Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 4th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I will try to get this debate back on track and deal with the issues that I think have been confronting us. The debate was ably introduced by the Minister and it has been predictably interesting, presenting some sharply contrasting views. It has also demonstrated a dichotomy between sincerely held views of former and venerable public servants and political views. There has been a further dichotomy within the political classes as to what constitutes responsible decision-making. As my noble friend Lord Murray indicated, even within the same party you can sometimes find a dichotomy of view—it happens, I say to the Minister. I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, that when it comes to a party having differences of view, I would think the Liberal Democrats could give master classes.

The position of these Benches was laid out clearly by my noble friend Lord Callanan. He also addressed the precipitate and surprising decision of the Government to delay their own Bill by, unusually, not proceeding with a committal Motion. The Minister, with admirable verbal gymnastics, sought heroically, if perhaps not completely convincingly, to explain that decision, but I think the reason is simple: the Government had concerns that the sensible amendment to the committal Motion that my noble friend had tabled was drawing support, and it may well have been that the Government were fearful that support for the amendment or a version of it would prevail and the Government would lose. But that was a judgment for the Government to make. I observe that the amendment was not prescriptive and would have left matters entirely under the control of the Government. What has now emerged is a welcome breathing space for the Government to consider and answer some serious questions about the agreement on which the Bill is predicated. Some of these questions have already been asked, but it will be my pleasure in a moment to add to them.

My noble friend Lord Callanan raised some of the most serious issues arising from the agreement, and it is interesting that the concerns he expressed were mirrored during the debate by a number of contributors. If we look at the agreement and at the trust fund, we find that there is an absence of knowing in detail what the views of the Chagossian people are on these issues. That was raised by a number of contributors, including my noble friend Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, has concerns about that.

The noble Lord, Lord Morrow, and my noble friends Lord De Mauley and Lord Bellingham spoke movingly about the treatment to which the Chagossian people have been subjected over decades. I found that moving— I say to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, that I am not being hypocritical in expressing that sentiment—and it was very much echoed by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hoey and Lady Foster of Aghadrumsee, who graphically described the lack of engagement in relation to current matters.

Then there is the issue of money—in today’s economic climate, a hot potato if ever there was one. The Chancellor is scratching around looking for every penny she can find, defence urgently needs upfront cash and taxes are almost certainly going up, yet the British taxpayer is going to be asked to pay almost £35 billion to Mauritius, a point that was raised by a number of contributors. My noble friend Lady Noakes gave a devastatingly forensic analysis of the costs and the Government’s disparate approach, and I will leave that to the Minister to respond to. Those concerns were echoed by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster of Aghadrumsee, and the noble Lord, Lord Weir of Ballyholme.

Then there was the position of China, and the not imagined but avowed objective of China to strengthen ties with Mauritius because of its strategic advantages, and China’s commitment to elevating the bilateral strategic partnership. These clearly cause concern to many of your Lordships, notably my noble friend Lord De Mauley. Even the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, nobly supporting his Government, said, “China is a threat”. I agree. That was again referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Weir of Ballyholme. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, that I was a Defence Minister for nearly four and a half years, and one of my areas of responsibility was south-east Asia. China is a resolute prosecutor of its own interests, with an overt desire to exercise influence globally. At our peril do we waver in our vigilance.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

I am so grateful to the noble Baroness. I just want to say that I am quite sure that the Mauritians would agree with that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

That is an unexpected source of encouragement, for which I thank the noble Lord.

Finally, and very importantly, the defence and security implications of this arrangement are clearly ringing alarm bells, as noted in the contributions from my noble friends Lord Lilley, Lord Blencathra, Lord De Mauley and Lord Bellingham. My noble friend Lord Bellingham helpfully distinguished between this agreement and the sovereign base areas in Cyprus, to which the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, referred. The whole point is that we have sovereignty in Cyprus and can control these arrangements, but we cannot under this arrangement: we are in the hands of the agreement and Mauritius’s disposition to us.

The Minister described the base as a prized military asset. I was very glad to hear that and, of course, I agree. It was also emphasised by the noble Lord, Lord Jay. But it is this aspect of defence and security to which I wish to devote my final remarks. The Minister already has a lot of questions to which a response is required, and the observations from my noble friend Lord Lilley certainly require comment, but here is my addendum.

With the help of the Bill, I have been endeavouring to knit together the components of the agreement with the text of the Bill. Seeking clarification from the Government on a number of vital points is part of a necessary scrutiny process, but His Majesty’s Opposition reserve their overall position on the Bill and will determine their approach at a subsequent stage in the procedure. In the meantime, let me set a general perspective.

We reach the ninth introductory paragraph to the agreement before there is any mention of

“protecting international peace and security”,

with specific reference to

“the long-term, secure and effective operation of the Base on Diego Garcia”.

Although I might have hoped for earlier recognition of the primacy of defence and security, this is where we are. But the drafting confirms that this is a pivotal part of the agreement, which then promotes defence and security to Article 3 of the agreement and enhances that status by including Annex 1, so progress has been made. I mention this because it goes to the heart of what the agreement stands for, what it is about, and the need for absolute clarity.

There is the further question of the extent to which material text in the agreement should be replicated in the Bill. I propose to raise a number of factual questions, which I appreciate may require the Minister to go back to her officials. I am content that she does that and can respond by letter, a copy of which could perhaps be laid in the Library. At least the Government have now helpfully provided some time within which to do that.

Going back to the agreement, under Article 3,

“the Parties shall not undermine, prejudice or otherwise interfere with the long-term, secure and effective operation of the Base, and shall cooperate to that end”.

That is an undertaking of fundamental importance by Mauritius to the UK. It explicitly implies that Mauritius should not enter into any arrangements, either on its own account or with any third party, which could be in breach of that undertaking. That, by implication, logically confers upon the UK a right to respond to such arrangements by taking whatever action is necessary to safeguard the base, and our interests and those of our allies on the base. Can the Minister confirm that that is the Government’s understanding?

An important protection is granted to the UK by Annex 1, paragraph—

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

Forgive me for interrupting, but the noble Baroness said a few minutes ago that the sovereign base area in Cyprus was not the subject of a treaty. It was the subject of three treaties: the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance and the treaty of establishment.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I hesitate to correct the noble Lord. I think what I said in response to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, was that the sovereign base areas in Cyprus and this arrangement are not the same. The point that the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, made was, in fact, about expeditiously communicating with Cyprus if we are going to do something. With the greatest respect to the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, I thank him for his intervention but I think we are slightly on different planes.

I had got to the UK’s position under Annex 1, paragraph 1A, which says that the UK shall have

“unrestricted access, basing and overflight for United Kingdom and United States of America aircraft and vessels to enter into the sea and airspace of Diego Garcia”.

That is good. Annex 1, paragraph 1B(i), says the UK shall have “unrestricted ability” to

“control the conduct and deployment of armed operations and lethal capabilities”

on Diego Garcia. That is strong; it is a clear reassurance and there should be no ambiguity as to what it means. But less clear is Annex 1, paragraph 1B(viii), which says the UK shall have “unrestricted ability” to

“permit access, basing and overflight for non-United Kingdom and non-United States of America aircraft and vessels, upon notification to Mauritius”.

If that is merely a courtesy intimation then it does not compromise the UK controlling the conduct and deployment of armed operations and lethal capabilities on Diego Garcia. If that notification requires the consent of Mauritius then it most assuredly does, so can the Minister confirm that such intimation is purely a courtesy and that consent to the proposed action is not required from Mauritius?

Under Annex 1, paragraph 2, the UK

“agrees to expeditiously inform Mauritius of any armed attack on a third State directly emanating from the Base on Diego Garcia”.

It is in the middle of the Indian Ocean, and a territorial armed attack on a third state could theoretically be mounted from the base, albeit that is perhaps unlikely. Can the Minister confirm whether that obligation to inform “expeditiously” extends to assets which, for example, merely called into the base to refuel and are once again at sea or airborne? Does that obligation also apply if UK forces disable hostile aircraft, drones, ships or other devices which present a threat to the base?

I ask these questions because in any live conflict, the environment is kinetic. The last thing on the minds of military commanders will be seeking consents. These questions which I have posed require clear, unambiguous answers.

I turn to how the agreement engages with the Bill. I would have thought that the issues I have already raised, plus the importance of the role of the joint commission under Article 12 and the mechanism for setting disputes under Article 14, all merit a specific mention in the Bill. Can the Minister confirm whether the Government are prepared to look at the drafting of the Bill with a view to incorporating some of these issues into it?

Specifically, there is in the Bill a reservation to His Majesty under his prerogative to make laws for Diego Garcia and to empower His Majesty to make Orders in Council. I raised this at the very helpful briefing meeting held by the Minister, for which I thank her, but I will add this point. His Majesty is commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces. What if a threat to the safety of our Armed Forces manifests in the base itself or in the assets operating from there? If there is a disagreement with Mauritius as to the character and gravity of that threat and how the UK proposes to respond, does the lawmaking power under Clause 3(3) prevail to do whatever is necessary to protect our military and civilian personnel and our assets?

This agreement raises two profound concerns. First, if the Government concede this area of British sovereignty, how safe are our other crown territories—the Falklands, Gibraltar and our sovereign bases in Cyprus? The moment that lawyers come sniffing around any of those, will this Government be resolute and stand up to that? Secondly, this agreement should not be seen as some tying up of loose legal ends with a box ticked. It has a significant impact on the British taxpayer, on the Chagossians themselves and on our defence and security interests.

Notwithstanding the acknowledged authority of the noble Lords, Lord Browne of Ladyton and Lord Beamish, and the respect in which they are held in this House, the lack of support from the Government’s own Back Benches is troubling. I look forward to the Minister’s response, because this debate has raised a series of profoundly concerning substantive issues, and this Chamber needs reassurance.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Beith) (LD)]

My Lords, if this amendment is agreed to, I will be unable to call Amendment 7 by reason of pre-emption.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 89 in my name and in support of the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Callanan.

At Second Reading, I raised the broad issue of the royal prerogative, and the Minister is aware of my, perhaps inquisitive, interest in that. That broad power is in Clause 3, and the specific reference to His Majesty’s power to make Orders in Council comes in at Clause 5, particularly in Clause 5(1)(a). That is powerful. For the benefit of the Chamber, I repeat what that says:

“His Majesty may by Order in Council … make any provision that appears to His Majesty to be appropriate as a result of the Treaty”.


The following paragraph goes on to explain that that can be a

“consequential, supplementary, incidental, transitional or saving provision in relation to … this Act, or … an Order under paragraph (a)”.

I want to thank the Minister for her letter, which she very kindly sent to me yesterday. In it, she alludes to this particular issue and says that “Clause 5 of the Bill creates a new statutory power for His Majesty to make such provision by Orders in Council as he considers appropriate as a result of the treaty”. This led to my Amendment 89, because I am just trying to seek clarification of this power. In particular, I want to establish whether that power can be used by His Majesty, for example, to withdraw the United Kingdom as a party to the treaty and withhold any payment due to Mauritius if Mauritius violates any terms of the treaty.

This is not a lengthy matter for discussion. In responding, I would ask the Minister, if she opposes my amendment, and I anticipate that she may, to be specific about the ground of objection. It may be that she says, “I don’t want the Secretary of State being mixed up in anything like this, it’s just unnecessary and tiresome and he’s got enough on his plate without being burdened with all that”. On the other hand, she might consider that this is an incompetent use of the royal prerogative. I would be interested in understanding that better.

It would be more alarming if the Minister said that she does not consider that, if Mauritius violates any terms of the treaty, the UK will be able to withdraw and cease payment. It is rather along the lines of the point raised by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, who is not in his place. There is a basic issue about whether the thing is working or not. In his case, the thing is not working because the base has disappeared under the ocean. In the dim and distant past in contract law there was something called “frustration of the contract”: if the underlying purpose disappeared, the contract evaporated. The Minister has undertaken to investigate that further and we shall await that.

I really want to understand, if Mauritius violates the treaty, what practical solution is available to the UK: whether it is paying the money, coming out of the treaty or taking whatever other remedial action is necessary. I shall look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly in relation to Amendment 77 from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, on the process for the establishment of the joint commission. This is critically important because, while the treaty does talk about the process of setting up the joint commission in Annex 3, there is no determination as to whether that person, as the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, said, will be a Member of Parliament, will be accountable to Parliament or will be a civil servant. It would be very helpful if we had more detail in relation to that matter.

It brings me back to my days studying constitutional law at Queen’s University, Belfast, when Professor Brigid Hadfield used to lecture us about the mischief behind the law. She would say, “Read the debate in Parliament to find out what the mischief was”. I was just thinking of her there when I was listening to the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. It would be really useful to find out what the Government’s position is in relation to this joint commission, because it could be a very critical part of the post-agreement scenario, where there is accountability to this place. I would really welcome clarity in relation to that matter.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group speak to perhaps one of the most concerning parts of the treaty—although the previous bit was also concerning: namely, the risk that this agreement will undermine our security. Given the large number of amendments in this group, I will speak only to those in my name. I know that my noble friend Lady Goldie will speak to her amendments as well, and I will certainly not seek to pre-empt her arguments in my remarks, as my noble friend is much more of an expert on defence matters than I will ever be.

My Amendment 18 is a commencement block that would prevent the main clauses of the Bill coming into effect until the Government have laid a report on securing a guarantee that all non-UK and non-US civilian personnel stationed on the archipelago will benefit from the provisions of Annex 1. Annex 1 protects the UK’s unrestricted access to Diego Garcia’s sea and airspace. The treaty makes reference to some civilian activity, but we are seeking an assurance from the Government that that part of the treaty in its entirety applies to civilians stationed on Diego Garcia. I hope the Minister will be able to give us that assurance.

Amendment 67 speaks to one of the most fundamental questions, which has already been the subject of much debate. The treaty is clear that the UK must inform Mauritius of any armed attack on a third state directly emanating from the base on Diego Garcia, using the magnificent word, “expeditiously”. The dictionary definition of expeditiously is “quickly and efficiently” and “with speed”. Many have rightly asked what expeditiously means in practice. My Amendment 67 clarifies that the UK Government must not inform Mauritius of any relevant armed attacks until the attack has ended. Providing prior notification to Mauritius, or indeed any third state not directly involved in the attack, could risk the safety of British and American servicemen who are engaged in the relevant operation. Could the Minister confirm that nothing in the treaty requires the UK Government to give forewarning of any attack emanating from the military base? If that is the case then I am sure they can accept the amendment.

Additionally, my amendment seeks a requirement not to notify Mauritius if notification would endanger the security of the base. Can the Minister confirm that nothing in the treaty would prevent the Government withholding notification if notifying Mauritius would endanger the base? My noble friend Lady Goldie will be going into additional details on these important issues.

Amendment 69 in my name seeks to make a point about the location of specific equipment and installations on the base. It is essential that the security of the base is maintained. It would not be acceptable if the UK Government were to endanger the security of equipment at the military base by notifying Mauritius. In replying to the debate, can the Minister please address those concerns? It is essential that the UK Government have the right to refuse notification when doing so would endanger the base itself or our personnel.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I associate myself with the remarks of my noble friend Lord Callanan on the amendments to which he spoke. I shall be dealing with the word “expeditiously” and I will try to ensure that that characterises my contribution, and perhaps influences this debate.

I wish to speak to my Amendments 83, 85, 86 and 87. At Second Reading, I raised the issue of the mismatch between the Bill and the treaty that it implements. My main concern in this whole affair is our defence and security and the implications of this Bill on that. I identified a range of areas where greater clarity is required. Before I continue, I should say that I have received a letter from the Ministers, for which I thank them. That sought to clarify some of the questions that I asked at Second Reading. The letter brings a degree of clarification, but in other respects it leaves me with questions. I shall address these as I explain my amendments.

Amendment 83 is simply a technical drafting amendment to accommodate my remaining amendments in this group. It specifies that the commencement of the treaty cannot occur until the conditions outlined in my amendments have been satisfied.

Amendment 85 relates to the specific notification requirements under Annex 1 1(b)(viii) of the treaty. My amendment would require that Clauses 2 to 4 do not come into force until the Secretary of State has published a statement establishing that the notification in Annex 1 1(b)(viii) of the treaty does not require the consent of Mauritius in response. The provision in Annex 1 to which this refers says that:

“In accordance with this Agreement and with reference to Article 2(5) and Annex 2, in respect of Diego Garcia, Mauritius agrees the United Kingdom shall have … unrestricted access, basing and overflight … for non-United Kingdom and non-United States of America aircraft and vessels, upon notification to Mauritius”.


The amendment seeks to enable the Secretary of State to make explicit, before Clauses 2 to 4 of the Bill can come into force, that the consent of Mauritius is not required for us to host third-party forces on Diego Garcia.

As I mentioned, I have the letter from the Ministers in which they helpfully clarify that permission from Mauritius is not required. However, I require the Minister to confirm that such notification is after the event. If notification is required before the event, that implies consent is required, or that the intimation of an objection by Mauritius is possible. That is why I seek the clarification.

We cannot have a situation where Mauritius can in any way object to which forces are present at the base. The operation of the base, including the matter of the basing of our allies, must be solely at the discretion of the United Kingdom. I would appreciate the Minister giving a guarantee that Mauritius will have no control whatever over the basing and overflight of other countries’ forces. Unusually, the Minister and I are perhaps nearly at consensus in idem here. If that is the case, why would the Secretary of State be reluctant to publish a statement?

Amendment 86 is another defence and security amendment. It seeks that Clauses 2 to 4 would not come into force until the Secretary of State has published a statement establishing that the obligation under Annex 1(2) of the treaty

“does not extend to aircraft and vessels which have landed or docked at the Base for the purposes of maintenance or refuelling prior to the armed attack on a third state”.

Annex 1(2) of the treaty is the provision that requires the United Kingdom

“to expeditiously inform Mauritius of any armed attack on a third State”.

As we have discussed, much has been made of what is meant by “expeditiously”. The Ministers’ letter to me stated that they are satisfied that this does not require the UK to seek the permission of Mauritius, nor for notification to be given prior to the event. That is helpful. The International Agreements Committee of this House has also concluded that it interprets “expeditiously” to mean

“as soon as reasonably practicable in the circumstances”.

I believe that the Minister gives her interpretation in good faith, but what of Mauritius’s interpretation? Does the Minister know whether the Mauritian Government share this view? If she does not currently know, and I quite accept that she may not, I would be happy for her to write to me to confirm the point.

--- Later in debate ---

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Weir, that these provisions have been discussed and approved at the highest levels of the US security apparatus. Both the IAC and the IRDC have scrutinised them. This treaty specifically confers—

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

Forgive me for being slightly behind the curve; I was trying to follow the sections in the annex. The Minister referred to Annex 1(11), in particular the definition of “unrestricted”. That paragraph states that

“‘unrestricted’ means not requiring permission or notification, subject to the standing authorisations and notifications separately agreed between the Parties to meet the requirements of international or domestic Mauritian law or current practice”.

For the sake of clarification, what are these “standing authorisations and notifications”?

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My Amendment 20S seeks to get the Secretary of State to produce a report on the so-called economic partnership between the United Kingdom and Mauritius, which is set up under Article 11 of the treaty. Parliament should have an opportunity to take note of that and debate it in both Houses.

The reason that is important, apart from the fact that the control of money is the supreme function of Parliament, is that the economic partnership article, Article 11, in the agreement, is very strange. It says:

“In consideration of this Agreement, the United Kingdom agrees … a. to pay Mauritius an annual sum; … b. to capitalise a Trust Fund for the benefit of Chagossians as established by Mauritius; and … c. to grant multi-year funding as part of a development framework for projects to be undertaken by Mauritius across twenty-five (25) years. … The arrangements for such payments, including amounts and modalities shall be agreed separately”.


It then says that this is a “full and final settlement” of the financial aspects of ceding sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius.

Now, to call this a partnership is a very strange thing. We give them money annually. We give them more money for the benefit of the Chagossians. We give them yet more money for the benefit of the Mauritians. Where is the partnership in all this? If this partnership were ever to be introduced, I hope that Ministers would feel obliged or, out of their natural desire to be helpful, would seek to explain to us why this is a partnership rather than a kind of surrender where we give up the money, we give up the territory and we let them decide—even the trust fund that we set up for the benefit of the Chagossians is “as established by Mauritius”. So the Mauritians are going to determine how this trust fund is used and spent; the Chagossians will have no say in it and will probably get precious little benefit from it.

I hope the Minister will let us in on the secret. What is the quid pro quo in all this? Normally, any partnership means that there are two sides to it. I used to be a partner in a firm, and we were partners; we all benefited from each other. We did not have one side being partners and the other side getting all the benefits. I am genuinely mystified about this. Was it just that this was signed up for when the Government were suffering a fit of generosity? Perhaps the coffers were overflowing with funds. They could not think what to do but give some away to Mauritius for this, some away to a trust fund for that, then more away to Mauritius for 25 years. Where is it all coming from? Perhaps the Minister will enlighten us. I beg to move.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I did not expect to participate in this, but I was having a conversation earlier with my noble friend Lord Minto, who is very knowledgeable about corporate finance. He posed the question: is there anything in this whole arrangement that would stop Mauritius capitalising on the revenue stream that they have coming to them and selling that off to someone else?

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I am sorry that my noble friend Lord Kempsell is not here to move his amendment, which I thought was a particularly good one.

We debated some of the financial aspects of the treaty on the first day in Committee. The Minister at that time asked to delay her remarks on those amendments to the appropriate group. I assume this is the group that she was referring to, so we all look forward to the fuller answer on the finances that she promised then.

The core contention of the Government is that the deal costs an average of £101 million a year and the present net value of payments under the treaty is therefore £3.4 billion. This has been challenged by my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Altrincham, but the Minister, rather than engaging in the substance of those challenges, has relied on the Government’s published figures and refused to explain why she believes those figures accurately reflect the cost of the deal.

The Minister has relied on the approval of the Government Actuary’s Department and simply argued that consistency was essential. These are typical deflections that, no doubt, many Ministers have used in previous cases, but they do not address the concerns of my noble friends. We know that the payments are front-loaded at £165 million for the first three years, and then £120 million for the next 10 years. After that point, it is index-linked. As my noble friend Lady Noakes set out at Second Reading, that will see the cash payments hitting more than £650 million a year by the end of the 99 years, depending, of course, on what indexation you use. With all those additional considerations, it is our contention that the true cost of the deal is not £3.4 billion, as claimed by Ministers, but something more like £35 billion.

So the question lands: why would the Government seek to play this down? If they are so delighted with the deal—if it is such a good deal for the British public that they keep claiming that they deliver for, as all government policies should surely be—then surely they would want to be open about the true cost of things. They brag about spending on every other area; they take every amount of money per year, cumulatively add it all up and then put it in a press release and brag to the British people about what a great amount they are spending in every area except for this one. Does the Minister think it is better that the country should know the full costings before the treaty comes into effect, or would she prefer that the UK tie itself into these vast annual payments first, before admitting what the true cost of the deal actually is?

We are clear that the British people deserve to know what their Government are signing up for. Ministers should engage with the detailed costings laid out by my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Altrincham, and the points made by my noble friend Lord Lilley, rather than hiding behind their pre-prepared lines. If they have nothing to hide, what is wrong with producing a report that we can all see and study and get checked by independent financial experts? Once Ministers have admitted the true cost of the deal, then they can start justifying the so-called benefits of the treaty against what the true cost actually is. I do not think that people would be impressed by arguments justifying that figure, but Ministers should do the decent thing and justify the real numbers openly and in public.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

Noble Lords will recall that we debated the financial elements of the treaty in some detail last week, and I genuinely do not think that further debate is going to persuade anybody of anything this evening and probably is not a good use of time at this stage. However, I respect that the noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Kempsell, who was not here to speak to his amendment, have tabled further amendments, so I am happy to put their minds at rest about the matter to the best of my ability this evening.

Noble Lords already know that the Government published full details of the financial payment on the day that the treaty was signed. These details are in the finance exchange of letters, which is included in the treaty in the version laid in the House and published on the government website. The details are also set out in the accompanying Explanatory Memorandum, which was also laid before the House and published on the government website. It is plain to see how much the treaty is costing. The breakdown on page 10 of the Explanatory Memorandum is particularly straightforward for anyone who might desire further information about what will be paid in each year of the treaty. Indeed, the clarity with which the information was presented by the Government was welcomed by the Office for Statistics Regulation, which confirmed that it was consistent with the principles of intelligent transparency.

Therefore, there is no requirement for any additional report on the financial costs, either before the Bill comes into force, as the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, proposes, or before each payment, as is suggested in the other amendment.

The quid pro quo I was asked about is that we get a unique military asset shared with our closest ally on a legally secure basis. The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, asks why I rely on government figures and the answer is because I am representing the Government. With that, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

Before the Minister sits down, the particular question I pose—and I am not being polemical; I think there is an issue—is: what actually stops Mauritius, contractually, from commercially transferring this revenue stream in a capitalised form to another purchaser?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I think the noble Baroness is asking me what a sovereign country would do with some money that it gets as part of payment from this treaty. I am not sure what the problem would be with Mauritius investing that money in something that then provided it with a return, which it could then use to support public services or anything else in Mauritius. I am not sure if I have properly understood exactly what the noble Baroness is concerned about. I would be happy to engage further—

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I am happy to speak outside the Chamber.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

Okay, that might be a good idea. I hope that the noble Lord can withdraw his amendment on that basis.

--- Later in debate ---

This is an extremely important matter, which goes to the very heart of what the Government are about. Are they about the rigorous adherence to international law—even when it does not apply—and at the same time ignoring it when it does, or are they actually about upholding Britain’s interests, in which case handing over a base to a country, rendering it part of a nuclear-free zone, cannot be in the interests of ourselves, our allies or the defence of the West. I beg to move.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, my Amendment 88 in this group is very much in a similar vein to my earlier amendments, although I see I do not have the presence of my newly acquired fan—the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard—to encourage me. I seek reassurance that the

“unrestricted access, basing and overflight”

provisions in Annex 1(1)(a) of the agreement includes the right of the UK to allow nuclear-propelled vessels and nuclear-armed vessels and aircraft to enter the sea and airspace of Diego Garcia.

Although not in the amendment, the annexe of the treaty referred to also specifically covers the United States of America, and, for the avoidance of doubt, I include it in the confirmation I seek from the Secretary of State in this amendment. Again, I am asking that this be confirmed by the Secretary of State before the Bill can come into force. In this respect, I am perhaps baring my teeth more than my noble friend Lord Lilley, which is a rather unusual situation.

As my noble friend Lord Lilley pointed out, Mauritius is a party to the Pelindaba treaty, which establishes the African continent as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. This prohibits the research, development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, testing, possession, control or stationing of nuclear weapons in any signatory state. Article 7 of the Mauritius treaty states that both Mauritius and the United Kingdom confirm that no

“existing international obligations or arrangements … conflict with the provisions of this Agreement, and that nothing in this Agreement shall affect the status of existing international obligations or arrangements except as expressly provided for in this Agreement”.

Annex 1 of the treaty states that the United Kingdom retains

“unrestricted ability to … control the … deployment of armed operations and lethal capabilities”.

Nuclear weapons are lethal capabilities. So Britain and the United States must, as per the terms of the treaty, have an unrestricted ability, surely, to house nuclear weapons or to dock nuclear submarines at the base on Diego Garcia should we choose to do so. Yet that would appear to require an express provision in this treaty, and I cannot find it.

Article 7(3) appears to seek to allay those concerns, but I would welcome an absolute clarification from the Minister. Will Mauritius’s membership of the Pelindaba treaty prevent us basing Vanguard-class submarines or, in the future, nuclear-armed aircraft, or the United States stationing any nuclear weapons at the base on Diego Garcia? That is a question that I require answered. This cannot be left in doubt—hence my requirement that the Secretary of State publish a statement to confirm the matters I have raised before this Bill comes into force, so that everyone is clear about what the UK and the US can or, perhaps more alarmingly, cannot do. As my noble friend Lord Lilley commented, although they are not directly covered by the Pelindaba treaty, my amendment also makes reference to nuclear-propelled vessels and, for the avoidance of doubt, I seek reassurance that Mauritius would not take exception to that. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Coaker) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, for their amendments. I appreciate that they have questions about how the treaty protects the full operation of the base, and I want to reassure them that the treaty enables the continued operation of the base to its full capability. The treaty and the Bill we are debating today will have zero impact on the day-to-day business on Diego Garcia. Importantly, it will not reduce our ability to deploy the full range of advanced military capabilities to Diego Garcia. I am putting some of this on the record, and the noble Baroness, as a former Defence Minister, will know the careful calibration of the language that I am using: I am putting it on the record so that we are all clear.

As I say, noble Lords will understand that I pick my words with care in this particular context. I cannot and will not discuss operational matters on the Floor of this place, but I am confident that the Chamber would not necessarily want me to. The long-standing UK position of neither confirming nor denying the location or presence of nuclear weapons must stand. But let us talk about the hypothetical. The amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, concern the application of the Pelindaba treaty. Mauritius is a signatory, as the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness said, to the treaty. The UK is not a signatory to the treaty but is a signatory to Protocols 1 and 2. I can confirm to the Chamber that the Governments of the UK and Mauritius are both satisfied that the Diego Garcia treaty is compatible with these existing obligations.

I also remind colleagues, because this is important—again, I think the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, if I remember rightly from his remarks, and, indeed, the noble Baroness raised this—that we are not alone in the matter. The Government of the United States have also tested all aspects of the Diego Garcia treaty in depth and at the highest levels of the security establishment. They, too, are satisfied that it protects the full operation of the base. Indeed, when I was talking about the earlier amendments in answer to that, I quoted the remarks of Secretary of State Marco Rubio and his comments about being satisfied with the treaty in every aspect.

Amendments 63 and 88 therefore are not necessary. We do not need a review of the impacts of nuclear treaties on the future operation of the base, as the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, has proposed, because the future operation of the base has been protected. I say to the noble Baroness that we do not need to reopen paragraph 1.a of Annex 1 to the treaty, as has been suggested, because this already provides for unrestricted —that is the key word—access for UK and US vessels to enter the sea of Diego Garcia. Paragraph 1.b.i provides for unrestricted ability to control the conduct and deployment of lethal capabilities.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I do of course understand the sensitivity of not discussing operational activity in a public domain. However, if I revert to the Minister’s understandable reliance on what I described at Second Reading as that “huge protection” in Article 1, that is explicitly in contradiction with Article 7(1). Article 7(1) says expressly with reference to international obligations or arrangements that, if they are not to be obtempered or agreed to, that must be provided for in this agreement. That is the dilemma that is perplexing my noble friend Lord Lilley and myself. We seem to have on the face of this treaty a self-evident contradiction.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I understand the point that the noble Baroness is making. What I am saying to her is that the Government of Mauritius, the Government of the UK and the Government of the US see no contradiction in what the treaty says, and explicitly lays out, in respect of the ability of Diego Garcia to operate in the way that it has always done, with the lethal capabilities as outlined elsewhere in the Bill.

I hope that is helpful to the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness as reassurance that the situation will stay the same as it is now. As I have said, all those three parties to that treaty are confident that that remains the case.

I will say, however, that, although resisting the amendments, I am grateful that they were tabled. They are really important amendments to have made in order for the Government to have put on the record important elements of the treaty and the Bill. We have been able to clarify for the Chamber, and for those who read our proceedings, that the position that we would all want to see will continue with respect to Diego Garcia and that the full capabilities will be maintained.

Let me be absolutely clear: the full operational use of the base is protected to ensure that the base is able to continue in every way that it always has done. I hope that is helpful. On the basis of the reassurances that I have made and the comments that I have put on the record, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, will feel able to withdraw his amendment.