(9 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support the government amendments and Amendment 60, which stands in my name and that of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. At the outset, I, too, pay tribute to the battles, as the noble and learned Baroness put it, fought by her and the noble Lord, Lord McColl, to bring about child trafficking advocates with the appropriate powers. I have always been pleased to support their powerful advocacy.
As noble Lords have said, we are grateful for the Minister’s efforts in securing these important amendments, which significantly strengthen the role of child advocates in the Bill. In Committee, we pushed for changes to be made to Clause 48, and specifically to give advocates the legal powers that they would require in order to carry out their role effectively. This is the purpose of Amendment 60—but, of course, I am delighted to see that the same powers are outlined in government Amendment 61. Alongside the legal powers, we are pleased that government Amendment 72 gives child trafficking advocates the ability to co-operate and work for public authorities. These are important steps in securing the protection of vulnerable children who have been, and are, the victims of the most heinous crimes.
Guardians will be able to effectively and successfully act in a child’s interests only if they have the appropriate powers to instruct solicitors and have access to the required information from public authorities. Evidence from members of the Refugee Children’s Consortium, the Children’s Society and the Refugee Council demonstrates that local authorities have, unfortunately, failed on many occasions to respond adequately to the needs of the trafficked child.
While I give the Minister the warmest thanks for the amendments that he has brought forward today, I am rather disappointed that between Committee and Report we were not given sufficient information on the interim outcomes of the pilots that are being undertaken. I am grateful for the letter sent out by the Minister on Monday evening, but there is not quite enough detail to tell us clearly what needs to be improved, what is working in the current trials and what is not. The trials started in September 2014 and it would have been helpful if, five months on, we could have had more details and information to inform our debate today. So I have a few questions for the noble Lord.
It would be helpful if he could tell us how many children each advocate represents at a time, what services are available to help with any potential language barriers the children may have, and—as the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, said—what the difference is between the role of the advocate and that of the social worker. Do the trials demonstrate that there is a clear enough definition between those two very specific roles? Have any areas been identified thus far where more work needs to be done or where there are potential problems? I wonder, for example, why there has been a slower rate of uptake than may have been expected.
With that, I say again that I am very grateful to the Minister for all that he has done on these issues, and I look forward to his response.
My Lords, while welcoming very much the enormous progress that has been made—I have no doubt that a lot of that is due to the Minister’s personal efforts—I have two points that I should like to raise. I thought that the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, was going to ask about independent reviewing officers, but I suppose that that is subsumed within the question of accountability.
My first point, highlighted by the noble Lord, Lord McColl, concerns the use of the term “reasonable grounds to believe” which the government amendments apply in place of “reason to believe”. On Monday when we discussed legal aid, the Minister said that he thought it was important that no one should be deterred from applying to be referred to the national referral mechanism, and therefore that it would be better to have “reasonable grounds to believe” as the catalyst or prompt for various things to follow. It would be ironic if that were to be a reason for the change today in the case of child trafficking advocates.
I wonder whether there is in fact any difference between the terms. Is one more subjective than the other, or is one a harder test than the other? I ask this because if they mean the same, would it not be better to retain a non-technical term in order to anticipate any change there may be in the arrangements for the national referral mechanism? We know that consideration is being given to having a single stage going straight to conclusive grounds. Are we constraining a change which a lot of NGOs are calling for by including a technical term in the legislation? This is a question that goes to quite a number of the amendments that we will be considering today.
My second point is about legal representation. I think that on pretty much every occasion when we have discussed this issue I have argued for its importance. I did wonder whether the instruction should be given by the child or by the advocate. Is it the advocate’s role to assist, which is the Government’s amendment? I think that perhaps it is. The lawyer needs to hear from the child, but I am not even sure whether a child—I hesitate to ask this question in the presence of the noble and learned Baroness—has the capacity to give instructions to a legal representative. Should they instead be given by someone on the child’s behalf? However, that is not the main thrust of my question.
Government Amendment 61 states:
“The advocate may (where appropriate) assist the child to obtain legal or other advice”,
and so on. Can the Minister flesh that out? If a lawyer is approached and asked for advice, but legal advice is not appropriate in the circumstances, the lawyer is going to say so. We do not need legislation to put a block in the way—and, indeed, there should not be a block in the way of that approach.
I would not want to think that the advocate would be in a position to stop the question to a lawyer: “Is this a legal issue that you can help sort out?”. I would not want to think that the term “appropriate” in this context is because it is appropriate to the trafficked position of the child—because a child victim may have much wider needs than those which are directly related to his or her having been trafficked. Again, I think it would be a great pity if those who are involved are made to question whether seeking legal advice is the right thing to do.
If the Minister can flesh out and get rid of my concerns about Amendment 61, it would be very helpful to have that on the record. If he cannot, I will really wish that I had not raised them, because I would not want the negative points to be on the record, either.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for moving her amendment. I will speak to my amendments as well. I begin by joining others in paying tribute to the noble and learned Baroness and to my noble friend Lord McColl for eventually securing the amendments that they are looking for. I am grateful that we have been able to do that.
A hallmark of the way in which this Bill has gone through is that it has drawn upon the incredible level of expertise in your Lordships’ House in these particular areas. We have tried to distil that into strengthening the Bill, which enjoys cross-party support and which we all want to see passed. That expertise is also reflected in the 23 amendments that the Government tabled in Committee and by the further 72 amendments, 27 of which we will be considering on the second day of Report. I was reminded by officials that this is something of a record. I do not know if they meant that as a compliment—equating the number of amendments to the effectiveness of the Bill. However, as we have gone through this process, time and again, new pieces of evidence—new gaps—have come to light and, where at all possible, the Government have sought to respond to them.
I will speak to my amendments first and then deal with the questions which were raised. The government amendments reflect the European Union fundamental rights agency’s key functions for such a role and the Northern Ireland human trafficking and exploitation Act. These amendments have been drafted following significant consultation with NGOs and Peers on the precise wording necessary to seek the overall objective of ensuring that we have set out the fundamental principles of these roles in statute.
The government amendments clarify beyond doubt the independence of the child trafficking advocate’s role; ensure the advocate promotes the child’s well-being as well as acts in the child’s best interests; and give the advocate the power to assist the child in obtaining legal advice, as referred to by my noble friend Lady Hodgson. I will return later to the question raised by my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I know that this has been at the very forefront of the debate on this issue and is reflected in the amendments tabled by noble Lords today.
These amendments also remove the Secretary of State’s discretion to make detailed regulations and replace this with a duty to do so. We are also ensuring, through these amendments, that the regulations provide for advocates to be appointed to potential child victims of human trafficking as soon as possible.
The government amendments will also place a requirement on public authorities to co-operate and share information with child trafficking advocates, where any disclosures do not contravene a restriction. This will place beyond doubt the status of the advocate across the criminal justice, care and immigration systems. Again, these government amendments closely reflect those made by noble Lords, as referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall.
Of course; that goes without saying. A copy was placed in the Library. I readily accept, having been on the Back Benches and followed legislation, that that is meant as a get-out clause. However, the noble and learned Baroness should have had that letter as a courtesy, and I will make sure that she is furnished with one within the next few minutes.
The University of Bedfordshire has been appointed to undertake an independent evaluation of the child trafficking advocates trial. That evaluation will establish what difference the specialist advocate scheme made for child trafficking victims compared to the existing provision. The success of the trial will be measured by assessing the impact of advocates on the quality of decision-making in relation to the child trafficking victims’ needs by key professionals—for example, social workers, immigration officials and police officers—the child trafficking victims’ well-being; their understanding, experience and satisfaction of the immigration, social care and criminal justice system; and their perceptions of practitioners. The evaluation will include a process assessment to show how the advocate process operated in practice and what might be improved. The early findings show that in the first four and a half months, 59 children were allocated to the child trafficking advocates trial. The advocates are largely perceived by stakeholders to be doing well, and there is emerging evidence of advocates’ positive impact in individual cases.
The point was raised about the college case, where one individual who was being helped by an advocate was having problems being released by their college. The very fact that the advocate was there and was able to make representations to show that the individual’s college record was not being damaged as a result of the necessary meetings she had to attend is a good example of the work that is being done.
I have a copy of the letter for the noble and learned Baroness and I will make sure that she receives it. I am aware that a number of other specific points were raised. I will look very carefully at those and will be happy to write to all noble Lords, particularly the noble and learned Baroness, following this. But I hope that on the basis of those reassurances, the noble and learned Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
The Minister is being very clear that there is no difference between “reason to believe” and “reasonable grounds to believe”. Many people who will encounter these provisions will have been used to the “reasonable grounds” formula through dealing with the NRM. This point is relevant to other parts of the Bill as well. Can he reassure the House that the guidance that will be published will make it crystal clear that there is no need to get to that point in the NRM procedure in order for the provisions to bite and to be applied?
I totally agree with that. I also recognise that the guidance will be a key part of filling in some of the gaps in the information. When the guidance is released, it will be informed by the results of the trial. That will strengthen still further the operation of the role going forward.
My Lords, I want to speak briefly on what might appear to be a rather discordant note. I support the government amendments for the following reasons. I have great sympathy with the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord McColl, which has been supported. However, when the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, raised the issue about child exploitation, we talked about the spectrum of people with needs.
In local authorities there are individuals with as high a level of need as some trafficked individuals—and I am not saying that trafficked individuals do not need a specialist service. I work with some of the relevant organisations, and a specialist service is needed. There are numerous sexually exploited young people who the local authority is attempting to support—the Children Act 1989 was as special as this legislation is—but because of cuts in local authority spending, children’s services are unable to provide the level of service needed, particularly in mental health support services, hostels for runaways and a whole range of services that we would expect to be given to asylum seekers. It is therefore difficult to set a standard for one group of individuals and say that we are not going to meet it for others.
I would be delighted if the Minister were able to say, “We are going to set this standard, and it should be for all individuals who have these needs”. However, under the 1989 Act, children who are described as being in need—there are thousands on local authority books—are simply not receiving those services. I wanted to inject that into the debate because someone has to speak for the local authorities, which are continually derided as not providing services appropriately. I speak as a vice-president of the Local Government Association, but that is neither here nor there. I simply hear from social workers and people in communities who are attempting to deliver services but against all odds. If there are specialist advocates who can give a high-quality service, such as guardians ad litem—I was eight years in CAFCASS, and I know all about the services such specialists are able to give—we need to look to enabling local authority social workers to give such services to every child in need.
My Lords, we dealt in the previous group of amendments with the distinction, or lack of it, between “reason to believe” and “reasonable grounds to believe”, and to which the noble Lord, Lord McColl, referred. Here, just as on that issue, the guidance will be important in making clear the position. That is because the first few days are so critical, as the noble Lord and others have said.
Guidance will also be important as regards our international obligations, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, referred. Looking at Amendment 78, I have been wondering whether it is necessary to detail what are already obligations, or whether one should have simply the general umbrella description, so that we are not stuck on any particular points. It might be necessary because we are, we hope, making quite a step change. It might also be necessary because having them spelt out in primary legislation will be an easier route to a remedy through the courts; but I raise the point because, if the amendment is not accepted, the guidance will be important in that regard.
My Lords, I support much of what has been said on all sides. It is clear that this is a matter which will not go away and which the House wishes to be resolved. I came across it repeatedly during my 18 years as a London MP—I probably had similar experiences to those of my noble friend Lady Hanham. It is clear that situations which are simply appalling are happening today in London and they have to be dealt with as soon as possible.
I am afraid that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, put her finger on it: I found that the problem was not the law; the problem was making the law effective. The problem was, as she said, how one got a person out of the hands of an abusive employer into some sort of help. They had no information; they had no knowledge of their rights; they came here in total ignorance of the situation. Practical enforcement is what we have to concentrate on. I am afraid that the law will not help here; it is the reality of the situation on the ground floor. Therefore, I want to ask my noble friend what is really being done about a new contract which goes out with the visa. If a contract goes out with the visa all the time, you are beginning to tackle the problem. If you also have a commissioner who concentrates on those areas—the Philippines, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and so forth—where the problem mainly originates, you are beginning to tackle it. Unless you do that, all the law in the world will not avail you.
My Lords, at the previous stage, I commented on the irony that the history of the arrangements for overseas domestic workers was a concession introduced for humanitarian reasons, so that the worker could accompany the family with whom they had been working and would not lose their job. In hearing the experiences that have been related to us, I found it particularly distressing and concerning to learn that a number of workers were informed that, if they were to escape and start work for someone else, they would be working illegally or would be here illegally if they did not approach the authorities. Virginia Mantouvalou in the work that she did in conjunction with Kalayaan reported in her conclusion that the single fear that interviewees who participated unanimously voiced, now that they were undocumented, was a fear of the authorities, of imprisonment and of deportation.
I agree that this is a matter for the rules but what is available to us is primary legislation because noble Lords do not take part in constructing immigration rules. I also agree that a review will not be a waste of time. As my noble friend Lady Hanham said, this amendment will not be a complete solution but it is an interim step and it may give workers who are abused the confidence to get away and seek the help which the noble and learned Baroness has told the House is available. I do not say this lightly, but if I were not to support this amendment, I would feel complicit in slavery and servitude.
(9 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have added my name to this amendment, as I did to its predecessor amendment in Committee. Anticipating today’s debate, I had a quick word with the Minister, who helpfully—perhaps he seized on it as a way through today, at any rate—agreed that the noble Baroness, I and others may be let loose in the Home Office in discussions with officials. This is a complex issue. It is right to take considered steps, but steps do indeed have to be considered. The short point, as the noble Baroness said, is that people working in the field—I may say that those I have met are no slouches—argue forcefully for a specific course of action. Given the energy that they put into assisting victims by means of their legal work, I take very serious note of that. I am happy to support the amendment but, more importantly, because this is not something that is going to be solved in a 15-minute debate, to continue the discussion at the Home Office, and I am grateful to my noble friend for that.
I have tabled Amendment 17—I suppose it is allied to this one—about claims in the employment tribunal. Again, I am not seeking a solution today. My amendment, which really is adequate only for the purpose of raising the point, asks the Secretary of States to consult the appropriate people with regard to access to the tribunal by victims of modern slavery. I mention the national minimum wage in particular. If there is an employment contract, a claim must be brought within three months and is limited to two years’ arrears. I mentioned the two-year limit to a colleague in this House and said I was concerned that victims of slavery were prejudiced by it. He said, “Well, if we extended it beyond two years, other groups would want it to be opened up”. I thought that if it was not immediately obvious to someone steeped in what the House is doing that a victim of slavery, servitude or forced labour was unlikely to have been able to have access to an employment tribunal until that situation had finished, then this was something that had to be dealt with in detail and very carefully.
There are new regulations, which have just come into force, providing that from July the two-year restriction will apply. I understand that the Deduction from Wages (Limitation) Regulations were introduced to answer concerns expressed by business over unexpected and unquantified holiday pay claims; they were not aimed at victims of trafficking. Clearly they will affect victims of trafficking, but those victims are not mentioned in the impact assessment that BIS provided for the regulations.
There are other issues, too: for example, there is the family worker exemption, where someone treated as a member of a family is not entitled to the national minimum wage or to any payment at all, but the Court of Appeal—I have had an example of this—has regarded someone who worked 14 hours a day and slept on the dining room floor as being treated as a member of the family. That would have been an overseas domestic worker, and of course I am aware of the review of overseas domestic worker visas, but there are particular issues around the national minimum wage that we must not lose when we are dealing with other parts of this jigsaw.
I appreciate that there are a lot of stakeholders with a great range of interests in employment rights and the danger of unintended consequences is high, which is why I framed my amendment as I did. However, the victims of modern slavery have themselves suffered unintended consequences. All the Minister needs to do to my Amendment 17 is to say yes.
My Lords, I have also put my name to this amendment—as with the two noble Baronesses who have spoken, for the purpose of further consideration, not for the purpose of being part of the Bill at the moment.
There are two points that I want to make. The first is that there is clearly a gap. The second is that this would give an opportunity to victims who cannot have the satisfaction of the trafficker prosecuted—or indeed if the trafficker or slave owner is actually acquitted—none the less to take civil proceedings under a different and less onerous standard of care. The criminal law, as I am sure everyone in this House knows, requires the jury or the magistrate to be satisfied so as to be sure, but in the civil courts—the High Court, the county courts or the small claims courts—it is sufficient to have the balance of probabilities. So it gives an added opportunity to those who have suffered to get some redress, even if it does not go through the criminal courts. It is for that reason that we seek the opportunity for the Government to have a look at this to see whether something can be done at a later stage.
(9 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I also have Amendments 2 and 3 in this group. The Minister has, quite understandably, urged noble Lords not to endanger the Bill by continuing to seek to improve it—or, to use his words, to improve it “even further”. We must all accept that the Bill has been improved significantly and will be improved, the more so when we get to the end of this stage. We will be considering, I think, 72 government amendments this week.
I well understand, of course, the point that he makes. As much as with any Bill that I have ever known, there is a passion within and outside this House to end up with the best Bill possible, and we owe a lot to a lot of people who work on these issues. What is possible may not be quite the same as what would be if we had another six months, and I accept that some of what some of us would like to see in the Bill needs time for consideration and consultation—more time than we have before the end of the Parliament. I prepared all that to allow other noble Lords to leave the Chamber before I got to the point of my amendment.
We have opportunities for changes or to make sure that the Bill does what we think it does, which we can do without the best endangering the good. With my amendments in this group, I want to be quite sure that Clause 1, whose first two subsections reproduce Section 71 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, does not itself, in its additional subsections, become the victim of the best. The term used in subsection (3) is that “regard may”—and I would like to inquire about the purport of that—
“be had to all the circumstances”.
Subsection (4) gives examples of “personal circumstances” that may make someone particularly “vulnerable” to servitude, slavery, forced labour and so on.
I tabled amendments to the same effect in Committee, because I was concerned then, and remain concerned, that “circumstances” is a term used for external matters, while “characteristics”, which is the term I use in my amendment, means things that are intrinsic to the person. Yesterday I went to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. I am ashamed to say that I had not realised until then that “circumstance” comes straight from the Latin: “circum” meaning “around” and “stance” from “stare”, meaning “to stand”: in other words, something surrounding—as I say, something external. On the other hand, “characteristic” is defined by that dictionary as,
“a distinguishing trait or quality”.
The distinction that I had been concerned about is borne out by the definitions. A characteristic is not a circumstance.
I have been concerned by the evidence I have heard about the limited use of the equivalent existing offence for crimes against children in Section 71 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. This is not because no children are exploited; there is clear evidence to the contrary. I hope, therefore, that this amendment will make Clause 1 more useful to the CPS in prosecuting those who exploit children, for whom I have a particular concern, as your Lordships know.
I wish to ask the Minister two questions. He has made it clear through this amendment that situations in which children are forced into slavery through threats or coercion will come under the offence set out in Clause 1 through Clause 3(5), and, if the child is targeted specifically because they are a child, they would be covered under Clause 3(6). Both of these are welcome reassurances.
Will he please clarify what the situation would be where there is no force or coercion but it is difficult to prove whether a child has been specifically targeted? I also wonder whether he has given consideration to strengthening the imperative to consider these situations of exploitation in Clause 1(4) by requiring that regard “should” be had to them, rather than the present suggestion that regard “may” be had. I look forward to his reply.
In her foreword to the draft Bill, the Home Secretary wrote:
“I want a strong message to go out to any individual or group involved in the enslavement of victims; you will not get away with it, we will catch you and you will go to prison for a very long time”.
I completely agree. We must ensure that offences of exploitation of all kinds, as well as trafficking, slavery, servitude and forced labour, can be properly and regularly prosecuted. I believe that Amendment 4 will help to do this and I commend it to your Lordships.
My Lords, I wish I had thought of “exogenous” and “endogenous”. I will resist changing the term “characteristics” to “circumstances” when it appears later in the Bill.
However, I remain concerned, for the reasons I gave. I was not just playing with words for the pleasure of playing with words but because of the impact that the wrong word may have on the success or otherwise of a prosecution. It is not really the way to go about it if there is a better way of doing so. One should not rely simply on examples that strain the meaning of the term about which the examples are given. There are better ways of doing it.
As I said at the start of the debate, I understand the Government’s concern to make sure that we get the Bill on the statute book. However, if the Minister is able to look at this matter before Third Reading, I would be very happy for him to do so; I shall certainly not pursue the point today. With regard to the trafficking directive, I look forward to finding out how long “shortly” is in this circumstance. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I rise because I have been quoted both in judgments and in evidence that I have given, and if I sit here and do not say anything, some might think that I did not agree with what I said last time. Well, I do.
I am concerned about child exploitation. I think that there are cases—and we have certainly been aware of them in court—where children have been exploited in circumstances which it would be difficult to describe as slavery or servitude or forced labour or even human trafficking. Children are exploited in many different ways and I do not think, if I may say so with respect, that the law caters adequately for those who exploit children who are not under some kind of parental or guardian responsibilities.
For that reason, I support the amendment. One problem with this area of the law seems to be that although we can often find the child who has been exploited we do not seem to be very good at hunting down through the chain of exploitation. For instance, we are very concerned, and obviously so, with children who come from abroad and are left in charge of cannabis factories. So far, we prosecute the child. We do not wait to see who is bringing the food once a week that is thrown through the prison door—because the house is no more than a prison. Where are they going? Who are they looking at? Who are they talking to? Who is making the money from the cannabis plant that the child is looking after?
The other feature that I want to draw attention to is how we relate to the provision on the protection of victims—that is, the defence under Clause 45. We provide a defence, which I strongly support, for slavery or trafficking victims who have committed an offence in circumstances that are defined, but the Bill speaks in Clause 45(1)(c) of “relevant exploitation”. Relevant exploitation in the Bill cannot address child exploitation of the kind that the amendment is designed to address. I ask the Minister to look at that, too.
My Lords, no one could possibly fault my noble friend for lack of persistence or focus, and no one would not want the best legislation for tackling—or, better, preventing—offences against children. I am afraid that I cannot support her amendment. I am sorry about that because I know her ambitions for the Bill, but I understand many of the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, about practice. I would have thought that the point just made by the noble and learned Lord about cannabis farms was also one about practice and observation by the police; I would not have thought that a new offence was needed for that to be dealt with properly.
I have heard it said that a separate offence would mean that the police would take the matter seriously, but what we have heard from the criminal justice professionals, as other noble Lords have said, is that it is not a matter of an alternative but that there would be real risks to Part 1 of the Bill. They argue not just that a separate offence is not necessary—we often hear in this Chamber that something is not necessary and tend to ask, “Well, what harm would it do?”—but that in this case there would be harm. Alison Saunders and Kevin Hyland referred to the issue of determining age, which noble Lords have mentioned. This has bedevilled claims for asylum and responses to asylum seekers for a long time.
To add to the point that the noble and learned Baroness made, in relation to the letter that several of us received today from Kevin Hyland, the point about the case which he discussed with her was not just that so much time was spent on the issue of the woman’s age but that, as he writes, it was,
“distracting the jury from the real issue of her exploitation”.
I take that very seriously. I also take the point made by Alison Saunders that the clause would require evidence beyond reasonable doubt that the accused,
“believed, or had reasonable grounds for believing”,
that the person was under 18.
(9 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe Government have tabled amendments, to be debated on another day, enabling the Secretary of State to introduce regulations to provide assistance and protection for victims on top of the requirement on the Secretary of State to introduce guidance on identifying and supporting victims. However, as my noble friend Lord Warner has already said, these government amendments do not give any specific guarantees of support and assistance on basic principles of protection and assistance, which would provide appropriate consistency for victims in the way that they are treated within a firm framework; nor do they address the consequences of the national referral mechanism not being on a statutory basis since its introduction. That lack of a statutory basis has contributed to feelings of arbitrariness in the application of the national referral mechanism, which have been compounded by the absence of a formal right to appeal an NRM decision, making the system somewhat unaccountable and potentially unjust.
The Home Office’s NRM review, published late last year, to which my noble friend Lord Warner referred, recognised the issues related to the involvement of United Kingdom Visas and Immigration in the current system and recommended that UKVI be included in the future as a participant in the mechanism rather than as a lead agency. The Government have expressed their commitment to improving the identification of and support for victims of modern slavery and, in the light of their own review, recognised that final decisions about who is a victim cannot be left to UKVI, which has another remit to fulfil, and, whatever the reality, will struggle to be regarded as impartial and open-minded on this issue.
However, further changes are needed. What is being sought in the amendment that my noble friend has moved is not new within the United Kingdom. The Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2015 and the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Scotland) Bill both contain provisions for support of victims that go beyond what is contained in this Bill. The result could well be, if this Bill is not further amended, that there are significant differences in support and assistance provided to victims across the different nations within the United Kingdom, which is surely not the objective.
The amendment would place the framework of the national referral mechanism in statute, create a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to set out in regulations the arrangements for a system of victim identification and support and provide for a formal right of appeal against any decision made through the system. However, the Government appear to be saying that they are not prepared to go down this road. The argument in the Minister’s recent letter is that, because this is a time of major change in how we identify and support victims, putting the national referral mechanism on a statutory footing now would be unhelpful and mean a loss of flexibility to improve the system. Instead, the Government have put down an amendment which would provide an enabling power for them to make regulations about identifying and supporting victims.
In his recent letter, the Minister said that the Government had tabled such an amendment to provide an enabling power to place the national referral mechanism into statute by regulations, albeit there does not appear to be any specific reference to the referral mechanism in the amendment. However, there is no reason why adopting the provisions of the amendment that has been moved by my noble friend would lead to potential inflexibility developing, although that is something on which the Minister may wish to comment. The argument that regulations are somehow better for establishing something in statute, such as the NRM, because they can be changed without the requirement for further primary legislation could be used in relation to any organisation or process that is being put on a statutory footing and, in so doing, avoid proper discussion and debate with the ability to amend proposals, which would be provided for by including the terms of this amendment in the Bill.
The amendment which my noble friend has moved, unlike the Government’s enabling power amendment, means that the NRM will be placed into statute on the basis set out in it. The current problems of feelings of arbitrariness in the application of the process of the referral mechanism would be addressed and some consistency achieved in improving the identification and support of victims of modern slavery, to which the Government have expressed their commitment. The Government’s amendment, which is still to be discussed, is simply an enabling power. It is not a guarantee and it is not a requirement. I hope that the Minister will be able to give a helpful response to Amendment 47.
My Lords, I had my name to an amendment moved in Committee by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss—I was about to say my noble and learned friend. That amendment is tabled again today and is much simpler: in order to avoid the need for primary legislation, it is for regulations to be made. Like others, I want the national referral mechanism to be on a statutory basis, and I welcome the government amendments which we will debate on Wednesday—although I have one or two questions about them.
I would be worried about including the new clause proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Warner. To establish it now or “as soon as practicable”—I am not sure what that means in a statutory context, but let us say that it is pretty soon; it is not waiting for the end of a trial, as I interpret it—must, as trials of the new procedures proposed by Jeremy Oppenheim are to be undertaken, risk establishing one statutory basis and then changing it by regulation. Some of the language in the amendment seems to me problematic. The noble Lord will correct me if I am wrong, but I do not think that the term,
“trafficked, enslaved or exploited persons”,
is defined in the same way as victims of,
“slavery and human trafficking offences”,
which is what we have in Clause 41, where the general functions of the commissioner are set out.
I have confidence in what we are being told by the Government about moving to a statutory basis. Without trying to analyse every dot and comma, I would worry that there might be hostages to fortune in the new clause which would require primary legislation to change, rather than the opportunity to rely on regulations, which is what the Government propose.
As Amendment 48 is in my name, I have perhaps been a little slow in getting to my feet. I am content with what the Government propose in principle and therefore did not feel it necessary to propose my amendment with any particular enthusiasm, but I am concerned that at some stage there should be a statutory basis for the NRM. I do not believe that it is appropriate for the power to be other than to enable the Government to make such a statutory regime without going through primary legislation. I entirely support what the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said. I share her concern about Amendment 47, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Warner, because it is so specific. If the trials are effective, the Government may well find that changes are necessary, and because of the way in which Amendment 47 is framed, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, they would probably require further primary legislation. The whole point of what she and I want is to have the statutory process in a way that can be produced by regulation, not further primary legislation. For that purpose, I support my amendment, as far as it goes, and I am not at all happy about Amendment 47.
My Lords, if this amendment is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment 49 because of pre-emption.
My Lords, when I read the Hansard of our first debate on this issue, I realised how much I agreed with the noble Baroness, and I agree with her tonight. I am also concerned about applying the reasonable person test to a child for the reasons she gave and because children develop at different stages. To ask a jury, as I suppose would have to be the case, not only to see what a reasonable adult person would do but to take account of the variables of a child’s development makes the test so complicated that it would be inappropriate. That is the sort of word one uses to be polite, is it not? I do not think we should be requiring this of a child. It adds to the complications and is not the direction in which we should be going.
I have been at meetings where I have heard the noble Baroness say to the Minister that we should not be constructing legislation that allows people to say, “I was trafficked, therefore I should be let off doing anything wrong”. She has been very upfront and quite blunt about that, and she is not trying to resile from that attitude here. I support her amendment.
I shall be very brief. As has been said, the Government’s amendment removes the need for child victims of trafficking or slavery to prove that they did not have a realistic alternative and puts the onus on the prosecution to show that they acted unreasonably. However, as has been said by my noble friend Lady Kennedy, trafficked children will still need to pass a reasonable person test to benefit from the defence, which will, essentially, presumably require an adult juror to decide whether a similar child in similar circumstances would have acted in the same way.
I assume that the Minister will respond to this point anyway, but given the inherent restrictions of the defence in the Government’s amendment to Clause 45 and that it applies only to offences committed as a direct result of trafficking, slavery or servitude, do the Government maintain that it is necessary to ask a potentially traumatised and vulnerable child victim then to pass an additional test of reasonableness and, in effect, show that they have behaved reasonably to achieve legal protection? When the Minister responds, if he feels unable to give a helpful reply—which I hope he will feel able to do—is it the Government’s intention that it is necessary to ask a child victim, potentially traumatised and vulnerable, to have to pass this additional test of reasonableness, given that there is considerable restriction of the defence in the Government’s amendment to Clause 45 in that it applies only to offences committed as a direct result of trafficking, slavery or servitude?
My Lords, I wonder whether the Government have made any assessment of the number of people who would fall within the cohort identified by the noble Baroness. I have been looking through the review of the NRM to see whether I can work that out. I have not been able to do so but I have found the table, which shows that the proportion of potential victims referred to the NRM who received a positive, conclusive decision in 2013 in the UK was 88%. In other words, we are talking about 12% who did not receive the “conclusive grounds” decision. I do not know what that represents in numbers but the argument will go from there that, if the numbers are tiny, the amounts would not be great. As the noble Baroness said, the merits test means that the lawyer concerned is the one who bears the risk. In that connection, it has to be a lawyer who gives advice because of the provisions that make it a criminal offence to give legal advice on immigration if one is not qualified or regulated by the Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner. The ask is, therefore, not very great.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, for returning to move her amendment and giving us an opportunity to again look at this important area.
The Government are keen to ensure that we get right the legal support available to victims through the Bill. That is why we amended the Bill in Committee in this House to extend the existing legal aid provision for victims of trafficking to those who have experienced slavery, servitude or forced labour. This support will be provided once an individual has received a positive “reasonable grounds” decision in the NRM, which is generally made within five working days of an individual being referred to the NRM. I accept totally the point made by the noble Baroness about it being essential that good decisions are made early, and that might be done within that definition. I do not consider that this short period of time without legal aid should have a significant adverse impact on individuals. We want as many victims as possible to gain access to the safety and support provided by the national referral mechanism. Once referred to the NRM, individuals will have 45 days’ reflection and recovery in which to make informed decisions about their immigration choices in a safe environment and with access to legal aid.
I am concerned that providing access to legal aid without any link to the NRM may encourage some victims to not opt for the support available to them. Opening up legal aid to those not in the process would not only risk incorrect use of the system but would mean that individuals could bypass the safeguarding system in place for them, and risks individuals remaining in situations of exploitation. For this reason, I think it is right that legal aid is available only once individuals have entered the national referral mechanism.
However, we are open to changes from the existing system. We have committed to piloting a range of changes to the NRM in light of recommendations made by the recent review, which will include incorporating the “reasonable grounds” decision into the initial referral. In practice, this would have the effect of providing earlier access to legal aid because “reasonable grounds” is the trigger by which that would happen. Any changes to the NRM would be reflected in the provision of legal aid and could be made through secondary legislation.
I hope that the House will be reassured that, through the NRM pilots, we will be testing moving access to legal aid for victims of modern slavery to the point of referral, as was being suggested. Given the concern that this amendment could inadvertently discourage victims from leaving a situation of slavery, I hope that the noble Baroness will consider withdrawing or not moving her amendments.
I should just answer a couple of points raised by my noble friend Lady Hamwee and by the noble Baroness. I was asked about the NRM pilots. Those pilots will test the provision of legal aid at the point that a case enters the NRM. The NRM review did not recommend access to legal aid prior to this point. We do not currently intend to test this proposal.
A point was made about the comparable system for asylum seekers. Advice is available for potential asylum seekers to understand their rights under the refugee convention. There are limited funds available for more general immigration advice that a victim of modern slavery would seek. We need to ensure that advice is therefore appropriately targeted and best assists the victims. Asylum seekers come to the UK as a place of safety and may then seek advice on their next steps. This is not the same as a victim of modern slavery, who may still be in a situation of exploitation. We think that linking legal aid to the NRM process is the best way to ensure that such advice is received by the right people and that victims are encouraged to gain access to the protection and support available in the NRM mechanism.
For those reasons, I ask the noble Baroness to reflect on her amendment.
(9 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in moving Amendment 2, I will, with the leave of the House, speak also to Amendments 3, 7 and 8. These all relatively minor and technical amendments in relation to the Prevent duty in Part 5, Chapter 1, of the Bill.
Schedule 6 specifies those authorities subject to the duty. Amendments 2, 3 and 7 increase the flexibility here to allow for the duty to apply only in relation to the performance of certain of a specified authority’s functions that we chose to refer to in the schedule. We do not have any intention of altering the current descriptions in Schedule 6 at the present time, but these amendments will allow for the possibility of such nuances to be included in the future.
Amendment 7 seeks to provide a clarification that functions caught by this duty do not include functions exercised outside Great Britain. This matches the territorial extent of this part of the Bill.
Amendment 8 follows on from the government amendment tabled on Report, which required that the Prevent guidance be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. This amendment allows for the power to issue such guidance to commence upon Royal Assent. This will ensure that the guidance can be issued and considered by Parliament at the earliest opportunity, prior to the duty itself being commenced, so that specified authorities have as much time as possible to make preparations in the light of the guidance before it takes effect. I beg to move.
My Lords, I welcome these government amendments, as I do all their amendments at this stage. I particularly welcome the proposal that only particular functions of authorities which are specified in the future may be caught. I wish I had thought of using the term “nuance” when I tabled a similar amendment at a previous stage about the current list of authorities.
I have a question for my noble friend on Amendment 7 and functions exercised outside Great Britain. I imagine that his notes include one or two examples of what that might comprise. I asked my noble friends sitting next to me whether they had any ideas. My noble friend Lady Ludford suggested that the measure might apply to the activities of UK Visas and Immigration. I do not know whether the Home Office would come down with a heavy fist on a Home Office body, but I am sure that it is a good principle. It seems that my noble friend may not have any examples, in which case I will let him off the hook as he has been so helpful on other matters.
My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend for her question on these amendments. We are happy to supply further examples but one which springs to mind is that of a university which has another campus outside the United Kingdom. However, if there are other examples which would be helpful to your Lordships, I am happy to write at a later date.
My Lords, I also congratulate my noble friend the Minister on putting the Bill into far better shape than it was in when it left the Commons, as is so often the case in your Lordships’ House. It shows your Lordships working brilliantly together, as we do.
I agree with everything that my colleagues on the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the noble Baronesses, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws and Lady Lister, said about the clauses we are looking at now. I also say to my noble friend Lord Lamont that if he had been with us at Second Reading and in Committee, he would have been rather more assured that some of the aspects that concerned him about the guidance have already been debated at great length. I am sure that my noble friend the Minister will have taken those issues on board.
On substance, I also say to the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, that this is about clarification, which will make all the difference to perception. Perception is hugely important; I think of the 500 signatories who attached their names to a letter in the Guardian only last week. The Minister has responded with clarity, which is exactly what we all asked for. I thank him for that.
Finally, and with respect to my noble friend, I remind all noble Lords of the need to put pressure on whoever is in government after the forthcoming election to bring back to the House debate and legislation regarding data retention. This is an aspect that remains in the forefront of many noble Lords’ minds. It needs to be addressed further and as quickly as possible.
My Lords, an acknowledgement of the Minister’s hard work, openness, patience and availability in numerous meetings applies not just to these clauses but to the whole of the Bill. He has been so helpful, as other noble Lords have said.
Having said that, I think it is right to say—noise from behind me suggests that I might be about to criticise the Minister; I am not—that there is a lot of work for the Government and local government, at all levels and in all sectors, to do. I will not be the only Member of your Lordships’ House who has had a number of emails this morning saying that the writer is very concerned about the Bill, or making points about the need for tackling radicalisation to be done from the bottom up. Such emails also mention issues around discrimination and all the things that many of us have voiced at some length during proceedings on the Bill. At this point, while giving ourselves a pat on the back for having got to here, it is only right to remember that the work done outside the legislation is probably more difficult than the legislation itself.
I gave very brief notice to the Bill team of one question. If the Minister is not able to answer it, since it arises from his most recent letter, which is not on the record in Hansard, I will of course understand if he would prefer to answer it by letter. The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, asked about due regard, particular regard and so on. The letter says, in terms, that the particular freedom of speech awareness and the principle of academic freedom are not elevated above the Prevent duty. On the last day of Report, I think, we heard a very helpful explanation of what “due regard” meant. Having said that, the letter goes on a couple of pages later to say that particular regard is stronger than due regard. I found it a little difficult to reconcile the two parts of the letter. The Bill team started to explain it to me, but I needed to get into the Chamber for the start of these proceedings. If that is better dealt with by letter, to have the same status as the letter that gives rise to the questions, perhaps that would be the way to do it.
My Lords, the Minister’s characteristically generous comments when he introduced these amendments illustrate his attitude to the whole Bill. I hope that the well-deserved praise that he has received so far does not damage his promotion prospects in the future, given where it is coming from. He said that the debate had lasted thirty-eight and a half hours. There were times when it flew by and there were times it did not, but it is a testament to your Lordships’ House—and I think noble Lords across the House, other than the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, have recognised this—that we have a substantially improved Bill from the one that we received, and with no votes, which is an interesting comment on the way we have proceeded in our discussions and debates both inside the Chamber and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, referred to, outside the Chamber as well.
I thank the Minister for the number of occasions on which he has been willing to engage. We have all engaged with Ministers across parties in the past where we have engaged but have felt that they perhaps have not engaged in the same way. He has not been guilty of that on any occasion. He did engage properly. Even last Wednesday, I caught him at around midnight as he was leaving the Chamber, and he was willing to discuss the issue of academic freedom further. I think that says a lot about how we got to this substantially improved Bill.
My only question is to ask whether the Minister can place on the record the points that he made in his extremely helpful letter in that regard, as outlined by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. I think that would be very important. I thank him and his Bill team, who have been available at all times for discussions and debate. I think that is what has led to the improvements.
Can I make one plea? I have also received emails and letters about this. There is some misunderstanding of the purpose of the Bill and how these measures will work. That is going to be very important. Legislation is one thing, but hearts and minds and understanding to make it work in practice in the way that it is supposed to—doing no less and no more than is intended—will be extremely important.
As well as the clarity that the Minister has given to the Bill as a whole, particularly on freedom of speech and academic freedom in Parts 1 and 2 of the Bill, the issues will now receive judicial review. That is extremely important. We pushed it to a vote in the Commons. We did not succeed, but we have succeeded in agreement across your Lordships’ House on that point during our debates.
On the issues of guidance, the fact that we have now increased parliamentary scrutiny by affirmative order is extremely important. I also recognise that during Committee, as the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, said, several changes were made to that guidance. She recognised that it would have to be changed before it was presented to your Lordships’ House through an SI.
We support these amendments. We are grateful to the Minister for putting them forward. We also welcome the spirit in which this Bill has been debated and discussed and the changes that have been made. It is a significant testament to your Lordships’ House that, as I said at the beginning, we have a much improved Bill in comparison to the one we received, and with no votes, by negotiation and discussion.
(9 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 13B. Clause 25 provides that “due regard” must be given—I emphasise the word “due”—to,
“the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism”.
I have to say, preliminary to speaking to the detail of this amendment, that the more that I have thought about it, in one sense the less concerned I am about Clause 25(1). It is not the heavy duty that in some ways it has been presented as, but probably in some ways it simply encapsulates common sense. That is in one sense. Where I find a real problem is in the elaborate infrastructure or superstructure—I am not sure which it is—that has been built around this simple proposition and the context in which the clause, and the whole of Part 5, is now being viewed: the feeling among the Muslim communities that they are being got at. That is why I am still of the view that it would be far better not to have a statutory duty with all the bureaucracy, costs and difficulties that that carries. However, my amendment is much more modest than that principle.
As I said, Clause 25(1) provides for “due regard”. Under Clause 28, the Secretary of State is to issue guidance, and under subsection (2) of that clause the authorities must “have regard” to the guidance. Therefore, is the heavier duty the duty in Clause 25? Is there significance in the difference? Is it technical perhaps that Clause 25 is about a statutory duty and that Clause 28 is about guidance, which does not have the same status as legislation and therefore less regard might be had to it? However, what was a two-faceted question became triple-faceted when the Government laid an amendment on freedom of expression in universities. I do not want to anticipate the debate on that issue but I note that the institutions are to pay “particular regard” to the freedom of speech duty in the 1986 Act. So we now have three levels. Indeed, the Secretary of State is to have “particular regard” to that duty when issuing guidance and considering directions.
It is clearly important to understand the relative weight of these terms. In respect of education, perhaps the freedom of expression duty, because it prompts particular regard, trumps the duty concerning preventing people being drawn into terrorism. On reading all this again, I have to say that, as well as being about the relative weight, it is about which duty is the one in the new clause. In other words, the hierarchy seems to be particular regard, due regard and then plain regard. I am looking for assistance from the Minister on this.
Amendment 13B provides that,
“each specified authority shall have”—
why not?—
“regard to the impact … on local communities”,
which I have put in the plural, and on people connected with the authority, and,
“of the manner of the exercise”,
of this on local communities.
Among various briefings over the past few days, I have received the response to the Prevent duty guidance consultation from the London Borough of Sutton. I should like to share with your Lordships some of the comments that have been made. It states:
“There is a further issue of risk of negative impact from the duty if it is undertaken without careful consideration of local context. There is already evidence to suggest that the delivery of interventions such as around female genital mutilation and honour based violence adding to polarisation of communities. The interventions are important but must be delivered with understanding”.
In the response, a young Muslim woman is quoted as asking,
“‘why in my class are the girls taken out and spoken to about FGM and honour based violence and everyone looks at me and the other girl in a headscarf—these things have nothing to do with my life and are not risks I’m interested in. I’d rather know more about how to stay safe walking across my park’”.
As the London Borough of Sutton response says:
“The guidance is silent on such issues”.
The phraseology of this amendment was prompted by an amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, towards the end of the last day in Committee on the new Privacy and Civil Liberties Board. We have quite properly spent time in our debates emphasising the importance of a positive approach to community engagement—in other words, engagement, not disengagement—and it being a continuing process. Time and again, it has been put to Members of your Lordships’ House that the Muslim communities feel that they are viewed as the problem; namely, that if you are a Muslim, if you are not a terrorist you are a potential terrorist and you need to prove that you are not. Obviously, that is the most enormous slur or slander on the vast majority of Muslims, and it is very counterproductive in that it is polarising and alienating.
My amendment refers to the impact on communities, pupils, clients, patients and so on. As has been said to me, there are questions about workability, functionality and encroachment into the private sphere by the state. I mention the manner in which the duty is exercised because attitudes show in actions and words, and we all know that it is not only what we do but the way that we do it. I beg to move.
Before the Minister sits down, has he had any inspiration about the term “particular regard” which might help the House?
The short answer is that that inspiration is perhaps on its way to me. Perhaps I may come back to that on a later group of amendments, if the noble Baroness would allow me.
My Lords, I thought that I gave notice to the Bill team, whose heads are no doubt spinning with the speed, but something may be on its way.
I can tell the noble Baroness that the “particular regard” element is actually in relation to the Secretary of State’s duty. It is to say that she must have particular regard to the duties under freedoms of speech. The difference between due and particular in this context is that the latter, in all cases, elevates the freedom of speech consideration among all the considerations that must be borne in mind, whereas specifying that due regard must be had to a factor simply underscores the importance of that factor while leaving the degree to which it must be elevated by the specified authority to be determined by the circumstances of the case.
I will leave that to the schoolmasters. However, in this regard, my noble friend should find this reassuring because we are saying that the Secretary of State should have a particular regard. That is a higher threshold to be aware of: the importance of academic freedom of speech within universities. It is a higher test and it is appropriate to say that before she offers direction, she ought to be able to satisfy whether that test has been met. I shall hand back to the noble Baroness.
My Lords, as I said, there is something of a hierarchy in this. “Having regard” implies proportionality, whether it is “due regard” or simply “regard”. I am grateful for the Minister’s explanation. However, I should like regard to be had to the impact of this part of the Bill and to the manner of the exercise of the duty. I am grateful to noble Lords who have commented and who have supported that proposition. The bottom-up approach is precisely what I am seeking to articulate.
The Minister and other noble Lords have referred to far-right extremism. I have acknowledged that in previous debates as well. In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, it is the current context that has caused so many comments from members of Muslim communities. That is why so many of us have made such reference to it. I too am shocked—but not surprised—by her report of girls talking about going to Syria. She asked, “What does that say?”. To me, it says let us look for the best way of addressing this issue. All the comments I have made about a bottom-up approach are directed to doing that. The noble Baroness, Lady Afshar, said that, and she is nodding vigorously now.
I am sorry that the Minister has not been able to suggest further ways of acknowledging this approach and these concerns. However, the guidance is not complete. Although the consultation is closed, over the last few days responses have indicated that points made by Members of your Lordships’ House will be taken into account in finalising the guidance. I hope that this approach will have at least that status, as the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, suggested. That would give a degree of comfort. I beg leave to withdraw my pedantic amendment.
(9 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, several groupings of amendments today and previously have called for quite a tour de force from my noble friend to respond. The House is very well aware of that and grateful to him for that, and for his openness to discussing the measures in the Bill. If I may say so, in the Modern Slavery Bill, too, he has set an extraordinarily high standard at the very end of the Parliament.
I follow the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, in my first point. My noble friend can take this as a comment or a question, as he feels most comfortable. My point is about further consultation. Such a strength of feeling has been shown in the debate on guidance that clearly the best outcome would be another round of consultation with the organisations concerned. The second best would be informal discussions between my noble friend and those who have expressed particular concern.
That takes me to my second point. I am well aware of the Government’s wish to move this along very quickly. My noble friend mentioned the commencement of Clause 28. I take that to mean that the guidance will follow shortly. People will be reading this debate in Hansard. They may have given up by this point, but some will have stuck it and will want to know when the guidance will be issued so that there will be a debate about it. If the Minister can say any more about the timing, that will be very useful to people outside the House.
My Lords, I have one more technical question to ask the Minister; I have given him notice of it. His Amendment 14E starts by saying:
“Guidance issued under subsection (1) takes effect on whatever day the Secretary of State appoints”—
so it appears to start by saying that this is solely about the timing of when the guidance should be brought into effect. But the second part of the amendment is technical, stating:
“A statutory instrument containing regulations … may not be made unless”,
it is approved by both Houses.
That seems a very odd way to put the fact that the guidance is to be approved as to content as well as the timing of its coming into effect. It would have been much happier if the provision had said at the start explicitly that not only is the guidance taking effect on the day set out in the regulations, but that the content will be laid before Parliament.
One can erect a technical, logical argument that the content must be included within the timing, so to speak, but as this is so important, I would be most grateful if the Minister can confirm that Amendment 14E as drafted is intended to mean that both Houses of Parliament must affirmatively approve the content as well as the timing of the guidance.
My Lords, I will also speak to Amendments 15G, 15H and 15J. I referred at the start of this afternoon to the infrastructure which goes along with the statutory duty created by this Bill—the bureaucracy, cost and so on. I do not underestimate or undervalue the negative impact to which I also referred earlier. I read then a part of the response to the consultation on the draft guidance from the London Borough of Sutton. It also referred to descriptions of working across borough boundaries. That made me realise that the legislation may not reflect the current realities of the way local government works.
Sutton talks about sharing,
“a great deal of information and planning with neighbouring boroughs around risk and consequent Channel planning ... This cross border risk identification and consequent planning is not considered in the guidance”.
It goes on to talk about training, and about,
“‘borrowing’ a Police Prevent Engagement Officer (PEO) from the Police in a neighbouring Borough. There is no PEO allocated to Sutton”.
It continues:
“It would clearly be impossible to provide the frontline training for staff in local authorities and education institutions and organisations suggested in the guidance without significant additional funding”.
I shall come to that on the next group of amendments, when I will talk about collaboration in training.
That is a response to the guidance, but should there be something in the Bill? Local authorities are increasingly sharing back office functions, and indeed some front office functions as well. Children’s services and adoption services may be shared, as may any number of services. So should a local authority have “a panel … in place”, as Clause 34(1) requires? I suggest that a panel should be “available” instead. An authority should have access to a panel. It would still have the duty; it would not be avoiding responsibility. But as the clause is worded, would each authority be required to have its own panel? I hope that the Minister will be able to reassure us that local authorities can share functions as I have described.
Clause 34 is about Channel, whereas the previous chapter dealt with Prevent. The point comes up here, so can the Minister confirm that guidance will allow for cross-border as well as multi-agency working? I suppose the bottom line is that the Bill should not actually make cross-border arrangements of this sort ultra vires. If that can be dealt with in guidance, fine. But as the Minister is going to be reflecting so much over the next two or three days, perhaps he could get somebody else to reflect on that point—because if we lose the opportunity to make it clear in the Bill, we shall be in trouble.
In relation to Amendment 15G, my noble friend Lord Carlile drew attention to the need to recognise that when we talk about housing providers, we do not usually mean local authorities. He mentioned the Peabody trust, I think, as probably having the most social housing in London. He mentioned a point that had not previously occurred to me, about recognising the knowledge that housing providers have of their tenants, and the important role that they can therefore play. Understandably, having heard those comments, the Minister answered in terms of the panel. But I am not so concerned about that, because Clause 35(4) provides for co-option. It does not use that term, but that is what it amounts to: there can be appointed,
“such … persons as the … local authority considers appropriate”.
It could therefore appoint a representative of the housing providers.
The amendment, which is the same as the one to which I spoke in Committee, is about the support to be provided to, or required by, an individual. Clause 34 deals with the support that the panel can provide or facilitate, and subsection (5) deals in general terms with the support plan. There is no mention of specific services in it, so housing could be read as being included in those arrangements. However, subsection (6) applies when,
“a panel determines that support should not be given”,
and is considering,
“whether the individual ought to be referred to a provider of any health or social care services”.
Why is that reference so narrow? There must be other relevant services, and I would have thought that housing was pretty obviously one of those. Stable accommodation plays an important role in stabilising someone who has a chaotic or difficult life. I have referred to “other” services because there seems to be no reason to limit the clause, as drafted. The clause does not require the provision of any services; what it requires is the consideration of whether an individual should be referred, and the arrangements to refer him. If there is no positive reason to limit the clause, I am bothered that the Government may be quite unnecessarily depriving the local authority of a tool that it could use.
I hope that, at the very least, the Minister can take this on board. Earlier today, somebody said, “I hope the Minister will go away”, and then there was a pause; let me put it as hoping that he will take away the possibility of guidance covering this issue. Similarly with my earlier point, the point here is that the Bill should contain an assurance that other referrals are within the powers of the panel. I do not read it that way, but I am happy to defer to those who are more skilled in interpreting what legislation actually means. This is another vires point, and I beg to move.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friends for tabling these amendments and allowing us to return to the measures in Chapter 2 of Part 5, relating to programmes to support individuals at risk of being drawn into terrorism. Of course in England and Wales, these provisions relate to the existing Channel programme, which we are putting on a statutory basis. My noble friends’ contributions have benefited from great experience of local government and I will seek to address the issues raised by their amendments.
Amendment 15F relates to the duty requiring each local authority to ensure that a panel is “in place” for its area to provide support to people identified as being vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. The amendment would substitute “available” for the current term “in place”, aiming to ensure that there is flexibility to allow for panels to be in place for combined local authority areas. I hope that I can reassure my noble friend that this amendment is, in reality, unnecessary because Clause 39(3) already provides for one panel in a local authority area to serve multiple local authorities. Local authorities have the flexibility to determine whether to run their own panel or conduct panels with one or more other local authorities.
Amendments 15H and 15J would add to the list of members of a panel any other local authority which was “served by the panel”. I assure my noble friend that the intention here is that some authorities may wish to co-operate by having one panel serving a number of areas and, in those circumstances, would want to ensure attendance by all the local authorities concerned. In certain areas this may be the most suitable approach, and the Government would support this. As I have said, Clause 39(3) already ensures that the panel must include a member from each local authority and each police force where a panel serves more than one area. In addition, the proposed legislation already anticipates other local authorities sitting on a panel by listing them in Schedule 7 as partners to the panel. This means that they are subject to the duty to co-operate with the panels under Clause 36. These additional local authorities would most certainly be invited to attend if a person from their area was under discussion.
Amendment 15G would add “housing” to the list of additional services to which a panel should consider making an onward referral if it was considered that support from the panel was inappropriate. This follows up on a point made by my noble friend Lord Carlile when we debated these clauses in Committee. There are of course many types of support which a panel could consider in these circumstances. I reassure noble Lords that the guidance which will be produced specifically mentions housing as one of these.
My noble friend asked, “Do housing providers attend Channel panels?”. The answer is yes. In Westminster local authority housing advisers have attended Channel panels where appropriate. This is particularly important where vulnerable individuals have already been allocated social housing. For matters concerning new allocations it is the responsibility of the local authority to take this forward. In relation to the Bill, it seems more appropriate to confine the list to those types of support most essential to safeguard health and immediate welfare.
I hope that my noble friend is satisfied with the explanation that has been put on the record and that I will not have to take the amendment away to think again. Perhaps she can reflect on this and withdraw her amendment.
Before my noble friend sits down, I should say that he referred to Clause 39, where the reference is to the “combined area”. I intended my questions to be rather broader than the combined area—where authorities collaborate to provide particular services and activities. As I understand the term—and I may be wrong in this—that does not amount to a combined area. More current experience in local government indicates that I may be right. I took my examples from the response of the London Borough of Sutton. I did not name it, but it was talking about working in collaboration with Croydon. I think both Croydon and Sutton would be pretty surprised if they were thought to be a combined area. I am prepared to reflect, but I am trying to give my noble friend an opportunity to respond, since he has not sat down yet—in the House of Lords parlance.
Of course we will look again at any suggestions, particular one coming from the borough of Sutton. We are saying that, where the duty applies, and the Channel panel covers a number of local authority areas, they would be deemed combined for the purposes of the Channel programme. I am happy to look at that and perhaps it is something about which I can write to my noble friend, though I may not need to do so. Co-operation between local authority officers would be permissible, not just in combined areas. Local authorities could co-operate; “combined” is a specific term and it would cover those areas too.
My Lords, I have referred previously to the cost of the statutory duties—in relation not just to the substance, but to the infrastructure built by the Bill. This amendment refers both to,
“local authorities and other specified authorities”,
but I particularly had in mind local authorities. I am not sure that I have yet done so, but I declare an interest in that I am joint president of London Councils.
I have previously mentioned the “new burdens” principle, which might be expected to apply to these activities, and I have previously referred to some of the costs which have been estimated by the Government. London Councils is unconvinced by these.
My noble friend Lord Scriven will speak to this amendment, so I shall simply explain that, as a way of drawing attention to the costs, the amendment proposes an annual report to Parliament by the Secretary of State. The matter could be included in a report dealing with other matters. Maybe there should be some prospective reporting of the costs anticipated to be incurred.
On the first day of Report, I think it was, the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, referred to the refusals to disclose money allocated to the Metropolitan Police for counterterrorism for security reasons, though, as he observed, some detail of that budget eventually comes into the public domain as it is scrutinised by the London Assembly. I used to chair the Assembly’s budget committee, so I remember all that.
There should be as much transparency in this area as possible. There is a lot of concern about the costs and, in any event, what money is spent on what is a matter of public interest. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Hamwee, and I thank the Minister for guiding the Bill so ably and patiently through the House. I am aware of the time, so I will try not to keep the House too long.
Until now, the debate has been about putting on to a statutory footing the powers that some specified organisations will have and some that they will not. The Minister, along with others who support this going on to a statutory footing, has indicated that this is to bring the rest up to the standard of the best. I know, as I am sure do many people who have had responsibility for public service and budgets, that bringing things up to the best does not necessarily mean being able to do it on the cheap; there is a cost associated with it.
Evidence has come from a number of organisations. In my former life as leader of a council, I was not one who participated in the Oliver Twist-type approach to budgeting by always asking for “more, please”; that is not the approach. However, when new burdens or new statutory responsibilities are being put on an organisation, it is only fair that it is adequately funded for those. As I say, evidence has come from a number of sources in the past couple of months about putting this on to a statutory footing—for example, from the Quilliam Foundation, the Local Government Association and a number of local authorities. More revealingly, the Audit Commission, when it did a report on Prevent in 2008-09, made it clear that resources were needed if this was going to be done effectively and efficiently. I assume that the Minister and the Government want to see this being done in that way.
It would be worth looking at the fact that historically something in the region of £140 million per year, or even more, was previously allocated to Prevent, and large cities were getting somewhere in the region of £600,000 per annum to deal with Prevent issues. I always go to impact assessments because they are very revealing, and I notice that in this one the Department for Communities and Local Government indicates that authorities will need somewhere between £4,000 and £40,000. Past evidence suggests that to do this to the best, large authorities need somewhere in the region of £600,000. It is telling that the impact assessment says that we do not have complete data on all the specified authorities that will be affected, and that is why there may be a discrepancy.
Manchester City Council, in a report that went to its cabinet only a few months ago, highlights specifically the financial burden that this is now having on a city such as Manchester, and says clearly that it cannot be sustained at its present level. So there is evidence historically; there are people who are not providers, or not public statutory bodies, such as the Quilliam Foundation, and existing providers of Prevent, who are saying that resources will be needed.
The London Borough of Sutton has done some work on the consultation and says that for such a borough, somewhere between £50,000 and £60,000 would be required for a Prevent co-ordinator—looking at local government, that is about the rate that such people are paid. Somewhere in the region of £250,000 would be required for new interventions, based on best practice from Wandsworth. Sutton also anticipates somewhere in the region of a £150,000 per annum increase in capacity for core safeguarding work, child protection and early work interventions.
This is not cheap. This is not work, if we are going to do it effectively, that can be done with existing resources; that is becoming very clear. The cost from Sutton does not include some of the extra work needed for administration and, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee suggested, some of the extra work needed for looking cross-border at a larger area.
Staff training is a full duty within the guidance. I quote from paragraph 37, which states:
“Local authorities will be expected to ensure that frontline staff have a good understanding of Prevent, are trained to recognise vulnerability to being drawn into terrorism and are aware of available programmes to deal with this issue”.
Staff training in itself will run into many hundreds of thousands of pounds for large authorities. Some of them have between 8,000 and 10,000 staff. The impact assessment states that it will cost £62 for 20 members of staff trained. For a local authority with between 8,000 and 10,000 front-line staff, as some of our large metropolitan authorities have, it will mean £31,000 to carry out just one section of the guidance. That is a significant cost.
I suggest that the duties placed on the public sector will be far more than the anticipated £10 million to £14 million per annum that the impact assessment suggests. I will give one example of why the figures are completely inadequate. Staff training is anticipated in the impact assessment to require an allocation by government of £300,000 per annum. There are 254,000 staff employed by the public sector in the north-east region. Assuming that only 50% of those are front-line staff, that is more than £300,000 per annum. Yet £300,000 per annum is being given for the whole country for staff training.
The amendment tries to get a commitment that, if we are going to go down the route of putting this onto a statutory footing and we want to make sure that local public bodies carry out best practice, adequate funding is provided. If not, the Government’s target of meeting best practice will not be achieved. Resources will not be available, particularly in the present climate in terms of public sector resources. So I ask the Minister the questions asked by my noble friend Lady Hamwee: will new burdens apply to the new duties that are to be put on the public sector, and will money be put forward annually, as the amendment says, before Parliament, so that local authorities and other public bodies locally will be compensated for the duties they will have under a statutory footing?
I am happy to look at that. We are consulting on this. A little bit like the discussion we had on universities and higher education earlier on, it might be the case that there is some misunderstanding about the level of the duty which will be required as a result of this new law. That is the reason why the consultation will be very helpful. It is something that I will take away and reflect back on, and also feed back to colleagues in the Department for Communities and Local Government in relation to this, with whom we work closely. I will also perhaps write to the noble Lord with a little more information if I can. In the mean time, if the noble Baroness would be willing to withdraw her amendment, I would be grateful.
My Lords, I, too, am bemused about whether this is a new burden or whether the cost will be nil. I do not have the impact assessment with me, but looking back at the costs that I quoted in Committee on 28 January, I see that I referred to the impact assessment estimating that the total cost of the measures for England and Wales would be around £40 million, although within that, the cost of placing Channel panels on a statutory footing has been estimated at nil. Perhaps everybody is right. I am also bemused at the figure of £62 to train 10 staff. That seems remarkably little. I presume that it covers the trainer and the time of the staff being trained. My noble friend and I have both been quoting Sutton because we have had the material to help us. It is certainly right to say that in terms of London boroughs, Sutton is a small borough.
I am grateful to my noble friend for agreeing to make sure that at least the information that has been put out is correct and that there are no queries hanging over that, and particularly for his offer to consult with the umbrella organisation London Councils. I have no doubt that this topic is one which will be raised repeatedly in conversations between local authorities and DCLG, as well as with the Home Office, but I am glad to have had the opportunity to air this, and it is important that the points made by my noble friend have got out into the open. I am sorry, I am not suggesting that there has been any attempt not to reveal anything. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I welcome the government amendments. In my clumsy way, I tried to deal with the issues raised by the independent reviewer about his remit and the new board at the last stage. The Minister referred to two of the five issues that the independent reviewer sought to cover, which I tried to cover at that last stage. I am flattered that he suggested that my Amendment 16A comes from my own interest and concerns about the Justice and Security Act and the disclosure of sensitive material, closed material proceedings, special advocates and all the rest of it, as well as my concerns about immigration and nationality law. I indeed have those concerns but I cannot say that this is a self-started amendment. I was asked to pursue the subject. The independent reviewer has made clear that he wants this. He does not seek to go beyond the counterterrorism area. I hope that the amendment is clear on that. His blog has already been quoted and I shall quote from it too. He wrote:
“It is however a shame that the Reviewer was not also given the opportunity to review the operation of other powers, including immigration powers, to the extent that they are used for counter-terrorism purposes. I have no evidence whatsoever that any of those powers is used in an improper manner. But in such a sensitive and secret area, it is as well to have the assurance that only independent review can provide”.
He continues by quoting from his report of last July, which said:
“More than one person of a suspicious cast of mind has suggested to me that the unreviewed powers (for example, the use of the Royal Prerogative to withdraw passport facilities) are likely to be used for the purposes of doing the Government’s ‘dirty work’”.
I suggest my amendment because the independent reviewer has a holistic approach to this whole area. Individual case oversight and different reviewers, to which my noble friend has referred, while reassuring, do not meet the points that the reviewer has in his mind. He clearly looks at how the whole of counterterrorism legislation is operating and has ranged beyond the relatively narrow legislative remit that he has had in the past. Previously, I have heard him say that he is not seeking a turf war with other reviewers but, equally, he does not see these things in silos, which is why this amendment has come forward. I beg to move.
My Lords, I support the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. This amendment derives from the work of the Joint Committee on Human Rights in scrutinising the Bill. We took evidence from a number of people, including the independent reviewer. It was his recommendation about the major gaps in his function which should be filled which led to the creation of this amendment. I did not put my name to it to lead it because, in my innocence, I thought that there was a possibility that we might get to it earlier in the evening when I would be engaged in a committee. I have much to learn about your Lordships’ House.
As the noble Lord, Lord Ashton, rightly says, the independent reviewer had identified these major gaps. The Government have also accepted and recognised those gaps. I think that the independent reviewer has been looking at the whole architecture of counterterrorist legislation and has tried to ensure that there is—I do not like to use the word holistic—a complete, effective and standard-based approach to the review, which I do not think is provided by individual case-by-case judicial proceedings.
The opportunity here is simple and it would not add a great deal to the work of the independent reviewer were the Government to consider again this amendment. As the Minister has said, the office of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation is very highly respected in the country. I have worked very closely with some of the predecessors of David Anderson QC and I know how very significant that work is.
We are just asking for two issues to be moved into the remit of the independent reviewer under this amendment. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has said, the first concerns Part 2 of the Justice and Security Act 2013, which deals with closed material procedures. Those procedures apply in litigation, which very often is litigation that is seeking compensation in claims against the Government and other authorities, and where there is a problem that there is material the disclosure of which will be damaging to the interests of national security.
The review that the noble Baroness referred to was what Parliament laid down in the Act. That was what Parliament required as the oversight for that Act. We will have to stay with the extended remit as we have put it. At the moment, I am afraid that I cannot make any guarantees that we will extend it to the Acts that my noble friend Lady Hamwee asked for.
Finally, on the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board, whether or not it is what the independent reviewer wanted, he may be making the best of a bad job, but he has stated that,
“if skilled and practical people are appointed to the Board, content to work under the Reviewer’s direction, the capacity for independent review will be improved … the Government has listened to what I have been saying, and put forward changes which should significantly improve the ability of the Independent Reviewer to do an effective job”.
I am therefore confident that the changes we are proposing will further enhance his ability to provide robust oversight of the full range of counterterrorism legislation on the statute book, including this Bill, once enacted. I again ask my noble friend to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, it is late, but it has been a worthwhile discussion and I am glad to have had support, although maybe slightly qualified support in some cases, for the principle of my amendment to Amendment 16. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, that if her name had been the lead name on the amendment, we would probably have reached it at about 5.15 pm, because that is the way it always goes.
The noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, used the terms “extent” and “impact”. I do not think that there is really anything between us on the substance, but she reminded me of the amendment that I tabled at a previous stage, referring to any other law relating to counterterrorism and national security legislation, and then adding something about considering whether such legislation contains appropriate safeguards, is proportionate and necessary.
I think that the Minister made my point for me, because in describing the changes to the timetable that the independent reviewer must observe, he said that now he would have more opportunity to make thematic reviews. That is precisely why I would like to see the provisions in the amendment included in the Bill. I can see that that is not going to happen, but this will not be the last time that the point is made. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(9 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Schedule 1 to the Bill provides for the seizure of passports from persons suspected of involvement in terrorism. Paragraph 2 deals with the seizure of passports at a port, and paragraph 2(8) sets out what the officer undertaking this exercise must tell the person. He must tell him that he is suspected of intending to leave Great Britain or the UK—there is a slightly different provision for Northern Ireland—
“for the purpose of involvement in terrorism-related activity”,
and that the officer is entitled to exercise the power to seize. Reciting those statutory grounds does not seem to be enough. There is no provision on the face of the Bill for the person to be informed of at least the gist of the reasons for the suspicion.
The draft code of practice, which has been out for consultation, includes some notification requirements but it does not include this one. As the Joint Committee on Human Rights pointed out, the draft code provides that,
“where a senior police officer authorises retention”—
this is at a different stage—
“the individual must be given a written notice which should … inform the person that they may … request reasons for the retention of their travel documents … Elsewhere, the draft Code provides that a police constable exercising the power … must issue the person with reasons for its exercise … ‘if requested’ and if travel documents are returned within the”,
first period which is provided by the schedule,
“they are to be accompanied by a notice reminding the individual that they may formally request reasons as to why their travel documents were seized and retained”.
None of that addresses the need to tell the person straightaway.
I should like to see in the Bill the JCHR recommendation,
“that the Code should provide that a person subject to the exercise of the power should be informed of the reasons for its exercise at the earliest opportunity in every case, and not merely where the individual makes a request”.
That is very fundamental, not only to the exercise of the power but as to how it is perceived. We rightly spent a good deal of time in Committee—and will, I am sure, spend more time—on the difficulties of perception and perceived discrimination against certain groups, which perhaps is a different issue from actual discrimination but is a very real issue.
In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, supported my point. He said:
“No one would suggest that all detailed reasons must be given, but if someone is told that their passport is being taken away they should be told the essence of the reasons why if this power is to be acceptable and not criticised as obviously unfair”.—[Official Report, 20/1/15; col. 1236.]
It was building on that phrase “the essence of the reasons” that I have provided in my amendment for a summary of the reasons and not for the detail. I am aware that there may be security issues around that.
In Committee, the Minister gave a very long response to the group of amendments of which this was one—I think that there were 24 amendments—so it was quite an achievement to cover the ground. I fear that I did not manage to extract from the response a reply to this specific point. At the end of his reply, I asked him whether some comments he was making applied to gisting, and he said that they did not. Therefore, it seemed to me appropriate to bring the matter back at this stage in the hope that I will hear that we could include something like this in the Bill but certainly in the hope of hearing a detailed defence of the Government’s position. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and I should like to say strongly that I do not support this amendment. There was a very good reason why we said that reasons should be given “at the earliest opportunity”. We absolutely accepted that there will be occasions on which it simply is not reasonable, either on security grounds or because of the speed with which the information is travelling in relation to the possible perpetrators from whom the passport is being taken, to expect the police to have reasons to hand. The phrase “at the earliest opportunity” leaves it sensibly open for the police to be able to respond in good time with some information as to why this has taken place. The committee discussed at great length that to expect a summary there and then on the spot—which is what the noble Baroness is asking for—would probably be too difficult in certain circumstances.
We have to accept that some of the information will probably arrive without much notice to those who have the difficult task of removing the passport. Given that the person will already be at a port or an authority in order to leave the country, surely it is right that in such cases we give trust and time to the security services and the police to do what they have to do in an emergency—that is, to remove the passport—and then, at the earliest opportunity, state the reasons.
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, quite reasonably asked us to imagine a situation. I understand what she described. But perhaps we should also imagine the reaction of the individual—so the whole of the scene.
My noble friend the Minister talked about the return of documents as soon as possible, senior authorisation, the 72-hour limit, the role of the chief constable and the court, and so on. None of those is likely to satisfy the individual at the point at which they have been stopped. Let us say that you are an outraged, innocent traveller. Everything that has been described by way of safeguard is after the event. On the point about profiling and discrimination, perception is so important. The safeguards will not answer that point.
My noble friend said that the amendment was not necessary. It may not be necessary in terms of reasonable suspicion—that is not my argument—but something is necessary, even if it is difficult. On giving reasons at the earliest opportunity, I take the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, that the police may not know at this point. I can imagine that there might be an urgent phone call to the effect that so and so is likely to go through border control in 30 minutes’ time or on to such and such a flight, and the services will need time. However, that having been said, the code does not even provide for an explanation at the earliest opportunity. It talks about “requesting reasons”; it puts the onus back on the traveller. However, the officer may not know the reasons—so you can request them as much as you like but you will not be given them by somebody who has not been informed of them.
I take the point about security. I suspect that these situations might all be emergencies. To conclude, is there some way of encapsulating and dealing with this concern? If it is not in the Bill at Third Reading, could there be at the very least a change to the code to make the arrangement more human for the person affected? I would be very happy between now and next week to try and thrash out how this might be provided.
On the latter point, of course the code is open to consultation. I certainly give an undertaking that my noble friend’s remarks will be fed into that consultation process.
My Lords, Amendments 3 and 4 are also in this group. In Committee, I raised the issue not only of “arrangements”—the term used in the schedule—for persons unable to leave the United Kingdom after the retention of travel documents, but arrangements for their travelling companions. The Secretary of State can make arrangements for the person concerned, but often people do not travel by themselves, and those who are with them will be affected as well, as the noble Baroness just said. My noble friend Lord Ashton said that the debate had,
“highlighted a potential gap in the current provisions”,
and said that,
“the Government are committed to considering this issue in greater detail”.—[Official Report, 20/1/15; col. 1257.]
My question is, of course, whether the Government have now had a chance to consider the situation. If we do not refer to other people in the Bill, and if it is a fair point that arrangements for companions of the traveller in question should be considered, is there some other basis on which the arrangements could be made without the provision being ultra vires? I beg to move.
My noble friend Lord Ashton indeed undertook to go back to consider whether the intention was that those travelling companions would be covered. The brief answer is that I can confirm that parliamentary counsel’s view is that that is indeed the case under the current wording. I hope that that will provide assurance, but for the purpose of the record, I can confirm that paragraph 14 of Schedule 1 already gives the Secretary of State sufficient scope in appropriate circumstances to make arrangements for travel companions of a person whose travel documents are retained. That is because such arrangements will relate to the person subject to the exercise of the power. An amendment to the Bill to apply that provision to travelling companions is therefore in our view, and that of counsel, unnecessary.
Amendment 3 would widen the ability of Paragraph 14 to include where a person is,
“unable to make the journey to which the travel relates”.
The additional wording is unnecessary, as it is captured in the current drafting of,
“unable to leave the United Kingdom”.
For that reason, we are unable to accept the amendment; but I hope, having had the opportunity to clarify that important provision, that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, that is good news. I had not thought that the words “in relation to” the person could extend to “in relation to relations”, as it were. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 6 and 7. In Committee I raised the issue of people who might be travelling for humanitarian reasons rather than simply—if that is the right term—because they are involved in terrorist-related activity. I recognised the difficulties in this, as an individual could assert that he is simply travelling to give humanitarian aid. It is hard to untangle what constitutes support, as envisaged by the Bill, which is more than humanitarian assistance. To put it another way, showing that humanitarian assistance is not so intractably bound up with the activity in whatever country it may be is very difficult.
I therefore chose to base my argument on the position of reputable organisations such as the Red Cross. I had not anticipated the contribution from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, which extended the matter very usefully to issues that had come to his attention in his chairmanship of the Joint Committee on the Draft Protection of Charities Bill. He drew the committee’s attention to examples where there had been deterrence to those organisations—I think it is fair to say organisations rather than individuals —that were seeking to go to the areas in question for all the right and good reasons, but feared that they might be prosecuted under the terrorism legislation.
I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, and I think I took it at the time, that this is actually quite difficult to find one’s way through as a matter of practice. Rather than adding it to the Bill, I have suggested—and I am grateful that the noble and learned Lord has added his name to Amendment 5—that the training to be provided and dealt with in the code of practice should include identifying people to whom this applies; that is, persons intending to leave for humanitarian purposes, not for the purpose of involvement in terrorism-related activity. In other words, those who had exercised the immediate power should be assisted in this.
The other two amendments in the group take me back to the issue of equalities, discrimination and the perception of discrimination. At col. 145, my notes tell me, I dealt specifically with the Equality Act, which was mentioned in debate, as well as recording when the powers are exercised. There is a provision in the code about monitoring. I think that monitoring requires recording, and we are all only too aware, as my noble friend Lady Hussein-Ece has referred to today, of the problems of profiling and inappropriately stereotyping—well, any stereotype is probably inappropriate—and inappropriately identifying individuals who may be the subject of suspicion. I beg to move.
The Government’s position is that we do not want people to pay money to terrorists for any reason, so I think that what the noble and learned Lord said was correct.
My Lords, there were a few nuggets in that, for which I am grateful, so I shall not spend time on Amendments 6 and 7.
I absolutely take the point that there might be other entirely legitimate reasons for going to Syria or wherever, as the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, suggested. It made me realise how important gisting is, or an explanation of the reasons for many powers being exercised, because the reasons may come out in an exchange at that early point—the noble Baroness is right about photojournalists and many other completely proper reasons.
The Minister said that the Government do not want people to use humanitarian reasons as a pretext. I did not use that term, but that was exactly what I meant. I think I said that someone could assert that they were going out for that purpose. I agree with that. As to whether officers need training, let me just say that I put question marks against that rather than ticks.
Not being aware of prosecutions does not entirely answer the point. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, talked in Committee about the chilling effect. I fear I have not followed up his references, but he also pointed us to legislation in Australia and New Zealand, which, as I understood it, he felt dealt rather better with that point. The noble and learned Lord nods at that.
I had hoped that we might have been able to take the matter a little further today. On some points we have, but I think that this may remain a real issue. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, Amendment 8 takes us back to the subject of gisting, but in the context of the imposition of a travel exclusion order. Clause 4 requires an explanation of the procedure for applying for a permit to return. I would extend that explanation to a summary, bearing in mind the security issue of the reasons for the imposition. I am not seeking a detailed explanation, but for reasons to be given that give an outline, so far as it can be given, for the individual to understand what is being imposed on him.
Amendment 9 would insert a reference to not having a reasonable excuse when failing to comply with a condition attached to the permit to return. In Committee, I referred to a “material failure to comply”. The Minister pointed to the provisions in Clause 10 dealing with the offence which would flow from breaching the condition—in particular, that an individual subject to a TEO would be guilty of an offence if he returned without reasonable excuse. I am seeking to align the provisions and to attach similar wording to the provision that deals with the invalidation of a permit. I beg to move.
My Lords, I want to add words of support for the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Providing the “gist”, as it was referred to by the Joint Committee, would certainly dispel some of the concerns that could arise about the potential random use of these powers, even if they were not so used. Providing that little bit more information, with individuals having direct experience of the reasoning, rather than the oversight process that would follow, would have a useful purpose.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that. I certainly had not envisaged putting any ideas into an individual’s mind as to what might be effective to explain his position. On a more general point in response to the comments on gisting, an individual who is subject to these processes is likely not to be wholly open-minded as to the reasonableness of the Secretary of State. Issues of transparency are important here as well. The Government rightly talk about a balance and I do not disagree with that. However, having in mind the need for a balance, I am sorry that the Government have not been able to produce a provision dealing with gisting at the various points at which it might—or to my mind should—arise. My attempts are very amateur. It is a shame that the Bill does not reflect the Government’s approach, which of course, on the issue of balance, I fully share. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Gloucester is rather nearer to London than 200 miles, which is a possible distance. Having said that, I reaffirm my support for the amendment.
My Lords, at the last stage I supported the noble and learned Lord. I had not thought it would be appropriate to come in at this stage because I had to deal with something else while remaining in the Chamber, so I was not able completely to concentrate on what he said. However, as one of those who, I suppose, must be regarded as having danced the most during the earliest part of this afternoon, I reaffirm my support. I trust the courts to take a proper attitude to the issues which come before them, which is what this amendment is about.
Before the Minister rises, I will just say that, as I understand what is proposed by my noble and learned friend Lord Brown, he is not saying that the courts’ powers should be in any way unusual. This is really giving them an ordinary responsibility within the scope of judicial review as I have always understood it.
(9 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberAmendment 103A is the first in a series of amendments relating to Part 5 of the Bill, which relate also to the Prevent strategy and its partner, the Channel programme. Part 5 seeks to make statutory for participants in these two programmes actions and duties that have until now been voluntary. That switch from co-operation to co-option raises a whole range of issues for those involved. The universities in particular are very unhappy, about both the threat to their autonomy and the conflict that this creates with their duties under other legislation to promote debate and safeguard freedom of speech.
The provisions in the Bill and its accompanying guidance also pose problems for other educational institutions: schools, further education colleges and sixth-form colleges, which provide for the younger—and arguably more impressionable—adolescent age group. Generally, there is considerable concern that these provisions may backfire and, far from helping to improve the present position, may well serve to make matters worse. To date, all these educational institutions have co-operated voluntarily and willingly with the Prevent strategy, accepting and developing it to suit their specific circumstances within the framework of their safeguarding policies. They worry that making these duties obligatory and pushing through this legislation with relatively little consultation will not only leave teachers and administrators with a considerable bureaucratic burden, but will also alienate those on whom those burdens fall as well as those whose activities it seeks to monitor.
In this context, Amendment 103A is a probing amendment; I am not suggesting that this wording is in any way appropriate. Essentially, it seeks to draw attention to the lack of clarity in the terminology used in the Bill and, in particular, in the draft guidance, which was issued alongside the Bill. The Bill itself is very careful to use the term “terrorism” and the duty specified in Clause 21(1) is,
“to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism”.
Clause 33 states that,
“‘terrorism’ has the same meaning as in the Terrorism Act 2000”,
which is a definition that has been around for some 15 years, so presumably the courts are reasonably happy with it. The definition of “terrorism” in the Terrorism Act 2000 relates to the “threat of action”, which involves violence against people and property, endangers lives, constitutes a serious risk to health or safety, or seriously disrupts an electronic system. It is less clear, and more subjective, what “being drawn into terrorism” —the words used in the Bill—means. The difficulty arises from the draft guidance that was issued.
The guidance makes it clear that the purpose of the legislation is,
“to exclude those promoting extremist views that support or are conducive to terrorism”.
In turn, paragraph 5 of that guidance defines terrorism as,
“vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs”.
Further, those caught by Clause 21(1) are required to assess how far their students or pupils are at risk of being drawn, not only into violent extremism, but,
“non-violent extremism, which can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism”.
An article in Times Higher Education suggested that that could apply to those using non-violent techniques such as sitting in a road to block the passage of equipment to be used for exploring fracking. As the Joint Committee on Human Rights pointed out, the terminology is so vague as to leave much discretion in the hands of the police and other members of the local panels being set up under Chapter 2 of this part of the Bill, whose task it is to decide whether those reported as being drawn into terrorism, or vulnerable to being so drawn, should be put on a support programme. I have a great deal of sympathy with the Association of School and College Leaders, whose briefing to us pointed out that the lack of legal certainty over definitions of terms such as “extremism” will make it extremely difficult for schools and colleges to know whether they risk being in breach of this new duty. The association remarks:
“A number of members had received the Prevent training in their schools and colleges, and while some found it helpful, others found that it was so vague in respect of what to look for that they felt even less confident about the duty after going through the training”.
It seems very difficult for us to impose these duties on such a wide body of institutions if there is such uncertainty over what this duty involves. I beg to move.
My Lords, Amendment 103B in this group is in my name. Widespread concerns have been expressed about Prevent becoming a statutory duty, and it has been suggested that Clause 21 be left out of the Bill. My preference would be for it not to become statutory, but I recognise that the Government have thought about that carefully and come to a view. I declare an interest as one of three joint presidents of London Councils, the umbrella organisation for the London boroughs. Like others, it is concerned.
I have two main, and rather different, points to make about the amendment. It would mean that the duty would not apply to any of the specified authorities—those listed in Schedule 3, and any more that are added,
“unless the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a report regarding the operation of the duty”.
I shall come back to the term “operation” in a moment.
My first point is to ask whether imposing the duty is appropriate to all specified authorities, and for all the functions of those authorities. My second point is about funding, particularly in the case of local authorities. As my noble friend has said, authorities will have a statutory duty, as set out in Clause 21, to “have due regard”—and in talking about activities leading to terrorism, she has identified an important issue. My amendment would require each authority to be considered separately. The authorities are different, and they operate differently. That is why I have used the term,
“the operation of the duty”.
The scheduled authorities range from local authorities through a great variety of educational institutions, the police, prisons, health services and health service providers. Even if the duty is appropriate for a higher education institution—we will be paying a good deal of attention to that aspect today—is it appropriate for a primary school or a nursery school?
Of course, preventing people being drawn into terrorist activities is immensely important. However, I wonder whether our great arts institutions, which get a lot of public funding—although not as much as most of them would like—have more opportunity than a nursery school does to deal with this issue. A nursery school may have a responsibility, but it is a responsibility to make kids aware of the difference between violence and talking about things. That is much more important than closing off the issues.
I do not think it is enough to say, as I suspect the Minister may suggest, that there will be a proportionate light touch, because having the duty creates work and bureaucracy, and requires record-keeping. The Secretary of State will have the power to issue directions and, in the case of educational institutions, Ofsted will apply them. As has been suggested to me by some of those concerned—especially by those from the Muslim community, although my concerns are not limited to that—the records may then show that there is disproportionate criticism of schools in areas with a large Muslim population. That will give the alienating message—I believe “alienating” was the term my noble friend used—that we are concerned about.
I suspect that others will talk about the principle of applying a statutory duty to local authorities, as distinct from a function and a power, as has been the case, and would be the case. I want to ask my noble friend about services that are contracted out by local authorities, as many services are. If an authority is in the middle of a contract, it cannot change it; it certainly cannot change it unilaterally. How should it deal with that? New and renewed contracts would have to tie organisations into the new duty. That is in part why I have used the term “operations”, because I am unclear how this will work in practice.
My noble friend has great legal expertise in the terms being used here. We are saying that, clearly, if you put anything on a statutory footing—even to “have due regard to” the guidance—then there must be a consequence should you fail to have due regard or are found not to have due regard; and that that must be specified in the legislation. That is all we are doing here. I am sure we are all of the view that such a measure would be used only in extreme circumstances. We fully expect that all universities will do what the best universities are doing already, which is to have their systems and procedures in place for this. As I have said, I am very conscious that we will be returning to this in further groups; but in the mean time I would be grateful if my noble friend might consider withdrawing the amendment.
My Lords, before my noble friend responds, I had degrouped that amendment from my, rather than from anybody else’s, amendments. In replying, my noble friend the Minister has relied a great deal on Clause 24 on guidance. However, that does not seem to me to justify the ability of Parliament to consider, authority by authority and function by function, the application of this duty, which is a much more significant duty—on that I am very much with my noble friend Lord Phillips—than the words “due regard” in everyday speech might suggest. If I were to see Hansard by the time we reach Clause 24 today I might think that my noble friend had given me quite a lot of material to press my amendments to that clause, because he has said an awful lot that supports what I am arguing should go on to the statute book. We will come to that, but I wanted to make it clear that my point is about Parliament’s role in this; it is not about consultation on guidance.
I thank the Minister for his response to my amendment and other noble Lords who have participated in this very interesting debate. It was supposed to be a relatively minor probing amendment to clarify the definitions and to make the point, which I think still needs to be made, that where there is not clarity in definition, it leaves a great deal to the judgment of those expected to implement these duties. That in itself poses problems, both for those in the process of implementing them and those who, perhaps further down the line or on the panel, will have to make assessments about those seen to be vulnerable to terrorism. And what does “being drawn into terrorism” mean? There are problems here for those who need to interpret the legislation.
We have had a much wider debate than just about definitions. It has been a very interesting debate about, as I said in my introduction, whether the Prevent strategy should be statutory. I am very much of the view taken by my noble friends Lord Phillips and Lady Hamwee, that in fact the subsequent clauses—24, 28 and 30—make the whole business of being statutory fairly rigorous.
The effectiveness of the Prevent programme, whether we need to review it, whether it is sensible that the programme should be statutory, or whether we should not continue to rely on the voluntary participation of the institutions are all questions that we will undoubtedly come back to, both later today and on Report. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, the world of local government, in its kaleidoscopic way, is changing at the moment with new groupings of authorities, such as the Association of Greater Manchester Authorities. Although the duty is expressed as a duty on each individual authority, will the Government be open to authorities seeking to find ways for neighbours to provide services to fulfil the duty? This has only just occurred to me, but it seems that one should be open to practical ways of dealing with this sort of thing.
Separately, I ask whether my noble friend is able to address my points about the contracting-out of services, which I raised in the first group of amendments. I do not know whether he has any notes on that. It is mentioned in Amendment 106 in the Minister’s name, which caused me to go on a hunt for Schedule 36A to the Education Act. That is only about education and there are many other services which are contracted out. I asked London Councils whether I was barking up the wrong tree in worrying about this. Its answer was that I was not and that this is something worth pursuing.
My Lords, I suspect that my noble friend’s amendment highlights the fact that this is a list which has been cobbled together with some speed and that perhaps, in trying to ensure that all the bases were covered, the normal diligence of the Home Office has fallen apart. As to the specific point about unitary authorities, my noble friend Lord Rosser suggested that perhaps a county council could act on behalf of a unitary authority. The very point about unitary authorities is that you cannot do that. That would raise some very interesting and wide issues so I assume that that is a simple omission. Regarding the list on criminal justice, while I assume that the duty is placed on the individual institutions, there is nothing said more generally about the role of headquarters bodies or contracting bodies like the National Offender Management Service.
There are a couple of other possible anomalies that the Minister might want to address. I note that community health councils, which still exist in Wales although they have been long abolished in England, are listed, but that the successor of the successor of the successor bodies for community health councils in England, Healthwatch organisations, are not included. Will community health councils in Wales have a Prevent duty that does not apply to the bodies which now fulfil many of those functions in England? Finally, I do not see the Ministry of Defence Police in the list of police organisations.
If it is a function across health professionals and health services, the proportion of people who come into contact with an acute trust is significantly small. Why have the health service and GPs been excluded from the duty, yet consultants who see the minority of patients have been included? What is the significant difference in order for the Government to be making that delineation of clinicians?
My Lords, if the Minister is going to come back to us on various points, perhaps he can include something on patient confidentiality.
As I sat down to take that intervention, further inspiration came to me on this matter. We are consulting GPs on their role in this, and we will have regard to the important points relating to patient confidentiality to which the noble Baroness referred.
Finally, Amendments 119 to 122 would allow the Government to make changes, through regulations, to Schedules 3 and 4 at any time after the Bill is granted Royal Assent, and before such time as the rest of this part commences. The amendments ensure that, in the event that there are additional bodies to which the Prevent duty should apply or which should be partners to Channel panels, then those bodies can be added to the appropriate schedule with as much notice as possible before the duties on them commence. This is clearly in the best interests of those bodies because it will give them time to prepare. This has particular relevance to the addition of Scottish bodies. The Government have made clear that it is our hope and intention that Scottish bodies will become subject to the Prevent duty, and we are currently discussing this with the Scottish Government.
We still wish to make the changes to the schedules as soon as possible after Royal Assent, and to have the duty commence for all specified authorities in England, Wales and Scotland at the same time. Therefore, I invite the Committee to agree these government amendments and trust that, in the light of my earlier clarification, the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, Amendment 112BA is grouped with a number of other amendments, most of which relate to Clause 24. The amendments in this group in my name and those of my noble friends have been tabled to enable me once again to raise issues about equalities and concerns about discrimination.
It has been put to me that Prevent is regarded as a security prism through which all Muslims are seen and that Muslims are suspect until proved otherwise. The term “siege mentality” has also been used. We have discussed the dangers of alienation arising from the very activities that should be part of the solution, not part of the problem, and of alienation feeding violence. I have said to the Muslim organisations that have contacted me, and I think I have said in the Chamber, that because the current context for this legislation is the war in Syria and since most Britons, not all, who are drawn into fighting there are Muslims—I am not saying that they come from the same ethnic background; that is, of course, quite different—it is inevitable that Muslims will make up the great majority of those who are the subject of, or some might say subjected to, the provisions of this Bill.
We have laws about equalities and they apply to this legislation as to every other piece of legislation. I doubt that much can be done in legislation to address the concerns I have just summarised but what can be done should be done: in legislation, in practice and in providing safeguards against discrimination. Transparency is a very important tool and it occurred to me today that, the more transparency there is about how these provisions are operated, the more ammunition—if that is not an indelicate word in the context—the Government can give themselves to counter those concerns.
I have mentioned the current context. The counter- terrorism strategy and policy of course are also directed to dealing with other extremism manifested in violence—for instance, right-wing extremism. I am told that freedom of information requests for basic statistics about Prevent are routinely denied on the basis of national security. It seems to me that we should be looking for ways of providing information that do not endanger security. For instance, I wondered how many individuals are in a programme because of anti-Semitic violence. Over the last day or two, I have been pondering what it would look like if one substituted “Jewish” for “Muslim” in the briefings and descriptions we have had. The issue is not just how I would see it as a Jew—not a very observant Jew but one who is aware of her background and heritage—but also whether other people, who might be resistant to some of the points I have been making, would see things differently if it were a different group interposed in that way. I think that if this were aimed at the Jewish community or communities, I might feel targeted rather than protected. I say all that by way of some introduction and can go through the specific amendments fairly quickly.
I said earlier this evening that I think—although I am going to have to read the debate to check—that the Minister in his answer on the first group implied more support, at least for the thoughts that lie behind these amendments, than I suspect he is going to articulate now and he also implied more consultation than the clause spells out. The clause deals with revised guidance as well as the first issue of guidance. If one accepts the Minister’s point about how well the Government have conducted the process so far for the purpose of the argument, nevertheless the issues I am raising will be important for the revision of guidance as well.
The first of my amendments, Amendment 112BA, states:
“Guidance … shall in particular deal with equalities issues”.
I think that that speaks for itself.
Amendment 112BB would insert that there must be consultation with,
“the specified authorities subject to the guidance”,
as well as with, as stated in the Bill, the Welsh and Scottish Governments. The clause then goes on to include the very wide catch-all—although it could be a very narrow “catch-few”—of,
“any person whom the Secretary of State considers appropriate”.
It must be right for those who are going to be the subject of this guidance to be consulted.
I then take that a stage further with Amendment 112BC by providing that, before responding to that consultation, a specified authority should,
“consult its local or other relevant communities”.
It comes pretty naturally to most local authorities to consult their own communities when they are proposing to do something, although not always. However, I do not just mean residents as a kind of amorphous bunch. There are communities within communities. We are all members of more than one community, and the specified authorities can identify their communities as they see fit under what I am proposing.
The next of my amendments, Amendment 112CB, relates to Clause 24(7), under which the Secretary of State can make minor revisions to the guidance without going to Welsh and Scottish Governments if the,
“Secretary of State considers that the proposed revisions … are insubstantial”.
I would like to see that as an objective test so that it could be challenged—in other words, I would like to change this subsection so that the consultation provisions have effect unless they are insubstantial.
Amendment 112DA is an amendment to Clause 25. It must be the case that authorities have the opportunity to make representations before directions under this clause are given—this being the clause which takes us to the sanction for failing to comply with the duty. I would hope that that would be automatic. It is perhaps a matter of general law but, again, I think that it should be spelled out.
Amendment 112F also relates to the directions clause provisions. It would insert that the Secretary of State should report to Parliament on any direction given. Giving a direction in this way is a pretty substantial action, and I think that it should be reported to Parliament with the reasons for it.
I hope that I have covered everything that is in my name. My noble friend tells me that I have, so I beg to move Amendment 112BA. As I do so, I realise that each of the amendments is on what might be thought to be a small point but, in my view, they amount to trying to find a way of addressing concerns which are clearly very real in the minds of those who have been looking at this legislation.
My Lords, I should like to speak to Amendments 112C and 112E, which are in my name. I start by apologising to the Minister. I am sorry that I could not manage to get to his meeting last week. I know that my noble friend Lady Hamwee expressed my concerns and I am grateful for the Minister’s letter on some issues which has been referred to considerably since we started today’s session.
These two amendments are important and my noble friend Lady Hamwee ended on that point. After going to war, the right to curtail freedoms is one of the most important decisions that a Government have to take. The one thing that is missing at the moment on some of the key directions, particularly on guidance and on where the Secretary of State gives a direction to an authority, is any sense of accountability and transparency.
I shall take the amendments in order. Amendment 112C says that if guidance is issued,
“the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament … the proposed guidance or proposed revisions”,
and it should be done by an affirmative instrument of both Houses. As I have said on earlier amendments, guidance also needs to be combined into one document with any other parallel guidance that will ease matters for those having to use it. The duty in the Education Act 1986 is absolutely clear and I believe that the guidance has been brought forward in haste. The Commons has not managed to see the draft guidance and the consultation does not end until tomorrow. I am grateful to my noble friend for some of the changes that he has made but I see nothing in his letter that relates to this issue of transparency and accountability to Parliament. It is important on such a sensitive issue that goes to the heart of the freedom of people in this country that Parliament at the very least should have the right to examine any changes that the Secretary of State wishes to lay.
Amendment 112E asks for the same scrutiny for the Secretary of State should she or he direct under the terms of this provision. It is important that we as Parliament understand how and why an appropriate authority has failed, partly so that we can amass the evidence that my noble friend talked about earlier, but also because we as Parliament need to know exactly what is happening. Amendment 112E also provides that:
“A copy of any such report must be sent to—
(a) the Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights;
(b) the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation; and
(c) any other person whom the Secretary of State deems appropriate”.
It is also important that the relevant sector sees what is going on so as to understand the issues, a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. The three bodies mentioned also deal with some of the wider issues around terrorism, freedom and liberties. It would be inappropriate for them not to comment before such matters were discussed in Parliament.
Before the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, makes that decision, I revert to the question of what it is that is being required and one of the reasons why that might imply that it is better to have more consultation about it. One of the reasons why some of the previous Prevent programmes failed, and fell into disrepute with the communities concerned, was that they were not seen as about preventing people from going down the road to become dangerous, violent extremists. Rather, they were seen as being programmes that put a series of spies in the camp and were about reporting individuals to the authorities for action to be taken against them. Speaking personally, I am all for mechanisms that identify people who are a danger to the rest of us and make sure that appropriate steps are taken, but this was perceived as being the authorities intervening and getting the data. We are going to come to this subject in a minute, but when I questioned the Channel panels as to why the intelligence services were not specifically listed as an agency involved in that, the argument given at that stage was that it was because it would make it look as if the Channel panel process was part of a process of ratting on individuals to the authorities.
It is important to get this guidance in a form where the communities understand that it is not about pointing the finger at individuals in a way that might lead them into trouble with the authorities, but is a way of supporting individuals and preventing them going down that road. That is why this distinction of whether this is about “prevent” or “pursue” is so important, as is getting public and community buy-in to the way in which this is enforced.
My Lords, my noble friend might not be too pleased to know that I was scribbling quite a lot during his reply, but he will be pleased to know that I can hardly read what I have written. However, I am sure that this is something that we are going to want to come back to next week. It strikes me that a lot of this debate has been on the premise of what the situation is here and now. Even with the reassurance that my noble friend Lord Carlile is so heavily involved in this, I do not suppose that he is going to want that to be for ever and a day. There might come a time when he finds other things that he will apply his energy to.
Leaving that aside, I made the point earlier that what we are talking about here is not only the guidance that we will see fairly shortly. The noble Baroness said that we will not see it until after Committee; in fact we will not see it until after the end of the Bill or even, as far as I understand it, until after enactment. There is also the question of revisions to the guidance, which is surely going to have to be changed; it is very unlikely to be exactly what is required in its first incarnation. It is the sort of guidance that needs time for individual organisations to have their own internal discussions and for umbrella organisations to trickle down the consultation—
I am grateful to my noble friend for allowing me to interrupt her. The Minister, during the course of his speech a few moments ago, mentioned the Prevent oversight board on a number of occasions and kindly referred to my involvement. Does he agree with me that, if the Prevent oversight board is to have a realistic oversight role, it should meet reasonably often; it should be able to choose what it reviews from time to time; and it should be heavily involved in the quality control of Prevent schemes around the country rather than, as at present, meeting very rarely and not really carrying out a great deal of detailed scrutiny?
I am not sure whether that was a question for me; I assume it was, although it seems to be beyond the amendments that we are dealing with here. In making that point, though, I think my noble friend is pointing to the breadth, depth and complexity of this issue and to the need to keep everything under review and to be open to making changes as it becomes apparent that they are needed. This sort of guidance needs time for those who are affected to trickle down consultations, sweep up the responses and reflect back—perhaps this goes to my noble friend’s point as well—experience on the ground.
Like the noble Baroness, I mentioned nurseries in the first group and said rather more about the bureaucracy involved, which would be inappropriate for small organisations such as the nurseries, pre-schools and primary schools that we are talking about. It is about the substance as well as the bureaucracy. I was reminded by her anecdote of the six year-old son of a friend who was being visited by a German family. The child came downstairs going—I do not know how Hansard can reproduce this—“Rat-a-tat-tat”. He was asked, “What are you doing?”, and replied, “I’m killing dirty Germans”. That is exactly the same sort of experience, but how should one react to that?
On the individual amendments rather than the generality, I am glad to hear that the Government will consider equalities issues. What the Minister was given to read was that the Government will, “consider any equalities issues that have arisen since we published the draft for consultation”. There will be issues, I think. I will not get into a discussion at this time of night on the philosophy of consulting the population of prisons, although I think there is quite an interesting debate to be had about that.
Under my Amendment 112CB, the Secretary of State would have to take the decision about whether or not proposed revisions to the guidance were substantial, but that should be by an objective test, not a subjective one.
In summary, I come back to two words: transparency and safeguards. I will of course consider the detail of what my noble friend said, but it is quite clear to me that, with perception being so important as well as reality, we have to reduce the opportunity for incorrect perceptions as well as everything else.
My Lords, Amendment 115AA takes us back into Chapter 2 and the Channel programme. Clause 28 deals with local panels for assessment and support. The Bill provides that a chief officer of police can refer an individual to a panel. I was requested to raise the first of my amendments in this group by London Councils to allow local authorities as well as the police to make direct referrals in order to access specialist support for individuals who are identified as vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. London Councils is concerned that the provisions might have the effect of limiting the access of public bodies other than the police to a key source of support. It gives as an example a teacher who may spot a pupil who has been accessing extremist materials and refer that pupil to the local authority under the school safeguarding policy. The local authority might conduct an assessment under safeguarding and child protection legislation, agree that the pupil is vulnerable to radicalisation and decide that the sensible next step would be for the case to be considered by the panel in order to access appropriate support.
London Councils is also concerned that, as drafted, an unbalanced relationship between the police and local authority would be created. The local authority of course would chair the panel. Another concern is that cases that come up before a panel are “deconflicted” by the police to ensure that the person concerned is not subject to an active investigation before a support plan can be put in place. I would be grateful if my noble friend could respond to that offer from local authorities to be even more active.
Amendment 115AB takes us to what the support plan would include. It returns to points that I have already made about discrimination, grassroots, bottom-up and perceptions. I suggest a reference to people,
“who will be consulted in keeping the plan under review”,
in order to ask about the role of the local community, religious leaders, the family and so forth and how they will be recognised.
Amendment 115AC is about the support that the panel may put into place. We are told that it must consider reference to a provider of health or social care services. Those are not the only services. I seek to add the words “or other”; for instance, housing. I know that Ministers have referred to Jobcentre Plus and so on. There are a number of other services which might be appropriate for an individual. I do not whether counselling would come within local care, but certainly that is also one which should be considered.
The last of my amendments in this group is Amendment 118ZA. It would amend Clause 32, which is about indemnification. We are told that the Secretary of State may agree to indemnify a support provider against reasonable expenses. I think that that should be “shall”. We have already more than touched on necessary expense and good investment but nevertheless there is concern about the expense of the sorts of programmes we have been discussing today. The authorities that will be required to undertake these various duties and activities will be very stretched to find the money for them and questions of prioritisation will arise. If I can be told that “may agree to indemnify” actually means “shall” in the odd way we sometimes seem to go about drafting legislation, that is fine, but I am certainly looking for some sort of reassurance. I beg to move.
There is a reason why we want to put the local authorities’ duties on a statutory footing. If the Secretary of State is doing everything that the noble Lord wants her to do, I do not see any particular benefit in putting that on a statutory footing. However, rather than going backwards and forwards on this, I am prepared to take this matter back. If there is more information that I can provide to the noble Lord, I will do so.
All providers are bound by a service level agreement with the Home Office that sets out the terms and conditions of their appointment, including conduct. In addition, as part of their co-ordination role, the police regularly review progress made against any interventions commissioned. Any misconduct will be treated seriously, with the option of terminating an agreement with a provider. It would be unusual—and we think unnecessary—to provide for these matters in the Bill.
Finally, I would like to address my noble friend’s Amendment 118ZA, which seeks to ensure that the Secretary of State must indemnify a support provider against any costs and expenses incurred in carrying out functions as a provider. I would like to reassure noble Lords that the costs for each case would be considered and, where the case was deemed appropriate, those reasonable costs would be indemnified. However, there might be some cases where it would not be appropriate to indemnify costs. One of the key reasons for resisting making the indemnification clause a blanket duty, required in all cases, is that it is included in the Bill to plug a gap that might not arise in all cases. The gap is the absence of reasonably priced insurance in the open market for risks that might arise for intervention providers. Depending on the precise nature of the support the provider is giving, there may or may not be sufficient availability of cover in the market. The intention behind Clause 32 is to allow the Secretary of State, only where a provider cannot get adequate cover, to step in with an indemnity. We do not want the Secretary of State to have to indemnify if a product is available on the market. The Secretary of State should therefore have discretion to decide which costs or expenses would be indemnified, but, as I have said, it is the intention that reasonable costs would be indemnified.
I hope that my responses have addressed the concerns raised by these amendments during this debate, and on that basis, I invite noble Lords not to press the amendments.
My Lords, the reference to insurance leaves me—I have to confess—rather bemused. That was not at all what I thought this clause could be about. However, I will not take time expressing my bemusement. The Minister started his response by using the terms “practical” and “effective”. Those are criteria for me as well. Unfortunately, as it happens, I am not wholly convinced that we identified the same ways of arriving at that conclusion.
I am particularly grateful to my noble friend Lord Carlile for expanding the point about housing. Of course, he is absolutely right: local authority housing supply is minuscule, almost disappearing. However, the role of housing providers in this area can be very significant. I will think about the detail of the Minister’s response and perhaps come back to it. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I will try to move this amendment in under one minute, and not only because the Chief Whip is here. The amendments in this group more or less replicate, word for word, amendments made in respect of the Prevent programme. This part of the Bill is about the Channel programme. The Minister has been stressing the importance of guidance—which makes me think that my amendments are important. I simply invite him at this point to make any further or different comments or responses to those which he gave when I moved and spoke to similar amendments earlier this evening. I was just under a minute, I think. I beg to move.
The noble Baroness has set a racing example, and I, too, will try to be extremely brief. My name is on Amendment 115B, which repeats the request found in two earlier clauses in the Bill through my amendments that when the Secretary of State issues or revises guidance she should make sure that Parliament has sight of an affirmative instrument in both Houses. I repeat, for the third time, I think, today, that where guidance is in parallel with other guidance, it should be issued as a single document.
The principal reason for this amendment is exactly the same as that for the other amendments: the Secretary of State has taken to herself and her successors a right to take decisions on guidance on sensitive issues. It is extremely difficult to assess which people are vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. I am sure Parliament would want to have sight of this guidance and be able to review in future. As with my other comments, I hope that the Minister will be able to provide some reassurance that Parliament will be able to assess the guidance before it is given.
My Lords, we have had a very brief debate on this part of the Bill. I am grateful to my noble friends for tabling this amendment. I fear that I may not be able to satisfy them. Amendment 115B seeks to make the guidance under the duty in Chapter 2 subject to approval under the affirmative procedure. Noble Lords should be aware that Channel is already an established programme across England and Wales and those who participate in the programme follow existing non-statutory guidance. The Channel programme has been in place since April 2012.
The current guidance for local authorities’ panels is being amended, in consultation with those involved in the programme, and will be reissued on a statutory basis. Guidance of this sort is not routinely made subject to parliamentary scrutiny, and the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has not recommended that it should be in this instance.
Amendment 115AF seeks to ensure that local authorities are consulted on any guidance issued for panels. Amendment 115E aims to ensure that partners of panels, or their representatives, are consulted before any guidance is issued. I can assure noble Lords that local authority panel chairs, panel members and police practitioners are being consulted about the revised guidance. Panel members invited to a meeting are likely to be those panel partners who have shared relevant information in relation to a referred individual and therefore will also be consulted at a local level. The consultation process will ensure that the views of all relevant stakeholders are taken account of and that the guidance is meaningful for those to whom it is issued. Their experience and expertise is invaluable in achieving this.
I hope that reassures my noble friend and that she will withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I suspect that as with the equivalent group on the previous provisions, we may want to come back to these issues. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I am very grateful to the noble Lord. That is extremely helpful. Of course I have no intention of pressing the amendment. I look forward to hearing what he says next week on Report. I ask him to reflect not only on the recommendation of the Joint Committee that the remit of the independent reviewer should be expanded but also, as the Minister mentioned, the other part of the Joint Committee recommendation—paragraph 7.8 of their report—that the Government should make available to the independent reviewer resources necessary to perform his task effectively. In particular, David Anderson has explained that it would help considerably if he were assisted by a security-cleared junior counsel. That seems a very good idea to me. I do not think that the provision of such assistance would need statutory authority, but I hope that the Minister can reflect on that. Other noble Lords may wish to intervene in relation to this debate.
My Lords, I am glad to hear what the Minister has said. Reference has been made to the Work Programme. My amendment extended beyond the remit to the question of the frequency of reporting, which is a point that the current independent reviewer raised. Less frequent reporting on some matters will free up time to focus on others, responding of course to the current situation. There is also the question of specific statutory powers for access to classified information and to gather information. He has said that he has not had a problem but that he feels that it would be appropriate for the matter to be dealt with in statute. I wanted to ask that those points be among those that the Government are considering and, like others, I look forward to seeing the amendment on Report.
My Lords, I will add a few words of support for what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and my noble friend. I feel very grateful to my noble friend the Minister for taking the initiative in this group of amendments. David Anderson has set out very clearly and correctly the additional support that he needs and the programme of work that it would be in the public interest to have in his hands. The Minister seems to agree, provisionally at least, with David Anderson’s representations as articulated by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in particular, and I feel that we can now await next week with some confidence.
My Lords, I have Amendments 118G and 118K in this group but I want to say on Amendment 118J that I take the noble Baroness’s point about the impact on communities. The point has been raised with me as well and rightly so.
The first of my amendments in fact builds on the consultation paper. Under the section headed “What would the … Board do?”, it sets out in bullet-point form a number of core objectives. In most of the cases it uses the terminology that the subject of the consideration is,
“sufficient to meet the threat and adequately take account of privacy and civil liberties concerns”.
I think that I would prefer to see the word “properly” rather than “adequately” take account of privacy and civil liberties concerns. It is essential that that aspect is set out in the consultation paper, and I would hope to see it spelled out in the remit for the board in the statute as well. If it is not there, it is not there, and it will be difficult for the board to pursue that. My amendment is quite mild in that it seeks to provide advice to Ministers on that aspect of legislation. I have used the word “adequately” to reflect the consultation paper, although, as I said, I would prefer proper account to be taken of those concerns by that clear purpose being put on the face of the Bill.
My other amendment is about the chairmanship of the board, to which the noble Baroness referred. My amendment would give flexibility around whether the independent reviewer should chair the board. Mr Anderson has made his views clear about this being a possible diversion of his time and energy. I have a lot of sympathy with that, and the JCHR also took the point. The independent reviewer could still have an extremely central role in determining membership and the work programme without being the chair. I am not saying in this amendment that he—or, in future, she—should not chair the board; I am leaving it open for further consideration.
I have an amendment in this group. It may be a miserable little amendment suitably to be looked at at 11.20 pm. It says simply that any regulations under the clause should be by way of affirmative resolution.
Perhaps I may say something a little more widely about the group. When I looked at Clause 36, the first question that came to my mind was: what is it for? You do not get very much out of the wording. It seeks to provide advice and assistance to the independent reviewer. Why and for what purpose? Then we look at what the regulations are to contain. They may include provision about,
“particular things that the board may or must do”.
This lack of clarification about the purpose of the clause is reflected in the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and my noble friend Lady Hamwee.
I was quite interested in Amendment 118F because it contains provisions which I think would have shocked to the core the Home Secretary in the previous Government—the thought that these wide-sounding provisions should be given to a board. On the other hand, my noble friend stresses that this should be about privacy and civil liberty concerns. I think that if it were about privacy and civil liberty concerns, we would understand a little more about it. However, as it is, the lack of clarity about what it is for means that we are about to have the anvil dropped from a large height by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Carlile. I trust that we will hear a little more in clarification from the noble Lord in reply.
(9 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in moving Amendment 70, I shall speak also to Amendment 71—slightly less fast-tracked legislation than that which my noble friend the Chief Whip sought to take through the House just now.
Under the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, the Secretary of State can impose restrictions on an individual leaving a specified area—the so-called “travel measures”. Clause 13 provides that the Secretary of State must publish factors to be taken into account when deciding whether to impose such restrictions on an individual. My amendment would add not only the restrictions but “and what restrictions to impose”. The area to which I have just referred is not defined, quite understandably, but it could be anything from a small postal district to a very large region. This is a probing amendment, seeking reassurance about the factors that will be applied to the decision as to what the area is, as well as whether to impose the travel measure. I appreciate that the Secretary of State’s decision will have to be a reasonable one, but I am looking to find a way not only to make the criteria objective, but as far as possible, transparent.
Amendment 71 would add to proposed new subsection (1A) of Section 23 of the 2011 Act the provision that, where there is a travel measure, an individual who breaches it is not guilty of an offence—because breaches of the TPIMs measures are offences—if he contravenes the measure,
“with reasonable excuse and in exceptional circumstances”.
I have in mind, again in probing, how an individual who leaves a fairly confined specified area will be dealt with if, for instance, there is a medical emergency involving either himself or a family member living with him, or if there is a sudden severe illness of a family member who is living at the family home and not at the place where the individual has been relocated. Quite understandably, he will want to get there as fast as possible and not have to take time seeking a permit allowing him to do so. It is a humanitarian and reasonable matter that one might well have in legislation. If my noble friend gives me assurances about how these things have been dealt with in the past—they are not new—and understanding has been shown so that a prosecuting offence has not been pursued, I will be happy with that. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for tabling these amendments, which allow us to have a discussion on the travel measure that can be imposed on a TPIM subject.
Amendment 70 would amend the requirement for the Secretary of State to publish factors to take into account when deciding whether to impose restrictions under the travel measure. This would add an additional requirement to publish factors on “what restrictions to impose”. The purpose of the requirement in the Bill is to indicate the types of factors that the Secretary of State may consider when deciding whether to impose the travel measure. In each instance the location and size of any boundary will depend on the individual case. The factors that the Secretary of State may consider could include: national security considerations necessary to prevent or restrict involvement in terrorism-related activity; the original location of the TPIM subject, and by virtue of that, their family connections; the ability to access services and employment; the proximity to airports or ports; and the proximity to other TPIM subjects or prohibited associates. Any restrictions would have to be necessary and proportionate, as the noble Baroness rightly reminds us. The Secretary of State will publish these factors at Royal Assent and a copy will be placed in the Library.
Amendment 71 would allow a TPIM subject to use a “reasonable excuse” in exceptional circumstances to justify leaving the United Kingdom. In such circumstances, a prosecution for breaching the TPIM notice could not be brought. All other breaches of a travel measure—or any other measure—already allow for a reasonable excuse. The reality is that, if a TPIM subject leaves the UK without permission, they will be absconding from their TPIM notice. This is a very serious matter, as I am sure the noble Baroness would agree. It was the problem of absconsions which led to the creation of TPIMs as a successor to control orders. These individuals may very well pose a danger to the public in this country or overseas. We maintain that there is no reasonable excuse for leaving the UK without permission.
If a TPIM subject has a legitimate need to leave the UK, they can seek permission from the Secretary of State. There should be no circumstances where they leave the country without prior agreement. This morning, I discussed with officials the length of time that such measures might take. The experience is that these exchanges, permissions and interactions tend to take place on a very speedy basis. In the circumstances, we would not anticipate that there would be a problem in securing that permission.
I trust that, with that explanation and those reassurances, my noble friend may feel able to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, that is very helpful. I wondered whether my noble friend might refer to the need to have a passport to travel outside the UK, which would probably have been dealt with as part of the arrangements for the individual. I will read through the list of considerations which my noble friend gave in response to my first amendment. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 70.
My Lords, in moving this amendment I will speak also to Amendment 74. The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, also has an amendment in this group.
Clause 15 deals with appointments which an individual can be required to keep. Following comment from the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, this takes advantage of the legislation in order to require individuals to attend appointments, for instance, in connection with deradicalisation. I really do not like that term: perhaps I might say appointments that would help the individual return to or lead a more comfortable and normal life. Amendment 72 would add that the individual could request somebody other than the specified person.
Different individuals respond in different ways to different counsellors, if I can use that term in a very wide sense. This work has to be dealt with case by case, and it would be a pity if it were to fail because of the individual and his counsellor simply not getting on and there not being a sensible opportunity to change the personnel. We all know of people who we simply cannot rub along with for reasons that sometimes we cannot even quite identify.
Amendment 74 would provide, in connection with such appointments, that the Secretary of State would be deemed to have given permissions for travel to enable the individual to attend appointments and, crucially, will not unreasonably withhold permissions to attend appointments relating to deterring other people from involvement in terrorist-related activity. We are all aware—it is a matter of common sense—that returning fighters may have a positive role in deterring other people. In the debate on Thursday on the latest proscription order that has been introduced, the noble Baroness gave an example of a woman trying to return to this country who was disillusioned with what she had found—I think—in Syria. That sort of disillusionment should be harnessed, and I would like to find every way of making this legislation positive as well as inevitably negative. I hope that my noble friend can assure the Committee in that connection.
I gave the Bill team notice of this matter this morning—if it has not yet reached the Minister, I will understand if he cannot answer—and will pick up an issue that the independent reviewer raised. This matter was also taken up by the JCHR: the question of privilege against self-incrimination. The Government’s response to the independent reviewer’s report was to say that this would not be appropriate. The Government referred to a “blanket approach”. Can the Minister unpack that a little today? I beg to move.
My Lords, our Amendment 73 is in this group. As has been said, Clause 15, on appointments for people on terrorism prevention and investigation measures, allows the Secretary of State to require an individual to attend meetings with such persons as the Secretary of State may specify, at such locations and at such times as the Secretary of State may by notice require. The specified persons may choose the time and place of the meeting. The clause is expressed in general terms and the purpose of the amendment, which is a probing amendment, is to give the Government the opportunity to say more about what kind of meetings an individual would be required to attend, for what purposes or objectives and over what period of time. It would also be helpful if the Minister could say if assessments will be made of the outcome of these meetings and to whom the assessments, if they are made, will be given.
Our probing amendment provides for the Secretary of State to be able to instruct an individual on a TPIM to attend deradicalisation programmes, since we think it is important that the Secretary of State should be able to require people to attend Channel meetings and appointments and possibly those relating to other parts of the Prevent programme. However, I hope that in his response the Minister will not only address the specific point covered in this probing amendment but talk in more depth about how the Government envisage using powers under Clause 15.
My Lords, I am grateful for the response. On the last point which is not the subject of an amendment, I am glad to hear that questions of reassurances about evidence are and will be dealt with case by case. I had perhaps not understood the context of this, and that that might be the case. I am glad to hear it.
I hear what my noble friend said on my other amendments in the group and I do not think that it is necessary to detain the Committee, other than to comment that a change of counsellor/mentor/adviser will be within the provisions for review, which I think is how my noble friend explained how a change might be made. It is useful to understand that that might be the procedure. However, I am glad to see that it is appreciated that, for this to be successful, it must be a very personal matter. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I wish to add just a small point in support of what my noble and learned friend Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood has said, and that is to stress the word “legitimacy” which he used in the course of his address. It is crucial that this particular system should not be open to challenges in the court to any extent; one must try to the maximum to minimise the risk of challenges. This is a very difficult area, as shown by these cases to which the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, just referred. It is the interaction between Article 3 of the Convention on Human Rights, which deals with detention, and Article 8, which deals with respect for the family life of everyone. Where you get these human rights in play, it opens up the possibility of arguments being raised by way of challenge to orders of this kind.
The strength of the amendment which is being suggested is that it cuts back the open door—if I might put it this way—to challenges, and limits them in the most sensitive of all areas, which is the kind of relocation to which the noble and learned Lord has drawn attention. It is right that this is not a probing amendment. It is actually a very important point to try to secure these TPIMs in a way that makes them robust enough to stand up against possible challenges which, if the amendment was not made, would be very likely to come.
My Lords, my support for the noble and learned Lord’s amendment is for real, to use his own term. I was reading a little—obviously I do not have the experience of other noble Lords, including my noble friend—about control orders at the time they were to be abolished and TPIMs introduced. One could not help but feel quite disturbed by some of the experiences undergone and the impact, as has been said, not only on the individuals subject to the orders but on members of their families so, as I say, I support this amendment.
I have just one question for the noble and learned Lord. It is about whether it is necessary—he must consider it is because he has included them—to have the words about the individual having “no connection”. As I read it, but I might have missed something, the amendment to Schedule 1 to the 2011 Act takes out the references to having a connection with a locality because the 200-mile limit is being introduced. If that is so, and we are losing references to there being a connection in the Schedule, is that reference necessary in the amendment?
My Lords, I think noble Lords on all sides of the Committee have acknowledged that, because of the situation in which we presently find ourselves, powers of this sort are regrettably necessary. However, as noble Lords have said, their legitimacy is critical, and the rigour with which conditions are examined before they are imposed and the nature of that imposition itself are of the utmost importance. For all those reasons, I support the noble and learned Lord’s amendment.
I do not want to delay the Minister, but let us not beat about the bush. I do not speak for anybody other than myself, but I listened to every single speech, and those opposed to these amendments seem to be in favour of them being amended in line with the views of the committee that looked at the draft Bill. Will the Minister go back to the Home Secretary after this debate and make the request on behalf of this House for us to see, if not the draft Bill, the amendments to the amendments by Wednesday or Thursday this week, so that this House can make its mind up as to whether or not it wants to debate them and ask the other place? At the end of the day, Parliament has to decide but, as he knows, we are up against a time limit. Will he go back and say to the Home Secretary—these need not be his views, as he can just say he is the Minister with the message—that the House has asked whether it can see this information in time to do something with it?
My Lords, before my noble friend responds, and without making any comment about whether we should or should not be shown things, I do not think it is appropriate to characterise all the opposition to these amendments as solely being about the way in which they have been put. My noble friends have made points of principle which we should not ignore.
I also acknowledge the noble Lord’s experience as a former Minister—I am surrounded by former Home Office Ministers and Security Ministers in this debate. The specific point is whether there could be further provisions. The noble Lord says we should not beat around the bush. The issue here is that we are contemplating measures at a fairly late stage in a Bill which contains a number of measures which we desperately want to make sure get on to the statute book. We do not want to risk this Bill and all the provisions in it at present, as we think they are vital. In fact, we consider that they are more vital than the simple addition of these amendments—as desirable as we may see them individually—to the Bill. We do not want to do anything which would jeopardise the process. There has to be a recognition that the other place—I am sure the noble Lord, as a distinguished former Member, would recognise this—would feel that it was being required to look at 21 amendments, running to some 19 pages in a 53-page Bill, on a fast track and with ping-pong between the two Houses on consideration of Lords amendments. It might feel, rightly from a constitutional point of view, that that would be a difficult thing for it to agree to. I am simply airing the issues.
The noble Lord asked specifically whether the draft Bill which has been shown to the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra and Lord Armstrong, can be shared more widely. I have undertaken to the noble Baroness that I will go back to the department and discuss that, and I will certainly come back with an answer as to whether that is possible. However, for the reasons which I have articulated—while recognising and appreciating the spirit in which these amendments have been put forward, which we absolutely share—I ask the noble Lord to consider withdrawing his amendment at this stage.