Terrorism Act 2000 (Code of Practice for Examining Officers and Review Officers) Order 2014

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Monday 7th July 2014 Grand Committee

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)]

My Lords, as noble Lords will know, Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 allows an examining officer to stop and question—and, when necessary, detain and search—individuals travelling through ports, airports, international rail stations or the border area to determine whether that person appears to be someone who is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism. Examining people at ports and the border area contributes on a daily basis to keeping the British public safe. Those engaged in terrorist-related activity travel to plan, finance, train for and commit their attacks. Most major international terrorist plots have involved individuals travelling through international borders to plan and prepare their attacks. Schedule 7 is an important part of the UK’s counterterrorism strategy and integral to the UK’s border security arrangements.

The Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act, which received Royal Assent on 13 March 2014, made changes to Schedule 7—and to Schedule 8, which provides for the treatment of persons detained under Schedule 7 powers. These changes were made following extensive public consultation in 2012 and are intended to reduce the potential scope for Schedule 7 to be operated in ways that may interfere with individuals’ rights unnecessarily or disproportionately, while retaining operational effectiveness.

The changes made to Schedule 7 include: reducing the maximum period of examination from nine to six hours; extending to individuals detained at a port the statutory rights, already available to individuals detained under Schedule 7 at a police station, to have a person informed of their detention and to consult a solicitor privately; clarifying that the right to consult a solicitor includes consultation in person; ensuring that all individuals examined for more than one hour are formally detained and given their statutory rights; introducing statutory review of the need for continued detention; introducing a statutory requirement for training of examining and reviewing officers; establishing a statutory provision that undertaking strip-searches of persons detained under Schedule 7 powers requires reasonable grounds to suspect that the person is concealing something which may be evidence that they are involved in terrorism, and requires a supervising officer’s authority; repealing the unused power to seek intimate samples— for example, blood or semen; and making express provision that an examining officer may make and retain a copy of information obtained or found in the course of an examination.

Noble Lords will appreciate that our discussions are consequential on the full debates that we had when the Bill was before us. The existing code of practice must be revised to reflect the changes made to the powers by the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act and to make specific provision on training and reviews. I am grateful to noble Lords for attending this debate and beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, this is consequential on previous debates. It is amazing how much and how quickly all that agonising goes out of one’s head, and one has to remind oneself of the subject of it. I am glad that we have had the chance to consider the draft code of practice and the covering SI. What concerns me is the delay in the introduction of the review arrangements, which I assume is because it has simply not been possible to get the training in place quickly enough. I am not suggesting that the better provisions of the legislation, as they are after the work done on the then Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill, should be delayed. However, could my noble friend confirm that training is on track for the more senior officers, who will be detailed to undertake the reviews, and how supervision will be carried out in the mean time? I notice that the code says that it will be delayed until the relevant provisions come into force. However, in distinction, the paragraphs about audio recording say that there is no requirement to follow the code until next April. That is the time when the review provisions are to come into force, or so we are told. I do not know whether I am seeing a problem where there is none. Perhaps my noble friend has information, although he may not, about the proportion of officers who will be trained to undertake the more senior role.

I shall raise a point again that I raised during the passage of the Bill. Will training cover how officers should deal with the family or other accompanying passengers of the individual who is being held or detained? I think that I mentioned during the Bill’s passage that I had come across an example, which I hope was a rare one, of an individual being told that, if he insisted on waiting for a legal representative, it would be a problem for his elderly mother, with whom he was travelling. In other words, inappropriate pressure was put on him to forgo a right. I am also not clear what happens if, because of detention, passengers miss their flights. I hope that my noble friend can also confirm that the facilities for this work are satisfactory and appropriate. We have talked about short-term holding facilities a good deal, of course.

The code refers to legal privilege, where the restriction seems to be on copying, not on looking at it. You cannot erase something from your head although, obviously, there would be a restriction on using it—but what happens if a privileged document is copied when it should not be?

Paragraph 41 suggests that consultation with a solicitor is invariably not allowed. This is in the examination part of the code, not the detention part. I had thought that it was always allowed, but not necessarily with a solicitor of the individual’s choice. Is that only when the individual is actually detained?

Paragraph 42 states that an examining officer may grant a request that a named person is informed of the examination at his discretion and that:

“Where reasonably practicable, the request should be granted”.

Is it discretion or reasonable practicality?

Paragraph 45, which is where we get on to detention, states that the power may be exercised,

“where the examining officer considers it is appropriate to do so”.

The last bullet point of paragraph 46 states that:

“Detention is an option (during the first hour of examination)”.

Is that bullet point just about the first hour of detention? If I am asking too many questions, I have no doubt that my noble friend will ask to write to me.

However, I will raise a couple of matters which I hope he can confirm now. First, paragraph 7.2 of the Explanatory Memorandum reads:

“Examining people at ports and the border area contributes daily to plan, finance, train for, and commit their attacks”.

I shall not reread that, but when the Minister looks at it, he will realise that some words must be missing. I do not think you detain people in order to help them plan their attacks. I have had a word with the Minister’s officials, and I think they think it is a typo, but quite an important one.

My second question is on similar lines, but I think I am on dodgier ground. It is on annexe A to the code, which explains to the detainee that he is detained to determine essentially either whether he is involved in terrorism or whether he is entering or leaving Northern Ireland. I thought, or perhaps I had assumed without applying much thinking, that it should be “and” rather than “or”. Looking at Schedule 7, Northern Ireland is dealt with in a separate paragraph. Will my noble friend confirm that detention can be solely to establish whether somebody is going into Northern Ireland without any terrorism-related aspect? I am sorry to have slung that at my noble friend. I looked at this rather too close to the time of the debate to give him notice of the rather detailed points which I have just raised.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I will be giving the Minister a somewhat easier time than he has just been given by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.

I thank the Minister for the explanation of the purpose of this order, which brings into operation a code of practice for examining officers and review officers in respect of the exercise of the powers under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 and under Schedule 8 to that Act where the powers are exercised in connection with Schedule 7, as amended by Schedule 9 to the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. The code of practice revises the preceding code of practice to take account of amendments made to Schedules 7, 8 and 14 to the Terrorism Act 2000 by the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014.

The Explanatory Memorandum refers to commencing the remaining provisions of Schedule 9 to the 2014 Act this month to coincide with the issue of the code of practice brought into operation by this instrument, with the exception of the provision to which the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, referred requiring review of the detention of persons detained under Schedule 7, which are being delayed until next April to allow sufficient time to develop, accredit and train all examining and review officers. I shall pursue some of the points she raised. Will the Minister say how many examining and review officers still require to be trained, how long the training of each officer takes and why the required training has not been completed by this month and has had to be delayed? The need for such training must have been known for some time. Could the Minister also spell out the impact of this delay, in practical terms, including any impact on the provisions of this instrument, which comes into force at the end of this month?

The Explanatory Memorandum also refers in paragraph 4.5 to consultation on this issue having taken place with “National Business Leads”. Perhaps the Minister could remind me who or what this organisation is or these people are.

As the Minister said, the Explanatory Memorandum states in paragraph 7.2 that:

“Schedule 7 is an important part of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy and key to the UK’s border security”.

The memorandum goes on:

“The changes to Schedule 7 in the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act are intended to reduce the potential scope for Schedule 7 powers to be operated in an unnecessary or disproportionate way, whilst still retaining their operational effectiveness”.

It then lists the changes made under the 2014 Act. They include ensuring access to legal advice for all individuals examined for more than one hour. In that regard, could the Minister clarify what legal entitlements people have when detained under Schedule 7? Will they have access to free legal advice?

The changes also include reducing the maximum period of examination from nine hours to six hours. The Government and others recently expressed concerns about the numbers going from this country to Syria apparently to be trained and engage in violence in the current conflict, and the possible consequences of that. In the light of concerns about what might happen if and when these people return to this country, with or without others, and what their intentions might then be, is it the Government’s view that all the changes made by the 2014 Act, including reducing the maximum period of examination from nine hours to six hours, actually enhance our ability to minimise the risk of those potential threats? Do the Government believe that the new code of practice provided for in this order—reflecting the amendments made to Schedule 7 to the 2000 Act by the 2014 Act—contribute to rather than potentially diminish our security in the present climate?

I simply conclude by commenting that the Explanatory Memorandum states that,

“the majority of consultation respondents agreed that the revised code clearly reflected the changes made to Schedule 7 powers in the”,

2014 Act. What it is not able to say is that the majority of respondents agreed that in today’s climate all those changes are still appropriate. We will not oppose this order, but I hope that the Minister will respond directly to the points and questions I raised, as well as those of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.

Serious Crime Bill [HL]

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd July 2014 Lords Chamber

Debate on whether Clause 4 should stand part of the Bill.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I am opposing the Question that this clause stand part of the Bill simply to probe. I hope that nothing I say will take the Minister by surprise. I would like to use this opportunity to thank him and his officials for the factsheets that we have had and, in particular, for the Keeling schedules. I discovered that in my pile of copies of statutes, I had a copy of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. I then rapidly discovered how out of date that print was, so the material that we have been sent is very useful indeed.

This debate is closely tied to the previous one—still on third parties’ interests. Clause 4 is about receivers, and proposes an addition to the Proceeds of Crime Act involving proposed new Section 10A of that Act, which is inserted by Clause 1 on determining the extent of an interest in property. Essentially, the purpose of this stand part debate is to ask who deals with what, and when. How would all this operate? Who determines whether and when there has been no,

“reasonable opportunity to make representations”,

or whether there would be,

“a serious risk of injustice”?

I am of course quoting from proposed new Section 51(8B) —whereas proposed new Section 10A(1) in Clause 1 provides that the court, not the receiver, determines the extend of a defendant’s interest,

“if it thinks it appropriate to do so”.

My request, therefore, to the Minister is simply for him to explain the procedure.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, it was kind of my noble friend Lady Hamwee to thank those who are supporting me at official level in the Bill; I am supported by a very fine team, and I am grateful. I am also grateful for the fact that a number of noble Lords have taken time to talk to me about the Bill. That has helped us all to get an understanding of a complex measure. Those Keeling measures are needed in order to have the faintest idea about what is going on. Noble Lords will therefore understand the complexity of the matter and why the excellence of my officials is important to me.

Clause 4 deals with the circumstances in which an individual affected by a determination of interest may make representations to the court appointing an enforcement receiver. A court can confer certain powers on an enforcement receiver, including the power to realise property. This power is accompanied by a requirement to allow persons with an interest in the property a reasonable opportunity to make representations to the court.

As we discussed in the previous debate, the basic principle is that an appeal against a Section 10A determination as to the extent of the defendant’s interest in a property will be permitted only where the person was not given an opportunity to make representation to the judge who made the determination, or there is a serious risk of injustice. In cases where there is no receiver, the Court of Appeal will hear the appeal in the normal way. In cases where the court appoints a receiver, however, it is not bound by the determination and can hear representations. It is in effect hearing an appeal.

As interested third parties will generally have had an opportunity to make representations to the court prior to it making a determination of interest in property, the changes made by Clause 4 limit to certain circumstances the right of such parties to make further representations to the court appointing the receiver. As I have explained, it is not a right of appeal at large and does not allow representations to be made that are inconsistent with a determination, except under the two circumstances I described: first, when the affected party was not given a reasonable opportunity to make representations to the Crown Court before it made its determination; and, secondly, where the court considers that the determination would result in a serious risk of injustice to the person. These two circumstances mirror those in Clause 3, which set out the grounds under which the Court of Appeal may hear an appeal against a Section 10A determination.

So that we are in no doubt as to what it means, the “serious risk of injustice” will include an instance where an innocent third party with no links to criminality has an interest in a house that is to be sold to satisfy a confiscation order against a defendant. The innocent third party may have been out of the country when the determination was made and, consequently, had not received notification of the hearing. By contrast, it would not include instances where there has been an inconvenience to a third party—for example, if they had to move out of rented accommodation that was to be sold to satisfy a confiscation order. A serious injustice is not anticipated to be such a rare instance that it would be considered to be an exceptional circumstance. It will be a matter for judicial discretion, based on the facts of the individual case.

The clause enables an interested third party to make representations where their interest in the property came to light only after the Crown Court had made its original determination. Subject to the court’s consideration of any such representations, and to the outcome of any appeal, a determination made by the court is binding on the receiver. As I have said, in cases where there is no receiver appointed, any appeal will be dealt with by the Court of Appeal. This represents an equitable balance between the effective enforcement of confiscation orders and the important rights of third parties. On that basis, I beg to move that Clause 4 stand part of the Bill.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, that is very helpful. I commented to my noble friend when we discussed Part 1 that flow-charts might be quite useful. As he has described the sequence of events, it occurs to me that flow charts or some sort of fairly straightforward step-by-step explanation would be particularly helpful to third parties who get caught up in these proceedings. A defendant will be likely to have legal representation and advisers who can assist with what happens at what stage. A third party may suddenly find that he or she is affected and they ought to be able to find out what steps are available to make representations and how they should be made, without necessarily having to go to the expense of instructing lawyers themselves.

The right thing to do would be to make this user-friendly to people, about whom we should not assume any degree of guilt or their being reprehensible at all. I just use this opportunity to air that thought and of course I am not going to resist Clause 4.

Clause 4 agreed.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

1: Clause 5, page 5, line 12, after “prosecutor” insert “and the defendant”

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the first amendment is an amendment to Clause 5, which will introduce a new Section 11 to POCA. The proposed new Section 11(8) provides for the prosecutor to have an opportunity to make representations regarding the time for payment. Clearly, the defendant must have an opportunity as well. I tabled the amendment simply to ask my noble friend whether he can explain when that opportunity would be, and whether he can say whether proposed new Section 11(8) concerns the prosecutor’s response to the defendant’s representations, which are covered elsewhere—in existing legislation if not in the Bill. I beg to move.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, Clause 5 includes provisions designed to minimise delays in the confiscation process. This is achieved by amending Section 11 of POCA to make it crystal clear that the full amount that is ordered to be paid by the court must be paid on the day on which the order is made, unless the court is satisfied that the defendant is unable to do so, for example, because they need time to realise their property.

The maximum additional time allowed for a defendant to pay their confiscation orders has been reduced from 12 months to six. There will also be a further restriction on the length of an extension of the time to pay limiting it to more than is necessary, for example, to realise funds from a specific asset.

My noble friend has indicated that this amendment is designed to tease out whether the defendant has a right to make representations to the court about the time for payment. She has rightly pointed out the fact that the proposed new Section 11(8) expressly confers on the prosecutor the right to make representations, but no such express right is conferred on the defendant.

I can assure my noble friend that the defendant will indeed be able to make representations to the court. However, in view of the way in which the process will operate, it is not necessary to provide for this in the legislation. As I have explained, the default position is that a confiscation order will be payable on the day that it is made. This is the current position. We do not believe that it is impractical. Certainly, for lower value orders, there is no reason why the defendant cannot visit the fines officer and discharge the confiscation order before leaving the court.

The court will not be expected to allow additional time for payment on its own motion. In practice, the court will only be in the position to consider making an order under proposed new Section 11(2) of POCA to extend the time given to the defendant to pay their order if the defendant has made representations to the effect that they need more time to pay their order or part of it. This will be done as part of the confiscation hearing.

Similarly, under proposed new Section 11(4) of POCA, it will be for the defendant to make an application to the court to extend the period allowed for payment. It is implicit in making such an application that the defendant will set out his or her arguments for being afforded more time to pay the confiscation order. New Section 11(8) is intended to ensure that the prosecutor has the right to respond to the case made by the defendant. Having heard the explanation, I trust that my noble friend will agree that the amendment is unnecessary.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the noble Baroness will know that I was concerned about the very tight provisions of new Section 11. She has explained that the defendant will have an opportunity to make representations at the time. That is reassuring, because it is almost never possible to realise an asset on the day that an order is made and it is often not even possible to transfer money immediately. What she has said about the processes is helpful and I am grateful to her for her explanation of proposed new Section 11(8). I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 1 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, I will insert a single sentence here, although it may be rather a long one. I am afraid that my noble friend may have great difficulty in doing what the noble Lord suggests because he will come into conflict with a deep and entirely erroneous Treasury view about hypothecation. For all my political life, I have fought the battle for hypothecation, which is the only way we will get people to accept a whole range of things in future.

It was extremely successfully done on the landfill tax, but the money was then stolen by the incoming Government, who did not understand. The Treasury had hated it in the first place; it had been forced through by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, my right honourable friend Kenneth Clarke. Immediately after he went, the Treasury mandarins got the money back again because they do not like someone else deciding how the money shall be spent. I beg my noble friend to stand firm against that wholly unacceptable attitude.

The Pope was right, in the 1920s, when he talked about subsidiarity being the basis of democracy. He was, of course, attacking fascism and communism. I am afraid that bureaucratism is just as damaging in always trying to concentrate decisions about how money shall be spent in the hands of the Treasury. I think that the more people who make decisions about how it shall be spent, the more we will be able to make democracy work. Obviously, there have to be restrictions and some overall view, but I hope that my noble friend will take this opportunity to fight like a tiger for an essential part of any sensible democracy: hypothecation. Hypothecation should be a tick rather than a cross when something such as this is put forward.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I wonder whether Hansard will be able to resist its usual refusal to let us put lots of “ands” and “buts” in very long sentences.

I have been trying to think of something to say in Latin to the noble Lord, but my A-level Latin is too long ago for me to be able to do it. However, he is probably asking your Lordships the sort of question to which we should answer yes. I remember that from the very early days of my Latin education.

I am certainly on the yes part of the spectrum of answers to this, in principle. I think a large part of the problem is what I unkindly call “turf wars” between the MoJ and the Home Office about who should have the money when the proceeds are recovered. I realise it is more complicated than that.

On the wording of the amendment, I wonder whether it is possible to identify the communities and neighbourhoods affected in an effective and straightforward manner, if at all. For instance, on the proceeds of crime of someone high up in an organised crime organisation dealing with drugs, can you pin down the communities and neighbourhoods affected in the way suggested? I am very attracted to money going towards crime prevention and assisting those who are affected by crime, but I am just not quite sure about this provision. However, the questions the noble Lord asked the Minister about ARIS and the wider questions about how the proceeds of crime when recovered are applied are very important.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, on the face of it, this is a beguiling amendment, not least because of the way the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, moved it by giving an example of helping a primary school understand a bit more about the way our complicated world works. There is no one in this House who defers more than me to the need for this country and this Parliament to help our citizens have a better idea of what it is to be a citizen in our barbarically complicated society.

I concur with my noble friend Lady Hamwee, and I think there is perhaps another problem with the wording of the amendment in that it simply talks about,

“reinvestment in the communities and neighbourhoods affected”,

which seems as wide as the Atlantic Ocean and gives no reinvestment guidance about what, why or wherefore.

I have a deeper problem with the amendment. We heard the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, give the example of $20 billion to $40 billion that should be recovered from frauds in developing countries and is not. We heard other examples from my noble friend Lord Taylor of Holbeach of the abject failure of our current laws to achieve their purpose. I am not in favour of doing anything to diminish the resources available to the prosecutorial authorities for seeking to make more as regards compliance with the manifold laws we already have. It is a sort of scandal that we go on passing law after law with the most perfect of purposes, but then fail utterly to give those charged with implementing those laws the wherewithal to do that.

My noble friend Lord Taylor of Holbeach talked with some satisfaction of six advisers. I have to tell him that when you are up against the big, bad guys, a team of six will look rather small, and he is talking about six to cover the whole landscape. Therefore my reservation about the amendment is simply that if its effect is to reduce at all the current grotesquely inadequate resources that go toward compliance, I am afraid that I am not for it.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

5: Clause 8, page 7, leave out lines 17 and 18

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, this is a short point because it is just a short question. Amendment 5 is to Clause 8 and Amendment 26 is to Clause 28—the equivalent Northern Ireland provision. Amendment 5 seeks to leave out new Section 25A(2)(a) of POCA, which allows the court to discharge an order in the case of a deceased defendant where,

“it is not possible to recover anything from the estate”.

My question is: is this not covered by new Section 25A(2)(b), which says that a discharge could be made where it is not,

“reasonable to make any attempt … to recover anything”?

It seems to me that if it is not possible to make an attempt, it certainly would not be reasonable. That is my question. I beg to move.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, Clause 8 deals with the discharge of certain unpaid confiscation orders and applications to vary unpaid orders down in value. Despite the best efforts of law enforcement agencies, some confiscation orders are uncollectable and sit on the books of Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, accruing interest at 8% a year.

Clause 8 provides that the court will be able to write off unpaid confiscation orders where the defendant has died and it is not possible or reasonable to seek payment of the order from the defendant’s estate: where, for example, there are no assets remaining in the estate. Clause 28 makes the same provision for Northern Ireland.

In Clauses 8 and 28 there are two cases where orders may be written off: first, where it is impossible to get any money out of the estate; and, secondly, where it is not reasonable to make any attempt or further attempt to get money out of the estate.

These amendments suggest removing the case for discharging orders where it is impossible to get any money at all out of the estate. My noble friend has indicated these amendments are essentially designed to probe what would be covered by a first set of circumstances for discharging an order that is not covered by a second set of circumstances.

My noble friend is correct to say that there is certainly a significant degree of overlap between the two. If there are no assets of any note in the estate, it would not be reasonable to make an attempt to recover moneys owing to discharge a confiscation order. Equally, it would not be possible to recover anything from the estate.

That said, I believe it is helpful to retain both cases. The first case where it is impossible to get any money at all out of the estate could be said to be a subset of the second case, where it is not reasonable to make any attempt or further attempt. However, there may be circumstances not covered by the second case. It is important that this clause should encompass all possible scenarios to ensure uncollectible orders may be discharged.

I hope that, in light of that explanation, my noble friend will be content to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am not sure that I do understand that it would ever be reasonable to make an attempt to recover something where it is not possible to recover it. I am not going to make a fuss about it. However, when I hear about 8% a year, I think I need to review my investment strategy. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 5 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

10: Clause 11, page 10, line 7, leave out subsection (1)

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, this amendment is to Clause 11, while Amendment 27 is an equivalent amendment to the equivalent Northern Ireland provision, Clause 13(1). The Minister has already referred to the change from “reasonable cause to believe” to “reasonable grounds to suspect” in the context of the exercise of restraint order powers. The question, obviously, is designed to explore why there is a lower hurdle when we are talking about investigation only, not proceedings.

I appreciate that the later part of Clause 11 requires reporting by the court, although the court can decide not to require it, and that proceedings have to be started within a reasonable time. I am assuming, but perhaps the Minister can confirm this, that a defendant can apply for the restraint to be lifted on the basis that reasonable time has passed and there are no proceedings, and that “reasonable time” is assessed on a case-by-case basis and is not a fixed period. However, it occurs to me that the provision might be giving rise to additional litigation because there are uncertainties around this.

Temporary asset freezing—which is what this is, essentially—could be for quite a long time. We are talking about someone who is not a convicted criminal and may not yet even be a defendant. There could be an impact on that person’s dependants and their business. It is, therefore, a serious matter and I look forward to an explanation of why the Government have chosen to lower the hurdle and the protections that will be in place. I beg to move.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, I am pleased that my noble friend Lady Hamwee has raised these issues. We do not take the impact of restraint orders lightly and we fully understand her points. However, these orders effectively freeze property to prevent it being dissipated before a confiscation order is made. This is important in effective use of the Proceeds of Crime Act. The property is then available to sell, which helps to satisfy a confiscation order which may subsequently be made.

The intention of the Proceeds of Crime Act was to introduce the ability to obtain a restraint order as early as possible in the investigation to remove any possibility that a criminal will become aware, as a result of the investigation, that their assets are at risk and so move or hide them. We have been discussing this for much of the afternoon. Restraint orders are, therefore, available from the earliest stages of a criminal investigation. As I have already said, and as my noble friend is aware, the current test for obtaining a restraint order in all circumstances is that there is a “reasonable cause to believe” that the alleged offender has benefited from his criminal conduct. This is a proportionate test in circumstances where a defendant has been charged and is being prosecuted. In this case there will be available evidence to meet the test of “belief”.

However, the operational experience of our criminal justice colleagues in relation to this issue has shown that, at the early stage of an investigation, it is very hard to prove belief. The reality is that at that stage of an investigation there may be limited evidence, simply because the investigation has not yet had time to gather it. It is notable—as the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, has said—that the number of restraint orders has fallen since 2010-11, despite the Government’s push for more asset recovery action. The number of restraint orders obtained had been increasing and reached a peak of nearly 2,000 in 2010-11 but has dropped every year since then, with fewer than 1,400 restraint orders being made last year.

Delaying the obtaining of a restraint order until there is sufficient evidence to meet the “reasonable cause to believe” test can provide suspected offenders with an opportunity to dissipate or hide their assets to protect them from seizure. The amendment we are making to POCA in the Bill therefore revises the test for restraint in the earliest stages to “reasonable grounds to suspect”—I emphasise “suspect”—that the alleged offender has benefited from his criminal conduct. It is also of note that the amendments include a requirement for the judge making the restraint order to set a date for the matter to be returned to the court so that it can consider whether sufficient progress has been made with the investigation or give reasons for not arranging such a hearing. This reflects current practice of the court when it makes a restraint order in the absence of the person who will be the subject of the order. Making the practice mandatory will ensure appropriate judicial oversight of restraint orders made during a criminal investigation.

It is important that the Committee understands that Clauses 11 and 31 are not breaking new legal ground. “Suspicion”, as opposed to ‘belief’, is a test in other similar matters. Within POCA itself, a judge has to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a defendant has benefited from their criminality in order to issue a production order. Also, under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, a police officer may arrest without a warrant anyone whom he or she has “reasonable grounds for suspecting” has committed an offence. So, at the early stages of a criminal investigation, it is appropriate that the court uses the threshold of suspicion, rather than belief. We think that this is a direct parallel supporting the amendment we are seeking to make in Clause 11.

This was one of the issues considered by the Joint Committee which undertook pre-legislative scrutiny of the Modern Slavery Bill. In its report, the Joint Committee made the following comment:

“It is imperative that law enforcement authorities should be able to freeze relevant assets at the earliest possible stage in an investigation, and rarely, if ever, more than 24 hours after arrest. We therefore strongly recommend that the test for obtaining a restraint order be amended to make it less stringent. We note that the Government has already committed to reducing the test from ‘reasonable cause to believe’ to ‘reasonable suspicion’. We approve of this formulation.”

I hope the Committee will do so too.

My noble friend Lady Hamwee asked what would happen if a defendant were able to make an application to a court to lift a restraint order. A court may discharge a restraint order, on application, where the investigation has not progressed to its satisfaction. That freedom is available to a defendant, who may also apply to the court to vary a restraint order. It must do so if the investigation has not progressed satisfactorily. I hope that noble Lords will be happy with my explanation and that my noble friend will be content to withdraw her amendment, in the light of my comments.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am glad to hear about the judicial discretion which might be applied. I would like to think that the reduction in the number of restraint orders or applications for them is because of a problem with the legislation and not something inherent in the new arrangements with, for instance, those concerned not directing their minds to the lower test. That can always be an issue and changing the test does not change it. I am, of course, happy to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 10 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

19: Clause 14, page 11, line 34, leave out from “kind” to end of line 36

[Baroness Hamwee]

Amendment 19 would remove paragraph (b) of new subsection (7A) in Section 67 of POCA. Amendment 20 would make an order under this new subsection (7B) an affirmative order. Having had the benefit of a discussion with the Minister, I know what is meant by the phrases,

“money that is represented by”,

and “may be obtained from” as distinct from money actually obtained from. It was an interesting discussion, but it would useful to have the information on the record.

On the order which is required, what is proposed by the Government is quite significant, and it seems to me that an affirmative order would be more appropriate in this case. I beg to move.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, Clause 14 amends Section 67 of the Proceeds of Crime Act with a view to speeding up the confiscation of funds held in bank accounts. In addition, the clause enables, through secondary legislation, the powers in Section 67 to be updated to include other realisable cash-like financial products, such as share accounts and pension accounts that may be held by banks or other financial institutions.

Currently, seizure powers under Section 67 of POCA apply only to money in its traditional form held in an account with a bank or building society. Money can also take the form of, or be represented by, innovative financial products. This includes digital currencies whereby the user obtains goods or services by virtual means rather than a physical or electronic exchange of funds.

Currently, it is not possible to realise such instruments for the purposes of seizure under Section 67 of POCA. The extension of powers to encompass other financial products may require modifications to Section 67 to provide for such financial instruments or products to be converted into cash. The new subsection (7B) of Section 67, inserted by Clause 14(3), provides the power to make such modifications.

Clause 14(3) also applies to money that may be obtained from a financial product that is something other than a standard current or savings account. I shall give examples of this, and I am grateful to my noble friend for giving us the chance to put this on the record. An example of such a product would be a pension plan that has yet to mature but will pay an annuity and a lump sum on retirement. Other examples could include a share account or a virtual currency such as Bitcoin. Essentially, therefore, the clause provides for the capture and realisation of instruments with an economic value. I hope that that explains to my noble friend the use of the term “represented by” a financial instrument or product in Clause 14(3).

By virtue of Clause 14(5) an order made under new Section 67(7A) of POCA will be subject to the affirmative procedure. New Section 67(7B) simply amplifies the scope of the order-making power in new Section 67(7A)—it is not a second free-standing order-making power. I hope that I have made that clear. Accordingly, it is not necessary to refer to new Section 67(7B) in Clause 14(5). That being the case, I hope that my noble friend will agree that her amendment is, strictly speaking, unnecessary. However, it has served a useful purpose in that I have been able to explain the purpose of the provisions in Clause 14. In the light of that explanation, I hope that my noble friend will be content to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am afraid that it occurred to me only while I listened to my noble friend’s explanation that I have not pursued the issue, where it is digital currency or an annuity under a pension plan, of how that will be assessed in cash terms at the point when the cash needs to be calculated. I assume that that must be somewhere else in the legislation—probably in existing legislation. However, that is an issue. We heard recently about how bitcoins are fluctuating in value. Therefore the point at which the calculation is made is very important. Also, we all know that there are issues around the value of an annuity. Therefore I realise, listening to my noble friend, that there is a lot more to this to be thought about than I am afraid I had thought about. Of course, I will beg leave to withdraw the amendment at this point, but—

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I will willingly write to my noble friend. I am not in a position to be able to tell her the process of valuation of those things from the Dispatch Box today, but I am sure that it would be of interest to the House to know how those valuations occur. I do not suppose that that is the only circumstance in which those things have to be valued.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am grateful for that; I did not seek to put my noble friend on the spot today. However, as I said, there is a lot more to that than might appear in the Bill. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 19 withdrawn.

Student Visas

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Tuesday 24th June 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I am sure that the Minister shares my and many people’s anger and shame that so many innocent students have been duped and have had cheating promoted to them as if it were a British value—which clearly it is not. Can the Minister tell the House whether the individual students caught up in this will have a chance to retake the tests before immigration action is taken against them? Can he also say what positive steps the Government are taking to promote the sector, which we all agree is such an important export? We know that a factor in students choosing to come and study here is whether they feel welcome or not.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I will start with the last suggestion made by my noble friend because it is really important. Despite having to deal with this problem— I think the whole House will understand why the Government have had to deal with this problem—we recognise the enormous asset that we have in the higher education and further education facilities in this country. They are global assets and we want them to be available to the world. But they must be conducted under rules which reflect the fact that people come here to study and not as a short cut to involvement in working.

We have had a lot of debates in the House. I think that some of the best have been on this subject, but sometimes I have been the only person saying that students should remain within the net migration figures. I hope that noble Lords who thought differently will be thinking along my lines now and seeing how important it is. I have emphasised that we want the brightest and the best to come here, but they should do so with their sponsorship in order and without the criminality that has been revealed by this particular investigation.

Serious Crime Bill [HL]

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Monday 16th June 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I confess that I am at a loss. For once, I am not struggling to ask apparently innocent questions as a painful way of masking criticism. My scepticism has also been confounded because so often legislation is added to the statute book when the offences have already been defined and measures have been put in place. I am not a fan of using legislation to promote a message, but the Bill does seem to be about filling lacunae, and I congratulate the Minister and the Home Office on that.

That does, however, make it rather difficult to find a thread running through it on which to base my remarks today. No doubt a theme common to all the issues covered will be—as has already been said—that legislation cannot do everything and that good practice is fundamental. I know that the House will do what it does so well, which is to focus on workability. I am very glad that the Bill has started at this end and I thank the Minister for his introduction.

My noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford talked quite a lot about tracking down and recovering the proceeds of crime in the context of legal aid. He kept saying, “Just find the money”. The Bill cannot assist investigative skills and I am aware from another part of the legal forest—matrimonial work—of the resourcefulness that some people use to conceal their assets. HMRC is pretty good at ferreting out where assets have been hidden.

I am a bit uneasy about using taxation as a sanction—perhaps this is the “Al Capone” clause. I am not entirely sure that I understand the tax provisions. Is there to be a tax assessment when the source of the income cannot be identified but comes under the spotlight as perhaps coming from criminal assets—my civil liberties antennae are twitching slightly—or are we levying a percentage at the marginal rate on income rather than on the whole of the income-producing asset? We will ask questions in Committee. While my antennae are still active, I note from the material I read from the Home Office that the Crown Court must determine whether the defendant has a “criminal lifestyle” and is to apply the balance of probabilities in assessing whether there is “general criminal conduct”. I can see some questions arising from this.

I welcome the priority given to the victim surcharge and compensation, and the use of the assets. I was reminded by a case study in the material provided by the Home Office—for which I and other noble Lords will be grateful—that we are not dealing with the proceeds of crime in a vacuum: it is the crime itself which we seek to reduce or eradicate. That case study could also be a case study from material for the Modern Slavery Bill. It is the underlying crime that makes these provisions so important. But that will not stop us examining, for instance, the Secretary of State’s powers to amend provisions regarding default sentences; and Clause 14, which allows the Secretary of State to amend primary legislation. I was guilty of the perhaps unworthy thought that parliamentary counsel had simply not had enough time to produce the substantive provisions which the Government have in mind. If not, do the Government intend to produce a draft order so that we can understand what they have in mind here?

As for organised crime groups, the current money-laundering rules are a burden on professionals, and Part 1 might add to that. I am aware that another policy aim of the Government, of course, is deregulation. We have had briefings, from the Law Society and the Institute of Chartered Accountants in particular, about Clause 41 and organised crime groups. Prejudice is often expressed against fat cat lawyers. There may be some, although many are very lean, and there may be some lawyers and accountants who are not straight, and I do not defend them. However, there seems to be a lot of justified concern about how this clause will work. We are told that there has been no prior consultation, so the most important question for now is what plans the Home Office has to engage in discussion with the professional bodies. Everyone has an interest in this provision working well.

Before I received the briefings, I was concerned about things such as the burden of proof, serious crime prevention orders as prevention without a conviction, and the definitions. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, I thought that the meaning of the term “helping” in the context of criminal activities could be taken to absurd extremes. Perhaps the question about gangs is how successful the gang injunctions have been so far and their relationship with joint enterprise. A criminal group seems to be three-plus, so more are needed for joint enterprise. Only 25 of the 33 local authorities who are in the Ending Gang and Youth Violence programme responded to the data request. Is this an indication that they are under enormous pressure and are underresourced, because this is described as a “potentially beneficial tool”? Intriguingly, we are told that gangs can disappear from the radar in one area and reappear in another. Do the Government intend to produce guidance on what enables those people to be identified as being the same gang? We will deal with what constitutes harm to children. This made me wonder whether gang-related violence included psychological harm. I am thinking of vulnerable youngsters—particularly how girls may be used by gangs, becoming part of them but being victims of them at the same time.

I am delighted that the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, is taking part in this debate, because she always has such sensible things to say about drugs policy and drugs legislation. I accept the need to deal with cutting agents; their use is pernicious in several different ways. The responses to the Government’s consultation on this mentioned legal clarity, but I can see evidential issues raising their heads as well. I wondered about the equipment used for cutting agents. Do they—I am sorry, I cannot now avoid the pun—warrant attention as well as the agents themselves?

As regards children, the House sometimes has a tendency to divide into sort of a Bill half full/Bill half empty approach. It is very likely that the part of the Bill on the protection of children will attract proposed additions, as it gives an opportunity for colleagues to pursue their often very justified concerns. My noble friend Lady Walmsley, who has been unable to change her arrangements for this afternoon to be here, already has an amendment, agreed by the Public Bill Office to be in scope, that would make it a duty for people who work in regulated activities with children or vulnerable adults and who suspect abuse to report it to the local authority.

The change to the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 to spell out that harm includes psychological harm is the result of sustained work by many NGOs and the Private Member’s Bill from my honourable friend the Member for Ceredigion. It is blindingly obvious to us in the year 2014, but the same issue of what is meant by harm arises in other legislation. It has been addressed recently in the context of domestic violence but outside statute. In that and other contexts, I confess that I am concerned that psychological and emotional damage may be regarded as excluded by implication, since it is to be explicitly included in this case.

Noble Lords will have received briefings from children’s organisations on other possible changes to the 1933 Act. I find quite persuasive the argument that the term “wilful” to describe actions is very narrow. Again, I wonder about guidance and the CPS’s view. It is important that the language that is used carries its natural meaning, so that it is easily used by practitioners.

There is also the issue of the age bracket for victims, possibly taking it up to 18. I doubt that anyone who has had more than fleeting contact with teenagers could argue that they are more resilient than younger children, as has been said. I, too, was horrified by what I read in our briefing about the paedophile manual. I was surprised that it needs specific provision, but for the moment I will just ask whether internet service providers have been consulted on Schedule 3.

All the legislation in the world will not deal with the deeper-rooted cultural issues surrounding female genital mutilation. The Government, I know, are very well aware of that and have been very determined in their approach. I count the Member for Hornsey and Wood Green as a real friend and a long-standing colleague as well as an honourable friend, and I can vouch for the activity that she, among many others, has undertaken.

I end with a positive story. I was at a meeting on Thursday, in the margins of the Global Summit on Ending Sexual Violence in Conflict, with a number of Members of other parliaments. A representative from Portugal recounted a tale of the boyfriend of a potential victim protesting and campaigning against the abuse. In a gloomy subject, I thought that was a cheering report.

There may be a common thread to this: that practice is important and that being alert to what technical changes are indeed necessary to implement existing policy is something on which we can profitably use our time.

Passport Office

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Thursday 12th June 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, the government website still shows the waiting time as being generally three weeks. Are the Government considering putting updated news on that website so that the public are aware of the position? The Post Office is another route to obtaining travel documents. Is it experiencing extra demand? Has there been an impact on Post Office services and on its level of work?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I cannot answer with specific information on the latter point, but I can say that, even at this point, 97% of passports have been issued within three weeks and 99.24% have been issued within a four-week period. None the less, because of the large number of applications, small percentages can mean large numbers of people whose lives have been inconvenienced. That is why the Passport Office is working seven days a week and efforts are being made to ensure that people are not inconvenienced. The Home Secretary’s Statement made that quite clear.

Queen’s Speech

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Monday 9th June 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I thought that after about 50 speakers, a change of pace might be welcome. I had planned to read to your Lordships the poem “Deportation”, by Carol Ann Duffy. The time constraints mean that I can only give noble Lords a taster:

“Love is a look

in the eyes in any language, but not here,

not this year. They have not been welcoming.

I used to think the world was where we lived

in space, one country shining in big dark.

I saw a photograph when I was small.

Now I am Alien”.

We do not have an immigration Bill; we will have rules—we seem to get new Immigration Rules almost every week. I will continue to raise the problems of restrictions on family migration, although not as effectively as the Poet Laureate. I note the irony of those restrictions, and how families are split up when according to the Queen’s Speech we are to have tax benefits for married couples—support for marriage.

Without a Bill, there is still a lot to be said about immigration. From the negatives, last week a report from the Chief Inspector of Prisons said that deportees are treated as commodities by security staff; and from the positives, recent reports on immigrants’ contribution to the economy have come from the Office for Budget Responsibility, the OECD, and the Institute for Fiscal Studies.

By way of legislation we have the modern slavery Bill, to which many noble Lords referred, which is one of those Bills which we will all welcome and strive to make even better. The focus, as other noble Lords have said, has tended to be on the trafficking of children and young women for sexual exploitation. I agree with the points made by other noble Lords that it is important to extend our focus to all victims: domestic workers, boys and young men, vulnerable people, and people who have left the services. I very much welcome the comments made by the pre-legislative scrutiny committee on supply chains.

Of course, legislation is not everything, as other noble Lords have said. We need to increase support for victims as witnesses and to help them rebuild their lives. I very much liked the phrase of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford that we need affirmation to live well. There is the functioning of the national referral mechanism, the work of witness protection, the work and resources necessary for social services and for the criminal justice system—in that case, how it operates—and not criminalising victims. I know that the Government are very well aware of those and other issues. The challenge is to achieve changes in practice. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Derby asked whether we can afford all this, or at least said that that would be the question. Is not the question: can we afford not to focus on this?

This week the Government are hosting the Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict—an admirable initiative. Some of the issues to which I have referred are the international ones found in different contexts, including the appropriate response by authorities and services, identifying victims as victims and treating them appropriately. As the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Carlisle said, I have decided to refer only to the Bishops’ Benches in my speech.

We recently debated problems police forces have in recognising victims of domestic violence—there is a read-across there. The Howard League recently reported on children within the criminal justice system. It told us that a child was arrested every four minutes in the past year in England and Wales and recommended a reduction in arrests for trivial matters. That is a matter of appropriate responses.

It is ten to nine now and we will be back in less than a week to debate the Serious Crime Bill. I will not say more now than that I welcome, as others have done, the statutory recognition of psychological injury to children, putting it on the same footing as physical injury. It is extraordinary that it needs to be spelt out but clearly it does, as was done—again I mention domestic violence—some months ago.

It seems it is also necessary in terms of legislative lacunae to add to our laws on female genital mutilation. I cannot help noting that this is just a few days after the deportation of Afusat Saliu and her daughters whom she was seeking to protect from FGM in Nigeria.

I had planned to ask the Minister about the extremism task force which started last year after the Woolwich murder to such fanfare and then went very quiet. However, there seems to have been something of a coda or possibly even a new movement in that. It is extraordinarily important to be open-minded and imaginative in addressing the issues around extremism and radicalisation. I guess that many NGOs have less baggage than government institutions in the eyes of the individuals at risk. The NGOs need to be supported.

I wonder whether the time has come to consider extending the role of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation whose experience might well be used more proactively. Above all we need to talk—Northern Ireland showed us that at home. There must be so many different personalities among the boys and young men at different stages of their development—such a range of reasons for their conduct. Legislation, in itself, will not persuade them to buy into the rule of law. We must be prepared to take risks. It was brave of the American Government to exchange prisoners they were holding for the US soldier whom they retrieved last week.

My Lords, I have one more stanza:

“They are polite, recite official jargon endlessly.

Form F. Room 12. Box 6. I have felt less small

below mountains disappearing into cloud

than entering the Building of Exile. Hearse taxis

crawl the drizzling streets towards the terminal.

I am no one special”.

Crime: Domestic Violence

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Tuesday 13th May 2014 Grand Committee

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, Refuge has been mentioned, so perhaps I should declare an interest as a past chair. I learnt a great deal from Sandra Horley.

Sticks and stones may break my bones but words will for ever haunt me, perhaps break my spirit and even my mind. The impact of non-physical behaviour is often less evident to other people. “How did you get that bruise?” “Oh, silly me, I walked into a door that I didn’t see was open”—not “I didn’t understand and escape the dynamics of a dysfunctional relationship”. Both are manifestations of controlling behaviour, as other noble Lords have said, and have a great deal in common, including the ever present fear of when it will break out, reducing the victim’s capacity to cope with it, being demeaned and diminished.

It is not just words, though. The briefing which we have received from the organisations just mentioned by my noble friend Lady Jenkin of Kennington listed relevant behaviours. Reading that list, I thought, “Where have I seen some of these before?”, such as sleep deprivation and the use of extreme stressors such as rape. There are a number of behaviours in this list which, if they were undertaken by someone in an official capacity, could well be regarded as torture under international law.

Domestic violence has risen up the public consciousness but, as the HMIC report said, the overall police response is not good enough. It talked about it being a priority on paper but, in the majority of forces, not in practice. One of the factors identified was officers lacking skills and knowledge. It is easy to understand how much more straightforward it is to identify a single act of physical brutality than insidious and brutal courses of conduct, still less when this is not immediately evident with a physical outcome. I do not underestimate the problems of evidence, and I agree with quite a lot—not everything—that my noble friend Lord Lester said, particularly about the use of the existing law. Let us use what we have got unless it is clearly inadequate. The work on stalking the year before last indicated that there was an inadequacy, and led to a change in law. However, if it is not inadequate then I for one am not enthusiastic about some sort of duplication. However, having conduct identified and tagged as criminal is very important, as my noble friend Lord Paddick has said.

One of the recommendations of the HMIC report was about the views of victims as an essential element in monitoring police effectiveness. The report said that the Home Office should ensure that the views of victims of domestic abuse are incorporated routinely and consistently into national monitoring arrangements. I ask my noble friend the Minister—if he cannot answer it today perhaps he could write; one has picked this up in thinking about it and he may well not have a briefing on it—how are the views of victims to be included in the monitoring process if they do not report? How do you find the victims? How do you get at their views?

One of the things that have helped raise awareness over a period of perhaps 20 years is when victims’ experiences are made real in fiction through popular culture. Those of us whose soap of choice is “The Archers” are witnessing one character’s charm turning into control at the moment. I congratulate those who work in the media and who bravely—because this is not always welcome—include such storylines. However, all this is important, not just for raising general public awareness but because it gives victims the confidence to identify, recognise and articulate that what they are suffering is not normal; it is abuse, and it is a crime.

Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2014

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Monday 12th May 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I have difficulties with both the substance of the order and the amendment. It seems that we may be in a world of policy-based evidence and an amendment that is being brought to the House because the Opposition are looking for something to object to without objecting to the ban itself. The matters identified in the amendment seem to be good reasons to oppose the ban, but the Opposition support it.

The ACMD not only recommended no change in the status of khat—that it not be controlled under the Misuse of Drugs Act—but set out a number of other recommendations dealing with local needs assessments; education and prevention initiatives; culturally specific and tailored treatment and recovery services; partnership working; addressing the problems through engagement and dialogue with the local community and interagency working; working through community safety partnerships; and regular monitoring and returns. It also made a specific recommendation about data to form the basis of future research. Those would themselves have formed a very good amendment, but that is not what is before us.

The ACMD was quite clear on the merits of the ban. The Secretary of State, on the other hand, seems to be saying—if I can summarise it—that since it is banned in the rest of the EU, it must be banned here. The ban was announced last July. Will the Minister tell the House what evidence there has been of the drug’s use since that announcement? Some time has now gone by. Indeed, it has been banned in the rest of the EU since January of last year, so if there are concerns, some of those might have come to light.

One of the reasons that we are given for the proposed ban is the risk of this country becoming a regional hub or a haven for criminals. I was interested to read some of the characteristics of khat, one of which is that it has a very short life. The active ingredient declines a couple of days after being picked; it needs to be fresh for it to have an effect. I have no doubt that the users of it, as consumers, are as demanding as consumers of most products, so is it a genuine concern that we would become a regional hub, if what might be distributed through the hub has, in fact, lost its efficacy by the time it is traded on?

The risks identified from a ban include the users moving towards more addictive, harmful and expensive substances; a black market; and organised crime stepping in to supply the drug and criminalising—inevitably—the users. I appreciate the proposals about applying an escalator to how offences are dealt with, but we would be criminalising users and suppliers, and we know that one crime leads to another.

Of course, I am aware that the Minister in the Commons and the Home Secretary, in her response to the Home Affairs Select Committee, have presented the matter as finely balanced, and that the communities where use is widespread are divided. Looking at the reports, I have been wondering how broadly women in those communities want a ban and men do not. I wonder whether that is rather simplistic reporting. I find it difficult to believe that a ban would instantly lead to such a considerable behavioural change and make model husbands of former users. I have my doubts about that. There is one view that clearly comes from the Somali community, and that is that they would prefer their children to use khat rather than alcohol or tobacco. The ACMD has reported that the use of khat has been decreasing over recent years.

In the Commons, there was very little discussion—nothing from the Minister, I believe—about the broader issues of drugs policy or the wider context, to which reference has just now been made, of the economy of Kenya and the potential instability and risks associated with that. I would be very wary of banning something of cultural significance, with the risk of driving a wedge between the police and the already quite marginalised communities. The references in the reports to the use of khat at weddings made me think of sugared almonds at weddings in some other traditions and how one might respond to any suggestion that that tradition be changed. In summary, I am not persuaded by the orders, but I am not persuaded by the amendment: I would leave the balance as it is.

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

My Lords, I support the amendment to the decision of Home Secretary to ban khat under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, although I identify with the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, in relation to the amendment. There are very good reasons to oppose this ban. I make clear at the outset that if khat presented a serious health risk to users, I would support a ban on the importation and sale of the substance. On the other hand, we now have sufficient evidence to show that banning the possession and use of psychoactive substances—even dangerous ones—is counterproductive. Of course, the excessive use of khat by small groups of Somalis needs to be tackled; the question is how. We know that bans on possession and use delay treatment. They divert resources away from public health and education initiatives and into the criminal justice system. We also know that a criminal record is extremely damaging to anyone’s employment prospects. The criminalisation of these people will therefore tend to lead them to continue with their drug habit or—if they ever get away from it—to return to it. There are very severe and negative consequences of banning, particularly on the consumer side.

That is the evidence framework within which I have thought about the Home Secretary’s decision to ignore the advice of the ACMD and ban not only the supply but the possession and use of khat. This is a most serious decision for the communities involved, people principally from Somalia, Yemen and Ethiopia. The small but vociferous group of campaigners from Somalia believe that a ban on khat will get rid of the problems as they perceive them—social problems within families and so on. In reality, those using khat will continue using the substance at a vastly increased price. The Home Affairs Select Committee’s ninth report suggested that a hundredfold increase in price could be expected from a ban on khat. The khat user who continued to use khat would also risk, as I said, a criminal record. The alternative, to which other noble Lords have alluded, is that khat would be replaced by alcohol in particular. We know that alcohol is far more dangerous and would have all sorts all sorts of consequences that khat does not have. Either alternative, therefore, would be much worse than the status quo. I am not suggesting that the status quo is wonderful, but it is nothing like as serious as the possible consequences of a ban. The idea that the household would have more cash to spend on food is, sadly, a delusion. Some women might see their husbands spending £25 on khat and think, “I could do with that to buy some shoes for the kids”, but it is a little more complex than that.

The ACMD had clear, scientific reasons for advising the Home Secretary that,

“the evidence of harms associated with the use of khat is insufficient to justify control and it would be inappropriate and disproportionate to classify khat under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971”.

These are very strong words from the ACMD and, particularly, a council led by Professor Leslie Iversen, whom I know quite well and who is a highly regarded scientist known for his incredible moderation, gentleness and so on. He is not a wild man; if he allows such words to go forward to the Government, we really need to take note.

The two central findings concern the medical and social harms, as others have indicated. The ACMD concludes that khat has no direct causal link to adverse medical effects, other than a small number of reports of an association between khat use and significant liver toxicity—a small number and an association. In scientific lingo, as we know, “association” simply means that the two things tend to happen alongside each other. There is no indication of a causal link between the use of khat and medical consequences. On the question of anecdotal evidence of social harms, the ACMD concludes that its research into these has found no robust evidence that demonstrates a causal link between khat consumption and any of the harms indicated.

Professor Iversen emphasised in his letter to the Home Secretary that the council’s recommendations were based on a rigorous and systematic process of evidence-gathering and subsequent analysis of what was submitted and presented to it. In other words, as I understand it, the recommendations should not be set aside other than for matters of serious national security or national interest. Now my understanding is that the main reasons for the Home Secretary’s decision have nothing to do with medical and social risks, and are twofold. First, as others mentioned, Sweden and the Netherlands in particular have banned khat and would find it helpful if the UK took the same step in order to avoid this “hub”. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, dealt very effectively with that point, bearing in mind the very short life of the substances within khat that people are interested in.

The other issue raised, which I find utterly peculiar, is that there is some relationship between khat use and terrorism. That is quite remarkable. I will deal with the terrorism issue very quickly. A very small trade in a perfectly legal, low-cost substance in a few BME communities is just not a serious candidate for a terrorist threat or interest. Indeed, the ACMD was not provided with any evidence of al-Shabaab or any other terrorist group’s involvement in the export or sale of khat, despite consultation with the relevant national and international official bodies. I understand that the Home Secretary has claimed that the ACMD would not have been aware of these things. However, it was aware of the people who are aware of them—and consulted them. The fact that the ACMD picked up nothing in this area should be taken seriously. On the other hand, banning a substance such as khat and increasing its value a hundredfold or more really might interest terrorists. Even on that count, this ban could be—and could be expected to be—counterproductive.

The first question one must ask on the hub possibility is whether the bans in these other countries are working. There is apparently no evidence that they are, or that they are even helpful. I would not expect them to be helpful. The idea that we follow other people simply because they want us to seems a little wrong.

I want to put a proposal with respect to khat. The Government introduced temporary-class drug orders for the purpose of controlling new psychoactive substances. I will not go on for very long on this but I want to put it forward. I applaud the Government for their policy. Its great strength is that these TCDOs do not criminalise the possession and use of these drugs while the TCDO remains in place. However, it provides for the ban of production and sale of substances that may prove dangerous. These orders were designed to enable the ACMD to analyse new drugs and determine whether a full ban under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 could be justified. The only possible justification given by the Government and Home Secretary—I emphasise that—for a ban of khat concerns the supply of khat to other European countries or supply involving terrorists, not that that point needs to be taken seriously. An order along the lines of a TCDO, which avoided criminalising users of khat, would fulfil the Government’s objectives while avoiding unnecessary and severe consequences for the BME communities affected.

The 12-month review proposed in the amendment would then evaluate a narrower issue: the supply ban and, for example, the price increase and illegal activity that will inevitably result. The ACMD could do that work, its findings could be put to the Home Secretary and, if the supply ban was seen not to be in the national interest, it could be dropped. If the ACMD recommended education and preventive initiatives, tailored treatments and other social interventions could then be funded instead of that money going into the criminal justice system. There is an awful lot to be said for that approach. The ACMD thought about this very carefully and that is what it came up with.

The above proposition is relevant even at this stage, if I may say so. We know that some 40% of legislation is never implemented. It is surely possible for the Government to implement only the supply side of their ban and defer—I hope indefinitely—the implementation of the ban on possession and use of khat. Such a plan would enable a more focused 12-month review, as I have already mentioned. I hope the Minister will be willing to take this idea away, even at this late stage: a supply ban only could be introduced and then evaluated to see whether it should continue.

Immigration Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Monday 12th May 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)]

I wish to speak on this amendment—forgive me for being so tardy—as I just wish to place certain things on record.

I support the amendment tabled by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and am deeply disappointed and irritated by the amendment tabled by the Minister. While the noble Lord has just set out his reasons for not accepting the original amendment tabled by the noble and learned Baroness, the only reason given by the House of Commons was one of financial privilege. As has been said on other occasions, when the Government use financial privilege as the reason for rejecting amendments in the Lords, it too often looks as though the Government simply do not have sufficiently strong arguments to counter the just and moral reasons given by the Lords. Yes, I well understand that it is the Speaker who decides whether or not financial privilege should be applied, but the Government could have asked the House to waive financial privilege and chose not to do so.

This is frustrating for us but, more importantly, it has real implications for the small number of vulnerable children who are subjected to the evils of trafficking. These children have suffered the worst kind of traumatic experiences and they are desperately in need of a guardian, appointed on a statutory basis, to accompany them,

“throughout the entire process until a durable solution in the best interests of the child has been identified and implemented”.

On the subject of financial privilege, I ask the Minister to provide us with the Government’s computation of the predicted costs of the amendment that was rejected in the Commons.

Again I place on record my thanks for the extraordinary diligence and dogged determination of the noble and learned Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord McColl of Dulwich, to get justice for trafficked children. I also say to the Minister that I still do not understand why the Government have been so reluctant to act before now, why they could not have agreed to amendments in earlier Bills and why there was no provision for guardians in the draft modern slavery Bill. I know that pilots have now been announced, but if that has been the Government's intention for some time, why was there not an enabling clause in the draft Bill? I am pleased that the Government clearly now intend to introduce an enabling clause by amendment, but they could have done so much more.

In the absence of the amendment passed by this House, an enabling clause in the modern slavery Bill is welcome, but what would trigger that enabling power? Despite what the noble Lord just said, I am still slightly concerned about the statutory basis for the scheme. I want to be absolutely clear that, when a guardian feels the need to give instructions to a lawyer where a child is incapable of doing so, that lawyer will have the statutory basis to be empowered to represent the views of that child. Can the Minister give that assurance?

I also have a question about the timings. Could the Minister confirm that the trial will start on 1 July? Could he further tell the House when the pilots are due to end? As he would understand, it would be unacceptable if, when it came to the report that is in the amendment of the noble and learned Baroness, the Government were able to say that they had not had time to assess the outcomes of the pilots. I want to ensure that the timescale works.

The Minister in the other place said that the trial would cover 23 local authorities. Will all trafficked children be placed within those authorities, so that all trafficked children are covered by the trial?

I will mention one thing that may seem a bit pernickety. I was slightly concerned by some of the reasons given by the Minister in the other place for rejecting the noble and learned Baroness’s earlier amendment. He said one reason was that it dealt only with children under immigration control and that he wished in the modern slavery Bill to craft provisions covering all trafficked children. Of course, there was nothing to prevent the Government accepting the amendment and then repealing the provision if necessary when replacing it with a clause in the modern slavery Bill.

As I said, I welcome the fact that the Government are now introducing an enabling clause, but I am frustrated that it has taken such a long time. I am also rather frustrated that, in the end, the Government took the advice from the Speaker that financial privilege should be attached to this specific amendment. Sometimes, of course there are questions of money but in this case the money is negligible. Sometimes there are questions of politics but this issue has had cross-party support throughout. I am just frustrated that it has taken so long to get to where we are. Of course, I trust what the Minister said. I just seek clarification on the various questions I asked.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I note that at the last stage the noble Baroness and I both used the term “dogged” to describe the work done by those who advocated—if that is not the wrong term in this context—the guardianship provisions. I sense that the House would like to move on as there is so much agreement, so I will go straight to the one question I have left of those I had on the amendment.

There is a difference, in the normal understanding of the terms, between “advocacy” and “guardianship”. They are not the same thing. Of course, the detail of the role will be described when we come to the legislation so we will then understand just what it will cover. No doubt we will discuss that. The one question I have left for my noble friend that has not already been asked is: how will the Government assess and evaluate the trials or pilots—whatever we call them—including assessing the need for the provisions that are not included in the trial? The noble Baroness mentioned the one about being instructed and being able to carry out instructions, which I was also concerned about that because of my own professional background. If the trials do not cover a part of the role, how are we going to know whether that role was necessary? I hope my noble friend can explain what the approach to the assessment and evaluation will be.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

There can be all manner of speculation about whether, if someone was born in, for example, Somalia but left at the age of three, Somalia might afford citizenship to them. Would Somalia give them citizenship in such circumstances if Britain had removed citizenship on the basis that they were a threat to national security here? Would Pakistan? Would Syria? Would Egypt? The test of reasonable grounds for believing that the person would be able to acquire another nationality does not answer that question. What if they cannot do so? That is the question that my noble friend Lady Smith raised, and at the moment it has not been answered satisfactorily. I wait with interest to hear what the Minister says.

There is a second matter: what constitutes service? It ties in with the point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. What constitutes service when somebody is abroad? Is it good enough to serve notice on relatives living in Britain? Why should it be assumed that they would be able to inform adequately a person who is living somewhere else that they have had their citizenship removed? I would be very interested to hear the Minister’s response to what constitutes service. If someone is in a place such as Syria or Somalia, what is the likelihood of being able to serve notice—in the way that we understand service normally in law—on somebody in a war-torn area or a place where there is chaos and little in the way of government as we understand it?

What do we do about the issue of appeal, which was just mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope? At the moment, the normal period for appeal in the rules of citizenship is 28 days, and nothing suggests that that would change. Is someone in Somalia expected to be able to appeal within 28 days, not having been in receipt of service but having been informed days before, over a very poor telephone line, that they have the right of appeal but time is about to run out? What is the answer to the question of the appeal period?

If a person is unable to acquire another citizenship, will the withdrawal of citizenship then be negated? Will it fall away, and will the person then reacquire their British citizenship? Are we giving that as a guarantee? Will we see reinstatement if no other state is prepared to follow through?

I ask those who are international lawyers, or international lawyers advising the Government: when someone has a right to citizenship, is there not always a level of discretion in a state to say, “Yes, you are entitled because you were born here, but then you went away and you became a British citizen, but we are not going to allow you to apply and become a citizen of this country now because we believe that there is intelligence of your conducting yourself in a way that might be inimical to our national interests”? The question is much more complicated than is being suggested by the way in which the Government are seeking to appease us at this moment. That is why those of us who were concerned about this issue wanted there to be a much more considered review before the law was changed. I fall in line with others: I should like very clear answers to some of the questions raised by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Macdonald, and by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and to the questions that I have raised, before I would be satisfied that the movement by the Government has been far enough.

This is an issue of high moral import. This is an issue that affects not only us here, but which will be looked at around the world. There will be implications for people in other parts of the world, too. I ask the Government to take great care over the answers that are given because, as we have heard from others, courts will deal with applications, appeals and reviews based on some of the answers given today.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, noble Lords will be glad to know that I will be as energetic as I can in editing my remarks to exclude questions which have already been asked. However, I retain some points and concerns on the amendments, including on the principle.

Questions have been asked about what is meant by being “able”, and also about the practicalities of the matter. The Minister in the Commons said: “I am sure that”, the Secretary of State,

“would … have to consider practical issues and the other surrounding circumstances … She will, therefore, wish to consider those other practical or logistical arrangements as part of her determination”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/5/14; col. 193].

Can my noble friend give the House assurances as to how all that will actually be reflected in statute or, if not in statute, then in guidelines? I mention here the guidelines published by the UNHCR on statelessness, which specifically refer to the application of nationality laws in practice being,

“a mixed question of fact and law”.

On the right of appeal, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has said that he trusts that there will be an assurance that the issues will be dealt with as open evidence. I add to that, while having the same hope, that if there are aspects which cannot be dealt with openly, will the provisions—I do not much like them, but they are what we have got—on gisting and special advocates apply? I have seen some doubt as to whether that would be the case.

On the amendment for review, I am glad that the Government have tabled this, as I did both in Committee and on Report. However, I stressed then the importance of independence. That term is missing from the Government’s amendment. Perhaps I can put it this way to my noble friend: can he confirm unequivocally that the review will not be in the hands of somebody who is within the Home Office?

Like others, I would welcome this being a matter for the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. Concern has been expressed about resources, but whoever does the job is going to need the resources to do the job. I, too, have a question about why, after the first year, it should be triennial. If we are dealing with small numbers, then the job should be correspondingly small. I also ask the Minister to give us an assurance that the Government will support the reviewer undertaking more frequent reviews if he considers that they should be undertaken.

In debate, we have barely touched on the impact on communities of whom an individual in question is a member. I would support the appointment of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, because that postholder deals with people who are in rather connected situations where other measures might be applicable—and, indeed, might apply if deprivation is not to be used. It is clear that there is a danger that the use of the state’s powers, which focus on neutralising—if that is the word—the individual without considering the negative effect on the community, is an issue, as well as the specifics for the individual and their family. I am sure that the independent reviewer would focus on that as well.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, this has been an extremely good debate: a serious one, on a very serious issue. We have been fortunate to be able to hear from a large and well qualified body of the Members of this House. I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken, and I will do my best to provide those assurances that have been sought by noble Lords. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in welcoming the Government’s move in tabling their amendments in the Commons, wanted assurances. I am most grateful to him for letting me have sight of the things he was concerned about so that I was able to address them. I can say the same of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, who did not raise all the issues she had intended to because they had been raised by other noble Lords. However, I think that that most noble Lords have a similar need for reassurance, and I am well aware of the responsibility to provide that assurance to Members of the House.

Perhaps most important is the whole question of the meaning of “reasonable grounds to believe” and whether those reasonable grounds of belief are appropriate for determining the ability of a person to acquire another nationality. The Home Secretary’s decision must be “reasonable” based on the evidence available to her on the nationality laws of those countries and the person’s circumstances. That will include having regard to any practical arrangements, but those will vary from case to case, and it is not possible or appropriate to speculate about what weight those issues would carry in a particular case. “Satisfied” has been interpreted to mean that SIAC decides for itself whether a person is a dual national. In some circumstances a person, after being deprived of British citizenship, may take steps which guarantee that another country will not recognise him or her as a national. The appeal should therefore review the decision at the time it was made, which is why the phrase “reasonable grounds to believe” instead of “satisfied” is used.

Both the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, asked what the position would be if the foreign state had some discretion in whether to approve an individual’s request for citizenship. I think that the noble Baroness went as far as to say that she thought that there were likely to be grounds for discretion in almost any case. The clause refers to whether under the laws of a country or territory a person is able to acquire the nationality of that country. The key issue will be whether the Secretary of State reasonably believes that they are able to acquire the nationality. It does not say that the person must have a right—an automatic entitlement—to that other nationality. Where there is a discretionary judgment there may be reasonable grounds to believe that the discretion will be exercised. However, reasonableness would require something more than saying that the person should apply for the exercise of a general discretion to grant citizenship to any country that has such discretion. I hope I make myself clear on that. The Home Secretary must have reasonable grounds to believe that, at the end of any application process—if one is required—the person will become a national of another country.

European Union: Justice and Home Affairs

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Thursday 8th May 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I have always said that you cannot play the ball if you take your bat home. If you walk out of a negotiation, you should do it only if you have planned to do so, and if you have a strategy for getting back in. Early in my professional career, I knew a solicitor who mistakenly walked out of a meeting in his own room; there is no way back from that.

My default position is clear: stay in the game and stay in the room, and do not be overconfident—or, indeed, arrogant—about being invited back. The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, and others, put all that far more diplomatically than I just did.

I may be blissfully blinkered, but I recognise the dangers in being too simplistic about all this. I recognise the importance of careful scrutiny, as did my noble friend Lord Faulks. He recognises that the Executive can benefit from that. The points which have been made about the impact assessments are not rhetorical, but points of real substance. Until I listened to this debate, and in particular to what the noble Baroness, Lady Corston, had to say, the importance of an impact assessment of what you are not doing—of what you are opting out of as well as opting in to—had not occurred to me.

Therefore, although my first reaction to the very scathing joint report of the three Commons Select Committees was to wonder whether they were too close to a whinge to be useful, they were not wrong. Process, as well as substance, is important. So, too, is the procedure for the eventual vote, which it appears will be a vote in the singular. The Home Secretary has made it clear that we will be presented with a package. All noble Lords will be acutely aware of the tensions and constraints of being faced with a single decision; we face it every day with secondary legislation, which is unamendable.

It is trite but true that in such an internationally connected world, the bad guys are among those who are internationally connected; the noble Lord, Lord Judd, put that very clearly. Many Europhobes seem to distinguish between the states in the European Union and their roles within the EU, and as holiday destinations. I am sure that many who have very determined anti-EU views would be apoplectic if they were described as being soft on crime. However, if one thinks about the measures which we are being asked to consider, the resistance to many of those measures in the area of justice and home affairs is tantamount to that. I agree very much with my noble friend Lord Teverson that it would be very helpful, essential even, to disaggregate the term “national interest”. It is a matter of identifying the priorities and explaining what you mean by it. Some aspects of national interest are in conflict with one another, so one has to be clear about which ones take priority.

I do not pretend that opting in to everything is any sort of panacea. The Minister mentioned the Passenger Name Record data agreement and the Council decision on that. The annual report confirms:

“The UK has recognised first-hand the benefits of PNR through its own border systems”.

Just after reading that I read a piece by Simon Calder in the Independent about the recent problems with the IT systems at our borders, when,

“the passport readers and ‘e-gates’ stopped working. Manual processing led to ‘longer queues for some passengers’ according to the Immigration and Security Minister … that translated as ‘mayhem’”.

The Minister, he goes on to say, said:

“‘Security must remain our priority at all times’”.

Of course; but we have a very respected journalist saying:

“What the minister actually meant was: the illusion of security must be maintained at all costs”.

He went on to describe the problems around that, saying:

“The authorities want to keep bad people out. Yet the UK’s frontiers … are leaky. So officials plod dutifully through the procedure of manually entering the passport details of returning holidaymakers who they know pose no threat and are merely tired, grumpy and keen to get home”.

I mention that because it seemed to me to point to the experience of some of our systems as experienced by our citizens on a day-to-day basis, and their perception of how we go about some of these things.

I wanted to mention two other matters; so much else has been covered. The first is the probation order. Our EU Committee, in its inquiry on the 2014 opt-out decision, referred to this, reiterating the view that the,

“measure has potential to provide benefits for the management of offenders on a cross-border basis and that nothing is being gained by not implementing its provisions”.

The Government’s response was to support the principle but to be concerned about practical operability and the possibility of different practices among member states, with there being,

“no clear understanding as to how this measure will work in practice and thus very little evidence on which to judge its effectiveness”.

The Government’s response to the EU Committee was to say that these issues are,

“unlikely to be resolved during our negotiations with the Commission”.

I latched on to a comment by the Justice Secretary in a debate in the House of Commons, when he said:

“At the moment we believe the measure is flawed and we have therefore decided it cannot be in the list of things to opt back in to”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/4/14; col. 92.]

I cling on to the phrase “at the moment”, in the hope that the moment will come, because it would be a great pity if those with suspended sentences, who are doing community service or are on probation, cannot fulfil their sentences back in the UK rather than where they have been sentenced. This would be so much in line with our own rehabilitation agenda. In recent weeks we have often discussed such matters as prisoners in this country being released into the areas where they will be at home with their families, and the importance of settling back with family and a job, without delay. I hope that the Government can keep working at this to overcome the difficulties that have been identified.

We have also not opted into the directive on children suspected or accused in criminal proceedings. I mention that as well because the points that I am going to list will resonate with Members of your Lordships’ House. We spend a lot of time, rightly, on considering children within the justice system. The directive covers matters such as a mandatory right to access to a lawyer and not being able to waive the right, as well as a right by children to an individual assessment to identify the child’s specific needs for protection, education, training and reintegration into society. Then there is the questioning of children being recorded. The directive says that,

“all measures alternative to deprivation of liberty should be taken by the competent authorities whenever this is in the best interests of the child”.

It says:

“In proceedings involving children, the urgency principle should be applied to provide a rapid response and protect the best interests of the child”.

I understand that there may be questions over how these things are applied, but the principles are ones that we would all agree with.

I have said that I am concerned about the style of negotiation and how we will be left with a series of bilaterals, which of course always depend on the other party agreeing to play. The short point is we cannot assume that those negotiations will succeed in our terms. This is all work in progress. I do not suppose that my noble friend Lord Taylor of Holbeach will respond to the encomium of the noble Lord, Lord Dykes, with anything other than due thanks.

Like the noble Lords, Lord Teverson and Lord Boswell, I think that comprehensibility and transparency are important because you are not really transparent unless most people understand what you are doing and saying. All this is central to this area of work. It is important that, in dealing with these issues, Parliament and the Government are not just accountable but manage to deal with them in a way which is reasonably accessible and understandable—to Parliament, as a start, as the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, said. I do not want to continue to share the analysis and the gloom of the noble Lords, Lord Bowness and Lord Judd.