Baroness Smith of Basildon
That clarification is helpful and I am grateful for that. I did not know that the noble Baroness was able to intervene on Report and was unsure whether to accept the intervention, but it was a very helpful clarification.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, I first raised this issue about the impact on communities when talking about the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board. On this issue the Minister and other noble Lords have in numerous contributions made it clear that the views of communities and the impact on them must be taken into account. Looking again at the guidance we are debating—I sent out for copies—it goes some way to doing that but, given the comments that have been made, it may be that the guidance could be a little clearer and more explicit on this issue. I am sure that when exercising this duty under Prevent we will all be seeking the same objective, which is to prevent people turning to or being drawn into extremism that could lead to violent behaviour. The sentiments are exactly right and what every Member of your Lordships’ House has said since the beginning of the debate, but if the noble Lord could clarify that and put it on record, and perhaps consider how the guidance could be made more explicit in that regard, that would be helpful.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Bates) (Con)
My Lords, this has been a good curtain-raiser debate because we will come back to this issue in five successive groups, looking at different aspects of the Prevent strategy. I was lulled into a slightly false sense of security by my noble friend Lady Hamwee when she said that the more she read, the more she felt that the clause made sense and her amendment was perhaps not necessary. She then elaborated on it in a way that provoked a very helpful debate.
I should say two things in the context of the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Judd, and my noble friend Lady Buscombe. When we talk about communities here, it is helpful to start from the position that everyone is equal before the law. Everyone is of equal value and they have the same vote and the same rights. Everyone is equal in our society. That is part of what a democratic society is about and what we are seeking to protect and uphold through this strategy. In a sense, to overfocus on particular groups is sometimes not helpful. All these measures are about prevention of terrorism and extremism. As the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, mentioned, there is far-right extremism, such as the murder of Mohammed Saleem, an 82 year-old, and bombs being placed nearby. Some 25% of the people on the Channel programme at present are from extreme right organisations. We have faced a lot of violent threats such as violence in Northern Ireland. We fear violence from animal rights groups and far-right groups. There are a range of people who would seek to attack that central principle that all people are equal, and are of equal value and worth in our society. That is what is really under attack.
We must never be drawn into a situation where, for fear of offence, we are not able to speak that truth. I do not want to link too far back, but I am afraid my mind is still full of the horrors of what we were talking about before—
Lord Lamont of Lerwick (Con)
I apologise. I have just rushed into the Chamber and caught my noble friend’s words. What interests me is the phrase used in the guidelines to which we shall come later. That phrase is “non-violent extremism”. My noble friend has talked about extremism and terrorism, but will he talk specifically about non-violent extremism? We heard the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, about the teaching of Plato and other people talked about classes in which they had discussed the pros and cons of authoritarianism versus democracy. I once attended a meeting at Queen Mary College where a lot of Muslim students said—very politely and while making it clear that they opposed violence and terrorism—that they did not believe in western-style democracy. That was what the discussion was about. What sort of non-violent extremism are the Government worried about? Some people might consider some forms of modern art to be non-violent extremism.
Lord Bates
The definition that we are working to—I shall put it on the record for my noble friend as we have been through this a number of times in Committee—is,
“vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs”.
We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our Armed Forces. People may want to argue with that or take issue with it, but that is the definition we are working to.
The point that I wanted to make, in referring back to the earlier Statement, relates to something that the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, asked me about. In Rotherham, one of the central findings of Louise Casey’s report was that because of “cultural sensitivities”, people had failed in their duty to protect children at risk in that area. We cannot be in that position. All that we are interested in here is protecting the liberty of the entire community of the United Kingdom. That includes people of all faiths and none, from a range of different backgrounds and traditions. I wanted, first, to put a marker down for that principle—that we need to focus above all on the values of democracy and individual liberty, which some people would seek to undermine.
The second point made was a fair one—that what we should be doing with Prevent is, at best, not something imposed from the top down. The noble Lords, Lord Hussain, Lord Scriven and Lord Judd, and my noble friend Lady Hamwee made that point. That is why, in the consultation on the guidance, we have said that we want people to come up with their own plan. We cannot not have a plan for dealing with something that is focused on trying to undermine the things that free speech, universities, schools and British values are all about. We cannot step aside from that. But if ideas come from the bottom up, so much the better. That would be entirely compliant with the spirit and the letter of the Bill.
I shall now deal with a couple of the specific points in the amendments. Amendment 13A probes the use of the word “due ” in the context of the requirement in Clause 25 to have “due regard” to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. The amendment probes why the word “due” appears here but not in Clause 28, which requires specified authorities simply to “have regard” to guidance issued relating to compliance with the Prevent duty. This is quite a technical drafting point, but I will seek to address my noble friend’s concerns. The term “due” in Clause 25 indicates that, in the exercise of their functions, specified authorities will need to have regard to a number of different factors and the intention is that by stipulating that they must have,
“due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism”,
they place sufficient, proportionate weight on this consideration among the many that are relevant to the performance of those functions. In complying with the Prevent duty, however, authorities should have regard to only one guidance document, so there is not the same requirement to weigh up competing guidance and “due” is therefore unnecessary here.
Baroness Hamwee
Before the Minister sits down, has he had any inspiration about the term “particular regard” which might help the House?
Lord Bates
The short answer is that that inspiration is perhaps on its way to me. Perhaps I may come back to that on a later group of amendments, if the noble Baroness would allow me.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I thought that I gave notice to the Bill team, whose heads are no doubt spinning with the speed, but something may be on its way.
Lord Bates
I can tell the noble Baroness that the “particular regard” element is actually in relation to the Secretary of State’s duty. It is to say that she must have particular regard to the duties under freedoms of speech. The difference between due and particular in this context is that the latter, in all cases, elevates the freedom of speech consideration among all the considerations that must be borne in mind, whereas specifying that due regard must be had to a factor simply underscores the importance of that factor while leaving the degree to which it must be elevated by the specified authority to be determined by the circumstances of the case.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury (LD)
I cannot resist asking: how is this going to go down with schoolmasters and the rest?
Lord Bates
I will leave that to the schoolmasters. However, in this regard, my noble friend should find this reassuring because we are saying that the Secretary of State should have a particular regard. That is a higher threshold to be aware of: the importance of academic freedom of speech within universities. It is a higher test and it is appropriate to say that before she offers direction, she ought to be able to satisfy whether that test has been met. I shall hand back to the noble Baroness.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, as I said, there is something of a hierarchy in this. “Having regard” implies proportionality, whether it is “due regard” or simply “regard”. I am grateful for the Minister’s explanation. However, I should like regard to be had to the impact of this part of the Bill and to the manner of the exercise of the duty. I am grateful to noble Lords who have commented and who have supported that proposition. The bottom-up approach is precisely what I am seeking to articulate.
The Minister and other noble Lords have referred to far-right extremism. I have acknowledged that in previous debates as well. In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, it is the current context that has caused so many comments from members of Muslim communities. That is why so many of us have made such reference to it. I too am shocked—but not surprised—by her report of girls talking about going to Syria. She asked, “What does that say?”. To me, it says let us look for the best way of addressing this issue. All the comments I have made about a bottom-up approach are directed to doing that. The noble Baroness, Lady Afshar, said that, and she is nodding vigorously now.
I am sorry that the Minister has not been able to suggest further ways of acknowledging this approach and these concerns. However, the guidance is not complete. Although the consultation is closed, over the last few days responses have indicated that points made by Members of your Lordships’ House will be taken into account in finalising the guidance. I hope that this approach will have at least that status, as the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, suggested. That would give a degree of comfort. I beg leave to withdraw my pedantic amendment.
Lord Bates
My Lords, this has been an excellent debate. I often say that it has been a good debate when I stand up at the end of a group of amendments, but this has been a truly outstanding discussion. We have been talking in an academic context; I think this debate should almost be required reading in many institutions, although I would not wish to encroach on academic freedom by suggesting it so blatantly.
It has evoked such strong passions because there are so many Members of your Lordships’ House who have held and hold positions in our great British universities and who have benefited from the freedoms of speech and academic research which exist there. These are strengths and the envy of the world. We have all had the opportunity and privilege of benefitting from them. When I look at the warden of Wadham College I always have particular regard to what he has to say—whether it is telling me about legislation or taking the short cut across the quad. It evokes a deep passion in us all and we are right to feel very proud of our institutions and the freedom of speech which takes place within them.
I want to put how we arrived at this situation into some sort of context. The Prevent strategy was introduced in 2007. As the noble Baroness will recall, in 2005 we had the outrage of the terrorist attack on the London Underground; 54 people were killed and several hundred people were injured. There were two Terrorism Acts—one in 2000, when the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, was Cabinet Secretary, and a subsequent one in 2006. I want to echo the points made by my noble friend Lady Warsi. There was a view which said, “Listen, there is something more afoot here. We need not just to tighten the law, to tighten the surveillance and prosecution element of it. We need somehow to prevent and to get ahead of the poisonous ideology which is pervading these people’s minds to actually think that they would consider blowing themselves up on a crowded subway train. We need somehow to engage with that”. So the previous Government, to their credit, came up with the concept of Prevent. Right from the outset the Prevent programme went across all bodies and organisations. All public bodies were encouraged to think about how they could prevent people from being drawn into terrorist activities.
One of the dangers of listening to my noble friend Lord Deben is that I get so carried away by his arguments and powers of persuasion that sometimes I forget that I am not sitting on the Back Benches and I nod vigorously towards him. Then I remember that I have a responsibility on the Front Bench and am jolted to focus on Clause 25, which says that the general duty to which we ask people to have due regard is that:
“A specified authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism”.
That is what it says. We can get drawn into its implications, but that is the principle that is on the face on the Bill.
So we had the Prevent strategy, which applied across all organisations and which was reviewed and refreshed in 2011. After the horrific murder of Drummer Lee Rigby on the streets of Woolwich, there was an assessment of the Prevent strategy and the conclusion went something like this. “Listen, there are some wonderful things going on. We have regional co-ordinators. They are working very well with the universities in looking at who is on campus, making sure that they have preparations in place and that views which are potentially dangerous and leading people into extremism and terrorism are noted. However, it is very patchy. There are some universities that are extremely good and there are some which, to be honest, just do not want to play ball. Invariably, as is often the case, the ones that are very good are in the low-risk areas and the ones that are very poor are in the high-risk areas”. The extremism task force which was considering this came forward and said, “We need to put this on a statutory footing, so that we get some consistency of delivery across the piece—across all organisations—and we bring the ones which are not taking their responsibility seriously up to the standard of what the others are doing already”. So we arrived more or less at where we are.
Then, because the guidance to be put out was going to be specific—and noble Lords have had some great fun at its expense—this was something that we put out to consultation. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, referred to differences with the Scottish consultation. I think I said in Committee that in relation to the particular, narrow elements, the requirements such as giving advance notice on speeches are very limited compared with the much more extensive Universities UK guidance for external speakers, which requests,
“a script or précis from the speaker outlining what they intend to say and requiring them to sign an undertaking acknowledging that their speech will be terminated if they deviate from it”.
This is from Universities UK’s current guidelines on having speakers on campus, which also talks about:
“Briefing the chair in advance of the event, making clear that they have a responsibility to ensure that no speaker or other person present at the event infringes the law; this briefing could highlight the circumstances under which they must stop the event, issue warnings to participants on their conduct or request the withdrawal or removal by stewards (or the police if necessary) of the person(s) concerned”.
I do not recall a hue and cry from the collective colleges of our great universities to say that this was outrageous and should not be happening; people just kind of said, “Listen”—
Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws
The reason why there was no hue and cry from the colleges and universities is that they just ignore it. It is a shame on Universities UK that it produced guidelines that are so ridiculous that people cast them to one side. I am afraid that this has led to a diminution of respect for the organisation, and that has been a problem across the board.
Baroness Brinton
Does my noble friend not agree that the difference between the UUK guidance and the Bill is that the Bill gives the Secretary of State powers to act against the university whereas at the moment the UUK guidance merely advises universities to think about something? I hope that the Minister will recognise that.
Lord Bates
I am grateful for both those interventions. However, I think they make my point: the fact that the guidance is there to put in place in universities for speakers but it is just brushed aside and ignored seems to give some veracity to the arguments put forward by the extremism task force, which reviewed our counterterrorism strategy and arrived at the conclusion that there is something to be said for having a more statutory footing.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
I am sorry to interrupt the Minister. Could it not be that the universities simply thought that the guidance was—I will not use too strong a word—hopeless and misguided?
Lord Bates
It could be. I do not know what was in their minds.
The pressure and stipulation that are contained even in the consultation document issued in December, which we went out to consultation on—sadly, I have then gone and pre-empted the consultation by assuring your Lordships that certain sections of it would not apply—are a much lighter touch. There is no question, none at all, of the Government telling people who to have on their campus, in their university or in their college to speak. All we ask is that they have systems and procedures in place by which they ensure that the people who come on to their campus—
Baroness O'Loan
I thank the Minister for giving way. Surely it is not the case that all the Government are asking is that they have some procedures; surely it is the case that under the Bill the Secretary of State will have the power to direct universities as to what they do, and therefore it is that power that makes a difference.
Lord Bates
On that element, the noble Baroness is correct; there is a power there. If you make it a statutory duty, there needs to be some element of saying, “Well, so what if they brush aside their statutory duty?”. What if they brushed aside their statutory duty on a whole range of things? We have talked about that: the Public Order Act 1986; the Protection from Harassment Act 1997; the Terrorism Act 2006, which talks about inviting support for a proscribed organisation or punishing statements encouraging terrorism or disseminating terrorist material; and the Public Order Act 1988, or “breach of the peace” law—these are all Acts that contain a duty. What if organisations fail to observe the health and safety Act, and an inspector comes and says—I realise that I have tested the House.
Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)
I am most grateful to the Minister for giving way, but I think that he really is fighting the last war. It is perfectly clear that the Bill is going to enter into force and that it is going to make certain new statutory obligations. Many of us have argued the case against that and for a voluntary approach, and I still believe that that would have been better, but it is not what is going to happen. So although he can have a lot of fun at the expense of UUK, there are other lessons that could be drawn from it—one of which, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, said, is that no one actually paid any attention to it. So if really unwise guidance is given, as was given then, that is what will happen.
We are talking now about a statutory obligation, though, and that is something completely different. Let us simply work on the basis that something like Amendment 14D is going to come into force. I ask the Minister to address in his winding-up speech one or two modest ways, which have been suggested around the Chamber, in which it could be improved before Third Reading, drawing on some of the excellent language in Amendments 14 and 14A. That is what would enable the Home Secretary of the day. In the next lot but one of amendments we will get on to the guidance, but that is the heart of the whole matter. I do not think that we should dilly-dally much longer on whether or not there is going to be a statutory obligation.
Lord Bates
I certainly take the noble Lord’s point but perhaps I may address some of the key points in the amendments that have been put forward.
I just want to put this in some kind of context. I admit to having had a bit of fun at Universities UK’s expense, but I think that quite a few noble Lords have had a bit of fun at the expense of the consultation document. Given that my noble friend Lord Deben has exhorted us to be in favour of all debate, one should not necessarily try to close off one part of it. However, I accept that perhaps I have pushed far enough, and the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, has got me on track. I shall address some of the particular points that have arisen.
I shall turn to the amendments themselves, but I think it would be helpful to address first the general principle that many noble Lords have spoken about, today and in Committee: the inclusion of universities and further education institutions within the scope of the Prevent duty in Clause 25. In Committee I outlined specific case studies, as did the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, of students and graduates who had gone on to commit terrorist atrocities. For the avoidance of doubt, in all the case studies I mentioned, including the 2010 Stockholm attack and the 2009 Detroit aircraft attack, the perpetrators had studied in UK institutions.
Young people accounted for around 31% of terrorist-related convictions between 2001 and June 2014. Within that date, the figure for at least two years is even higher, at 35%. The Prevent duty is designed to apply to sectors that can most effectively protect vulnerable people from radicalisation and from being drawn into terrorism.
In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, who have previously asked for evidence—I went back and said, “What evidence do we have from the regional co-ordinators at BIS that there is a level of non-compliance?”, and I have already referred to part of it—in the year up to 25 January 2015, at least 62 events were held on campuses that featured an extremist speaker or speakers. We know of another eight events that were publicised but later cancelled. Speakers at these events have, for example, called for apostates of Islam to be beheaded and have stated that a man who beats his wife should not be questioned as it is solely a matter between them.
I do not mention all this to suggest that these speakers should necessarily be banned—that is not what our guidance says is required under the Clause 25 duty—but to demonstrate the point that extremist views are propagated on campuses, that students are at risk of being drawn into terrorism and that a disproportionately high number of young people go on to become involved in it.
Since we last debated these issues, the consultation on the draft guidance has finished. Officials are still working through the responses, but an early indication shows that 42 higher education institutions emailed a response to the Home Office and, out of those, only eight stated that universities should not be subject to the duty. Furthermore, Universities UK—I qualify, of course, praying that organisation in aid of my position—which represents 133 vice-chancellors and principals, has not called for universities to be excluded from the Prevent duty. It reiterated its support for the duty when it met my honourable friend the Minister for Immigration and Security and my right honourable friend the Minister for Universities and Science earlier this week.
All this is not to say that universities have not raised issues with the current draft guidance. Almost all of them have done so, in a constructive fashion, and we thank them for their responses. That is the point of this form of public consultation and we will be making a number of changes to the guidance before it is published in its final form. I have already mentioned in Committee two changes that we propose to make: amending the reference to all speakers having to give prior sight of presentations; and making clear that not all staff need to receive Prevent training. We will be working through other changes and of course, as has been said, all that guidance, which will be issued to chancellors, will now be the subject, in a later group of amendments, of an affirmative resolution in both Houses of Parliament.
I now turn to the issue of freedom of speech, which has been heavily focused upon. It was mentioned that placing the duty on universities could have a chilling effect on freedom of speech and academic freedom, which would be contrary to the core function of our universities—a function which, as I have already said, makes universities one of our most important arenas for challenging extremist views and ideologies. As my noble friends Lord Deben and Lady Warsi said, I drew your Lordships’ attention in Committee to existing guidance referring to how speakers are treated. That is why I have tabled Amendment 15D.
This amendment would require further and higher education institutions, when carrying out the Prevent duty, to have particular regard to the duty to secure freedom of speech contained in the Education (No. 2) Act 1986. This will require higher and further education institutions, when considering all the factors that they need to consider when complying with the Prevent duty, to place particular emphasis on the duty to secure freedom of speech. I am sorry that I caused my noble friend Lady Hamwee so much confusion earlier with the difference between having due regard and having particular regard. The reason we put that in is that we want to have a higher test to differentiate between having due regard to the guidance and having particular regard to freedom of speech under the 1986 Act. That was not accidental; it was absolutely intentional and, had I been a little sharper, I might have mentioned that to noble Lords earlier.
The noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Macdonald, have tabled an amendment along similar lines, Amendment 14A, although we would argue that the Government’s amendment goes further. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has tabled Amendments 14 and 15 with a view to ensuring that, to the extent that Scottish higher and further education institutions are subject to the Prevent duty, their compliance with that duty is also subject to their need to ensure freedom of speech. This is quite clearly a logical approach, given that those bodies are not covered by the duty in the 1986 Act, and we are not in disagreement with the general principle of the noble and learned Lord’s amendments.
Given, however, that no Scottish bodies are currently listed in Schedule 6, these amendments are unnecessary. If and when Scottish institutions are added to Schedule 6 by order, the Government can use the power in Clause 26(3) to make consequential amendments to this chapter. We would at that point seek to ensure that Scottish institutions had the same requirement as those in England and Wales to pay particular regard to the need to secure freedom of speech, as contemplated by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. I hope that that goes some way to reassure the noble and learned Lord on this point.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee spoke to her Amendment 14C, which would require that guidance to the education sector must recognise the duties of that sector to secure freedom of speech, to promote tolerance and respect for democracy and to offer a broad and balanced curriculum. The guidance already makes these points in the relevant sections. I refer my noble friend to paragraph 105 of the draft guidance in particular. There were a number of points, but I am conscious of the time I have taken to respond.
Baroness Lister of Burtersett
The Minister, in talking about Amendment 14, seemed to imply that it related only to Scotland. He said that he agreed with this amendment, but Amendment 14 incorporates an amendment from the Joint Committee on Human Rights which makes very clear that the Prevent duty should be subject to the duty in Section 43(1) of the Education (No. 2) Act 1986. Is he now saying that he agrees with that?
Lord Bates
I take that point and will come to it as I go through my notes. I will go through them in no particular order but will start with my noble friend Lady Brinton, who asked about paragraph 50 in the guidance. We will reflect on my noble friend’s points about the language in the paragraph and look to clarify this in future. We will also reflect on the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, about prior restraint. I hope that I have reassured the noble Baroness that there is nothing here which would take us back to the times of prior restraint.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, asked why academic freedom is not specifically covered. He is quite right in his interpretation that freedom of expression, as secured by the duty in Section 43(1) of the 1986 Act, includes academic freedom, which is articulated in Section 202 of the 1988 Act, as was said by the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan. The freedom within the law to question and test received wisdom and to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions is therefore legislated for.
Lord Elystan-Morgan
There is no specific reference, of course, in the new clause, Clause 29, to Section 202 of the 1988 Act. The Minister is, no doubt, well aware that the Joint Committee’s report speaks of the necessity for a specific reference to Section 43 and Section 202 in the very same breath. In other words, my submission is that one is the obverse of the other. Section 43 of the 1986 Act guarantees freedom of speech and academic freedom, as it refers to students, employees and so on. Section 202 of the 1988 Act is the obverse of that in that it refers to the freedom of a person to do those things and yet retain employment. The two are inseparable, in my respectful submission.
Lord Bates
I will reflect again on the point about Section 202 of the 1988 Act and will see whether it is there, or whether it is, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, suggested, implicit in our wording.
My noble friend Lord Deben talked about the importance of debate. I hope that I have gone some way to reassure him that that is entirely consistent with our view. The guidance stipulates that and it is now stipulated in the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Butler, asked about the Home Secretary. The Home Secretary can issue directions to universities and this makes a real difference. The power to issue directions will be subject to multiple layers of protection, including judicial oversight and that of the Prevent oversight board, on which my noble friend Lord Carlile provides independent representation. We agreed, following a discussion in Committee, to look again at this, and a direction will be issued only as a last resort.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)
My Lords, I have a fairly simple question. I have various connections with universities, but I shall not bother with that just now in order to save time. Subsection (2) in the new clause inserted by Amendment 15D refers to,
“carrying out the duty imposed by section 25(1)”,
and goes on to state that “it” must have particular regard to the freedom of speech. “It” definitely refers to the freedom of speech part. I have no difficulty with that. I do not share the difficulty of my noble and learned friend Lord Scott, which is obviously a Chancery difficulty, but my difficulty is fundamental. When carrying out the duty imposed by Section 25(1) may lead you in one direction, the freedom of speech duty may lead you in the opposite direction. In that case, which wins? That is why it is so important that the amendment states that we should,
“have particular regard to it”.
The noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, suggested that it should be the top priority where there is a conflict. I do not know what quite what the intention is in that respect, but it is quite obvious that there can be a conflict, and if there is a conflict, what is to happen? With great respect, the Government’s new clause does not so far conclusively answer that question.
Lord Bates
I am grateful to my noble and learned friend for that intervention. He hit upon a real issue, and we are going to have to write on that point. When exploring how to indicate that the commitment to free speech is to be taken seriously and nothing should take away from that, we did not want effectively to phrase the amendment in such a way as to say, a bit like Universities UK, “You can now just disregard it because you can claim everything is free speech and therefore do not need all the rest of it”. This is a serious thing that the Government are saying. We believe that there is a particular risk and that universities ought to have due regard to it. We would like that to be done consistently. That was the reason that we landed upon to,
“have particular regard to it”.
This answers the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, and with this I will sit down. You cannot have a debate of this quality, with such incredibly perceptive points being raised, and not be open to it. As I hope I have demonstrated throughout this process since we began our journey at Second Reading, I have tried to listen and have due regard to the views expressed in your Lordships’ House—and nothing will change on that. We will reflect very carefully on the particular points raised. Of course, if there are ways in which we can tighten the language that we use and points to take on board, we still have time to do that, but we feel that in putting forward Amendment 15D, we have something that can give real reassurance to universities in this regard.
Lord Hope of Craighead
My Lords, in view of the hour which we have reached, I am sure that all noble Lords would like me to bring this debate to an end as soon as possible. First, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. This has been a debate of very high quality, and many interesting points have been raised. I am most grateful for the answer the Minister gave on Scotland, which satisfies me. We can no doubt return to that by order, if necessary.
As for the rest, I think that it is a search for clarity. I ask the Minister to bear in mind the contribution of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, and the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby, when she was complimenting the Minister on Amendment 15D. I think she said, “We are not there yet”. In a way, that sums up the essence of the debate. Many points have been made in various ways and many questions have been asked which the Minister clearly has not been able to answer. I think we are reassured by the open mind which he expressed in his concluding words. In view of that, the proper thing for me to do is to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.