Viscount Hailsham
Main Page: Viscount Hailsham (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Viscount Hailsham's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberWould the noble Lord address the point that regulations are unamendable?
I thank the noble Viscount for the intervention. I would have thought that regulations are amendable by a debate in this House.
These regulations would allow for sunset and review provisions to be included, so the legislation can cease to have effect if appropriate, as I said.
I was talking about how regulations that require consultation with key stakeholders and need approval by both Houses improve on the current public spaces protection order system, which allows a local authority to impose buffer zones with scant transparency. The decision to introduce PSPOs is often initiated, drafted and implemented by one person or a group of council officials, with very little scrutiny and awareness of what factors they have taken into account.
I will speak briefly to other amendments. Those tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox and Lady Hoey, engage with the civil liberties and rights issues. However, they accept that interference with a decision can be disallowed, which would be a first in criminal law and very hard for the individual to defend themself against. A woman could simply claim that a choice made in the privacy of her mind had in some way been influenced by a message or person.
However, the tidying-up changes that my noble friend Lady Sugg proposes do not speak to the disproportionality of Clause 9, and in some ways worsen it. For example, Amendment 84 would ensure that a buffer zone also applies where an abortion clinic is embedded within a hospital or GP surgery, as we heard. This would vastly increase the footprint affected by buffer zones. Even if only all 373 abortion clinics were included, this would leap from the current 225 square metres to 26 square kilometres, and it would single out the issue of abortion for wildly disproportionate restrictions in comparison with other health areas. A person providing false information on a leaflet about any other medical issue would be free to do so, but someone providing accurate information on abortion would be criminalised.
I could say a lot more, but this is a big group with many speakers, and I know at least one noble Lord who was dissuaded from speaking because time is not limitless. As my noble friend the Minister will know from his many conversations, there is strength of conviction on both sides of this argument. I urge him to adopt the evidence-based policy route. There is again clamour for reform of this House, but the importance of our scrutiny and revising role is not clearly understood. We would be lax in our duty if we merely rubber-stamped or gently tweaked this inadequate and ideologically inspired clause.
I rise to address Amendments 85 to 88, 90 and 92, to which my right reverend friend the Bishop of St Albans has added his name. He regrets that he is unable to be in his place today. I also have sympathy with a number of other amendments in this group.
It is a heated and emotive debate on this clause, and it was heated and emotive when it was added in the other place. The danger is that we get dragged into debates about whether abortion is morally right or wrong. Indeed, I have had plenty of emails over the past few days, as I am sure other noble Lords have, tending in that direction. As it happens, I take the view that the present law on abortion strikes a reasonable balance; in particular, it respects the consciences of women faced, sometimes with very little support, with making deeply difficult decisions.
Moreover, history teaches us that the alternative to legal abortion is not no abortion but illegal abortion, with all the evils that brings in its train. Others, including people of my own and other faiths, may disagree with me on either side but that is not the focus of your Lordships’ deliberations this afternoon. Rather, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, reminded us, we are seeking to weigh the rights of women to access legal health services alongside the rights of others to seek peacefully to engage, persuade or simply pray.
However much we may disagree with the causes and tactics of those protesting, we need to remember that in a democracy not everything that is unpleasant should in consequence be made illegal. Harassment and abuse of the kinds to which the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox and Lady Sugg, and others have alluded must be condemned in the strongest possible terms. The use of legislation, including on harassment, to confront inappropriate behaviour is absolutely legitimate, but it already exists. If such behaviour is becoming more widespread, let us see the police and local authorities use those current powers more extensively so that they can create a safe and respectful atmosphere for vulnerable women.
I understand that no one has ever demonstrated that widespread abuse is prevalent or that new powers are necessary. At the least, we need clear research, as the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, proposes, to underpin such extensive new measures. In line with other provisions of this Bill, many of which we have already discussed, there is a need for the Government and police to take proportionate action while maintaining the strongest possible safeguards for freedom of speech, expression and assembly. Those are at the core of our nationhood. I do not think that Clause 9, as drafted, takes that proportionate approach.
I respect the views of those noble Lords who take a harder line against abortion and the many who reject the position from a more liberal standpoint. However, I cannot accept that it is desirable to legislate against expression of opinion on the matter or providing advice and guidance, even if one is in one’s own home or a place of worship. I cannot believe or accept that seeking to provide information could be met with a six-month prison sentence. I believe Amendments 88, 89 and 90 would help set a better balance on these provisions around freedom of speech. They would leave those things that are genuinely egregious in the clause and extract those things that are not.
Amendment 85 clarifies that Clause 9 cannot apply within an area
“wholly occupied by a building which is in regular use as a place of worship”.
Again, I do not expect or demand that religious positions on abortion are respected any more than others, but I worry that a minister of a religion holding views that are mainstream within his or her faith tradition—and are demonstrably legal to hold—could be barred under this legislation from expressing that view within their own place of worship.
I have some difficulty in understanding the thinking behind this amendment. If a sermon was being preached in a church or mosque, which is what we are being asked to contemplate, that sermon would not in any way impact on the person visiting the abortion clinic some distance away.
I thank the noble Viscount for his intervention. As the noble Lord, Lord Beith, said a few minutes ago, you might have a poster outside the church, mosque or temple saying that you are having a particular event on a particular day. It appears that would be caught by this legislation, but let us have the matter clarified by Ministers.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and others for their principled note that good powers must protect those who hold views with which you disagree or even find deplorable. Abortion is contested and emotive. I do not dispute that, as a result, there may on occasion be actions and levels of disruption that fail the test of Christian or any other charity. I deplore it when that happens.
However, there is a point of principle here going far beyond matters of abortion. Clause 9 is so broad and non-discriminate in its approach that it sets unfortunate precedents. I have real concerns that if we pass this clause into law in anything like its present wide form, we will see demands arise for exclusion zones, buffer zones or whatever they may be called in all manner of other locations and for all manner of purposes. I will listen with care to the rest of this debate, but I urge further concern in the approach to this part of the Bill. I hope Ministers will reflect on this and bring back some revised wording at a later stage.
I am delighted to tell the noble Baroness what my opinion is. My opinion is based on real sadness that, since 1997, the other place has progressively ceased to be a House of scrutiny. MPs devoted just two hours to the Report stage of this Bill. What happened in 1997 was that there was an exuberant Conservative who tested the patience of the Labour Government with their great majority. The noble Baroness deserves a proper answer to her question. His name was Eric Forth; he is, sadly, no longer with us. I begged him, and so did my noble friend Lady Shephard of Northwold, because we were shadow Leader and Deputy Leader of the other place, to be a little bit selective, but he was not. Night after night, he kept up the Labour Party, so what did the Labour Party do? In exasperation, it brought in programme Motions, which means that every Bill has a limited amount of time. What did the Conservatives do? They protested, saying, “We won’t allow that to happen when we come back into government.” Of course, it is such a convenience for the Executive that they did allow it to happen when they came back into government. That is why every Bill is subjected to inadequate scrutiny in the other place, so it is incumbent on us to give it the proper scrutiny that our lack of timetable Motions enables us to give it.
I agree with what my noble friend is saying about timetables, but in response to the noble Baroness, perhaps he would address this point. The truth is that Members of Parliament voted for Clause 9 in very large numbers. They did so because they were aware of the very considerable concern in their own constituencies about what was going on outside abortion clinics.
They might have voted for all sorts of reasons. We have already heard that Stella Creasy refused vote for the Bill because it had gone wrong as far as she was concerned. Of course I will give way.
My Lords, I have Amendment 93A in this group. In the spirit of scrutiny, I wondered what “an abortion clinic” and “abortion services” actually meant. To me they include professional counselling which puts both sides of an issue and all the options. I say that because it seems as if we have got into a rather binary state where this is just about the abortion procedure.
I am convinced that there is a serious problem for women attending some clinics who are seeking an abortion. I am also aware of how activities can move around geographically. I understand that there is not a problem now with the activities that we have been talking about outside places where abortions do not take place but counselling does. However, as the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, said, activities have moved to new sites; she mentioned one that has been affected for the first time in many years. My amendment is to raise that issue, bothered that what is a problem now could be displaced and become a problem elsewhere. Obviously it is probing the position, but as we are seeking to tackle this, we should do so comprehensively.
My Lords, I am in general opposed to those of the amendments which are designed to reduce the impact of Clause 9. As I said at Second Reading, I support the concept of buffer zones around abortion clinics. Of course I accept the two propositions eloquently expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox: first, that the right to demonstrate and freely express views is of great importance in a democratic society; and secondly, that the provisions of Clause 9, as many of your Lordships have articulated, impose serious restrictions on such abilities. But again, as I said at Second Reading, these rights are not absolute. They have to be balanced with the rights of others, and the correct balance is often not easy to identify and can be the subject of legitimate disagreement—it usually is. However, in the context of abortion clinics, Clause 9 gets the balance about right.
I will identify occasions where the balance falls the other way: in favour of the demonstrator. Some of your Lordships will think that the examples are trivial. I have often hosted meets for our local hunts, both before the ban and after it; after the ban, our local hunt acts fully within the law. The saboteurs come and demonstrate, and they are often very tiresome. However, provided they operate within the law, I would not for one moment seek to ban them. There is another example. Pacifists sometimes demonstrate outside military recruitment offices. I disagree with that and think it is wrong in principle, but again it would never occur to me to seek to prohibit that activity.
The motives of those demonstrators and those who demonstrate outside abortion clinics have something in common. It is not that they are just expressing their own opinions, which of course they are absolutely entitled to do, but they are trying to induce a change of attitude on the part of others. It is when I come to those who protest outside abortion clinics that I am conscious of why the balance tips. Those who attend abortion clinics have come to a very painful and serious decision, and often an anguished one. I think it is very wrong to subject them to what is often intemperate bullying of an extremely nasty kind.
I mentioned at Second Reading that the BBC did a poll which found that 15% of women who went to abortion clinics had been coerced into doing so. We do not have the information as to how many partners have said, “I don’t want this child, go and have an abortion”. We need to establish that by finding the evidence. We hear all the time that the people outside the abortion clinic are against abortions. We do not see the intimate pressure that women are often under in the home—not only from male partners but perhaps from their families—to do with shame and other things. This needs to be looked into before we make a decision on this.
Parliament is in a position to make a judgment about these matters. I was in the House of Commons for nearly 30 years—not as long as my noble friend Lord Cormack—and I was well aware of, in many circumstances, from evidence which came from many quarters, the kind of abuse to which women seeking an abortion were subjected by those who demonstrated outside abortion clinics. I strongly suspect that is why the House of Commons voted for Clause 9 in such substantial numbers, because it knew it was happening and that it was wrong. We do not need a further review to establish those basic judgments.
My Lords, my difficulty is this. In interpreting things in the way he is, the noble Viscount is suggesting that he knows why people did something. I have no idea why people in the Commons voted in the numbers they did. The noble Viscount has a view on what might have driven that; others might have another view. Generally speaking, since I have been in this place, the House of Commons has voted in huge numbers for things I have disagreed with, and unless the Opposition is going to go home, what am I supposed to do? I cannot keep saying, “I think they really did it because they were really motivated —we do not know, do we? Will the noble Viscount clarify why he keeps stressing that? Is it relevant to us?
It is, because we are being asking what the evidence is. I was telling the noble Baroness that, when I was a Member of the Parliament, for a very long time, I was conscious of some of the abuse that was going on from speaking to people coming to my surgery. In the House of Commons, we get a reflection of the views of Members of Parliament who are encountering the same response from their own constituents.
Is the noble Viscount aware of any statistics on the number of people now who are being prosecuted or who have been convicted of harassment of people at abortion clinics? I am completely unaware of that, and none of those who are promoting this clause has produced any such evidence.
I am not, but what I am telling the Committee is that those who have a great many dealings with the public, particularly Members of the House of Commons, have passed by a very substantial majority the view that Clause 9 is necessary. That accords with my own personal experience, after 30 years or so in the House of Commons.
May I remind my noble friend that he and I cast many votes during the debates on Brexit, regardless of what the House of Commons was doing, because we thought we were right?
I agree with that, but I think my noble friend is overlooking the fact that, in the House of Commons, it was not a whipped vote when they were talking about Clause 9; it was what is sometimes laughingly referred to as a free vote. I personally always took the view that, when I was not a Minister, a vote was a free one, but I am conscious that that was not always the view—perhaps not even of my noble friend. If my noble friend wants to intervene again, of course he can.
I would like to say a word about one or two of the amendments. I start with Amendment 80. The substantive offence is that provided in Clause 9(1). I ask rhetorically what can be the reasonable excuse for an interference? I agree with the view expressed by my noble friend Lady Sugg. I suspect that I know the intended purpose of the amendment: to allow the defendant to introduce the defence of free speech before the courts. However, if Parliament decides that Clause 9 should not have the defence of free speech—and that is what the clause provides—then such a defence should not be available in a court.
On Amendments 81 and 86, in my view the matters are of far too much importance for the designation of zones to be left to local authorities, as advocated, I think, by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. The abrogation of the right of free speech and the abrogation of the right of association should be left to Parliament and not to local councillors.
The phrase “intentionally or recklessly” in Amendment 82 is wholly unnecessary, with one exception. It seems to me that the concept of intent is incorporated in the definition of interference as contained in Clause 9(3). The exception is the word “impedes” in paragraph (c), because I acknowledge that an act of impeding could perhaps be committed without intent. Ministers should clearly reflect on the criticism that has been expressed as to the scope of what is included in the definition of interference. I agree very much with what my noble friend Lady Sugg said about the expression of opinion. I am sure she is right about that, and it has been supported by others in the Committee.
Amendment 85 is in the names of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester and my friend the noble Lord, Lord Beith. I almost always agree with him but on this occasion I am bound to say that I think he is wrong. With the exception of the point he made about the poster outside the church, I have very great difficulty in seeing anything that could be said within the church that could interfere with somebody seeking access to an abortion clinic, save for that which has been addressed by Amendment 97, in the name of my noble friend Lady Sugg.
As to the penalties provided in Clause 9(4), I am much more relaxed and would not seek to argue against some amelioration of the sentences set out in the Bill. In general, I think that Clause 9 is a proportionate response to a very serious mischief, and I hope that we will not water it down substantially.
My Lords, I did not expect to say how much I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. It means that I do not need to say an awful lot. I regret that the people moving the amendments which seek to water this down very significantly, starting with Amendment 80, have not addressed the amendments moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, which seek to turn this into a reasonable working clause.