Armed Forces Commissioner Bill

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Consideration of Lords amendments
Tuesday 3rd June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

I note with interest the Government’s amendment in lieu. Does the Minister agree that, in all of this, which is unobjectionable in the main, there is a concern not around the person making the complaint but around the person about whom the complaint is made? As we live in an increasingly litigious society—the number of service complaints are going up and the number of cases considered by the ombudsman has been going up—it is likely that the Armed Forces Commissioner’s work and the number of people complained about will go up. Is the Minister satisfied that there is sufficient support for those about whom complaints are made, since the distress that it causes when those complaints are unfounded, or unfounded in part, is significant?

[Luke Pollard]

I know that the right hon. Gentleman has experience as a Minister who covered this area in the last Government. He is right that we need to reflect on the fact that everyone is innocent until proven guilty. Certainly, we need to make sure that we are looking after our whole force.

It is true that there are issues that we believe are not being addressed because there is not a sufficient spotlight being shone on them. It is for that reason that the Armed Forces Commissioner Bill provides for a reporting function not to Ministers or the Chief of the Defence Staff, but to Parliament. Indeed, I believe the Defence Committee chaired by my hon. Friend the Member for Slough (Mr Dhesi) is likely to receive those reports. It is precisely for those reasons that I believe the commissioner may be able to offer a view as to how the system they oversee will be able not only to protect victims and perpetrators, and seek justice with perpetrators, but deal with people who may be falsely accused. Largely, I expect general service welfare matters to be the predominant piece of activity for the commissioner, rather than necessarily looking at individual aspects of abuse or misbehaviour for which there is already a legal system within defence that can address some of those. As a whole, however, I take the right hon. Gentleman’s point.

In addition to the amendment that we have tabled in lieu, the Government have also committed in the other place to updating their current Raising a Concern policy, which includes replicating the protections available to civilians under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998. The update will outline the role of the commissioner and ensure that similar protections for people under the policy are applied to disclosures made to the commissioner. That will include provisions related to anonymity and confidentiality, and ensure that anyone who raises a genuine concern in line with the policy will be protected from unfair or negative treatment due to the raising of that concern.

Further, the Government will conduct a thorough communications campaign to ensure that members of our armed forces and their families are clear about the role of the commissioner and how to access their office, how it interacts with existing policy protections and policy, the type of issues that can be raised, and how they will be dealt with.

Taken together, our Government amendment and the additional commitments that I have outlined today and that Lord Coaker outlined to the House of Lords will establish genuine protections for people wishing to raise concerns anonymously, and build trust and confidence with the armed forces and their family members in a way that we cannot envisage would be achieved by Lords amendments 2 and 3 on their own.

This Bill is a critical step in renewing the nation’s contract with those who serve. For the first time, we are providing them and their family members with a genuinely independent champion, a direct point of contact for them to raise welfare matters and to have those issues scrutinised in due course by Parliament, and in turn for the Government—this Government and any Government in the future—to be held to account. That can only be a positive thing. I therefore urge the House to support the Government’s position.

Diego Garcia Military Base

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Thursday 22nd May 2025 Commons Chamber

[John Healey]

My hon. Friend knows that I have had discussions with her and the hon. Member for North Cotswolds (Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown) about the capability of the House of Commons to scrutinise and hold to account the Government— of whatever party—in areas of necessarily highly secret and confidential activity. She knows that I have a different view about how to deal with that challenge, but deal with it we must.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

The Secretary of State has cited UNCLOS—under pressure from my right hon. Friends the Members for Braintree (Sir James Cleverly) and for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis)—as the reason for this expensive cave-in. I am familiar with UNCLOS, and although I am a layman and so is the Secretary of State, could he explain in lay terms which parts of UNCLOS are responsible for what has happened, because it is not clear to me and it will not be clear to my constituents and to his, who will be paying the bill for this?

[John Healey]

The judgments of any international tribunal or court do not necessarily just apply to the UK; they are taken by other agencies, other organisations and other nations. In particular, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Prime Minister spelt out this afternoon, if there is uncertainty or a binding finding against the UK about the sovereignty of Diego Garcia, our ability to protect, in particular and most immediately, the electromagnetic spectrum on which our sensors, radars, communications and intelligence functions depend is compromised. That is the security assessment and that is the military view. That is why we have taken this step, and recognised that the best and only way of safeguarding the operational sovereignty—the total control and protection—of the Diego Garcia island base for the future is the deal we have struck this afternoon.

UK Airstrike: Houthi Military Facility

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Wednesday 30th April 2025 Commons Chamber

[John Healey]

I do indeed. It is part of a longer-term programme to degrade the ability of the Houthis to hit international shipping, to defend and protect freedom of navigation, and to recognise that conflicts in the middle east have a big impact on business and prosperity in this country. The British Chambers of Commerce recently published a survey that said 50% of businesses in Britain report that they have now been impacted by conflicts in the middle east.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

I draw attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests, and congratulate all involved on a very successful joint operation. Matters like this are likely to attract retaliation from Iran and its proxies. What is being done to support our allies in the region against possible attacks? As Carrier Strike Group 25 prepares to transit and exercise in the region on Operation Highmast, will he assure the House—without going into specifics—that all is being done to protect our men and women?

[John Healey]

The right hon. Gentleman, who I think served as a Defence Minister under two Administrations, will know that Defence Ministers and Secretaries, including me, give the highest priority to our forces’ protection. My hon. Friend the Armed Forces Minister and I went over that matter in detail with military planners and chiefs before the carrier group set sail, and I was briefed on that again when the Prime Minister and I visited the carrier last week. In general terms, the operation last night was designed to prevent further escalation. It was designed to prevent further Houthi attacks by taking out the major weapons manufacturing site that we struck last night.

Ukraine Update

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd April 2025 Commons Chamber

[John Healey]

My hon. Friend mentions a company in his constituency. I do not know whether he is also referring to Sheffield Forgemasters in his constituency, which is a proud industrial firm in Sheffield, in south Yorkshire, that will be making British steel to supply to a new Rheinmetall artillery barrel factory. It is a new investment in this country, directly as a result of the Trinity House agreement struck in October between the UK and Germany, and it will create 400 jobs in Britain. It will mean that we are able to produce gun barrels in this country for the first time in over 10 years. It is a good example of investment, just like the £1.6 billion that I announced a couple of months ago for new short-range air defence missiles for Ukraine. We will see over 5,000 of those produced in Northern Ireland, creating an extra 200 jobs in Thales in Belfast. It is a good example of where we can support Ukraine, strengthen our own national security and boost economic growth at the same time.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

“Reassurance force” sounds like a euphemism for escalation that would expose our boys and girls to very significant risk, yet on 3 March the Prime Minister said to me, from the Dispatch Box, that we would not be deploying troops to Ukraine without a US backstop and without a US security guarantee. He was right, wasn’t he?

[John Healey]

I have already said this afternoon that the Prime Minister has made it clear to President Trump, as I have done to Secretary Hegseth in the US, that we support absolutely their bid to secure a negotiated peace and we expect there to be a role for the US in helping to secure that peace for the long term. What we are leading alongside the French is a determined effort—a coalition of the willing—that demonstrates that European nations like us and the French, with the capability to lead such a deployment, are willing to step up and do more. But, as I have said, Europe and nations like the UK stepping up does not necessarily mean the US stepping away.

Oral Answers to Questions

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Monday 10th February 2025 Commons Chamber

[Al Carns]

National resilience and defence in depth is essential as we move forward, when the threat is transferred from non-state actors to state actors across the globe. When the strategic defence review comes out in the next couple of the months—in the spring—Members will see that that is a central tenet throughout.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

Last week, the Gurkha class of 2025 proudly attested in Pokhara. There is one part of the British armed forces that does not yet have women: the Brigade of Gurkhas. Will Ministers do what—sadly, and not for the want of trying—I failed to do, and rectify that omission?

[Al Carns]

I served with the Gurkhas on various tours in Afghanistan and across the world. They are some of the best forces we have, and they do a fantastic job upholding the freedoms we enjoy. I will continue to work with the Gurkhas, and I look forward to meeting their ambassador here very soon to discuss issues such as this.

Russian Maritime Activity and UK Response

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd January 2025 Commons Chamber

[John Healey]

We do not and will not comment on specific operational details like that. Needless to say, however, we work very closely with the Irish Government on such matters. Recently, our Chief of the Defence Staff met his counterpart from Ireland.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

I commend the Defence Secretary for his statement and for the actions that he has taken—particularly to change the rules of engagement to allow for the closer inspection of that vessel. However, he does not control all the maritime assets of this country. In December, the Transport Secretary told me that there had been no instances of the UK using its agencies to board and inspect bits of the Russian black and grey fleet. Will he speak to his colleagues across Government to ensure that we use all the arms of government and its agencies to interdict unlicensed, unregistered threats to our security?

[John Healey]

Where there are grounds for interdiction, the Government collectively will certainly be ready, with the appropriate agency, to take action. The right hon. Gentleman will know, having served as a distinguished Defence Minister for some years, that that sort of close co-ordination and collective action is a feature of the national security secretariat that we have at the very heart of our Government. It plays an important role and ensures that we can deal with any such threats or aggressive activity in the most appropriate way.

Armed Forces Commissioner Bill

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 21st January 2025 Commons Chamber

[Jim Allister]

It does. When a former Member of this House with Army experience, Mr Danny Kinahan, was appointed veterans commissioner, great expectations were placed on his shoulders. Sadly, as the right hon. Gentleman says, among the reasons proffered for leaving his role, Mr Kinahan stated that he felt his freedom of action was impinged on by the Northern Ireland Office. Be that right or be that wrong, the perception that such an office holder would have those restraints placed on them does untold damage to that office.

As I have in the past, I pay tribute to Mr Kinahan for his service in that role. I also wish well his recently appointed successor, Mr David Johnstone, whom I had the privilege of meeting last week. I trust that as he takes forward the work of representing veterans, he will find himself unrestrained. However, this Government could put all that beyond doubt by putting the veterans commissioner on the same statutory footing as the Armed Forces Commissioner.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

I join the hon. and learned Gentleman in paying tribute to Danny Kinahan; as a Minister who had some dealings with him, I would certainly say he did a very good job indeed. I wish his successor all the very best. Will the hon. and learned Gentleman acknowledge that the previous Government actually went one step further by appointing a Minister for Veterans’ Affairs of Cabinet rank—a very experienced individual—which this Government have failed to replicate?

[Jim Allister]

That is true. However, they failed to take the step I am now advocating of putting the veterans commissioner on a statutory footing. This Government can go one better and do the right thing for veterans, and I trust that they will. I do support new clause 2; I think it is a step in the right direction, but it is not enough. We need to offer our retired servicemen the facilities we are offering our serving servicemen.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Murrison]

Given the support that the hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for Reading Central (Matt Rodda) have expressed for improvements in service housing, which must be one of the principal issues affecting the welfare of serving members of armed forces, what is the hon. Gentleman’s objection to amendment 10? Given what he has said, I should have thought that he would be fully supportive of it.

[Graeme Downie]

I agree that housing is one of the issues that the commissioner will want to consider, and I hope that they will, in Scotland and throughout the United Kingdom, but I do not think it helpful to be prescriptive. We must ensure that the commissioner is fully independent and can determine their own priorities, and we should not seek to place requirements on them. Otherwise, Parliament will be dictating to them what they should do. I believe that they—and their staff, appointed through the appointments process—will be more than capable of doing that for themselves.

Amendment 6, tabled by the hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell, seeks to impose a timescale for the implementation of the Bill. I am sure that the Minister, like other Members, wants to see the commissioner begin their new and expanded role as quickly as possible, but it is important that this be done fully and correctly. In Committee, I asked Mariette Hughes, the Service Complaints Ombudsman, how staff would cope with the additional powers that are being transferred. It was positive to hear that staff were excited about the new powers and believed them to be necessary; that is a sign that the legislation is both needed and framed correctly. On timescales, Mariette Hughes said that

“there needs to be a significant scoping period to determine how many staff will be required and what the budget will look like.”––[Official Report, Armed Forces Commissioner Public Bill Committee, 10 December 2024; c. 6, Q6.]

Amendment 10 seeks to rush that process, and risks losing the good will within the ombudsman’s team. I come back to the importance of independence, and my belief that there must be a culture of independence from the beginning, without artificial deadlines or criteria being imposed. I know the Minister wants to move as quickly as possible with this legislation while ensuring its effectiveness, and I ask him to comment on the timescale, but I do not believe that the amendment is required.

I turn to an issue that I raised on Second Reading and again in Committee, and which is mentioned in new clause 2: relationships with veterans commissioners and the devolved Administrations. Given that I was the only Scottish Member on the Public Bill Committee, ensuring that this legislation is effective for my constituents is one of my key concerns. When I asked Mariette Hughes about this issue in Committee, she was incredibly practical and clearly focused on the need to solve problems with the devolved Administrations, rather than taking a heavy-handed approach. In my view, her approach is correct. She said that she would work

“with the devolved Administrations…sit round the table and talk about whose job it is to take this forward, because we can all agree that this is what needs to happen for people.”––[Official Report, Armed Forces Commissioner Public Bill Committee, 10 December 2024; c. 6, Q7.]

In Committee, I asked the Minister about housing, which has been discussed. I was reassured by his response that

“if the commissioner was looking at housing in a Scottish context, you would expect them to make recommendations to the Scottish Government.”––[Official Report, Armed Forces Commissioner Public Bill Committee, 10 December 2024; c. 68, Q108.]

That is the kind of constructive scrutiny that I would like to see, and I feel that new clause 2 is heavy-handed in its dealing with the devolved Administrations. An annual report will be presented to this House; I am sure that MSP colleagues of all political parties, as well as Scottish MPs, will be quick to hold a Scottish Government of any political stripe to account when recommendations are made to them.

New clause 2 does not take account of the fact that the power to tackle issues such as housing lies not with veterans commissioners, or even with the Scottish Government, but with local councils, which are even closer to communities. I know that the shadow Minister, the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford, abhors central control from a distant place, so I am sure that he will agree that seeking to control housing policy in Fife or Moray from London is not appropriate. I urge Members to reject new clause 2.

As I said, the fact that the Government brought forward this legislation so early on and the other positive steps that have been taken to support our armed forces and veterans show the commitment of the Labour party and this Government to supporting both. I hope that we can maintain the positive tone of discussions on the Bill to date, and that we can speak with one voice this evening and pass this legislation without amendment.

UK Air Defence

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Thursday 16th January 2025 Commons Chamber

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

I am grateful for this opportunity and declare my interests as a reservist, the father of two servicewomen and the brother of a serving admiral.

Among the many issues that should be keeping Ministers awake at night are two tech-based conundrums that particularly worry me. One is future access to critical minerals and their products, which I have spoken about in the past. The other related issue is the patchy nature of the protection of these islands against missiles and drones. That is what I want to raise this evening.

Everything costs, and it is easy when one is not in government to wish the ends without the means. At the moment, defence is spread too thinly and what I am suggesting would spread it even more thinly. Whether the UK should be globally deployable or focus on the defence of the homeland and its Euro-Atlantic neighbourhood is moot. The likelihood is that we will soldier on, make do and mend—we always have. But the scene is set for the biggest retrenchment since Suez. I wish it were otherwise, but it falls to this Government to make the call. Their attempted unforced surrender of the Chagos islands is perhaps an indication of where their thinking lies.

In 1963, the 35th US President told his National Security Council that European NATO members were not paying their fair share. John F. Kennedy said,

“We have been very generous to Europe and it is now time for us to look out for ourselves”.

On Monday, the 45th and 47th President will likely be saying the same thing. Clearly, American frustration with Europe enjoying the insurance policy without paying the premium is nothing new. What is new is the American willingness to strong-arm Europe into changing its ways. Forget 2% or 2.5%—Trump says he wants 5% of GDP spent on defence by all NATO members, and here is the kicker: he wants a 20% tariff on all goods imported to the US. Combine the two and it is not a stretch to imagine him slapping tariffs on European goods unless Europeans step up to the plate.

Ultimately, the single most important reason Trump can do what we fear he is about to do is that America is no longer principally competing with Europe’s proximate threat—Russia. A vast but thinly populated nation of 144 million, a busted economy and a military whose weaknesses have been generously displayed for all to see since February 2022 is not perceived by Washington as a main threat. An America emerging from the 9/11 Bush counter-terrorism era is back to facing off with great powers once again, but the great power is not Russia; it is China.

As the US pivots, European states of all sizes must step up to defend their homeland and safeguard the north Atlantic. There are no free passes. Israel is a small state, but its military capabilities are unmatched in the middle east. Its layered missile defence systems—the famous Iron Dome, David’s Sling and Arrow—and its formidable fleet of aircraft demonstrate how small states, with a little help from their friends, can punch way above their weight. Several of those small states will provide the first line of defence against Putin’s Russia. The bulk of the cruise, ballistic and hypersonic missiles that Putin would fire at Britain as a proxy for the US will be intercepted by existing defence systems and fighter aircraft stationed in the Baltic states, the Czech Republic, Slovakia or Poland.

While our geography, as so often in our history, gives strategic depth and protection from long-range attack, we can have less confidence in dealing with proximate threats from sea and subsea platforms and with threats to deployed and overseas assets, such as Cyprus, that fall well within the scope of short-range missiles and drones from Russia, Iran and their proxies. In any event, some missiles directed at the homeland would get through in the event of a full-on attack right now by the Russian Federation. That has been our blind spot.

The public would expect that missiles evading the first line of integrated missile defence would be destroyed closer to their target. The Type 45-mounted Sea Viper and the ground-based Sky Sabre are exquisite examples of air and missile defence systems, but there are simply not enough of them—not enough missiles ready to go and not enough industrial capacity to enable resilience in anything more than the very short term. Russia’s war on Ukraine has helpfully made us alive to our vulnerability. Russia, as we have seen in Ukraine and throughout its history, is capable of taking long-term pain in a way that it seems unlikely we would. As things stand, the capital is particularly vulnerable to Russian missile attack, unless we park all our Type 45s—those that are operational—on the Thames.

Happily, unlike Israel and Ukraine, we are surrounded by friends. It makes sense to be a full part of, and a contributor to, NATO integrated air and missile defence, but European IAMD, and its suppression and destruction of enemy air defence systems, are currently completely reliant on the US. In any event, the suspicion is that a full-on attack by Russia right now would find too many holes in the patchy architecture that has evolved to protect against missiles.

Germany has recognised that threat; it has owned the consequences of doing nothing. It has established the European Sky Shield initiative, and has begun procuring trusted systems such as Patriot and Arrow 3. The UK has been considering joining ESSI. Where are we with that? What about off-the-shelf systems such as Arrow 3?

[John Cooper (Dumfries and Galloway) (Con)]

I thank my right hon. and gallant Friend for that point. It is interesting that the Arrow 3 project he mentions is a joint project between Boeing in America and the Israeli defence machinery. Is there something in the innovation offered by Patria, a Finnish company, which is offering to help us build armoured vehicles here in Britain but based on its design? Do we need less of a reliance on domestic systems and to consider, as he says, off-the-shelf systems from elsewhere?

[Dr Murrison]

There is a great deal in what my hon. Friend says. Historically, buying off the shelf has proved to be somewhat more cost-effective than designing exquisite systems of our own. I hope very much that, as we go further into this process, we can partner with others to ensure that what we buy is both integrated and cost-effective. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s thoughts on ESSI.

Ukraine has shown the limitations of the “just in time, not just in case” policy that has driven our failure to stockpile the materiel of war in recent decades. In the 1930s, the shadow factories initiative fitted commercial premises that typically produced cars for reconfiguration as armament factories, in case the need should arise, which it did. Car workers would switch to become the basis of the skilled workforce necessary to create materiel for prosecuting the war effort. That then happened, to the point that in 1940, this country was outstripping Germany in the production of fighter aircraft. With every respect due to the Few, the Battle of Britain was won in Britain’s factories and on its production lines as much as in the skies. Victory hinges just as much on logistics now, except the timelines are far shorter. The defence ecosystem in the US 2022 national defence strategy had more than a whiff of the 1930s in advancing an intertwined commercial-military co-operative.

In a good light, we can see shadow factories in the thematic approach to missile defence taken by the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory missile defence centre. Crucially, it is industry partner-based, with a heavy focus on growing suitably qualified and experienced people, of whom we are desperately short. The MDC is now 20 years old. What assessment has the Minister made of it, and what changes does he propose to its structure and remit to help plug holes in our missile defence architecture? In the light of prevailing circumstances, will he consider upgrading the MDC so that it has the salience and clout approaching that of the pre-war directorate of aeronautical production? Then, it was Spitfires and Hurricanes; today it is missile defence, SDEAD—suppression and destruction of enemy air defences—and drones. Then, it was preparation for the total war to come; now—God willing—it is deterrence.

There are those who say that the solution to our vulnerability to missile attack from the east is simple: it is Israel’s Iron Dome—the close-in element of the layered missile defence system used successfully to thwart Iran in April. However, Israel is a small country with a small population concentrated in a small number of cities with limited critical national infrastructure. It is surrounded by hostiles. Happily, none of that applies here.

Our missile defence must be fully integrated with NATO partners. NATO needs European leadership as the US pivots, and we must not encourage those whose primary interest in defence lies in extending the remit of the institutions of the European Union, rather than the defence and security of Europeans. We do not need the distraction of a separate, competing EU defence architecture; NATO is our strength and our stay, and we must use our status as the continent’s leading military power to ensure it remains so. In particular, we must articulate clearly the case for layered missile defence and SDEAD within a NATO construct, as the US pivots towards the Indo-Pacific. The UK and Europe need NATO integrated air and missile defence that incorporates close-in systems to guarantee major centres of population, defence assets and critical national infrastructure. Crucially, member states must not give an aggressor capable of waging an attritional war grounds for believing that the west will exhaust its ordnance in the first few hours or days.

Where are we with the versatile and scalable very short to medium-range modular ground-based air defence system envisaged by NATO Defence Ministers at their meeting in October 2020? What application might that system have to provide the last arrow in our quiver—one that will destroy missiles that have evaded intermediate layers and are about to land on critical sites in the UK? For a country with no money, directed energy weapons offer a potential solution for dealing with drones and missiles, albeit in line of sight and in good weather. Is DSTL’s DragonFire weapon still on course for service with the Royal Navy in 2027, and what export opportunities are Ministers exploring? Do they expect that Type 26s, Type 31s, and any Type 32s will carry DragonFire or successor directed energy weapons? Will they be fitted as standard, or as expensive retrofits?

Do we really need a sixth-generation manned—or even hybrid—fast jet to replace Typhoon? Would it not be better to rely on the F-35 airframe with mid-life upgrades in a future that is surely progressively unmanned? The lineal, if less romantic, descendants of the Few will be tech geeks, gamers, coders and those who provide a human interface with artificial intelligence. What are we doing to grow them, and will the Minister visit the #TechTrowbridge initiative that I started in Wiltshire’s county town, which was once a centre for Spitfire manufacture? He would be warmly welcomed on his way to his constituency.

The reason that a grisly artillery war has played out in Ukraine is because nobody has been able to command the airspace. Happily and to our surprise, Russia has been unable to suppress or destroy Ukraine’s air defences. In the future, unmanned combat aerial vehicles configured to shoot the archer, not the arrow, will do that. I would be very surprised if Lord Robertson were not casting a critical eye over the global combat air programme, and comparing and contrasting its cost and effectiveness with those of unmanned combat aerial vehicles.

I appreciate the deep cultural difficulty of envisaging an unmanned future battlespace. It is deeply unsettling for those of us steeped in the traditions of the armed forces, but while there will always be a need for sufficient booted and spurred combat troops ready to close with and kill the enemy and hold the ground—as the Member of Parliament for a garrison town, I am not for one moment suggesting a further reduction in headcount—this country will never again be able to expose itself to attritional warfare of the sort we are seeing being played out in Ukraine. Politically and societally, that would be impossible and unconscionable. That means integrated missile defence, SDEAD, drones, and command of the electromagnetic spectrum.

Once again at a dreadnought crossroads, Britain must configure the forces at its disposal for the long term in all domains and take a lead as what is still the principal military power in its Euro-Atlantic voisinage. Early pointers suggesting that this Government are taking the right fork in the road would include difficult and unpopular decisions such as standing firm on the deep space advanced radar capability envisaged for Cawdor barracks on the St David’s peninsula, which was bottled by previous Governments. As we chop to an unmanned future, those pointers would—for example, and very painfully—include consignment of the RAF Red Arrows aero-acrobatics team to the historic flight.

This Government have four years left to run—the time the directorate of aeronautical production had to fit out this country with what it needed to prevail. Recent events have revealed the fundamental truth that we are vulnerable now, as we were then, and the shifting geopolitical plates will likely make us more so. The public will never forgive an Administration of whatever colour who muddle through, leaving them open to the predations of Putin’s advancing missile programme.

UK Submarine Fleet

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Wednesday 15th January 2025 Westminster Hall

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Dr Andrew Murrison (in the Chair)]

I intend to call the Opposition spokesman at 5.8 pm. There are several Members seeking to catch my eye, so brevity is a virtue.

Oral Answers to Questions

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Monday 6th January 2025 Commons Chamber

[John Healey]

My hon. Friend is right in general terms: Russian aggression is not simply confined to Ukraine, and we all saw what happened on Christmas day. We are deeply concerned about the damage and sabotage to undersea cables. I can confirm to the House that for the first time the joint expeditionary force—the JEF—has activated an advanced UK-led reaction system to track potential threats to undersea infrastructure and to monitor the movements of the Russian shadow fleet. That will be run out of the standing joint force headquarters at Northwood.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

The Secretary of State said that his aim is to ensure that Ukraine is in the “strongest possible position”, but for what? Does he intend to support Ukraine in commanding her internationally recognised borders or to ensure that the de facto border, which excludes Donbas and Crimea, becomes a more permanent feature?