Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Committee stage & Lords Hansard - Part 1
Thursday 27th January 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering]

3: Clause 1, page 2, line 46, at end insert—
“(7) The Secretary of State must not charge a fee for the processing of applications under this section.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that the Secretary of State must not charge a fee for the processing of applications under section 17A.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, this is the first time I have spoken on the Bill, as I was unable to speak at Second Reading. I want to speak to the amendments in my name in this group. I look forward to hearing the thrust of Amendment 13 from the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. At the outset, I declare that my mother was a naturalised Brit through marriage, under an earlier incarnation of this Act. I am also a non-practising member of the Faculty of Advocates.

I shall move Amendment 3 and speak to Amendments 4, 5, 6, 7, 18 and 22. I am enormously grateful to Michael Clancy of the Law Society of Scotland for his expertise and briefing in preparing these amendments, which concern the fees to be charged under Clauses 1, 2, 3 and 7 of the Bill. The amendments are the work of the Law Society of Scotland, and in particular I pay tribute to its immigration and asylum sub-committee, which has considered this part of the Bill in some detail.

The Law Society of Scotland states that it agrees with Clause 1, subject to the registration process being free. There is no clarity around that in Clauses 1, 2, 3 and 7. This is a cause of concern and which is why I have tabled these amendments. In this connection, the Law Society acknowledges and agrees with the 2020 report by British Future, Barriers to Britishness. At pages 10 and 11, it recommends:

“Citizenship by registration should be free for those who become British by this route. This group mostly comprises children and those with subsidiary categories of British nationality, such as British Overseas Territories Citizens and British National (Overseas) passport holders from Hong Kong who now have a route to citizenship through the bespoke British National (Overseas) visa.


Nationality law should be amended to allow children born in the UK to be British citizens automatically, restoring a policy that applied before 1983.


Vulnerable groups of people should be encouraged to take legal advice, which should be affordable and widely available in all parts of the UK.”


The Law Society looked particularly at the case of PRCBC and O v Secretary of State for the Home Department—reported in “[2021] EWCA Civ 193”—where the Court of Appeal held that the fee of £1,012 for certain applications by children to register was unlawfully high. An appeal to the United Kingdom Supreme Court has recently been heard. We await the decision in due course.

I also want to refer to the extremely helpful report from the Constitution Committee of this House about the Bill. Paragraph 16 concludes:

“The Government should clarify its intentions on the amount of fees to be charged under Clauses 1, 2, 3 and 7.”


The committee sought clarity as to what fees will be charged for registration applications under this clause and under similar provisions in Clauses 2, 3 and 7, referred to earlier. The committee also referred to the forthcoming appeal decision of the Supreme Court.

I urge my noble friend, when summing up on this little group of amendments, to come forward and say whether fees are going to be applied and at what level they will be set. It is inappropriate to discuss the Bill at this stage and not to have any idea as to what fees will be charged during the process. With those few remarks, I beg to move.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 13 in my name. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham—who cannot be here today—for their support. I support the other amendments in this group. I am grateful, too, to the Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens, of which I am a patron, and to Amnesty International UK, for their help. Once again, I pay tribute to them for their continued work to promote children’s citizenship rights.

Essentially, the new clause would ensure that children are not excluded from their right to citizenship by registration by unaffordable fee levels, well above the cost of administering that right. It will also require action to raise awareness of this right.

It feels a bit like Groundhog Day. I have lost count of the number of times we have raised this issue in your Lordships’ House. Indeed, we are now known as “Terriers United”, although I do not think that all the terriers are able to be present today. On our last outing, during debate on the then Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill of 2020, I warned the Minister that we would be snapping at the Home Office’s heels until we achieved justice for this vulnerable group of children.

I will recap the arguments briefly. We are talking about a group of children who were either born here to parents—neither of whom was, at that time, British or settled—or who have grown up here from an early age and have rights to register as British citizens. A combination of factors, notably the exorbitant fee of more than £1,000—£640 more than the most recent stated cost of administration—lack of awareness of the need to register, and the difficulties faced by local authorities with regard to looked-after children, have resulted in thousands of children being denied that right to British citizenship, even though it is theirs. A High Court judgment, to which I shall return, noted the mass of evidence. As a consequence, many children born in the UK feel alienated, excluded, isolated, second best, insecure and not fully assimilated in the culture and social fabric of the UK.

When we last debated this issue, as part of an amendment calling for a review of the barriers to registration of the right to citizenship, the Minister said:

“I completely acknowledge the points that the noble Baroness makes about citizenship costs; I will not tell her that you do not need citizenship to live here, because your Lordships will not accept that sort of answer.”


Quite right. I trust that there will be no attempt to revive such arguments today. Instead of trying to combat our arguments, the Minister proposed a “task-and-finish activity”. This would involve discussion of the issues in the wider context of societal cohesion and integration, which, sadly, will suffer as a result of this Bill. She then said that she would

“think about how we can then bring that back to the House”.—[Official Report, 5/10/20; cols. 429-30.]

Well, we had one initial meeting. It was very constructive, but it did not really address the substance of the withdrawn amendment, and nothing came back to the House.

In the meantime, there has been a significant development: the Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s judgment which had found the fee unlawful because of the Home Office’s failure to take account of the best interests of children under Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act. It is worth noting a few points from the Court of Appeal’s judgment. First, it spelled out:

“There is no issue but that the recent and current levels of fees have had a serious adverse impact on the ability of a significant number of children to apply successfully for registration.”


It noted that payment of the fee would involve “unreasonable sacrifices” for those on low or middle incomes and, in the case of the children of lone parents on benefits,

“it is difficult to see how the fee could be afforded at all.”

Secondly, it underlined the importance of citizenship. Both these points, it said, were

“not disputed by the Secretary of State.”

Thirdly, and crucially, it said that, because

“no other consideration is inherently more significant than the best interests of the child”,

the Home Secretary

“must identify and consider the best interests of the child … and must weigh those interests against countervailing considerations.”

The judgment gave short shrift to the frankly pathetic Home Office argument that the debate on the fees initiated by Members of both Houses constituted consideration of children’s best interests. The chutzpah of trying to put that argument takes my breath away; anyway, the court would have nothing to do with it.

The case was heard by the Court of Appeal in October 2020 and the judgment was given in February 2021. The Home Office chose not to appeal against the best interests judgment yet, nearly a year later, it still has not published the outcome of the best interests review required by that judgment. However, because of a separate appeal on a different point of law to the Supreme Court in the name of PRCBC, of which I am a patron, and O, whose case it was, judgment on which is still awaited, Ministers now argue that publication of the best interests review must await that judgment. Why, given that the judgment has nothing to do with the best interests review?

As it happens, I understand that the judgment will be given next week. Can the Minister therefore commit to publishing the outcome of the best interests review swiftly following that judgment, and certainly before Report? If not, why not? The longer the continued wait, the more children will be denied their right to citizenship because of the level of the fee. This cannot be right. Please do not use the Supreme Court’s irrelevant judgment as an excuse for rejecting this amendment. These children cannot afford to wait any longer. Every month of delay is another month of exclusion and alienation from British society. The terriers are growing very impatient.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Horam (Con)]

I am sorry, but I did not quite follow the noble Baroness’s point.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

Perhaps I can clarify. We all agree that we should know what the figure is. We are also seeking clarification from the Government Benches on why the fee is almost double the cost of processing the work. That is where there is a bit of a mismatch, if I have understood Members correctly.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Horam, that there is no suggestion of putting a figure in the legislation. The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, is suggesting that there should be no fee at all, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, does not mention any numbers at all in her amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

I am sorry, but that is irrelevant, because this is not about immigration. It is about the right to register for citizenship for children who have been born here or who otherwise have lived most of their lives here.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I thank everybody who contributed to this debate. I thank my noble friend for his courteousness in giving as full a reply as he is able to at this time.

I acknowledge the indefatigable campaigning skills of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, and the work they have done. I am grateful to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester for sharing the concerns of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham and his work in this regard.

I will focus on one particular aspect of my noble friend’s reply. I will not get involved in the best interests review because that is a separate argument. We need a very clear undertaking that, if the Supreme Court is to rule on the appeal as soon as next week, the Government will come forward and let us know what the scale of fees will be. I accept that the amendments I have put forward are the more radical. They say that the fees should be waived for all the reasons given during the debate: they are proving a barrier to children who, as the Government Benches and the Minister have agreed—I welcome that—should be welcomed, and citizenship should be awarded to them provided they meet the conditions. I do not think that a fee of £400 more than the cost of the work being done is satisfactory. It is unacceptable.

In the words of the Law Society of Scotland and of the Constitution Committee, I urge the Government to clarify their intention on the amount of fees to be charged under the relevant clauses—Clauses 1, 2, 3 and 7—after the Supreme Court judgment is announced, and to come forward with an amendment in this regard before Report, otherwise I will feel obliged to retable the amendments. At this moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 3 withdrawn.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Thursday 27th January 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering]

25: Clause 9, page 11, leave out lines 33 to 36
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment deletes the proposed new sections 40(5A)(a) and (b) in the British Nationality Act 1981.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak also to Amendment 26 in this group and I look forward very much to hearing other noble Lords speak to their amendments in this group, which are very much on the same theme.

My amendment is perhaps a little more radical than some in this group, so, for the purposes of clarity, I am seeking to delete from the amendment to Clause 9 that was carried in Committee in the other place the proposed subsection (5A), which states that the notice to be given to a person to be deprived of citizenship, thereby notifying that their citizenship is to be withdrawn,

“does not apply if ... the Secretary of State does not have the information needed to be able to give notice under that subsection”

or if it is not

“in the interests of the relationship between the United Kingdom and another country”.

I will set out my reasons for doing this.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, what I think I have tried to explain today—and it will be obvious that are clearly differences between us—is that, where the highest harm individuals can rely on another citizenship, the Home Secretary has within his or her power the ability to remove that citizenship. Of course, the one citizenship that is protected is when someone is only a British citizen and of no other territory.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, this debate has been very moving in parts and extremely thoughtful, and I thank everybody across the House who contributed.

I, for one, am not unsympathetic to what the Government are trying to do. To tackle my noble friend Lord Hunt full on, I think he said that if Parliament does not accept Clause 9 then the Committee, or Parliament, will try to stop the Government from doing it. From what I have heard from the debate today, I think that is precisely the mood of the Committee and the conclusion that we have reached.

There are a number of alternative amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, and the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, have come to blows, if you like, as to the purport of Amendment 27. There are parts of the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, that I find attractive, in particular removing the whole of Clause 9.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I followed with great interest the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, in speaking eloquently to the clauses stand part in the last group. Like the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, I shall speak only to a particular amendment, that put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, to which I have lent my signature, as have others. Once again, I am grateful to the Law Society of Scotland for its background briefing, and I shall refer briefly to the report of the Constitution Committee in which its concerns were quoted.

I am grateful to the Law Society of Scotland for highlighting its concerns, which I share. This is a probing amendment to understand the background following on from my noble friend’s summing-up in response to the previous group. I find myself half way between my noble friend Lord Hodgson, who is not a lawyer, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, who is a lawyer of some repute. I am a member of the Faculty of Advocates but have not practised for a considerable period. However, I enjoyed the one case on which I was a junior before the European Court of Human Rights—the proceedings were very similar to those enjoyed in our erstwhile proceedings when the House of Lords enjoyed the right of final appeal.

The reason why I believe that Clause 31 does not fit well with the Bill goes back to the standard of proof test set out in the leading case for asylum cases, Ravichandran v Secretary of State for the Home Department, as a “well-founded fear of persecution”. In the Court of Appeal in 2000, it was confirmed that the standard of proof in civil proceedings—the balance of probabilities referred to in Clause 31(2)—was not suitable for immigration matters. Instead, what was important was making an assessment of all material considerations such that it

“must not exclude any matters from its consideration when it is assessing the future unless it feels that it can safely discard them because it has no real doubt that they did not in fact occur”.

Lord Justice Sedley described the balance of probabilities as

“part of a pragmatic legal fiction. It has no logical bearing on the assessment of the likelihood of future events or (by parity of reasoning) the quality of past ones.”

For the past 20 years, the approach taken in the Karanakaran case was consistently followed by the courts. In Scotland, the Outer House of the Court of Session reaffirmed that case as the correct standard of proof approach to be applied in the case in 2020 of MF (El Salvador) v Secretary of State for the Home Department. In that case, it was held that the First-tier Tribunal judge had erred in law by applying the wrong standard of proof in respect of an application for permission to appeal brought by an asylum seeker.

In Kaderli v Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office of Gebeze, Turkey, in 2021, the High Court reaffirmed, while referencing the Karanakaran case, that the question as to determining a well-founded fear of persecution is that of an evaluative nature about the likelihood of future events. In that case, it was held that the judge erred in holding that it was for the appellant to prove on the balance of probabilities that the corruption alleged had occurred. The true test involved the application of a lower standard: whether there was a real risk that the appellant’s conviction was based on a trial tainted by corruption. This was consistent with the approach to the fact-finding in the immigration context.

In the view of the Law Society of Scotland,

“the change in clause 31 appears to go against the intention of the New Plan for Immigration, and flies in the face of 25 years judicial scrutiny.”

So my question to my noble friend the Minister, in summing up this evening, is: on what basis are the Government prepared to set aside the cases that I have set out this evening?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the question. What is driving it, as I said a few moments ago, is the attempt to have a consistent and clear approach to decision-making. When you have a single test with different elements, and it is all under “a reasonable likelihood”, it is then that you are more likely to have inconsistent decision-making—I will not use the word “mishmash”. What you are doing here is really two things, and Clause 31 sets them out clearly. You are first saying, “Are you who you say you are?” and “Did you, in fact, fear such persecution?” Those are factual questions, decided on the balance of probabilities. Then the question is: “Is there a reasonable likelihood that, if you were returned, you would be persecuted?” That is a question of reasonable likelihood.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My noble friend is, in fact, rewriting the law. I am not an immigration lawyer, but if I were, I think I would be a little confused at the moment. In the case that was decided in 2021, Kaderli v Chief Public Prosecutors Office of Gebze in Turkey, it was clearly said that

“The true test involved the application of a lower standard”


than the balance of probabilities. So now no immigration lawyer could plead the application of the lower standard because my noble friend is raising the bar in this Bill.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I thought I made it absolutely clear when I said earlier that the court in that case made its decision against the legislative background at the time. Parliament is entitled to change the legislative background. We will want to make sure that we remain consistent with the refugee convention, and, as I said earlier, we believe that we are. There is nothing wrong with doing that. It is simply not the case that we are somehow bound as a Parliament by what the Court of Appeal said in the case referred to by my noble friend. Therefore, with great respect, I disagree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, where he said that a single holistic question was better and that the higher standard was objectionable. With respect, I disagree on both points.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, the effect of Clause 39 is to criminalise the act of seeking asylum in the UK, even if the person has no option but to flee. Clause 39 makes arriving in the UK without leave, without ever actually entering the UK, a criminal offence. I am therefore moving Amendment 120, with the invitation of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, which would remove the relevant part of Clause 39.

I note that whereas a person violating Clause 39 could get a sentence of four years in prison, I recently saw in the media a case of modern slavery which attracted a suspended sentence. So having the temerity to arrive to claim asylum is considered multiple times more serious than enslaving and exploiting someone.

Clause 39 criminalising arrival would cover people intercepted in UK territorial waters and brought into the UK, and presenting themselves to an immigration official to claim asylum. They would arrive, even if they do not enter. Note that this is not targeted at traffickers and smugglers but at the sorry individuals being smuggled and seeking asylum. Why should they be criminalised? Remember that no visa exists for the purpose of claiming asylum—the noble Lord’s amendment wants to rectify that—and it is impossible to claim asylum without coming to the UK. It is a classic Catch-22 situation.

The clause is inconsistent with Article 31 of the refugee convention, which obliges signatories to

“not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees … present in their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.”

This non-penalisation is at the core of the refugee convention—even Australia has never considered criminalising irregular entry.

Of course, if an asylum seeker becomes a criminal as soon as they arrive, this can have implications for their future as a refugee. They will have a criminal record and be deemed to be not of good character, and this will impact on their ability to integrate, to settle and, down the line, to acquire British citizenship.

As we discussed on an earlier group, the definition of “particularly serious crime” is being lowered to a 12-month sentence. Since they could get a four-year sentence under Clause 39, or 12 months on a summary conviction, the person could lose their protection against expulsion and refoulement simply as a result of arriving in the UK to claim asylum. It is pernicious to criminalise someone who simply arrives in, not enters, a country— there has always been a distinction between the two. I am afraid that it is somewhat Kafkaesque—I maybe overuse that phrase—as well as pernicious and unnecessary. I beg to move.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 121 and 122. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for lending her support in signing Amendment 122. As the noble Baroness set out, and as we heard from the Deputy Chairman, if Amendment 120 carries favour with the Committee, Amendments 121 and 122 could obviously not be moved.

I intend these amendments to probe my noble friend the Minister. The thinking behind this is that it represents the concerns expressed to me by Law Society of Scotland, to which I am grateful for drafting the amendments and the wording that it has used. Rather than just deleting the offending wording in new subsections (D1) and (E1), I am proposing to delete “arrives in” from the relevant sections of Clause 39 and insert “enters” instead.

Clause 39 of the Bill adds a new component to the existing offence of illegal entry, and subsection (2) thereof adds new subsections to Section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971. New subsection (D1) makes it an offence for someone who “requires entry clearance” to arrive in the UK without “a valid entry clearance”. An entry clearance is a visa issued before travel, because it becomes leave to enter when the person enters the UK. The burden of proving that a person holds valid entry clearance lies on that person. This is of concern, given that EU citizens are not routinely given any physical evidence of their entry clearance if they apply using the UK Immigration: ID Check app—no visa vignette is placed in their passport. So the key addition to the offence provision is to make arrival an offence.

The Explanatory Notes clearly state:

“The concept of ‘entering the UK without leave’ has caused difficulties about precisely what ‘entering’ means in the context of the current section 24(1)(a) of the 1971 Act.”


Entering is defined in Section 11(1) of the Immigration Act 1971, which I recall studying at the University of Edinburgh some time ago, as disembarking and subsequently leaving the immigration control area. Arrival is not given any technical legal definition, so it will simply mean reaching a place at the end of a journey or a stage in a journey. So it is unclear whether a person needs to reach the mainland in order to arrive in the United Kingdom.

My first question to my noble friend is: can she clarify at what point a person arrives in the United Kingdom? The Explanatory Notes and the separate definitions of the United Kingdom and United Kingdom waters seem to suggest that arrival on the mainland is necessary. The new provisions will allow prosecutions of individuals intercepted in UK territorial waters and brought into the UK, who arrive in but do not technically enter the UK, as set out in paragraph 388 of the Explanatory Notes.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Thursday 10th February 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering]

156: Clause 59, page 63, line 1, leave out subsection (4)
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment deletes Clause 59 subsection (4).

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for setting the scene and others who contributed to the previous debate on this part of the Bill. I welcome my noble and learned friend Lord Stewart to his place on the Front Bench. He is a much more distinguished member of the Faculty of Advocates. I am grateful to the Law Society of Scotland for raising its concerns with me, which has led to my tabling the amendment. I very much look forward to hearing from others on this group, particularly the noble Lords, Lord Alton of Liverpool and Lord Coaker. We will hear their views on their amendments in due course.

This amendment seeks to delete Clause 59(4), which states:

“Guidance issued under subsection (1) must, in particular, provide that the determination mentioned in paragraph (d) is to be made on the balance of probabilities.”


The amendment is to raise my concerns and dismay but also to provide the opportunity for my noble and learned friend in summing up the debate to explain the Government’s thinking on raising the bar for evidence.

Clause 59 makes specific reference, as we heard earlier, to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and seeks to amend Sections 49, 50, 51 and 56 of it. The clause raises the standard of proof for determining a reasonable grounds decision for a victim of trafficking from “suspect but cannot prove” to “balance of probabilities”. Indicators that a person is a victim of trafficking can be missed by first responders, meaning that a referral to the national referral mechanism is not made. If a referral is made, reasonable grounds represents a sift to determine whether someone may be a victim of trafficking and whether further investigation is needed.

Home Office statistics reveal that 92% of reasonable-grounds decisions and 89% of conclusive-grounds decisions on the balance of probabilities are positive. The evidence basis for so-called overidentification is not made. The lower standard of proof at the reasonable-grounds decision stage helps ensure that potential victims do not miss out on being properly investigated and progressed to the conclusive-grounds stage of the national referral mechanism.

--- Later in debate ---

I hope those remarks have gone some way to answer the points raised by the right reverend Prelate and my noble friend Lord Deben. I hope I have emphasised something which I am sure does not need to be shared across the House, as compassion for victims of these dreadful and wicked crimes is understood universally throughout the Committee, across party lines and in the House generally.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

I am anxious not to delay matters but to seek clarification at this stage. A number of noble Lords have raised concerns about why the burden of proof has been changed and the fact that, through this higher standard, a number of victims may not enter the system at all. I cannot believe it is the Government’s wish to prevent genuine victims of modern slavery and trafficking to be excluded from the process. My noble and learned friend gave a simple, clear clarification that it was to make the bar the same for both, but the fallout, in the view of legal opinion from practitioners who will be using this on a daily basis, seems to be that we will inadvertently exclude justified victims from the whole process. I cannot believe that this is the Government’s intention, where they are genuine victims.

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

I am grateful to my noble friend for her intervention, which permits me the opportunity of not only repeating what I said from the Dispatch Box earlier about the importance of decisions being taken on a case-by-case basis, but advising the House—perhaps I should have done so in answering the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool—that in addition we are providing enhanced support and training to first responders.

The rationale underpinning the change proposed in relation to burdens of proof is certainly not to seek to exclude persons who ought to receive help and assistance from receiving it. The Government’s wish is that all who are victims should receive assistance and all who are criminal should receive their due punishment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, it has been an excellent debate. I thank everyone for their contributions. I think there may be a question outstanding from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, as regards children under the age of 18, but I take it as read that anyone aged under 18 would still be referred to the local authorities. I assume that my noble and learned friend will write to us if that is not the case.

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

I am grateful to my noble friend for that, and I beg the pardon of the noble and learned Baroness for not addressing her question directly. If she is content, I will have that expressed in writing to her.

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

I am obliged.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

I am grateful to my noble and learned friend. He has endeavoured to be as full as possible in his response to all noble Lords. I express my disappointment that the guidelines are being changed in the way the Government envisage. I am slightly confused, because a lot of the situations for which this Bill makes provision would not have arisen if we had kept our international and European responsibilities under the Dublin convention, whereby we could have returned many asylum seekers to the first country in which they arrived.

It is a regrettable change. I do not think my noble and learned friend disagreed that a number of victims will be omitted from the system as a result. I will consider with others what to do at the next stage, but at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 156 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I support all these amendments but I will speak to Amendment 169, to which I have put my name. I will deal with two other people apart from the anti-slavery commissioner who said that her gravest concern lies with Clause 62 above all the other clauses in this part of the Bill.

The United Nations rapporteur said:

“We are concerned that Clause 62(3) would be in violation of the State’s obligation to ensure non-punishment of victims of … forms of slavery for any unlawful acts … that are a direct consequence of trafficking.”


That, of course, is exactly what the Modern Slavery Act says in relation to people who commit offences if they are done in the course of being a trafficked person. So far as children are concerned, if they are under 18, they cannot be responsible for acts that they have done under the coercion of being a trafficking victim.

Perhaps of more significance to the Government is the issue of prosecution. Caroline Haughey QC, who advises the Government and regularly prosecutes traffickers—with great success I am glad to say—has described this Bill as catastrophic. She is a very successful QC. She is very measured and “catastrophic”, to my mind, is the most unusual word for a sensible prosecuting QC to use. She goes on to warn of the risks of losing witnesses for prosecutions because they have been guilty of offences themselves. We do not have enough prosecutions. It is an extremely serious matter that we do not have enough, and this clause is certain, if it is left in its original state, to reduce the number of prosecutions that Caroline Haughey and other QCs are trying to do in the criminal justice system.

I think again the Government ought to bear in mind why so many people who are victims have criminal records. It is perfectly obvious—they are much easier to identify and traffic, children as well as adults. They are the sort of people the traffickers go for because they know they are much less likely to come voluntarily to the public eye. They need protection against having been trafficked just as much as anybody who has a clear record. I implore the Government to think very carefully about this effect on prosecutions and the fact that criminals are very likely to be trafficked people.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

I am delighted to follow the noble and learned Baroness. The Committee has benefited greatly from her insightful comments on the background. This is a particularly murky world about which we are talking. People are in an extremely vulnerable and unfortunate position, and they may well be preyed on and further exploited by the very people I applaud the Government for trying to target.

I will speak briefly to Amendments 160 and 163 in my name. Amendment 160 is the key amendment; again, it is a concern raised by the Law Society of Scotland, which is keen to ensure that these provisions be brought to account only in exceptional circumstances. The reasoning for this—which follows very well from the discussion we have heard in this debate—is that Clause 62 excludes from the national referral mechanism persons who have committed criminal offences as well as other offences relating to terrorism. It excludes those who have claimed to be victims of terrorism in bad faith. However, it appears to divide victims into the worthy and the unworthy. Surely the Government must explain their reasoning behind this. In my view, and that of the Law Society of Scotland, no one should be disqualified from being a victim of one crime because they have been a perpetrator of another—precisely for the reasons that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, gave us. Victims of trafficking could be criminalised for conduct relating to their trafficking. This is in breach of Article 26 of the Council of Europe trafficking convention. I cannot believe for a minute that this is the intention of the Minister or the Government in this regard.

The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, referred to a recent court case; I do not know if it is the same one to which I will refer. A violation of Article 4 of the ECHR was recently found against the United Kingdom, in this regard, by the European Court of Human Rights in VCL and AN v the United Kingdom. For those who would like to research this further, the reference is application numbers 77587/12 and 74603/12.

I conclude with a question to the Minister. Does he not share my concern that the clause, as it stands and without reference to exceptional circumstances, introduces a high risk of a double punishment for those victims who have received convictions? Moreover, disqualifying certain victims from protection increases the prospect that they will be further exploited by organised criminal groups as they will be unable to access protection from the state.

[The Lord Bishop of Bristol]

My Lords, I have added my name to those of noble Lords who oppose Clause 62 standing part of the Bill. I echo remarks made by noble colleagues.

As the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, just said, Clause 62 goes to an essential point of principle in the entire operation of how modern slavery protections ought to work. The proposal is that Clause 62 makes victimhood a conditional state. In fact, it sets up a division between worthy and unworthy victims, as the noble Baroness commented. This would be such a retrograde step. If we are serious about destroying the business model of modern slavery and identifying and prosecuting as many slavers as we can, we must find ways of incentivising and supporting all victims to come forwards. By excluding from support those who have acted in bad faith—a term for which I greatly welcome more clarity from the Minister on what it would mean—or those deemed a threat to public order, we are creating two categories of victim.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Report stage
Monday 28th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, the circumstances in which British citizenship may be removed were keenly debated in Committee. This group concerns a narrower issue: whether it should be possible to remove someone’s citizenship without giving them notice of it at the time and, if so, in what circumstances. Clause 9 struck me as so problematic that, in Committee, I tabled a stand part notice; that is echoed today by Amendment 20 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza. In Committee, I asked the Minister to take Clause 9 away and challenged her, if she could make the case for such an extraordinary power, to come back with a version of it that is far more limited in scope and subject to proper safeguards and accountability.

The Minister responded to that challenge as positively and wholeheartedly as I could have hoped. I pay tribute to her, to her fellow Minister, Tom Pursglove, to the Bill team and to those at the Home Office and in agencies with whom I have discussed these issues—and I pay no less tribute to the NGOs and individuals who have impressed on me the dangers of Clause 9. The result, after what I think I can fairly describe as very considerable movement on the part of the Government, is the first six amendments in this group, together with Amendment 85, which concerns commencement. They have been pulled into proper shape by the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, and I hoped that they could be tabled last Monday as government amendments, with my support, but an extra day was needed to conclude our discussions, so they appear under my name. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, and the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, for adding their support.

These amendments achieve four important things. The first is a far more restricted range of circumstances in which notice can be withheld. The original Clause 9 would have allowed the Secretary of State to withhold notice whenever that appeared to her to be in the public interest. Amendments 15 and 16 remove the subjective element and provide that notice may be withheld only if the Secretary of State does not have an address for service, or if she reasonably considers it necessary on one of the four exceptional grounds specified in Amendment 16.

Let me illustrate my understanding of how those exceptional grounds could arise in practice. A terrorist may be living in a safe house here, or more likely abroad, without realising that his whereabouts are known to the authorities. To require a notice of citizenship deprivation to be served on him at that address would reveal to him that he is the object of covert surveillance, contrary to the interests of national security: proposed new sub-paragraph (i). The same may be true of a participant in “organised or serious crime”—the phrase being taken from Section 1 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, which defines the remit of the National Crime Agency: proposed new sub-paragraph (ii). If intelligence as to location was supplied by a foreign liaison partner which does not wish its cover to be blown, notification at that address could jeopardise our intelligence relationship with that country: proposed new sub-paragraph (iv). The person in question might be, for example, with a dangerous armed group in a failed state. To require a courier to travel to such places to serve notice, at great personal risk, would be wrong: hence proposed new sub-paragraph (iii).

I do not believe that these grounds will be commonly advanced—it seems that, with a degree of ingenuity, workarounds have been found in the past—but neither, I suggest as a former independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, should they be dismissed as fanciful. It may be relevant that the laws of two of our closest allies are, if anything, more broadly drawn than this amendment. The New Zealand Citizenship Act 1977 allows for notice of deprivation to be dispensed with if it would be for any reason “not practicable” to serve it on the subject. The Australian Act of 2020 allows the Minister to determine that notice should not be given if it could prejudice the security, defence or international relations of Australia or Australian law enforcement operations.

The second feature of these amendments is to introduce powerful safeguards for conducive grounds deprivations that were entirely absent from the original Clause 9. In New Zealand, they have judicial scrutiny of these decisions. In Australia, they have regular ministerial review. Elements of both those safeguards are contained in the new Schedule 4A, which is set out in Amendment 14 and referred to in Amendments 17 and 19.

The judicial safeguard is in paragraph 1 of the schedule. If the Secretary of State wishes to withhold notice, she must apply to a superior court of record—the Special Immigration Appeals Commission—in advance or within seven days. SIAC will examine her reasons and decide, applying judicial review principles, whether her assessment is obviously flawed. That is the same test that is applied to the making of terrorism prevention and investigation orders under the TPIM Act 2011. SIAC will no doubt develop similar rules to deal with it, which might, in an appropriate case, provide for the appointment of a special advocate. If she does not succeed on her first attempt or on a subsequent application, which must be based on material change of circumstances or further evidence, the Secretary of State must either give notice in the normal way or revoke the deprivation order altogether.

The review safeguard is in paragraph 2 of the schedule. The Secretary of State must consider, three times a year for two years, whether the reasons for non-notification remain valid. If, after the sixth review, she still resists notification, she must make a further application to SIAC, which will, once again, give independent scrutiny to her decision.

The twin requirements of judicial approval and regular review will place a significant burden on the Secretary of State in any case where she wishes to exercise this power. I make no apology for that. Under the Immigration Rules, as they stood between 2018 and 2021, it was easy—far too easy—not to give notice but simply to record it on the file. That path was taken in no fewer than 29 of the 45 conducive grounds deprivations, mostly related to national security activity abroad, that were made in 2019, 2020 and 2021. These amendments not only require non-notification to be a last resort on paper; they make it hard work in practice. They should ensure that, in its own interests, the Home Office will take this exceptional course only when there really is no possible alternative.

The third feature of these amendments relates to appeals. Of course, a subject cannot appeal against a notice of deprivation until he has become aware of it. But Amendment 18 provides that time for appeal will begin to run only once notice has been given. It will not, therefore, be necessary to rely on the discretion of the court to extend time for appeal in cases where deprivation has not been notified at the time.

The fourth and final feature is in the proposed new subsections 5(c) and (d) inserted by Amendment 18. Any person whose citizenship was removed without notice must be informed of that fact, with reasons and information about appeal rights, as soon as they make themselves known to the Home Office, whether within the two-year review period or thereafter; for example, this might be by seeking consular assistance or a fresh passport.

Amendment 18 has another significant and, I would suggest, highly beneficial effect. The point has been well made by other noble Lords that upstanding citizens of this country, notably dual citizens, may be anxious about the removal of their citizenship without their knowledge. Amendment 18 provides such people with a means of reassurance. They have only to contact the Home Office to be told whether this has happened or whether, as will almost always be the case, it has not.

In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, challenged the House to

“find a way forward on Report that takes away the genuine fear from millions of people who believe—erroneously, but they believe it—that Clause 9 as drafted and the implementation of further measures will put them and their families at risk”.—[Official Report, 27/1/2022; col. 518.]

These amendments rise to that challenge. They should ensure that non-notification is confined to those rare cases where it is truly necessary, and they are subject to strong safeguards, including regular review, judicial scrutiny and a right to be informed on request.

I come finally to subsections (5) to (7) to Clause 9, which seek to limit the effect of the D4 case by providing that an unlawful failure to notify a pre-commencement deprivation order should not affect the validity of that order. I will listen carefully to my noble friend Lady D’Souza develop her manuscript amendment to remove those clauses, but in the meantime, to assist our deliberations, I ask the Minister to give two assurances relevant to that amendment. First, will she confirm that anyone subject to a pre-commencement deprivation order will be informed of that fact if they contact the Home Office, by analogy with proposed new subsections (5C) and (5D), as inserted by Amendment 17? They would then be in a position to proceed with any substantive appeal. Secondly, will she confirm, by analogy with Amendment 18, that the Home Office will not suggest that any of these people are out of time for appeal as a consequence of the interval between the decision to remove their citizenship and the giving of notice?

If my amendments are accepted, and those assurances given, I believe that we will have played our part as a revising Chamber and achieved a broadly acceptable balance. Opinions on citizenship removal will, of course, continue to differ, but the aggravating factor of removal without notice will be strictly confined and properly safeguarded for the future, as it was not in the Immigration Rules as they stood prior to the D4 judgment of last year, and as it was not under Clause 9 as it was passed by the Commons. I beg to move my amendment and, if necessary, I will test the opinion of the House.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for her support in drafting these amendments, and I hope that she will give an assurance that the Government do, indeed, support these amendments. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for addressing many of the concerns that I raised in Committee, particularly those expressed to me by the Law Society of Scotland, which was extremely dissatisfied that, in the original Clause 9, the Government had not fully justified the removal of citizenship without notifying the affected person. It asked that this clause be reconsidered, and I am grateful to the noble Lord for doing so.

Equally, in Committee, I raised the concerns expressed to me by the European Network on Statelessness in its briefing. It was very concerned that Clause 9 as drafted would

“have severe impacts on the rule of law and on a person’s fundamental rights”,

and that, as drafted, Clause 9

“disregards many of the UK’s international obligations, including the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality, the obligation to avoid statelessness, and the right to a fair hearing.”

In its view, the UK Government

“has not provided any justification as to why such a restriction on fundamental rights is needed.”

I pay tribute to the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich; many of my concerns have been addressed. I support the amendments introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and support the reasons that he has given. The restrictive range of circumstances has been greatly reduced in which a citizen’s rights could be taken away. I support the powerful safeguards he set out as to why a citizen could be deprived of their citizenship, the rights of appeal, the provision that a citizen must be informed that their citizenship is going to be removed and the reassurance that he set out that could be given by condition C at that time. I support the amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering]

25: Clause 11, page 13, line 33, leave out “a refugee is a Group 1” and insert “a person is a”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures equality of treatment by removing the distinction between Group 1 and Group 2 refugees.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, when I tabled these amendments, I had sought to seek a greater reassurance from my noble friend the Minister than I achieved in Committee. Obviously, I realise, given the result of the last few votes, it may be that Amendment 28, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, and others, will find greater favour with the House. However, I shall take this opportunity to set out my opposition in principle to what the Government are seeking to do here: it is not just the fact that two groups are being created, but the way in which those two groups will be treated differently.

Perhaps the most offensive provision in Clause 11 is subsection (5). The Explanatory Notes refer to it as

“differential treatment of refugees based on their group. Differences may, for example, apply in terms of the duration of their permission to remain in the UK, the availability of routes to settlement, the ability to have recourse to public funds, and the ability of family members to join them in the UK. There is no obligation for these powers to be exercised and discretion may be applied.”

The greatest difficulty that I have is that it is not clear that there will be discretion or, indeed, how that discretion will be applied.

I hate to say it to my noble friend, but I find it offensive that this differential between groups 1 and 2 has been created. In taking the two groups out and substituting the general term “person”, I draw attention to Amendment 27, which asks for “reasonable discretion” to be exercised. I believe that is the key to all the amendments before us. This comes directly from the advice that I have received from the Law Society of Scotland as to how the provision will apply, if the original clause is left unamended. It says:

“We take the view that how a person enters the UK should not impact on family reunion. Safe and legal routes have been reduced since the UK left the European Union with the removal of the Dublin III Regulation. This provision appears to be actually reducing the prospect of families using one of only the two safe and legal routes the Asylum seeker has i.e., refugee family reunion – the other being UNHCR resettlement. Fewer safe and legal routes are likely to result in more unsafe and perilous journeys.”


Given the new situation arising daily in Ukraine, and the dreadful humanitarian crisis that we see there, I hope that the Government will resist the provisions in the clause and look favourably on my amendments and think again—but I fear that perhaps the House will favour the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard. I beg to move.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

My Lords, I welcome the new clause proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, but we need to do a belt-and-braces job here. I am afraid we have to go back to the issue of compatibility and “Oh yes it is; oh no it isn’t.”

In Clause 11, we are introducing something entirely new. This two-class categorisation of refugees—the real refugees who came direct and the class 2 refugees who did not—is not anywhere in the refugee convention. None of that is in the refugee convention. The Government say that it is all perfectly compatible with the convention and assert that it is our right to interpret the convention in this new way, differently from the way that it has been interpreted up to now by our courts, differently from the way that the UNHCR, the custodian of the convention, interprets it in its authoritative judgment on our Bill, and differently from the way in which 146 signatory states interpret it.

We did the “Oh yes it is; oh no it is not” game at length in Committee and the Government stuck to their view, but I think it is fair to say that the Committee found it rather hard to understand the Government’s view. I wondered whether the Minister perhaps let the cat out of the bag when he told us:

“It may … be”—


to be fair, he did put it tentatively—

“that a convention entered into in 1951 is not absolutely suitable for the world of 2022.”—[Official Report, 8/2/22; col. 1463.]

Tonight, we heard the Minister seeming to hint that it might be time to review the convention as if it was in some way out of date. I could not disagree more.

I refute the Minister’s contention in one word: Ukraine. Life itself—zhizn’ sama, as a Russian would say—refutes the Minister’s contention. In the world of 2022, we see these hundreds of thousands of people—now over 500,000, the UNHCR says—abandoning their homes, trudging the motorways, crowding on to the trains, fleeing the tanks and rockets, and streaming into Poland and Hungary, Slovakia, Moldova and Romania. Are they refugees? Yes, of course they are refugees, just like the Hungarians in 1956 and the Czechs in 1968. Are they entitled to refugee convention rights? Yes, of course they are. But if the Bill, including Clause 11, is enacted or had been enacted, any of them who wanted to come to this country could be only group 2 refugees, without full convention rights, because they had not come directly from Ukraine and could have asked for asylum in Poland or Hungary. That is even though there are no direct flights from Ukraine, and even though we say Ukrainians have to have visas to come here—although we do not issue visas to asylum seekers.

The key point for the House tonight is that there is nothing in the convention or, as I understand it, subject to correction from the legal authorities round me, anywhere in international law requiring an asylum seeker to apply in the first safe country they reach. This, the rationale for Clause 11, is a Home Office invention. The convention sets only one test: not how the refugee got here, but why. What was it that drove him to come here? Was it a well-founded fear of persecution back home? That is the question. But if Clause 11 is approved, that question or test becomes redundant and irrelevant because, no matter what horrors he is fleeing from, if a refugee did not come here directly he could be only a group 2 refugee, subject to the harsher regime, detention and offshore processing set out in all the subsequent clauses that we are also going to have to look at closely, in my view. This just will not do.

My concern is with the refugees but also for the reputational damage we do to ourselves, if we go down this road, and the practical consequences for the refugee convention. Suppose our new invention caught on and other countries started following suit. Well over 20 million refugees are in countries contiguous to their homelands—just across the border—and nearly all these countries are developing countries. Suppose the convention were in future to be interpreted by all and sundry to mean that the exiled Syrians and Iraqis must always stay just across the frontier in Lebanon or Jordan, and that the Afghans must always stay in Pakistan, but the developed world can wash its hands of these problems and leave it to the Jordans and Pakistans, because the refugees could never move on and obtain asylum elsewhere. The only places they could obtain asylum were in the Jordans and the Pakistans.

What would the consequences of that be? They would be disastrous for the first host country; there are 1.5 million people in Lebanon from Iraq and Syria, and more than that from Afghanistan in the camps around Peshawar in Pakistan. We would be saying that Pakistan and Jordan are going to be stuck with that for ever, as far as we are concerned. It would be disastrous for the refugees, too.

If this doctrine caught on—if it were the general reading of international law that first hosts had sole responsibility—anyone seeking to flee persecution would find the gates of freedom clanging shut in their face. If we leave Clause 11 in the Bill, we do not just betray our values and trash our reputation, we could kill the refugee convention, sadly, though we need it in the world of 2022 as much as ever. I propose that Clause 11 be deleted.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, obviously I am disappointed that my Amendments 25, 26 and 27 have not found favour with the Minister or the House. My noble and very good friend Lord Horam said that he hoped that France and Belgium would take some of the asylum seekers and refugees back. That would indeed have been the case if we had managed to negotiate that we stayed within the Dublin III convention—so that is another source of disappointment.

My right honourable friend the Prime Minister stated yesterday in a very holy place that the UK would be very generous with Ukrainian refugees, but I regret to say that I do not hear how that is going to be applied in what I heard from the Front Bench this evening. However, I shall not press my amendments, because I believe that Amendment 28 carries more favour, so I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 25 withdrawn.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 8th March 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering]

72: Clause 76, leave out Clause 76

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

I am grateful for this opportunity to speak to Amendments 72 and 74, and I congratulate my noble friend on the honour of being appointed a privy counsellor. It is richly deserved, and we can all bathe, I hope, in reflected glory. I look forward very much to hearing from my noble friend how her Amendment 73 will impact, and possibly supersede, my Amendments 72 and 74.

Before that, however, I want to raise my concerns about the new powers included in Clauses 76 and 77, which raise a tribunal charging power in respect of wasted resources. I do not disagree that there may be circumstances in which unnecessary costs arise, but it is a very dangerous precedent to set that a First-tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal may—as I understand it, for the first time ever—charge the participant. Without going into the details, which I am sure the House is familiar with, I will briefly set out my concerns, those raised by the Law Society of Scotland, and those of the Select Committee on the Constitution in its report published as House of Lords Paper 149.

In the view of the Law Society of Scotland, the reason that Clause 76 is “problematic, unnecessary and unacceptable” is that:

“The First-tier or Upper Tribunal is to be given powers to charge a person exercising rights of audience or rights to conduct litigation if that person is found to have acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently. Under current statutory”


law—for example, the Solicitors (Scotland) Act 1980—

“and common law powers professional regulators have sufficient powers to deal with matters of professional discipline such as improper or unreasonable conduct. It is inappropriate that the determination of negligence should be included in the clause when that is properly the province of the civil courts. Furthermore, we note that any amounts charged under this clause for negligence are to be paid to the Consolidated Fund rather than to the client who may have suffered as a result of any alleged negligence. This appears to be a form of”

backdoor

“taxation rather than compensation for negligence.”

Through these two small amendments, I would like to understand better the thinking with which the Government have drafted these two clauses. Amendment 74 is consequential on Amendment 72, simply leaving out Clause 77 if the House was minded to remove Clause 76.

I am delighted to say that the House of Lords Constitution Committee, in its report of January this year, also quoted the Law Society of Scotland and said in paragraph 94:

“There is at least the potential that these new rules could discourage legal representatives and immigration advisers regulated by the office of the Immigration Services Commissioner, as well as applicants, from raising or engaging in legitimate proceedings.”


I would like to think that this was not the intention behind the government thinking, but I would very much like to hear reassurance from my noble friend the Minister that this is indeed the case.

To conclude, in the view of the Law Society of Scotland this clause is “unnecessary”; there are already existing statutory and common law powers for the appropriate regulators to deal with such issues as “matters of professional discipline” following existing complaints procedures; and it is therefore

“inappropriate that the determination of negligence should be included in the clause when that is properly the province of the civil courts.”

I also set out the Law Society of Scotland’s and my objection to the fact that this would be

“paid to the Consolidated Fund rather than”

towards reimbursing

“the client who may have suffered as a result of any alleged negligence.”

With these few remarks, I beg to move. I look forward to hearing the Government’s response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Baroness McIntosh of Pickering for explaining her amendment. Government Amendment 73 is a technical amendment to Clause 77. It does not change the policy; it makes a minor revision to the drafting of subsection (1) of Clause 77 to ensure that it matches the rest of the clause in only making provision in relation to the Immigration and Asylum Chamber. This change will prevent any uncertainty arising about the jurisdictions in which this clause should be applied, and it gives the Tribunal Procedure Committee complete clarity about how to approach drafting the rules to enact these measures.

I turn now to Amendments 72 and 73. The Government are committed to making the immigration and asylum system more efficient, while also maintaining fairness, ensuring access to justice and upholding the rule of law. To achieve this, we need all representatives involved in these proceedings—whether they are acting for the appellant or for the Home Office—to play their part in ensuring that appeals run smoothly. Representatives do not just have a duty to act in the best interests of their client; they also owe duties to the courts and to the public interest, which include acting with integrity, upholding the rule of law and supporting the proper administration of justice. We are aware that there are concerns about the behaviour of some representatives in immigration proceedings, which can waste judicial and tribunal resource and lead to delays in the tribunal process. Existing case law identifies the types of circumstances and behaviours which have led to costs orders being made or considered, and the principles applied by the courts. These have included showing a complete disregard for procedural rules through, for example, abusing court processes in relation to evidence or the timing of applications. As with the current costs orders regime, the policy will apply equally to the representatives of both parties—in answer to the question of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. This will include the Home Secretary when represented by presenting officers. To further ensure fairness, the paying party will be able to make representations before any order is made, and the tribunal retains absolute discretion as to whether a charge should be made in each case.

As I explained in Committee, tribunals can currently make wasted and unreasonable costs orders which relate to the legal costs of the parties. However, these mechanisms are generally only considered at the request of the other party and are infrequently employed. Clause 76 creates a new power for tribunals to order a party to pay an amount which represents a portion of the tribunal’s costs which have been wasted as a direct result of that party acting unreasonably, improperly or negligently. This power applies across all tribunal jurisdictions and is subject to the Tribunal Procedure Committee making rules for its application in a particular tribunal. It will allow the tribunal to make an order in relation to wasted tribunal resources in the same types of circumstances which would currently warrant a wasted or unreasonable costs order. An order can be made against “relevant participants”: this means legal and other representatives exercising rights of audience, and the Secretary of State where they are a party and do not have legal representatives. I hope that this goes some way to reassuring my noble friend.

To encourage increased consideration of whether to make costs orders, Clause 77 provides a duty on the Tribunal Procedure Committee to introduce tribunal procedure rules in the Immigration and Asylum Chamber. This will lead to judges more regularly considering whether to make a wasted costs order, an unreasonable costs order or a tribunal costs order under the new Clause 76 provision. This will ensure that circumstances and behaviours which have warranted the making of costs orders previously will more often give rise to judicial attention. While the requirement in Clause 77 is for the TPC to make rules in the Immigration and Asylum Chamber, it is at the committee’s discretion to create similar rules in other jurisdictions if it considers it appropriate. Specifically, Clause 77 requires procedural rules which identify circumstances or behaviours which, absent of reasonable explanation, the tribunal will treat as warranting consideration of the making of a costs order. The rules thereby introduce a presumption that requires the representative, or other relevant party responsible for such circumstances or behaviour, to explain themselves and why such a costs order should not be made. This will ensure the regular consideration of costs orders by the tribunal. More importantly, however, the tribunal will retain absolute discretion as to whether to make an order in all cases.

Noble Lords have asked whether this will mean fewer representatives willing to take on immigration work. The Government think it right that representatives should explain themselves if they are responsible for circumstances to be set out in the rules as warranting consideration of a costs order. However, where there is a reasonable explanation, no order would be expected. The tribunal continues to have full discretion as to whether to make the order. Therefore, these changes should not impact legal representatives who fulfil their duties to the court, remain committed to their work and ensure justice for their clients.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked why these changes are being made in the Immigration and Asylum Chamber and not in other jurisdictions. Obviously, the Nationality and Borders Bill as whole is focused on reforming the asylum system. Clauses 76 and 77 are part of a programme of reforms designed to streamline immigration and asylum appeals. There has been judicial concern, and a recognition that a problem exists with the behaviour of some legal representatives and other relevant parties in immigration proceedings. It is at the discretion of the Tribunal Procedure Committee to create similar rules in other jurisdictions if it considers it appropriate.

For the reasons I have outlined, I hope that my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering feels able to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

Before my noble friend sits down: I asked a specific question as to why the money raised will be paid into a consolidated fund. I listened carefully and I do not think I heard him respond on that point.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid that I will have to come back to the noble Baroness on that point.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all those who have spoken. I detect the mood of the House is not to support these provisions but the hour is late, and we have a lot more business to come, so am reluctant to test the opinion of the House. At this stage—

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am sorry for interrupting, but I have just been informed that the answer to the noble Baroness’s question is that it is standard practice.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

I am most grateful. If that is the case, I am surprised that the Law Society of Scotland is not aware of that, because it certainly did not respond in that regard.

I am grateful for the opportunity to raise my concerns. I would like another opportunity at some future date to pursue this further, but for the moment I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 72 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering]

83: After Clause 78, insert the following new Clause—
“Fees
(1) Section 68 of the Immigration Act 2014 is amended as follows.(2) After subsection (9), insert—“(9A) Notwithstanding subsection (9), in setting the amount of any fee in relation to registration of British citizenship the Secretary of State—(a) must not set that amount at a level beyond the Secretary of State’s estimation of the administrative costs of the function to which the fee relates,(b) must have regard to the need to promote British citizenship as the nationality of all persons connected to the United Kingdom and British overseas territories citizenship as the nationality of all persons connected to the British overseas territories, and(c) may have regard only to—(i) the costs of exercising the function,(ii) fees charged by or on behalf of governments of other countries in respect of comparable functions, or(iii) any international agreement.” (3) After subsection (10), insert—“(10A) Fees regulations must provide that no fee is to be charged for—(a) the registration of any child who is looked after by a local authority, or(b) the registration by statutory entitlement of any person to correct any historical legislative unfairness.””

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, it gives me great pleasure to move Amendment 83. I say at the outset that I shall neither speak to nor move Amendment 84. I take this opportunity to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham and the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, for their support for this amendment.

The attraction of this amendment is that, after this matter was raised in Committee, it marries together two separate ideas—one pressed so eloquently by a long-standing campaigner on these issues, the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, and the other by me in a separate amendment. I say how delighted I am that we have the support of the Constitution Committee of this House in its HL paper 149 of January this year. Paragraph 15 states clearly:

“Clause 1 provides that a person is entitled to be registered as a British overseas territories citizen if a number of conditions are met. This clause corrects the historical inability of mothers to transmit citizenship. It is unclear what fees will be charged for registration applications under this clause and similar provisions”


in later clauses. It goes on:

“In a recent case the Court of Appeal held that a fee of £1,012 for certain registration applications by children was so high as to be unlawful.”


In paragraph 16, the Constitution Committee therefore requests:

“The Government should clarify its intentions on the amount of fees to be charged under clauses 1, 2, 3 and 7.”


Amendment 83 deals specifically with Clause 1. In the amendment, we state that no fee can be set above the cost to the Secretary of State of registration and that the cost must be set having regard to the vital importance of rights to citizenship by registration, securing the shared connection of all British persons; can be set only having regard to the specified principles; must not be charged to register the right to citizenship of

“any child who is looked after by a local authority”;

and must not be charged to register the right to citizenship of any person under a statutory provision specifically intended to correct past legislative discrimination or injustice that had wrongly excluded that person from citizenship.

It is clear from the Explanatory Notes—I entirely endorse this—that the purpose of Clause 1 and the whole of Part 1 is to correct a historical wrong, saying:

“This clause creates a registration route for the adult children of British Overseas Territories citizen … mothers to acquire British Overseas Territories citizenship”.


The wrong is that:

“Before 1 January 1983 children could not acquire British nationality through their mother. While registration provisions have since been introduced to rectify this issue for the children of British citizens (section 4C of the British Nationality Act 1981), this was not changed for children of”


British Overseas Territories citizens.

I am sure your Lordships would agree that charging £1,012 for a child and £1,126 for an adult to be registered as a British citizen is prohibitively expensive when the cost to the Home Office of registration, as estimated by the Secretary of State, is only £372. It could lead to many in this position not seeking registration because they cannot afford the fee. I ask my noble friend the Minister to tell us, in summing up the debate, where people—particularly children but also adults—will be expected to find the fee.

The remaining £640 in the case of a child, and more in the case of an adult, is money raised by the Home Office from the process that these British children and adults must go through to secure their citizenship rights. I do not know whether that is an unintended consequence of the way the fees are structured, but it does not seem fair to me.

In the case of PRCBC and others v SSHD, in February 2021, the Court of Appeal emphasised that for many

“children of a single parent on state benefits. it is difficult to see how the fee could be afforded at all.”

In its judgment handed down on 2 February 2022, the Supreme Court emphasised that these findings are not disputed. The court has similarly emphasised the importance of citizenship to a person’s identity and sense of belonging, and to their capacity to fully participate in social and political life. The Supreme Court Justice ruled that this a political decision, and I put it to the House this evening that it is now for us to rise and respond to the challenge and make sure that, as this is a matter of policy that is for political determination, we put it right this evening.

In conclusion, this is a very modest amendment. It seeks simply to remove the power to use the function of registering British people’s citizenship to raise money to pay for the immigration system and to restrict any fee that is charged to cover the estimated costs of registration. It does this by amending the powers in Section 68 of the Immigration Act 2014 to clearly distinguish rights to be registered as a British citizen from the many and diverse Home Office immigration functions to which those powers also apply. These people have lived their whole lives in this country and essentially have nowhere else to go. I do not believe that it is right that this fee should cause a barrier to them obtaining full citizenship, which, in my view, is their right.

As I said earlier, the amendment also precludes registration fees being charged in two specific cases. Local authorities should neither be charged nor discouraged from acting to secure the citizenship rights of British children whom they are looking after. Further, where a right of registration is provided to correct this historic injustice in British nationality legislation, the only fee should be to cover the process of that application.

With those remarks, I hope that this amendment will find the favour of the House and not just of those have who co-sponsored it, thereby correcting a historic injustice and ensuring that those who are entitled to this will actually be able to afford it. I beg to move.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, for tabling these amendments. I welcome her to the noble band of terriers who have been snapping at the Home Office’s heels on the issue whenever the occasion arose.

In Committee, the Minister, who to be fair is new to the issue, tried some of the old, discredited arguments. Notably, he referred to the

“sustainability of the system and fairness to the UK taxpayer.”

When challenged, he acknowledged that the system to which he referred was the migration and borders system. Once again the Home Office is conflating citizenship with immigration. We still await a convincing reason as to why children who were born or who have grown up in this country should be subsidising the migration and borders system. Moreover, the distinction between this group and taxpayers is simply not valid, as the children’s parents are already taxpayers and the children will be in future and may already be paying indirect taxes.

The Minister also tried to reassure us that there are a number of exceptions to application fees which protect the most vulnerable, including young people who are in the care of a local authority and applying for limited or indefinite leave to remain. However, the exceptions apply only to leave to remain, and when challenged he accepted the distinction between citizenship and leave to remain, saying:

“There is no arguing about that at all.”—[Official Report, 27/1/22; col. 469.]


When challenged again later, he assured me that he would not try the argument again today. Now that both he and the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, have accepted that that argument will not wash in this House, and the importance of citizenship has been a thread running through the debates on the Bill, I hope he will not attempt to use the argument again this evening.

In Committee, the Minister also promised to write in response to a number of questions on the best interests review, for which we have been waiting, like Godot, for a good year since the Court of Appeal ruled that the current fee is unlawful because of the failure to take account of the best interests of children under Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act. I am grateful to him for the letter, although I found it a bit confusing. However, as the noble Baroness said, at least we now have the Supreme Court judgment, which did not dispute the best interests finding, and the Minister’s letter confirmed that the best interests Section 55 review will be published. My understanding is that it will be published by early May. Can he confirm that and say whether it will include a race and disability equality assessment? Can he also give an assurance that Parliament will be given an opportunity to debate the review report?

It is difficult to believe that a fee of over £1,000 is in the best interests of any child who has to pay it, given the evidence of the insecurity, alienation, exclusion and isolation it can cause, as noted by the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court judgment found that, best interests aside, as the noble Baroness said, it is for political determination to limit the Home Secretary’s discretion in setting the fee level. The Bill gives us the opportunity to so determine politically.

Noble Lords have frequently cited the former Home Secretary Sajid Javid, who described the fee as “huge”. Less well known is that, just shortly before becoming the current Home Secretary, Priti Patel also questioned the level of the fee, according to a Times report, and indeed the Minister accepted that it is “a lot of money”. We have an opportunity this evening—or rather, this morning—to end the long-standing injustice created by this huge fee that has served to exclude thousands of children from their right to register as citizens. I hope we will take it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady McIntosh for tabling Amendments 83 and 84, concerning the fees that may be charged in relation to registration of British citizenship. Please be in no doubt that we recognise the strength of feeling on this subject, which I know is of particular importance to my noble friend, as well as the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. I say at the outset that the Government recognise that the acquisition of British citizenship is a significant life event and offers particular value to those able to obtain it, particularly children. All noble Lords agree with this point and have observed it.

Apart from allowing a child to apply for a British citizen passport, British citizenship gives them the opportunity to participate more fully in the life of their local community as they grow up. It also offers specific practical, legal and intangible benefits, including the right to vote on reaching adulthood, of course, and the particular sense of identity and belonging that results from knowing that the country that you have grown up in is your own.

Please let me also reassure the House that the Government are actively considering fees in this space. Following the Court of Appeal judgment in the case brought by the project for the registration of children as British citizens last year, the Secretary of State committed to reviewing the fee in line with her duties under Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. While I recognise that the House has been very patient, waiting for the outcome of that review as though waiting for Godot, it is the Government’s view that it was important to allow the Supreme Court to give its view on the questions raised by a separate ground in this case, which considered fundamental questions around whether the powers that underpin the setting of fees had been lawfully applied, before concluding that work. Following the Supreme Court judgment of 2 February, the Secretary of State is currently considering her policy response to the review, and I hope to update the House by early May. I cannot give a specific date.

Furthermore I reiterate that, as regards the new routes introduced by the Bill to correct instances of historical legislative unfairness, it remains the Government’s intention not to charge in instances where there has been historical unfairness and/or discrimination. This is in line with our approach to other instances of historical unfairness, where waivers and exceptions were introduced in fee regulations, as is appropriate for provisions of this nature. The Government are currently exploring options in this regard for the routes introduced by the Bill. I hope that this reassures my noble friend to some extent.

However, it is important to consider the legislative history of the fee-setting regime, and the intent that has underpinned it. Since the establishment of the current nationality regime in the British Nationality Act 1981, registration of British citizenship for those who either have an entitlement under the provisions of that Act or who are applying on a discretionary basis under Section 3(1) has been contingent on payment of a fee. Current fee-setting for British citizenship is underpinned by the powers set out under Section 68(9) of the Immigration Act 2014 which, as the Supreme Court has affirmed in its recent judgment, were explicitly authorised by Parliament and empowered the Secretary of State to set fees at a level that reflected the costs of exercising the function, the benefits that accrue to an applicant as a result of acquiring that British citizenship, and the wider costs of the borders and migration system. Parliament also explicitly authorised the maximum amount that may be charged in relation to an application for British citizenship registration at £1,500, through the Immigration and Nationality (Fees) Order 2016, which sets the framework for the current fees set out in secondary legislation.

The wider application of these principles and the powers to set immigration and nationality fees have underpinned the Government’s policy over the last decade of moving the borders and migration system to an increasingly self-funded basis, reducing the reliance on the UK taxpayer. Accordingly, fees across several routes, including nationality, have increased to support those broader funding objectives.

However, it is important to be clear on the role that these fees play in supporting the essential work of the border and migration system and particularly in funding the critical activity that supports and safeguards the interests of the people in the UK. These activities, which include ensuring that the UK’s borders are secure from threats and illegal activity, the effective operation of resettlement schemes to support those who are in greatest need and the management of a visa system that attracts the best and brightest to contribute to the UK’s prosperity, are essential to the delivery of the department’s wider mission and objectives.

Any reduction in income from fees must therefore be considered in terms of its impact on these activities, with the likely result being that activity in those areas will be reduced or income must be recovered through other means. This funding includes support for front-line operations that keep the country safe. A need to secure funding through other means may impact on fees for economic routes where the department’s objective is to attract visitors and skilled individuals to support the UK’s economy, which in turn benefits all those who live in the UK, or it will place an increased reliance on the taxpayer to fund these activities, which may in turn reduce the funding available for other important government work.

As such, there is a complex balance of considerations that the Secretary of State must take into account when setting fees, and, in line with the charging powers established by Parliament through the 2014 Act, these have informed the current fees structure. Fees charged are kept under review, as they are in other countries, and, as I have stated, there are ongoing considerations regarding fees charged for citizenship registration specifically, the outcome of which we will share in due course.

Additionally, I emphasise that elements of the amendment, such as the requirement to except fees for children in local authority care, although of course well intentioned, would more appropriately be set out in fees regulations and should not be introduced in primary legislation. In addition, it is not appropriate for a duty to have regard to the need to promote British citizenship in primary legislation that is setting fees. I therefore request that the noble Baroness withdraw her amendment for the reasons that I have outlined.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I am humbled by the level of support expressed in the House this evening and outside the House from the Law Society of Scotland, the Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens and Amnesty International UK. I pay tribute to the long-standing work of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and the support that I received this evening from the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham. Very seldom do the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and I agree, but on this occasion I am delighted to have her support and that expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, and others. I am particularly pleased to welcome the support of my noble friend Lord Hodgson, who speaks with great authority on these matters. As he described it, the Government are going in the right direction, but I argue that, this evening, I do not believe that they have gone far enough. Therefore, regrettably, I wish to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 83.