Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Ninth sitting)

Aphra Brandreth Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 24th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Aphra Brandreth (Chester South and Eddisbury) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Vickers. I rise to speak in strong support of new clause 13, tabled by the shadow Minister. The new clause would place a duty on the Secretary of State to review the functions and effectiveness of the regulatory authority, which is currently the Care Quality Commission, within one year of the passage of the Bill. The new clause is a timely, necessary and constructive addition to the Bill.

As colleagues will know, the Care Quality Commission plays a dual role in relation to the Mental Health Act. First, as the regulator of services, it ensures that providers meet fundamental standards of care and safety. Secondly, through its specific responsibilities in visiting and speaking to those detained under the Act, it ensures that people’s rights are protected and that the law is used appropriately and humanely. That is no small task. It is a balance that requires the CQC to be not only reactive but proactive, and not only independent but responsive to the lived experiences of patients—especially to the voices of the most vulnerable. That is why the new clause matters. As we bring forward significant reforms to the Mental Health Act through the Bill, and rightly modernise and improve safeguards and place greater emphasis on autonomy, dignity and therapeutic benefit, we must also ensure that our system of oversight and regulation is fit for purpose.

I welcome the direction that the Bill sets. Its four core principles are rightly placed at the heart of the legislation: choice and autonomy, least restriction, therapeutic benefit, and seeing the person as an individual. Those principles must shape the way that care is delivered on the ground. That means they must also shape the way that care is monitored, inspected and held to account. A review of the regulator’s role is not about criticism for its own sake; it is about ensuring that the regulatory framework supports and reinforces the ambitions of the Bill and that it can respond to emerging challenges, shine a light where services are falling short and, crucially, act to protect patient rights.

[Gregory Stafford]

My hon. Friend is being slightly charitable to the CQC. Given Penny Dash’s review, we all know that the CQC has significant problems, otherwise we would not be reviewing it. Does my hon. Friend agree that the new clause is absolutely vital because of the failures of the CQC up to this point, and our lack of faith in it being able to meet the challenges that this legislation will bring to the mental health sector? Does she also share our concern about the CQC’s ability to regulate and scrutinise properly?

[Aphra Brandreth]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. We have seen examples where regulators have not intervened quickly or robustly enough, and where systemic issues went unnoticed or unaddressed for far too long. We need to strengthen the remit and ensure that the CQC is properly equipped and held to the high standards that we expect of it.

I am an economist by background, so evaluation is something I think about a great deal. Reform, however well intentioned, must be followed by evidence, scrutiny and a willingness to learn and improve. The new clause ensures that we do not just set change in motion, but that we stop to ask whether it is working, whether the right things are being done, and if not, how we can improve.

The review required by the new clause would look not only backwards at whether the regulator has effectively carried out its existing duties under the Act, but, crucially, forwards, assessing whether it is ready to meet the responsibilities placed on it by the new reforms. I particularly welcome the requirement for the review to be published and laid before Parliament. Transparency is essential. It would allow Parliament to scrutinise but also gives patients, families, professionals and the public confidence that those questions are being asked seriously and answered publicly.

Ultimately, the new clause is about improving outcomes. When regulation works well it safeguards dignity, prevents harm, identifies and spreads good practice, develops trust and helps us build a system where the principles of this Bill—choice, autonomy, less restriction and greater therapeutic benefit—are not just written in statute, but visible in practice. That is especially important in mental health care, where so often the people subject to the Act are among the most vulnerable. Those in in-patient settings, particularly those who are detained, are often not in a position to advocate for themselves. They rely on a system that is vigilant, takes its safeguarding responsibilities seriously and puts patients’ rights first.

I hope that all members of this Committee will support the new clause. It is collaborative in its intent, constructive in its purpose and essential to delivering the meaningful reform that we all want to see. It reinforces the importance of accountability, transparency and listening to those most affected by this legislation. We owe it to those individuals and their families to make sure that we not only change the law, but also the culture and oversight that surrounds it. This review would help us do exactly that.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I am grateful to the Opposition spokesman, the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, for bringing this issue forward.

Two major independent reviews into the Care Quality Commission have reported under this Government: one by Dr Penny Dash, on the CQC’s operational effectiveness as a regulator of all health and social care providers including those in mental health, the other by Professor Sir Mike Richards on its single assessment framework. The CQC has accepted those recommendations in full, and although we are confident in the progress that the CQC is making, we recognise that the reviews did not closely inspect its statutory role in relation to monitoring the use of the Mental Health Act.

Those powers and duties are entirely distinct from those that the CQC uses to regulate the health and social care sector under the Health and Social Care Act 2008. In recognition of that gap, as the Opposition spokesman pointed out, we committed in the other place to report on that specific aspect of the CQC’s role in the first of the Government’s annual reports on the implementation of the Bill, which will be laid before Parliament one year after Royal Assent.

Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Seventh sitting)

Aphra Brandreth Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 19th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I want to speak in support of amendment 46. It is eminently sensible and would give all eligible patients the statutory right to create an advance choice document to record their treatment preferences in a formal legal document. Those preferences would be enjoyed only in the event of a future mental health crisis or detention under the Mental Health Act.

The amendment would give important control to patients and to those around them to know that their future care decisions would be applicable at the point at which they become incapacious. It would quite rightly place a requirement on NHS England—for as long as it continues to exist—and ICBs to ensure that those individuals are aware of their rights and, more importantly, that they are not just aware of them but are supported in creating an advance choice document if they so wish.

The amendment is all about empowering patients. The more we can empower patients who face these challenges, the better. It would increase their autonomy and help with the planning of their future care. It would help both in the understanding and the honouring of patients’ wishes. Critically, it would reduce conflict. In these circumstances, tensions are high and pressures are acute, so conflict can arise in the most unintended of ways. Having an advance choice document minimises that risk.

If the Government will not support amendment 46, what reassurances can the Minister give in relation to the code of practice? How will this be accounted for in the code of practice to ensure consistency in the information imparted to patients across the country by NHS England and the ICBs? We must ensure that there is not a postcode lottery and that everybody, regardless of where they live in the country, gets the consistency of care that they are entitled to.

[Aphra Brandreth (Chester South and Eddisbury) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I rise to speak in support of amendment 46, tabled by the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, which seeks to strengthen clause 45, an already welcome and progressive clause, by creating a statutory right for all eligible patients to create advance choice documents if they so wish.

Let me begin by saying that I think everyone on the Committee recognises the importance of advance choice documents. They are an excellent initiative, and I am glad that the Bill introduces a framework to support their use. I hope we can all agree that they represent a constructive and compassionate shift in how we think about mental health care—one that puts the patient’s voice at the centre. ACDs are fundamentally about empowerment. They allow individuals, while they are well and have full capacity, to record their wishes, preferences and concerns regarding their treatment, so that during future periods of unwellness, when they may lack capacity, their past self can still be heard and respected. As Bipolar UK has rightly put it:

“The idea behind an ACD is that you use your past to plan your future.”

That simple principle holds immense power. Individuals with lived experience of severe mental illness like bipolar disorder are often experts in their own care. They know what works, what does not and what signs to look out for. An ACD allows that hard-earned knowledge to be recorded, shared and used to guide clinical decisions. By identifying early warning signs and outlining preferred treatments, ACDs can enable families, friends and professionals to intervene earlier, potentially avoiding a crisis or reducing the severity of an episode. This is not just about better care; it is about safer care and, crucially, more timely care.

The research is persuasive. Studies suggest that ACDs can reduce rates of compulsory detention under the Mental Health Act by up to 25%. That is not a small statistic; it is a significant reduction in trauma for patients, in the use of force and in resource pressures on services. It is hard to think of a better example of a policy that both improves outcomes and reduces system strain. ACDs can also play a vital role in reducing inequalities, especially among racial minority groups, who, as we have all said, are statistically more likely to be detained under the Act. Ensuring that those patients can express their wishes in advance gives them greater agency and helps to address long-standing disparities in the system.

ACDs are not just a useful administrative tool; they are, as Earl Howe put it in the House of Lords,

“are a major component part of one of the Bill’s key strands, which is to give mental health patients better control over their own care—which, of itself, carries a therapeutic value.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 27 January 2025; Vol. 843, c. 79.]

I absolutely agree, which brings me to amendment 46. The clause as drafted places duties on NHS England and integrated care boards to consider making information about ACDs available, and to help those people whom they consider “appropriate” to create one. That is a start, but it falls short of what is needed. The shadow Minister’s amendment would take us further and create a statutory right for eligible patients to create an advance choice document. It would define clearly who is eligible—for example, those previously detained under the Act, those diagnosed with a condition that may require future detention and qualifying informal patients—and would put a clear duty on NHS bodies to inform these patients of their right and to help them to exercise it. This is not about placing a burden on services; it is about ensuring that everyone who stands to benefit from an ACD knows that they can make one and is supported to do so if they wish.

I appreciate that the Government have tabled amendments 32 and 33 to clause 45, and I welcome the intention behind them. Amendment 32 requires that NHS England and integrated care boards must bring the availability of this information and help to the attention of such people “as it considers appropriate.” Amendment 33 expands on how that might be delivered, including through conversations with qualified individuals and by having specific regard to the benefits of ACDs in the 12 months following discharge from hospital.

Although these are improvements, I must respectfully say that they stop short of what is needed. They continue to frame the duty in terms of who the board considers appropriate, yet the very point of ACDs is that we should not be gatekeeping access. We should not be making assumptions about who would or would not benefit from having one. Every eligible patient should be offered the choice, not just those whom the system deems suitable. We are dealing here with people’s autonomy and right to shape their future care, and if we start from a place of selective provision, we immediately disempower many of the very individuals we claim to support.

[Jen Craft]

I would welcome the hon. Lady’s thoughts on where clause 45 or the Government’s amendments allow for selective provision. My understanding is that they place an onus on mental health commissioners to make sure that all those who are deemed appropriate to be in receipt of an ACD should be given the ability to make one. I do not think that is selective; it is very much related to the purposes of the Bill, and it spells out who may come under the provision.

[Aphra Brandreth]

The hon. Lady has just made my exact point: that it is who they deem appropriate. That is the point I am trying to make. It is for the individual—of course, with support of people looking after them—to decide whether it is appropriate for them and to be offered it.

[Jen Craft]

Will the hon. Lady give way on that point?

[Aphra Brandreth]

I will make progress, as I know that a few Members wish to speak on this point, and we have a long day ahead.

I will touch briefly on amendment 18, tabled by the hon. Member for Winchester, which suggests that ACDs should include a person’s financial circumstances. I recognise the sentiment behind the amendment. As both I and the hon. Member for Winchester have said in Committee, financial stress can be a major factor in mental health, but I gently suggest that prescribing the content of an ACD in this way is unhelpful. The point of the document is choice. The individual decides what they want to include, not us. That is the strength of the approach. It is personal and voluntary; it is theirs.

Amendment 46 respects that principle. It does not tell patients what to include in their ACD; it simply gives them the right to make one, and ensures they are informed of that right and supported to act on it. ACDs can be lifesaving, and they help people to stay well, safe and in control. They are especially valuable for those who have been detained before or who are at risk of detention in the future. We know that they are already supported by a wide range of stakeholders and experts by experience.

The question for us is not whether to support ACDs—I think we all do. The question is: do we want to make access to ACDs a universal right for those eligible, or do we want to continue to leave it to the discretion of the system? I believe the answer is clear: we must empower people, honour their voice and do so not only when they are well and able to speak, but when they are unwell and most vulnerable. That is what the amendment seeks to do. I urge all colleagues on the Committee to support amendment 46 and strengthen clause 45. Let us make the right to create an advance choice document a reality for everyone who needs one.

Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting)

Aphra Brandreth Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 19th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

Clause 47 stand part.

New clause 21—Duty to provide advice and support to families and carers—

“(1) The Mental Health Act 1983 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 117B, insert—

‘117C After-care: provision of support and advice to families and carers

(1) The responsible integrated care board must ensure that, as part of the provision of after-care services under section 117 of this Act, advice and support is offered to the family or carers of the person discharged.

(2) This support must include—

(a) information about the person’s condition and recovery;

(b) guidance on how to support their recovery at home and avoid relapse;

(c) access to financial, housing, and social care advice services relevant to the situation of the person’s family; and

(d) procedures for family members or nominated persons to notify the integrated care board of concerns that the person is at future risk of detention under Part 2 of this Act.

(3) Where a concern is raised under subsection (2)(d), the integrated care board must—

(a) consider whether the individual meets criteria to be included on the register of persons at risk under section 125D of this Act; and

(b) take reasonable steps to involve the family or nominated person in planning of subsequent support, subject to—

(i) the person’s consent; or

(ii) if they lack capacity, the person’s best interests.

(4) The Secretary of State must publish guidance under section 125B of this Act on the format and provision of support under subsection (3)(b).’”

This new clause would require the integrated care board, as part of the aftercare services offered under the Mental Health Act 1982, to offer support and advice to the family or carers of the person being discharged from treatment.

[Aphra Brandreth (Chester South and Eddisbury) (Con)]

I will take a few moments to reflect on clauses 46 and 47. They deal with aftercare, which is at the heart of how we help people to recover from serious mental illness and reduce the chance of their readmission. Clause 46 will give mental health tribunals the ability to make recommendations about aftercare services—a welcome shift in emphasis towards recognising that recovery is something that happens not at the point of discharge, but in the weeks, months and even years that follow.

Until now, tribunals could recommend things like hospital leave or transfer, but they had no say in the vital question of what happens after discharge. Clause 46 gives them a voice in shaping that next phase. It is a step that could help to ensure that aftercare is not an afterthought, but a core part of discharge planning. The effectiveness of this change, however, depends on whether there are services to recommend. As the independent review made clear, the challenge is not just in writing aftercare into law, but in making sure that it is there in practice.

Clause 47 takes a welcome step in providing greater clarity and accountability around which local authority is responsible for arranging section 117 aftercare. By clarifying the rules on ordinary residents, especially for people who received care as children, and by requiring that local authorities and NHS bodies jointly issue written notice when aftercare is ending, the clause helps to ensure that decisions are made in a timely and transparent way. That improved clarity should support smoother transitions from hospital to community, reduce disputes between services and, ultimately, help to prevent relapse and readmission.

Clarity in law must be met by capacity on the ground, which is why the core question is not just what the clauses enable, but whether the system is equipped to deliver on them. I therefore ask the Minister what assessment has been made of the availability of appropriate aftercare services in the community. Can we be confident that NHS and social care teams have the resources that they need to meet the duty effectively?

We know that aftercare, under section 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983, can include support with housing, employment, social engagement and culturally appropriate services, all of which can mean the difference between recovery and relapse, but they only work when they are properly joined up, tailored to the individual and delivered in a timely way. The independent review put it well:

“priority should be given to making sure that good services are available to all…But we also believe that it is right that people who have been detained should have additional support to ensure a successful transition to the community.”

I agree with that principle. If we want to see fewer people detained, we must do better at supporting people once they leave hospital.

I support clauses 46 and 47. They are sensible, necessary reforms that will give structure and clarity to a part of the system that has often been patchy or overlooked. But if we want them to work as intended, they must be backed up by investment in community services, good local commissioning and effective partnership between health and social care. In short, these are good steps but must be followed through with real delivery on the ground if we are to achieve the lasting outcomes that we all want.

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris. Having taken your clear instructions, I will be very brief in speaking to clauses 46 and 47.

Clause 46 is a positive step in principle, but there are concerns that the recommendations remain non-binary and may therefore lack the practical effect—or the teeth —without enforcement or review mechanisms. I have three questions that I hope the Minister will address. First, will he clarify whether there are any plans to give legal weight to tribunal recommendations, perhaps by requiring a written response or justification where those recommendations are not followed? Secondly, how will the Government ensure that resource-constrained local authorities can implement recommended aftercare plans promptly and fully? Thirdly, could he please provide data on the expected impact of this provision on readmission rates?

Clause 47 clearly sets out and improves on the legal clarity, which is welcome, but I have a couple of questions. What steps will be taken to ensure that frontline practitioners understand and consistently apply the revised ordinary residence test? Has the Department conducted an assessment of the administrative burdens or delays that may result from the implementation of the clause? Apart from those questions, I welcome the provision.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

You will be pleased to know that I will be briefer this time, Mrs Harris; I want to leave room for my Opposition colleagues. The intent of the clause is entirely sound: to treat mental health as a health issue, not a criminal one. However, the capacity of NHS services to provide timely and suitable alternatives remains in question.

With that in mind, I have three questions that I hope the Minister will be able to address. First, will the Government commit to publishing the implementation plan for ensuring adequate numbers of health-based places of safety across regions before the clause comes into force? Secondly, what contingency measures are currently in place or foreseen if no place of safety is available and police powers have been limited? Thirdly, can the Minister commit to an annual publication of data on hospital-based places of safety, their capacity and their use?

[Aphra Brandreth]

As we have heard, the clause removes police stations and prisons as designated places of safety for individuals in mental health crises, ensuring that they are instead taken to appropriate healthcare settings. In my view, this is a pragmatic and practical part of the Bill that supports patients going through an extremely challenging time. Perhaps, in the past, it has been all too easy to look to police stations as, if not the default option for those suffering a mental health crisis, certainly an easy one. That is not because police stations are the right place for patients, but because alternative provisions were not readily accessible.

Clause 49 brings about several critical changes. First, it redefines “place of safety” so that for adults it now refers exclusively to hospitals that are willing and able to provide care. For children and young people, the definition aligns with the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 but crucially, it explicitly excludes police stations. Furthermore, the clause repeals section 136A of the Mental Health Act 1983, which previously allowed police stations to be used in so-called exceptional circumstances. The crux of the clause is to recognise that a mental health emergency is a medical crisis rather than a criminal one, and our system must reflect that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Aphra Brandreth]

It is a pleasure to continue to serve under your chairship, Mrs Harris. I rise to speak in support of new clause 12, which has been tabled by the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, and to comment on clause 54, which has been grouped for this debate alongside it. Those two provisions both deal with the care and treatment of children and young people admitted to hospital for mental health reasons. In doing so, they touch on one of the most sensitive and critical responsibilities we have as legislators: safeguarding vulnerable children at a moment of profound crisis in their lives.

Clause 54, as introduced in the Lords, will place a duty on the Secretary of State to review whether the current requirement to notify the Care Quality Commission should be extended. Currently, notifications are required only when a child or young person is placed in an adult ward for more than 48 hours. The clause asks whether that threshold remains appropriate, and whether other scenarios—for example, where a child is admitted for assessment or placed in an adult setting even for less than 48 hours—should also trigger notification. That is a welcome first step, and I support the clause.

However, I also recognise the limitations of a clause that asks the Secretary of State only to review existing safeguards, rather than requiring that those safeguards be strengthened. That is why I also support the aims of new clause 12, which sets out a more detailed and practical framework to ensure that children are admitted to adult wards only when there are truly exceptional circumstances, and always with appropriate scrutiny and documentation.

The issue has been a consistent concern across multiple reviews, including the independent review of the Mental Health Act, the Joint Committee on the Draft Mental Health Bill, and the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Each has made clear that existing protections are insufficient and that too often, vulnerable children are still being placed in inappropriate settings. That concern was echoed in evidence submitted to this Bill Committee by the Children and Young People’s Mental Health Coalition. Their written submission sets out the risks in stark terms.

In 2023-24, the CQC was notified of 120 instances in which a child or young person was placed on an adult ward. We also know that between December 2023 and November 2024, 319 children were sent out of area to receive treatment, often far from their families, schools and local support networks—that is nearly one child every single day. Those are not just numbers; they are children and teenagers, many already facing significant trauma, mental health challenges or adverse life experiences. They are often the most vulnerable young people in our society. How they are treated in the days and weeks following a mental health crisis may have lifelong consequences for their wellbeing, development and future.

The Mental Health Act and the code of practice are already clear: children should not be admitted to adult wards except in emergency situations, and even then, only if it is in their best interests. But as the Committee heard in written evidence, that standard is not always met in practice. Young people have reported feeling terrified on adult wards, with an expectation that they behave like adults in environments that were never designed for their needs. That is why new clause 12 is so important: it would give legal weight to existing guidance by requiring that any such admission was explicitly justified in writing, with clear reasons why no other options were available or suitable.

The new clause would also ensure that steps were taken to protect the young person during their time on the ward and, crucially, to transfer them to a more appropriate setting as soon as possible. It would also require immediate notification to the regulator when a child was placed on an adult ward or was out of area for more than 24 hours. Those are simple procedural safeguards, but they really matter. Requiring decisions to be explained and recorded helps ensure they are properly thought through, and provides transparency, oversight and a route to accountability.

I appreciate that the Government are seeking to address the issue through updates to the Mental Health Act code of practice. I welcome that intention and I recognise the role that the code can play in setting out professional guidance, but, with respect, I do not believe that is sufficient on its own. When children are being placed in adult psychiatric wards, potentially for weeks at a time, or being sent far from home in moments of crisis, we must do more than issue guidance—we must provide clear legal safeguards. This is not about placing unrealistic constraints on the NHS or criticising frontline professionals, who we know are working under significant pressure with limited resources. It is about ensuring that when difficult decisions are made, they are made transparently, in the best interests of the child and only when absolutely necessary.

We have a rare opportunity in the Bill to put those protections in place. I hope the Minister will consider the evidence submitted to the Committee, the recommendations of previous reviews and the cross-party consensus on the importance of getting this right. Let us not miss this opportunity to ensure that our mental health system treats every child with the care, dignity and protection they deserve, and to set out clearly and transparently the standards we expect when they are at their most vulnerable.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

You will be disappointed to know, Mrs Harris, that the notable contributions from my hon. Friends the Members for Chester South and Eddisbury and for Farnham and Bordon mean that my contribution will be even briefer than usual. [Interruption.] Rapturous support across the Committee—exactly the consensus-building that we are seeking to achieve.

I rise to speak in support of new clause 12. It necessarily addresses the inappropriate placement of children on adult wards, which is not just distressing but deeply damaging to those involved. The issue is about having child-centred safeguards. It is essential that we ensure that children under 18 are placed on adult wards only when it is absolutely necessary and there is no alternative. The new clause would not only support best practice—it aligns with clinical guidelines on age-appropriate care—but provide welcome legal clarity. It would strengthen and clarify the existing provisions within the Mental Health Act. For those reasons, I encourage all hon. Members to support it.

On clause 54, the Minister would be disappointed if I did not put a couple of questions to him.

Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting)

Aphra Brandreth Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 17th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Rosie Wrighting (Kettering) (Lab)]

I rise to speak to clauses 24 to 28 and the Government amendments to them. They cover an important and long overdue reform, which introduces a new statutory role: the nominated person, replacing the outdated concept of the nearest relative. I think, cross party, we all agree that this is about protecting some of the most vulnerable people in society and children.

The clauses and amendments make important changes to the current Act, which too often forces an individual to rely on someone they may not trust or even have contact with, just because of their family relationship. As the Minister said, the White Paper found that the vast majority would choose their parents, but we must have legislation that reflects the diversity of society and families. Growing up in a single parent family, it would have been inappropriate for my other parent—who is one of my nearest relatives, but who I did not live with, know or particularly trust—to be my representative or make decisions on my treatment and care. In my upbringing, the people who knew me best were not always my closest blood relatives.

The nominated person model gives individuals the right to decide who should speak for them when they are at their most vulnerable. That might seem like a small change, but it is a powerful one and aligns with the Bill’s overall goal of placing patient voices at the heart of mental healthcare. Having someone a person trusts—someone who knows them and can advocate for them—is vital. I was contacted by a constituent whose brother was sectioned and assessed at hospital as needing ongoing support in sheltered accommodation. His social worker challenged the decision and recommended private accommodation. That confusion, despite his sister continually challenging the recommendation, meant he was discharged, with nowhere to go, in the middle of the night.

It is crucial that safeguards will remain. Where an individual cannot nominate someone themselves, a person can still be appointed on their behalf, but with far clearer guidelines and recourse if concerns arise. It is not about removing protection; it is about modernising it to reflect the society we represent. Mental health legislation must reflect the value and diversity of the society it serves, and the clauses and amendments before us bring us a step closer to that.

[Aphra Brandreth (Chester South and Eddisbury) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I rise to support amendments 54 and 55, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, but I will first briefly speak to clause 24, which is an important and long-overdue step towards modernising the Mental Health Act 1983, crucially strengthening the rights, dignity and autonomy of individuals subject to it.

The reform of the existing nearest relative provisions, replacing them with a new system that allows for the appointment of a nominated person, is an important part of ensuring that individuals get the right support, and modernises an outdated system. The current model is based on a rigid and outdated hierarchy in which the role of the “nearest relative” is determined by law, not by the wishes of the patient. This one-size-fits-all approach fails to account for the complexities and nuances of individual relationships. It can result in someone unsuitable, or even actively harmful, being placed in a central role in a person’s care and treatment journey. Indeed, the limitations of the system have been acknowledged by practitioners, patients and policymakers alike. It is too often disempowering, and the patient can lose agency at a time when they need to be empowered to feel in control of the situation as much as possible.

As the shadow Minister says, clause 24 is the cornerstone of the reforms. It is an important change to the current legislation to reaffirm the commitment to patient-centred care, to dignity and to the principle that those receiving treatment under the Mental Health Act should have a voice in decisions about their support network. The aim of the clause—to put the patient first—is important. It acknowledges that the person best placed to advocate for the patient may not be their closest relative. In some cases, family dynamics are fraught. In others, the designated relative may hold views about treatment that conflict with the patient’s wishes or medical advice. We have seen real-world examples in which the imposition of the “nearest relative” role has led to tension, distress and, ultimately, a breakdown in trust. That is not the kind of environment in which recovery is fostered.

Amendments 54 and 55 would address the specific issue of nominated persons and those with parental responsibility for children under the age of 16. It is important that we consider situations in which a young person may be in a vulnerable position and their decision on who their nominated person should be may not be in their best interests. We have a particular duty to ensure that children are safeguarded. Clause 24 as it stands will allow under-16s to choose someone who is not the parent to have significant power, including the ability to discharge the child from hospital.

We must listen to and actively try to support any young person who needs that kind of intervention—it is not that their views should not be considered. However, there is a very real risk that a vulnerable child or teenager might be coerced by or under the control of an older partner, for example, as my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth pointed out. Perhaps they might choose an older friend. We need to consider that a decision made by the nominated person, such as an older friend, may have implications for those with parental responsibility. For example, that older friend may decide to discharge a child from hospital and into the care of the parents, who would not provide advocacy or be part of that decision making.

The Minister said that safeguards will be put in place, but can he expand on that? There are some real concerns here. Let us consider a situation in which there has been a decision by a court to determine which parent has responsibility for the child. If complex family issues have already been considered by the family court, it is right that the decision be followed. I respectfully ask the Minister to reconsider this point. We must respect the fact that parents of those under 16 are best placed to advocate for, support and act for their children. This is about capacity, consent and, ultimately, safeguarding.

[Gregory Stafford]

My hon. Friend makes a powerful point. I remember the comments made by the hon. Member for Southend West and Leigh, who is chuntering from a sedentary position—I think he disagrees with my hon. Friend’s point. In his reply to my intervention, he made the point that there are situations in which things are the other way round, where those who have parental responsibility are not necessarily the appropriate persons.

Does my hon. Friend agree that, on first principles, the parent should have parental responsibility in all areas of life, including the ones that she is talking about, unless there are specific reasons, such as the court decision to which she referred, that suggest that the parent is not the correct person to have responsibility? Surely, in the balance of danger or risk, there is a far greater risk if the nominated person is not a parent than if the nominated person is a parent.

[Aphra Brandreth]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. If parents are not acting in the best interests of their children, there is a wider safeguarding issue that needs to be considered. One would question why such parents had been left in a situation in which they have responsibility for their children and are potentially harming them.

That leads me nicely to another point, which is that introducing the additional wording would bring mental health in line with physical health. For someone under the age of 16, it is their parents who have the responsibility to act in the best interests of their physical health; it seems to me that one would expect the same for mental health. I therefore urge the Committee to support amendments 54 and 55.

Let me return briefly to the overarching aims of clause 24. I underscore the point that the wider principle at stake—patient autonomy—is one that I support. The ability to make informed choices about one’s care should be a central component of our care system. In mental health, where individuals can feel particularly vulnerable, that becomes even more essential. Granting patients the power to nominate someone who will advocate for them, advise them and represent their wishes is a powerful act of empowerment. Moreover, this change enhances safeguards for patients. It ensures that the person acting on their behalf is someone they have chosen and trust. It reduces the potential for conflict and opens the door to a more collaborative and compassionate model of care.

If the Committee agrees to the amendments, which would provide the necessary safeguards for children, who I believe should be considered separately to adults, my overall view is that clause 24 represents a pragmatic, compassionate and patient-focused update to the Mental Health Act. It aligns with our modern understanding of mental healthcare and puts trust, respect and dignity at the heart of our legislative framework.

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I am grateful for the opportunity to speak to amendments 54 and 55, which propose that where a nominated person is appointed to represent the interests of a patient under the age of 16, that individual must hold parental responsibility. At face value, that is a concise and apparently straightforward proposal. However, as with much in the Bill and in our mental health legislation more broadly, what appears simple can raise intricate legal and ethical questions. I therefore wish to probe both the merits and the challenges of these amendments. I do so not to come down firmly on one side of the argument or the other, but in the hope of assisting the Committee to think through the implications of the amendments. I hope to prompt the Minister to provide further clarification as our consideration of the Bill proceeds.

I will start by setting out the case in favour of the amendments. There is an intuitive and, I would argue, legally grounded rationale behind amendment 54. It rests on the principle that serious decisions concerning a child’s mental health—decisions that might involve treatment without consent, or even deprivation of liberty—ought to be taken, or at least overseen, by somebody who already holds recognised legal responsibility for that child.

Parental responsibility is not merely administrative. It carries statutory and common-law duties to protect, support and advocate for a child’s welfare. By requiring the nominated person to have such responsibilities, the amendment seeks to ensure a level of legal legitimacy and continuity. It would strengthen the position of those with a formal bond to the child and might help to guard against the risk of unsuitable or ill-informed individuals stepping in to play such a critical role.

In that sense, amendment 54 reflects what many would see as good legal hygiene. It would bring new legislation into closer alignment with the Children Act 1989 and with broader child welfare practice. It would create a baseline expectation that only those with legal authority over a child should make, or help to make, decisions of such magnitude. It would also offer reassurances to families. For parents and guardians already concerned about the complex and sometimes opaque processes of mental health detention, the amendment offers a clear signal that their role cannot be set aside lightly. That reassurance may be particularly important when children are subject to long-term care or involuntary treatment. However, questions begin to surface at precisely that point, because although the principle appears sound, the practice is far from straightforward. It is therefore important that we probe both the advantages and disadvantages of the amendment.

Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)

Aphra Brandreth Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 17th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Danny Chambers (Winchester) (LD)]

I beg to move amendment 49, in schedule 2, page 87, line 13, at end insert—

“(18A) In section 130B (arrangements in relation to independent mental advocates: England), after subsection (3)(d), insert—

‘(e) support the patient’s carer and family members to prepare for the patient’s discharge from hospital treatment, and

(f) support the patient to access help with social and financial stressors that might otherwise increase their likelihood of future detention.’”

This amendment extends the support offered by Mental Health advocates to cover social and financial stressors and support for family carers and other members of the household when the patient is discharged.

It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris. I jumped the gun this morning, so I have already spoken in detail about the amazing initiative at Melbury Lodge with Winchester Citizens Advice. I will not bore the Committee with the details again, except to say that it is a brilliant example not only of delivering really good care for patients, but of a really good cost-effective intervention for the taxpayer. If it is not appropriate for it to be set out in secondary or primary legislation, will the Minister consider a meeting with me, Melbury Lodge and Winchester Citizens Advice to discuss how this type of initiative could be rolled out across the country?

[Aphra Brandreth (Chester South and Eddisbury) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris. I rise to make some brief comments on amendment 49.

I am sympathetic to aims of the hon. Member for Winchester in tabling the amendment. A patient who is being discharged from hospital may indeed require specific, targeted support. The overall success of their treatment and continued recovery can be greatly enhanced where the right structures are in place to support them in the community. The amendment rightly draws attention to social and financial stressors that may affect an individual at the point of discharge and in the weeks and months that follow. We all recognise that there is a pressing need for a more joined-up approach between in-patient services and community provision. Without that, we risk patients falling through the cracks and suffering unnecessary and distressing re-admissions. Better discharge planning must be at the heart of our efforts.

I have some concerns, however. Although I acknowledge the good intentions behind the amendment, it risks expanding the remit of independent mental health advocates beyond what might be appropriate. There is a delicate balance, but an important distinction, between advocacy and care co-ordination. Independent mental health advocates play a vital role, and it is essential that their independence and clarity of purpose be preserved. If we are not careful, we risk blurring that boundary. In doing so, we may undermine the very effectiveness of the independent mental health advocate in fulfilling their primary function.

The role of an IMHA is to support patients in understanding and exercising their rights under the Mental Health Act. They may already be involved in supporting an individual to prepare for discharge, including by contributing to plans for ongoing care and support. The amendment would significantly increase the breadth of that role and might shift the focus away from the core purpose of advocacy.

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

My hon. Friend makes a pressing point. Does she agree that if the amendment is accepted, there will be a requirement for additional training to deal with financial and social support, which goes outside the current scope of these important advocates?

[Aphra Brandreth]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. This is not a simple or straightforward addition; it would require potentially substantial training. We would not want somebody in a role that they were not adequately prepared for. With any amendment, we would need to ensure that training, and the time and expense of it, had been factored in.

Even with the best intentions, the success of any extended support role, such as that envisaged in the amendment, will ultimately rely on the availability and integration of local services. Where appropriate services are in place and are working well together, advocates can play a valuable role in signposting and supporting access. Rather than placing additional responsibilities on the IMHA, our focus should be on working with community providers to ensure that the necessary support, particularly for social and financial needs, is consistently available and is effectively joined up across the system.

Having said that, I recognise and welcome the emphasis placed by the hon. Member for Winchester on the role of carers and family members. Too often, they are overlooked in discharge planning, yet their involvement can make a critical difference to a patient’s successful transition from hospital to home. When carers feel informed, supported and prepared, it gives patients the reassurance and stability that they need to continue their recovery with confidence. The primary responsibility of the independent mental health advocate, however, must remain their responsibility to the patient. I am concerned that the drafting of the amendment could create ambiguity about who the IMHA is principally there to support.

Financial stress is undoubtedly a real and urgent concern. Mental ill health can severely affect an individual’s capacity to work, to manage their finances or even to engage with systems of support. Equally, financial instability can exacerbate mental health difficulties. Those are serious challenges that must be addressed, but I would question whether the IMHA is the right professional to take on that role directly. Instead, we should ensure that they are well placed to refer individuals to appropriate services without assuming responsibility for co-ordinating that support themselves.

[Gregory Stafford]

I do not know whether the hon. Member for Winchester will press his amendment to a vote, but if he does, would my hon. Friend support the idea of having a pilot roll-out of the system before we go the whole hog, because of all the potential problems that she has highlighted?

[Aphra Brandreth]

That is an important point. These are quite substantial changes, and we do not know the full impact that they would have on the system. We have talked about issues such as whether there is sufficient training for advocates and a joined-up approach with what is happening in the community. A pilot would provide the opportunity to see where it is working and where there might be things that need to be changed or considered. It would certainly be a sensible approach. We all want to ensure that we are supporting individuals to be discharged in a safe way that minimises the likelihood of their being readmitted, but we need to do so without overcomplicating the roles and the system that are currently in place.

I commend the hon. Member for Winchester for bringing these important issues to the attention of the Committee. His amendment raises legitimate and timely concerns around the support offered to individuals leaving hospital, as well as the wider context in which recovery takes place. I hope that I have been able to offer some reflections that will assist hon. Members in considering the matter further.

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[Stephen Kinnock]

The clause seeks to strengthen the protocol on discharging individuals under the Act by introducing a statutory requirement on the person who makes the discharge decision to consult with another. Currently, a patient’s responsible clinician can, in law, unilaterally decide to discharge a hospital in-patient from certain powers of the Act. Under our amendments, they will be required to consult someone else who is professionally concerned with the patient’s treatment, whether that be in the hospital or in the community. Where the responsible clinician is a consultant psychiatrist, the consultee may be a nurse, psychologist or occupational therapist. That is to ensure a more rounded perspective on the patient’s readiness for discharge from the Act.

The clause will introduce a similar protocol for the discharge of people under guardianship, guardianship orders and community treatment orders. For guardianship and guardianship orders, the person who makes the decision to discharge from the powers under the Act may need to consult either the responsible local social services authority or a person’s designated social worker. For patients under a community treatment order, the responsible clinician is required to consult the community clinician, in recognition of the fact that they will likely have a much clearer understanding of the patient’s progress in the community and whether they are ready for discharge under the Act.

Although multidisciplinary-based decisions represent best practice, we know that they are not always taken. The clause seeks to change that by helping to make sure that the decision to discharge is carefully considered and receives greater professional oversight.

[Aphra Brandreth]

I rise to speak to the implications of clause 34 for clinical decision making, patient safety and the operation of the Mental Health Act more broadly. The clause introduces a new requirement for the responsible clinician to consult another professional, from a different professional discipline, who is involved in the patient’s care before they make a decision to discharge a patient from detention or from a community treatment order under section 23 of the Mental Health Act 1983. If the patient is on a community treatment order, the clinician must consult the relevant community clinician.

At its heart, the clause seeks to ensure that decisions about discharge are not taken in isolation. It reflects a wider shift in mental health care towards collaborative, multidisciplinary approaches. We should welcome that in principle. These are often complex decisions that involve vulnerable individuals, and a single viewpoint may not always capture the full clinical picture. By requiring consultation with someone from another discipline, be that a nurse, an occupational therapist or a psychologist, we can help to ensure that decisions are more thoroughly considered and less likely to overlook risks.

The clause provides an important safeguard against premature or inappropriate discharge, particularly in cases where a patient may continue to pose a risk to themselves or others. It builds in a degree of professional scrutiny that supports safer and more consistent practice and, in doing so, should improve confidence among patients, families and practitioners.

I would be grateful if the Minister provided further clarity on a few practical points about how the clause will operate. First, it requires consultation but does not appear to specify whether the consulted clinician must agree with the responsible clinician’s decision in order for discharge to proceed. In cases where there is disagreement between clinicians of different professional backgrounds, what is the expected course of action? Is the responsible clinician ultimately free to proceed, or will there be an escalation mechanism? It would be helpful to understand how differing professional opinions are to be balanced and how potential deadlock is to be managed.

Secondly, although I welcome the intention to improve the rigour of decision making, will the Minister reassure the Committee that the additional consultation requirement will not introduce unnecessary delays into the discharge process? It is, of course, essential to get these decisions right, but it is also important that we do not create new barriers to discharge when a patient is clinically ready to move on. Delays in discharge can have a negative impact on patient outcomes, as well as increasing pressure on services. Although the consultation must be meaningful, it should also be proportionate, timely and clearly understood by all involved.

Will the Minister comment on how the requirement will be implemented in practice? For example, will guidance be issued to support clinicians in understanding their duties under the clause and to ensure consistency across services?

Overall, the clause represents a thoughtful and measured reform. It strengthens patient safety, promotes professional collaboration and introduces a safeguard that is both reasonable and necessary. Notwithstanding the clarifications I have raised, I hope that it will help to ensure that discharge decisions are made with greater confidence and care without becoming unduly bureaucratic.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

The hon. Member for Chester South and Eddisbury asked about differences of opinion. The second professional does not have to agree. The ultimate decision in such cases sits with the responsible clinician, to ensure the clear accountability of decision making.

The hon. Lady also asked about delays. We see consultation with another professional as important to making a more informed decision on whether the patient is ready for discharge under the Act. It is especially important that the second professional involved in discharge decisions is from a discipline different from that of the responsible clinician. That will ensure a broader perspective, particularly when the second professional, such as a nurse, may have had more frequent contact with the patient.

[Aphra Brandreth]

On the discipline of the second clinician consulted, is there any guidance as to who might be appropriate? I mean not just the list of potential professions but whether there is guidance on who would be appropriate in different situations. We welcome the multidisciplinary approach, but I would like some clarification. Given your earlier response, saying that they need to agree, it is not really clear how this would add to the process. It would help if there were clarity on the professions.

[The Chair]

Order. When you say “you”, you are referring to the Chair.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

I will first discuss clause 41 and schedule 3. Independent mental health advocates are specially trained advocates who can support patients detained under the Mental Health Act to understand their rights and participate in decisions about their care and treatment, but not everyone who would benefit from an independent mental health advocate currently has access to one. In view of the benefits that advocacy can bring, we are expanding the right to an independent mental health advocate to all mental health patients, including informal or voluntary patients who are not detained under the Act.

We know that some informal patients are not told about their rights and legal status. Informal patients in Wales already have the protection, and we want to extend it to patients in England. It will help ensure that the voices of individuals are heard and their rights respected, and that potentially vulnerable groups, including children and young people, do not go without important advocacy protections.

Moreover, the Bill provides an additional enhanced mechanism for ensuring that the most vulnerable mental health patients, those compulsorily detained under the Mental Health Act, are able to benefit from advocacy. We are introducing an opt-out system for that particular cohort, to put the onus on hospital managers rather than patients themselves to request independent mental health advocacy services. Hospital managers must notify providers of advocacy services about the patients who are eligible for IMH advocacy. Advocacy providers must then arrange for independent mental health advocates to interview those patients to find out whether they want to use their services.

The right to an independent mental health advocate will also be expanded to include part III patients who are subject to the new supervised discharge, which allows for part III patients to be conditionally discharged into the community and still deprived of their liberty. The Bill also enables independent mental health advocates to provide extra help to patients to have a greater say in their treatment or to make a complaint. Together, these changes increase the access that patients have to advocacy, which contributes to improved patient rights.

I will next address amendment 19. We appreciate that people under 18 are a vulnerable group who would benefit from advocacy representation. For this reason, the Bill extends the right to an independent mental health advocate to informal patients, including under-18s, who are often admitted on a voluntary basis. We are introducing a duty on hospital managers to inform them of this right. That means that hospital managers will be expected to proactively approach all children and young people, and others, such as their parents or carers, to make sure they know that they are entitled to an advocate and help them to appoint one.

We will make it clear in the code of practice how independent mental health advocates should support children and young people with their particular needs. However, we think it is right that detained patients, including under-18s—rather than informal patients—receive advocacy on an opt-out basis. This is because they are subject to greater restrictions, meaning that it is even more important that they are supported to exercise their rights.

Finally, I will address Government amendments 42 and 43. Schedule 3 introduces the concept of “English qualifying informal patients”, who, for the first time in England, will be eligible for independent mental health advocacy services. We are amending this measure to change the definition of both English and Welsh qualifying informal patients. Amendments 42 and 43 are minor amendments to address a technical issue with the legislation. There is case law saying that the term “informal patient” would cover anyone there on a voluntary basis and not subject to any compulsory legislative framework. However, as currently drafted, the Bill’s definition is wider, defining an informal patient in England or Wales as an in-patient in hospital who is receiving assessment or treatment for a mental disorder at the hospital but not subject to the Mental Health Act. A person deprived of their liberty under any other legislation such as the Mental Capacity Act 2005 or under a court order would therefore be classed as an “informal patient”, which would be incorrect, as people who are detained cannot, under case law, be informal patients.

That would lead to complications in practice. A patient subject to the deprivation of liberty safeguards would be eligible for independent mental health advocacy as well as independent mental capacity advocacy. However, an independent mental health advocate cannot provide any help or support in relation to the Mental Capacity Act. The amendments address that issue by changing the definitions of “English qualifying informal patient” and “Welsh qualifying informal patient”, to be an in-patient receiving assessment or treatment for a mental disorder who is not detained under any other legislation or court order.

For those reasons, I hope that the hon. Member for Winchester is satisfied not to press his amendment, and I commend Government amendments 42 and 43, clause 41 and schedule 3 to the Committee.

[Aphra Brandreth]

I rise to speak to clause 41, which brings into sharper focus two pillars of a fair and rights-based mental health system: the provision of clear information to patients and the strengthening of independent mental health advocacy. It rightly recognises that, when a person is detained under the Mental Health Act 1983, often during a period of acute crisis and difficulty in their life, they need to feel that their clinical needs are being met, but in a way that respects them as individuals, with the same entitlements to dignity and agency as any other member of our society.

The clause provides for informal patients to be eligible for an independent mental health advocate. I welcome the extension to enable more individuals to access this vital advocacy. It empowers patients to know that independent advocacy is available, but we must ensure that there are sufficient resources so that those who choose this help are given sufficient support when they are in a potentially vulnerable position. As someone representing a constituency that is in England but borders Wales, I also welcome that these changes bring care into line so that advocacy help is offered to informal patients, regardless of which side of the border they are accessing treatment.

The clause places a renewed duty on services to ensure that information is given to patients clearly, promptly and in a form that they can understand. It introduces an obligation for advocacy providers to determine, through an interview, whether a qualifying patient wishes to use the service. This support is important; no person should be expected to navigate the complexities of mental health legislation, or their rights under it, without proper guidance. However, where there is a duty

“on hospital managers and others to notify providers of advocacy services about qualifying patients”,

can the Minister clarify who is meant by “others”? Will there be a list of people and roles who are given this responsibility?

The role of an independent mental health advocate is vital. These individuals can be a lifeline. They can help people to understand their rights and any medical treatment, and crucially, can support an individual to have their say about any treatment. Clause 41 rightly reinforces the importance of independent mental health advocates, and it is important that we match that ambition with the legal and practical steps to support them.

It is entirely right that we welcome the recognition of the role of independent mental health advocates, who serve a vital function in ensuring that patients’ voices are heard and their views represented, especially when navigating what can be an incredibly complex legal and clinical environment. Their independence is fundamental to not only their effectiveness but the confidence that patients and families can place in the system, which brings me back to my point. It is therefore important that we support independent mental health advocates with the resources that they need to do their job effectively.

If we are to rely further on advocates, we need to ensure that they are in a position to deal with that, so that we do not create statutory entitlements that are difficult to act upon. Actions, as well as words, are needed. At present, many areas already struggle with advocacy coverage. If we now place additional expectations on the service, and I believe that we will through this provision, we must ensure that there are sufficient numbers of trained, experienced independent mental health advocates across the country to meet rising demand. Can the Minister reassure the Committee that the necessary people with the skills and training are available to fulfil this expanded role?

We must also consider the patients’ experience, as has been the focus of so many of the remarks made in the Committee today. Again, I emphasise the vulnerability of patients at times of crisis. If we are to tell patients that support in the form of an advocate is there for them, we need to ensure that it is accessible and easy to reach and understand. Clause 41 moves us in the right direction, but implementation is everything. It must be backed by local accountability, adequate funding and clear operational guidance. This includes ensuring that all patients, regardless of background, language or capacity, are given support that is appropriate and effective.

It is vital to consider the wider implications of this clause. The reinforcement of the independent mental health advocate’s involvement should be mirrored by greater investment in advocacy services, stronger integration with care planning and more regular engagement with patients themselves on how these services work in practice. In our earlier discussions, my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon suggested that we use trials, which could also be considered here to ensure that, as changes are brought in, they are matched by appropriate service levels.

I am largely supportive of clause 41, which I think moves us in the right direction towards a transparent mental health system that is there for patients, ensuring that they have a voice and are not an afterthought. As long as it is deliverable in practice, and does not give false hope to patients, the clause strengthens the Bill.

[Josh Dean]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mrs Harris—when I wrote my speech, it said “this afternoon”, but it now says “this evening”. I rise to speak to clause 41 and schedule 3. I welcome the role that they will play in extending the right to access the services of an independent mental health advocate to voluntary patients in England not detained under the Mental Health Act, and ensuring that all detained patients are offered these services through an automatic referral, creating an opt-out system.

Independent mental health advocates play an important role in supporting patients detained under the Act to understand their rights and participate in decisions around their care and treatment. Clause 41 and schedule 3 seek to ensure that the individual needs of each patient are taken into account, even where they may not be able to engage in decision making about themselves. In doing so, they recognise the patient as an individual. This provides for important safeguards for patients and reinforces the Bill’s principles of autonomy and least restriction, which is a crucial part of bringing mental health legislation into the 21st century. I similarly welcome Government amendments 42 and 43, which seek to further strengthen the important safeguards in the Bill.

I hear the points that the Minister has made on children and young people admitted informally, but I would be grateful if he could address the matter further. As we know, informal patients are those who consent to an admission to a mental health hospital or whose parents consent to an admission on their behalf. Often, they are treated under the same or similar conditions as those detained under the Act. While detained patients will receive an automatic referral to advocacy services under the new opt-out scheme, my understanding is that that will not be the case for those admitted informally, meaning that informal patients would still be required to ask for the support of an independent mental health advocate.

Children admitted informally are likely to experience the same conditions as another child detained under the Act, but without the parity of access to advocacy services through the opt-out system. Because a parent is able to consent to informal treatment on their child’s behalf, they are one of few groups, if not the only one, able to be admitted informally without their own consent. Therefore, there is a concern that children and young people admitted informally may continue to experience problems accessing the support of an advocate. I seek the Minister’s assurance that the Government have considered fully the provision of advocacy services for informally admitted children and young people, and how this gap might be addressed.

I welcome how these parts of the Bill will embed those important principles of individuality, autonomy and least restriction, expanding the important safeguards offered by independent mental health advocates. I would be grateful if the Minister could touch on those points about children and young people in his response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Aphra Brandreth]

Does the Minister have any more detail on that? Is there a timeframe for recruiting these advocates and putting the training in place? That would help reassure the Committee that there is provision to ensure that the timing will fit with the introduction of the changes in the Bill.

[Stephen Kinnock]

As has been discussed, as soon as the Bill gets Royal Assent we will launch an extensive consultation around the code of practice. The code of practice will cover everything from training to recruitment to capacity building, and the plan will be set out in the first annual written ministerial statement, which will take place one year after the Bill receives Royal Assent.

My hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford asked about children admitted informally. We are introducing a duty on hospital managers to inform informal patients of their right to a mental health advocate. We will set out the importance of independent mental health advocate representation for children and young people in the code of practice. That could include the importance of a proactive approach for hospital managers.

We will also describe in the code the new role for independent mental health advocates in relation to informal patients, including vulnerable in-patient groups, such as children and young people, people from ethnic minority backgrounds and people with a learning disability or autism.

The hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon asked whether we have the money for it. The funding requirements will, I think, be related to our best estimate of likely workforce and funding requirements. If we are going for 330 additional IMHAs, the funding requirements will be defined by that number.

The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, asked whether it will be local authority funding. We are obliged to fund new burdens on local authorities to resource this expansion of the independent mental health advocates. He then asked a blizzard of additional questions; I got lost in the thread of them all. We will go through Hansard and write to him.

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[Sojan Joseph (Ashford) (Lab)]

I welcome the strengthening of section 132 of the Mental Health Act in respect of information about complaints, as proposed in clauses 42 to 44.

Clause 42 deals with information about complaints for detained patients. Currently, through the code of practice, there is a requirement that hospital managers will pass on that information. They should do so both orally and in writing, ensuring that the information is accessible, including in easy-read format for people with learning disabilities. Hospital managers should also ensure that the information has been understood. The clause would amend section 132 of the Act by placing that statutory duty on hospital managers, supplying detained patients and the nominated person with the necessary information about complaints, and taking practicable steps to ensure that the information has been understood.

Proposed new subsection (2A) deals with the types of complaints covered by that duty. They include complaints about carrying out of functions under the Act and about medical treatment. Proposed new subsection (2A)(c) ensures that the statutory duty covers information about the patient’s right to complain to the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman about the maladministration of such complaints. Proposed new subsection (2B) sets out that the duty is triggered

“as soon as practicable after the commencement of the patient’s detention”.

That means that the duty will be triggered each time the section under which the patient is detained changes, and when the authority to detain under that section is renewed.

In respect of part III of the 1983 Act, which concerns restricted patients to whom automatic renewals do not apply, the duty will be triggered every 12 months from the start date of detention. As I mentioned earlier, much of that process is already expected to take place, but ensuring it takes place in future by making it a statutory duty is a sensible and welcome strengthening of that safeguard.

That is also the case for clause 43, which relates to information about complaints for community patients and seeks to amend section 132A of the 1983 Act. As a result of the clause’s changes, there will be a statutory duty on hospital managers to supply information about the complaints procedure, as set out in clause 42, to community patients and the nominated person. That will mean that the patient must be provided with complaints information as soon as practicable after they are placed under a community treatment order, and each time that community treatment order is renewed.

Clause 44 deals with information about complaints for conditionally discharged patients and inserts proposed new section 132B, which requires hospital managers to give complaints information to conditionally discharged restricted patients. The proposed new section states that such information must be provided before the patient leaves hospital, or as soon as possible when the patient is conditionally discharged. Patients must receive the information when they are first detained in the hospital, and again whenever they are conditionally discharged. As with clause 42, the hospital manager must ensure that the patient has received such information both orally and in writing, and that practical steps have been taken to ensure that the patient understands the information. A copy of the information must also be given to the nominated person within a reasonable timeframe, unless the patient has requested otherwise. I support the clauses, as the changes made by it will strengthen the Act.

[Aphra Brandreth]

I rise to make a few brief remarks about clauses 42 to 44, which would amend the 1983 Act to place statutory duties on hospital managers to supply complaints information to both the patient and the nominated person in respect of detailed patients, patients subject to a CTO and conditionally discharged patients.

These are important clauses. The people concerned are potentially vulnerable individuals. They need to know that they have a voice in this process and feel empowered to speak out and complain, should they wish. There is a duty on hospital managers to ensure that detained patients understand how to make complaints. However, I ask the Minister how that duty will be checked and evaluated. We all agree that the ability to speak out to make a complaint is important, but we need to ensure that proper safeguards and parameters are in place on how that will happen.

I also welcome the provision requiring that the information must be provided as soon as is practicable. That is important to give patients confidence. The timing requirements will potentially make a huge difference. The journey of a patient may change rapidly over the course of their treatment, so not leaving it too long will potentially make a substantial difference to their ability to recover swiftly, and ensure that they have been able to speak out if they are concerned not just about their detainment but about the way that their treatment is being carried out, and the potential implications of that.

Like many of the measures that we have discussed, these clauses might have administrative implications. We need to ensure that we have fully considered and are able to put in place the necessary support for hospital managers to deal with complaints appropriately. It is important that if someone comes forward with a complaint, it can be dealt with swiftly.

As mentioned on some other matters, we need to ensure consistency for patients, so that they understand the information that they are being provided and that, whatever region they might live in or hospital they might be at, consistent information is provided. I would like the Minister’s reassurance on that point.

Overall, however, the clause improves patients’ awareness of their rights and how they can seek redress. I think we all agree that that is extremely important. It will promote accountability in mental health services by encouraging feedback and complaints. I would like reassurance of some oversight to ensure feedback on any complaints that come forward so that we identify where consistent issues come up, to provide better services not just to the individual but to future individuals. Overall, the clauses support better outcomes by addressing potential grievances and ensuring that they are addressed early and constructively, so I am supportive of them.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

You will be delighted to know that I will be mercifully brief, Mrs Harris, because I am broadly supportive of all three clauses. Having worked as a doctor in clinical practice, and as a barrister, I am cognisant of the importance of transparency, patient autonomy and procedural fairness, in particular with vulnerable patients who are often seen in a mental health care setting.

I welcome this trio of clauses, but I have some gentle challenges to put to the Minister for when he gets to his feet. First, how will data be captured on the information that is to be provided to patients and their families? What feedback mechanisms will be in place, not just for patients but for those who support them—their carers and families—and for clinicians, on the practicalities of how the system is working?

Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting)

Aphra Brandreth Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 12th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

Although I acknowledge that police forces have faced an increase in workload pressures in recent years, I do not accept that the amendments passed in the other place are the correct way to address that. Indeed, I believe that keeping them in the Bill risks being counterproductive. The expertise, skills and equipment of the police remain essential for safely reaching individuals in crisis, especially where they might be an immediate danger to themselves, pose a risk to others, or face a threat from others. I therefore welcome the Government amendments and urge Members to support them.

[Aphra Brandreth (Chester South and Eddisbury) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Furniss.

Government amendments 26 to 29 risk undoing some of the good work done in the other place, where careful improvements were made to strengthen the Bill and ensure a more compassionate and effective response to mental health crises. I am concerned that by removing the words

“by a constable or other authorised person”

and deleting clause 5(7), which provides a clear definition of who the authorised persons are, we will open up ambiguity about who is permitted to detain someone under the Mental Health Act. This is not just a technical or drafting issue; it has very real consequences for the people involved.

I understand and support the principle of enabling more flexible and clinically led responses to mental health incidents. We all recognise that the police should not be the default option in every case. The amendments made in the Lords acknowledged that and broadened the group of people who could respond to mental health crises beyond police officers to trained and equipped professionals: mental health nurses, approved mental health professionals, paramedics and, crucially, someone trained and equipped to carry out detentions under the Act and who would not be put at unnecessary risk by doing so. “Trained and equipped”—that is the key point.

The definition of “authorised person” in the Bill as it stands makes it clear that those given such a serious responsibility must have the appropriate training and experience and must not be “put at unnecessary risk” when carrying out that role. That wording is important. As the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, said, it provides a framework of accountability, not a free-for-all. By removing that structure, the Government’s amendments will leave a legal vacuum. The law will say that someone must be detained, but not by whom. That uncertainty will create a risk that services will simply revert to defaulting to the police.

I stress again that that is not fair on the police, who are already under immense pressure. Yes, they are used to seeing people at their most vulnerable, but dealing with someone in a mental health crisis is a very particular challenge, and one that they might not be fully trained to manage. The College of Policing’s 2019 mental health snapshot found that almost 95% of police call-outs flagged as involving mental health did not actually require a police response, yet police officers continue to be sent out because the system lacks clarity and capacity elsewhere.

Baroness May, speaking from real experience as a former Home Secretary, made that very point in the other place. She said that police officers were being sent to mental health incidents for which they had no training or clinical expertise, and were being asked to make judgments that they simply were not equipped to make. She went on to say that

“the very essence of a police presence—somebody in the uniform coming to deal with them—could actually exacerbate their mental health situation”.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 20 January 2025; Vol. 842, c. 1525.]

I would add that, for the individual experiencing a mental health crisis, being approached by the police may feel criminalising rather than supportive. It reinforces a justice-led response rather than a health-led one. That is not the direction in which we should be going.

Although I welcome the Government’s intention to offer more flexibility in emergency and clinical settings, we have to be careful about how we achieve that. Removing the wording inserted into the Bill will not create clarity; it will create confusion. In a system already under pressure, confusion tends to mean delay, risk aversion and inappropriate responses. Removing the specification will not free professionals; it will expose them, and it will expose patients to the possibility of being handled by someone without the right qualifications, which may worsen their condition or create a longer-term distrust of mental health services.

I hope that the Minister can offer some reassurances, both about who will be expected to carry out these detentions and about how we can ensure that they have the proper training, resourcing and protection. Without a clear definition of “authorised person”, we cannot be confident that those involved will have the right expertise to support extremely vulnerable individuals at times of acute need.

I want to touch briefly on the importance of early intervention and de-escalation. Situations involving mental health crises can often be tense, and support in the early moments can be critical. De-escalation is a vital skill; the presence of a calm, trained mental health nurse, for example, in those early moments can change the outcome of a person’s crisis. Having the right professional present—someone who can act without waiting for the police to attend—can be the difference between escalation and calm. The identity of the responder matters.

This is not just about outcomes, but about the experience of the individual. Removing the criminal justice framing from the outset is essential to delivering dignity and the right kind of care.

[Jen Craft (Thurrock) (Lab)]

There seems to be some circular talk about the level of risk that clinicians and medical professionals can be expected to shoulder. I notice that clause 5(7), inserted in the other place, specifies that they would

“not be put at unnecessary risk”.

Is there not an inherent risk involved in detaining people who need to be detained under the Mental Health Act? Those people are not in a position to give consent and quite often do not wish to be detained. By stipulating that the police will not be involved in situations or by making medical professionals the first responders, is there not a risk of putting them in harm’s way?

[Aphra Brandreth]

It is extremely important that people are not put at risk, and that is exactly the point I have been making. People need to be properly trained, and we need to set out who those individuals can be, rather than leaving ambiguity in the wording. The Government amendment will undo exactly the protection that the hon. Lady rightly points out.

[Gregory Stafford]

My hon. Friend is making a clear point, but I want to add that there are clearly places and situations in which non-police professionals, such as mental health professionals, deal with extremely dangerous and violent patients. They are appropriately trained to do so. It is not in isolation that non-police public professionals are dealing with dangerous people. It is about the right situation, the right place and the right training.

[Aphra Brandreth]

My hon. Friend helpfully expands on the points that I and other Opposition Members have been making. If we are not careful, the Government amendments will move us further away from the aim of a person-centred approach.

I urge the Minister to reconsider the amendments. The wording inserted in the other place struck a thoughtful balance. The wording inserted in the other place struck a thoughtful balance. It allowed flexibility, but grounded it in clear criteria of training, safety and competence. Removing that definition will weaken the Bill. It will make it harder, not easier, to ensure that the right person is supporting someone at their moment of greatest need. We owe it to patients, professionals and the police themselves to get this right.

[Gregory Stafford]

The clause is a necessary reset—[Interruption.] Goodness, what a background noise! If only I had such a response to everything I said.

The clause is rooted in the central recommendation of the 2018 independent review of the Mental Health Act, that the criteria for detention are too broad and being applied too inconsistently. Too often we hear stories of people being detained not because they pose a real and present danger, but because services are stretched, community alternatives are not available, or there is simply a lack of clarity on when detention is justified.

This clause is necessarily corrective. It raises the bar by introducing a clear and structured risk threshold that requires the possibility of serious harm to health or safety, rather than vague concerns or subjective impressions. The inclusion of terms such as “likelihood” and the focus on actual risk mark a clear move towards the evidence-based practice that we want to see and away from overreach.

For me, the key strengths of the clause include, first, a higher threshold for detention. Under section 2 of the Mental Health Act, detention for assessment is permitted only if serious harm may occur. That means that professionals must assess the nature and the degree of harm, as well as the likelihood, injecting rigour and proportionality into decision making.

The clause also clarifies the treatment criteria. Under section 3 of the Act, detention for treatment is allowed only if serious harm may occur without it and if treatment is necessary, and, crucially, it must be available. That prevents people from being detained without any therapeutic benefit, a concern that has long plagued the system. The clause also aligns measures across the Mental Health Act: the new threshold applies not only to the initial decision to detain, but to emergency detentions and renewals. That brings consistency and coherence across the different parts of the legislation.

The final key point among the strengths of the clause is the definition of the authorised person, which is vital. It ensures that those tasked with detention powers are properly trained and equipped to deal with the complex and often volatile realities of mental health crises. Whether a doctor, an approved mental health professional or a specially trained nurse, the provision ensures that detention is exercised by someone with relevant expertise, not by default by the police. Taken together, the changes significantly strengthen the legal framework around detention, reduce the risk of misuse and reaffirm the principle of least restriction, the idea that coercive care should be used only when no other alternative exists.

The problems I have with Government amendments 26 to 29 are as follows. The Minister proposes to delete references to

“a constable or other authorised person”

from the clause. On the surface, that may appear to be technical, but in fact I think it is a profound and problematic shift. The amendments would weaken the very safeguards that the clause is trying to strengthen. We must be careful about how we frame this.

The amendments risk undoing the clarity and purpose of the clause by making it ambiguous who can lawfully detain someone under the Mental Health Act. Instead of defining the responsibility clearly and ensuring that it is held by trained professionals, the amendments will strip the clause back to vague flexibility, with no guarantee that the right expertise is present in real-time decisions.

The power to detain and to move individuals to a place of safety, in particular under sections 135 and 136 of the Act, is largely restricted and falls under the responsibility of police officers. These provisions, while designed to protect the public, can often result in the criminalisation of people in acute mental health crises, even when there is no threat of violence or risk to others.

Furthermore, the clause as passed by the House of Lords would relieve police officers of responsibilities that fall outside their core expertise, while also reducing the stigma and trauma associated with police-led interventions. It would streamline the process, ensure that individuals are supported by professionals trained specifically in mental health care, and maintain police involvement only where there is a clear and present risk to safety. In doing so, it would significantly strengthen the system and place mental health crises more firmly within the domain of health rather than law enforcement.

Let me set out the key problems with Government amendments 26 to 29. First, I think that they will blur the lines of responsibility. The clause rightly states that detention must be carried out by a constable or other authorised person, namely someone who has been designated and trained to carry out this high-stakes task. The Government amendments will remove that requirement. In doing so, they risk creating confusion on the ground about who is permitted to act. In a moment of crisis, ambiguity costs time, and time costs lives.

Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

Aphra Brandreth Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Stephen Kinnock]

I see. I am sorry; I had misunderstood the shadow Minister’s point. I thought it was about sharing data on particular patients, especially those who are crossing borders. The point about waiting lists is a more difficult issue. The Welsh Government have taken a view on how best to define them. For example, I know that ambulance waiting times have been quite controversial because there is a different definition in Wales to England. Many feel that the definition adopted by the Welsh Government sets the bar at a higher standard, which can then sometimes framed, in the hurly-burly of politics, as failing more than they would be if they had used a different metric, but they have chosen to use that metric.

In the context of devolution, it is up to the Welsh Government to decide how best to evaluate the Welsh health service and its performance. I take the shadow Minister’s point on having the best alignment that we can, but when it comes to this UK Government, we will determine how performance is evaluated for England, and the Welsh Government will determine how best to evaluate performance for Wales. I think that the Welsh media, the UK media, this Parliament and the Welsh Parliament will then decide who is failing and who is succeeding.

[Aphra Brandreth (Chester South and Eddisbury) (Con)]

I represent an English constituency on the border with Wales; on some streets, one side is considered Welsh and the other English. Does the Minister recognise that it matters to people in England and Wales that there is consistency across both parts of our fantastic country, and that it is not sufficient to say that what happens in Wales will affect only Welsh people, or what happens in England will affect only English people?

[Stephen Kinnock]

I absolutely accept the point that there are deeply integrated communities on that border. A huge number of people live in England and work in Wales, or live in Wales and work in England. However, the fact of the matter is that health is a devolved policy area. It is, therefore, up to the devolved Administrations to determine how they want to measure the performance of their respective systems. It would be a violation of the principles of devolution if one Government in our United Kingdom were to dictate to another how they should evaluate their devolved policy areas—whether that is health, education or any other devolved area. I hope that I have responded to the best of my ability.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3

Application of the Mental Health Act 1983: autism and learning disability

--- Later in debate ---

[Zöe Franklin]

That presents challenges, but again, I would refer back to my own casework, and I am sure there are Members on the Committee who will have had the same experience. There are examples across the UK where health boards and providers find ways to appropriately share information with families and other carers to get the best outcomes for patients. I simply ask that, when the Minister and colleagues in this space have those examples, they share them. I know that there are some areas where this is already done effectively, particularly in Scotland, and I seek to reference those examples.

My final point on amendments 2 and 5 is that we need to ensure that those around a patient are given the opportunity to raise concern or the alarm when part of the report does not meet the patient’s needs. We need to address the patient’s full needs, and to ensure that they are both reflected in the reports and met.

[Aphra Brandreth]

Like my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon, I have a lot of sympathy with some of the things that the hon. Lady is trying to achieve through the amendments. If there is to be an additional requirement for six-monthly rather than annual checks, how will the balance be struck to ensure that there is a focus on care rather than on the administrative burden that might be required?

[Zöe Franklin]

Helpfully, I was about to move on to a point about amendments 3 and 6, which would shorten the length between care and treatment plan reviews from 12 to six months.

We need to reflect on the fact that sometimes we do not get it right when we support an individual. In such circumstances, it is particularly important that we are able to have reviews every six months, rather than 12. It does not have to be a detailed, full-scale review. If all involved in the patient’s care come to the conclusion that the care needs are being met, that review could be incredibly short. If someone’s care is inadequate or inappropriate, it is not right that they should have to suffer unnecessarily for a year without the changes that are needed. Halving the time between the care and treatment reviews ensures that patients are not left languishing and instead have care that truly reflects their individual needs. I would reiterate that a six-month review can be incredibly short, and it also benefits patients by making them aware of where their care is not working for them, so that it can be reviewed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Gregory Stafford]

I agree entirely. That could be the unintended consequence of amendment 51: in essence, if the housing provision is not there, discharge will be delayed. From my understanding of the amendments in the group, those who tabled them are trying to speed up and improve discharge. My hon. Friend is absolutely right that we need to think about the practical implications of the Bill.

The amendment would require co-ordination among health, social care and housing services, which may be challenging in under-resourced areas. Frankly, because parts of those organisations are not used to working in the ways that the amendment would require, it might fall over without suitable training, the necessary lead-in time and a practical understanding of how it will work.

Amendment 4 would ensure that housing needs are formally considered during the care and treatment review meetings for adults with autism or a learning disability, without an EHCP. I understand that the aim is to support more effective discharge planning and reduce the risk of unnecessary or prolonged hospital stays. That is entirely in keeping with what we should be trying to do in the Bill. Holistic care planning reduces delays in discharge, improves cross-sector collaboration and supports community-based care, which we all support.

Once again, however, there is potential for complexity in the implementation. New processes may be required to involve the housing authorities. Resources and local housing shortages could limit the amendments’ practical impact. Another layer of complex review processes could add to that administrative burden. If there is inconsistent local capacity, the effectiveness of the amendment will almost certainly vary depending on the local housing infrastructure, which could lead to a postcode lottery, for want of a better phrase, in who receives the adequate care and housing.

Amendment 2 would ensure that children and young people with autism or learning disability, as well as their nominated persons and independent mental health advocates, receive a copy of the care, education and treatment review meeting report. I have a lot of sympathy with that. It potentially increases empowerment and transparency, ensuring that patients and their advocates are fully informed, which could enable better participation in care decisions. It has a legal and ethical alignment with the principles of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the UN convention on the rights of persons with disabilities, both of which emphasise supported decision making. It might also improve advocacy, as independent mental health advocates can more effectively represent a patient’s interest when they have access to the full report.

[Aphra Brandreth]

My hon. Friend is making valuable points about the benefits of the amendment. For vulnerable individuals, family involvement is often extremely important, but does he agree that that must be balanced with ensuring that potential disagreements do not put at risk what is best for the individual?

[Gregory Stafford]

My hon. Friend makes a key point that I was about to address. Clearly, where there is a supportive family structure with the best interests of the individual at heart, the amendment will work extraordinarily well. However, we have to be realistic about the practical implications.

Not every patient has a strong family structure around them. Unfortunately, some patients may even have family members who, for financial or other reasons, actively do not have their best interests at heart. There is a potential concern around confidentiality. I ask the hon. Members for Winchester and for Guildford how they would balance that conflict in practical terms, especially when the CETR includes sensitive clinical information that could be used in a way that is not beneficial to the patient by someone who does not have their best interests at heart. As my hon. Friend the Member for Chester South and Eddisbury points out, disputes can happen if patients or families disagree with professional assessments or recommendations.

Finally, although this is probably not the strongest point, we should think about the administrative burden. Given the increased workload that we are putting on all our health and care workers and services, there will clearly be an administrative burden in sharing these reports.

Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting)

Aphra Brandreth Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

The new clause also requires a formal consultation process, ensuring that the plan is developed with the people it affects the most: individuals with learning disabilities, autistic people, their families, clinicians and advocates. I know that the Government will point to ongoing engagement with stakeholders and that is, of course, welcome. What we are asking for here is guaranteed participation that is enshrined in law.

[Aphra Brandreth (Chester South and Eddisbury) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. The new clause is incredibly important. We do not want vulnerable people to slip through the cracks and not receive the right support, and it is really important to ensure that there is consultation with the right stakeholders. I recently met with Down Syndrome Cheshire, and last year I met with the Cheshire West and Chester SEND accountability group. They said that one of the things they value most is being listened to so that they can inform the process. Does my hon. Friend agree that that is a really crucial part of new clause 11?

[Dr Evans]

My hon. Friend speaks to the heart of what we all know from our constituency day jobs, where many of us here in this place speak to outside organisations and families. On Second Reading, the hon. Member for St Neots and Mid Cambridgeshire talked passionately about the impacts and the sorry stories that we have all heard about. The whole point of this Bill is to make mental health care patient-centred, but also family and advocate-centred. That is a driving thrust of what the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care was asking us for, and it is why we have enshrined the individual in the first clause of the Bill.

My hon. Friend is absolutely right: if we are committed to the principle enshrined on the front of the Bill, we need co-production. That must be more than a tick-box exercise. If the Government believe that the necessary plan is already in place, will the Minister say where that is covered, and would he put that plan in the House of Commons Library? Is it fully costed? Has it been fully consulted on? Will it be published within 18 months and incorporated in the NHS long-term plan? If not, how will the ICBs and local authorities be expected to deliver? How will the changes to NHS England affect plans to deliver the legislation? Having the legal duty to produce a costed plan will provide a focal point and fulcrum to build around, to ensure that the most serious mental health conditions receive the attention they need.

I know the Minister cares deeply and wants to do his best. He wants the legislation to be enacted as swiftly as possible. I also recognise the commitments and priorities facing the country, but this new clause is about turning good intentions into action. I simply aim to strengthen the hand of the Minister when it comes to negotiating with the Chancellor about funding, so that he has the evidence base required to bolster his position. I hope hon. Members across the Committee, especially on the Government Benches, see it as a supportive, sensible, balanced and practical solution to have this debate and then campaign with the Chancellor to get the money needed for the services.

Turning to the Lib Dem amendments, I begin by recognising the genuine intent behind amendments 10, 22, 24 and 21. Addressing the needs of people with autism and learning disabilities, particularly ensuring appropriate crisis accommodation and reducing unnecessary detention, is unquestionably important. That said, I have specific concerns about legislating for service provision in the Bill.

I understand why we do not legislate for the number of intensive care units, hospices or detox centres in the health system. There is an argument that that might be a good idea. Those are critical services, yet their commissioning and capacity are generally managed through policy funding decisions and local planning, rather than through statutory duties. Introducing a statutory duty for crisis accommodation risks unintended consequences. It may limit the flexibility of integrated care boards to respond to local needs, and could impose significant new resource burdens without clear funding commitments. That risks setting a precedent for increasingly prescriptive legislation across health and social care, which we should approach cautiously. We do not want to pit one condition against another.

On the proposed requirement on the Secretary of State to produce a commissioning plan within four months, I acknowledge the desire for a timely response. The choice of a four-month deadline, however, seems arbitrary and may not allow sufficient time for robust consultation and realistic planning. We need to be mindful that rushed plans can undermine long-term success.

On the proposed reporting requirements, although transparency is vital, I highlight that new clause 11, which we are proposing, would provide stronger and more detailed mechanisms to hold the Government to account on implementation and resource allocation, while allowing flexibility. We should focus on supporting those provisions rather than layer on multiple overlapping reporting duties, which risk duplication and confusion. In conclusion, the amendments raise important points and I look forward to the Minister’s response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Aphra Brandreth]

I rise to make a few remarks on new clause 11, which would require a costed plan to ensure that ICBs and local authorities are able to provide adequate community services for individuals with learning disabilities and autistic people at risk of detention under part II of the 1983 Act.

We need to ensure that there is a fully cost-effective plan with accountability to support those with learning disabilities. For instance, Cheshire West and Chester council, one of the local authorities in my constituency of Chester South and Eddisbury, has let down parents, families and those with learning difficulties because of its poor management. It has come at the cost of adequate provision, particularly in school places, and therefore puts more people at risk of mental health problems because they are not getting the support they need in the community.

With the measures outlined in new clause 11, we could go a long way to ensuring accountability. I am sure the Minister will agree that we need to ensure that commitments are backed by funding for the good of those who need SEND support. I urge all those on the Committee to reflect on the value of the new clause. Crucially, it would also require the costed plan to be informed by a consultation with a range of stakeholders. That is incredibly important, because we need to listen to the lived experience of those who are often extremely vulnerable to ensure that they receive the right support. In my intervention, I referred to some of the important groups in my constituency. Down Syndrome Cheshire and the Cheshire West and Chester SEND Accountability group are just two examples, but there are so many more. They are clear that they value being listened to, so that they can inform the process.

The new clause would ensure a costed plan, where commitments are not just words, but backed by funding. Crucially, it would mandate a formal consultation process to inform the plan, incorporating the view of a broad range of stakeholders, including those with lived experience such as those I mentioned in my constituency. There are individuals, carers, healthcare providers and advocacy groups whose voices all matter. We need a plan that is costed so it can be delivered, and that, crucially, reflects the needs and rights of those most affected. I fully support the new clause.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I thank hon. Members for this set of amendments, which draw attention to the important matter of implementation and community support for people with a learning disability and autistic people. I heard this issue raised many times on Second Reading.

I will begin with amendment 20. I am grateful that this important issue has been raised. Although he has not been appointed to the Committee, I know that the hon. Member for St Neots and Mid Cambridgeshire has spoken powerfully and movingly about the tragic circumstances surrounding the death of Declan Morrison, his constituent, and the need to ensure effective and timely community-based support.

Proposed new section 125E of the Mental Health Act, provided within the Bill, already requires integrated care boards and local authorities to seek to ensure that the needs of autistic people and people with a learning disability can be met without detaining them. That should be driven by the specific needs of the local population, informed by the dynamic support register. That requirement already covers any relevant needs for crisis accommodation. We expect, and will set out in statutory guidance on dynamic support registers, that they will cover any relevant needs for crisis accommodation.

In contrast, the amendment seeks to place a prescriptive legal requirement to ensure provision of a specific service in all circumstances, irrespective of what people in the area actually need. That would have the unintended effect of restricting integrated care boards in designing provision and allocating resources in the most effective way to meet people’s needs.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Bloore (Redditch) (Lab)]

On a point of order, Ms Furniss. Could we have some clarity on what adjourning the Committee right now would mean? Several members of the Committee have not returned from the Division, and it would be good to know the implications if we adjourn now.

[Aphra Brandreth]

The Conservative members of the Committee all came back at 5.40 pm, when we were asked to return.

Oral Answers to Questions

Aphra Brandreth Excerpts

Tuesday 25th March 2025 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Kinnock]

I absolutely agree. The state of NHS dentistry in our country is shameful. The golden hello scheme enables 240 dentists to receive a £20,000 joining bonus payment to work in dental deserts, and we are negotiating with the British Dental Association the long-term reform of the contract. The issue is not the number of dentists in the country, but the paucity of dentists who are doing NHS work.

[Aphra Brandreth (Chester South and Eddisbury) (Con)]

The north-west has some of the worst levels of children’s oral health in England, with Cheshire and Merseyside falling below the national average. In rural villages in my constituency like Bunbury, where bus services have been cut, and Kelsall, where a dentist is keen to open an NHS practice but faces barriers due to city centre prioritisation, residents are struggling to access NHS dental care. Given the challenges of rural access, what steps is the Minister taking to ensure that NHS dental provision is available in those rural communities?

[Stephen Kinnock]

I find it quite striking when Conservative Members stand up and describe the abysmal state of NHS dentistry. It makes me think, “Well, who created this mess in the first place?” But that is as an aside. The fact is that we have the golden hello scheme for dentists to come and work in so-called dental deserts. We recognise that the fundamental problem is around incentives for dentists to do NHS work. That is why we are doing a long-term contract negotiation to ensure we have an NHS dentistry contract that is fit for purpose and where every penny allocated to NHS dentistry is spent on NHS dentistry.

Obesity: Food and Diet

Aphra Brandreth Excerpts

Monday 20th January 2025 Commons Chamber

[Aphra Brandreth (Chester South and Eddisbury) (Con)]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Stroud (Dr Opher) for securing this debate on the important subject of the impact of food and diet on obesity. Over the past 30 years, as has been noted, obesity has been the subject of over 700 food-related health policies in England. Yet, while successive Governments have recognised the immense challenge of obesity and have sought to tackle it through various strategies, schemes and mandates, obesity rates have remained excessively high.

Although, over the past five years we have seen adult obesity rates stabilise and the number of children who are overweight or obese fall to the lowest level since 2000, there is so much more work to do to address this issue, which is having an alarming impact on people’s health. In the UK today, more than one in 20 cancer cases are linked to excess weight, and obesity is predicted to overtake smoking as the leading preventable cause of cancer in women by 2043. It is estimated that, by 2035, the cost of treating type 2 diabetes will exceed that of treating all cancers today.

Alongside this health crisis comes a phenomenal financial cost. The NHS currently spends £6.5 billion a year on obesity-related illnesses. Indeed, the independent national food strategy cited an even larger figure of £18 billion, with diabetes care alone already accounting for nearly 10% of the NHS budget. We must act now to address this issue. We do not have another 30 years to get this right; nor can we afford another 700 policies.

We cannot just look for easy wins on this subject. Rather, we should look for a meaningful, transformative policy shift and not fall foul of previous mistakes. In the past, approaches by Governments have not always been joined up in understanding the whole food cycle, from supplier to shop shelf. Political and economic decisions have contributed to that. If we are serious about reforming the food system, the Government will have to implement a strategy that engages producers of all sizes, from small businesses to large corporations, across the supply chain, to give consumers a choice when they make their weekly shop.

Although it may seem in some respects that we now have access to more food options and choices than ever before, for many people those choices are often limited by cost. Too often the cost of healthy options is increasing while the cost of ultra-processed foods decreases. In the UK, the majority of our diets are now made up of ultra-processed foods. Growing evidence links UPFs and adverse health outcomes, so it is vital that more research is done to ensure we are making informed policy decisions.

We need to ensure that it is not just the large food manufacturers that are dominating the discussion and leading the market, and that we are creating opportunities and spaces for smaller, innovative food producers to contribute to the debate and help to provide solutions to some of the challenges we face. Part of the solution means working with our farmers, who already produce some of freshest, healthiest food to high animal welfare standards of anywhere in the world. The produce of the farmers in my constituency is second to none: Cheshire beef and dairy products are some of the most nutritious, natural and tasty on the market. We need to ensure our farmers and food producers are part of the solution, and that we strive to connect people to where our food comes from.

Just as we need a joined-up approach across the supply chain, we need a joined-up approach across Government. The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and the Department for Health and Social Care can publish a strong food strategy, but it will need involvement from the Treasury to ensure the path from farm to fork or supplier to shelf is supported.

I have talked about choice and the impact of food prices for families who are trying their best to make healthy choices, but alongside cost limitations are the limitations on people’s time. My husband and I both work full time and, as a mum, I know from experience that after a long day at work, all too often the easy option is to pick up some food on the way home that is convenient but perhaps not that healthy for us and our family. I know there are thousands of hard-working parents across Chester South and Eddisbury—indeed, the country—who will know what I am talking about.

We as legislators, and supermarkets as the gateway where people buy their food, can take steps to improve choice for consumers, both financially and in relation to convenience, that will help us to become a healthier nation. For instance, supermarkets could have a section with ingredients next to healthy recipes, shortening the time the consumer would need to be in the shop and encouraging them to try new and nutritious meals.

We can and must do more to address this issue. We must connect people with where their food comes from, have a frank conversation about the impacts of ultra-processed foods and deliver research to ensure we have evidence to make meaningful change. We need to support smaller businesses, working with them as they develop innovative ways to produce and market their products, and ensuring they have a voice at the table, alongside the large suppliers and supermarkets. We need to understand the challenges that families face with the costs and time constraints of busy family life, and ensure we are doing all we can to help them navigate a path to healthy, nutritious and tasty food.

In conclusion, I hope the Government will look at delivering a food strategy based on cross-party consultation that will address the food system from supplier to shelf, because the cost of obesity for individuals and for society as a whole is unsustainable and is a health crisis we cannot ignore.