Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(10 years, 10 months ago)
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Lord Walton of Detchant (CB)
My Lords, I rise briefly to give warm support to this amendment tabled and so ably presented by my noble friend Lord Dear and others. I firmly believe that the threshold in the Bill is set far too low.
I have been a lifelong supporter of Newcastle United Football Club. My friend, the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, who unfortunately is no longer in his place—and I call him “friend” in the social sense, not in the parliamentary sense—is for reasons best known to him, despite having been leader of Newcastle City Council, a Sunderland supporter. If I were to chide him and say that he is foolish to continue to support that team, which has been absolutely hopeless all season, despite beating Manchester United last night, and if I were to say that the team is in fact languishing at the foot of the Premier League and in imminent danger of relegation, I think that he would be extremely annoyed because he is a loyal supporter of Sunderland. If I persisted with that theme, he would reasonably regard me as a confounded nuisance.
If one looks at this clause and interprets it in a strictly literal sense, I would potentially be in breach of this statute if I said those things. In fact, I do not for one moment believe that he would seek an injunction; at least I hope not. Having said that, I believe that the clause is absolutely unacceptable and needs to be amended. There is even a possibility that the clause as drafted could act as a sort of charter for individuals of paranoid personality or malicious intent in leading them to seek this kind of injunction much more frequently than would ever have happened in the past. This clause is unacceptable and I strongly support the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, in response to that I can say that frequently and over decades I have been annoyed and alarmed and distressed by Manchester City.
When I read this Bill I too was concerned about the threshold, but as someone who has something—I know—of a reputation as a fluffy liberal I understand the Bill’s architecture much better than I did when I first came to it. It meets the principles enunciated at the start of the debate. I have understood the context as well, and am reassured that the everyday annoyances that have been used as examples and of which we are all capable will not be caught. Crucially, I have understood that preventing behaviour from escalating and staying out of the criminal justice system are at the heart of this part of the Bill.
Noble Lords have talked about the body of case law that has been built up in the housing sector; there was certainly an effective, large lobby from it at the earlier stage. I agree with my noble friend Lord Faulks about the difficulties of discriminating between two housing sectors. It is not that one is caught in social housing but not caught in owner-occupied housing—from which it may be very difficult to move—in quite the distinctive way that has been described.
Even as a lawyer I see that “convenient” in the term “just and convenient” has an everyday connotation that seems a bit baffling in this context, but the term has a pedigree, as does the case law built up in the social housing sector. It is quite a hurdle to overcome. Lawyers in this House far more experienced than me may correct me, but I understand the term to incorporate “reasonableness”, “proportionality” and “appropriateness”. I do not see the examples that have been cited as being caught within this; I have seen neither the noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, nor even the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, at a rally or on a march, nor many of my friends who might want to be lobbying outside the MoJ against legal aid cuts. It just does not extend in that way, because there is that protection.
Unlike the current ASBO, the IPNA takes offenders directly into the criminal justice system.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
I apologise for interrupting my noble friend and am grateful to her. May I ask her the same question I asked my noble friend Lord Faulks? Can she give us a specific example of something that would be prevented by the Bill as it stands?
Baroness Hamwee
My noble friend is asking for examples of behaviour. It could be kids kicking a football around on a bit of open ground—which happens on a bit of open ground next to my house. I am lucky enough to live on the Thames but I find it extremely annoying to have discovered that rowing is the most noisy activity: one might not have expected it. It could be a bit of drinking—not drunken behaviour but people sitting around with a can of lager. I know from neighbours’ comments that they feel apprehensive about that and, although there has never been anything for them to be apprehensive about, they just do not like people sitting around drinking cans of lager in public. I also suggest dogs being exercised on the same ground where children play—there are a lot of annoyances in that kind of area. People see me and no doubt think that I am a poor old lady delivering pizza leaflets for tuppence a thousand when I am delivering political leaflets.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
Is my noble friend suggesting that all these examples should be capable of being stopped by the courts?
Baroness Hamwee
Of course, if people feel threatened and their lives are badly impinged upon. That is what the Government are trying to prevent by this Bill. I do not want to downplay the impact of some bad behaviour on many people who react in a way in which I would not necessarily react, but the impetus to prevent—
Baroness O'Loan (CB)
Can the noble Baroness explain precisely how judges are supposed to interpret a threat and a feeling of being threatened from the words “nuisance” and “annoyance”? Also the use of the word “threatened” would indicate a much higher threshold.
Baroness Hamwee
I would say because of the context of the Bill, the clear policy underlying it and the evidence that would have to be given. I have heard the exchange about hearsay evidence but a judge has still got to be convinced that it would be just and convenient, and therefore proportionate, as I understand it, to grant an injunction.
Lord Morris of Aberavon (Lab)
When the noble Baroness uses the word “frightened” is she not arguing the case for maintaining the present position of causing harassment, alarm or distress?
Baroness Hamwee
Of course, these things are all subjective to some extent and perhaps that was an inappropriate word for what I was trying to describe. However, with what is reasonably frightening one is attempting to put objectivity into it; what may be unreasonably frightening would fall into a different category.
Perhaps I may now refer to the preventive nature of the provisions and say that, in considering whether the clause impinges on the fundamental freedoms of individuals—and we are talking here about individuals and not peaceful assembly—the convention rights, including freedom of expression, are protected in any event, as I understand them. The Minister will no doubt explain that the Government have responded to the JCHR’s concerns.
I have been critical about the reliance in the Bill on guidance. I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, about it not being appropriate to give guidance to the courts—I made that point at the previous stage—but they would not be guided in the way that the potential applicants listed in the Bill would be, and the guidance will now be statutory.
The noble Baroness the Lord Speaker has confirmed that the second amendment—the reasonabless amendment —would fall if this amendment were agreed to. I finish by saying that I will still feel free to annoy people by delivering leaflets and by expressing minority opinions. I fear that, as a child of the 1960s, the musical exhortation has not persuaded me.
Lord Howarth of Newport (Lab)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, was right in this, at least in drawing attention to the scourge of anti-social behaviour. When I represented the constituency of Newport East I was all the time aware that there were households and, indeed, communities whose lives were very seriously blighted by anti-social behaviour. There is enormous political pressure on MPs representing constituents to find ways to crack down more aggressively and more effectively on such behaviour patterns. That pressure is, of course, amplified by the tabloids.
That is precisely why we should be moderate in this matter, why we need to be restrained and why we must try to get the right balance. Therefore, the provision in law that a threshold of “harassment, alarm or distress” must be exceeded seems to me to strike the right balance. I think that it is dangerous and improper to lower the threshold to “nuisance or annoyance”. It is surely unthinkable that we should risk introducing legislation that could impair the rights of people to go on demonstrations, as my noble friend Lady Mallalieu offered as an instance, or of kids playing football in the street, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, worried about. There are all manner of other innocent behaviours that are, indeed, annoying, but that in a free society we should not dream of legislating to prevent.
The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, did not annoy me—he never could annoy me—but he startled me with the arguments he scraped together in his gallant speech in support of the Government’s position. He asked: is it a realistic fear that people would be subject to IPNAs for trivial and inadequate reasons? He offered the thought that the requirement that applications would have to be made through an official public agency should be seen as a filter and a safeguard. The vast majority of public officials handle their responsibilities fairly, properly, scrupulously and reasonably. I hate to say this, but it is also, surely, an observation that all of us have made that if you put a man in uniform, or if you vest official authority in a person, some will find themselves tempted, and succumb to the temptation, to use power overweeningly. We have to be very careful indeed.
The noble Lord says, further, that guidance will be offered to these agencies so, again, we do not really have cause to worry. I am sure that the guidance will be a force in the right direction, but guidance is only guidance; it is flimsy and an insufficient protection. The much better protection would be not to write this risk into law. He offers a much more reassuring protection—that such injunctions could be made only at the discretion of a judge and that we can rely upon the judges to exercise common sense, decency and appropriate restraint and to be animated by a mature and wise sense of justice. In that case, why legislate? We do not need to do this. We can rely on the judges not to order injunctions against people who are merely guilty of causing trivial annoyance. It does not seem sensible, in the present circumstances in which the resources of the courts have been very attenuated, to add this burden to them.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Cormack. What are we here for if not to protect civil liberties? Justice and convenience are very often in tension. I suggest that what may be for the convenience of the Government politically, for the convenience of local citizens, whose annoyance threshold is perhaps rather low, or for the convenience of agencies may be very ill assorted with justice. I think that the Government’s position is unwise and I very much hope that the House will support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dear, and his colleagues.
Baroness Hamwee
“( ) For the purpose of determining whether the condition mentioned in subsection (2) is fulfilled, the court shall disregard any act of the respondent which he or she shows was reasonable in the circumstances.”
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, Amendments, 4, 5, 24 and 25 are all directed at a defence for an application for an IPNA or for a criminal behaviour order. My amendments are different from definitions of the first condition which is the requirement for an injunction or an order.
There must be cases where the conduct can be expected—or maybe we will end up with “reasonably be expected”—to cause the impacts that we have been debating. Nevertheless, there is good reason for that conduct. It is not clear to me if, as drafted, there is any defence other than “I didn’t do it” or that the conduct does not meet the test.
In the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Section 1(5) includes a provision similar to the one which I have set out in two of these amendments—that:
“For the purpose of determining whether the condition”,
of the test,
“is fulfilled, the court shall disregard any act … which … was reasonable in the circumstances”.
In case that point is not clear enough, I have specifically used the term “defence” in my more homemade Amendments 5 and 25.
There must be an opportunity for the respondent or defendant to explain himself, and I would not be happy to leave whether or not to proceed to the discretion of the applicant or prosecuting authority, whichever we are talking about. At the previous stage, the Minister said that he would take away the first of each pair of these amendments to explore whether it was appropriate to introduce an explicit reference to reasonableness. I appreciate that he went three-quarters of the way to doing so this afternoon. I know that he gave no commitment at that stage, but in any event I do not believe that his amendment, had he pursued it, would have met the point of a defence. Conduct which could reasonably be expected to cause nuisance or annoyance might still be conduct for which, in particular circumstances, there is good reason. The court should actively have to consider this.
The point is made more important by the fact that it is likely in this area that there will be a lot of litigants in person, so the legislation itself needs to be extremely clear.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Hamwee for her explanation of these amendments. She explained that they seek to provide the respondent or offender with a defence as to why an injunction or criminal behaviour order, which are also included in these amendments, should not be granted—namely, that the behaviour was reasonable in the circumstances. My noble friend has pointed out that this issue is distinct from the amendment that we have already debated, which is related to the first condition for the grant of an injunction.
If I may respond at this point to the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, about his queries in the previous debate, I can say that the provisions in Clause 1(5) are not defences; they are factors for the court to take into account when imposing restrictions or requirements. The two issues mentioned should not be confused with defence issues.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
As I understand it, that is the case. I was going on to argue the question of defences because that was the issue that my noble friend wanted to sort out. However, I hope that we have saved the price of a stamp by clearing that up in the Chamber.
In effect, my noble friend is seeking to argue that it is not enough to be able to establish, in the case of the injunction, that the conduct in question could reasonably be expected to cause nuisance or annoyance but that it should also be necessary to show that the conduct was unreasonable in the circumstances. My noble friend has pointed to the reasonableness defence in Section 1 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which applies to the ASBO on application, although it is worth noting that no such defence is contained in Section 1C of that Act, which relates to the ASBO on conviction. I am sympathetic to the point that she raised and I hope to persuade her that it is already effectively covered.
I will deal first with the injunction. As my noble friend will be aware, the second condition that must be satisfied is that the court considers that it is “just and convenient” to grant an injunction for the purpose of preventing the respondent from engaging in anti-social behaviour. As I have already indicated, in applying this limb of the test, the court will look at whether it is reasonable and proportionate in the circumstances of the case to grant an injunction. It will be open to the respondent to argue that he or she had a good reason for his or her conduct. The court will weigh that up against the evidence submitted by the applicant and come to a view. If the court is satisfied that the reason put forward by the respondent is a sound one, I fully expect it to conclude that it will not be just and convenient to grant an injunction. Therefore, the defence is, in practice, inherent in the drafting of Clause 1 as it stands.
In the case of the criminal behaviour order, it is again important to look at the wider context in which the court will apply the test in Clause 21. The same public law principles of reasonableness and proportionality will apply. It would therefore be open to the offender to argue that there were reasonable grounds for the conduct in question, which the court would then consider alongside the evidence presented by the Crown Prosecution Service.
I might add that there is no reasonableness defence in Section 1C of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which provides for ASBOs on conviction—the forerunner to the criminal behaviour order. That section does, however, stipulate that the court may consider evidence presented by the prosecution or the defence, which will be the position in relation to the criminal behaviour order, albeit that is not expressly stated in the Bill.
In addition, it is worth pointing out that, in deciding whether to apply for a criminal behaviour order, the Crown Prosecution Service would need to be satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of obtaining an order and that it was in the public interest to apply for an order. The prosecution would therefore consider any evidence which showed that the conduct of the respondent was reasonable in the circumstances.
In short, the point made by my noble friend is well made. I assure her that a respondent or offender will be able to raise such a defence, which will then be properly considered by the court alongside evidence submitted by the applicant for the injunction or order. In the light of this reassurance, I do not believe that these amendments are necessary and, as a result, I hope that my noble friend will be prepared to withdraw Amendment 4.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, my noble friend is having a difficult enough day, so I reassure him immediately that I will seek to withdraw the amendment.
I notice the reference to the public interest test in the case of the criminal behaviour order. As regards the injunction—this is not a matter for this afternoon—I wonder whether my noble friend might consider a reference to the point in the statutory guidance. I reassure my noble and learned friend that I am seeking not guidance to the court—I would not dare—but guidance to potential applicants in order to prevent them going forward if it is not appropriate that they should go forward in the circumstances that I sought to outline. As I said, it is not a matter for this afternoon and I know that the Government are consulting on the guidance but I hope that my comment at this point can be taken as a contribution to that consultation. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, the noble Earl knows how sympathetic I am to his amendments, particularly in regard to detention. I made a cack-handed attempt at about 11.43 pm on day 4 out of five of Committee to raise issues about Schedule 2, and I have some questions for the Minister.
I am aware that Part 1 of Schedule 2 contains some significant safeguards—I hope the Minister will not feel upset at my using that term—and that paragraph 1(3)(a) provides that the applicant for a supervision order or a detention order must consult the youth offending team. There is no explicit provision for the court to consult the youth offending team although it may be good practice. Can he give me any reassurance on that score?
Secondly, is the Minister able to give me an example—I am sorry if it seems as though I am harking back to an approach adopted in an earlier debate, but I have asked this question before and it will not come as a surprise to him—of such a severe or extensive breach that only detention would be appropriate, without that activity also being a criminal matter? Perhaps he will also say whether there is a role for guidance from the Home Office, and what that role might be, for rules of court and for sentencing guidelines in this connection.
Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)
My Lords, I have not always felt that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has addressed herself to issues that are hugely important or pertinent in this Bill, although she has gone into a great deal of detail. However, the point that she has just raised about the circumstances in which the Government envisage these powers in respect of juveniles being appropriate is extremely important.
There is a risk that the Government will, no doubt inadvertently, create a perfect storm around some of these matters. The powers under the dispersal order—we will come to this later—can be exercised without proper prior consultation. This can then lead to young people in breach of a dispersal order being potentially subject to detention, with all the consequences that the noble Earl described.
I can envisage circumstances in which the perhaps over-hasty, ill thought through use of dispersal order powers will lead to young people being rounded up and to some of them, because they are in breach of a dispersal order, being potentially subject to detention. That seems to be a toxic cocktail for community relations in many of our towns and cities.
Therefore the question that the noble Baroness has just asked the Minister is extremely important. What are the circumstances in which it is envisaged that detention is the appropriate outcome of a breach of, in particular, a dispersal order? What are the circumstances? What is the context in which this will be done? Are the Government going to provide sufficient guidance to make that clear? Otherwise, I can envisage circumstances in which young people will be detained as a consequence of something that was perhaps ill thought through at the time, with enormous social consequences.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
My Lords, in Committee, my noble friend Lady Hamwee questioned whether it was appropriate for under-18s to be excluded from their own homes on the grounds of anti-social behaviour. After further consideration, I am content to make a change that ensures that only adults can be excluded from their home where there is a threat of violence or a significant risk of harm to others.
Councils have wider safeguarding duties and other legislation that allows for a child to be removed from the home when it is in their best interest. For instance, local councils already have duties under the Children Act 1989 to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. Where a young person is committing serious anti-social behaviour to the extent that agencies are considering applying for an injunction with the power to exclude that young person from their home, the local council should first consider whether the child is “in need” under the Children Act and, if so, provide appropriate support as an alternative to simply excluding a young person from their home. A Part 1 injunction could still play a role in transforming the young person’s life as well as protecting victims from further anti-social behaviour. However, if removing them from the family home is considered necessary, this should be done under existing legislation and not just be seen as a chance to disperse the problem to another area.
I do not believe that this change will weaken agencies’ ability to deal with anti-social behaviour caused by minors. Agencies can still apply for an injunction to stop the young person’s behaviour and the court can attach a power of arrest to the order in cases where an individual has either been violent or threatened violence when committing or threatening anti-social behaviour, or where there is a risk of significant harm to another person by that individual. The power of arrest will act as a deterrent and allow the police to take swift action to protect the victim or communities if the injunction is breached. Of course, youth offending teams will play an important role in identifying the problems that drive the young person’s behaviour and measuring the risk they pose to others to ensure that the right action is taken. However, we accept that excluding a young person from their home using an injunction will not be the right action and I therefore commend the amendment to the House. I beg to move.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, the bad news for the government Front Bench is that this amendment was put down in the flurry of amendments that my noble friend Lord Greaves and I rushed to table when the timetabling of business was changed. That encourages me to continue that sort of scattergun approach to matters I think need to be discussed in Committee, but of course I am extremely happy to see this among the government amendments and to know that the change will be made. I am very grateful to the Government for listening.
The Earl of Listowel
My Lords, I support the right reverend Prelate. I was grateful to the Minister for the chance to discuss this matter yesterday, and I understood from what he said that he expected the courts to use naming and shaming to a very limited extent. That is comforting to some degree, but I worry about this, because many young people who will be drawn into this procedure are the sort with whom I am familiar from my parliamentary work with young people in or on the edge of care. The familial experience—the father often absent from the home, often violence in the home, often alcohol or other substance misuse in the home—has left many of them feeling deeply worthless and very guilty about themselves. We all know, I think, that when a young person sees a parent desert them, they do not think, “This is a very irresponsible adult”; they think, “What have I done to drive this person away from me?”. The risk is that, by the state coming along and publicising their name in the newspaper as a bad boy, they will think, “Yes, look, even the local newspaper thinks that I am useless, worthless, a bad boy and there is no good in me”. That is one area of concern for me.
The other is that when these young people grow up in a family where there is little love or attention and they are not listened to, sometimes, if they cannot get any fame, at least notoriety—their ability to be notorious—is something that they can chase after. If they will not be listened to in their home or anywhere else or given attention in school, at least if they cause a lot of aggravation they can see their photograph in the local newspaper. There are real reasons to be concerned about this. I am very grateful to the right reverend Prelate for tabling the amendment and I look forward to the Minister’s reply.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, in Committee, I tabled an amendment on the clause which was an attempt to suggest a compromise before we had even discussed it, because I knew that the Government would be keen to stick to the general approach. That amendment would have meant that the clause applied only to 17 and 18 year-olds.
As the right reverend Prelate said, the existing provisions are not absolute. I have some questions for the Minister arising from them. Given that there is currently discretion to allow reporting that is in the public interest, and given the public policy underlying the Bill, would that not be a strong indicator to the court on how to view the public interest test? Would not reversing it, so that the individual is named unless the court decides otherwise—apart from the consequences for the individual; I entirely take the points that have been made—mean additional process for the courts?
I suspect that there would have to be a pre-trial application for anonymity. If I am right, how does one ensure anonymity before that or in the listing of the application? The right reverend Prelate made the point that that would overturn the culture—in fact, the practice—of the youth court. It would be much easier for it to be able to continue with its current practice.
The existing provisions contain a lot of detail about lifting restrictions. Conversely, if one has reversed the presumption, what is the trigger for restriction to apply? What would be pointed to in an application to restrict reporting? Another question is whether any stakeholders have argued for the provision that we see in Clause 17.
Finally, what consideration have the Government given to how communications have changed, particularly with Twitter, which spreads information almost faster than a heartbeat and certainly before restrictions could be applied? Ironically, the law brought into effect in 1933 seems more appropriate for the age of speedy communications, where you start with restrictions and then consider whether to lift them. That would work much better for communications 80 years on.
Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)
My Lords, I add just a word based on my experience of how these things are dealt with in the courts. The advantage of the present rule is that a uniform rule applies throughout the country and avoids the problem, which is commonplace in the courts, of different practices in different areas and different judges taking different views. The uniformity of the rule is one advantage.
The second point, which the noble Baroness just mentioned, is that it is essential, if a reporting restriction is to be effective, that it be asked for at the beginning. There is always a risk that somebody nips out of the court before the order is made and the damage is then done but the individual can say, “I wasn’t there when the order was made”. To be effective, it has to be made at the start.
The third point is representation. I do not want to go into the issues about legal aid, which are not a matter for this debate, but there would be concern that people who are not very experienced and not attuned to all the matters raised by the right reverend Prelate fail to take the point. My impression is that if the point is taken as eloquently as the right reverend Prelate made it, the court would be very slow not to make an order unless there were compelling reasons for refusing the application, but it requires an application to be made, because I suspect that a court will not take the initiative without that.
Those are advantages of the present rule which would be lost. Obviously there is a balance to be struck, but I would be interested to know to what extent study has been made of the effect of losing those advantages, if the Bill is to remain in its present form.
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(10 years, 11 months ago)
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Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 56YG I shall speak also to Amendment 56YH. I have to say that I am amazed by the influence of my noble friend the Chief Whip, who just by sitting there has prevented anyone walking in front of me.
Schedule 7 deals with the powers to seize invalid passports, and these are two quite small, probing amendments, although they are serious. The first amendment would leave out the provision for a constable, who has various powers of search and seizure, to authorise a person—any person,
“to carry out on the constable’s behalf a search under this paragraph”.
That is a search which may involve the use of force—reasonable force, but nevertheless force. I question whether it is right for such powers to be authorised—perhaps not technically delegated, but to the outside world they would seem to be delegated.
My second amendment would leave out the requirement to return an expired travel document, but not where it is thought that it might be intended to be used for purposes for which it is no longer valid. My question, of course, is: why not? If the document has expired, what harm is there? Are there no other systems that are sophisticated and efficient enough to pick up whether an expired travel document is, in fact, expired? This seems an odd sanction, merely on the basis of reasonable belief. My particular reason for questioning it is that it might really irritate people quite unnecessarily. I have written “unnecessary aggro” against this, and I genuinely think that we should avoid causing unnecessary aggro, because there are enough sensitivities around passport and immigration controls and so on without adding one which, to my mind at any rate, is not necessary. I beg to move.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
I thank my noble friend Lady Hamwee, who explained that these two amendments relate to the powers to seize invalid passports. As she has said, they are probing in nature. Such powers may be necessary where a passport has been withdrawn in the public interest; for example, to disrupt a person’s travel overseas due to the serious issue that they may be engaged in terrorism.
Amendment 56YG relates to the ability of a constable to authorise a person to carry out a search on their behalf. The purpose of this provision is to allow a constable to make use of support if required when carrying out a search at places other than a port. Such support would be exercised under the authority of a constable, and I reassure my noble friend that, in view of the type of case to which this paragraph applies, it would in practice be likely to be carried out in the presence of a constable. The authorised person—such as a police community support officer—would not be empowered under the provision to use reasonable force or to require a person to hand over the passport for inspection purposes.
Amendment 56YH, which I think my noble friend labelled the “avoiding unnecessary aggro” amendment, relates to expired travel documents. I agree with my noble friend that there is often little harm in returning an expired document to the passport holder. Indeed, there is provision in paragraph 4 of Schedule 7 for that very purpose. The provision recognises that the passport holder may wish to retain the expired passport because, for example, it may include extant visas for travel to other countries. It may even provide memories of places that they have travelled to previously; as well as a visual record, for good or bad, of how we may have looked some 10, or even 20, years ago.
However, on a more serious point, the British passport does of course remain the property of the Crown at all times. There is no entitlement to a passport and no statutory right to have access to it. If a person intends to make use of an expired passport for a purpose for which it is no longer valid—in other words, for a fraudulent purpose—it is right that a constable should be able to remove the document. This would prevent it being used elsewhere for fraudulent purposes, where the level of checks may not be so robust.
It is also entirely inappropriate that a constable should hand back an expired passport to a person where he or she reasonably believes that it is intended to be used for a fraudulent purpose. It would send out the wrong message to the passport holder and would simply allow—if not, indeed, encourage—them to continue to make use of the document for wrong and potentially unlawful reasons. I hope, in light of the explanation I have given, that my noble friend will withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I will do so but I have to say that, first, on the issue of the expired passport, there are some good reasons which a passport holder may not even think of at the time. One that immediately occurs to me is the need to be able to show the number of days you have been in the country, which involves showing when you have travelled out of and back into the country. There are tax reasons why a number of people need to be able to show that. It is a matter of the officer’s discretion and reasonable belief but I find it difficult to imagine how the conversations would be conducted. I should perhaps ask my noble friend whether he can tell the Committee how one challenges an officer’s decision. His notes may say, even if I did not think of it beforehand.
As regards whether someone other than a constable can exercise the powers of search and seizure, my noble friend says that, in practice, it would be the constable. If that is the case, the obvious question is: why allow for anyone else to do it? Another question is whether there will be instructions to officers—guidance, codes of practice or whatever—that might deal with this. I do not know whether my noble friend can deal with either of those at the moment—I know that colleagues are here particularly to talk about the next group of amendments—but if he has anything to say, that would be good. If not, perhaps he could write to me.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
I will just assure my noble friend that I do not think I can add to what I have said other than, on the first point about why we should not restrict the power in that way, it is important that there is a level of flexibility that allows the constable to exercise it. In most cases, as I have said, the person would be someone such as a community support officer. As far as the document is concerned, my noble friend raised the point about other reasons. Of course it is at the discretion of the officer, but one hopes that at that point a case could be made. She raised the issue of tax, which is not one that I was thinking through as she spoke. I am sure that there is a list of other circumstances. However, ultimately, it boils down to the document being the property of the Crown, and it should remain so.
Baroness Hamwee
Perhaps after today the Minister could let me know what arrangements there will be for a challenge, and about a code of practice. He nods and, on that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
“Report by Secretary of State
The Secretary of State shall, no later than three months after the coming into force of section 132, report to Parliament his or her recommendations—(a) for the introduction of safeguards in respect of legally privileged material, excluded material and special procedures material in respect of a person detained under Schedule 7 or 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000, and(b) for the introduction of a statutory bar to the introduction in a criminal trial of admissions made by a person detained under Schedule 7 or 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000.”
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, in moving Amendment 56YJ I will speak also to Amendment 56YK. I also have Amendment 100A in this group, which is a consequential amendment. The whole of this group deals with Schedule 8, which is Schedule 7—port and border controls—in the previous legislation. My amendments have come up as a curtain raiser, though in this debate they are probably more of an epilogue. They relate to future possible action rather than to anything that might happen immediately, as would other actions flowing, in most cases, from the work of the JCHR. I am not suggesting that noble Lords who are moving and speaking to them are merely acting as mouthpieces—I know that that is not the case.
My noble friend Lord Lester is unwell and very sorry not to be here to speak to amendments in his name and to which he has added his name; my noble friend Lord Avebury has his instructions. I do not want to make a Second Reading speech at this point—perhaps speeches on these issues will be longer on Report—but I will make some general remarks. I acknowledge that the Government have moved forward a little on the relaxing of the arrangements to which this schedule applies, but like others I am eager for more.
I was interested in some of the comments that the Government included in their publication responding to the response to the review of the operation of Schedule 7. We do not have the responses published, but there are some interesting and telling comments. A self-declared police officer says:
“Schedule 7 should also incorporate a clear commitment and implementation process to the Equality Act 2010 general duty of ‘fostering good relations’”.
There are comments about,
“More tactful or less intimidating examinations”.
The report says of the community engagement events which the Government undertook that,
“The conduct of examinations was raised repeatedly”.
The Equality and Human Rights Commission commented at length on the lawfulness of stopping without suspicion. It said that,
“there should be no power to detain and question for more than 1 hour”,
on the basis that if an officer cannot articulate suspicion after 30 minutes of questions, he certainly should not detain for up to nine hours.
The Government asked whether respondents had any personal experience of being stopped and detained. I note that the proportion of those who said that,
“Schedule 7 powers are unfair, too wide ranging and should be curtailed”,
was considerably higher than the proportion who said they had personal experience. Even if you add the “prefer not to say” responses, it is still a higher proportion.
I was also interested to see the advice to examining officers following the recent case about,
“the right to consult a solicitor in private, in person and at any time during the period of detention”.
I know of a man who was detained but did not exercise that right because he was told by the officer who detained him that this was bound to lead to a delay, meaning that his wife and his elderly, infirm mother, with whom he was travelling, would be left even longer not knowing what was going on—a practice that I hope never to hear of again. Clearly, training in this is an issue.
Of course, my underlying point is about the balance between protection and security, and individual liberty, some of which is about what the Government can do through officers and some of which is about safeguards written into the legislation.
My amendments anticipate what we might be seeking if this debate were following the report by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation when we know the outcome of the Miranda case, but I have picked up on his evidence to the recent Home Affairs Select Committee inquiry into this. Amendment 56YJ picks up two of his recommendations, 4 and 7, on the introduction of safeguards in respect of legally privileged material and on a bar to the use in a criminal trial of admissions made in the circumstances of such a detention.
Amendment 56YK shows that I am ever the optimist. I would never expect wording such as this to be used in legislation, but we are only in Committee. It seeks assurances from the Government about following through on—although I would say, for the purposes of the debate, looking seriously at—recommendations made by the independent reviewer following the Miranda case. I am sure that my noble friend the Minister will give assurances about that. I remain optimistic but also vigilant. As I said, Amendment 100A is consequential. I beg to move.
Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 57 to 64. It is important to consider the backdrop here. Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 is a highly intrusive police stopping power and it operates outside the normal regulatory framework that covers other police powers of stop and search.
Under Schedule 7, individuals are stopped and they are not under arrest but they are examined for up to nine hours, under the current arrangements, where they can be questioned, searched and have their belongings searched; they can be strip-searched; and they can have samples of their biometric data, including their DNA and fingerprints, taken from them, regardless of the outcome of the encounter and in the absence of a lawyer. People are stopped under it and are obliged to co-operate or face arrest, a period of imprisonment or a fine for any refusal. In addition, there is no right to compensation or assistance in rearranging any flights or other transportation that they might have missed as a result of this examination or detention. It is important to see just how extraordinary these powers are.
Recent research has shown that in 2011-12—the examination of this material has only just been encapsulated in a report—63,902 stops were carried out under Schedule 7. Of these, 2,240 lasted more than an hour and 680, which is less than 1%, resulted in a detention. Although no information has been provided on the number of people convicted, and on what charges, there were just 10 terrorism-related convictions between 2009 and 2012. I have been involved in most of the cases and can tell you that none was as a result of a stop at an airport or any port. We have no convictions based on these stops.
Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his very considered response to the matters that have been raised. I am grateful to him for indicating that further thought will be given to some of the matters that have been part of the debate here. I know that there will be no movement on certain things, but that there might be some movement on others. On that basis, I will not press my amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am extremely grateful to my noble friend for his very helpful response and I am glad that there will be further opportunity to discuss these things. He has given some important assurances on a number of points. My amendment 56YK was really rather tongue-in-cheek, of course. It was also a bit of a nod to my honourable friend the Member for Cambridge, who had it down in the Commons but did not really manage to speak to it. I would not subcontract such matters, but the assurances of further consideration are very helpful to hear. I have never doubted the very serious way in which the Government are considering this.
A number of noble Lords will want to take part in discussions of this on Report. In particular, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, was not able to stay long enough this afternoon, and I am sure that my noble friend Lord Lester will be back to discuss it. I think that I can assure the Committee that there will be a pretty substantial debate next time round. Most importantly, we will be looking at where the Government’s thinking is going before we come back onto the Floor of the House. There are clearly very important discussions to be had. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(10 years, 11 months ago)
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Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, the Government remain committed to strengthening the system of firearms control where necessary in order to protect people from harm. We have identified two loopholes in the Firearms Act 1968 that we are taking the opportunity provided by this Bill to address.
The first change is in response to a recommendation made by the Home Affairs Select Committee in 2010. The committee recommended that persons with suspended sentences should be prohibited from possessing firearms in the same way as those who have served custodial sentences. The Government have accepted that recommendation, and subsection (1) of the new clause will ensure that the same prohibition applies to people who have suspended sentences.
A person who has served a custodial sentence of between three months and three years cannot possess a firearm for five years after the date of their release. For the purposes of suspended sentences, this prohibition will start from the second day after the date of sentence rather than the date of release. This is because a person with a suspended sentence will not be in custody from the date of sentence, so the prohibition needs to begin almost immediately. We have said the second day after the date of sentence so that, if the person does have a firearm, they are not instantly in breach of the law upon receiving their suspended sentence. In effect, they may have around 24 hours to sell the firearm or transfer ownership of it to someone else.
I should say, however, that this requirement on a person given a suspended sentence immediately to divest themselves of any firearms is subject to the transitional provision in subsection (3) of the new clause. This provides that a person who has had a suspended sentence imposed, and who holds a firearm or shotgun certificate on the day that the new legislation comes into effect, will be able to continue to possess their firearm or shotgun for the duration of that certificate. This is to ensure that we are not placing any additional burden and bureaucracy on the police by obliging them to go through their records to find certificate holders who have suspended sentences. As I have already said, this is purely a transitional arrangement; it will not apply to anyone given a suspended sentence after commencement.
The second change, made by subsection (2) of the new clause, will ensure that prohibited persons are prevented from possessing antique firearms. Currently a person with any criminal conviction would be able to possess an antique firearm. Intelligence indicates that there is a growing interest in antique firearms from criminal groups. This amendment will ensure that persons convicted of a criminal offence and sentenced to at least three months’ imprisonment, including a suspended sentence, will be prohibited from possessing antique firearms in the UK.
We believe that closing both these loopholes will strengthen public protection by ensuring that, as the 1968 Act intended, persons convicted of a criminal offence carrying a sentence of at least three months’ imprisonment are prohibited from possessing firearms. Amendment 104 simply makes a consequential amendment to the extent clause. I commend the new clause to the Committee.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, my noble friend the Minister said that an offender would be allowed a couple of days’ grace, as it were, to sell or hand over the firearm. If the offender wanted to hand it to someone in the same household, would that person have to have a licence, so that there would be no question of it being kept around on the premises and available unless the licence was already there for someone else?
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
I am sure my noble friend saw me nodding. That is quite correct.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, I understand, and can picture, some of the incidents that have been described. When I used to have to go up to Manchester regularly at weekends, I took to checking whether Manchester United was playing at home and took care not to travel back on trains which might be full of supporters. Having said that, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Condon, on this. I would be very reluctant to make this a new criminal offence and add it to the statute book. Indeed, I would be reluctant to add any new criminal offence to the statute book unless it was absolutely necessary. Will my noble friend say a word about aggravating factors in sentencing? Would this be a matter for sentencing guidelines, which I know are not under the control of the Government given that we have a Sentencing Council? If an offence has been committed in this context, a sentence can be imposed without the need to create a new offence. I take the point that has been made about that. If a new offence were created in this context, the same problems would arise in pursuing a prosecution as arise with existing offences.
Lord Rosser (Lab)
My Lords, the amendment we are considering, which was moved so ably by my noble friend Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, would create a specific offence of assault against workers in public-facing roles. Reference has been made to various people who fall in that category such as shop workers, and they also include bus drivers and health workers. The proposed offence would carry a period of imprisonment not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.
Reference has been made to statistics provided by organisations such as the Association of Convenience Stores, USDAW and the British Retail Consortium. The latter estimated that 30,000 attacks on shop staff were reported last year. Women comprise a high percentage of staff in shops, and that is the case with a great many public-facing roles. Given that it is their employment, if they see a potential incident arising it is not particularly easy for them to walk away from the scene.
It has been argued that there is no need to create a different category of offence. I think that the issue is fairly clear cut. The noble Lord, Lord Condon, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, have expressed the same view on this issue and we wait to hear whether it is shared by the Minister. However, I think a lot of people feel that those who are attacked and assaulted in the course of their employment are entitled to greater protection than might be the case in other circumstances.
The current sentencing guidelines for assault indicate that an offence committed against those working in the public sector or providing a service to the public should be regarded as an aggravating factor adding to the seriousness of the offence. However, as has been said, that is just one of a number of possible aggravating factors. There is a wide range under the sentencing guidelines for common assault offences of this kind.
We are also aware that many of these assaults do not seem to be reported where they happen in the course of people’s employment, which is what we are talking about. The survey by USDAW, as I think my noble friend Lord Foulkes mentioned, showed that 17% of retail staff who had suffered a physical assault at work had not reported it as they believed that nothing would be done. There is also a feeling among some employees that many cases which are reported are not prosecuted, even where the assailants are known to the police.
Reference has been made to the separate offences of assaulting police officers in the execution of their duty and, in Scotland only, assaulting emergency service workers. The offence in Scotland in respect of emergency service workers is defined by the Emergency Workers (Scotland) Act 2005 and is, I think, subject to a maximum of nine months in prison or a fine of up to £10,000. Prosecutions using that Act have grown year on year since its introduction. There were 324 prosecutions in 2010-11 and, in total, there have been just over 1,100 prosecutions since the Act came into force, with the implementation of the Act raising the profile of assaults on those who provide emergency services.
The evidence indicates that if we had a separate offence in England and Wales of assaulting public-facing workers—we are talking about people in contact with the public in the course of their employment—with tougher penalties than for common assault, that would increase the likelihood of cases being prosecuted. It would restore what is clearly waning confidence among many public-facing workers that the judicial system will protect them, and it would act as a deterrent, as preliminary evidence from Scotland shows that while the number of prosecutions for assaulting emergency service workers has gone up, the number of such incidents has declined. That suggests that the message may be getting over, but I am afraid that attacking and assaulting people in the course of their employment when they are carrying out that role in direct contact with the public just will not be accepted. There has to be a change in attitude towards assaults of this kind, and I suggest that that can only properly be reflected in making clear that the penalties will be higher than they would be for other kinds of assaults.
The present arrangements in England and Wales do not appear adequate, as assaulting a public-facing worker in the course of his or her employment is not a separate specific offence and is regarded as being only one of a number of potentially aggravating factors relating to the crime of common assault. The result is that such assaults are not regarded as being much more serious than many other assaults in the way that applies, as it should, to assaults on a police officer in England and Wales and emergency service workers in Scotland.
If the Government want to assert that this Bill is about putting the victim first, they should recognise that public-facing workers are all too often victims of assault in the course of their employment, and they should accept this amendment, which creates a separate specific offence, with tougher penalties, for assaults of this kind.
Baroness Meacher (CB)
My Lords, in speaking to Amendment 56NA, I commend the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for tabling it. We need government and, indeed, all political parties to get together to try to create a safer world for our young people while new psychoactive substances are so readily available to them. The amendment has merit on two grounds: first, it seeks to remove these substances from the shop window, as one might put it, which has to be helpful; and secondly, a feature of the amendment is that it focuses exclusively on suppliers and does not seek to criminalise the users of these substances. Those are two important points in favour of the amendment.
However, we need to be aware of some of the potential problems with the amendment. My only qualification for speaking today is that I chaired the APPG inquiry into new psychoactive substances, which received evidence from all the major governmental and non-governmental organisations involved in this field, as well as academics and those working on the front line, who really understand the implications of policies and perhaps their ineffectuality. As a result of that work, I have a number of concerns.
The first is the absence of proportionality or logic in the proposal. We have to accept, albeit reluctantly, that a sizeable proportion of young people will use drugs that may harm them. Our aim must surely be to reduce the incidence of addiction to any dangerous drug and, in particular, to reduce addiction to the most dangerous drugs, whether legal or illegal. We also need to reduce as far as possible the risk of a young person having a single dose of a substance that can cause death or serious injury.
Our drug policies must face reality. We will not stamp out drug use through bans and punishment. Our only hope is to create a rational system which makes abundantly clear to our young people those substances that are seriously dangerous, those that cause medium harm and those with short-term and relatively mild ill effects. We have not even begun to go down the road of proportionality in our drugs policy and, unfortunately, this amendment does not adopt this essential principle. Some other countries have done so, with impressive results, and even the US is beginning to take steps in a rational direction.
My comments on this amendment reflect my increasing conviction of the need for proportionality in our drug policies, combined with extensive information, education, treatment and psychological support for those who need it. Only with such an approach will we have a chance to achieve a safer drugs policy.
We need young people to respect the law. If the law is an ass, young people will get round it or simply ignore it. The amendment does not offer a proportionate response to these substances. There is also a lack of logic in the amendment, if I may put it that way; for example,
“a herbal substance with the appearance of cannabis”,
would be banned under this amendment. Why those particular herbal substances? They may in fact present a far lower risk and be far preferable for the health of young people than legal drugs such as tobacco and alcohol, and certainly the many other drugs that are available.
The Angelus Foundation, the organisation behind this amendment, argues in its briefing that the ban should apply only to synthetic psychoactive substances. It accepts that head shops have sold a number of substances that are non-addictive, do not cause significant social problems or are mild in their effects. It rightly says that such substances should not be caught by this amendment. But why should synthetic substances of similarly low risk and lack of social consequences be banned? Young people will very quickly realise the inconsistency in the situation.
Turning to a different issue, I find myself in agreement with the Home Office concern that the amendment completely bypasses the ACMD—the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs. That august body of scientists should be at the heart of drug policy-making, assessing risks and actually making decisions—if I had my way —on the classes of different drugs. If we had scientists making these decisions, we would arrive at a more sensible set of policies.
Another and quite different concern is that if this amendment were passed it might be seen as a solution to the problem of NPS. Of course, a proportion of these young people will immediately go to the web if they cannot get what they want from the local head shop, and that proportion could be very close to 100%. Young people know all about the web—far more than I do—and it would not take them many minutes to realise that that is all they have to do to get what they want.
A very different question is whether the authors of the amendment explored the implications for research of this measure. Already, serious psychopharmacological researchers are having incredible difficulty obtaining the substances they need to undertake their research.
Also, have those supporting the amendment considered its cost implications? Trading standards representatives who gave evidence to our APPG on Drug Policy Reform made clear that if they are to take responsibility for policing head shops, they will need money to do it. That money has to cover the testing of those substances. It is no good their picking up a substance from a head shop if they have no idea what it is and no money to test it.
In conclusion, I applaud Angelus for its untiring work to try to reduce the access of young people to dangerous psychoactive substances. I welcome the attempt to reduce the risks to our young people of NPS. Whatever is agreed on the amendment, I hope that all political parties will work together to achieve improved policies to deal with the considerable risks presented to our young people by new psychoactive substances.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I well understand the concern expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. For instance, I recognise what I can think of only as collusion between sellers and buyers of substances labelled bath salts, plant food, and so on. The noble Baroness says that this is her only qualification—come on, it is some qualification. We are very lucky to have her explain her point so clearly and, to my mind, so persuasively. As she says, trading standards authorities are as concerned as everybody else and struggling to find a way to deal with this. Has the noble Lord had comments on the proposal from the Trading Standards Institute?
Like the noble Baroness, the points that occurred to me, which I will not repeat but simply support, are: is this risk-based, is it evidence-based, will it bring the law into disrepute, does it recognise the psychology of the consumer? Chemists in China will stay ahead of the game and will use the internet. Of course we have to be smart, but we have to be smart differently, not try to beat them in the way that they are working.
Lord Howarth of Newport (Lab)
My Lords, the problems of new psychoactive substances are real and perilous. My noble friend Lord Rosser mentioned the number of recorded deaths. It is simple for an organic chemist to synthesise a new psychoactive substance to mimic the effect of a substance that has been banned. We understand that, across Europe, about 250 new psychoactive substances have been introduced in recent years. The Angelus Foundation, which originally proposed the new clause, has counted at least 250 head shops offering to provide such substances on the shopping streets of this country. There are other outlets, as has been mentioned, all of which succeed at the moment in evading existing regulation.
It follows that the buyers of those substances have no information about the composition, toxicity or purity of what they are buying. It is not only from the head shops that those substances can be obtained. Increasingly, they are being bought over the internet. Social networking spreads the news of the arrival of a new substance, and it is not at all uncommon for party invitations, distributed through social networking, to contain links to the suppliers of such substances.
The situation is very dangerous. The substances are cheap to produce and pretty cheap to buy. Sadly, young people are willing to take extraordinary risks with their own health and safety. A survey by Mixmag of club drug users found that no fewer than 25% of respondents said that they were willing to purchase and consume any white powder, unidentified.
The Angelus Foundation is right to have highlighted this issue and to have dedicated itself to improving the education available to people about new psychoactive substances. I pay tribute to Maryon Stewart, who created the Angelus Foundation following the tragic death of her daughter, who had consumed a new psychoactive substance. Maryon Stewart was impressive when she gave evidence to the inquiry which the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, chaired on this issue.
However, with genuine great respect for the Angelus Foundation, and of course for my noble friends Lady Smith and Lord Rosser, I believe that this proposed new clause is not the right way to approach the problem. Attacking head shops in the way that it envisages might indeed succeed in driving them out of business, but my worry is that it would drive the people who are purchasing these substances into the arms of nastier criminals—into the danger and squalor of engaging with gang-related street dealers in car parks and alleyways. If they are not already using the internet, and I suspect that most of them will be, it will of course drive them into its seductions and dangers, perhaps particularly those of the dark web. The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction reported in its 2013 annual statement that it has identified 693 different internet outlets offering new psychoactive substances for sales. Actually, what I think will happen is that the internet will drive the head shops out of business, just as it has driven record shops and book shops out of business. This is not a measure that would enable us to police the net.
The Angelus Foundation has been candid that its purpose in proposing this new clause is to ban the sale of new psychoactive substances but all the evidence from 50 years of prohibition is that banning substances does not stop trafficking in drugs or people using drugs. In fact, it drives innovation; as one avenue is closed, another is opened. Prohibition has been an engine of crime. It has been counterproductive and has produced appalling consequences.
There are also civil liberties implications in this proposed new clause. Since an earlier version was debated in another place, it has been revised to require a lower standard of proof. The proposition is now that if a court is satisfied merely on the balance of probabilities, and not beyond reasonable doubt, it may make an order against a head shop listing products which appear to trading standards officers to be psychoactive and synthetic, and to have been bought for the purpose of intoxication. If the proprietor is unable to demonstrate that that is not the case, he will be liable to a prison sentence of six months or a level 5 fine. It is inconceivable that in this country we should legislate to imprison people because it appears to an official of the state that such and such is the case and the accused is unable to disprove the allegation. We have not seen legislation like this since the days of the Warsaw Pact in eastern Europe. It would be wrong for us to lower our standard of justice.
I am also bemused to note that the expectation, according to the Angelus Foundation briefing, is that consultation should follow once the legislation is on the statute book. That would be Alice in Wonderland legislation. I had not hitherto seen my noble friend Lady Smith of Basildon as the Red Queen, or my noble friend Lord Rosser as the Red King.
The Intoxicating Substances (Supply) Act 1985 is, I suggest, a bad model for legislation to deal with the problem that we are addressing. It was designed to ban the sale of glue or lighter fluid for purposes of intoxication, but we know what glue and lighter fluid are. The very difficulty is that we do not know what these new psychoactive substances are, so how would the court establish the balance of probabilities? Would it be on the basis of guesswork or on the say-so of a trading standards officer? Justice, like policy, ought to be based on evidence. One of the great difficulties that we are facing is that the infrastructure for forensic testing in this country is entirely inadequate. We have not invested as we needed to do in it. That is a point that we made in the all-party group’s report. The result is that the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, temporary class drug orders and the whole apparatus of the Advisory Committee on the Misuse of Drugs are underresourced and unable to deal with a problem of the scale, complexity and pace of change that we have to deal with in respect of new psychoactive substances.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am taking this opportunity to ask the Minister, who knows about my question, whether Clause 115 has the effect which it seems to me to have. The new section which is to be inserted into the Police Act will provide for powers to anyone to disclose information to the College of Policing where this is,
“for the purposes of the exercise by the College of any of its functions”.
Will the Data Protection Act be overridden in its entirety by this provision? What checks, possibility of challenge and possibility of complaint will there be? Is there any proportionality, propriety and so on? I am sure that I will be told that there is a difference between the college’s functions and its powers but I am not clear about the extent of this clause, which seems to be very wide.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
I take it that my noble friend’s comments primarily were probing. Clause 115 provides the basis of information-sharing agreements between individuals and the College of Policing. In order for the college to fulfil its objectives it will need, from time to time, to have access to certain information. This information could cover a range of issues, including information about data in support of its work on the effectiveness of policing practice, data to inform the standards it sets for police officers and staff, and information that will help it produce the standards of ethics and values for the police. For example, as part of the college’s work to develop standards and ethics for the police, it may need information from the IPCC about its investigations and some of the lessons it has learned from the conduct of police officers. This information will be general and it should not be necessary for the IPCC to share information that would enable the college or its staff to identify individual police officers. I hope that noble Lords agree that it is important for the IPCC and other public authorities to have a clear legal power to share this valuable information with the college.
Baroness Hamwee
Of course, at this stage I am probing. Anything more comes later. I understand to an extent the purpose of the clause, which is to give powers. Perhaps it is a failure of my imagination but I am not clear as to what sort of information the college might require to be disclosed. I will look at what my noble friend has said. As I have said, this seems to be a very wide clause. I will have to do some work on this after today but I am not clear on how the restrictions to which my noble friend has referred would work in this connection. For the moment, I am left with one question. Has the Information Commissioner specifically been consulted about this clause?
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
I suggest that between Committee and Report I meet my noble friend to address her specific concerns, which I hope will help with clarity and understanding at the next stage.
Lord Harris of Haringey
Does the noble Baroness agree that it might be helpful if the Minister, in writing to her, sets out a precise list of what is required and explains why it would not be possible for that list to be laid in regulations so that it is clear what information is being referred to? The way in which it is written at the moment seems extraordinarily broad.
Baroness Hamwee
I agree with that. I was going to press my noble friend a little on whether the Information Commissioner has been consulted. I hoped that there might be time for inspiration to flow across half the length of the Chamber but I do not think that it has.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
While inspiration may be somewhat limited, I take on board the noble Lord’s suggestion. As I have said, I will suggest a meeting to address some of the concerns.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, in moving this amendment, I shall speak also to Amendments 56QZC and 56QZD, which are on the same issue. Clause 119 deals with consultation on regulations about hours, leave or pay. My amendment, which is probing at this stage, would remove the provision whereby the duty on the Secretary of State,
“to consider advice from the Senior Salaries Review Body or to refer the matter to the Police Remuneration Review Body does not apply if the Secretary of State considers that”,
the matter is so urgent that there is not enough time, or the nature of the proposed regulations makes it unnecessary to undertake that. The duty is to “consider” advice rather than consult, so perhaps the message goes out but one does not wait to receive responses.
In my mind, this boils down to hours, leave and pay. What can be so urgent about these matters that the Secretary of State should not have to undertake process? If they are minor, the SSRB and the PRRB can say so. Indeed, if they are urgent, the two bodies could say, “We appreciate the urgency but we simply do not have time to deal with this”. The provision in new Section 52A(5) is a check on the Secretary of State, so I am concerned that it may be sidelined. The other amendments in this group are with regard to the Northern Ireland Secretary and the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland. I beg to move.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for the opportunity to address this important safety mechanism in the functioning of the Police Remuneration Review Body. The provisions that my noble friend’s amendment would delete from the Bill are intended to be used in only two instances. The first is if a matter is so urgent there is not enough time for the Secretary of State or the Northern Ireland Minister of Justice to consult the review body, which is of course not in constant session. To illustrate that, the Government have in mind a time of national emergency—for instance, ongoing, widespread rioting, or co-ordinated terrorist attacks across the country, or even, because we must always plan for every eventuality, at a time of war. There might be, for example, an alternative process for arranging officers’ shift patterns, or officers might be called to take on special duties that we could not foresee but which might be critical to the national response to an emergency, and for which we would want them, rightly, to be compensated.
Secondly, the provisions that my noble friend has drawn to our attention are intended to be used in situations where it would be unnecessary to consult the review body on a matter. For example, if a minor drafting error in the regulations needed to be corrected it would be inefficient and unnecessary to have to consult the Police Remuneration Review Body before correcting the error. Similarly, if there was an uncontroversial change to employment law that did not automatically apply to police officers by virtue of their unique employment status, of which noble Lords will be aware, we would want to amend regulations to reflect this change in the law without reference to the review body.
We added this power specifically in response to comments by policing partners, including the Police Federation and the Police Superintendents’ Association, that they would be concerned that not being able to make police regulations without reference to the body, in certain circumstances, could actually make the system more cumbersome. We believe that this provision addresses that concern.
I should conclude my comments on this proposed amendment by noting that in all cases, regardless of whether the review body is consulted or not, a draft of the proposed changes must be supplied to all interested parties before any changes are made, and this includes the opportunity for interested parties to make any representations. Therefore, neither the Secretary of State nor the Northern Ireland Minister of Justice would ever make changes to police officer remuneration in a vacuum, and would always have the input of representatives of police officers and those responsible for maintaining police forces. I hope in the light of my explanations that my noble friend will be able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, it is helpful to have that explanation on the record. On the point about hours, leave and so on in the event of a national emergency—I believe that “national emergency” is being used in a rather non-technical, wide sense—I had assumed that the terms and conditions of the regulations already allowed for the flexibility needed for the circumstances referred to by my noble friend. That is no doubt naivety on my part. As to whether something is necessary, I simply say that it can be a matter of judgment. That is why I thought it was important to understand what was meant here. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
Before my noble friend responds, perhaps I may add to the list of things that she might want to mention. As I understand it—I would be interested to know whether I read this correctly—my noble friend seeks a spread of experience. Points can be made about the date and the percentage, but what is important, apart from independence and the perception of independence, is that good practice—there is a lot of it among the police, but it is not confined to the police—could be spread to the non-police investigators and, conversely, that experience from elsewhere might be shared with those who have that professional background.
The last time that I took even the slightest issue with the noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington, somebody said to me, “Watch it, they’ll all have your car registration number”. However, I drive so slowly as perhaps to be a problem in that way.
We are trying to get to a good mix. Nobody exclusively has the right experience or the right way to approach these matters.
Baroness Doocey
My Lords, I thank the Minister—my noble friend the listening Minister—for his positive response. I confirm that I was referring to serious cases —he was right about that—not the cases that should rightly be dealt with at a lower level. I apologise to the House if I did not make that entirely clear.
I am delighted that the Minister has confirmed that, in future, all serious cases will be investigated independently by the IPCC. That is very important. Everyone who has made comments agrees that it is important that the IPCC is not just independent but seen by the public to be to be independent. We can all agree on that.
However, I am concerned about the issue of a date. To me, the words “direction of travel” mean, “Kick it into the long grass”. It would be sad if that happened. I understand the experience of noble Lords who have spoken, and it may well be that the date that I chose is too soon, but there must be a date as a cut-off point. If there is not, it could go on and on; that would be very wrong. We must deal with this issue of the perception of the police investigating the police. That will continue as long as the vast majority of investigators are former or seconded police officers.
Having said that, I have no desire for the IPCC to lose very good officers who are doing a very good job and who have experience. The issue is not to throw the baby out with the bath water. There is time for us to modify my proposal, which the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, has agreed that we should do. With that in mind, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(10 years, 12 months ago)
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Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
I shall speak also to Amendments 56ZG, 56ZH, 56ZJ, 56ZK, 56ZL, 56ZQ, 56ZR and 56ZS.
This group of amendments takes us to Clause 69, Chapter 3, on the “Closure of premises associated with nuisance or disorder”. The heading ends with “etc”. We have talked quite a lot about the “etc” in this Bill. I am concerned in these amendments with who may be affected by a closure order. For instance, Clause 69(1) provides that there may be a closure notice if,
“the use of particular premises has resulted, or … is likely … to result, in nuisance to members of the public, or … that there has been, or … is likely soon to be, disorder … associated with the … premises”.
The closure notice will prohibit access by everyone, essentially, subject to some particularities. It occurred to me that premises that may well be affected are pubs, which very often have staff living in them. There are particular rights for people who habitually live on the premises, but “habitually” is quite a high test. The provision that I have just mentioned is about access to the premises. I read that as allowing the people listed to continue to occupy the premises, but I may be wrong in that. The guidance that the Government have issued in draft suggests that it means access in order to collect belongings. Will the Minister confirm, or otherwise, that the closure notice could mean that people will be turned out of where they live? The amendment removes the word “habitually” and Amendment 56ZK is consequential.
Amendment 56ZG would add a right of access not just for the owner but also for an operator. I am again thinking about pubs and other leisure or business places. The owner is not necessarily the person who operates the business on the premises. In a later clause, there are provisions for rights of appeal. Again, I seek to add an operator in there, because I am not clear whether an operator would have an interest in the premises for the purposes of these provisions. Interest in land has a narrower meaning than I read it here. I also suggest that there should be access by anyone designated and agreed by the police who is required to ensure the safety and security of the premises. It would be unreasonable to refuse access if looking after the safety and security of the premises is required, as I assume that it would be.
Amendment ZJ is what my noble friend Lord Greaves would call, “One of those legal things”. As the Minister said, he is occupied “Pendling” today, rather than being in your Lordships’ Chamber. Clause 69(4) states:
“A closure notice may not prohibit access by”,
certain people,
“and accordingly they must be specified”.
I suggest that they should be deemed to be specified. If they must be specified, what happens if the specification fails to include them? That would be grounds for a challenge over a relatively small issue. I am trying to be more helpful there than perhaps I am in the other amendments.
Amendment 56ZL is about the service of notices. The guidance to which I referred states that it is a local matter as to who is designated by the local authority to serve the notice. I agree with that, so I think that we should say so and not just say any employee of the local authority.
Amendment 56ZR inserts a new subsection on the display of information. There is a defence of a reasonable excuse. I am not sure whether a lack of knowledge, which this amendment would cure, is a sufficient excuse when we are talking about a criminal offence.
Finally, Amendment 56ZS concerns compensation. In Clause 83(5), it seems that the court needs to be satisfied as to all four matters set out. However, that cannot be right, because the first two are mutually exclusive. This is therefore a drafting amendment, but not a drafting amendment for the sake of it. I am suggesting that the court needs to be satisfied as to the matters in paragraphs (a) or (b) and paragraphs (c) and (d). I beg to move.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, these amendments address aspects of the new closure power. As noble Lords will recall, the power has two key parts: the closure notice and the closure order. Where informal measures have failed, or are inappropriate, the closure notice allows the police or the local authority to close quickly those premises for up to 48 hours out of court. In some cases this will be sufficient to resolve the problem, but in others a longer-term closure order might be required. Following the closure notice, the police force or the local authority that issued it can apply to the court for a closure order to close premises for up to three months, although this can subsequently be extended by the court to a maximum of six months. This allows the local authority or the police to find a solution to the problem while protecting victims and communities.
Amendments 56ZG and 56ZH seek to exempt the operator of the premises and anyone else designated to secure the premises from the effect of a closure notice. The purpose of the closure powers is to restrict the number of people who are able to access premises, and therefore to reduce the nuisance or annoyance associated with it. The clause allows the owner as of right to access the premises so that they may secure and maintain it and obtain any items or information they may need. As my noble friend has explained, there may be cases where a person other than the owner is in control of the premises. Alternatively, the owner may not be able to attend and secure the premises. The closure powers cover a wide range of premises and therefore a wide range of situations. To include the term “operator” may make the definition too wide, enabling a large number of people to claim that they cannot be prohibited from accessing the premises by the closure order. This could have the effect of undermining the closure notice itself.
However, Clause 69 already contains provisions to allow the closure notice to be tailored to the appropriate circumstances, which was a concern my noble friend raised. Subsection (3) allows for the police or for the local authority to define who is prohibited, at what times and in what circumstances. The police or the local authority will therefore consider what the appropriate arrangement is on a case-by-case basis. It is in their interests to have the premises properly and safely secured, as this will help ensure adherence to the closure notice. They will be able to make arrangements to ensure that the appropriate people can access the premises, whether this be the operator or someone designated by the owner.
The list of those whom a closure notice cannot prohibit relates to those who should not be prohibited by an out-of-court notice in any circumstances. It is our view that this should remain as those who habitually live there or who own the premises. The clause adequately caters for my noble friend’s point as regards the operator of the premises.
Amendment 56ZJ seeks to amend Clause 69(4). Subsection (4) states that the closure notice cannot prohibit access to those who,
“habitually live on the premises, or … the owner”.
This means that those people can continue to access and, indeed, occupy the premises. However, a closure order can prohibit those who live in the premises and the owner. A closure order can be made only by the court. That is an important distinction between the two measures. It is for the court to decide who should be prohibited. The breach of closure notice is also a criminal offence, whether or not it is specified. It is important to be clear who can enter premises subject to a closure notice. It also needs to be clear to those who may seek to enter premises as well as those enforcing the closure notice. Whether this is specified or not does not change the fact that the closure notice cannot prohibit those who habitually live on, or own, the premises, as I have already said. Therefore, even where an oversight occurs, it will not result in an individual having breached a closure notice as the notice cannot prohibit access. As I say, a closure order can be made only by the court.
Amendment 56ZQ seeks to allow the owner, occupier or operator of the premises to appeal a closure order. I am pleased to reassure my noble friend that the Bill already allows for this. Clause 77 sets out two categories of people who can appeal a closure order. These are, first, a person on whom the notice was served and, secondly, a person who has an interest in the premises but on whom the closure notice was not served. Clause 72(2) covers the serving of a notice. It lists a number of ways the police or local authority can serve the notice and requires that they do all of these, if possible. Therefore, in the majority of cases, the owner, operator and occupier will be served the notice and therefore can appeal under Clause 77(1)(a). If, for some reason, it was not possible to serve the notice on the owner, operator or occupier, they would be able to appeal under Clause 77(1)(b), which provides that anyone,
“who has an interest in the premises but on whom the closure notice was not served”,
can appeal the closure order. In this clause, “interest” covers those with a financial or legal interest in the premises. Given those reasons, I hope that my noble friend will not move the amendments I have covered.
Amendment 56ZL would allow a local authority to appoint a business partner to serve a closure notice, as my noble friend explained. I acknowledge from my own experience that this can be helpful. Local authorities considered different ways of delivering these services and concluded that the decision to serve a notice should remain with the local authority. I would like to take the amendment away and come back to it on Report.
Amendment 56ZR seeks to ensure that those who may need to know about a closure notice or order are properly informed of its provisions to ensure that it is not breached inadvertently. The Bill requires that the police or local authority,
“must if possible … fix a copy of the notice to at least one prominent place on the premises … each normal means of access … any outbuildings that appear … to be used with or as part of the premises”.
They must also, if possible,
“give a copy of the notice to at least one person who appears … to have control of or responsibility for the premises, and … to the people who live on the premises and to any person who does not live there but was informed (under section 69(6)) that the notice was going to be issued”.
This ensures that, where it is possible to do so, the notice will be clearly displayed and given to the key individuals who may be seeking to access the premises. If, for whatever reason, the notice could not be served and displayed in the way I have indicated, resulting in an individual accidentally entering premises in contravention of a closure order or notice, it could be considered that in the circumstances the individual had a reasonable excuse. They would not then be in breach of the notice or order and would not have committed an offence.
Amendment 56ZS would allow those seeking compensation to have to satisfy only two of the conditions set out in the Bill rather than all four. I listened very carefully to what my noble friend said about the drafting elements, and I am sure that officials have noted that as well. However, the amendment would mean that the court would have to be satisfied only that one of the conditions set out in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) of Clause 83(5) had been met alongside the condition in paragraph (d). However, I take on board the helpful comment made by my noble friend Lady Hamwee about the drafting. We will reflect on that in advance of Report.
We have deliberately framed these provisions around the four conditions that have to be met. We often decry the growth of compensation culture and we do not want to add to it here. Of course, where the owner or occupier of the premises subject to a closure notice or order has suffered financial loss, was not in any way associated with the anti-social behaviour on the premises and took reasonable steps to prevent such behaviour, that person should be entitled to claim compensation. However, we do not believe that the ability to seek compensation should extend more widely than this. To do so would open up the police and local authorities to numerous claims, and would make it more difficult for applicants to know whether their claim was likely to be successful. Importantly, this amendment might also deter police and local authorities from exercising their closure powers in appropriate cases, thereby exposing victims to continued distress.
Having said that, I note that my noble friend’s intent in tabling this amendment came from a drafting perspective. However, based on the assurances that I have given, I hope that she will withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, of course I shall do so but, on that last point, when I looked again at my amendment in preparation for today’s debate, I thought that this would be something that would be completely bemusing to anyone who did not have the Bill in front of them. I apologise for that. It should be paragraph (a) or (b) and (c) and (d). It also seems that the applicant having incurred financial loss, as set out in paragraph (c), was a given—one has to incur loss to have a claim for damages. So it may or may not need to be said.
I am grateful to my noble friend for the other points that he has covered. On whether or not one refers to the operator—I am thinking about businesses—we are back to guidance. My noble friend talked about discretion on a case-by-case basis. He is aware that I would prefer to rely on guidance as little as possible.
I remain concerned about the term “habitually resident”. There is a danger of people who live in the premises being adversely affected when they should not be caught up in this. Where will they go?
I note that the Minister talked about “interest”, where it is used in the context of a financial and legal interest, as being something between interest in property and the normal, general meaning of the term. I will think about that. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee
Part 5 of the Bill is about recovery of possession of dwelling-houses on grounds of anti-social behaviour. This amendment—and others in this group in my name—proposes that the court’s response should be proportionate and that this should be written into the legislation. I very much support the thrust of the amendments in this group in the name of the noble Baronesses, Lady O’Loan and Lady Young, which are more oppositionist than mine.
The draft guidance on the purpose of the new absolute—I emphasise that word—ground for possession says that it is,
“intended for the most serious cases of anti-social behaviour and landlords should ensure that the ground is used selectively.”
So it is an absolute ground but is to be used selectively. I am very uncomfortable with that. If it is to be used selectively, the legislation should make it clear that the absolute ground is not an absolute ground to be applied in every instance. The Joint Committee on Human Rights, which made this point in relation to exclusion from dwelling houses under other clauses, takes the view that reliance on the Human Rights Act, which the Government have prayed in aid, is not satisfactory when Parliament has the opportunity, as we do here, to define the test in the legislation.
Another group of amendments seeks to leave out the term “visiting” so that possession could not be sought on the basis of behaviour by someone who is visiting premises. Can the Minister be specific as to what may or may not be proportionate to fulfil the conditions in the grounds for possession of properties under various tenures—that is, possession of somebody else’s home—when the visitor may not even be a regular and frequent visitor but an occasional one? I would not be persuaded that the fact that someone was a regular and frequent visitor and behaved badly should be grounds for possession.
Amendment 56AE is a small amendment on the regulations about reviewing the requirements. Sometimes whether something “may” or “shall” be provided seems to be a matter of how you feel on the day and how the wind is blowing. I have always had a problem with understanding the term “may in particular” if it means that you must do something. Frankly, some of the Bill is hard enough without it being elliptical.
My noble friend Lord Greaves has tabled a number of amendments to these provisions, to which I will speak briefly. He seeks to change the term “locality” to “vicinity” and asks whether the term “locality” means the same as where it is used elsewhere in the legislation—for instance, with public spaces protection orders—and whether it is wider or narrower than “neighbourhood”. Of course, in any event, how appropriate is it here? His Amendments 56ACA and 56ABA on Clause 86 deal with conditions surrounding a breach of an IPNA which is not in the dwelling house or its locality, but which is capable of causing nuisance or annoyance to a resident or occupant of housing in the locality or to the landlord or manager. Therefore, as my noble friend says, something that could annoy outside the locality would fulfil the condition and allow possession to be obtained, and a person on his own with nobody else in sight might fulfil the words in the Bill. There would be considerable evidential problems if the person was on his own and nobody else could see it, but in terms of the strict wording he may be right.
Finally—as far as I am concerned—Amendment 56ADD would leave out Clause 87(8), which directs the tenant who needs help or advice about possession notice to,
“take it immediately to a Citizens’ Advice Bureau, a housing aid centre, a law centre or a solicitor”.
My noble friend queries whether it is appropriate to include a reference to the citizens advice bureaux in legislation. Of course, the very obvious questions here are about willing the ends by suggesting that a tenant should go there to seek help, but not willing the means to do so. I beg to move.
Baroness Young of Hornsey (CB)
My Lords, Amendments 56ADC and 56AL are in my name and that of my noble friend Lady O’Loan. As something urgent has come up, I am afraid that my noble friend cannot be here today. Essentially, I tabled these amendments in order to find out a bit more about what the Government see as the implications of Clauses 86 and 89. My understanding of the Government’s case is that they want to speed up the process of evictions from social housing in order to,
“better protect victims in the most serious cases of anti-social behaviour and criminality”.
I am sure that we would all support that.
The DCLG consultation described the proposed new measure on possession as limited to cases of proven,
“serious housing-related anti-social behaviour”,
which suggests that there would be limited application of these clauses rather than using them as a way of increasing the number of evictions. It would be helpful if the Minister could clarify this point because only one of the triggers for mandatory possession in this section relates to a conviction for seriously violent crime. The other triggers relate to breaches of injunctions or criminal behaviour orders.
Given the high rate of breaching of ASBOs over the years of approaching 58%—of that figure, another 43% of all ASBOs issued have been breached more than once—there does not seem to be proportionality in these sanctions. Where is the discretion to allow for different circumstances and for the fact that approximately seven in 10 children breach their ASBO, often due to lack of support or organisation rather than calculated non-compliance? It seems that this proposed new power must inevitably lead to a rise in evictions. If this is not the Government’s intention, will the Minister tell the Committee how the Government will prevent such a rise? These clauses could have very severe implications for under-18s. It will affect children who have done nothing wrong but who have had the bad luck to share a dwelling with somebody who has. The clauses could also be deemed detrimental to the children and young people who do breach or offend.
I am concerned in particular that children will suffer. There do not appear to be many, or any, safeguards. Therefore children will suffer due to the impact of, potentially, one person’s behaviour, especially as a family evicted on these grounds may be deemed to have made themselves intentionally homeless—that is, of course, what the amendment seeks to address—and are thus unlikely to be rehoused in comparable accommodation in their neighbourhood. How does this sanction address the underlying causes of anti-social behaviour? Surely making a whole family homeless due to the behaviour of one family member, or indeed a visitor, is both a both a double punishment and counterproductive. My understanding is that even if mandatory eviction would not amount to a breach of the human rights convention, it is still a public policy proposal that doubly punishes the most vulnerable families in our society. A mandatory requirement for the judge to order possession removes all but the bare minimum of judicial discretion in deciding whether or not an individual or a family is to be evicted.
Can the Minister explain how it is desirable that by the simple act of having a visitor in a dwelling place, a family might be made homeless? How is someone supposed to know that a visitor has breached an ASBO? How will these clauses be policed and monitored? I am particularly concerned that care leavers, who may be helped through the allocation of a local authority flat when they leave care, often find it difficult to prevent local drug dealers or other undesirable elements subject to ASBOs entering their property and sometimes settling in for a long stay. What would the consequences be for a young person in this position who felt bullied into providing accommodation for someone in breach of an ASBO?
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I do not want to go through every amendment again. On the question of the term “locality”, the Minister has explained that there will be confusion if the term used in housing law is not used here and I understand that. My noble friend’s point was that, while that may be the case, there will be confusion if the term is used in the Bill in different places meaning different things, but I will leave that to him to pursue after today.
I was intrigued by the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, about local authorities being sued for failing to take steps that were open to them. I wonder whether providing an absolute ground, which the guidance says is to be used selectively, might not cause more difficulties as regards what is open to neighbours to claim. I understand entirely the point about the impact on neighbours—although perhaps I do not understand it entirely, because I am lucky enough not to have suffered from such a degree of unneighbourly activity. Having been a councillor, however, one cannot be unaware of what goes on.
I would be repeating what I said before if I were to comment on the term “proportionate” and the use of discretion, so I will simply beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(10 years, 12 months ago)
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Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
This group of amendments takes us to Clause 91, which provides for possession in the event of riot-related offences. The first amendment in the group is Amendment 56AM, tabled by my noble friend Lord Greaves, who also tabled Amendment 56ACC. He proposes to leave out the words “a person” from the new grounds so that the ground for possession would be limited to an offence by the tenant residing in the dwelling house, not the tenant or another person. My noble friend, who cannot be here today, asks whether—as he and I read the legislation—this could include, for instance, a lodger or someone who has been taken in by the tenant on the advice of the Government to avoid the spare bedroom tax.
My Amendment 56AB would restrict the ground for possession to the commission of a serious offence, using the definition in new Section 84A in Clause 86 for convenience. I understand and appreciate that granting possession will be a discretionary matter, but the court must take account of some circumstances being such as to justify the exercise. I was concerned, as I have been on similar points, by the Government’s response to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which said that it was not persuaded by the Government’s justification for this ground for possession. The Government say that this is likely to happen only very exceptionally. The ground is discretionary, which means that the court will not be able to make a possession order unless it considers it reasonable to do so. The court may be less likely to conclude that it was reasonable to evict when the crime was not committed in the locality of the property. As it is a riot-related offence, it may have been committed some way away and have nothing to do with the property. We are talking here about offences which, in all likelihood, are unrelated to the other occupants of the property. The JCHR commented that this response would disproportionately affect women and children.
This Bill is, rightly, victim focused, but I am concerned that this punishment would create new victims—other occupants of the property. If an offender who is about to set out to take part in a riot and to loot is not deterred by the thought that he might be convicted of a criminal offence and be imprisoned, and the effect of that on his family, would he even think about the tenancy? I find it hard to put myself in the mind of such a person, but I doubt it.
My amendments would restrict the offence in question to a serious offence and try to meet the Government part way on this. I have other amendments that would allow the court to transfer the tenancy to the spouse of an offender who herself or himself is not an offender. I am not happy with the clause, but I have cut out the first bit and gone straight to seeking a compromise with the Government. I beg to move.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
The noble Lord has made that point several times. It is up to other noble Lords to judge whether it correctly identifies anti-social behaviour, which is what the Bill seeks to address.
I would like to talk about the subject of this debate—that is, the specific proposals in Clause 91. As the law stands, thuggish behaviour against neighbours or in the locality of a tenant’s home may be a basis for eviction. However, looting, or other riot-related criminal activity, by tenants further away from their homes would not usually be taken into account. I do not think that is right, although the noble Lord may think that it is. People who wreck other people’s communities through riot-related offences should face the same consequences that they would if they carried out such behaviour in their own neighbourhoods. Clause 91 enables that to happen. It also sends out a strong and important message for the future that if you get involved in a riot, whether that is near your home or not, there may be consequences for your tenancy.
However, I emphasise that we would expect landlords to seek to evict under this new ground for possession only exceptionally. With regard to the concern raised by the Joint Committee on Human Rights—that the ground amounts to a punishment and may disproportionately affect women and children—it is important to note that safeguards will be in place. The new ground is discretionary, and so, just as is the case for the existing discretionary grounds for possession for anti-social behaviour, the court would have to consider whether it was reasonable to grant a possession order in the light of the facts of the case. The impact on the whole household and any young children is likely to be a relevant factor in this.
Amendments 56AM and 56CC to this clause would mean that possession action under the provisions of Clause 91 could be triggered only where the tenant, and not a member of their household, had been convicted of an offence. Amendments 56B, 56C, 56D and 56E would mean that only convictions for “serious offences”, as defined for the purposes of the new absolute ground for possession, could trigger possession action under the provisions of Clause 91.
As I have said before, it is an established principle of tenancy law that a tenant is held responsible for the behaviour of members of their household. There is also an issue of wider parental responsibility here. In practice, though, the landlord would need to prove that it was reasonable to grant possession, and we consider it unlikely that the court would find this to be the case where a child of a tenant has, as a one-off, got caught up in, and committed, an offence during a riot. Clearly, a tenant, or any other parent, should be held more responsible if their teenage child makes their neighbours’ lives a misery over a period of years than if they just let them out of their sight for a few hours. Similarly, in practice we would not expect this new ground for possession to be used where the conviction was for a minor offence. We would expect these provisions to be used only exceptionally and in relation only to serious riot-related offences. Therefore, a landlord might, for example, consider possession action where one of their tenants had been convicted of a serious assault on a police officer, but not where they had stolen a pair of trainers from a shop. Again, even if a landlord were to apply for possession on the basis of a minor offence committed at the scene of a riot, we would not expect the court to consider it reasonable to grant possession. Therefore, we would, in practice, expect the impact of Amendments 56AM, 56CC, 56B, 56C, 56D and 56E to be limited.
I recognise, however, that, through these amendments, my noble friends—I was also grateful for the speeches made by my noble friends Lady Berridge and Lord Faulks—are seeking to ensure that we establish in law that only serious offences committed at the scene of a riot by a tenant could provide a trigger for possession under the new ground. I am, therefore, ready to consider these amendments further, without commitment, in advance of Report.
Amendments 56CA and 56CB would enable the court, when granting possession against a tenant, to order that the tenancy be transferred to another individual. There may be occasions, for example where relationships break down, where it is appropriate for a court to determine to whom within a household a new tenancy should be granted. In general, however, decisions about who should be allocated available social housing locally should rest with the landlord or, where nominations agreements are in place, with the local authority. They, not the courts, understand who is most in need of social housing locally, and are best placed to make decisions in the light of that knowledge.
In short, I believe that these provisions make entirely appropriate changes to the discretionary grounds for possession available to landlords. It will still be for the landlord and the courts to decide whether possession is reasonable in all the circumstances. That said, in relation to the riot-related provision, I will, as I have indicated, take away Amendments 56AM, 56CC, 56B, 56C, 56D and 56E and consider them further. With that assurance, I commend Clauses 90, 91 and 92 to the Committee.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I confess that I am a little confused by the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. As I understand it, he supports the concept but takes issue with differentiation between tenures. However, in supporting the concept and saying that different tenures should be dealt with in a similar way, I assume that he is talking about confiscation of a property. However, we do not have to go there as that is not what is provided by the Bill. Obviously, I am very grateful to my noble friend—
Lord Rosser
I said that no redress of comparable severity would apply to an owner-occupier as opposed to somebody in rented accommodation.
Baroness Hamwee
As I said, the noble Lord is concerned about differentiation. That is where my logic—perhaps not his—takes me. I am grateful to the Minister. My amendments on the transfer of a tenancy sought to ameliorate the situation, although I recognise landlords’ concern. As regards what is reasonable for a court or a landlord to do, I am not sure whether the reasonableness concerns the seriousness of the offence or the nature of the household—for instance, whether there is a child in the household. I have a bit of a difficulty there. Having said that, my noble friend made my argument extremely well. I am very glad that this matter will be considered further and will not take up any more of the Committee’s time on it tonight. I look forward to coming back to it on Report, whenever that is. It is probably quite soon. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 56AM.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, in moving Amendment 56F, I will speak also to Amendments 56G and 56H, as well as Amendments 56GA, 56GB, 56HA and 56HB in the name of my noble friend Lord Greaves.
With Clause 93 we reach Part 6 of the Bill—Local Involvement and Accountability—which starts with community remedies. The first of my amendments is to Clause 93(3), which provides that an action which might be included in the community remedy document is appropriate if it has one of three objects: assisting rehabilitation, ensuring reparation, and punishment.
A community remedy should have an objective of more than punishment. The Offender Rehabilitation Bill, which has been through this House and is now in the Commons, makes a very welcome switch in direction in penal policy by the way in which it looks at rehabilitation. There is a change in general thinking along these lines as well. My amendment would require two of those three actions—not punishment alone, but either reparation or rehabilitation as well; and it might just be rehabilitation and reparation.
Amendment 56G is on a completely different point: consultation on the community remedy document. It would require the police and crime commissioner, or MOPAC in London—I do regret the loss of the acronym MOPC—to consult with local authorities. I cannot believe that I have omitted to mention the London boroughs, but I am sure that the Minister will tell me that, for this purpose, they are unitary. Amendments 56GA and 56GB from my noble friend Lord Greaves are much better, but they do the same thing.
Amendments 56HA and 56HB are my noble friend’s amendments to Clause 94. They ask about the relationship between the requirements that the community remedy document places on someone, whether by agreement or conviction, and the requirements under IPNAs and CBOs. Are they the same? Are the requirements in Clause 93 the way in which IPNAs and CBOs will also operate, or are community remedies alternative and additional? Why are they all needed?
My noble friend’s amendments also probe the concept of the community remedy as an alternative to a fixed penalty notice or a caution when an offence has taken place. He is concerned that the whole area of penalties versus cautions might become even more muddled. I share this concern. I think I saw a government statement recently announcing changes in the use of unconditional cautions; I might be wrong, but this is not central to the amendments. Apart from, perhaps, my first amendment on consultation, these are probing amendments as to the provisions in this part of the Bill. I beg to move.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
Each PCC has to consult within his area on what is considered to be an appropriate menu—if one might call it that—of suitable community remedies. I have little doubt that members of the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners will discuss this matter in some detail among themselves and that there will be considerable input. However, essentially it will be about local decisions made to address local problems and finding local solutions for local anti-social behaviour and for dealing with low-level crime at a local level and in a formal way.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I suspect that the debate about the role of the local authority and the relationships between the local authority and local policing bodies is destined to go on and on. However, wherever the word “community” is seen, I move almost seamlessly to local authorities. Police and crime commissioners are indeed democratically accountable but so are local authorities. Local authorities are going to be more local than most of the police and crime commissioners, whose areas of responsibility are very wide, and of course they cannot impose a penalty themselves. Anti-social behaviour is very much a local authority concern. I am not seeking to downplay the role or status of police and crime commissioners—I would expect both to contribute. However, I thank the Minister for his response and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, the noble Baroness has made some interesting and important points and I agree that the impact on the victim is what we should be looking at. But I am concerned about the wording. This may be a start, but it is not the complete solution. Notification is not the same as an assessment and certainly not the same as any evidence that there has actually been previous anti-social behaviour and claiming that there has—one can see how mischief could be made of that. What is vulnerability? These things cover a wide spectrum. I take the point about starting from how the victim feels and whether feeling that makes that person a victim whereas another person might not feel victimised by the same behaviour, but it is a complicated area.
My amendment 56L would provide a trigger in the case of more than one complaint if it is made by somebody living at a different address. What I am getting at is that this needs to be about more than just a tiff between two neighbours and not something that is very short term.
Amendments 56LA to 56LE in the name of my noble friend Lord Greaves are, he says, part of his attempt to get uniform and accurate descriptions of councils in different parts of the Bill. The Minister will recognise this. The only thing that I would disagree with him on is the phrase “part of his attempt”—I think one could call it a campaign.
The Earl of Lytton (CB)
I come to this area of problems between neighbours or people in residential environments through my work as a chartered surveyor. I see it in terms of being brought into situations where these problems have turned into some sort of property dispute. I have enormous sympathy with what the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, set out, and with what the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said. The difficulty is that when people have annoyed each other there are various phases to this annoyance.
The first stage is to say: “Oh, well. They have done something they should not have done”. The second stage is: “If they do that again, I shall take action”. The third stage is when absolutely anything, however minor, triggers the most violent reaction. People who have got themselves in a sensitised situation cannot get out of that psychological bind. That is one of the most difficult and intractable things that one has to deal with. This may result in the police being called out on multiple occasions or the local authority being endlessly rung. That is the reality.
Yes, people will claim that they are vulnerable, although in a sense that is a self-assessment of whether they are actually vulnerable or it is some self-created vulnerability. What I do know is that on both sides of the argument, the perpetrator and the victim are likely to think that the other is completely nuts, irrational and unreasonable in their attitude. I do not know how this Bill or this amendment resolve that issue. There is a case for taking some of these things out of what one might call a heavyweight approach to dealing with the problem.
Whether one fires off in the direction of some other community means of trying to unpick things—getting people to realise that their neighbours’ children are not ogres and the children’s parents to recognise that the affected person is also not an ogre—is a really difficult issue. I am not sure that we have the solution here. However, I shall certainly give the matter some careful thought between now and the next stage, because there is something in terms of social cohesion and peaceable existence for people in residential environments that needs to be addressed much more deeply.
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(10 years, 12 months ago)
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Baroness Donaghy (Lab)
My Lords, I knowledge the progress made in extending the law regarding private property and dangerous dogs. In supporting the amendments, I do not wish to undermine the Government's proposed action but rather to strengthen it. I recognise that the noble Lords, Lord Henley, Lord De Mauley and now Lord Taylor of Holbeach, are fully in sympathy with the plight of the 23,000 postal workers who have been attacked and injured both physically and mentally by dogs in the past five years. They have been on the rounds, as it were, and witnessed what the CWU members are up against. Again, I fully acknowledge the involvement of Ministers.
I also appreciate that the Government wish to simplify and rationalise the law around anti-social behaviour. But in attempting this, I do not believe that they recognise the specialist requirements for dealing with dangerous dogs and their owners. There is insufficient focus on this in the proposed legislation. I will come on to the impact assessments in due course.
As my noble friend Lady Gale said, having met some of the parents of children killed and maimed by dogs, it is clear that the human cost is devastating. However, the economic cost is also worrying, with the loss of approximately 4,500 working days due to injuries sustained by postal workers. Campaigners feel strongly that the introduction of dog control notices would provide an effective preventive measure for alerting the authorities to the potential for dogs that could act dangerously in the future. In nearly every case, attacks have been the culmination of incidents that, if put together and acted upon, could have prevented that accident. The Government have argued that the new “flexible tools package” of orders will be as effective as the dog control notices introduced in Scotland and Northern Ireland, if not more so. However, the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, as my noble friend Lady Smith has already pointed out, does not agree with that argument.
Specific dog control notices would be a message for the dog owner to take action before an attack and would raise the profile and awareness among dog owners. Many of them exercise their dogs in public parks. They get to know each other and also know the good dog owners and the not so good ones. It would encourage a communal network. Issuing dog control notices should be a simple procedure. They could be issued by those trained to recognise examples of poor control. Action should be taken on the first occasion that a dog attacks anyone. It is the first time in studying for this debate that I have heard of this “one bite” rule or “one free bite” rule, which is appalling and trivialises the seriousness of the issue.
The PDSA has estimated that more than 1 million dogs display aggressive behaviour towards people and pets on a weekly basis. Its research shows that an overwhelming 87% of people believe that pet owners should face tough penalties if their dog attacks another person or animal. For the Government to introduce penalties for attacks on private property is commendable, but they are after the event, after the injury and after the death. Specific dog control notices would establish a framework to encourage better behaviour, preventing serious incidents and would establish a record of behaviour patterns.
The overall impact assessment concentrates entirely on the issue of making it a criminal offence to allow a dog to be dangerously out of control on private property belonging to the owner of the dog. That is hardly surprising, but it is concentrating on legal sanctions after an attack. As I have already said, many attacks are the culmination of behaviour that is well known in the community. The overall impact assessment then refers us to the specific impact assessment on these measures published at the same time as the Bill. That took a bit of finding. It dates back to 9 May 2013. I assume that it has not been updated. Looking at the specific impact assessment, the concentration is on replacing dog control orders with public spaces protection orders, with community protection notices replacing litter clearing notices and defacement removal notices. There is no mention of dangerous dogs, although I understand that it is supposed to be an overall umbrella notice which covers everything.
I realise that the subject of dog control notices has been debated in the other House, and despite all the major stakeholders supporting this and the proposals for compulsory microchipping, the Government have set their face against it. Obviously, local government is in a difficult position, as it is strapped for cash and cutting back on areas such as dog wardens. Therefore it is not surprising that it has shown no enthusiasm for dog control notices. However, the concern is that community protection notices would be a blunt and unwieldy measure. The danger is that they would be slow to serve and open to challenge in the courts.
The Minister of State, Norman Baker, indicated that,
“muzzling, neutering, microchipping, keeping a dog on a lead … can be required under a community protection notice”.—[Official Report, Commons, 15/10/13; col. 682.]
If that is the case, why are the two impact assessments completely silent on this? Looking through the draft guidance for front-line professionals on the reform of anti-social behaviour powers, the section on community protection notices makes no reference to dogs. It does say that before anyone is issued with a community protection notice, the accused should be given a written warning—presumably posted through the letterbox by a postal worker. We have to get to page 48 of the 64-page draft guidance before the actual word “dog” is used, and that is only in relation to public spaces protection orders—the old dog control orders—so we are back to square one.
Thousands of postal workers have been injured, children have been killed and maimed, just over eight guide dogs are attacked and killed per month on average, yet the draft guidance to professionals waits for 48 pages to mention the word “dog”. There is a danger that what the Government regard as streamlining by introducing community protection notices is actually a lack of focus on this important issue. If there is no focus now, what hope will there be when its implementation depends entirely on local discretion and funding?
What further guidance will the Minister give on issues such as the definition of “out of control” and “dangerously out of control”? What guidance will there be when aggressive dogs are allowed to roam freely on the landings of communal flats, terrifying the neighbours? What steps will be taken if an owner in receipt of one of these new community protection notices simply swaps the dog for another? Will compulsory microchipping accompany a community protection notice? Nothing in the draft professional guidance gives us a clue. This is an area crying out for more effective steps to identify and deal with bad owners and poor dog control before someone is maimed and injured. I fully support the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, I shall make one point in the context of this Bill, which follows a comment by the noble Baroness, Lady Donaghy. Much of this Bill is about anti-social behaviour where someone is “likely to” do something, “threatens to” do something, or something is “capable of” causing harm and various sorts of problems. This is all about people. The dog provisions which we are being asked to consider in these amendments are preventive, not reactive. I would like to see much more of a similar attitude to “likely” behaviour or “possible” behaviour of dogs in the preventive way that we are applying to people in a large part of this Bill.
Police: Public Trust
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(11 years ago)
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Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, it is a privilege and a pleasure to congratulate the noble Baroness on behalf of the whole House. It is entirely appropriate that she was introduced on 5 November. I am sure that she will forgive me for saying that the term “feisty” could have been coined for her. I have to warn your Lordships that she takes no hostages when she is set on getting something done.
If Wikipedia is to be believed, the noble Baroness spent 10 years in the Middle East studying carbonised plant remains—we are more lively here—having studied archaeology as a mature student before politics took over. The noble Baroness, to whom I an finding it hard not to refer by her first name, has been a member of the London Assembly since its inception in 2000; was deputy mayor to Ken Livingstone in 2003-04; and I could use my nine minutes listing the positions that she has held, including, as she has mentioned, membership of the Metropolitan Police Authority and, now, deputy chairmanship of the London Assembly’s police and crime committee.
However, the noble Baroness is more intent on doing than on being. I understand that, for instance, she still goes out early on a Monday morning on a tea run for homeless people. That is between things such as working on a food strategy for London, promoting cycling and much more. She tweeted of her appointment:
“I feel very lucky, but the possibility of protocol disasters is high”.
That is as may be, but the probability of her making an impact on the House is high.
I do not normally tell anecdotes, but I will tell one. A long time ago, before the current rules on evidence-taking, I gave a statement to the police after seeing someone behaving suspiciously. I was asked what he looked like and what he wore, and I said, “I couldn’t really see. He was wearing dark clothes”. The statement, as written by a police constable, was: “He was wearing a pale grey sweater with a navy V-neck trim”. I refused to sign it but I am ashamed that I did not take it further. However, I realise that that has coloured the attitude—the trust—that I have. That is one reason why neighbourhood policing is so important, because it is not just about the content of what is done but the impression that is made. Neighbourhood police are the police whom the public meet day to day, whether north or south of the Trent. Little things like that, as well as the big, have an impact, and a small bad experience can leave us with a large loss of trust.
I confess to your Lordships that I am very embarrassed to presume to talk about trust in a debate in which a recent Reith lecturer has made such a contribution. My personal experience has had a particular impact. I think that personal experience has an impact because one applies one’s own judgment and makes one’s own assessment of trustworthiness. There is a different approach to assessing trustworthiness in the case of individuals and of institutions. I was interested in the comment about young people making a distinction between local police and the TSG. When you look at individuals you are more discriminating and nuanced, but of course you often judge the whole institution by a small part.
Of course, these are general comments that apply to public service generally, as did the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Young, about the necessity and difficulty of changing culture. There is a range of obvious reasons why trust in public services and public servants is so important—that is blindingly obvious, and I apologise for my cod philosophy. However, without trust, how can one win the co-operation of the public or, as my noble friend Lord Paddick, has termed it, “collaboration”? That may be right, because it suggests partnership, which is so necessary for effectiveness. I was interested to see the extract from the ESRC’s Policing by Consent, which said that,
“perceptions of legitimacy are stronger predictors of compliance with the law than perceptions of deterrent risk”.
It referred to authorities behaving,
“fairly and respectfully towards those they govern”,
and added:
“When the police act according to principles of procedural justice, citizens regard such activity as legitimate; they defer to its authority and recognise and justify the power that it wields”.
Another reason for the importance of public trust is its impact on recruitment. The police, like other services, need to recruit good people and I doubt that anyone is more upset by the bad apples than other officers; in that, I echo my noble friend Lady Doocey. The police service needs to be a service with which people want to be associated. It needs to be seen by young people thinking about it as a career path as a profession of which they would be proud to be a member, and one that would provide job satisfaction. Therefore, like other noble Lords, I welcome the College of Policing, about which we will talk more outside this debate. However, I will say now that leadership and training need to recognise and capitalise on a range of abilities, among which I place emotional intelligence very high.
On recruitment and retention, it is clearly necessary to recruit a mix of people who inspire trust. Some people trust the stereotypical powerful authority figure, but even that figure does not necessary come in the form of a white male. However cohesive our society, having forces comprised of people we recognise—“people who look like us”, as they say—is a component. Progress is being made but the struggle is uphill.
Stop and search has been mentioned. That is not just a matter of numbers or of who is stopped and searched, but the quality of the encounter and how they are treated. Transparency is also a component, as has been said. However, I share the view that it is not a panacea. It is not just a matter of pushing information into the public domain. Indeed, one way of concealing information is to give so much that what matters is not noticed—it is hidden in plain view.
The general public depend very much on the media. My noble friend referred to the media. Indeed, I think he used the term “sensational” in that regard. Social media as well as the more traditional media select and interpret what is published.
The debate has largely been about specific policing mechanisms and arrangements. Some have referred to high-profile events and investigations and their devastating impact on how the police are regarded. In what is still a fairly new policing landscape—as we have learnt to call it—the focus has largely been on police and crime commissioners but I want to mention police and crime panels. We cannot assess the success or otherwise of commissioners without also looking at the panels because they have the specific role of being a check and balance, for which they need powers and resources. They should be able to analyse information and ask questions in holding police and crime commissioners to account. I agree very much with what the noble Lord, Lord Wasserman, said about the importance of that. Very shortly, we will consider in detail the mechanisms with which to respond to complaints—mechanisms which must be, as well as be perceived to be, independent, timely, fair and competent—but should we not consider whether a fall in the number of complaints is a good thing, or whether it indicates a lack of trust even in how they are dealt with?
The debate has been about trustworthiness, which I welcome. However, trust is not an entitlement: it has to be earned again and again, day by day and every day.
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(11 years ago)
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Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, I think that the noble Lord sought to assist me, and I want to respond to his answer because he has actually puzzled me even more. He said, both before and after receiving enlightenment from the other end of the Chamber, that he really cannot conceive of the circumstances where it would not be appropriate to consult the other authority. He says that the provision was put in on Report in the other place. However, that does not really answer my question. Can he give me any circumstance where he thinks it would not be appropriate? That might help me to understand why it is there.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
I wonder whether I should come in on the same issue to allow time for reflection. As I said to the Minister through his officials, I did not move my amendment because I assumed that there must be legislation which would require both authorities to agree. I read “consult” in this clause as meaning consult not around the outcome of actual closure but about the things surrounding it. I thought that, rather than taking the Committee’s time, I would simply not move it. Perhaps it would have been better if I had.
Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)
Perhaps the Minister can assist the Committee by giving us some examples of when this power might be required and what the circumstances would be. It is about restricting the public right of way to a highway, but under what circumstances is that likely to happen and what sort of roads would these be? The requirement is to notify “potentially affected persons”, which,
“means occupiers of premises adjacent to or adjoining the highway, and any other persons in the locality who are likely to be affected by the proposed order”.
Depending on the nature of the highway concerned, that could be a very large number. One also wonders why it is confined to the locality when it might have a much wider impact. I suspect that the answers might be clearer if I had a better understanding of the circumstances in which the Government envisage this power being used. If they are rather narrower than the potential of this clause seems to suggest, I would like some clarity on why that is not made clearer in the clause.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee
This amendment takes us to the clauses on closure notices. My amendments are about closure notices, temporary notices and extensions to closure notices. They insert a reference to proportionality at every point. I anticipate that the Government will say that we need not worry because the mechanism that has been designed involves a local authority or a senior police officer, and they would not apply for a closure notice and the court would not grant a notice unless it was proportionate.
Closing premises is a significant step. Closure has to be necessary but, as I read the provisions, the behaviour itself need not be serious enough to justify an order. For instance, one might want to close premises to preclude offensive behaviour—that is one of the types of behaviour in question—but what if the offensiveness is not of such an extreme to justify closure? There are other types of behaviour that could lead to closure notices being applied for and granted—for instance, criminal behaviour, which surely could be dealt with through other mechanisms.
I anticipate that we may be told that this is a matter for guidance, but closing premises is a serious matter and the legislation must be very clear so that we do not have to rely on guidance. Indeed, because it is a serious matter, one ought to have in mind that in any notice applied for or decision made the process should allow for challenge and possibly even a subsequent claim. Therefore proportionality ought to be integral to the power. I beg to move.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
“Temporarily”, I said. I am sorry. I might have said “temporary” but I meant to say “temporarily”. It may be me misspeaking or the noble Baroness mishearing but: “temporarily premises that are the focus of public nuisance or disorder”.
A number of existing powers could be used to close such premises but they are similar and overlap in a number of ways. We are consolidating these existing powers into a single scheme applicable to all premises associated with anti-social behaviour. These powers are flexible and can apply to private and residential premises, and to business premises whether licensed or unlicensed. The notice allows for immediate action while the longer-term order is put in place if it is required. This will give professionals a simple and flexible means to protect the public, making it easier to act preventively.
However, noble Lords will agree that such a power requires safeguards. Of course, local agencies already work informally with individuals and businesses to mitigate the risks of crime and anti-social behaviour before resorting to formal powers. This will continue to be the case. Most businesses want to protect their customers and premises. Where there is information that premises may be the location for or contribute to crime and anti-social behaviour, they can be invited to take action to tackle it, and many do.
Clauses 69 and 70 specify a minimum rank for police officers authorising the issue of a closure notice for up to 24 hours, with a higher authority needed for both the police and local authority for the extension of the notice up to a maximum of 48 hours. The provisions also include requirements about notification and consultation, and of course only the courts can require closures of premises for longer than 48 hours.
The noble Baroness has not tabled amendments but I can use some of the information that she was seeking. The court has to be satisfied that there is likely to be serious nuisance or disorderly, offensive or criminal behaviour. The second element is that it is necessary to prevent the nuisance or disorder from continuing, recurring or occurring. In practice, we expect that in most cases informal measures would be the right starting point. The draft guidance directs professionals towards informal measures in the first instance, where appropriate. Indeed, if alternatives to closure are available but have not been considered, it is difficult to see, save in exceptional cases, how it could be argued that the closure notice is necessary. Professionals, as public authorities, would have to exercise their powers proportionately or risk an adverse judicial review.
Additionally, in applying the test, a court, the police or a local authority must have regard to an individual’s human rights—for example, Article 8 rights. As I said when similar issues were raised in respect of earlier parts of the Bill, such qualified rights can be infringed only where to do so is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of a legitimate aim.
The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, asked me what the reasonable grounds are. It is a matter of evidence, usually comprising of witness statements and statements of victims and police officers, in particular. CCTV evidence, for example, can also be brought into play when deciding whether there is a justification for the grounds. The term is commonly used in legislation and I hope that noble Lords will accept that.
The noble Baroness also asked who has been consulted. Given that the notice is affixed to the premises it would not be appropriate to name all the individuals who had been consulted. Guidance highlights the importance of partnership working and it is advised that the police and local authority keep a record of who has been consulted.
The noble Baroness also asked why we do not require the police and local authority to make information about the closure of the premises more publicly available, such as in a paper or some other way. The closure powers are flexible in that they can be used for residential, business, licensed and non-licensed premises. There may be circumstances where a short-term closure of the premises is needed to resolve a problem, such as closing a residential premises for 24 hours to prevent a Facebook party. That would not be of interest to the wider public in that area, and requiring the police or local authority to make a public announcement of all closures would add an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy. That is why we require the police and local authority to consult anyone they think appropriate as well as the owner and occupier of the premises. Clause 72 requires them, where possible, to fix a copy of the notice to the premises.
I hope that I have been able to answer the questions that the noble Baronesses have posed. I hope my noble friend will accept my explanations and agree to withdraw her amendment and that noble Lords will support the provisions in this part of the Bill.
Baroness Hamwee
I was going to say I will catch up with that when I read Hansard. I wonder whether, rather than starting with my amendment, I should have moved one in the group in the name of my noble friend Lord Greaves. I am grateful to the Minister for responding to my noble friend’s amendments that were not moved and not mine. Clearly, the answers will deserve, and require, some reading.
One comment I will make is that of course the right of judicial review must remain and human rights must apply. However, I do not think that having either of those available means that we should allow legislation which is insufficiently clear or detailed to go ahead without questioning it. At the same time, the Government are trying to reduce the use of judicial review, so the argument that that remedy is still available is not one which particularly appeals to me. However, I imagine that my talking any longer will not appeal to other Members of the Committee, so I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(11 years ago)
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Lord Marlesford (Con)
There was a campaign for a long time—much too long—to remove the most unsatisfactory arrangement under which certain individual protestors hogged the space in Parliament Square, to which the noble Lord, Lord Martin, has just referred. It was eventually ended and the square is infinitely better from every point of view. We were all strongly in favour of having protests, but not permanent protests. I am not absolutely clear where the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, is suggesting his hut should be. I believe that the area, as the noble Lord, Lord Martin, said, is very much a world heritage site, and it would be difficult to accommodate a permanent building in any of those spaces without intruding on the area. I strongly support the amendment of my noble friend Lord Deben.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
I support the notion, if not necessarily the detail of finding a way of using what is at the heart of our democracy and an area that has Parliament, Westminster Abbey and the Supreme Court, around it, and which is indeed a world heritage site—I shall not get into the issue of whether traffic should be using it—to provide a means of public expression. I mean expression by the public, not those of us who are in the buildings. That is something in which the Hansard Society is interested as well.
My noble friend’s speech was about the amplification of noise and his amendment would extend the prohibitions to the other prohibited activities, which are about putting up tents, having what is called sleeping equipment, and so on. The noble Lord, Lord Martin, may have referred to this, but other noble Lords have focused on noise. If there is to be an extension—I agree that the fewest extensions or prohibitions the better—I wonder whether it is necessary to deal with both aspects.
Lord Deben
Yes, it parallels exactly what is already enacted for Parliament Square. The reason for that is: when people look at the present situation they could easily duplicate what was the major problem in Parliament Square, which was people living there week in, week out. It excludes that, but it does not exclude the normal arrival to speak or to put forward views, or indeed to ask permission for loudspeakers, which is also possible. It would merely put us in the same position as the House of Commons, which seems to be a not unreasonable proposition.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I accept that, of course, and the possibility of seeking permission. But we have not experienced the problem of people moving into Abingdon Green, and so on. I think that my noble friend will understand my slight caution about that part of the amendment.
Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)
My Lords, I realise that when the House is in a mood of almost unanimity the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, can be relied on to inject a notion of something or other into the discussion. It is therefore very dangerous to say that perhaps this amendment is not quite right, but I do so as somebody with an office in Millbank House. I notice that the boundaries that the noble Lord, Lord Deben, has created would effectively mean that Millbank House could be completely surrounded by demonstrators, which would be entirely consistent with what has been said.
I am not sure that if they were to use loud-hailing equipment it would make a substantial difference. I wonder whether the boundaries are set quite right to cover the full extremities of the parliamentary estate, bearing in mind the way in which sound carries. If the Government are going to take away this amendment—as I hope they are—and think about it carefully and positively, I suggest that they look at precisely those boundaries to make sure that the whole of the parliamentary estate is covered.
Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)
My Lords, I have some sympathy with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, although the words of his Amendment 34A may not find too much favour in the light of the previous debate, when it refers to,
“making speeches whether or not amplified”,
given the discussion that we have had about amplified speeches outside your Lordships’ House.
There is an important criterion on which, I believe, the noble Lord is seeking reassurance from the Government. People have a democratic and legitimate right to protest in public places, and we would really not want to see these powers misused, if people are campaigning or lobbying for a particular cause or issue, although I do not think that that is the Government’s intention. It would be helpful to have some comment from the Minister. Can he give reassurance that there are no circumstances in which this provision would be allowed to curtail legitimate debate, campaigning or protest? As the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, said, there are other ways in which such issues should be dealt with. We all know of cases where laws have been used for purposes other than those intended by Governments. As the Minister will appreciate, it creates huge suspicion when provisions seem open-ended. I hope that he can give reassurance and be very clear on that, perhaps stating specifically in guidance that the intention would not be to limit in any way the democratic responsibilities of the citizen.
Baroness Hamwee
I will not waste the Committee’s time by repeating the arguments, but this is an instance where guidance would not be enough. Unless we can have hard examples of where the provision might be properly used to restrict assembly where there is no other provision to deal with any of the problems, it would not be adequate for guidance to say something like, “The Government would not expect this to be used in such and such a situation”. This is a power that I would be very unhappy to give to anyone because of its misuse, unless there was a very good reason to allow it here and they have no other tools.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I am really grateful for this debate. It has been very helpful to the Committee to be able to talk in these terms. I draw noble Lords’ attention to Clause 55 and how it is constructed. I am not a parliamentary draftsman and sometimes legislation is difficult to read or understand, but here the tests that are required on public spaces protection orders are quite clear and explicit.
We all agree that rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly are important, and we would not wish to interfere with them in this Bill. Noble Lords are right to seek from me reassurance on this. What the amendment seeks to do is not as important as the probing that lies behind it. The legislation sets a very high test that must be applied before a public spaces protection order is used, as I will explain. The first condition of the test, in Clause 55(2), states that the activities must have had a detrimental effect on the quality of life of those in the locality or it is likely that such activities will occur which could have this effect. The second condition is that the activity is persistent, unreasonable and is justified by the restrictions on the notice. I think that gives us a pretty clear idea of the sort of activity which a public spaces protection order is designed to cover.
I consider it highly unlikely that, in the case of a peaceful protest, or holding placards or handing out literature, or talking to people, even the first condition could be met. I do not see that as being a condition which any court would allow.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I have Amendment 53FA in this group. It is an amendment to Clause 60, dealing with restricting the right of way over a highway. I am suggesting that in subsection (4), which provides:
“A public spaces protection order may not restrict the public right of way over a highway for the occupiers of premises”,
we should also refer to “users” of premises,
“adjoining or adjacent to the highway”.
This is a probing amendment to ask whether the term “occupiers” includes people authorised by the occupier. Obviously this would apply to all premises, but it was thinking about business premises that made me decide that this needed to be made clear, because restricting in effect the use of business premises would be a serious matter.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friends Lord Greaves and Lady Hamwee for explaining their amendments. Before I start on my notes, I should draw my noble friends’ attention to the underlying conditions that local authorities need to reflect on before they make orders. I think that they condition the whole approach and, to some extent, satisfy some of the anxieties that my noble friends have expressed.
I can assure my noble friend Lord Greaves that, like him, I fervently believe that public spaces are there for everyone to enjoy, but they should not be ruined by a careless and irresponsible minority. These new orders are designed to allow maximum flexibility for the council, meaning that restrictions on access to, or use of, any land should be considered only as a last resort. However, where restrictions on access are necessary, the option should be available to protect victims and communities from anti-social behaviour. That is what we are about and it is what the Bill is about.
On Amendment 41, I accept that the categories of land listed are important and, indeed, worthy of the further debate they have received today. This is exactly why many of them are covered explicitly in the draft guidance. However, making this amendment would stop the local council protecting those spaces more generally from issues that might deter usage. It is important that we do not inhibit the flexibility provided by these new orders.
Perhaps I may illustrate the point. Many of the categories of land listed here are commonly used by dog walkers as well as children. Given the risk to children of diseases spread by dog faeces, it is only right that a council has the ability to introduce measures to ensure that dog owners clean up after their animal. In addition, where some of these areas of land have become a focal point for people to congregate and drink alcohol, making usage by others unpleasant or even impossible, the council should be able to prohibit the drinking of alcohol to free the space for the majority who want to use it responsibly. The amendment as drafted would preclude the council providing these protections or any others that were necessary on the categories of land listed.
Amendment 41A is more specific and is designed to protect any rights of common, such as the right to graze animals, enjoyed by individuals or groups on common land. This amendment is, I believe, unnecessary. A public spaces protection order would not be used to stop a commoner exercising his right of common. In the case of rights of common, it is hard to imagine a situation where a right exercised by a commoner could result in anti-social behaviour, unless it were being done in a particular way. The new flexibility afforded to councils with the public spaces protection order means they can address the problem element of the behaviour while protecting the wider rights.
Amendment 54 would ensure that certain categories of land could not have access restricted. First, let me say that I accept the importance of maintaining access to footpaths, bridleways and byways so that they are available for the enjoyment of all. However, the list in Clause 61 relates to those highways that are of strategic value. This means that, in all probability, restricting access would have a significant impact on the community, if not the region or the country, that far outweighs the impact of any problem behaviours. I do not feel that the same can be said for all public rights of way. However, I agree that they deserve special consideration and I am happy to see how this can be made clearer in the guidance, but where the anti-social behaviour—and it is the anti-social behaviour that we are dealing with, not access—of those using these routes has reached a stage where the community is suffering, the council should have the ability to restrict access either in part or in totality.
I would like to make one more point which I hope my noble friend will appreciate. Due to the way in which the current orders in this area are framed, in many cases a gating order, and indeed the complete closure of a right of way, is the only option available to councils. The new order seeks to change this. Problem behaviours and anti-social individuals and groups can be dealt with more effectively under the new power, ensuring that the restriction of access is necessary only as a last resort. We have made this clear in the guidance, but I am content to work with interested groups such as the Open Spaces Society and the Ramblers, to see whether it can be made any more explicit.
The other amendments my noble friend Lord Greaves has in this group relate to restrictions on rights of way over a highway and appropriate safeguards. Amendment 53B seeks to provide further safeguards on the list of things that need to be considered before the right of way over a highway is restricted. I believe that as currently worded Clause 60 provides those assurances. However, we can consider how to go into more detail in the accompanying guidance to ensure that my noble friend’s concerns are addressed.
Amendment 53D would mean that all those affected would have to be notified in writing. In most cases, I think this would probably be correct. However, it may be that for some orders another medium would be more appropriate, such as speaking individually to those affected if there is only a small number. As such, I do not believe we should tie the hands of councils in this way in the Bill.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee
In moving Amendment 41B, I will speak to Amendments 44A, 44B, 49A and 55A. The amendments take us to Clause 56, dealing with the duration of public spaces protection orders. I entirely take the point that Clause 55 is targeted at activities, but I also take my noble friend’s point that such an order affects everyone. After all, the title of the order is about protecting space, even though the language of the Bill is about the quality of life of the people who may be affected.
The orders may last for up to three years with, I understand, an unlimited number of extensions. The Minister said that he shares the view that public space should be for everyone to enjoy. I take a more urban view than that of my noble friend Lord Greaves. Where space is very scarce in an urban environment it is important not to restrict it. I am aware that one can argue this both ways: one can also say that it is important to ensure that activities do not take place that mean that it is not enjoyable for everyone. It is not just an urban or even suburban or rural issue.
My amendments would provide for the duration to be no more than a year with a single extension, and for there to be no new order dealing with substantially the same space until the expiry of a year—a sort of anti-avoidance provision. For all the reasons already discussed, I would be very concerned about having something that becomes permanent or semi-permanent, but I have a more practical concern as well—it is in part philosophical. My practical concern is: if the order is to stop undesirable activities, whatever they may be, taking place on a particular space, how does one assess that the threat has passed? If the order goes on and on, the culture, local habits and so on of the area may have changed necessarily, and we will never know whether we have been successful, as we should have been in that we have prohibited an activity, or whether we have actually changed behaviour.
Also, if an order goes on and on, it is difficult to see how it can be challenged in the wide, democratic sense. Clause 62 is about challenging validity, but that is different. However, I have Amendment 55A—a pretty ropey amendment, I am afraid, but it would allow some sort of challenge. It is not a good amendment because the clause is about validity, but it will enable me to raise the issue with the Minister on how one challenges such orders. I beg to move.
Lord Greaves
My Lords, I have one amendment in this group, which covers very much the same ground as covered by my noble friend Lady Hamwee, so I shall not pursue it further. I merely support everything my noble friend said.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
I never object to any noble Lord interjecting and asking questions. I have sought to explain why a defined period is specified in Clause 56. I shall certainly take back the suggestion on this matter made by my noble friend Lord Faulks and speak to officials. However, Clause 56 provides a key link through from Clause 55 to Clause 57 and sets out quite specifically the details behind the order. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee on the understanding that I will further consider Amendment 55A.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, having started as one who believes—I hope that I still do—very considerably in local democracy, I suppose that I have fallen into the trap over the years of viewing whatever comes to us on green paper as restricting it; it is the cynical view that too much legislation has somehow engendered. Like others, I do not see this debate as being two-dimensional in the way that the Minister has just described; that is, “Is it too long or too short? Well, it is in the middle so that must be okay”. It is a three-dimensional debate and the points that have been made about the expression of local democracy are important and serious. The Committee has challenged the structure of the provisions in a way that will bear a good deal of further consideration. The distinction made by my noble friend Lord Greaves between the different types of content of the orders—access on the one hand and particular activities on the other—may also get us to a better point.
On activities, I should have learnt by now not to look at my BlackBerry during debates, but a very long e-mail on this subject has just arrived from the naturists, who have been quite active in making representations on this Bill. It tells me that nudity is a state, not an activity, so how does this affect them? They are worried.
I do not want to leave it quite on that point so I come back to what the orders try to do and how that is best achieved. I shall of course withdraw my amendment at this point, but I hope that we might be able to discuss between now and Report how the orders will operate. Sadly, I see that the LGA, whose briefing I have just looked up, says that it does not think that the provisions are in need of further amendment. Perhaps we need to talk to it as well. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(11 years ago)
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Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, this will make me popular, as noble Lords are now able to leave the Chamber.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, I ask all noble Lords to leave the Chamber quietly out of respect for my noble friend Lady Hamwee.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I hope that my amendments live up to that. I speak also to Amendments 22QU and 22QV, and Amendments 56ZBA and 56ZBB. These amendments are all about fixed-penalty notices for failure to comply, in the case of the first pair of amendments with a community protection order, and in the second pair of amendments with a public spaces protection order. The Bill allows 14 days to pay the fixed penalty, which may be reduced in amount it if is paid within a shorter period; I imagine that it is anticipated that that would be seven days. It seems to me that 14 days is a very short period. I am not in this amendment seeking to argue the merits or otherwise of either of the orders but we do not want them to come into disrepute through there being difficulties in their application. Some people go away on holidays, not realising that a notice may have become payable, because they might not actually have been handed it. There are a number of reasons why 14 days for payment is in many areas regarded as on the short side.
My amendments would provide in both cases a period of 28 days with a discount if payment is made, say, within 14 days—or, at any rate, an earlier period—which is comparable with penalties under the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. Amendment 22QV, also to Clause 49, would replace a certificate being one that,
“purports to be signed by or on behalf of the chief finance officer of the local authority”,
with one that is simply “signed on behalf of”. I will probably be told that this is language used in many other Acts of Parliament, but it seemed to me a curious provision. More importantly, however, there would be no scope for challenge to it if the local authority got its procedures wrong. I have therefore tabled the amendment not as a frivolous matter but as a serious one. I beg to move.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
I thank my noble friend for explaining the purpose of these amendments. I suppose I could say that I had a vested interest in asking other noble Lords to leave quietly, as I had to respond to this amendment.
This amendment relates to the amount of time that an individual issued with a fixed penalty notice should be given to pay. Where breach of a community protection notice or of a condition of a public spaces protection order has occurred, the offender could be issued with a fixed penalty notice. Payment of this penalty notice discharges the perpetrator from any other proceedings for that breach and so they are, quite rightly, given a period of grace in which to pay the amount specified. Different fixed penalty notice schemes have different periods during which recipients are expected to pay the penalty; for example, littering is set at 14 days whereas others have a longer time. In this case we believe that 14 days is sufficient time for a perpetrator to pay that amount and that it provides the right balance between giving the offender enough time to pay the fine and ensuring that the process for collecting such money is both timely and efficient.
In terms of Amendment 22QV, I have listened to the case made by my noble friend, who highlighted certain instances of concern. However, the language used in the Bill is, of course, commonly used elsewhere on the statute book. For example, this terminology is also used in the Environmental Protection Act 1990 in relation to fixed penalty notices under that Act. In effect it avoids the chief finance officer having to come to court to give evidence personally that he or she had signed the certificate. Despite that provision, it remains a matter for the court to decide what weight to place upon the document as evidence, although in practice it is highly unlikely that whether the document is genuine will ever be an issue. I have heard the case that my noble friend has made, but the Government feel that on balance the 14 days and, as has been stated, the signature of the chief finance officer as stands in what the Government have tabled is the right way forward. For those reasons, I hope that my noble friend is minded to withdraw her amendments.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, of course I will withdraw them, given that this is Committee stage. The last of my amendments would not impose any requirement to give evidence any more than would the words in the Bill, but I can see that I will not get anywhere with that. On the 14 days, is it just a question of the Government saying, “We think this is right”, or is it something more detailed than that? We have different views. I have said that I am concerned that the timing may too easily be missed, and that it could bring the penalties regime into disrepute. If the noble Lord has any more to say in support, I would be glad to hear it. Will he tell the Committee whether the shorter period envisaged is indeed seven days, which I rather guessed at? I do not know whether his notes give him that information.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
It would be appropriate if I wrote to the noble Baroness; I will come back to her specifically on whether it is seven or 10 days. However, on the 14 days, that is the Government’s position as it stands.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I will speak also to Amendments 22QYB, 22QYC and 22QYD.
Clause 50 states who may issue a community protection notice or a fixed penalty notice. Amendment 22QW queries whether paragraph (c) of Clause 50(1) is necessary. It provides that a community protection notice or fixed penalty notice may be issued by,
“a person designated by the relevant local authority”.
Paragraph (b) refers to the notices being issued by, “the relevant local authority”. The authority will have to designate a signatory because whatever it does must be done by someone acting in its name. Therefore, I am puzzled as to what paragraph (c) adds.
I have added my name to Amendment 22QY standing in the name of my noble friend Lord Greaves—he got there first—because my real objection concerns subsection (4) of Clause 50, which provides that only someone in a post,
“specified in an order made by the Secretary of State”,
can be designated. Surely, designation must be a matter for the local authority. Does the Secretary of State have to intervene at this level?
Amendments 22QYB and 22QYC probe whether all police community support officers have the relevant technical knowledge to deal with community protection notices. On previous Committee days we discussed some of the difficulties that may arise in using the existing statutory powers that environmental health officers have, for example, as opposed to using the new mechanisms provided in the Bill. A lot of technical knowledge needs to be applied in deciding whether an infringement has occurred, especially in respect of noise.
My last amendment in this group concerns serving a notice. A fixed penalty notice can be handed over to the individual or be delivered to that person’s address either by hand or by post. If it is to be delivered by post, I am concerned to know when it is deemed to have been issued. If it is issued when the notice is put in the post, it will reduce, by at least a day and possibly more, the time that the recipient of the notice has to pay. I have already said that I am concerned about how short that time is. I beg to move Amendment 22QW.
Lord Ramsbotham (CB)
My Lords, the point I am about to make has been made in connection with a great deal of other legislation and concerns the abilities of those with learning difficulties and disabilities to understand the content and implications of notices such as those we are discussing. It is important to ensure that the legislation includes reference to the provision of appropriate adults or advocates or whatever sources are used to make certain that the full implications are explained to those who may have such difficulties to avoid them getting into yet further trouble, completely inappropriately.
Lord Greaves
My Lords, on behalf of parish and town councils I thank the Minister for his slightly helpful comments at the end of his remarks. Perhaps, before the Bill is implemented, the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, and I and the NALC might get together to see whether we can put forward a clear, evidence-based proposal to the Government which they might consider seriously.
I thank the Minister for his helpful reply to my Amendment 22QYA, which I had forgotten to speak to.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, last week I, too, had a long reply to an amendment to which I had not spoken. Perhaps that is the way to go.
On the last of my amendments on the power to issue CPOs, I asked whether everyone falling within the description of what will be the new paragraph 1ZB in the schedule to the Police Reform Act would have the power. I think that the Minister is saying that everyone who falls within that description will have the power and not only particular individuals who have received training. Am I right in understanding that?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
There may be certain circumstances in which people are specifically trained for this function; there may be others where the work they undertake would include training in this function; and there may be others who operate under the guidance of other individuals who have been trained as to how it should be effectively done. It will depend on the circumstances.
No authority acting under this provision will wish to make a mistake. They will want to do it properly because it is in their interests that the CPN should be enforceable.
Baroness Hamwee
It shows how naive I am, but I have to say that it simply had not occurred to me that the designation under subsection (1)(c) would be of an organisation which is not a public body in the way that we would normally understand it, such as a local authority. As the Minister says, the notice is very powerful and there are criminal consequences. I would certainly like to think about that a little more but of course, for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.