UK Air Defence

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Thursday 16th January 2025 Commons Chamber

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

I am grateful for this opportunity and declare my interests as a reservist, the father of two servicewomen and the brother of a serving admiral.

Among the many issues that should be keeping Ministers awake at night are two tech-based conundrums that particularly worry me. One is future access to critical minerals and their products, which I have spoken about in the past. The other related issue is the patchy nature of the protection of these islands against missiles and drones. That is what I want to raise this evening.

Everything costs, and it is easy when one is not in government to wish the ends without the means. At the moment, defence is spread too thinly and what I am suggesting would spread it even more thinly. Whether the UK should be globally deployable or focus on the defence of the homeland and its Euro-Atlantic neighbourhood is moot. The likelihood is that we will soldier on, make do and mend—we always have. But the scene is set for the biggest retrenchment since Suez. I wish it were otherwise, but it falls to this Government to make the call. Their attempted unforced surrender of the Chagos islands is perhaps an indication of where their thinking lies.

In 1963, the 35th US President told his National Security Council that European NATO members were not paying their fair share. John F. Kennedy said,

“We have been very generous to Europe and it is now time for us to look out for ourselves”.

On Monday, the 45th and 47th President will likely be saying the same thing. Clearly, American frustration with Europe enjoying the insurance policy without paying the premium is nothing new. What is new is the American willingness to strong-arm Europe into changing its ways. Forget 2% or 2.5%—Trump says he wants 5% of GDP spent on defence by all NATO members, and here is the kicker: he wants a 20% tariff on all goods imported to the US. Combine the two and it is not a stretch to imagine him slapping tariffs on European goods unless Europeans step up to the plate.

Ultimately, the single most important reason Trump can do what we fear he is about to do is that America is no longer principally competing with Europe’s proximate threat—Russia. A vast but thinly populated nation of 144 million, a busted economy and a military whose weaknesses have been generously displayed for all to see since February 2022 is not perceived by Washington as a main threat. An America emerging from the 9/11 Bush counter-terrorism era is back to facing off with great powers once again, but the great power is not Russia; it is China.

As the US pivots, European states of all sizes must step up to defend their homeland and safeguard the north Atlantic. There are no free passes. Israel is a small state, but its military capabilities are unmatched in the middle east. Its layered missile defence systems—the famous Iron Dome, David’s Sling and Arrow—and its formidable fleet of aircraft demonstrate how small states, with a little help from their friends, can punch way above their weight. Several of those small states will provide the first line of defence against Putin’s Russia. The bulk of the cruise, ballistic and hypersonic missiles that Putin would fire at Britain as a proxy for the US will be intercepted by existing defence systems and fighter aircraft stationed in the Baltic states, the Czech Republic, Slovakia or Poland.

While our geography, as so often in our history, gives strategic depth and protection from long-range attack, we can have less confidence in dealing with proximate threats from sea and subsea platforms and with threats to deployed and overseas assets, such as Cyprus, that fall well within the scope of short-range missiles and drones from Russia, Iran and their proxies. In any event, some missiles directed at the homeland would get through in the event of a full-on attack right now by the Russian Federation. That has been our blind spot.

The public would expect that missiles evading the first line of integrated missile defence would be destroyed closer to their target. The Type 45-mounted Sea Viper and the ground-based Sky Sabre are exquisite examples of air and missile defence systems, but there are simply not enough of them—not enough missiles ready to go and not enough industrial capacity to enable resilience in anything more than the very short term. Russia’s war on Ukraine has helpfully made us alive to our vulnerability. Russia, as we have seen in Ukraine and throughout its history, is capable of taking long-term pain in a way that it seems unlikely we would. As things stand, the capital is particularly vulnerable to Russian missile attack, unless we park all our Type 45s—those that are operational—on the Thames.

Happily, unlike Israel and Ukraine, we are surrounded by friends. It makes sense to be a full part of, and a contributor to, NATO integrated air and missile defence, but European IAMD, and its suppression and destruction of enemy air defence systems, are currently completely reliant on the US. In any event, the suspicion is that a full-on attack by Russia right now would find too many holes in the patchy architecture that has evolved to protect against missiles.

Germany has recognised that threat; it has owned the consequences of doing nothing. It has established the European Sky Shield initiative, and has begun procuring trusted systems such as Patriot and Arrow 3. The UK has been considering joining ESSI. Where are we with that? What about off-the-shelf systems such as Arrow 3?

[John Cooper (Dumfries and Galloway) (Con)]

I thank my right hon. and gallant Friend for that point. It is interesting that the Arrow 3 project he mentions is a joint project between Boeing in America and the Israeli defence machinery. Is there something in the innovation offered by Patria, a Finnish company, which is offering to help us build armoured vehicles here in Britain but based on its design? Do we need less of a reliance on domestic systems and to consider, as he says, off-the-shelf systems from elsewhere?

[Dr Murrison]

There is a great deal in what my hon. Friend says. Historically, buying off the shelf has proved to be somewhat more cost-effective than designing exquisite systems of our own. I hope very much that, as we go further into this process, we can partner with others to ensure that what we buy is both integrated and cost-effective. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s thoughts on ESSI.

Ukraine has shown the limitations of the “just in time, not just in case” policy that has driven our failure to stockpile the materiel of war in recent decades. In the 1930s, the shadow factories initiative fitted commercial premises that typically produced cars for reconfiguration as armament factories, in case the need should arise, which it did. Car workers would switch to become the basis of the skilled workforce necessary to create materiel for prosecuting the war effort. That then happened, to the point that in 1940, this country was outstripping Germany in the production of fighter aircraft. With every respect due to the Few, the Battle of Britain was won in Britain’s factories and on its production lines as much as in the skies. Victory hinges just as much on logistics now, except the timelines are far shorter. The defence ecosystem in the US 2022 national defence strategy had more than a whiff of the 1930s in advancing an intertwined commercial-military co-operative.

In a good light, we can see shadow factories in the thematic approach to missile defence taken by the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory missile defence centre. Crucially, it is industry partner-based, with a heavy focus on growing suitably qualified and experienced people, of whom we are desperately short. The MDC is now 20 years old. What assessment has the Minister made of it, and what changes does he propose to its structure and remit to help plug holes in our missile defence architecture? In the light of prevailing circumstances, will he consider upgrading the MDC so that it has the salience and clout approaching that of the pre-war directorate of aeronautical production? Then, it was Spitfires and Hurricanes; today it is missile defence, SDEAD—suppression and destruction of enemy air defences—and drones. Then, it was preparation for the total war to come; now—God willing—it is deterrence.

There are those who say that the solution to our vulnerability to missile attack from the east is simple: it is Israel’s Iron Dome—the close-in element of the layered missile defence system used successfully to thwart Iran in April. However, Israel is a small country with a small population concentrated in a small number of cities with limited critical national infrastructure. It is surrounded by hostiles. Happily, none of that applies here.

Our missile defence must be fully integrated with NATO partners. NATO needs European leadership as the US pivots, and we must not encourage those whose primary interest in defence lies in extending the remit of the institutions of the European Union, rather than the defence and security of Europeans. We do not need the distraction of a separate, competing EU defence architecture; NATO is our strength and our stay, and we must use our status as the continent’s leading military power to ensure it remains so. In particular, we must articulate clearly the case for layered missile defence and SDEAD within a NATO construct, as the US pivots towards the Indo-Pacific. The UK and Europe need NATO integrated air and missile defence that incorporates close-in systems to guarantee major centres of population, defence assets and critical national infrastructure. Crucially, member states must not give an aggressor capable of waging an attritional war grounds for believing that the west will exhaust its ordnance in the first few hours or days.

Where are we with the versatile and scalable very short to medium-range modular ground-based air defence system envisaged by NATO Defence Ministers at their meeting in October 2020? What application might that system have to provide the last arrow in our quiver—one that will destroy missiles that have evaded intermediate layers and are about to land on critical sites in the UK? For a country with no money, directed energy weapons offer a potential solution for dealing with drones and missiles, albeit in line of sight and in good weather. Is DSTL’s DragonFire weapon still on course for service with the Royal Navy in 2027, and what export opportunities are Ministers exploring? Do they expect that Type 26s, Type 31s, and any Type 32s will carry DragonFire or successor directed energy weapons? Will they be fitted as standard, or as expensive retrofits?

Do we really need a sixth-generation manned—or even hybrid—fast jet to replace Typhoon? Would it not be better to rely on the F-35 airframe with mid-life upgrades in a future that is surely progressively unmanned? The lineal, if less romantic, descendants of the Few will be tech geeks, gamers, coders and those who provide a human interface with artificial intelligence. What are we doing to grow them, and will the Minister visit the #TechTrowbridge initiative that I started in Wiltshire’s county town, which was once a centre for Spitfire manufacture? He would be warmly welcomed on his way to his constituency.

The reason that a grisly artillery war has played out in Ukraine is because nobody has been able to command the airspace. Happily and to our surprise, Russia has been unable to suppress or destroy Ukraine’s air defences. In the future, unmanned combat aerial vehicles configured to shoot the archer, not the arrow, will do that. I would be very surprised if Lord Robertson were not casting a critical eye over the global combat air programme, and comparing and contrasting its cost and effectiveness with those of unmanned combat aerial vehicles.

I appreciate the deep cultural difficulty of envisaging an unmanned future battlespace. It is deeply unsettling for those of us steeped in the traditions of the armed forces, but while there will always be a need for sufficient booted and spurred combat troops ready to close with and kill the enemy and hold the ground—as the Member of Parliament for a garrison town, I am not for one moment suggesting a further reduction in headcount—this country will never again be able to expose itself to attritional warfare of the sort we are seeing being played out in Ukraine. Politically and societally, that would be impossible and unconscionable. That means integrated missile defence, SDEAD, drones, and command of the electromagnetic spectrum.

Once again at a dreadnought crossroads, Britain must configure the forces at its disposal for the long term in all domains and take a lead as what is still the principal military power in its Euro-Atlantic voisinage. Early pointers suggesting that this Government are taking the right fork in the road would include difficult and unpopular decisions such as standing firm on the deep space advanced radar capability envisaged for Cawdor barracks on the St David’s peninsula, which was bottled by previous Governments. As we chop to an unmanned future, those pointers would—for example, and very painfully—include consignment of the RAF Red Arrows aero-acrobatics team to the historic flight.

This Government have four years left to run—the time the directorate of aeronautical production had to fit out this country with what it needed to prevail. Recent events have revealed the fundamental truth that we are vulnerable now, as we were then, and the shifting geopolitical plates will likely make us more so. The public will never forgive an Administration of whatever colour who muddle through, leaving them open to the predations of Putin’s advancing missile programme.

UK Submarine Fleet

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Wednesday 15th January 2025 Westminster Hall

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Dr Andrew Murrison (in the Chair)]

I intend to call the Opposition spokesman at 5.8 pm. There are several Members seeking to catch my eye, so brevity is a virtue.

Oral Answers to Questions

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Monday 6th January 2025 Commons Chamber

[John Healey]

My hon. Friend is right in general terms: Russian aggression is not simply confined to Ukraine, and we all saw what happened on Christmas day. We are deeply concerned about the damage and sabotage to undersea cables. I can confirm to the House that for the first time the joint expeditionary force—the JEF—has activated an advanced UK-led reaction system to track potential threats to undersea infrastructure and to monitor the movements of the Russian shadow fleet. That will be run out of the standing joint force headquarters at Northwood.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

The Secretary of State said that his aim is to ensure that Ukraine is in the “strongest possible position”, but for what? Does he intend to support Ukraine in commanding her internationally recognised borders or to ensure that the de facto border, which excludes Donbas and Crimea, becomes a more permanent feature?

Chagos Islands: UK-US Defence Relationship

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Monday 2nd December 2024 Commons Chamber

[Luke Pollard]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his serious question and the way in which he presented it. It is important that we have certainty about the security of the future relationship. That is why the treaty sets out clearly security arrangements for the outer islands that will prevent foreign nations from putting security forces or security apparatus on those islands. The full details will be in the treaty. It is important to note that Mauritius was one of only two African countries that did not join the Chinese belt and road initiative, and maintaining a strong relationship with it—especially in more contested times—is vital. That is what the deal helps to deliver.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

The Minister says that the outgoing Biden Administration in the US are keen on the deal, which may or may not be the case, but the British public plainly are not—for good reason—and they see the payment of a dowry to Mauritius as rubbing salt into the wound. If he is not prepared to comment on the quantum that he has in mind, will he at least explain the structure of the costings he is applying to come to the figure that he wishes to give Mauritius for taking on these islands?

[Luke Pollard]

I thank the former Minister for his question. As he served in the Department that I now serve in, he will know that it is normal to reveal the operating costs for overseas bases, but that we do not—he did not and we do not—reveal the Government-to-Government payments. That was standard procedure for his Government and every Government before, and it remains the policy of this Government. This deal secures the future of the UK-US base, and I am hopeful that when the details come out, he will be able to understand why it secures that for so long, and hopefully he will be able to back it.

Defence Programmes Developments

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Wednesday 20th November 2024 Commons Chamber

[John Healey]

One of the most important things that this House—never mind the Government who introduced the Bill—has done in the past week is to give its full backing to the Second Reading of the Armed Forces Commissioner Bill. This is an independent champion who will improve service life and will be there for those who serve and the families who support them. I look forward to my hon. Friend’s contribution to those debates, and I congratulate him on becoming a member of the armed forces parliamentary scheme, which is a great scheme. I know that he will have inspiring experiences and will make an even more informed contribution to debates in this House.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

I appreciate the constraints on the Defence Secretary, but this statement makes a mockery of the SDR process. It also removes significant lines of contingent capability. He says that these will not be the last difficult decisions that he will have to make and that he is working in lockstep with the SDR, so is he, and is it, rolling the pitch for the removal or mothballing of the carriers, as has been rumoured? Does he understand what that means for the future of the Royal Navy as a globally deployable blue-water navy? Given his comments on Albion and Bulwark, is he also rolling the pitch for the future of the Royal Marines, since the two are intertwined and will be for the next 10 years before a replacement can be provided?

[John Healey]

Bulwark and Albion are not capabilities available to the Marines at present. On the Marines, I have said three times this afternoon that the future of its elite force, as part of the complex of what we need for the future, will be reinforced in the SDR. That is what I expect. The decisions that I have announced today are consistent with the SDR. He wrongly suggested that somehow these announcements make a mockery of it, but they are entirely consistent and are taken in consultation with the reviewers. On the future of carriers, in recent weeks my hon. Friend the Minister for the Armed Forces and I have paid particular attention to the plans for one of those carriers to undertake the carrier strike 2025 voyage into the Indo-Pacific, where it will have validation exercises with some important allies. It is a vital part of our ability to reinforce both our hard power and our soft power in future.

Armed Forces Commissioner Bill

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 18th November 2024 Commons Chamber

[John Healey]

I can indeed. Our definition of “relevant family members”, which is on the face of the Bill, will include bereaved families.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

Of course, the other group excluded from that provision is veterans—I speak as a veteran. Why is the Secretary of State not concerned about them? Should they not come under the auspices of this new official too? An example might be those who were exposed to potential contaminants at Camp Lejeune in the US. That is a thematic investigation that the new commissioner might undertake.

[John Healey]

Our first priority is those who serve and their families—those who are subject to service law. The range of agencies and services that support veterans is very different. A better way of improving support for veterans will be to fully implement the armed forces covenant in law, as well as the range of steps that the Minister for Veterans and People, my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Selly Oak (Al Carns), has already started to take. We have taken the view that the commissioner established by this Bill will give their first priority and full focus to those who are serving, as well as their families, who are also impacted by their service life.

As I have said, this Bill is significant and long overdue. It is long overdue because the forces have been badly let down for the past 14 years. The Conservatives have created a crisis in recruitment, retention and morale. Last year, the trained strength of the armed forces fell at the fastest rate for a decade—with 300 more personnel leaving than joining every month—and service morale fell to its lowest level on record. Only four in 10 of our forces personnel report being satisfied with service life. They report that the impact on families and on personal life was the leading factor influencing their decision to leave.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Cartlidge (South Suffolk) (Con)]

At all times, and on both sides of the House, we should want to ensure that our armed forces have our back and that their morale and the offer from the MOD is as strong as possible. The Opposition recognise that the Bill introduces a manifesto commitment for which the Government have a clear mandate and, moreover, that it creates a new mechanism by which the MOD intends to boost the day-to-day experience of our armed forces personnel. No one could disagree with that goal. While it remains to be seen exactly how the Bill will deliver in practice, we will not oppose it but will be a constructive, critical friend, because the least that those who bravely put their lives on the line to defend our country deserve is proper scrutiny from Parliament in matters of legislation and the armed forces.

Of course, there are areas of welfare not directly affected by the Bill where we want to see further progress, but, in terms of the Bill’s provisions, we wish to probe a number of matters. At face value, there is clearly merit in seeking to ensure extra accountability for how welfare matters are conducted in the forces. I note in particular, as the Secretary of State just stressed, that the commissioner will explicitly not be drawn from the ranks of either the military or the civil service, precisely in order to deliver genuine independence.

In many ways, that provision is not dissimilar to the principle that I wanted to see in the integrated procurement model back in February, with the idea of a second opinion in procurement, not least from the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory and the science base—the point being to ensure that major procurement programmes and the requirement request from the single services could similarly be subject to genuine challenge and transparency. After all, the Sheldon inquiry focused on transparency and openness as key tools to guarding against the bad culture that can pertain without confidence for military personnel and officials to come forward and air their concerns—what we call being “psychologically confident”.

Therefore, in principle, the proposal appears to be consistent with the push for a more transparent culture in defence that makes it harder to hide embedded problems. The most serious such examples could include the issues raised by the Lyons Review and the Defence Committee’s “Women in the Armed Forces” report, as referred to at oral questions earlier by the hon. Member for South Shields (Mrs Lewell-Buck). As such, if the new office of the commissioner genuinely exposes cultural weaknesses and hidden systemic problems that would otherwise not have been disclosed or would take longer to emerge, it should be welcomed.

That said, such extra transparency cannot be at the expense of operational effectiveness. That is why one of the most significant issues that we will want to probe further is the interaction between the commissioner and the chain of command, especially in sensitive operational settings. The Bill states that visits will not be permitted on national security grounds, but what if the commissioner and the chain of command disagree on whether those grounds apply? Will the Secretary of State adjudicate? If so, how will that work in practice? As my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne (Lincoln Jopp) alluded to in his earlier oral question, how will such visits work in practice without disrupting live operations? We must have clarity.

Off the back of the Armed Forces (Service Complaints and Financial Assistance) Act 2015, the previous Government did much work to reduce bureaucracy, shorten the complaints process and strengthen oversight. It is important that that is not undermined through the organisational upheaval that the Bill will inevitably generate. What steps will the Government take to ensure a smooth handover, especially in relation to existing casework? A few of our colleagues have experienced that recently.

On the territorial application of the Bill, as things stand there is a permissive extent clause that enables an Order in Council to provide for relevant sections of the legislation to extend to the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man or any of the British overseas territories except Gibraltar. First, what is the rationale for apparently excluding Gibraltar? Secondly, what of the US visiting forces?

As Minister for Defence Procurement with responsibility for the estate, I visited both Lakenheath and Mildenhall in my county of Suffolk, where there is a significant presence of US forces, F-35s and F-15s. I had the pleasure of meeting the then commanding officer, Major General Campo. There were a significant number of infrastructure, planning and other matters where, inevitably, the USVF needed clearance and input from the UK MOD. What will the Commissioner’s responsibilities be in relation to USVF, particularly where British personnel are stationed alongside them? Similarly, what about the personnel of the many nations assisting with training Ukrainians for Operation Interflex on the UK bases? My right hon. Friend the Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison) made a very good intervention. We agree that we want to question the point about veterans, and we will probe that in Committee.

Finally, on costs, we note that the Department expects the annual cost of the commissioner to be higher than that of the current ombudsman, and overall in the region of £5 million. Does the Secretary of State anticipate that the cost will grow further and above that estimation in the years ahead, as the commissioner becomes more established? More broadly, we know that many issues affect morale, recruitment and retention in the armed forces. We want the Bill to succeed, but there remain a number of areas of concern where delivering a better offer to our service personnel is critical.

On recruitment and retention, hopefully all hon. Members understand the critical importance of boarding school to service families, and that there are very few places not in the independent sector. Boarding school provides stability for their children in a career that does not automatically lend itself to such. Yet families affected by VAT on school fees will not find out until December exactly how they will be hit by a tax that commences the very next month. Let us remember that many such families do not receive continuity of education allowance, and will have to cover a 20% hike in fees from their taxed income. That is why the Opposition wanted the type of VAT exemption for all children of service families that is offered to children with special educational needs and disabilities with an education, health and care plan.

[Dr Murrison]

Does my hon. Friend agree that it is just not fair on the small businesses that are independent schools, such as Warminster School in my constituency, which traditionally have taken a significant number of service pupils, to have that level of uncertainty about what the school roll will look like in January?

[James Cartlidge]

That is an excellent point. I pay tribute to those sorts of schools and how they share in society’s commitment to our armed forces. It has been Labour policy since the 2017 general election—seven and a half years ago—to introduce VAT on school fees. Families who have personnel serving abroad this Christmas will have just December to deal with whatever those new fees mean for them. That is a shockingly short amount of notice.

On pay, we agree that those who serve their country must be appropriately rewarded, which is why in 2023 we announced a core armed forces pay rise of 5%, plus a further consolidated increase of £1,000, equating to a rise of approximately 9.7% for the most junior ranks, and including a freeze in food charges. Alongside pay, accommodation is an important part of the offer from the MOD. We all accept that much more needs to be done, and presumably that will form a key focus for the commissioner. I stand by what I said in the Remembrance debate: the problem is the underlying structural nature of so much of the accommodation in the defence estate. For that reason, as a Minister I wanted to see us potentially buying back the defence estate in England and Wales from Annington, so that we could plan a full rebuild and regeneration of the estate—the long-term solution that I think the Veterans Minister referred to earlier. I hope the Government will take that work forward, but I appreciate that it is highly legally and commercially sensitive, and there is a limit to what they can say on that.

As for the short term, the lesson from our winter plan last year is that investment and a plan for the defence estate can still yield results. Early on as the Minister responsible for the estate, in 2023, I accepted that the previous winter we had let down service families, and with the backing of Ben Wallace and then Grant Shapps, we secured £400 million in the defence Command Paper refresh, and delivered a winter plan that saw thousands of homes treated for issues such as damp and mould. Complaints to contractors fell sharply between 2022 and winter 2023.

That brings me to the final critical point—funding. The new commissioner will almost certainly be assailed with accommodation cases, but any reports that he produces will inevitably form one conclusion: there is a need for more investment in the estate, at a time when there are many other competing priorities. The £400 million that we announced required us to make choices about spending, and to prioritise accommodation and the welfare of personnel over other pulls on funding. It is incredibly important that the Government commit to spending 2.5% of GDP on defence as soon as possible. The Secretary of State will inevitably say that the last time we reached 2.5% was in 2010. I could as easily say that the last time we reached 3% was in 1996. They were two points on a pathway of consistently falling spending since the cold war, because successive Governments believed, like many around the world, that we were in a more peaceful era. That is a statement of fact.

The point is that welfare in the military is about us as a nation and a Government saying to those who serve, “We have your back.” That is impossible without more funding, and that means setting a definitive date for getting to 2.5%. The Conservative party will always support the welfare of service personnel. That is why we will try to work constructively with the Government on the Bill. We will not be dividing the House this evening.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi (Slough) (Lab)]

No one could argue with the honourable intent of the Bill: to improve service life. That is why there is widespread support for its main proposal, an enhanced role with new investigative powers. The Service Complaints Ombudsman and her predecessor have both called for powers along those very lines. This was a commitment in the manifesto on which my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and I stood for election.

The Defence Committee published a letter last Thursday setting out our initial thoughts on the Bill, to inform the House’s scrutiny today. We had hoped to have time to take account of the views of representatives of armed forces communities, as well as the Service Complaints Ombudsman, but the pace of events made that impossible. As a result, at this stage, my remarks contain more questions than conclusions.

If the Government are to be judged by their own success criteria, the two key questions for the House are these. First, how far will the Bill go towards improving service life? Secondly, is the commissioner established by the Bill given the right powers, protections and resources to act as the strong, independent champion that our gallant armed forces and their families deserve, and that the Government have promised?

On behalf of the Defence Committee, I ask the Minister for the Armed Forces to address in his winding-up speech the points that we raised in our letter, in addition to those that the Defence Secretary outlined earlier. What are the Government’s priorities for improving the service complaints system? It is striking that the Bill contains only one change to the system, when successive ombudsmen have found that the system as a whole is not efficient, effective and fair. To bring the Bill to life, can the Minister draw to the House’s attention examples of times when the power to conduct investigations on general service matters would have improved service life, if it had existed at that time?

It would be helpful if the Minister could clarify, as far as possible, who will be able to ask the commissioner, under clause 4, to investigate a “general welfare service matter”. Will that include members of the reserve forces, family members of reservists, former partners and spouses of serving personnel, and—the Secretary of State has, thankfully, already provided clarification on this—bereaved service families? This is a matter of interest and concern to representatives of armed forces communities such as the Royal British Legion.

The independence of the commissioner will be crucial in maintaining the confidence and trust of the armed forces community.

[Dr Murrison]

I am listening carefully to what the hon. Gentleman has to say. May I tempt him to agree with me that the Armed Forces Commissioner should have his or her powers extended to veterans, on the grounds that a lot of the themes that he or she would look at would be hybrid matters that affected both the veterans community and those currently serving? At the risk of being accused of being a one-trick pony, may I suggest that the Camp Lejeune case exemplifies that point?

[Mr Dhesi]

I would never accuse my right hon. Friend of being a one-trick pony. He tempts me, but I would like to consider that point about veterans, reserve forces and so on in Committee and thereafter.

The German armed forces commissioner—the inspiration behind the Bill, as the Secretary of State highlighted—is entirely independent of the German Defence Ministry and armed forces, but that is not the case for the commissioner under the Bill. The Secretary of State will appoint and be able to dismiss. The Secretary of State will fund the commissioner and agree their staffing arrangements—I am very grateful to the Minister for his briefing this morning at the Ministry of Defence, at which I was able to highlight some of my initial concerns—and the Secretary of State will be able to constrain the exercise of the commissioner’s powers on broad grounds of national security and personal safety. So when Ministers describe the proposed Armed Forces Commissioner as independent, they must surely mean something else. Can my hon. Friend the Minister explain exactly what? And can he tell us why he has not decided to go further in ensuring the independence of the commissioner from his Department? Can he also explain how the commissioner’s resourcing requirements have been estimated, what the process would be if the commissioner asked for additional resources, and who would find out and how if the commissioner was denied resources they had requested?

The Bill arrives during a crisis in armed forces recruitment and retention, at a time when there are high levels of dissatisfaction with service life, and an unacceptable level of inappropriate behaviour in the armed forces. The Defence Committee will be delving into that in greater detail. The Bill cannot solve those challenges on its own. It would be helpful to hear from the Minister exactly where the Bill sits within a coherent strategy and a set of broader measures, so that the House can consider the Bill in context.

Expectations of the new Armed Forces Commissioner will be high. They will need to be a strong character, with the best interests of the armed forces in mind. They will need to be prepared for questions and challenge, but also to understand, win support, and change hearts and minds. Their success will likely ultimately depend on the support and trust of the armed forces, including the chain of command. What kind of person do the Government imagine filling the role? How, if at all, will the key requirements of the role differ from those for the Service Complaints Ombudsman?

I appreciate that I have asked a lot of questions of the Minister, but he is a very capable individual and he has been taking copious notes. No doubt he will be able to answer all my questions in his speech. My Defence Committee colleagues and I warmly welcome the Government’s intention of allowing the Committee to conduct a non-binding pre-appointment hearing with the Secretary of State’s preferred candidate for the role. As the Secretary of State highlighted, that is in line with practice for the appointment of the Service Complaints Ombudsman. The Defence Committee has always offered both support and scrutiny to the ombudsman, and we look forward to working closely with the new commissioner. They will, I hope, become a regular witness before the Committee. I hope that the Government will ensure the smoothest possible transition between the two roles.

Defence: 2.5% GDP Spending Commitment

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Monday 11th November 2024 Commons Chamber

[John Healey]

I can indeed. It was one of my predecessors as Defence Secretary who admitted to this House that under 14 years of the previous Government the armed forces had been “hollowed out and underfunded”. That is no surprise when we look at the record of the Conservative Government when they came into office in 2010, compared with the record of this Government. Our first Budget has a £3 billion boost to defence. Their first Budget had a £2 billion real-terms cut. Our manifesto had a commitment to increase defence spending to 2.5%. Their first five years in government saw an 18% real cut in defence spending, which laid the foundations for the degradation and the poor state of our armed forces, and the poor state of the finances that we have now inherited.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

The last Government extended to state school pupils the undoubted advantage of the combined cadet forces, which had been the almost exclusive prerogative of private school students. Why, then—

[Mr Speaker]

Order. May I ask the right hon. Gentleman to look at me while he is asking his question?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Murrison]

Why, then, Mr Speaker, did this Government decide, last week of all weeks, to defund combined cadet forces and thus remove the advantages that state school pupils are now enjoying as a result of decisions taken by the last Government?

[John Healey]

I simply do not recognise the right hon. Gentleman’s description of any decisions that we have taken, and it would run contrary to what he and I agree is the value of combined cadet forces. Most of us, in our constituencies, have contact and working relations with good cadet forces that give young people opportunities that they simply would not have at school or in any other walk of life. They have an important part to play in the future of individuals, and also in the wider understanding of our armed forces.

Ukraine

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd October 2024 Commons Chamber

[John Healey]

I will indeed. I have had the privilege of visiting Interflex training courses four times now, I think. I visited the second ever course at Salisbury plain. It is deeply moving to see the level of commitment of British forces to the task of training the Ukrainians, and to spend time with those Ukrainian recruits. They are lorry drivers, bank clerks, PR executives of all ages, who have volunteered to fight for their country and their freedom. They are trained by British forces, now with those from other countries alongside them, who are equipping them to be able to fight for their country. Knowing that they will soon return to the frontline in their own nation is deeply sobering.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

I very much welcome this £2.26 billion, but has the Defence Secretary had the opportunity to study the National Audit Office report published last month into the impact of our operations in Ukraine, particularly Operation Interflex, on the availability of the defence estate for the training of units of the British Army? While that is acceptable in the short term, in the long term it probably is not. What impact assessment has he carried out, and what proposals does he have to make available the defence estate we need to train British soldiers?

[John Healey]

Nothing will shake our commitment to continuing the Interflex training programme. We are determined and we will continue that throughout 2025. Many of the partner countries that have been alongside us this year have already committed to doing that again next year. The right hon. Member asked me about Interflex, the defence estate and the training of Ukrainian soldiers. That will continue. On the National Audit Office report, I have indeed read that report. It is a welcome change from the normal run of National Audit Office reports into the Ministry of Defence that we have been used to in recent years. It praises a good deal of what has been done by the Ministry of Defence in support of Ukraine, and it is very welcome.

Afghan Special Forces Relocation Review

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Monday 14th October 2024 Commons Chamber

[Luke Pollard]

I thank the hon. Lady for her approach. This case is a perfect illustration of why it is important to get these decisions right. It is not possible to relocate every single person who supported the UK mission in Afghanistan, but there is an opportunity to appeal rejected applications. I would be very happy to meet her to discuss the case further, and to take it forward.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

I welcome the tone and substance of the Minister’s statement. Few of us thought 20 years ago that we would still be mopping up after Operations Telic and Herrick. Does he agree that the long shadow of discretionary warfare, particularly in the civil domain, should act as a powerful incentive for any Government when considering future military conflict?

[Luke Pollard]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his question, and for his work as a Minister in the previous Government.

As part of the new Government’s reset, we have commissioned Lord Robertson to undertake the strategic defence review, which will consider the threats we face. Although it is certainly true that state-on-state threats are more prominent than they have ever been, there are still non-state threats to the United Kingdom, which creates an enormous challenge not only in the military space but in the civil security space. The strategic defence review will try to work out the best shape. We have invited submissions from all parties, as well as from individuals.

Ukraine

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Tuesday 10th September 2024 Commons Chamber

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

What assessment has the Defence Secretary made of Operation Renovator and how does he plan to change it?

[John Healey]

The right hon. Gentleman asks a question with a good deal more information than the rest of the House. I will write to him with the detail he seeks rather than trying to give a superficial answer from the Dispatch Box.