Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My Amendment 20S seeks to get the Secretary of State to produce a report on the so-called economic partnership between the United Kingdom and Mauritius, which is set up under Article 11 of the treaty. Parliament should have an opportunity to take note of that and debate it in both Houses.

The reason that is important, apart from the fact that the control of money is the supreme function of Parliament, is that the economic partnership article, Article 11, in the agreement, is very strange. It says:

“In consideration of this Agreement, the United Kingdom agrees … a. to pay Mauritius an annual sum; … b. to capitalise a Trust Fund for the benefit of Chagossians as established by Mauritius; and … c. to grant multi-year funding as part of a development framework for projects to be undertaken by Mauritius across twenty-five (25) years. … The arrangements for such payments, including amounts and modalities shall be agreed separately”.


It then says that this is a “full and final settlement” of the financial aspects of ceding sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius.

Now, to call this a partnership is a very strange thing. We give them money annually. We give them more money for the benefit of the Chagossians. We give them yet more money for the benefit of the Mauritians. Where is the partnership in all this? If this partnership were ever to be introduced, I hope that Ministers would feel obliged or, out of their natural desire to be helpful, would seek to explain to us why this is a partnership rather than a kind of surrender where we give up the money, we give up the territory and we let them decide—even the trust fund that we set up for the benefit of the Chagossians is “as established by Mauritius”. So the Mauritians are going to determine how this trust fund is used and spent; the Chagossians will have no say in it and will probably get precious little benefit from it.

I hope the Minister will let us in on the secret. What is the quid pro quo in all this? Normally, any partnership means that there are two sides to it. I used to be a partner in a firm, and we were partners; we all benefited from each other. We did not have one side being partners and the other side getting all the benefits. I am genuinely mystified about this. Was it just that this was signed up for when the Government were suffering a fit of generosity? Perhaps the coffers were overflowing with funds. They could not think what to do but give some away to Mauritius for this, some away to a trust fund for that, then more away to Mauritius for 25 years. Where is it all coming from? Perhaps the Minister will enlighten us. I beg to move.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I did not expect to participate in this, but I was having a conversation earlier with my noble friend Lord Minto, who is very knowledgeable about corporate finance. He posed the question: is there anything in this whole arrangement that would stop Mauritius capitalising on the revenue stream that they have coming to them and selling that off to someone else?

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I am sorry that my noble friend Lord Kempsell is not here to move his amendment, which I thought was a particularly good one.

We debated some of the financial aspects of the treaty on the first day in Committee. The Minister at that time asked to delay her remarks on those amendments to the appropriate group. I assume this is the group that she was referring to, so we all look forward to the fuller answer on the finances that she promised then.

The core contention of the Government is that the deal costs an average of £101 million a year and the present net value of payments under the treaty is therefore £3.4 billion. This has been challenged by my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Altrincham, but the Minister, rather than engaging in the substance of those challenges, has relied on the Government’s published figures and refused to explain why she believes those figures accurately reflect the cost of the deal.

The Minister has relied on the approval of the Government Actuary’s Department and simply argued that consistency was essential. These are typical deflections that, no doubt, many Ministers have used in previous cases, but they do not address the concerns of my noble friends. We know that the payments are front-loaded at £165 million for the first three years, and then £120 million for the next 10 years. After that point, it is index-linked. As my noble friend Lady Noakes set out at Second Reading, that will see the cash payments hitting more than £650 million a year by the end of the 99 years, depending, of course, on what indexation you use. With all those additional considerations, it is our contention that the true cost of the deal is not £3.4 billion, as claimed by Ministers, but something more like £35 billion.

So the question lands: why would the Government seek to play this down? If they are so delighted with the deal—if it is such a good deal for the British public that they keep claiming that they deliver for, as all government policies should surely be—then surely they would want to be open about the true cost of things. They brag about spending on every other area; they take every amount of money per year, cumulatively add it all up and then put it in a press release and brag to the British people about what a great amount they are spending in every area except for this one. Does the Minister think it is better that the country should know the full costings before the treaty comes into effect, or would she prefer that the UK tie itself into these vast annual payments first, before admitting what the true cost of the deal actually is?

We are clear that the British people deserve to know what their Government are signing up for. Ministers should engage with the detailed costings laid out by my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Altrincham, and the points made by my noble friend Lord Lilley, rather than hiding behind their pre-prepared lines. If they have nothing to hide, what is wrong with producing a report that we can all see and study and get checked by independent financial experts? Once Ministers have admitted the true cost of the deal, then they can start justifying the so-called benefits of the treaty against what the true cost actually is. I do not think that people would be impressed by arguments justifying that figure, but Ministers should do the decent thing and justify the real numbers openly and in public.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

Noble Lords will recall that we debated the financial elements of the treaty in some detail last week, and I genuinely do not think that further debate is going to persuade anybody of anything this evening and probably is not a good use of time at this stage. However, I respect that the noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Kempsell, who was not here to speak to his amendment, have tabled further amendments, so I am happy to put their minds at rest about the matter to the best of my ability this evening.

Noble Lords already know that the Government published full details of the financial payment on the day that the treaty was signed. These details are in the finance exchange of letters, which is included in the treaty in the version laid in the House and published on the government website. The details are also set out in the accompanying Explanatory Memorandum, which was also laid before the House and published on the government website. It is plain to see how much the treaty is costing. The breakdown on page 10 of the Explanatory Memorandum is particularly straightforward for anyone who might desire further information about what will be paid in each year of the treaty. Indeed, the clarity with which the information was presented by the Government was welcomed by the Office for Statistics Regulation, which confirmed that it was consistent with the principles of intelligent transparency.

Therefore, there is no requirement for any additional report on the financial costs, either before the Bill comes into force, as the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, proposes, or before each payment, as is suggested in the other amendment.

The quid pro quo I was asked about is that we get a unique military asset shared with our closest ally on a legally secure basis. The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, asks why I rely on government figures and the answer is because I am representing the Government. With that, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

Before the Minister sits down, the particular question I pose—and I am not being polemical; I think there is an issue—is: what actually stops Mauritius, contractually, from commercially transferring this revenue stream in a capitalised form to another purchaser?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I think the noble Baroness is asking me what a sovereign country would do with some money that it gets as part of payment from this treaty. I am not sure what the problem would be with Mauritius investing that money in something that then provided it with a return, which it could then use to support public services or anything else in Mauritius. I am not sure if I have properly understood exactly what the noble Baroness is concerned about. I would be happy to engage further—

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I am happy to speak outside the Chamber.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

Okay, that might be a good idea. I hope that the noble Lord can withdraw his amendment on that basis.

--- Later in debate ---

This is an extremely important matter, which goes to the very heart of what the Government are about. Are they about the rigorous adherence to international law—even when it does not apply—and at the same time ignoring it when it does, or are they actually about upholding Britain’s interests, in which case handing over a base to a country, rendering it part of a nuclear-free zone, cannot be in the interests of ourselves, our allies or the defence of the West. I beg to move.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, my Amendment 88 in this group is very much in a similar vein to my earlier amendments, although I see I do not have the presence of my newly acquired fan—the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard—to encourage me. I seek reassurance that the

“unrestricted access, basing and overflight”

provisions in Annex 1(1)(a) of the agreement includes the right of the UK to allow nuclear-propelled vessels and nuclear-armed vessels and aircraft to enter the sea and airspace of Diego Garcia.

Although not in the amendment, the annexe of the treaty referred to also specifically covers the United States of America, and, for the avoidance of doubt, I include it in the confirmation I seek from the Secretary of State in this amendment. Again, I am asking that this be confirmed by the Secretary of State before the Bill can come into force. In this respect, I am perhaps baring my teeth more than my noble friend Lord Lilley, which is a rather unusual situation.

As my noble friend Lord Lilley pointed out, Mauritius is a party to the Pelindaba treaty, which establishes the African continent as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. This prohibits the research, development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, testing, possession, control or stationing of nuclear weapons in any signatory state. Article 7 of the Mauritius treaty states that both Mauritius and the United Kingdom confirm that no

“existing international obligations or arrangements … conflict with the provisions of this Agreement, and that nothing in this Agreement shall affect the status of existing international obligations or arrangements except as expressly provided for in this Agreement”.

Annex 1 of the treaty states that the United Kingdom retains

“unrestricted ability to … control the … deployment of armed operations and lethal capabilities”.

Nuclear weapons are lethal capabilities. So Britain and the United States must, as per the terms of the treaty, have an unrestricted ability, surely, to house nuclear weapons or to dock nuclear submarines at the base on Diego Garcia should we choose to do so. Yet that would appear to require an express provision in this treaty, and I cannot find it.

Article 7(3) appears to seek to allay those concerns, but I would welcome an absolute clarification from the Minister. Will Mauritius’s membership of the Pelindaba treaty prevent us basing Vanguard-class submarines or, in the future, nuclear-armed aircraft, or the United States stationing any nuclear weapons at the base on Diego Garcia? That is a question that I require answered. This cannot be left in doubt—hence my requirement that the Secretary of State publish a statement to confirm the matters I have raised before this Bill comes into force, so that everyone is clear about what the UK and the US can or, perhaps more alarmingly, cannot do. As my noble friend Lord Lilley commented, although they are not directly covered by the Pelindaba treaty, my amendment also makes reference to nuclear-propelled vessels and, for the avoidance of doubt, I seek reassurance that Mauritius would not take exception to that. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Coaker) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, for their amendments. I appreciate that they have questions about how the treaty protects the full operation of the base, and I want to reassure them that the treaty enables the continued operation of the base to its full capability. The treaty and the Bill we are debating today will have zero impact on the day-to-day business on Diego Garcia. Importantly, it will not reduce our ability to deploy the full range of advanced military capabilities to Diego Garcia. I am putting some of this on the record, and the noble Baroness, as a former Defence Minister, will know the careful calibration of the language that I am using: I am putting it on the record so that we are all clear.

As I say, noble Lords will understand that I pick my words with care in this particular context. I cannot and will not discuss operational matters on the Floor of this place, but I am confident that the Chamber would not necessarily want me to. The long-standing UK position of neither confirming nor denying the location or presence of nuclear weapons must stand. But let us talk about the hypothetical. The amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, concern the application of the Pelindaba treaty. Mauritius is a signatory, as the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness said, to the treaty. The UK is not a signatory to the treaty but is a signatory to Protocols 1 and 2. I can confirm to the Chamber that the Governments of the UK and Mauritius are both satisfied that the Diego Garcia treaty is compatible with these existing obligations.

I also remind colleagues, because this is important—again, I think the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, if I remember rightly from his remarks, and, indeed, the noble Baroness raised this—that we are not alone in the matter. The Government of the United States have also tested all aspects of the Diego Garcia treaty in depth and at the highest levels of the security establishment. They, too, are satisfied that it protects the full operation of the base. Indeed, when I was talking about the earlier amendments in answer to that, I quoted the remarks of Secretary of State Marco Rubio and his comments about being satisfied with the treaty in every aspect.

Amendments 63 and 88 therefore are not necessary. We do not need a review of the impacts of nuclear treaties on the future operation of the base, as the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, has proposed, because the future operation of the base has been protected. I say to the noble Baroness that we do not need to reopen paragraph 1.a of Annex 1 to the treaty, as has been suggested, because this already provides for unrestricted—that is the key word—access for UK and US vessels to enter the sea of Diego Garcia. Paragraph 1.b.i provides for unrestricted ability to control the conduct and deployment of lethal capabilities.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I do of course understand the sensitivity of not discussing operational activity in a public domain. However, if I revert to the Minister’s understandable reliance on what I described at Second Reading as that “huge protection” in Article 1, that is explicitly in contradiction with Article 7(1). Article 7(1) says expressly with reference to international obligations or arrangements that, if they are not to be obtempered or agreed to, that must be provided for in this agreement. That is the dilemma that is perplexing my noble friend Lord Lilley and myself. We seem to have on the face of this treaty a self-evident contradiction.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I understand the point that the noble Baroness is making. What I am saying to her is that the Government of Mauritius, the Government of the UK and the Government of the US see no contradiction in what the treaty says, and explicitly lays out, in respect of the ability of Diego Garcia to operate in the way that it has always done, with the lethal capabilities as outlined elsewhere in the Bill.

I hope that is helpful to the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, and the noble Baroness as reassurance that the situation will stay the same as it is now. As I have said, all those three parties to that treaty are confident that that remains the case.

I will say, however, that, although resisting the amendments, I am grateful that they were tabled. They are really important amendments to have made in order for the Government to have put on the record important elements of the treaty and the Bill. We have been able to clarify for the Chamber, and for those who read our proceedings, that the position that we would all want to see will continue with respect to Diego Garcia and that the full capabilities will be maintained.

Let me be absolutely clear: the full operational use of the base is protected to ensure that the base is able to continue in every way that it always has done. I hope that is helpful. On the basis of the reassurances that I have made and the comments that I have put on the record, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

Russian Ship “Yantar”

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, the “Yantar” spy ship has form when it comes to pushing boundaries, but directing laser beams at a UK Poseidon surveillance plane is an unwelcome development. It is provocative and irresponsible. In the air domain during the Cold War, there was a regular pattern of incursion into United Kingdom airspace by Russian planes, and the stratagem of reaction and close-flying escort by UK planes was developed, which was effective. How do we replicate that in the marine domain? For example, can a frigate close-shadow the “Yantar” so that the Russian crew feels under constant observation and any attempt to interfere with subsea infrastructure is immediately visible—and, importantly, whatever protective action is then necessary can be taken?

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Coaker) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for such an important question. The Royal Navy constantly monitors activity in and around UK waters. This includes the “Yantar”, which is continuously and closely monitored by Royal Navy frigate HMS “Somerset” and the RAF’s P-8s. As the Secretary of State for Defence described last week, Russia has been developing military capability to use against critical underwater infrastructure for decades. For that reason, we have directed a change in the Royal Navy’s posture so we can more closely track and robustly respond to the threats from that vessel and many others. Such actions have previously included surfacing a Royal Navy submarine, strictly as a deterrent measure, close to the “Yantar”, to make it clear that we have been covertly monitoring its every move. We will not shy away from the robust action needed to protect the UK.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group speak to perhaps one of the most concerning parts of the treaty—although the previous bit was also concerning: namely, the risk that this agreement will undermine our security. Given the large number of amendments in this group, I will speak only to those in my name. I know that my noble friend Lady Goldie will speak to her amendments as well, and I will certainly not seek to pre-empt her arguments in my remarks, as my noble friend is much more of an expert on defence matters than I will ever be.

My Amendment 18 is a commencement block that would prevent the main clauses of the Bill coming into effect until the Government have laid a report on securing a guarantee that all non-UK and non-US civilian personnel stationed on the archipelago will benefit from the provisions of Annex 1. Annex 1 protects the UK’s unrestricted access to Diego Garcia’s sea and airspace. The treaty makes reference to some civilian activity, but we are seeking an assurance from the Government that that part of the treaty in its entirety applies to civilians stationed on Diego Garcia. I hope the Minister will be able to give us that assurance.

Amendment 67 speaks to one of the most fundamental questions, which has already been the subject of much debate. The treaty is clear that the UK must inform Mauritius of any armed attack on a third state directly emanating from the base on Diego Garcia, using the magnificent word, “expeditiously”. The dictionary definition of expeditiously is “quickly and efficiently” and “with speed”. Many have rightly asked what expeditiously means in practice. My Amendment 67 clarifies that the UK Government must not inform Mauritius of any relevant armed attacks until the attack has ended. Providing prior notification to Mauritius, or indeed any third state not directly involved in the attack, could risk the safety of British and American servicemen who are engaged in the relevant operation. Could the Minister confirm that nothing in the treaty requires the UK Government to give forewarning of any attack emanating from the military base? If that is the case then I am sure they can accept the amendment.

Additionally, my amendment seeks a requirement not to notify Mauritius if notification would endanger the security of the base. Can the Minister confirm that nothing in the treaty would prevent the Government withholding notification if notifying Mauritius would endanger the base? My noble friend Lady Goldie will be going into additional details on these important issues.

Amendment 69 in my name seeks to make a point about the location of specific equipment and installations on the base. It is essential that the security of the base is maintained. It would not be acceptable if the UK Government were to endanger the security of equipment at the military base by notifying Mauritius. In replying to the debate, can the Minister please address those concerns? It is essential that the UK Government have the right to refuse notification when doing so would endanger the base itself or our personnel.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I associate myself with the remarks of my noble friend Lord Callanan on the amendments to which he spoke. I shall be dealing with the word “expeditiously” and I will try to ensure that that characterises my contribution, and perhaps influences this debate.

I wish to speak to my Amendments 83, 85, 86 and 87. At Second Reading, I raised the issue of the mismatch between the Bill and the treaty that it implements. My main concern in this whole affair is our defence and security and the implications of this Bill on that. I identified a range of areas where greater clarity is required. Before I continue, I should say that I have received a letter from the Ministers, for which I thank them. That sought to clarify some of the questions that I asked at Second Reading. The letter brings a degree of clarification, but in other respects it leaves me with questions. I shall address these as I explain my amendments.

Amendment 83 is simply a technical drafting amendment to accommodate my remaining amendments in this group. It specifies that the commencement of the treaty cannot occur until the conditions outlined in my amendments have been satisfied.

Amendment 85 relates to the specific notification requirements under Annex 1 1(b)(viii) of the treaty. My amendment would require that Clauses 2 to 4 do not come into force until the Secretary of State has published a statement establishing that the notification in Annex 1 1(b)(viii) of the treaty does not require the consent of Mauritius in response. The provision in Annex 1 to which this refers says that:

“In accordance with this Agreement and with reference to Article 2(5) and Annex 2, in respect of Diego Garcia, Mauritius agrees the United Kingdom shall have … unrestricted access, basing and overflight … for non-United Kingdom and non-United States of America aircraft and vessels, upon notification to Mauritius”.


The amendment seeks to enable the Secretary of State to make explicit, before Clauses 2 to 4 of the Bill can come into force, that the consent of Mauritius is not required for us to host third-party forces on Diego Garcia.

As I mentioned, I have the letter from the Ministers in which they helpfully clarify that permission from Mauritius is not required. However, I require the Minister to confirm that such notification is after the event. If notification is required before the event, that implies consent is required, or that the intimation of an objection by Mauritius is possible. That is why I seek the clarification.

We cannot have a situation where Mauritius can in any way object to which forces are present at the base. The operation of the base, including the matter of the basing of our allies, must be solely at the discretion of the United Kingdom. I would appreciate the Minister giving a guarantee that Mauritius will have no control whatever over the basing and overflight of other countries’ forces. Unusually, the Minister and I are perhaps nearly at consensus in idem here. If that is the case, why would the Secretary of State be reluctant to publish a statement?

Amendment 86 is another defence and security amendment. It seeks that Clauses 2 to 4 would not come into force until the Secretary of State has published a statement establishing that the obligation under Annex 1(2) of the treaty

“does not extend to aircraft and vessels which have landed or docked at the Base for the purposes of maintenance or refuelling prior to the armed attack on a third state”.

Annex 1(2) of the treaty is the provision that requires the United Kingdom

“to expeditiously inform Mauritius of any armed attack on a third State”.

As we have discussed, much has been made of what is meant by “expeditiously”. The Ministers’ letter to me stated that they are satisfied that this does not require the UK to seek the permission of Mauritius, nor for notification to be given prior to the event. That is helpful. The International Agreements Committee of this House has also concluded that it interprets “expeditiously” to mean

“as soon as reasonably practicable in the circumstances”.

I believe that the Minister gives her interpretation in good faith, but what of Mauritius’s interpretation? Does the Minister know whether the Mauritian Government share this view? If she does not currently know, and I quite accept that she may not, I would be happy for her to write to me to confirm the point.

--- Later in debate ---

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Weir, that these provisions have been discussed and approved at the highest levels of the US security apparatus. Both the IAC and the IRDC have scrutinised them. This treaty specifically confers—

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

Forgive me for being slightly behind the curve; I was trying to follow the sections in the annex. The Minister referred to Annex 1(11), in particular the definition of “unrestricted”. That paragraph states that

“‘unrestricted’ means not requiring permission or notification, subject to the standing authorisations and notifications separately agreed between the Parties to meet the requirements of international or domestic Mauritian law or current practice”.

For the sake of clarification, what are these “standing authorisations and notifications”?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

If I am wrong on this, I will write to the noble Baroness and put a copy in the Library so that all Members can access it. My understanding is that the crucial bit of Annex 1(11)(c) is

“‘unrestricted’ means not requiring permission or notification”.

The phrase,

“the standing authorisations and notifications separately agreed between the Parties”,

refers to things contained within the treaty. I will write to the noble Baroness to clarify that. I am grateful to her for pointing it out.

The fundamental point I am trying to make—which I think the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, made—is that we have an obligation under the treaty to notify Mauritius of activities emanating from the base but we do not have to seek its permission. “Expeditiously” notifying does not mean notifying before we take any agreed action. Those were the points that I thought the noble Baroness was making, but I will certainly seek to clarify exactly where that takes us with Annex 1(11)(c). I will write to the noble Baroness and provide a copy to others. I thank her for raising that.

The treaty specifically confers on the UK the unrestricted ability to

“control the conduct and deployment of armed operations and lethal capabilities”

in respect of Diego Garcia. Given that there is no question over operational freedom on Diego Garcia, it is unclear what necessary derogations the noble Lord, Lord Kempsell, is seeking. The annex gives the UK the extensive rights that we would need in such a situation.

The noble Lord, Lord Kempsell, raised reporting restrictions. His Majesty’s Armed Forces and the intelligence services routinely produce reports for the Prime Minister on all types of security matters. I reassure the noble Lord, and other noble Lords, that this will include operational issues arising on the Diego Garcia base. There is no requirement for this to be made a statutory obligation, as Amendment 81E seeks to do. Additionally, Amendment 81F would represent an unusual interference with the prerogative to conduct international affairs and to make or unmake treaties. Noble Lords will understand that there is often a need for confidentiality in international discussions.

The clock is flashing away and the Whip is getting jumpy next to me. I shall have a look at Hansard and I shall write to noble Lords in the debate with anything that I have not covered and any questions that have not been answered and make sure that the amendments that I have not responded to are responded to. I shall send the letter to noble Lords in the debate. Let me be clear: I shall write to noble Lords about two or three of the amendments that I have not covered, copy the letter to noble Lords and put a copy in the Library. I hope that that is acceptable to everyone.

I thank noble Lords for a really interesting and important debate on the security provisions of the treaty and ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

President Trump: Nuclear Weapons Statement

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Thursday 20th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

We encourage all states to join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. It has been a huge vehicle by which we have worked together to keep the world safe. This Government accept, as previous Governments have done and as do many Governments across the world, that the nuclear deterrent is part of the security architecture of the world. Part of having a nuclear deterrent is to deter from war, deter from aggression. The restatement of the deterrent policy is consistent with the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, under which the noble Lord will know that the UK is allowed to have weapons.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, following on from what the Minister has just very helpfully said, in relation to our own United Kingdom nuclear defence capability, we have seen just this week that between 400 and 500 jobs will be put at risk at the Atomic Weapons Establishment. The Government claim that the workforce needs to be reshaped so that it is fit for the future. However, in a time of growing international insecurity, can the Minister confirm that there will be no reduction in staffing for our nuclear weapons capability?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

What I can confirm is that there will be no reduction in our capability of ensuring that the nuclear deterrent is effective and that it remains so seven days a week, 365 days a year and 24 hours a day. That is the commitment that the Government make. I hear what the noble Baroness says about the AWE. That is about looking at reshaping how that important body works. The Government have committed £31 billion to the Dreadnought programme, with a £10 billion contingency. We have committed £15 billion in this Parliament to the development of a new warhead. That is a Government who are committed, as the last Government were, to spending billions of pounds on maintaining the credibility of our nuclear deterrent, which, as I said in answer to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, is essential to the global security of the world.

Ministry of Defence Procurement: UK-manufactured Products

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Tuesday 18th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

We are doing everything we can to support UK manufacturing. Let me set out one of the reasons why we are doing that. As I have said many times, Ukraine has been a wake-up call for us. The manufacturing industry in this country has been allowed to decline over decades, in a way that puts our homeland defence at risk. It is in our own national interest to grow our defence industries, which is why it will be at the heart of what we do. It is not only about what we do here. The noble Baroness will have seen that the carrier strike group was out in the Indo-Pacific and is now back in the Mediterranean. There have been numerous round tables, conferences and industry events on the carrier, and on the ships with it, to promote growth. One of the ways to do that is by expanding our growth to the rest of the world.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I revert to the Question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Beamish. When it comes to MoD procurement within the United Kingdom, there are two certainties: there is a £2.6 billion black hole in the defence budget and domestic procurement has virtually dried up. In addition to that, the defence investment plan appears to have evaporated. Can the Minister tell this House what is happening to put this country on to the Government’s much-vaunted phrase, “war readiness”?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

On the specific question of the defence investment plan, that will be published this year, so the noble Baroness and the House will not have to wait too long. It will lay out the investment decisions we are going to make. On the basis of a growing defence budget, that defence investment plan will lay out the sorts of capabilities we need and the decisions that will need to be made to ensure that we have war readiness. We need to learn from what has happened in Ukraine and look at the wars of the future. The defence investment plan will look to fight that war to ensure that we are war ready.

Ukraine

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Friday 31st October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Government for tabling this debate and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his powerful, passionate and clear introduction to it. This debate is timely for three reasons. It enables the political presence in the United Kingdom, so articulately described by the Minister, to show a continuing united front against President Putin’s illegal war in Ukraine. That powerful unity of purpose and resolve is very important. The debate facilitates an informed discussion among Members across this Chamber, with the wealth of experience that they reflect, to offer thoughts, opinions and ideas. Prominent among them is the noble Lord, Lord Barrow, to whose maiden speech we eagerly look forward. We will certainly be very interested to hear his contribution.

Perhaps most importantly, this debate is our opportunity to send a clear and uncompromising message to President Putin that the United Kingdom stands against bullies, has always stood against bullies and will always do so. We know the peril of appeasement; the facile delusion that you can do business with a bully; the fatal misapprehension that the bully is well intentioned towards his enemy, when the bully’s only interest is himself and the clinical and ruthless advancement of his illegal and brutal agenda. The United Kingdom sees that clearly, and I pay tribute to the Government for their steadfast support of Ukraine.

It is clear from the coalescence of support around Ukraine, whether from European neighbours who see President Putin for what he is, the coalition of the willing being progressed by the Prime Minister, or the more formal activity being pursued through NATO, that this continuing threat posed by President Putin to Europe must be primarily addressed by Europe. Of course, we welcome the continuing and vital support of the United States, but the responsibility falls on us and our European friends to demonstrate that we can step up to the plate and pay our way. European and western Atlantic security is our joint responsibility. We have to guard it, we have to fight off any challenge to it, and we have to be visibly determined in our resolve to do that.

For that strategy to be delivered, I suggest that in relation to Ukraine we need three things: greater clarity, perhaps, about the shape of the short term; the planning and resource necessary to sustain the medium term; and an outline of the longer term, in relation to both the rebuilding of Ukraine and the broader construct of Euro-Atlantic security.

Taking the short term first, we—the United Kingdom and our allies—must continue to supply Ukraine with what she needs to defend herself, and that includes training, so I was very encouraged to hear the Minister’s comments on that. On the broader front, when she responds, will the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, say whether there is clarity across the piece about who is supplying what, how this is being co-ordinated and whether we can have, perhaps in written form, an update on what UK military assets are currently being provided—although I accept the noble Lord has been very explicit about part of that supply? In her response, can the Minister confirm that in the supply of weaponry there is clarity that for Ukraine to respond proportionately to this illegal invasion, she must be free to target the locations within Russia being used for hostile attacks on Ukraine? Implicit within this is the political will to fund in a stable and predictable manner our UK defence capability. When dealing with such an overt threat to our security, the Prime Minister must provide that leadership, supporting his Chancellor and requiring the Treasury to fund to the levels necessary. It is so axiomatic that I do not expect the Minister to comment, other than to observe that if there is any hesitancy in providing such leadership, the only person clapping his hands with glee will be President Putin.

Moving to the medium term, if President Putin is recalcitrant, the supply of military assets must continue. We also need to audit, both as a country and with allies, the effect of sanctions on Russia. After this length of time, it must be possible to have a reasonably accurate measurement of the consequences of these sanctions. I appreciate that the Minister may not have detailed information to hand, and I am very happy for her to confirm that by letter. If, as is widely understood, sanctions are having a savage effect on the Russian economy, there needs to be a concerted coms strategy by us and our allies to get that message through to the Russian people. This has been discussed before— I remember the matter arising when I was a Defence Minister—but if the Minister can update the House on any progress, that would be helpful.

Looking to the longer term, that projection must embrace what is necessary to rebuild Ukrainian infrastructure. What is required to reinstate a functioning economy, and what political reforms are necessary to facilitate these objectives? It is clear that some excellent work is already being done, and the noble Lord the Minister referred to the contribution from the United Kingdom. Elsewhere, Hope for Ukraine, based in the United States, has a comprehensive programme to assist. The EU, through the EBRD, the European Investment Bank and the European Commission, has provided a total of €30 million to help Ukraine prepare large-scale infrastructure projects and, apparently, more funding is due from EU countries and donors. Can the Minister give us a more detailed update on what the UK is doing on this front? In aggregate across the overall contribution of support, we are not sure what that map looks like. How is macroeconomic support being given to Ukraine? Is it international loans and international financial guarantees? Is there, for example, a workable basis for the operation of commercial insurance indemnity across a range of commercial activity? I look forward to the Minister’s response on these specific issues.

Turning to what political reforms may be required within Ukraine, corruption in that country is sadly unarguable. Everything that the allies and friends of Ukraine are prepared to do to help carries a reciprocal obligation by Ukraine to fix what is bad. Without that explicit recognition from Ukraine, there can be no confidence among the international community that it is worthwhile providing help. This is serious. It gets to the heart of what we want a post-conflict Ukraine to look like. I suggest that Ukraine has to tackle judicial corruption. There are ongoing issues with judicial appointments and a lack of trust in the courts. There is war-related corruption. The ongoing conflict has apparently created new avenues, such as, we understand, officials demanding bribes for leave or diverting foreign aid meant for the front lines. There appears to be top-level and systemic corruption. That includes issues with state contracts and the influence of oligarchs, who, we understand, remain a problem that hinders foreign investment and economic growth.

It would appear thatsqueeze-col3 any progress in addressing this is glacial, particularly where large interests and big players are involved, such as natural resource extraction and large infrastructure projects. Will the Minister confirm what the United Kingdom is doing, either alone or with partners, to provide advice and support to Ukraine to try to help tackle these serious problems? Is it possible to provide any in-country support and advice? If there is any update she can provide to the House about progress on these essential reforms, that would be very welcome.

I conclude, as I started, with appreciation that this debate is taking place. I have endeavoured to encourage thinking across a time period about what is required as this conflict progresses. I have tried to be constructive and, I hope, conciliatory in suggesting positive proposals, but not shying away from what, under no circumstances, this Government should shy away from: the paramount obligation, for the safety of us all, to secure stable and predictable funding for defence. I look forward to hearing contributions from Members. I very much look forward to listening to the noble Baroness the Minister’s response. I end with the most important observation: His Majesty’s Opposition will support the Government’s continuing support for Ukraine.

Undersea Cables: National Security Threat

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Monday 27th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

There are certainly plans to do exactly as my noble friend asks. There certainly needs to be work on those plans, and they need some more detail to them, but there certainly are plans to do that. I have said a number of times from this Dispatch Box that the threats we face from others are now different in many respects from the threats we faced in the past. The disruption to data, the disruption to energy supplies and the disruption to communication are all part of the threat that we now face. Clearly, we are going to have to do more as a homeland to stand up against that. Part of it will require a conversation with industry, the public and the defence sector in order to protect ourselves.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, following the line just observed by the Minister, in recent months the principal threat to United Kingdom infrastructure has been from cyberattacks, notably against Jaguar Land Rover, Marks & Spencer, Co-operative Group and Heathrow Airport. Can the Minister confirm that the National Cyber Security Centre, currently located within GCHQ, is adequately resourced to deal with what it recognises is an escalating challenge? How does the National Cyber Security Centre liaise with the CyberEM Command, now sitting within the Strategic Command in the MoD?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

There is a co-ordinating committee, whose name escapes me, that brings together all those various parts of government to which the noble Baroness has just referred to ensure that we have that co-ordinated defence and co-ordinated work that, as she rightly points out, we need. I would say, without going too far, that we see it as a major priority for the Government, which is why we have established that new command to defend ourselves against cyberattack, but we also need to work closely with private industry and private business to achieve that. Suffice it to say that it is a really important point and something we are working on very hard to ensure that we protect our country.

Defence Industrial Strategy

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Wednesday 10th September 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I place on record my support for the enormous amount of work that has clearly gone into the production of this industrial strategy. It is very evident that those at the Ministry of Defence have put their thinking caps on, done the hard work and constructed a plan based around defence’s current and future requirements. There is therefore much to be applauded. The six priority outcomes are absolutely aiming in the right direction and the commitment to strengthening the MoD’s links with SMEs is particularly welcome.

A strong industrial base is vital for the future of our Armed Forces and our defensive resilience as a whole. The need has never been more evident than today, when we have seen a Russian incursion into a NATO ally’s airspace and the largest attack in Ukraine by Russia to date. This escalation is deeply troubling and underlines the importance of swiftly putting Britain into war-fighting readiness.

This is a solid piece of work, but the caveat is this: the solid piece of work crumbles if the bricks are not cemented together. That cement is implementation at a wartime pace. What matters now is that the words on these pages are translated into missiles, drones, equipment and ships. Critical to this is procurement. The chilling reality is that procurement has essentially dried up. There have been promising words in the SDR, but we have yet to see the major procurement contracts that the MoD has promised.

Procurement is the lifeblood of a successful industrial strategy. For example, I ask the Minister: how will the Government ensure that the Typhoon factory in Warton remains open and thriving? We have heard that the Government will be opening up six new munitions factories, but they must have orders. When will they be placed?

I understand that the promised defence investment plan will detail much of the procurement endeavour, but when? The defence industry has been waiting with bated breath since July of last year, and industry must have greater certainty. I implore the Minister to do everything in his power to ensure that the defence investment plan is published as soon as possible. In that connection, will the UK’s defence orders be joining a queue or with they be prioritised over orders for export?

When it comes to the new structures within the MoD, co-ordination of accountability to the Secretary of State is paramount. At the same time, duplication must be eradicated. The SDR and this strategy both mention the creation of a number of new bodies within the MoD: UK Defence Innovation, the Defence Industrial Joint Council, the office of defence exports, a defence office for small business growth and the national armaments director.

The strategic defence review identified a 10% reduction in Civil Service costs by 2030. Can the Minister clarify how, with the addition of these new offices, the MoD will achieve that staffing cost reduction? What existing structures will be merged or abolished, and who will be auditing progress? While I am on this topic, can the Minister update the House on the progress of appointing the national armaments director?

Page 30 of the industrial strategy details nine milestones to be reached by the end of this year. I do not believe any of these have as yet materialised, and the end of the year is fast approaching. Is the Minister confident that the 2025 timeline will be met?

In conclusion, I raise an issue that will come as no surprise to the Minister—budget. My right honourable friend the shadow Secretary of State and I have raised concerns about the bundling together of intelligence spending within the defence budget. That means that, despite the Government’s claims of spending 2.6% of GDP on defence by 2027, the actual money available to the MoD for defence spending is 2.2% of GDP. I am not trying to catch the Minister out, but I want to make this clear: the Government may have increased defence spending, but this level of spend is simply not enough to deliver everything in the SDR and indeed in this industrial strategy.

The Russian incursion into Polish airspace yesterday and the triggering of Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty serve as a stark warning: complacency is not an option. The contents of this strategy, which, as I have said, these Benches fully support, cannot be a prayer for the future. Wartime pace means delivering from now on and, quite simply, there is no safe alternative.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure and a challenge to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, who has such expertise in this area. We on these Benches also welcome the Government’s announcement of this new defence industrial strategy. We support the objectives of both boosting defence capability and increasing economic activity within our country. As someone who has worked in the sector—I no longer have an interest in it—I can say that, in the main, the jobs in the defence sector are high-quality jobs that pay well over the national average, so they are very worthwhile jobs for our citizens. More than that, they will contribute in large measure, we hope, to the resilience and security of our country.

Like the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, I will focus on procurement. I will not repeat the questions that she has already asked, although I am very interested in the answers. It is clear that an improved framework is needed and that, in the Government’s own words, waste, delay and complexity have prevailed. Big changes are therefore needed. We also support the aims of involving more SMEs and driving innovation. These are important, but how? Section 7 of the strategy sets out some details of process, but I would suggest that, as well as process, this all requires an entire change of culture across the sector, from the MoD to the primes and the SMEs. How will the Government fast-track the necessary culture changes that we need in order to move at pace?

The implementation of a UK offset regime is welcome and the sections in the strategy are encouraging. I appreciate that consultation is needed, but I also note that there are—we hope—contracts being let already before this regime is put in. Can the Minister tell your Lordships’ House how any offsets will be gained from contracts that are let before then?

Similarly, a buy British focus is really good and very important. However, some contracts are being let at the moment that do the exact opposite. They are contracts that may call into question the future of established capacity in this country: capacity that, once lost, will not be regained. Can the Minister therefore ensure that these are reviewed as soon as possible to ensure that permanent damage is not being done before this strategy is implemented. I will be happy to discuss further details on that with the Minister.

In the Spring Statement, Rachel Reeves confirmed an extra £2.2 billion of UK military funding. This increase will be paid for by cuts in overseas aid, which the Minister knows we deplore. This strategy contains spending of £773 million on the Government’s estimate, but can the Minister confirm that this is not in fact new money, but money out of the pot that was announced in the spring by the Chancellor? At the time, the Chancellor also announced the new Defence Growth Board. Can the Minister say what role this will play, and indeed what role it has played in the preparation of this strategy? How does this fit with the new defence investors advisory group that is announced in the strategy?

I also seek information on the whereabouts of the Defence Growth Partnership, which has been in place for some time and shares many of the same aims, particularly around SMEs and innovation. What is its role? Is it still working and how does it contribute?

A key drag on the success of this strategy will be the lack of available skills. Part of this announcement includes skills investment, which is largely focused on five new defence technology colleges. This is also welcome, as is the emphasis on apprentices. However, what is the role of Skills England in all this, given that it was supposed to be part of the picture on the national skills programme.

Following events, it is very clear that things are moving very fast globally, and moving in the wrong direction. They underscore the vital importance of working alongside our European allies in securing the UK’s defence. As I am sure the Minister will tell us, we continue to play key roles in JEF, E3 and other groupings, while NATO is of course our foremost security defence relationship and always will be. However, more can be done to deepen the co-operation and integration with our European allies. They share security challenges and together we can build scale to rearm at pace. Will the Government, for example, now agree to seek the UK’s associate membership of the European Defence Agency?

While EU institutions have a more limited role in defence, the Security Action for Europe—SAFE—defence fund is being established by the EU Commission. Recognising the opportunity that SAFE presents, the Minister of State, Stephen Doughty, told the Foreign Affairs Select Committee on Monday:

“It is a €150 billion instrument. It is very significant and could lead to significant opportunities for our defence industries”.


Can the Minister therefore update your Lordships’ House on the UK’s discussions with the Commission and the nation states on our participation in SAFE and tell us whether UK industry will be eligible to bid in the first round, which I believe is in November?

I have lots more queries, but I close by saying that this strategy is a first step and I absolutely concur with the noble Baroness that implementation is key to its success. We will happily support and work with the Government to help deliver the strategy and its objectives.

UK Defence and Aerospace Facilities: Protests

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Thursday 4th September 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The noble Lord makes a really important point. Let us use this opportunity to state that it is totally unacceptable for people to act as they have. There is legitimate protest, which this country is proud to facilitate, but we will not allow our bases to be broken into, people to be intimidated and protests to stray into the realms of illegality and violence. None of us in this Chamber would accept that. That is why we have proscribed Palestine Action and why we see people before the courts. We work strongly with the Home Office, the police and others to ensure that those who think that they can do that will face the full force of the law.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, the activity to which the noble Lord, Lord Austin, rightly refers is de facto sabotage of our critical defence capability. In Napoleonic times, setting fire to a naval dockyard was construed as such and punishable by death, which was abolished only by the Criminal Damage Act 1971. Does the Minister agree that any sabotage activity of the type described is profoundly serious, and is he satisfied that the criminal law is adequate to deal with the appropriate charge and penalty in such grave circumstances?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I know that the British media are always concerned with accuracy, so let me start my remarks by saying that, whatever I say now, we have no intention of restoring the death penalty—let us get that out of the way first; whatever review may or may not take place, that is not on the table. The noble Baroness who speaks for the Opposition makes an important point. This is a very serious matter. That is why we have proscribed Palestine Action. That is why we will take the action necessary to protect our defence industry and to stop intimidation and do all we can to support our world-leading industry. We will always continue to discuss with our Home Office colleagues and with others across government whether more needs to be done. Let us be clear: there is legitimate protest, which is perfectly acceptable, but some of the things that have gone on are totally unacceptable.

Republic of Ireland: Defence Co-operation

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Wednesday 3rd September 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her question. I start by saying as a Defence Minister how proud we all have been of the contribution of the British Armed Forces to what took place in Northern Ireland. That is the starting point for any discussion. The noble Baroness will have seen the comments by the Northern Ireland Secretary at the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee this morning, where he talked about being close to an agreement with the Irish Government on dealing with the legacy of the past. As far as the broader points on defence co-operation that the noble Baroness makes, she will be pleased to know that we are seeking to establish a new memorandum of understanding between the UK and the Irish Government by next year.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, to echo the important point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, it is the case that our defence capability exists primarily for the protection of this country and to enable our contribution to global security, particularly through NATO. Indirectly, the Republic of Ireland has benefited greatly from that strategic stance over many years. If, as the Minister has indicated, there is now an intention to enter into discussions with the Republic of Ireland, perhaps to refresh and renew the memorandum of understanding, does he agree that that would require to be underpinned by an appropriate financial arrangement?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The noble Baroness will know that there has been a memorandum of understanding between Ireland and the United Kingdom since 2015. Michael Fallon and Simon Coveney signed an agreement in 2015 on defence co-operation between the two countries, while respecting Ireland's neutrality and the fact that it is not a member of NATO. Like many countries across the whole of Europe, whether in NATO or outside, Ireland has been forced to confront the reality of what we face. Like every country, including our own, it is increasing defence spending and looking at what more it can do, not least, as I say, through a refreshed memorandum of understanding between us and the Irish Government, which we hope to be in place during 2026.