findings of the 2018 Home Office review. A blanket ban around abortion clinics would be disproportionate, a denial of the right to freedom of expression, it is unnecessary, and it could even be harmful.

The reality is that many of those taking part in these vigils often provide help to vulnerable women. Historically, as a result of expressions of prayer and offers of help, women have been able to avail themselves of practical, emotional and other forms of support of which they may previously have been unaware or were unable to access. Some women, who may be uncertain but feel forced to terminate a pregnancy because of their fears that they cannot cope, and who might be reassured by what they might hear before they get into the clinic, will inevitably suffer if a disproportionate ban is enforced. Some of these women have never had the opportunity to receive impartial counsel and support as they consider their options.

On 24 October the Minister said that the Bill is generally compatible with convention rights. I regret that I do not agree with him on that point. However, I agree with his comment on Clause 9:

“I am unable, but only because of clause 9, to make a statement that, in my view, the provisions of the Bill are presently compatible with Convention rights”.


He was saying that Clause 9 is not compatible with the convention rights.

Current laws already provide wide-ranging powers for authorities to keep public order and protect women and the public from genuine harassment and intimidation, including outside abortion clinics. The Ealing PSPO shows that a nationwide ban is unnecessary and that further measures to ban peaceful demonstrations can have the unintended consequence of harming individuals seeking to express their views. Clause 9 is poorly drafted. It is so broadly worded that it could be used to criminalise people who merely express opinion outside an abortion facility.

In 2018, the Home Office concluded there was no need to introduce buffer zones. The then Home Secretary, Sajid Javid, said that:

“introducing national buffer zones would not be a proportionate response, considering the experiences of the majority of hospitals and clinics, and considering that the majority of activities are more passive in nature.”

This position has been consistently reaffirmed by the Government since then, most recently on 27 September 2022.

A June 2021 poll undertaken by Savanta ComRes shows that only 21% of the population support introducing buffer zones around abortion clinics nationwide. A majority support either having no restrictions on speaking about the issue of abortion outside abortion clinics or restrictions in line with current legislation.

Clause 9 is not only not convention-compatible but disproportionate, as police officers already have the powers to intervene. If a vigil is causing harassment or harm, they can intervene under the Public Order Act, the Protection from Harassment Act, and the civil provisions of a public spaces protection order under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014.

A person guilty of these new offences would be liable, in the first instance, to imprisonment of up to six months and/or an unlimited fine, and in further instances up to two years’ imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine. The offences vary from “seeking to influence”, advising, persuading and informing, to “persistently, continuously or repeatedly” occupying the area within the proposed buffer zone. We value and believe in free speech—

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I realise that the nine-minute time limit is advisory but can I ask the noble Baroness to bring her speech to an end, please?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

Yes; I will do so shortly. Surely we do not think it appropriate to criminalise those who seek to exercise their rights to free speech by advising, persuading or informing or even by simply being present, quietly and unobtrusively? This is what happens in places such as Hong Kong, China and Russia, not the UK.

Such a penalty would be imposed in our country on those who seek only to pray and to offer help to women who may be in a desperate situation, and for whom help can be provided. I have met some of these women and their babies. I have seen their joy in the presence of their little ones. This is not an argument about access to abortion or preventing access—that right exists in law. Clause 9 would deprive people from offering help and support to women, for whom such help could be the difference between the choice to terminate the life of their unborn child and the ability to bring that child into the world in a safe place.

The Bill also reverses the traditional burden of proof which lies on the prosecution to prove any criminal offence beyond a reasonable doubt—

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I must ask the noble Baroness to bring her speech to an end, please.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

I will—I have very little to say. I ask noble Lords to bear with me; this is an important point. That clause is inconsistent with the common-law presumption of innocence and the protections under Article 6.

In conclusion, the Bill, while well intentioned, and probably reflecting a desire by the Government to try to show that they are strong, will deprive people of their historic and indeed ancient rights to protest. This is not what we as a country should be doing. We must not place an additional and unnecessary burden on our police. We need at this perilous time in the world to protect the rights of people to protest peacefully, and to utilise existing laws to deal with those who commit some of the many criminal offences which we have witnessed. We can do this, but the Bill is disproportionate in its effect and would be very damaging to those freedoms and constitutional rights which we have cherished as a people across the centuries.

Independent Office for Police Conduct

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I join the noble Lord in expressing my absolute disgust at some of the IOPC’s reporting under Operation Hotton. It provides for very painful reading that members of the police could have said such offensive things in any environment. As I have said before, the Home Secretary can decide, in conjunction with the chairman, whether to put the Dame Elish Angiolini inquiry on a statutory footing if it is not meeting its terms of reference. We brought in the duty to co-operate last year, and police and organisations can find themselves sanctioned if they do not.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

My Lords, is the Minister aware that the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel reported last June that the IOPC is not properly resourced to do the work it is charged to do? We saw cases going backwards and forwards between the MPS and the IOPC because of lack of funds. Can the Minister assure the House that the IOPC will be properly funded to do the important anti-corruption work it does?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The budget for 2021-22 is £69.6 million and will remain so for 2022-23. The IOPC employs about 1,000 staff, and nearly 30% of them have a police background—so I think it is pretty well resourced.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 17th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

I have added my name to this amendment for four reasons. First, the need is clear: we need complete protection of victims and the public interest, and to make certain that recalcitrant are no longer able to delay. Secondly, the duty of candour is clear: there is no doubt about what it entails. Thirdly, the remedies provided in the proposed new clause are extensive and proportionate. Finally, there can be no reason for delay. Why does it need consultation? It does not. The proposed new clause and the need are clear; we should pass this amendment.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Paddick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, for tabling this amendment.

Briefly, a duty of candour would bring about a change of mindset and culture by requiring openness and transparency about what has happened in investigations. It would lead to a more efficient deployment of resources, which would have a beneficial impact on the public purse. It could very much help to contradict allegations of police corruption and will grow confidence in the leadership of the police service because there would be a statutory obligation of openness and transparency, and therefore an assumption there would be compliance with the law rather than a suspicion of cover-up or, even worse, corruption. The amendment is framed to protect all necessary matters but to enable a different positive approach to the delivery of policing. I support the amendment.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I welcome that the opposition is united in support of this amendment.

The police have failed to own up to many of their mistakes. I personally have experienced police evasion, police spying and police deceit. It beggars belief that there is no duty of candour on our police force already. It actually imposes their own idea of what the law says and this is completely wrong, so I very much support this amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Paddick, for affording us this further opportunity to debate the case for a statutory duty of candour. They have rightly highlighted the importance of the police’s openness and transparency, which is a very serious matter. It is at the heart of public confidence in policing and ensures that the police are held to the highest standards; this is crucial to maintaining that confidence.

As I did in Committee, I start by highlighting the extensive work that has already been done and is ongoing to improve integrity and openness in policing. Back in February 2020, we introduced a statutory duty of co-operation for serving police officers as part of wider integrity reforms. This duty forms part of the standards of professional behaviour set out in Schedule 2 to the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 and, in so doing, has the force of law. It is worth quoting in full the relevant paragraph:

“Police officers have a responsibility to give appropriate cooperation during investigations, inquiries and formal proceedings, participating openly and professionally in line with the expectations of a police officer when identified as a witness.”


A failure to co-operate in this way constitutes a breach of the statutory standards of professional behaviour, by which all officers must abide, and could therefore result in a formal disciplinary sanction. I put it to the House at this point that this duty to co-operate puts a greater onus on officers than the duty of candour provided for in this amendment, as they could ultimately be dismissed for a breach.

The duty to co-operate has been introduced since the issues that were highlighted in the Bishop James Jones report concerning the bereaved Hillsborough families’ experiences, and the issues relating to the work of the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel, which were later highlighted in its report. We are keen that this duty becomes fully embedded within the police workforce. The recently announced inquiry, chaired by the right honourable Dame Elish Angiolini QC, will provide a further test of this duty.

In addition to the standards of professional behaviour, the College of Policing’s code of ethics delivers a set of policing principles and ensures that ethics are at the centre of all policing decisions. The college is currently reviewing the code and intends to further promote a policing culture of openness and accountability. The Government are confident that the work of the college will ensure that candour is directly addressed through this review.

Noble Lords will be aware that a response to the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel and Bishop James Jones report concerning the bereaved Hillsborough families’ experiences will provide a government view on a wider duty of candour for all public authorities. Before the Government respond to these reports, it is clearly imperative that the Hillsborough families are given the opportunity to share their views. We hope that this happens as soon as is practicable.

Bishop James’s report also encouraged public bodies to sign the proposed charter for bereaved families. This has now been signed by the NPCC, on behalf of police forces, so that the perspective of the bereaved families is never lost. The charter commits forces to acting with candour, and in an open, honest, and transparent way, when facing public scrutiny, for example through public inquiries.

Regarding the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, the decision on disciplinary action is not just for forces. Of course, the IOPC can also call it in.

In conclusion, we believe that the existing legislation requiring officers to co-operate already amounts to a duty of candour, and this is complemented by the further commitments that policing has made to transparency and openness. That being the case—

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

The Minister has described a duty of co-operation, which is not the same as the duty described by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and others, in the amendment. It is not fair to explain that they are the same and that a duty of co-operation goes further than a duty of candour. They are two different duties and the obligation to comply with charters and standards is very different from the obligation to comply with the statutory duty.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I was making the point that, in some ways, the duty of co-operation goes further because of the sanctions afforded to it, though I know that the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, for whom I have the greatest respect, disagrees with me.

Regarding an officer resigning or retiring, if he or she is found to have committed gross misconduct, the chair of proceedings can decide that they would have been dismissed if they had not already left the force, so leaving the force is no longer a way out, since this automatically places the officer on the College of Policing’s barred list, preventing them from working in policing again.

I know that the noble Baroness does not agree, but I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw the amendment, although I am not sure that he will.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Lords Hansard - part two & Report stage
Monday 10th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Newlove (Con)]

My Lords, I have listened to everybody speak, and I appreciate that it is late at night, but I ask my colleagues around this Chamber to remember that we are talking about a human life that was horrifically and brutally taken. We have a family broken to bits. I have to say that, as somebody who has been through the criminal justice system, and as a mother of three daughters, my emotions are running high, because it was at this time of night that Sarah went missing and the searches began. Yet here in this Chamber we are arguing over having a statutory inquiry for the soul of Sarah Everard. We have colleagues here waiting to see whether we are going to divide, and saying that we are going on too long and are going round in circles. I feel ashamed to listen to these conversations, when we in this Chamber should be thinking of Sarah Everard and her family.

Let me tell you that it is not easy for the family; every day is hard. We are talking about a family that is traumatised. Any information that has come from any Minister or any government department will not be absorbed, because they are trying to get through every minute of every day. I am not saying this to be emotional—“Oh, calm down, my dear”—and I am not a legal eagle, as my fellow colleagues are who have just spoken articulately, but what I can say is that it is absolutely shameful that this Government are putting this inquiry into two parts.

That is not to say I cannot thank the Minister for taking the time to discuss this. The shame of it is that we are going to go through part 1, which deals with all the things that we already know, and that is why it is quite quick, and then, following advice to the Home Secretary, she or he—I have worked with several Justice Ministers as Victims’ Commissioner, and it is quite right that there is a carousel—will make a decision. It is unfortunate to think that an adequate and eloquent lady will give advice to the Home Secretary only for that person to yet again make a decision with no timeline.

It could be one of your daughters who they find. You could have to go through these media perceptions, asking what she was doing out late at night. Yet we protected an ex-police officer by saying that we do not know what has gone on and will have to find out. We are fighting here to discuss the place of a statutory inquiry. Given the public interest and all the window dressing from politicians across the House—because this Bill does go back to the Commons to be debated once again—I think that is shameful.

This House works best when we work together but tonight, at half past 11, I have been on my feet and travelling for 14 hours. I have health issues; I have taken my painkillers to be here to speak up for Sarah Everard. To walk a mile in the shoes of this family, in this horrific case shows that they are now relying on people giving messages, with no legal intervention. Yet we, as the unelected Chamber, can fight for this important inquiry. It is disgraceful that it is in two parts.

At this time of night, we are playing politics. Maybe the Government will win this Division and maybe we will, but it is shameful. Everyone in this Chamber needs to be aware that this could happen to them and they would go through the same system. It does not matter who you are—at the end of the day, we owe it to the public to make demands. We have asked the Government to order a statutory inquiry. Only then will the police be held accountable, only then will we stop police forces and officers marking their own homework and only then, speaking from my former role as Victims’ Commissioner, will they be truly accountable. In any other role, we would be sacked. We would be going through a civil investigation, a duty of care, vicarious liability—whatever it may be.

We are talking about a human life, a young woman who committed to go into a car with a police officer. For absolute assurance, for the public interest, for public safety, for our young and future generations, for our daughters and our sons, we owe it to help the public gain confidence in a system that is supposed to be there to protect us. Most importantly, what we see as the ethos of the police officers who put that uniform on has disintegrated.

We must have a statutory inquiry for the soul of Sarah Everard and, indeed, for the sake of humanity. If we do not, this will be a shameful decision that we will always regret having made.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

My Lords, I am pleased to support this amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, as well as those of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, who has spoken so eloquently and passionately on this subject. The Government claimed that the inquiry that was established would be quicker as a non-statutory inquiry; from my experience, that is not necessarily the case. The reality is that in phase 2 of this inquiry, if not in phase 1, we need an inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005, which is not limited to the activities of one officer but embraces the very important issues of recruitment, vetting, funding and resourcing of anti-corruption activity, and the fact that the IPCC is so underfunded for the anti-corruption work that it has to do.

My inquiry and others before it have pointed out the serious deficiencies in the management and funding of those elements of police responsibility that are dedicated to identifying criminals within police ranks and dealing effectively with them. I reported in June last year. Given my experience of investigating matters involving the MPS, the IPCC and the Crown Prosecution Service over some six years, I do not believe that a non-statutory inquiry can act as effectively as one armed with the power to compel witnesses and the discovery of documentation. My panel was to report within 12 months of receiving documentation. We received our first documents in January 2015 and our last in March 2021. We reported three months later, saying:

“It is very important that lessons are learned about planning and preparation before the appointment of panels and similar public scrutiny bodies to avoid unnecessary distress to the families of those affected and unnecessary delays and costs to the public purse.”


I am sure that everybody’s thoughts tonight are with the family of Sarah Everard and with all those women who are listening, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has said, and who will be affected by the outcome of this inquiry. Earlier, as we sat waiting for this amendment to be called, a number of Members—noble Baronesses—were discussing what it feels like as a sole woman to walk out of your Lordships’ House at this time of night and later, and try to find our way safely to the places that we stay in.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Monday 22nd November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I have two points to raise. Following the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds, I start by saying that this is a sensitive subject. I agree with him that, even though this is the day of burial of Sir David Amess, and he is in our thoughts, I do not wish to criticise the police and their conduct on that day or talk about that incident. I want to talk at a slightly more abstract level. I appreciate that anyone in charge of the crime scene on that day faced a difficult decision and it is not for me to criticise what they did at that time; that is not my point.

My first point is to stand back and ask a more abstract question: who owns a death? The assumption, especially when a death is violent or in emergency circumstances, is that the death is owned by the state—by the police and the ambulance service primarily. They are in charge, it belongs to them and everybody else must have permission to be admitted. Even the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds sort of admitted that and gave that point away by saying that police needed better training to understand why and when they should admit people to the scene.

I would go a little further and say that the claims of the police and ambulance service have to be understood and considered in the light of other claims. Those other claims include the claims of the family and the dying person themselves as to who owns what is going on and who has a say. If we simply collapse into thinking that it is just a matter of getting better police procedure, we are conceding the major point. Of course it is in the public interest that a criminal who has killed people should be brought to justice, that their trial should be fair and the evidence preserved. But that is not the only interest in a death. It is not the only subject and there are other claims we should consider.

This afternoon, as some noble Lords know, there was an Oral Question on this topic in my name on the Order Paper. One noble Lord genuinely asked: has this subject ever come up before? I think he meant: has it ever come to a ministerial desk before? The answer of my noble friend was that she thought not—that the Amess case had brought it to public attention, but it had not really come up before. However, the real answer to that question is, “Yes, yes, yes”. It has come up before, for example at the Manchester Arena, and countless times in care homes over the last year throughout this country; it just does not rise to the level of Ministers’ desks.

Here, I have to admit that I have taken some advice from a distinguished academic specialising in emergency response, and I am told by her that this is partly because there is indeed police training on this subject, but it is primarily focused on how to explain to the families afterwards why the priest was not allowed in. That is the main focus of police training, rather than training them to think of the circumstances in which they might relinquish their claim—valid though it is—in order to respect the claims of others. That is my first point, and I think we should reflect on that.

My second point is a little more practical: we can do this better if we want to. We have done it better in the past. I was told today, again by the same distinguished academic, that there are lovely pictures from the Second World War of ARP wardens going into bomb sites—arduous and horrible work—immediately after a bombing to try to rescue the dying and recover the dead. They were accompanied by clergy with “ARP clergy” written on their tin hats, because it was assumed that these people were correctly and properly embedded in any team that was going to identify, and to find and rescue, people who were dying in the wake of a bomb. Of course, in those circumstances, there was no question of identifying the perpetrator. The perpetrator was well known and was not going to be brought to criminal trial on that basis.

I am treading on slightly uncertain ground for me here, but if you go to other countries—to Israel, for example—I am told that where there are bombs and emergency responses, there are people who are again embedded with the police. They would not be clergy because Judaism operates in a different way; there is no function, as I understand it, reserved to a clergyman in Judaism that cannot be carried out by a lay person. Although the approach to death is slightly different—it is not a question of last rites for the dying, but more a case of the proper treatment of the dead—these people are embedded with the police and it is all well understood. My noble friend Lord Moynihan, asking a supplementary question earlier today, drew attention to practice in certain US states. Again, there is much better relationship, a working relationship, between the police and what are called faith groups, in exactly these circumstances.

That illustrates the two points. First, we need to ask ourselves some radical questions about who is charge in these circumstances, and who has a claim—not just as a petitioner, merely standing at the door asking—to be there at the death. Secondly, if we want to, we can do better. That is why, today, I asked my noble friend if she would at least undertake a study that looked at practice in other countries and jurisdictions to see how they do it and what we can learn from that. I think we would benefit greatly from that. I do not ask any more.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Stowell and Lady Masham, for tabling this probing amendment, prompted by the tragic and terrible murder of Sir David Amess and the inability of the attending priest to gain access to Sir David in what may have been his final moments. I am not sure if it is a declarable interest but, like Sir David, I am a Catholic. My support for this amendment is a product of my faith.

In almost any situation in which someone has suffered a terrible injury, there is the possibility that a crime has been committed and therefore, of course, the location of that injury will become a crime scene. Current police procedures are very specific about the management of such scenes and actions taken in those first minutes may be critical to resolve any crime that has been committed. The responsibility lies with the first officers to attend. Access to such a scene is necessarily limited. A scene log will be created to manage and record all the activities within the crime scene. However, a variety of people do gain access. They include ambulance and medical personnel, undertakers, photographers and scene of crime officers. They all have a legitimate purpose in being at the scene, but not all these purposes relate to the maintenance of the integrity and provenance of any material that may be recovered from the scene. Crime scene officers are required to ensure that persons entering the scene are wearing suitable protective clothing to prevent contamination of the scene, and to ensure that they are protected from any hazards present. So, it is possible to provide safe access for clergy that will not in any way contaminate or inhibit an investigation. The question then must be: is it desirable to do so?

Northern Ireland has seen the cost and the benefit of the presence of a priest on many occasions. The PSNI has worked with very well with clergy of all denominations. Perhaps I could remind your Lordships of the terrible murder of the two corporals, Derek Wood and David Howes, by the Provisional IRA on 19 March 1988 in west Belfast. Father Alec Reid of nearby Clonard Monastery attended them as they lay dying. His prayers—his intervention at that most savage moment—were enormously important to so many.

Two Belfast priests died during the Troubles attending their parishioners who had been shot. Father Hugh Mullan died in 1971, going out into gunfire knowing that he could be shot. Another, Father Noel Fitzpatrick, died in 1972 when accompanied by a parishioner, Paddy Butler. Waving a white handkerchief, he attempted to reach wounded men during sustained and heavy gunfire. These were brave men living their call to minister. It has long been a tradition in this country and many others that there is recognition of the value of spiritual and pastoral support. For this reason, chaplaincy services are publicly funded in many situations. However, at the present moment, attending an emergency scene as a priest can be a daunting experience, as the response of police and ambulance personnel is not certain. It depends on a decision made by someone who may have no religious faith and who may see absolutely no justification for permitting access by a priest.

To be able to receive sacramental spiritual support in the event of a death, or possible imminent death, is of profound meaning and importance to Catholics. Indeed, the support of a priest or other minister of religion is of great importance to those of other denominations and faiths. As your Lordships have heard, Cardinal Nichols and the Commissioner of the Met have agreed to establish a joint group to study the access given or refused to Catholic priests at scenes of traumatic violence and to consider whether any changes are required to the guidance issued to officers facing such a situation. This is a very positive initiative that will inform the national debate. There can be no doubt that many factors will be considered but, given that safe access, with protection against any crime scene contamination, can be secured, the primary question must be whether such access should and can be managed in a way that will enable the celebration of the sacraments at this most sacred moment, the moment when we believe a soul is passing.

Undoubtedly, any future guidance will require processes for the identification, training, et cetera, of clergy who might be granted access in such situations, but these are practical issues which can be resolved. I put my name to this amendment because I believe it can be done, and it should be done, for the support of the dying person and for their family and friends, who may be enormously comforted by the fact that a priest was allowed to attend someone at this most sacred moment.

[Baroness Newlove (Con)]

My Lords, I support this amendment. I appreciate the time, but as somebody who has lost somebody to a violent act and has been in a crime scene, I reiterate the words of my friend, the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan. I am a Roman Catholic, but actually I am speaking about the procedures that the police had in place on that night. I was in a crime scene and I had to wait for permission to leave that crime scene and to be able to go and see Garry, who was dying. He died on the ground—he came around and then they rushed him. It may have been only minutes but it was hours in my mind. You have to wait for police procedures. I fully respect that the police are doing what they are doing, but it did feel at times that it was about the process and not about the dying man on the ground and my three daughters, who were covered in blood, being whisked away as victims of a horrendous, horrific crime. Even the priest in the hospital had to step away with anger at seeing how vicious a scene it was.

I support this probing amendment, not out of disrespect for the police officers, but I do believe that there are a lot of processes that go on. Even the Home Office is on the phone to see if things are flagging up. So, with respect, to make this procedure a lot better, we have to look at how we help victims and their families. My heart has gone out to Sir David’s family, because the shock of those seconds of losing somebody is something you will never, ever get over.