Lord Farmer
Main Page: Lord Farmer (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Farmer's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 80A is in my name. I will also speak to the other amendments in this group. I welcome the Government’s commitment at Second Reading to introduce zones around all clinics in England and Wales to ensure that women are able to access their legal right to abortion without harassment or intimidation. As the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said, this clause was added in the other place by a majority of Members across seven political parties.
This clause will protect the women who have made the decision to have an abortion and now wish to access the service in peace and privacy without somebody trying to tell them to rethink what is often a very painful, personal and difficult decision. My amendments are supported by the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Watkins, and by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. They have been tabled in response to the debate at Second Reading to provide clarity around the description of these zones and to tighten the definition of what constitutes interference.
Amendments 80A, 82A and 82B would change the term used in this clause from “buffer” zones to “safe access” zones. This terminology better reflects the purpose of the zones—to ensure that women can safely access care. It would also bring the description of the zones into line with that used in the law in Northern Ireland and in the proposals in Scotland, as well as around the world, including in Australia and Canada. Amendment 84 would clarify the intent behind the drafting so that sites such as multiple-use buildings and hospital grounds which contain an abortion clinic are also included in these zones.
Amendments 87 and 93 would tighten the description of banned activities, so that they very clearly apply only to people interfering with abortion services and not to any other protests, such as some of those referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. Following concerns raised at Second Reading about the breadth of these banned activities, Amendment 91 would remove “or otherwise expresses opinion” from the list.
Amendments 95, 96 and 97 would add exclusions to the safe access zones. Amendment 95 covers everybody attending a clinic with a service user with their consent. This is often a friend or a loved one—someone who anti-abortion literature sadly and inexplicably refers to as “an accomplice”. Amendment 96 would exempt any activities taking place,
“inside a dwelling where the person affected is also inside that or another dwelling.”
Amendment 97 would exempt activities taking place inside a church or other,
“place of worship where the person affected is also inside that”
place of worship. I hope that noble Lords and the Government will agree that, taken together, these amendments address many of the concerns raised at Second Reading and provide clarity and a tightening of the definitions in the clause.
I turn to other amendments in this group. I am afraid that I do not agree that there needs to be a “reasonable excuse” defence in the clause. This is about harassment and intimidation, not protest. I do not believe there is a reasonable excuse for the harassment or intimidation of women seeking to access their legal right to medical care. They are often in a vulnerable situation, having made a difficult decision—a decision which is theirs to take.
Amendments 81, 83 and 86 concern the universal application of the zones. Universality was debated in detail and agreed in the other place. It is a core requirement of this clause. Removing it would undermine its very point, which is about protecting women before harm occurs.
A method already exists to apply for locally based public space protection orders, or PSPOs, but their nature means that evidence about impact has to be gathered locally and for a prolonged period. They require women to be subjected to abuse and intimidation for months—even years—before they can be introduced. They place a burden of proof on these women, who are in a vulnerable situation. They are expensive and complicated. The process also requires significant time and resources from providers and local councils, which often do not have resources to spare. This is why, despite regular protests at clinics across the country, we have so few PSPOs—only five, despite regular protests at more than 50 clinics. This creates a patchwork of protection, so that women across the country face a postcode lottery as to whether they will face harassment when they go to a clinic. Once a clinic is successful in getting a PSPO, groups simply move to another site and the whole process begins again.
The introduction of “intentionally or recklessly” by Amendment 82 would likely make it harder to implement and enforce the clause. It would increase the likelihood that this measure would not be adequate to deliver on its aim.
Amendments 88, 89 and 90 relate to the list of banned activities that the previous amendments in my name seek to clarify and narrow. They would leave intact the other essential aspects of advising and persuading. “Seeking to influence” is at the core of the amendment inserted by the House of Commons. It is needed to cover the activities we are seeing outside abortion clinics around the country. The list in Clause 9 is based on these reported activities and their impact, which many women accessing care at these clinics report as being the most distressing.
Finally, Amendments 98 and 99 would remove Clause 9 entirely and instead require the Home Office to undertake another review into activities around abortion clinics. A review would undermine the vote in the other place to support the immediate addition of Clause 9, disagreeing with the clearly settled will of elected Members. Another review would delay stopping the harassment of women around abortion clinics.
Since the last review four years ago, protests have evidentially increased. BPAS’s database of abortion clinic activity currently includes nearly 3,000 accounts of service users, those accompanying them and clinical staff. Half of those have been received since the Home Office’s last consultation closed, and this is in no way an exhaustive list. Understandably, only a small proportion of women affected are willing and able to share their experiences when asked.
Since the review, the number of hospitals and clinics in England and Wales that have been targeted has increased by 20%. Just today, an abortion clinic in Doncaster has reported having people outside for the first time in years. We have seen an increase in co-ordinated activities. Tactics have evolved, groups are actively recruiting and are very well funded, often by American groups emboldened by Roe v Wade, which are now looking to sow division on our shores. Largely American-funded campaign groups with deep pockets are opposing our local councils when they seek to bring legal orders to protect women from harassment.
It is not right that this influence impacts the right to access healthcare in this country. As the former Home Office Minister, Victoria Atkins, said in the other place, new, immediate law is needed because of the failure of existing legislation to address the problem. Some 100,000 women a year in England and Wales have to attend an abortion clinic that is targeted by anti-abortion groups, which cause harassment, alarm, and distress to these women. Some 50 sites have been targeted in the last three years. It is clear that the existing law is not enough and this piece of legislation is needed. We must safeguard a woman’s right to access healthcare.
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 98 and 99, to which my noble friend Lady Sugg just referred. We need to stand back. Our constitutional responsibility in this House is to scrutinise, amend and, where necessary, push back on legislation that is unwise or uncompliant. We have particular leeway to do this about an issue not included in the Government’s election manifesto.
Clause 9, which makes it an offence to interfere with
“any person’s decision to access, provide, or facilitate the provision of abortion services”
is fundamentally flawed and should never have been added to the Bill. It is quite simply not about public order. It chillingly polices access to the idea contrary to pro-abortion orthodoxy that there are other ways to approach this most difficult of decisions.
Those pushing the clause took advantage of parliamentary maelstrom at a time referred to, to me, by one very seasoned, senior MP in the other place as “discombobulating daily turmoil”. The imposition of nationwide buffer zones would have been whipped against when it came up previously in the passage of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill. However, this time the whipping confusion was exploited and it was made the subject of a conscience vote—the first in relation to public order in 203 conscience votes since 1979.
We need to be clear-eyed about the significant majority for this new clause, which was accepted in the other place. Many MPs spoke and then acted on their unwillingness to let women seeking health services be harassed and intimidated, but the very many abstentions indicate that this was not straightforward. The law already protects women’s rights to access abortion facilities without hindrance, harassment and intimidation.
More fundamentally, the inaccurate assumption that harassment and intimidation are the hallmarks of vigils undermines the arithmetic of the other end. Hence my Amendment 98 calls for a review of current law and practice outside abortion clinics before making a major incursion into civil liberties. The 2018 Home Office review, which we have heard much about, found that people on vigils, not protests, are typically there to offer information and support, including but not exclusively if women want to continue with their pregnancy.
Would the noble Lord address the point that regulations are unamendable?
I thank the noble Viscount for the intervention. I would have thought that regulations are amendable by a debate in this House.
These regulations would allow for sunset and review provisions to be included, so the legislation can cease to have effect if appropriate, as I said.
I was talking about how regulations that require consultation with key stakeholders and need approval by both Houses improve on the current public spaces protection order system, which allows a local authority to impose buffer zones with scant transparency. The decision to introduce PSPOs is often initiated, drafted and implemented by one person or a group of council officials, with very little scrutiny and awareness of what factors they have taken into account.
I will speak briefly to other amendments. Those tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox and Lady Hoey, engage with the civil liberties and rights issues. However, they accept that interference with a decision can be disallowed, which would be a first in criminal law and very hard for the individual to defend themself against. A woman could simply claim that a choice made in the privacy of her mind had in some way been influenced by a message or person.
However, the tidying-up changes that my noble friend Lady Sugg proposes do not speak to the disproportionality of Clause 9, and in some ways worsen it. For example, Amendment 84 would ensure that a buffer zone also applies where an abortion clinic is embedded within a hospital or GP surgery, as we heard. This would vastly increase the footprint affected by buffer zones. Even if only all 373 abortion clinics were included, this would leap from the current 225 square metres to 26 square kilometres, and it would single out the issue of abortion for wildly disproportionate restrictions in comparison with other health areas. A person providing false information on a leaflet about any other medical issue would be free to do so, but someone providing accurate information on abortion would be criminalised.
I could say a lot more, but this is a big group with many speakers, and I know at least one noble Lord who was dissuaded from speaking because time is not limitless. As my noble friend the Minister will know from his many conversations, there is strength of conviction on both sides of this argument. I urge him to adopt the evidence-based policy route. There is again clamour for reform of this House, but the importance of our scrutiny and revising role is not clearly understood. We would be lax in our duty if we merely rubber-stamped or gently tweaked this inadequate and ideologically inspired clause.
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 98 in the name of Lord Farmer, and Amendments 88 and 90 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Beith, the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox and Lady Hoey, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans.
Amendment 98 would correct one of the most egregious aspects of the addition of Clause 9, which was originally added to the Bill in the other place. Amendment 98 would review why this law change is needed. This policy was reviewed just four years ago, and the then Home Secretary’s conclusion was that
“national buffer zones would not be a proportionate response”.
Those who support this clause have not demonstrated what has changed since that review.
I looked through the Home Office review from 2018, and it is interesting to note how little evidence is provided there that these buffer zones are needed. The review also sets out why the policy is unworkable, stating:
“There have been several cases where particular buffer zones have been successfully challenged on the basis they disproportionately infringe on civil liberties and freedom of speech ... buffer zone legislation has not always delivered exactly what service providers and pro-choice activists had hoped for.”
At the very least, before any law change is taken forward, we should understand what is alleged to have changed and why current laws are not sufficient. At present, the proponents of Clause 9 have not met that threshold so I support Amendment 98, which seeks to address this.
I turn to Amendments 88 and 90, which would arguably take out the most pernicious aspects of Clause 9. Amendment 88 would stop the proposed buffer zone, including criminalising a person who “seeks to influence”. This wording is sinister, impossible to enforce and an assault on our most basic freedom of speech. The same is true of Amendment 90, which would remove from the clause the provision to criminalise a person who
“advises or persuades, attempts to advise or persuade, or otherwise expresses opinion”.
Noble Lords and colleagues from the other place who support this clause tell us that they do so to protect women from harassment and intimidating behaviour. I again place on record my declaration that any harassment or intimidation should be subject to the law; something should be done about it. The sentiment is both worthy and correct in terms of its intent but that is a wholly different intention from seeking to stop people expressing opinions or attempting to persuade. Free societies are built on expressing opinions and attempting to persuade. Some might say that this should not take place at an abortion clinic but the Home Office review I mentioned earlier
“pointed out that the Chief Executive of BPAS”—
the abortion provider—
“had stated that 15% of patients change their minds about having an abortion at the BPAS clinics.”
I think noble Lords from across the Chamber would argue that it is plainly a decision for those women about how to proceed in those circumstances, so to deny them advice and explicitly block the expressing of opinions would rob those women of making an informed choice.
I add my support to the other amendments tabled to this clause, namely Amendments 80 to 83, 86, 89, 92 and 94. I hope that the Minister will recognise that there is concern from across this House for the consequences of Clause 9 and that he will allow a pause to think about it in more detail, avoiding a rushed change to the law that will have profound consequences for both women and freedom of speech in this country.
My Lords, I am in general opposed to those of the amendments which are designed to reduce the impact of Clause 9. As I said at Second Reading, I support the concept of buffer zones around abortion clinics. Of course I accept the two propositions eloquently expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox: first, that the right to demonstrate and freely express views is of great importance in a democratic society; and secondly, that the provisions of Clause 9, as many of your Lordships have articulated, impose serious restrictions on such abilities. But again, as I said at Second Reading, these rights are not absolute. They have to be balanced with the rights of others, and the correct balance is often not easy to identify and can be the subject of legitimate disagreement—it usually is. However, in the context of abortion clinics, Clause 9 gets the balance about right.
I will identify occasions where the balance falls the other way: in favour of the demonstrator. Some of your Lordships will think that the examples are trivial. I have often hosted meets for our local hunts, both before the ban and after it; after the ban, our local hunt acts fully within the law. The saboteurs come and demonstrate, and they are often very tiresome. However, provided they operate within the law, I would not for one moment seek to ban them. There is another example. Pacifists sometimes demonstrate outside military recruitment offices. I disagree with that and think it is wrong in principle, but again it would never occur to me to seek to prohibit that activity.
The motives of those demonstrators and those who demonstrate outside abortion clinics have something in common. It is not that they are just expressing their own opinions, which of course they are absolutely entitled to do, but they are trying to induce a change of attitude on the part of others. It is when I come to those who protest outside abortion clinics that I am conscious of why the balance tips. Those who attend abortion clinics have come to a very painful and serious decision, and often an anguished one. I think it is very wrong to subject them to what is often intemperate bullying of an extremely nasty kind.
I mentioned at Second Reading that the BBC did a poll which found that 15% of women who went to abortion clinics had been coerced into doing so. We do not have the information as to how many partners have said, “I don’t want this child, go and have an abortion”. We need to establish that by finding the evidence. We hear all the time that the people outside the abortion clinic are against abortions. We do not see the intimate pressure that women are often under in the home—not only from male partners but perhaps from their families—to do with shame and other things. This needs to be looked into before we make a decision on this.
Parliament is in a position to make a judgment about these matters. I was in the House of Commons for nearly 30 years—not as long as my noble friend Lord Cormack—and I was well aware of, in many circumstances, from evidence which came from many quarters, the kind of abuse to which women seeking an abortion were subjected by those who demonstrated outside abortion clinics. I strongly suspect that is why the House of Commons voted for Clause 9 in such substantial numbers, because it knew it was happening and that it was wrong. We do not need a further review to establish those basic judgments.
I do not think there is any doubt about that; the evidence is—
On the point about evidence, we are hearing people’s opinions about what the evidence is. Surely this requires a review so that we can involve the police, churches, abortion users—everybody—to get real evidence that is satisfactory to this House. At the moment, it is the kind of evidence where we are saying, “We know about and maybe you don’t.” I have not seen any 100% documentary evidence that these things are going on. I am going on the word of the noble Baroness and others.
The noble Lord, Lord Farmer, raised a question about the intimidation of women in clinics. He knows that clinics are regulated by the Department of Health and Social Care and the CQC and that it is expressly against the terms of their licence to do that; if they were found to be doing that, they would not be able to carry on.
I want to deal with the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, about penalties. The penalties provided in Clause 9 are equivalent to those for other cases of harassment in other statutes. Amendment 94 would introduce a penalty at the same level as for skateboarding in the wrong place. I happen to think that the abuse of women is a lot more serious than a skateboarding offence.