Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon Excerpts

Wednesday 8th January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I am not seeking to annoy or cause a nuisance, but I believe that it may well be the will of the House now to hear from the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, on behalf of Her Majesty’s Opposition, and then the Minister.

[Baroness Howells of St Davids]

My Lords, it is my right to speak. People have mentioned cats and dogs; nobody has mentioned race. If this is the wish of the House, I will not.

I rise to support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dear. I believe that the Bill will allow the law enforcers to use subjective prejudices to harass and even charge persons as young as 10. This law does not take on board the fact that this nation is now multicultural but still has not unlearnt its racial prejudices. The clause could have as damaging an effect as the sus laws which black people have fought and struggled to have repealed. We are not unaware that the sus laws are still enforced by a change of language, as was done at the Notting Hill Carnival in 2013.

Britain is now a land of many cultures, and what one culture will subscribe to is not always acceptable to others and may easily be interpreted as annoyance and nuisance. Anyone with a racial bias could misinterpret the actions of anyone, especially someone of colour, as being offensive and feel it within their right to accuse them of breaking the law. Such actions as the Bill proposes could criminalise many innocent persons and further damage the fragile gains that we have made in this country.

A child as young as 10 may not even know that he or she is breaking a rule. This happened under sus many times—because I have worked in the community, I speak from within. This is what happens when people are given the wrong law. A group of young people speaking loudly or displaying high spirits of any kind could be accused of causing a nuisance or annoyance to others who are not aware of the culture. They could be young people gathering together to chat, especially on housing estates where there is not an awful lot of room. Young people are more prone to be victims of this law because they feel deeply and express it. Others in society, I agree, also feel deeply, but they have the means of concealing their real feelings.

I should like to quote Assistant Chief Constable Richard Bennett of Thames Valley Police, who said he would not expose anyone to the obscenities he had hurled at him at times when he was delivering the law. I worked in the community as a human being. I am not representing the black community. I know what I had hurled at me and the discomfort it caused people that I was engaged in trying to help right the wrongs that were going on.

My motive for speaking here so openly and frankly has been curtailed, and I will not delay your Lordships longer. This clause, if unchanged, will have serious effects on the black community and divisions will be even further stretched, as under the sus law.

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Moved by

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

3: Clause 1, page 2, line 6, leave out paragraph (a)

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, in Committee, Clause 1(5)(a) was the subject of some debate. It and the related provision in Clause 21 have also been a subject between the Home Office and the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Essentially, this provision places a duty on the court to avoid, as far as practicable, imposing prohibitions or requirements in an injunction or a criminal behaviour order which would conflict with the respondent’s religious beliefs.

The Government have consistently maintained that this provision related to the manifestation of the respondent’s religious beliefs, rather than to the religious belief per se. However, for the avoidance of doubt, we have decided not to remove the provision from the Bill, on the basis that the courts would in any event, by virtue of the operation of the Human Rights Act, be bound to consider whether the proposed prohibitions or requirements were compatible with the respondent’s convention rights, including but not limited to the right to the freedom of religion. I beg to move.

[The Earl of Lytton (CB)]

My Lords, I can quite understand the reason why this particular safeguard or defence in injunctive procedures is to be removed. The noble Lord may rest assured that I am with him as far as the argument goes. I have written to his noble friend and had an answer this morning pointing out that, in normal civil injunctive proceedings, there are a significant number of available defences—depending on how one counts them, 15 or 20 or more. The Bill as it stands would have allowed for three; this will reduce it to two.

I still do not understand, because in his letter to me—which I thank him very much for, and for keeping me in the loop on correspondence generally to do with this Bill—the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, merely said that he did not agree with me. He did not explain why in one set of civil injunctive proceedings under this Bill there will remain two defences, but in any other injunctive proceedings there will be 15 or more. That seems a two-tier approach, so what is the direction of travel in that respect?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, perhaps I may come back to the noble Earl in advance of Third Reading on that to specifically clarify the issues that he has raised. In terms of what the Government have done thus far, our understanding and direction of travel is clear, responding directly to the concerns raised on this issue.

Amendment 3 agreed.

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Moved by

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

6: Clause 1, page 2, leave out line 19 and insert “An application for an injunction under this section must be made to—”

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, in developing our anti-social behaviour reforms, the Government have, both formally and informally, sought the views of the front-line professionals who will use the new powers. We have listened to them and, where appropriate, have accepted constructive proposals to improve the measures in the Bill. The amendments in this group exemplify this approach.

Under Clause 1(8), applications for injunctions against over-18s to prevent nuisance and annoyance will be heard in the county court and applications against under-18s will be heard in the youth court. However, some cases of anti-social behaviour involve mixed groups of under and over-18s. To allow for such cases, Amendment 19 would enable rules of court to be made which would, in turn, enable the organisation applying for an injunction to seek permission from the youth court for the application against the adult—or, indeed, applications if there is more than one adult—to be heard in the youth court alongside the applications in respect of one or more under-18s. The youth court may grant the application if it is “in the interests of justice”. If not, the application will be denied and the application in respect of the adults will be heard in the county court in the normal way.

If the case is heard in the youth court and an IPNA is granted, Amendments 8, 9, 10 and 11 provide that any subsequent proceedings in relation to the adults will be heard in the county court—for example, if there are proceedings for a breach. Only the initial application for the grant of an injunction will be heard in the youth court.

Amendments 6, 7 and 21 are consequential on Amendment 19. These amendments help put victims first. In most cases, it will prevent them having to attend court and give evidence twice. The amendments will also reduce costs and save court time. By linking these hearings in the youth court, we will retain the experience and expertise of its judges in protecting the best interests of respondents under 18. I beg to move.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

We understand the reasons for these amendments and for wanting to try to ensure that cases involving those under 18 and those who are adult, where they relate to the same issue, can be tried or dealt with in the same court. Therefore, I certainly have no wish to argue against the principle of what the Government are seeking to achieve. However, in the letter that the Minister sent to us on 18 December, in which he outlined these amendments that were being tabled, he said in respect of this issue:

“We believe that it is in the best interests of respondents aged under 18 for linked cases involving adults to be transferred to the youth court rather than vice versa”.

Can he confirm that that means that a case could not be held in the adult court if somebody aged 18 was involved? Perhaps for the sake of argument I may take as an example—perhaps it is very exceptional—a case where there are, say, four or five adults and one person under 18 who happens to be 17 and a half. Under these amendments, is it the Government’s position that it would not be possible, if the parties wanted it, for the matter to be dealt with in the adult court? Are they saying that if the cases are going to be dealt with together, that can happen only in the youth court? I should be grateful if the Minister could clarify that point.

I stress that we are not opposed to what the Government are seeking to achieve, but I pose the question in the light of the sentence in the letter that was sent to us where reference was made to believing it to be,

“in the best interests of respondents aged under 18 for linked cases involving adults to be transferred to the youth court rather than vice versa”.

Does that mean that they could never be held in the adult court, even if for example there were four or five adults and one under 18? I think that I know the answer to this, but could the Minister say why the Government believe that it is in the best interests of respondents aged under 18 for linked cases to be in the youth court rather than vice versa?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I will clarify that. As was put down in the letter of my noble friend on the final point, there is an understanding and appreciation that with youths under 18, youth courts have certain specialist knowledge in dealing with these cases. The point, which has been raised over and again, is that one of the key things, especially when it comes to such matters, is reforming and addressing particular issues, and ensuring that we prevent reoffending. We feel that the youth courts, particularly in the cases of under-18s, are best placed to deal with these issues. I can confirm that a case involving a person under 18 cannot be transferred to the country court in any circumstances.

Amendment 6 agreed

Moved by

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

7: Clause 1, page 2, line 21, at end insert—
“Paragraph (b) is subject to any rules of court made under section 18(1A).”

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Moved by

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

8: Clause 7, page 5, line 6, at end insert—
“( ) In subsection (1) “the court” means—
(a) the court that granted the injunction, except where paragraph (b) applies;(b) the county court, where the injunction was granted by a youth court but the respondent is aged 18 or over.”

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Moved by

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

9: Clause 8, page 5, line 31, leave out paragraphs (b) and (c) and insert—
“(b) a judge of the county court, if—(i) the injunction was granted by the county court, or(ii) the injunction was granted by a youth court but the respondent is aged 18 or over;(c) a justice of the peace, if neither paragraph (a) nor paragraph (b) applies.”

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Moved by

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

11: Clause 9, page 6, line 8, leave out paragraphs (b) and (c) and insert—
“(b) a judge of the county court, if—(i) the injunction was granted by the county court, or(ii) the injunction was granted by a youth court but the respondent is aged 18 or over;(c) a justice of the peace, if neither paragraph (a) nor paragraph (b) applies.”

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Moved by

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

16: Clause 12, page 6, line 36, at end insert—
“( ) the respondent is aged 18 or over,”

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[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, in Committee, my noble friend Lady Hamwee questioned whether it was appropriate for under-18s to be excluded from their own homes on the grounds of anti-social behaviour. After further consideration, I am content to make a change that ensures that only adults can be excluded from their home where there is a threat of violence or a significant risk of harm to others.

Councils have wider safeguarding duties and other legislation that allows for a child to be removed from the home when it is in their best interest. For instance, local councils already have duties under the Children Act 1989 to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. Where a young person is committing serious anti-social behaviour to the extent that agencies are considering applying for an injunction with the power to exclude that young person from their home, the local council should first consider whether the child is “in need” under the Children Act and, if so, provide appropriate support as an alternative to simply excluding a young person from their home. A Part 1 injunction could still play a role in transforming the young person’s life as well as protecting victims from further anti-social behaviour. However, if removing them from the family home is considered necessary, this should be done under existing legislation and not just be seen as a chance to disperse the problem to another area.

I do not believe that this change will weaken agencies’ ability to deal with anti-social behaviour caused by minors. Agencies can still apply for an injunction to stop the young person’s behaviour and the court can attach a power of arrest to the order in cases where an individual has either been violent or threatened violence when committing or threatening anti-social behaviour, or where there is a risk of significant harm to another person by that individual. The power of arrest will act as a deterrent and allow the police to take swift action to protect the victim or communities if the injunction is breached. Of course, youth offending teams will play an important role in identifying the problems that drive the young person’s behaviour and measuring the risk they pose to others to ensure that the right action is taken. However, we accept that excluding a young person from their home using an injunction will not be the right action and I therefore commend the amendment to the House. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the bad news for the government Front Bench is that this amendment was put down in the flurry of amendments that my noble friend Lord Greaves and I rushed to table when the timetabling of business was changed. That encourages me to continue that sort of scattergun approach to matters I think need to be discussed in Committee, but of course I am extremely happy to see this among the government amendments and to know that the change will be made. I am very grateful to the Government for listening.

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Moved by

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

17: Clause 13, leave out Clause 13

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[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, this amendment follows up the debate in Committee initiated by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, about Clause 13. This clause preserves an existing power available to social landlords to apply for tenancy injunctions to prohibit anti-social behaviour which relates to or affects their management of their housing stock.

In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, sought to challenge Clause 13 on the grounds that its provisions were not tenure-neutral. As I have indicated, Clause 13 simply preserves an existing power available to social landlords under Section 153D of the Housing Act 1996. That section, which, I might add, was inserted into the Housing Act by the previous Administration in 2003, responded to calls from social landlords that they needed to be able to hold their tenant responsible for the behaviour of visitors. However, strictly speaking, Clause 13 is not necessary, as an injunction under Clause 1 can be used to achieve the same end of holding the respondent responsible for the anti-social behaviour of the visitors to their property, regardless of tenure.

We included Clause 13 in the Bill because social landlords were familiar with tenancy injunctions. However, given the points raised in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and after further consultation with social landlords, we have decided to remove the clause to ensure that the injunction is completely tenure-neutral. This will fit in with our wider approach of simplifying anti-social behaviour powers through the Bill, while ensuring that social landlords, like the police and other agencies, will have access to the tools they need. I beg to move.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing the government amendment. Any move towards increasing tenancy neutrality in the Bill is to be welcomed. I will raise one issue with the Minister, which arises from the letter that he sent to us setting out the reasons for the changes that were being made. The paragraph in question states:

“However, as the IPNA can do everything a tenancy injunction can do, we are satisfied that there is no compelling case for retaining this bespoke provision for those living in social housing”.

Earlier in the letter, the Minister had said:

“The provisions in respect of the IPNA are tenancy neutral”—

I am not sure whether that is regarded as different from tenure-neutral—

“save for the provisions in clause 13”.

From that, one would assume that if Clause 13 is disappearing from the scene, then the provisions in respect of the IPNA are indeed neutral. With the comment in the letter that,

“the IPNA can do everything a tenancy injunction can do”,

that was why the Government felt that they could withdraw Clause 13. Of course, not only does Clause 13 cover what is said in Clause 12(1), that an injunction,

“may have the effect of excluding the respondent from the place where he or she normally lives”,

it also states:

“The court may include in the tenancy injunction a provision prohibiting the person against whom it is granted from entering or being in … any premises specified in the injunction (including the premises where the person normally lives)”,

and,

“any area specified in the injunction”.

In the light of the statement in the letter that the IPNA can do everything a tenancy injunction can do, are we to assume that that part of Clause 13(3) would or could apply to any tenure and not simply to those tenures previously covered by the tenancy injunction? As I understand it, the Government appear to have moved on that point and the provisions in respect of the IPNA are now neutral. Bearing in mind what Clause 13(3) said, which went beyond merely,

“excluding the respondent from the place where he or she normally lives”,

which covered,

“any premises specified in the injunction”,

and,

“any area specified in the injunction”,

is that something that is still to be reserved for social housing tenants or is it something that, if it was deemed necessary or desirable, could now be applied to anybody in any form of tenure?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, to clarify, as I said earlier in moving the amendment, an IPNA could impose the prohibitions that were specifically referred to in Clause 13 as well. For example, an IPNA could be used to deal with visitors to a property. As such, the provisions are covered in an IPNA. Therefore we have tabled the amendment in light of the comments made by the noble Lord in Committee.

[Lord Rosser]

That would be irrespective of tenure? It would not apply purely to social housing?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

As I stated earlier, the purpose behind the IPNA is that it would be tenure-neutral.

Amendment 17 agreed.