Alex Burghart
Main Page: Alex Burghart (Conservative - Brentwood and Ongar)Department Debates - View all Alex Burghart's debates with the Cabinet Office
(1 day, 12 hours ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move,
That this House calls on the Government to release the minutes of the meeting chaired by the National Security Adviser on 1 September 2025, at which the prosecution of the two alleged Chinese spies, since dropped by the Crown Prosecution Service, was discussed, including all actions arising from that meeting; and further calls on the Government to publish the minutes of all other meetings where the case was discussed, whether by officials or with Ministers, all relevant correspondence between the Crown Prosecution Service and the Government and between Departments, including correspondence between the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Cabinet Office, Attorney General’s Office, and the Treasury, and advice provided to the Prime Minister relating to the China spy case.
The purpose of this Opposition day debate and of our motion is very simple: transparency—that is all that we ask for. The basic facts are that two men were arrested on suspicion of having spied on hon. Members of this House for China, and the Director of Public Prosecutions has acknowledged that this appears to have been a “gross breach of trust” against hon. Members, yet the case against the two men collapsed because, in the words of the senior Treasury counsel, Tom Little KC, the case was “effectively unsustainable”; it was brought to “a crashing halt” because the Government’s own witness, the deputy National Security Adviser, refused to provide the fatal piece of evidence.
Mr Little had what he called a million-dollar question: was China an active threat to national security? The deputy National Security Adviser repeatedly refused to say yes. The Government effectively refused to say what was patently apparent to anyone remotely alive to the facts of the case. This House has every reason to be told why they refused, and why, for example, the Prime Minister did not intervene to prevent the case collapsing, when we know he was warned that it was unlikely to proceed. It is also reported that the Home Secretary tried to intervene.
We do not call for the publication of this material lightly. We know it is an extraordinary measure to call for the Government to publish documents relating to the formation of policy, but this is an extraordinary event. We have reached this point because the Government have been unable or unwilling to answer basic questions about what they knew when, and why they acted as they did. They have hidden behind civil servants and advisers, when it is Ministers who are supposed to make decisions, and in doing so, they have brought the actions and decisions of those advisers and officials into the spotlight in a way that is most irregular.
Just as worryingly, there has been a persistent inaccuracy and inconsistency in the Government’s statements, to the point where this House can no longer trust a word of theirs. There are a number of examples. First, on 13 October, the Security Minister denied in this House that the mega-mandarin meeting on 1 September, which is the subject of our motion, took place. Last week, the Solicitor General admitted that the meeting did take place. We now know that it was led by the National Security Adviser and attended by the Cabinet Secretary, the permanent under-secretary at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, senior representation from the Home Office and the Attorney General’s office, and the chief of MI5, but we still do not know what was said there, what was agreed or why the Government tried to deny its existence.
I was interested to see that the National Security Adviser was listed as being involved in that meeting. The National Security Adviser is a political appointee—he is a special adviser—and that is usually the reason why the deputy National Security Adviser is put forward to take all the flak. If the NSA himself is participating in policy meetings about this matter, why does he not come forward? Why is he sheltering behind a full-time official who is being hung out to dry?
My right hon. Friend makes a very pertinent point and is personally very experienced in such things. It has been reported that the National Security Adviser chaired that meeting. That is to say that he was taking a very active role in what was going on. That is why it is incredibly important that the Government come clean with us about what happened in that meeting, who attended and what was decided there.
The National Security Adviser has spent a great deal of time visiting various Chinese entities before and after his appointment. One appointment that he does not appear very keen on taking up is with the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, which has requested—quite legitimately, under the Osmotherly rules—that he appears before it, but Ministers appear to be blocking that. Why does my hon. Friend think that is?
My right hon. Friend is right: the National Security Adviser showed a great reluctance to attend. I understand that he has now agreed to attend, although the report I read said that he was going to attend in camera. If that report is correct—the Minister has the opportunity to say it is not true—I am not sure that that is the best level of transparency that this House might expect.
The second instance of inconsistency and inaccuracy that we draw attention to is from 7 October, when the Prime Minister told journalists that what mattered in this case was the designation of China as it had been in 2023, when the offences were alleged to have occurred. However, last week, on 24 October, the Director of Public Prosecutions said that that was categorically not the case. He said:
“The test was…positively not what the then Government was prepared to, or did, say in public about China…but rather whether China was—as a matter of fact—an active threat to national security.”
This is a most important point, and one that was revisited yesterday. There is a very serious question about why the deputy National Security Adviser believed that he would
“need to be in line with government policy at the time”,
when the Crown Prosecution Service said that it did not need to know about policy, but about the facts. The Minister should explain to the House why the deputy National Security Adviser chose to ignore the CPS in this case. He should also tell us whether he thinks the deputy National Security Adviser complied with civil procedure rule 35, which requires him to assist the court and overrides any other obligation.
Dr Scott Arthur (Edinburgh South West) (Lab)
Perhaps the hon. Gentleman can clarify what is happening here. Is the issue that the Government thought that China was a threat to national security but did not declare it, or that they declared it but China was not a threat? I am quite confused about the point he is making.
The hon. Gentleman will have a perfectly good opportunity to question the people responsible in a few moments’ time. The point is that the Government have been unclear, inconsistent and inaccurate, and we are giving them an opportunity to clear this up right now.
The previous Government were clear on a number of occasions that China was a threat, but if the hon. Gentleman had been listening to what I just said, he would have heard that the Director of Public Prosecutions said last week that it was categorically not a question of what the last Government said. Now that I have the hon. Gentleman’s attention, I will repeat for his benefit what the DPP said: that the question was
“whether China was—as a matter of fact—an active threat to national security.”
It was not a question of policy; it was a matter of fact. [Interruption.] I am not going to go through it a third time.
I am very grateful to my hon. Friend for setting out the story so far, but given that there have been so many variations on the truth, can he come up with an explanation of why the Government cannot alight on a single version of the truth of this matter?
I think there are basically two possible answers to my hon. Friend’s question. The first is that the Government cannot tell their elbow from their posterior; the second is that they do not want this House to know the truth. Either way, on a matter as serious as this, it is incredibly important that we get to the truth. Tonight’s motion presents the Government with an opportunity to be entirely transparent with us and set out the facts of the case as they were at the time—particularly on 1 October, when this all-important meeting took place.
I just want to clear up one small point. When the CPS originally decided to prosecute back in 2024, it was convinced on the basis of the then-required evidence that was in front of it that in this case, China was responsible, and therefore it posed a threat. What changed was the Roussev case, which redefined what the CPS needed to be able to say in order to go ahead with any further prosecution. It was made clear that all that needed to be done was to make the clear point that China was a persistent, continuous threat to the UK’s strategic interests. The reason why the CPS needed to make that statement had nothing to do with what had happened before; it was all about what resulted from the Roussev case. That was the key.
My right hon. Friend is absolutely correct, and the Director of Public Prosecutions has been very clear and consistent on that point.
The first senior Treasury counsel, Tom Little, yesterday said that he took the extraordinary step of having a direct discussion with the deputy National Security Adviser because he could not understand why what he said was a relatively straightforward piece of evidence—namely, that China was an active and ongoing threat—had not been provided. Why did the Government not provide that commitment?
That is the million-dollar question. Why were the Government not prepared to say something that was manifestly evidentially true to all and sundry?
The third example is that on 15 October, the Prime Minister said that the deputy National Security Adviser acted entirely independently, without consultation with Ministers or special advisers, and without political involvement. However, the CPS has now made it clear that there were multiple discussions about what the DNSA would and would not say, starting with one such discussion on 3 July 2025. Moreover, the DNSA’s first witness statement was sighted by
“the then National Security Adviser and the…Cabinet Office Permanent Secretary”,
and
“sent to the…Prime Minister through No.10 private office”,
including special advisers.
Is it therefore not incredible either way that the deputy NSA did not discuss the biggest spy case this century with his boss, the National Security Adviser, and was left to his own devices to provide the evidence?
I think we all find it difficult to believe that the deputy National Security Adviser was left entirely to his own devices.
A fourth example is that on 20 October, the Minister for Security, who is in his place, told the House:
“Final evidence went in in August, and I can give the hon. Gentleman an assurance that there is nothing the Prime Minister or any Minister could have done thereafter.”—[Official Report, 20 October 2025; Vol. 773, c. 640.]
We now know that there were meetings between the CPS and the Government on 3 and 9 September to attempt to rescue the case. Why did the Security Minister tell the House something that was not correct?
Tony Vaughan (Folkestone and Hythe) (Lab)
As far as I can remember, the Attorney General told the House of Lords yesterday that 3 September was when he was informed that there were evidential difficulties with the case. The key point is that he had no power to intervene, because of the memorandum between the Attorney General’s Office and the CPS. The Attorney General does not get involved in evidential sufficiency.
Ministers do get involved; it is their job to be involved. Ministers represent the Government. Ministers represent all of us. It is not good enough for the Government to say that they are entirely powerless in this instance—they are not.
A fifth example is that yesterday, the Cabinet Secretary said that he did not believe that the chief of MI5 had described China as a threat. On 16 October 2025, Ken McCallum said:
“Do Chinese state actors present a UK national security threat? And the answer is, of course, yes they do every day.”
How on earth did the Cabinet Secretary not know that? This issue is of paramount importance. There are many other such examples.
The Government have an opportunity to be clear with us today, not just about the meetings and the dealings of the past six months, but on their position as it stands. Will the Minister tell us what the material difference is between “a range of threats” and “an active security threat”? The deputy National Security Adviser was keen to make that point yesterday. Perhaps most importantly of all, do the Government believe that China is an active security threat? If not, what would it take to cross that threshold? It is time for the Government to publish all the details so that we can see what really happened here.
I know that the Government will protest their innocence and claim that it is all the fault of the CPS, or the last Government, or the legislation, just as they have tried to do for weeks, but such pleas and protests are no good reason for them to refuse to publish the material we are requesting today. This House may have been spied upon. This House has a right to straight answers. This House has a right to see under the bonnet when the safety and privacy of its Members may have been compromised. This House has a right to know the Government’s real position and the Government’s real agenda. If this Government have nothing to hide, they should hide nothing from this House.
Several hon. Members rose—
In one moment.
In the motion, the shadow Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster is seeking a wide range of documents. He was a Cabinet Office Minister himself, and he knows the sensitivity of those documents. He knows the legal professional privilege—
I will give the hon. Gentleman one more chance before I conclude. I say to him that highly classified material is subject to legal professional privilege and includes advice to the Prime Minister, which successive Governments have not released to the public. Why? Because it is in our interests to protect such material. The hon. Gentleman knows that in his heart of hearts.
I have always admired the shine on the Minister’s brass neck, and never so much as at this moment. I remember the Brexit debates, when he and many of the other gentlemen and ladies on the Labour Benches overrode legal privilege and asked for classified documents week after week. Members of this House may have been spied on, and the Government have a duty to be transparent. They cannot hide behind anything, given that they have previously asked for similar documents. Make them available!
I am looking at the hon. Gentleman and remembering the debates we had. Let me tell him the difference between what I was doing then and what is happening now. First, I was applying at the time, via a Humble Address mechanism, for a single document. By the way, his rather shambolic motion, which seems to be a fishing expedition, is totally imprecise. Secondly, that was not security material at this level, which is in our national interest.
Yes, I did.
Let me emphasise that I support parliamentary scrutiny. I support and welcome the ongoing process with the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. I support the Government’s continuing to engage with the ISC. What we will not do, though, is accede to the hon. Gentleman’s demand. He knows in his heart of hearts that it would be totally inappropriate for the long list of material he has stuck in the motion to be put in the public domain. Asking for open publication is completely different from the appropriate parliamentary scrutiny which, quite rightly, will go on.
Let me conclude by saying this. The Government and I are gravely disappointed that the trial did not proceed. In response to the point that was put to me by the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis), the DNSA’s evidence articulated clearly the range of threats that China posed to the UK’s national security and, indeed, our economic security at the material time. In the light of the threats that have been identified—I agree with the shadow Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster—this is a very grave matter. The Government are resolute in our determination to work across all parties and in partnership with the parliamentary security authorities, as was raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket (Peter Prinsley), to ensure that espionage and interference by China or any other country is not successful in the UK.