Strategic Defence Review 2025

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Monday 8th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I totally agree with the comments that my noble friend has made. I read the strategic defence review again over the weekend in preparing for the Question, so I know that it is chapter 6. The important part was the challenge that it makes—not only to the public but to us as politicians and to Parliament—to reflect on how we engage. Too often, when we talk about national conversations, we talk about having a village hall meeting here or a village hall meeting there. That is not sufficient. This requires a whole-government approach, involving all government departments, the devolved Governments, local authorities, civil society, financial society and industry. All those together need to wake up to the very real threat. As my noble friend says, we are facing a threat now, not in a year’s time or five years’ time. That threat is upon us, and we need to wake up to it.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I echo what the Minister has been saying: the threat that we are facing is immediate. Other countries, recognising that urgency, have taken steps to engage their public through a range of measures, from conscription at one end to seeking volunteers aged 18 and over for military training—as in France and Germany—at the other end. I think what this Chamber wants to know is what imminent steps will the Government take to educate the British public now about the gravity of the situation and to put the UK on to a comparable readiness footing to these other countries.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

In saying that we need to do more and to act more urgently, there are already steps that have started to be taken across government. We are already looking at how we extend and develop the reserve and cadet forces, which are important. We are already looking at how we celebrate the involvement of young people at remembrance events, as I just said. We are also having seminars and conferences with industry and with finance—I am going to an event on Thursday night with veterans and the City of London. All sorts of different events are taking place that seek to address the very real and important issues that the noble Baroness has raised. The real challenge for the Government is how we do that more quickly and more urgently, but it is certainly one that they have addressed and have taken on board. It is a whole-government response; it is not just the government response now—although the Government have to lead it, of course—but how we all come together to address that very real challenge that we face.

Royal Navy Submarine Force

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Monday 8th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I do not know the answer to the second part of the question, so I shall have to write to the noble Earl about it. To answer the first part of his question, I know that the Ministry of Defence is looking carefully at the concept of floating dry docks. It is a much quicker way of ensuring that we have the capability that would otherwise be provided by the more traditional dry dock. It is certainly an important question that we need to look at it urgently.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

Senior representatives from BAE Systems and Babcock recently warned the Defence Select Committee in the other place of the risk to the AUKUS programme of delays in decision-making and alignment. What steps have the Government taken in the light of that evidence to avert these risks?

President Trump: Nuclear Weapons Statement

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Thursday 20th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

We encourage all states to join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. It has been a huge vehicle by which we have worked together to keep the world safe. This Government accept, as previous Governments have done and as do many Governments across the world, that the nuclear deterrent is part of the security architecture of the world. Part of having a nuclear deterrent is to deter from war, deter from aggression. The restatement of the deterrent policy is consistent with the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, under which the noble Lord will know that the UK is allowed to have weapons.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, following on from what the Minister has just very helpfully said, in relation to our own United Kingdom nuclear defence capability, we have seen just this week that between 400 and 500 jobs will be put at risk at the Atomic Weapons Establishment. The Government claim that the workforce needs to be reshaped so that it is fit for the future. However, in a time of growing international insecurity, can the Minister confirm that there will be no reduction in staffing for our nuclear weapons capability?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

What I can confirm is that there will be no reduction in our capability of ensuring that the nuclear deterrent is effective and that it remains so seven days a week, 365 days a year and 24 hours a day. That is the commitment that the Government make. I hear what the noble Baroness says about the AWE. That is about looking at reshaping how that important body works. The Government have committed £31 billion to the Dreadnought programme, with a £10 billion contingency. We have committed £15 billion in this Parliament to the development of a new warhead. That is a Government who are committed, as the last Government were, to spending billions of pounds on maintaining the credibility of our nuclear deterrent, which, as I said in answer to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, is essential to the global security of the world.

Ukraine

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Friday 31st October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Government for tabling this debate and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his powerful, passionate and clear introduction to it. This debate is timely for three reasons. It enables the political presence in the United Kingdom, so articulately described by the Minister, to show a continuing united front against President Putin’s illegal war in Ukraine. That powerful unity of purpose and resolve is very important. The debate facilitates an informed discussion among Members across this Chamber, with the wealth of experience that they reflect, to offer thoughts, opinions and ideas. Prominent among them is the noble Lord, Lord Barrow, to whose maiden speech we eagerly look forward. We will certainly be very interested to hear his contribution.

Perhaps most importantly, this debate is our opportunity to send a clear and uncompromising message to President Putin that the United Kingdom stands against bullies, has always stood against bullies and will always do so. We know the peril of appeasement; the facile delusion that you can do business with a bully; the fatal misapprehension that the bully is well intentioned towards his enemy, when the bully’s only interest is himself and the clinical and ruthless advancement of his illegal and brutal agenda. The United Kingdom sees that clearly, and I pay tribute to the Government for their steadfast support of Ukraine.

It is clear from the coalescence of support around Ukraine, whether from European neighbours who see President Putin for what he is, the coalition of the willing being progressed by the Prime Minister, or the more formal activity being pursued through NATO, that this continuing threat posed by President Putin to Europe must be primarily addressed by Europe. Of course, we welcome the continuing and vital support of the United States, but the responsibility falls on us and our European friends to demonstrate that we can step up to the plate and pay our way. European and western Atlantic security is our joint responsibility. We have to guard it, we have to fight off any challenge to it, and we have to be visibly determined in our resolve to do that.

For that strategy to be delivered, I suggest that in relation to Ukraine we need three things: greater clarity, perhaps, about the shape of the short term; the planning and resource necessary to sustain the medium term; and an outline of the longer term, in relation to both the rebuilding of Ukraine and the broader construct of Euro-Atlantic security.

Taking the short term first, we—the United Kingdom and our allies—must continue to supply Ukraine with what she needs to defend herself, and that includes training, so I was very encouraged to hear the Minister’s comments on that. On the broader front, when she responds, will the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, say whether there is clarity across the piece about who is supplying what, how this is being co-ordinated and whether we can have, perhaps in written form, an update on what UK military assets are currently being provided—although I accept the noble Lord has been very explicit about part of that supply? In her response, can the Minister confirm that in the supply of weaponry there is clarity that for Ukraine to respond proportionately to this illegal invasion, she must be free to target the locations within Russia being used for hostile attacks on Ukraine? Implicit within this is the political will to fund in a stable and predictable manner our UK defence capability. When dealing with such an overt threat to our security, the Prime Minister must provide that leadership, supporting his Chancellor and requiring the Treasury to fund to the levels necessary. It is so axiomatic that I do not expect the Minister to comment, other than to observe that if there is any hesitancy in providing such leadership, the only person clapping his hands with glee will be President Putin.

Moving to the medium term, if President Putin is recalcitrant, the supply of military assets must continue. We also need to audit, both as a country and with allies, the effect of sanctions on Russia. After this length of time, it must be possible to have a reasonably accurate measurement of the consequences of these sanctions. I appreciate that the Minister may not have detailed information to hand, and I am very happy for her to confirm that by letter. If, as is widely understood, sanctions are having a savage effect on the Russian economy, there needs to be a concerted coms strategy by us and our allies to get that message through to the Russian people. This has been discussed before— I remember the matter arising when I was a Defence Minister—but if the Minister can update the House on any progress, that would be helpful.

Looking to the longer term, that projection must embrace what is necessary to rebuild Ukrainian infrastructure. What is required to reinstate a functioning economy, and what political reforms are necessary to facilitate these objectives? It is clear that some excellent work is already being done, and the noble Lord the Minister referred to the contribution from the United Kingdom. Elsewhere, Hope for Ukraine, based in the United States, has a comprehensive programme to assist. The EU, through the EBRD, the European Investment Bank and the European Commission, has provided a total of €30 million to help Ukraine prepare large-scale infrastructure projects and, apparently, more funding is due from EU countries and donors. Can the Minister give us a more detailed update on what the UK is doing on this front? In aggregate across the overall contribution of support, we are not sure what that map looks like. How is macroeconomic support being given to Ukraine? Is it international loans and international financial guarantees? Is there, for example, a workable basis for the operation of commercial insurance indemnity across a range of commercial activity? I look forward to the Minister’s response on these specific issues.

Turning to what political reforms may be required within Ukraine, corruption in that country is sadly unarguable. Everything that the allies and friends of Ukraine are prepared to do to help carries a reciprocal obligation by Ukraine to fix what is bad. Without that explicit recognition from Ukraine, there can be no confidence among the international community that it is worthwhile providing help. This is serious. It gets to the heart of what we want a post-conflict Ukraine to look like. I suggest that Ukraine has to tackle judicial corruption. There are ongoing issues with judicial appointments and a lack of trust in the courts. There is war-related corruption. The ongoing conflict has apparently created new avenues, such as, we understand, officials demanding bribes for leave or diverting foreign aid meant for the front lines. There appears to be top-level and systemic corruption. That includes issues with state contracts and the influence of oligarchs, who, we understand, remain a problem that hinders foreign investment and economic growth.

It would appear thatsqueeze-col3 any progress in addressing this is glacial, particularly where large interests and big players are involved, such as natural resource extraction and large infrastructure projects. Will the Minister confirm what the United Kingdom is doing, either alone or with partners, to provide advice and support to Ukraine to try to help tackle these serious problems? Is it possible to provide any in-country support and advice? If there is any update she can provide to the House about progress on these essential reforms, that would be very welcome.

I conclude, as I started, with appreciation that this debate is taking place. I have endeavoured to encourage thinking across a time period about what is required as this conflict progresses. I have tried to be constructive and, I hope, conciliatory in suggesting positive proposals, but not shying away from what, under no circumstances, this Government should shy away from: the paramount obligation, for the safety of us all, to secure stable and predictable funding for defence. I look forward to hearing contributions from Members. I very much look forward to listening to the noble Baroness the Minister’s response. I end with the most important observation: His Majesty’s Opposition will support the Government’s continuing support for Ukraine.

Undersea Cables: National Security Threat

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Monday 27th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

There are certainly plans to do exactly as my noble friend asks. There certainly needs to be work on those plans, and they need some more detail to them, but there certainly are plans to do that. I have said a number of times from this Dispatch Box that the threats we face from others are now different in many respects from the threats we faced in the past. The disruption to data, the disruption to energy supplies and the disruption to communication are all part of the threat that we now face. Clearly, we are going to have to do more as a homeland to stand up against that. Part of it will require a conversation with industry, the public and the defence sector in order to protect ourselves.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, following the line just observed by the Minister, in recent months the principal threat to United Kingdom infrastructure has been from cyberattacks, notably against Jaguar Land Rover, Marks & Spencer, Co-operative Group and Heathrow Airport. Can the Minister confirm that the National Cyber Security Centre, currently located within GCHQ, is adequately resourced to deal with what it recognises is an escalating challenge? How does the National Cyber Security Centre liaise with the CyberEM Command, now sitting within the Strategic Command in the MoD?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

There is a co-ordinating committee, whose name escapes me, that brings together all those various parts of government to which the noble Baroness has just referred to ensure that we have that co-ordinated defence and co-ordinated work that, as she rightly points out, we need. I would say, without going too far, that we see it as a major priority for the Government, which is why we have established that new command to defend ourselves against cyberattack, but we also need to work closely with private industry and private business to achieve that. Suffice it to say that it is a really important point and something we are working on very hard to ensure that we protect our country.

Defence Industrial Strategy

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Wednesday 10th September 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I place on record my support for the enormous amount of work that has clearly gone into the production of this industrial strategy. It is very evident that those at the Ministry of Defence have put their thinking caps on, done the hard work and constructed a plan based around defence’s current and future requirements. There is therefore much to be applauded. The six priority outcomes are absolutely aiming in the right direction and the commitment to strengthening the MoD’s links with SMEs is particularly welcome.

A strong industrial base is vital for the future of our Armed Forces and our defensive resilience as a whole. The need has never been more evident than today, when we have seen a Russian incursion into a NATO ally’s airspace and the largest attack in Ukraine by Russia to date. This escalation is deeply troubling and underlines the importance of swiftly putting Britain into war-fighting readiness.

This is a solid piece of work, but the caveat is this: the solid piece of work crumbles if the bricks are not cemented together. That cement is implementation at a wartime pace. What matters now is that the words on these pages are translated into missiles, drones, equipment and ships. Critical to this is procurement. The chilling reality is that procurement has essentially dried up. There have been promising words in the SDR, but we have yet to see the major procurement contracts that the MoD has promised.

Procurement is the lifeblood of a successful industrial strategy. For example, I ask the Minister: how will the Government ensure that the Typhoon factory in Warton remains open and thriving? We have heard that the Government will be opening up six new munitions factories, but they must have orders. When will they be placed?

I understand that the promised defence investment plan will detail much of the procurement endeavour, but when? The defence industry has been waiting with bated breath since July of last year, and industry must have greater certainty. I implore the Minister to do everything in his power to ensure that the defence investment plan is published as soon as possible. In that connection, will the UK’s defence orders be joining a queue or with they be prioritised over orders for export?

When it comes to the new structures within the MoD, co-ordination of accountability to the Secretary of State is paramount. At the same time, duplication must be eradicated. The SDR and this strategy both mention the creation of a number of new bodies within the MoD: UK Defence Innovation, the Defence Industrial Joint Council, the office of defence exports, a defence office for small business growth and the national armaments director.

The strategic defence review identified a 10% reduction in Civil Service costs by 2030. Can the Minister clarify how, with the addition of these new offices, the MoD will achieve that staffing cost reduction? What existing structures will be merged or abolished, and who will be auditing progress? While I am on this topic, can the Minister update the House on the progress of appointing the national armaments director?

Page 30 of the industrial strategy details nine milestones to be reached by the end of this year. I do not believe any of these have as yet materialised, and the end of the year is fast approaching. Is the Minister confident that the 2025 timeline will be met?

In conclusion, I raise an issue that will come as no surprise to the Minister—budget. My right honourable friend the shadow Secretary of State and I have raised concerns about the bundling together of intelligence spending within the defence budget. That means that, despite the Government’s claims of spending 2.6% of GDP on defence by 2027, the actual money available to the MoD for defence spending is 2.2% of GDP. I am not trying to catch the Minister out, but I want to make this clear: the Government may have increased defence spending, but this level of spend is simply not enough to deliver everything in the SDR and indeed in this industrial strategy.

The Russian incursion into Polish airspace yesterday and the triggering of Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty serve as a stark warning: complacency is not an option. The contents of this strategy, which, as I have said, these Benches fully support, cannot be a prayer for the future. Wartime pace means delivering from now on and, quite simply, there is no safe alternative.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure and a challenge to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, who has such expertise in this area. We on these Benches also welcome the Government’s announcement of this new defence industrial strategy. We support the objectives of both boosting defence capability and increasing economic activity within our country. As someone who has worked in the sector—I no longer have an interest in it—I can say that, in the main, the jobs in the defence sector are high-quality jobs that pay well over the national average, so they are very worthwhile jobs for our citizens. More than that, they will contribute in large measure, we hope, to the resilience and security of our country.

Like the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, I will focus on procurement. I will not repeat the questions that she has already asked, although I am very interested in the answers. It is clear that an improved framework is needed and that, in the Government’s own words, waste, delay and complexity have prevailed. Big changes are therefore needed. We also support the aims of involving more SMEs and driving innovation. These are important, but how? Section 7 of the strategy sets out some details of process, but I would suggest that, as well as process, this all requires an entire change of culture across the sector, from the MoD to the primes and the SMEs. How will the Government fast-track the necessary culture changes that we need in order to move at pace?

The implementation of a UK offset regime is welcome and the sections in the strategy are encouraging. I appreciate that consultation is needed, but I also note that there are—we hope—contracts being let already before this regime is put in. Can the Minister tell your Lordships’ House how any offsets will be gained from contracts that are let before then?

Similarly, a buy British focus is really good and very important. However, some contracts are being let at the moment that do the exact opposite. They are contracts that may call into question the future of established capacity in this country: capacity that, once lost, will not be regained. Can the Minister therefore ensure that these are reviewed as soon as possible to ensure that permanent damage is not being done before this strategy is implemented. I will be happy to discuss further details on that with the Minister.

In the Spring Statement, Rachel Reeves confirmed an extra £2.2 billion of UK military funding. This increase will be paid for by cuts in overseas aid, which the Minister knows we deplore. This strategy contains spending of £773 million on the Government’s estimate, but can the Minister confirm that this is not in fact new money, but money out of the pot that was announced in the spring by the Chancellor? At the time, the Chancellor also announced the new Defence Growth Board. Can the Minister say what role this will play, and indeed what role it has played in the preparation of this strategy? How does this fit with the new defence investors advisory group that is announced in the strategy?

I also seek information on the whereabouts of the Defence Growth Partnership, which has been in place for some time and shares many of the same aims, particularly around SMEs and innovation. What is its role? Is it still working and how does it contribute?

A key drag on the success of this strategy will be the lack of available skills. Part of this announcement includes skills investment, which is largely focused on five new defence technology colleges. This is also welcome, as is the emphasis on apprentices. However, what is the role of Skills England in all this, given that it was supposed to be part of the picture on the national skills programme.

Following events, it is very clear that things are moving very fast globally, and moving in the wrong direction. They underscore the vital importance of working alongside our European allies in securing the UK’s defence. As I am sure the Minister will tell us, we continue to play key roles in JEF, E3 and other groupings, while NATO is of course our foremost security defence relationship and always will be. However, more can be done to deepen the co-operation and integration with our European allies. They share security challenges and together we can build scale to rearm at pace. Will the Government, for example, now agree to seek the UK’s associate membership of the European Defence Agency?

While EU institutions have a more limited role in defence, the Security Action for Europe—SAFE—defence fund is being established by the EU Commission. Recognising the opportunity that SAFE presents, the Minister of State, Stephen Doughty, told the Foreign Affairs Select Committee on Monday:

“It is a €150 billion instrument. It is very significant and could lead to significant opportunities for our defence industries”.


Can the Minister therefore update your Lordships’ House on the UK’s discussions with the Commission and the nation states on our participation in SAFE and tell us whether UK industry will be eligible to bid in the first round, which I believe is in November?

I have lots more queries, but I close by saying that this strategy is a first step and I absolutely concur with the noble Baroness that implementation is key to its success. We will happily support and work with the Government to help deliver the strategy and its objectives.

UK Defence and Aerospace Facilities: Protests

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Thursday 4th September 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The noble Lord makes a really important point. Let us use this opportunity to state that it is totally unacceptable for people to act as they have. There is legitimate protest, which this country is proud to facilitate, but we will not allow our bases to be broken into, people to be intimidated and protests to stray into the realms of illegality and violence. None of us in this Chamber would accept that. That is why we have proscribed Palestine Action and why we see people before the courts. We work strongly with the Home Office, the police and others to ensure that those who think that they can do that will face the full force of the law.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, the activity to which the noble Lord, Lord Austin, rightly refers is de facto sabotage of our critical defence capability. In Napoleonic times, setting fire to a naval dockyard was construed as such and punishable by death, which was abolished only by the Criminal Damage Act 1971. Does the Minister agree that any sabotage activity of the type described is profoundly serious, and is he satisfied that the criminal law is adequate to deal with the appropriate charge and penalty in such grave circumstances?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I know that the British media are always concerned with accuracy, so let me start my remarks by saying that, whatever I say now, we have no intention of restoring the death penalty—let us get that out of the way first; whatever review may or may not take place, that is not on the table. The noble Baroness who speaks for the Opposition makes an important point. This is a very serious matter. That is why we have proscribed Palestine Action. That is why we will take the action necessary to protect our defence industry and to stop intimidation and do all we can to support our world-leading industry. We will always continue to discuss with our Home Office colleagues and with others across government whether more needs to be done. Let us be clear: there is legitimate protest, which is perfectly acceptable, but some of the things that have gone on are totally unacceptable.

Republic of Ireland: Defence Co-operation

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Wednesday 3rd September 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her question. I start by saying as a Defence Minister how proud we all have been of the contribution of the British Armed Forces to what took place in Northern Ireland. That is the starting point for any discussion. The noble Baroness will have seen the comments by the Northern Ireland Secretary at the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee this morning, where he talked about being close to an agreement with the Irish Government on dealing with the legacy of the past. As far as the broader points on defence co-operation that the noble Baroness makes, she will be pleased to know that we are seeking to establish a new memorandum of understanding between the UK and the Irish Government by next year.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, to echo the important point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, it is the case that our defence capability exists primarily for the protection of this country and to enable our contribution to global security, particularly through NATO. Indirectly, the Republic of Ireland has benefited greatly from that strategic stance over many years. If, as the Minister has indicated, there is now an intention to enter into discussions with the Republic of Ireland, perhaps to refresh and renew the memorandum of understanding, does he agree that that would require to be underpinned by an appropriate financial arrangement?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The noble Baroness will know that there has been a memorandum of understanding between Ireland and the United Kingdom since 2015. Michael Fallon and Simon Coveney signed an agreement in 2015 on defence co-operation between the two countries, while respecting Ireland's neutrality and the fact that it is not a member of NATO. Like many countries across the whole of Europe, whether in NATO or outside, Ireland has been forced to confront the reality of what we face. Like every country, including our own, it is increasing defence spending and looking at what more it can do, not least, as I say, through a refreshed memorandum of understanding between us and the Irish Government, which we hope to be in place during 2026.

Armed Forces Commissioner Bill

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments and / or reasons
Wednesday 23rd July 2025 Lords Chamber

It has been an honour to take forward the Armed Forces Commissioner Bill through this House, and I very much look forward to the valuable contributions as we finalise the last details of this defining legislation. I beg to move.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, it has been a pleasure to participate in our debates on this Bill. I echo and endorse the sentiments articulated by the Minister at the start of his speech.

These Benches made clear from the outset that we supported the Bill, and an independent presence in the form of the new commissioner is an important and welcome development. It was that very independence which suggested to me that the commissioner would be well placed to look at whistleblowing complaints. Those who have any knowledge of the Armed Forces know that the very environment of discipline and command structure that produces such exemplary servicemen and servicewomen is also a very closed environment, which can make it difficult to seek help when something goes wrong.

Sadly, we know all too well that things can go wrong. That may be in the life of an individual, or there may be a more systemic wrong, but the burning question is how redress is obtained. That is why it seemed that we needed an avenue over and above the existing procedures, and why allowing the Armed Forces commissioner to investigate whistleblowing complaints was the particular granite boulder at which I have been chipping away,

I have been greatly assisted by the expertise of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, who has been so supportive of my efforts, and so helpful to the House in explaining the particular virtues of whistleblowing. I was immensely encouraged when the House showed such powerful support for our efforts in amending the Bill as we suggested.

Although the Bill now returns to us with the amendment stripped out, and the granite boulder now bears a new inscription from the Government, entitled, “We are prepared to carry out a review of whistleblowing in defence”, I am very pleased at that progress. As the Minister indicated, he and his colleague in the other place, the Minister for the Armed Forces, wrote to me to confirm that this was the Government’s proposal. I now want to thank the Minister—these are not easy, cosmetic words from the Dispatch Box; I absolutely mean it—because the way in which the Minister and his colleague, Mr Luke Pollard, have engaged, has been immensely helpful to our efforts to try to improve the situation for our Armed Forces personnel. Above all else, I want to thank them both for listening.

I have accepted the offer in good faith, and I have agreed that the Bill should now pass so that progress can be made with this important appointment. But, before I lay down my masonry chisel, there are a few further inscriptions I wish to add to the boulder so that we all know where we are. The Minister was kind enough to reference a few of these, extracted from the letter which I wrote to him.

As I have previously argued, more than one route for making a complaint is not a weakness; anything which facilitates accessibility by the complainer is a strength. However, the specific points I wish to raise in relation to the role of the review are that it can be a stocktake of the current procedures and can assess whether these need to be simplified, and, if so, how that can be done. The review should also recognise the key distinction between simply raising a complaint and blowing the whistle on serious wrongdoing. As the Minister has kindly indicated, the review should also take place in close consultation with the Armed Forces commissioner whenever he or she is appointed.

It is very welcome that Minister Al Carns has been proposed to lead the review; it is very important to have a person of his stature conducting it. If the review is to gain the trust of service personnel, we must have someone who has the respect of the forces and experience of life in the services leading it.

I have a small number of specific questions about the review. How will the consultation take place, and what are the timescales? In particular, how will the views of service personnel be sought, and will the interim and final findings be published and laid before Parliament to enable full scrutiny of the findings? In the letter there is a reference to

“consistency between the application and accessibility of military and civilian whistleblowing procedures”.

I was not entirely clear what that meant, but I am sure the Minister will clarify in his closing remarks.

Further details of the review are to be published via a Written Ministerial Statement in due course. That review will produce initial findings by the end of the year and a final report and recommendations in spring 2026. Can the Minister say when the Written Ministerial Statement will be published, approximately, and will it contain the terms of reference for the review?

In conclusion, I look forward to the Minister’s response, I reaffirm my thanks for his constructive engagement and I hope that I can play a helpful role when the consultation process commences. Our common aim—of the Minister, myself and our colleagues across the Chamber—is to improve life for our service personnel. I support the government Motion and I support the passing of the Bill.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will be exceedingly brief, but first I join with the Minister in stressing the importance of remembering VJ Day. We on these Benches share his view.

I congratulate both the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, and the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and the team that he stands with, including Luke Pollard, who I had the privilege to meet with. I just say to both of them that the outcome that has emerged now at the end of this process is, frankly, better than anything I had ever hoped for. What we have been promised by the Minister—because of the persistence of the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, in raising and pushing the issue, as well as the willingness of the Government to listen—is this much broader review of whistleblowing in the defence sector, led by the Minister for Veterans and People. That is exceedingly important, because it underscores a changing cultural attitude in the whole defence sector and in the Government, which means that in the future we can look forward to much greater transparency and much more effective paths for whistle- blowing right across the piece.

Once again, I add my congratulations to those who have been expressed earlier. We also will no longer attempt in any way to impede the passage of this legislation. Its content is very positive and we supported that underlying principle. It has been a privilege to be part of this discussion and this process. I accept on behalf of my noble friend Lady Smith the opportunity to meet in the future, and we will put various thoughts in writing in order to assist the process.

Strategic Defence Review 2025

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Friday 18th July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the very powerful introduction to this debate from the noble Lord, Lord Robertson. I thank the Government for facilitating this important debate. The strategic defence review is a very significant piece of work, with clear sight-lines as to what our defence capability should be in a world of multifaceted and fast-moving threat. So I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, for his skilled leadership of the review and to his panel colleagues, General Sir Richard Barrons and Dr Fiona Hill, for their valuable contributions.

I very much look forward to the maiden speech from the noble Lord, Lord McCabe. He got off to a good start in life by growing up near me in Port Glasgow, attending Port Glasgow High School, which has enjoyed a fine reputation. Whatever our political differences, I feel an affinity with the noble Lord and I wish him well as a Member of this House.

The SDR is such a comprehensive document that there is insufficient time in this debate to do justice to the miscellany of issues and proposals within it, the great majority of which I agree with. So let me try to reduce this to bite-sized chunks.

First, I commend the reviewers for a realistic assessment of the threats and challenges confronting the UK. In the foreword, this phrase struck a chord with us all:

“The international chessboard has been tipped over”.


Another phrase in the foreword hit home:

“With multiple threats and challenges facing us now, and in the future, a whole-of-society approach is essential”.


These two phrases summarised for me the holistic threat that we have to confront. One part is the geopolitical environment and the other is what can now hit us at home, with incalculable consequences. That analysis creates a solid foundation on which to construct a modern, flexible defence capability that reaches beyond the shapes and structures familiar to many. In recognising that simple, inescapable reality, this review deserves the gratitude of us all.

I welcome the logical conclusions that follow that analysis: commitment to our independent nuclear deterrent, explicitly identifying NATO as the bedrock of our defence, reinforced homeland resilience, a new model integrated force, boosting our reserves, innovating at a wartime pace, a new partnership with industry and the appointment of a new national armaments director. I certainly hope all that enables us to address the new character of threat.

My one note of dissonance is that, amid the language of readiness, immediacy and pace repeated this morning by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, there is a mismatch with reference to, for example, “when circumstances allow” or to essential equipment with no specific date. In that I detect the meddling fingers of the Treasury after the noble Lord had done his valuable work.

In this exciting and brave new world for defence, the elephant in the room is money. None of the excellent aspiration proposed by the review means anything without attaching pound signs to the proposals. Ambition must translate into specific financial commitment, so I make no apology for pausing in my plaudits to deal with funding, resource and spend projections. I direct these concerns and questions to the Minister. The Minister probably regards me as an unrelenting, irritating nag constantly pushing him on funding. I do so not as a political attack but as a constructive challenge to ensure that the Government are doing what they say they are, as repeated earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson.

Noble Lords will all know that the Government have committed to increasing defence spending to 2.5% of GDP—or 2.6% if one includes intelligence spending. We now come down to simple arithmetic. If one takes the projected GDP figures for 2027 of £3.134 trillion, and then takes the spending on the single intelligence account for 2027—set at £5.1 billion in the spending review—it indicates that spending on the single intelligence account will be 0.16% of GDP in 2027.

This throws up several questions. If the Government are claiming that they will spend 2.5% of GDP on defence by 2027, or 2.6% including intelligence, how does this square with 0.16% being spent on intelligence? The Einsteins among your Lordships will have already worked out that 2.6% minus 0.16% equals 2.44%. If the Government shift all intelligence spending into definitions of defence spending, it appears they will not hit their 2.5% target. Can the Minister clear this up for me? Are the Government reclassifying all intelligence expenditure as defence expenditure or only a particular portion of it? If the latter, can the Minister tell the House what proportion of intelligence spending, in numerical terms, they are shifting into the definition of defence expenditure?

My second question on the money is on the new NATO defence targets. The 2025 NATO summit in The Hague led to the new target of spending 5% of GDP annually on core defence requirements, defence and security-related spending by 2035. Of that, 3.5% would be allocated to core defence expenditure; this is obviously higher than the Government’s currently stated ambition of reaching 3% when economic and fiscal conditions allow. Can the Minister give an unequivocal commitment that the Government will meet that 3.5% NATO target by 2035?

The remaining 1.5% contribution is, in NATO’s words, to

“protect our critical infrastructure, defend our networks, ensure our civil preparedness and resilience, unleash innovation, and strengthen our defence industrial base”.

We need to understand what the Government will include in this. Italy has recently passed a resolution to reclassify a bridge over the Strait of Messina as a strategic project vital for NATO’s interests, so that it can be included in its 1.5% obligation. What will His Majesty’s Government be bundling into this definition? If the Minister could give some concrete—I use the word deliberately—examples, it would be very welcome.

My concern with this expanded NATO definition is that it will not actually lead to any new money being injected into defence but will represent little more than creative accounting. I hope the Minister will implore his ministerial colleagues at the Treasury and the MoD to ensure that the Armed Forces are not fobbed off with balance sheet wizardry but see tangible benefit.

In returning to the review, just as I welcome the reviewers’ blunt analysis of threat, I found refreshing the frank assessment found on page 12 at paragraph 3:

“In modern warfare, simple metrics such as the number of people and platforms deployed are outdated and inadequate. It is through dynamic networks of crewed, uncrewed, and autonomous assets and data flows that lethality and military effect are now created, with military systems making decisions at machine-speed and acting flexibly across domains”.


When, as a Defence Minister, I stood at the Dispatch Box warding off accusations that the Army was at its smallest size since Napoleon’s time, I responded as courteously as I could to the sheer inanity of that comparison. It implied that military strategy, equipment and technology had remained static for over 200 years—but in vain I made my argument. To some, numbers were all that mattered. So I say to the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, that it took courage for the reviewers to be bold, but what they said had to be said.

I could talk about a miscellany of matters—transformation, defence roles, war-fighting, integrated force model, reservists, industry and all the other excellent matters that are covered in the review. Each merits its own debate, and each gives rise to a separate range of questions. I anticipate that many of these will be reflected in contributions from your Lordships today. I also anticipate that we shall regularly return to all these issues within the House. Some of your Lordships may want to talk about what they see as omissions from the strategic defence review. We look forward with interest to the debate.

I will focus—and this is made possible by the thoroughness of the review—on the highlighted significance of two domains: space, and cyber and electromagnetism, or cyberEM. On page 20, at paragraph 31, the review says:

“With the Integrated Force fighting as one across all five domains, greater attention must be given to the space and cyber and electromagnetic (CyberEM) domains”.


It goes on to say:

“A reinvigorated Cabinet sub-Committee should set the UK’s strategic approach to space, maximising synergies between the UK civil space sector and clear military needs”.


I am delighted by that recommendation. When I was a Defence Minister, such a committee existed and, interestingly, was chaired by the then Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, because, astutely, he understood the need for strategic leadership and governance embracing government departments with primary interests in space. Quite simply, it meant that space—a domain with unlimited opportunity but which, if malregulated or non-regulated, could deliver catastrophic consequence—was at the top of government thinking and awareness. Sadly, my party and Government subsequently downgraded that committee. I urge the Government, in accepting this recommendation from the review, to give serious thought to restoring that top level of political leadership.

I had hoped for comparable recognition for the domain of cyberEM. Given the primary importance of this domain, I had thought that parity of status with space would be appropriate. In fact, the review has chosen to restrict its proposals to defence only; the creation of a new cyberEM command within Strategic Command, which is very worthy, but cyberEM is at the heart of government activity. With the best will in the world, sharing, thinking and awareness across government will not happen without strategic leadership and governance, as is proposed for space. The alternative is silos of varying knowledge. I urge the Government to consider replicating the new structure for space as applicable to cyberEM.

I have focused on these domains because of the rightful prominence the review has attached to them. They are the new defence territory in a fast-changing environment. But they have an umbilical connection with myriad other areas of government activity, and that must be matched by an appropriate structure at the top of government.

I look forward to this debate. I conclude with my overriding concern: the money. Unless the Government can be specific about amount and timing, this well-received, and justly so, strategic defence review will become an interesting but passive library exhibit. Our defence industry will wither in that vacuum. Our safety and security will be deeply compromised. None of us wants to see that. I ask the Minister to reassure us.