Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base
William Cash Excerpts(13 years, 6 months ago)
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Justine Greening
At the moment, there is no proposal on the table. A proposal is being worked up, but things are at an early stage. Member states have had, I believe, two working group meetings with the Commission to talk about how any proposal might operate. Fundamental questions are still being developed on, for example, how the formula will work, and a host of other issues. As I have said, part of the challenge is how any avoidance loopholes might work in practice, and whether they would be substantial. We are at a very early point in the process. Today’s debate allows Members of our Parliament to have their say, which we can then add to the Commission’s process.
Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)
The Opposition Benches are virtually empty, but there are also no Liberal Democrats in the Chamber—there is a sort of let-out under the coalition agreement.
The Minister seems to be referring to enhanced co-operation, which the agreement says is the basis on which the Government will be engaged in discussions to help to shape a corporate tax base that does not undermine the competitiveness of the EU or the UK. She has made it clear that enhanced co-operation would have that effect, so clearly, we will not under any circumstances accept it. Therefore, the answer can only be no. Why do we not say so?
Justine Greening
As I have said, we need to manage risks, and it is unclear at this point where the process will end up. However, there might be risks posed by enhanced co-operation. We need to be part of the discussions to ensure that our arguments carry weight. Our arguments will not carry weight if we are not part of those discussions from the beginning, because we say that we never want to be involved. That is not a sensible approach. In addition, I do not agree that it is as simple as saying, “We don’t want to be in it,” because the proposal might go ahead in a different form involving a limited group of nations, which could still affect us, even if indirectly. I want to make it absolutely clear tonight what the Government are fundamentally seeking to achieve. We will not agree to any proposal that will threaten or limit our ability to shape our tax policy.
Justine Greening
My hon. Friend might well be right, but I want to make clear the rules and the processes going forward. No member state can unilaterally block the use of enhanced co-operation. Of course we can decide whether we want to be part of that—I have clearly set out the Government’s concerns about the proposal—but I am saying to the House that we need to participate in the debate and ensure that we influence the underlying proposal. We do not want to end up being unable to stop enhanced co-operation simply because it was a proposal that we fundamentally did not want in the first place. We need to make our case, with other member states, in order to influence the proposal as it develops, and that is precisely what we want to do.
Mr Cash
The Minister is always well informed, so I am sure that she knows that the Tax Commissioner has already said that if there is a veto—if, in other words, the Commission does not get unanimity—it will go ahead with enhanced co-operation. If we know that to be the case, why do we not just say no and be done with it?
Justine Greening
The Commission might, as my hon. Friend has said, take a view, but we need to understand what other member states think about the proposal. This evening is a chance for us, as a member state, to allow our Parliament to voice its concerns. The European Scrutiny Committee, which he chairs, has produced a helpful report that will no doubt form a basis of this debate.
I shall now finish my remarks so that other Members can put on record their views on the report.
Chris Leslie
The Minister has essentially enunciated a continuation of the policy advocated by the previous Administration. In fact, this common consolidated corporation tax base proposal has been around for a decade or so. In that time there has not been a massive change in policy, which is interesting, because I had anticipated that, in her quasi-Thatcherite mode, the Minister would say, “No, no, no!” to this proposal—but she did not.
As I said, it is interesting that the motion is quite carefully worded. It specifically mentions “reasoned opinion”, “subsidiarity and proportionality” and so forth, but if passed it would not actually instruct the House of Commons to reject the directive as drafted. I suspect—on this point I was considering intervening on the hon. Lady, but I thought I would let her finish—that it might be more to do with the Liberal Democrat position on this issue. [Interruption.] The Minister rolls her eyes, but there are no Lib Dems here so it is difficult to put them on the spot.
Hon. Members will be interested to hear the Lib Dems' official policy on a common consolidated corporate tax base. In their 2009 document, they stated that they would “address the variability issue” on cross-border corporation tax
“by developing a medium and long-term statement of business tax policy, covering a minimum two parliament timeframe. This statement would…identify areas for greater international co-operation on tax policy. A clear area for co-operation is in the movement towards a harmonised tax base in the EU, often referred to as a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base”.
So, there is a loud voice—muscular and visible, as we now know—in the coalition arguing vociferously in favour of a common consolidated corporate tax base. I say that for the benefit of the House, because it is important that hon. Members know the facts. Given that the motion was published only this morning on the Order Paper—hon. Members did not really have notice of exactly the Government’s proposition, which is quite ridiculous—and that all 298 pages of the supporting papers were published only yesterday, I am not surprised that many hon. Members have not yet woken up to the opinion being taken of the Government on this matter.
Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)
This is of course about direct taxation, and I welcome the Government’s limited stand against the draft directive, for the reasons given in the motion endorsing the European Scrutiny Committee’s report on the points that the Minister has just summarised. I remain concerned, however, about one matter still hanging over the debate. The Minister might be able to guess what I am about to say. It goes back to a motion that was before a European Standing Committee which asserted, in the name of the Government, probably for the first time since 1640—I mentioned Pym and Hampden just now—that the British Government, as a sovereign Government, were only primarily responsible for direct taxation, whereas in fact our Parliament is exclusively responsible for it. That motion was put to a deferred Division in the House and passed, which is pretty alarming. I invite the Minister to be rather clearer than she was the last time I put this point to her, because it must be made absolutely clear that this House is exclusively responsibility for direct taxation.
The Minister has been at pains to describe the context of this measure in the light of the questions of subsidiarity, but some Members might recall that it was on 27 April that I raised this matter with the Prime Minister, together with the proposed increase in the European budget and the Portuguese bail-out, not to mention prospective Greek bail-outs and whatever else. I said that we expected the answer to be no to each of those proposals. His reply referred only to the increase in the EU budget, and I hope—for reasons that have been expressed in interventions, including my own—that we are unequivocal in reserving to ourselves the absolute determination, and not merely the right, to say no to these proposals, because they infringe a number of important principles. I shall come to those in a moment.
I want it on record that the coalition agreement states that there should be
“no further transfer of sovereignty or powers”
to the EU. Our Committee report looked at that and found it wanting in relation to the EU referendum Bill. The Government have also said that they would reject any proposal that
“might threaten or limit our ability to shape our own tax policy.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 16 February 2011; Vol. 725, c. WA172.]
I have the greatest respect for the Minister, as she well knows, but she left out the next bit, which was the word “but”. That word “but” is represented by Banquo’s ghost, who is not sitting on the Liberal Democrat Front Bench tonight—[Interruption.] Ah! My hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) is there, acting as a surrogate, which is extremely unlikely in the circumstances, although I am delighted to see him and I hope that he will contribute to the debate at some point.
I want to continue with the words that come after the word “but”. They are that, “under enhanced co-operation” the coalition Government will
“engage in discussions to help shape a CCCTB that does not undermine the competitiveness of the EU or the UK”.
Now that is a monumental exception, because it is obvious, for reasons that I shall explain, that the proposal will undermine the competitiveness of the EU and the UK ab initio—and the Government know it. It follows from that, as light follows day, that there is no reason for us not to put our foot down now and say no. We know that the Tax Commissioner is saying that this is going ahead under enhanced co-operation, and this it not something magicked out of the air, as he knows perfectly well that that is what Germany, France and other countries are intending to do. When I provide the figures on the number of member states engaged in the process, as I shall in a moment, perhaps matters will fall into place.
The proposals before the European Scrutiny Committee are, for reasons set out in our conclusions, all profoundly objectionable, but the draft directive falls down particularly on four main issues: one, the sovereignty of this House; two, the insufficient legal base; three, an inadequate and unconvincing impact assessment; four, grounds of proportionality, making the doubling of tax regimes in the EU, the cost of establishing 27 new regimes and the apportionment formula excessively disadvantageous for certain member states.
I add that the Oxford university centre for business taxation says in its policy briefing that
“it is unlikely that the introduction of the CCCTB would bring significant benefits to the EU in aggregate in terms of employment, GDP or efficiency, although some individual countries could benefit significantly.”
I make that point because, under the formula of Roland Vaubel of Mannheim university, it is well known that there is such a thing as regulatory collusion and that, by the clever use of certain majority voting systems, through negotiations in the case of unanimity as in this instance or by enhanced co-operation, it is possible to arrive at a point where some countries benefit to the disadvantage of others. The Oxford university think-tank has its finger on that issue.
It is quite clear that the objective of this tax base—this is the important part that needs to be borne in mind on the big landscape—is to raise money to pay for the profligate, incompetent and failing European project. Countries such as Greece, Ireland and Portugal are either on the verge of or in danger of bankruptcy or are actually going bankrupt because of the systemic failure of economic policies. The stability and growth pact does not work: as I have said before, there is no stability, no growth and no pact.
The creation of a two-tier Europe will merely exacerbate these problems, as was noted when we debated the European Union Bill, and will lead to ever-greater German domination over the European economy. The economic predominance of Germany in east and central Europe might be a good thing from its point of view, but we now have a transfer Union and a massive redistribution of resources. What we are also witnessing as a result of the failure of this project are riots and protests as Germany repatriates its profits at the expense of cheap labour unit costs from the countries in which it has put investment in the centre of Europe, as Portugal, Greece and even Ireland have found to their cost. The pumping of money supports not so much the member states as the French and German banks, which have lent money indiscriminately to suit themselves—and we are expected to engage in the bail-out procedure, the covert mechanism for which is the stability mechanism, coming into effect in 2013.
As the European Scrutiny Committee insists, this whole proposal is in breach of the principle of subsidiarity. I remind the House that this principle is intended to ensure that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen. Direct taxation is such a policy. The national Parliaments are able to use the procedure under the treaties to challenge breaches of subsidiarity. At present, there are only six countries whose parliamentary Chambers propose to, or have, issued a reasoned opinion. We have, but, interestingly enough, the House of Lords has not. I think that we should note that.
In passing the motion, the House will challenge the breach of subsidiarity. I suspect that the Minister has figures that are even more up to date than mine, but as far as I know, of the 27 member states, the five that are on our side are Ireland, Malta, Netherlands, Poland and Sweden. I am told that Cyprus, Greece, Hungary and Slovenia have no plans even to scrutinise the proposal, that those yet to decide include Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic—the lower chamber and the senate—Denmark, Estonia, France, Lithuania, and Luxembourg; that Romania, Portugal, Italy and Spain believe that the draft directive complies with the principle of subsidiarity; and that the German Bundesrat is considering it only on the basis of content.
The picture is very uncertain. There is no guarantee that the accumulated number of reasoned opinions will be sufficient to meet the threshold requiring the European Commission to review the proposal, and because that will be known somewhat in advance, the tax commissioner will say that he has already received a demand to proceed with enhanced co-operation.
We have a serious problem on our hands; however, we have another card up our sleeve. Unbeknown to some, although I am more than happy to share the information with the House, under article 8 of protocol 2 the United Kingdom Parliament can go to the European Court of Justice, which has jurisdiction to determine our claim as the House of Commons—which is regarded as a separate Chamber—that the principle of subsidiarity has been breached. That gives us the basis for a challenge.
I believe that if the Government are not prepared to say no—which, for the reasons that I have already given, I think that they should have done already—the House of Commons should take the matter to the European Court of Justice; but would it not save an enormous amount of time and trouble if we simply recognised that the House is sovereign, that it has the right to take the action that it has taken, that the European Scrutiny Committee has done its job at this stage in the proceedings, and that the Minister is profoundly on our side of the equation? I know her sentiments, and I also know her Parliamentary Private Secretary. He was a member of the European Scrutiny Committee with me for years. He would be jumping about all over the place about this if he were still a member of the Committee, and agreeing with every word that I am saying.
Leaving aside the attack on Thatcherism, of all things, by the Deputy Prime Minister immediately after the disastrous showing of the Liberal Democrats in the polls, which is probably why no Liberal Democrat Members are present today—and, for that matter, the let-out that they have been given in the coalition agreement, which I think I have now shot to pieces—I would say that there is every reason for the Liberal Democrats to back down and not veto our Conservative party veto simply because of the coalition arrangement, and for the Prime Minister to do what I asked him to do at Prime Minister’s Question Time only a few weeks ago and say “No, no, no.” That would save a great deal of time and argument.
The UK corporate tax director of a major European bank has said that this proposal would increase our corporation tax and drive investment away, reduce our GDP by £73 billion over 10 years, increase the administrative burden, and lose the UK an estimated total of £58 billion, again over 10 years. We know that Mr Sarkozy and Ms Merkel are in favour of the competitiveness pact, which affects us although it is presented as a eurozone matter. I believe profoundly that, whether the proposal involves enhanced co-operation, the creation of a two-tier system, or whatever other means or machinations may be produced by the Faustian pact that is being devised in Europe, we should put our foot down, lead from the front, and say no. I am prepared to admit that the opportunity to do that exists, but I want to hear it from the Prime Minister’s own lips. He will then be able to enjoy as much success in this context as he, and we, enjoyed in the context of the alternative vote the other day, when the Liberal Democrats got their come-uppance.
Mr John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)
Tonight’s debate should be a vital one because, after all, it is about sovereignty; it is about power. The might of this House of Commons in its great years was based on one very simple proposition: that only a vote of the House of Commons could impose or remove a tax on the British people. It was that power which our predecessors fought for and achieved, and it was that power which was crucial to grant the supply to the Government, who could then choose how to spend it, on the advice and with the votes of the House of Commons.
We have been assured and reassured by countless Ministers of the Crown since we joined the European Economic Community in the 1970s that taxation was always a matter for unanimity; that we would always have a veto over any tax matter; and that there was no question of the European Union interfering and choosing taxes for us or running our tax system. Under the previous Labour Government, tax was said to be a defensible red line, which they always told us they had always protected. Under previous Conservative Governments, Ministers could rightly then say that it was always a matter entirely for the jurisdiction and decision of this House of Commons.
Yet tonight, in this small and short debate, we are presented with a 102-page draft law which is a comprehensive new corporation tax system for the European Union, including the United Kingdom. Worse still, we have been warned in a friendly way by the Minister that if this country disagrees with it, a group of countries may go ahead under some other procedure and create it anyway, and they will then exert extraterritorial jurisdiction over the UK because they will try to tempt our companies away from our system to their system. As my hon. Friend the Member for Amber Valley (Nigel Mills) has just said, tax advisers and accountants will be able to play all sorts of games under this complicated system so that companies that have some activities in Britain could be tempted into the European Union opt-in system. That would mean that the British Treasury and British Ministers would no longer have jurisdiction over them; we would get back only what the sharing formula allowed, which the European Union would be in charge of.
I assume that it is because the Minister is worried about that eventuality that she has not come here with a straightforward proposal just to veto the whole thing. My advice to the Government is that this should be the issue we fight over. This proposal is so outrageous, it is such a comprehensive violation of subsidiarity, as they call it, and it is such a U-turn from the proposition that a member state has control over its own tax affairs that surely we should veto it. If we vetoed it and other countries still wanted to go ahead as a lesser group than the European Union, we should follow things through and say that it therefore does not apply to the United Kingdom and we will not operate it in respect of companies that are properly domiciled here and should be taxed here under our rules. We should set the rules for organisations and companies undertaking activity in Britain, making money in Britain and employing people in Britain. If we cannot do that, what is the point of this House of Commons? I think the Minister is in a stronger position than perhaps her officials and advisers have suggested.
We have heard, I think rightly, from my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) that the legal base is not correct. In order to justify all the statements that this is a matter for unanimity, it must come under that measure in the treaty that states that other proposals can be produced but that they require the unanimous consent of all member states. It must come under a unanimous base. Once it is a matter to be decided under a unanimous base, we can then save the European Union a lot of time, trouble and money because we can simply say that we do not wish to have a collective corporation tax system and that Britain is going to use her veto. For once, surely, the United Kingdom could have some influence over the agenda of the European Union and we could show that we mean it when we say that taxation is for national decision—that it is a matter for subsidiarity, in the EU’s language, or a matter of sovereignty, in my language.
I would like to ask my ministerial friend what the point was of this House solemnly legislating to maintain, uphold or reaffirm the sovereignty of the British Parliament if we cannot even choose our own corporation tax regime. What is the point of our going along with the negotiations to try to ameliorate, improve or abate the severity of this draft law if we are doing so in the spirit that we will end up with a law of sorts anyway? We will then hear from the Minister that instead of it being something that we have vetoed, it is something we have taken the worst out to make it a bit more tolerable so that we can go along with it. It will not be necessary for the other member states who want the measure to use a special procedure to get it, and there will be no need for us to say to them that we refuse to go along with it or comply with it.
Mr Cash
Does my right hon. Friend recall the words of Chancellor Kohl, who, only 10 or 15 years ago, made it clear that, on the question of the speed of the convey, which is what this is all about, he would want the front of the convey to go ahead, led by Germany, and for the other Member states to be left in such a parlous condition that they would eventually, in his words, have to catch up?
Mr Redwood
My hon. Friend is quite right. That also explains why the European Union is so keen to try to get the Irish rate up, because if it is to have a common system such as this, it would not want a weak link. The EU would see a weak link as a state that dared to set a more realistic and lower rate in order to attract business.
Mr David Nuttall (Bury North) (Con)
It is always a great pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg), who sets out with such great clarity the grounds for my opposition to the measure. We have heard tonight a number of reasons why the proposal for a common Euro corporation tax, as I would like to call it, is wrong. This is yet another stage towards what the eurocrats are determined to proceed with—ever closer union.
We are here on a regular weekly or fortnightly basis, looking at the latest directive that comes before the House. Sometimes the directives could be described as dealing with relatively minor matters. This one most certainly cannot. The harmonisation and the Europeanisation or European Unionisation of the corporation tax base is a step too far. We have heard that its legal basis is unsound. It would, in my opinion, fall foul of the principle of subsidiarity. I believe that it is economically wrong.
It would be interesting to know how many FTSE companies in this country would be in favour of this crazy proposal. It seems that the only people who would benefit if it ever came into force would be those companies and tax jurisdictions that were outside such an arrangement. I accept that in the early days they could arrange their affairs in such a way as to make it attractive in order to encourage companies to come into the euro corporation tax area, but I am absolutely certain that before long, because of the bureaucratic and regulatory burden, they would have to increase their corporation tax rates to such a level that any companies that were ensnared within such arrangements would quickly wish that they had never become involved.
Mr Cash
Does my hon. Friend also accept that the objective at the heart of this is to move towards a harmonised tax system for one reason: to complete the circle of political union that will enable this to be one country, driven by fiscal direction, and at the same time to fill the belly of the European Leviathan with the money that will enable it to continue to create circumstances that will inevitably lead to more turmoil, implosion and a greater disaster than we already have?
Mr Nuttall
My hon. Friend hits the nail on the head. I see this as the thin edge of the wedge. It is the opening of a whole new war, and a whole new phase of European harmonisation. In fact, it is almost the final frontier, because it is the step towards a euro-wide sales tax and, ultimately, a euro-wide income tax that we would all be subject to. It is extremely difficult indeed.
I heard the Minster’s opening remarks, and it is to be welcomed that we will at least go back to our European partners and state our reasoned opinion for not proceeding with this. I am slightly concerned, to say the least, that we are not saying no outright, which would be a far simpler way of dealing with it. It reminds me of the message of the drugs campaign run when I was at school: “Just say no”. The simplest solution to the problem facing the House tonight would be just to say no. I see no great danger if other countries want to get together and operate a common corporation tax system—that may be ultimately what they want to do—but this EU proposal for a common corporation tax throughout Europe could be described as nothing other than giving away sovereignty, which, to come back to our national politics, is specifically outlawed in the coalition agreement, which states that there is to be
“no further transfer of sovereignty or powers”
to the EU over the course of this Parliament. If this would not be a transfer of sovereignty and powers, I do not know what would.
When the Minister responds to this short debate, will she give an estimated time scale for when she is likely to be able to come back and report on what success there has been in persuading other countries to adopt our position on this matter, and will she give an absolute confirmation that there will be no signing up to the proposal in any way, shape or form without the matter being brought back to the House for further consideration?
Mr Jenkin
But that was always the danger with article 5 and the subsidiarity clause. There are some very general objectives set out in the treaties, and subsidiarity is one of those catch-all arrangements that can justify stretching the meaning of other articles, as we have already seen.
How does the European Union justify the bail-out mechanism that the previous Chancellor of the Exchequer approved under article 122 of the Lisbon treaty, which was designed for natural disasters? How can a crisis in the euro possibly be classified as a natural disaster? The mechanism has, however, been allowed to go through by default.
The arrangement before us is another that will go through by default if we do not challenge it. Indeed, article 26 of the draft directive, the penultimate paragraph of the preamble, states:
“The objective of this Directive cannot be sufficiently achieved through individual action undertaken by the Member States because of the lack of coordination among national tax systems.”
It goes on to justify the objective as being
“in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity”—
and in its own terms that is very difficult to argue with.
I appreciate the European Scrutiny Committee’s points about the direct legal base, but the European Union is going for an indirect legal base. That demonstrates that subsidiarity was always a deceit. It was always something that could be a centralising, as opposed to a decentralising, concept, and if we rest our case against the proposal purely on the principle of subsidiarity we will allow the EU, rather than what we want ourselves, to determine what is imposed upon this country. If we rest our case against this proposal purely on the principle of subsidiarity, we are allowing the European Union to decide what shall be imposed on this country rather than deciding what we want for ourselves.
Mr Cash
I know that my hon. Friend was able to come in only somewhat late in the debate, but the arguments that we have been presenting show that there are a whole series of weapons that we can employ. Subsidiarity happens to be a procedural device that is available to us by way of a reasoned opinion, which is what the motion is about. We are critical of the Government’s position in that they have not exercised their political will, for all the reasons that my hon. Friend and others have explained. This whole business is an infringement not merely of the word “sovereignty” but of the practical requirements of the people of this country to tax themselves by consent. That is what it is all about.
Mr Jenkin
There is absolutely no difference between me and my hon. Friend on that point.
To echo my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood), the Budget moment in the calendar of this House is the most important political occasion of each year, when the Chancellor comes to this House to deliver his Budget judgment and it is for the House to determine what the levels of expenditure, taxation and borrowing should be. That is absolutely fundamental not only to the mechanics of our democracy but to the culture of our democracy and the culture of this House. This proposal is a very direct challenge to government by national democratic consent.
The only, rather lame and late, point that I might be adding to the debate is a very simple one, and I do so for the same reason as that which led my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) to lambast the concept of subsidiarity when it was first proposed in the treaty on the European Union back in 1992—the Maastricht treaty. It is, very simply, that subsidiarity is not sovereignty. Subsidiarity is subservience; it is submitting to the jurisdiction of the European institutions instead of the sovereign judgment of the British people as expressed in this House. Subsidiarity is no substitute for Government saying no, particularly where the veto is in their hands. I urge my hon. Friend the Minister to exercise that veto, knowing that she will have the confidence of the British people behind her, because they do not want her to say yes in this case.
Justine Greening
We need to be careful to ensure that we understand the complexities of the proposals. For example, we need to understand how companies that also operate in the UK may use any avoidance loopholes, and whether that will impact on the way in which they operate in the UK and structure their corporations. We need to be smart about understanding the breadth of the proposals. Whether we want to be in them is one thing, but we must be conscious that they may have an impact on us even if we are not part of them.
Mr Cash
Will the Minister be kind enough—and be smart enough—to make it clear that we will not do anything that the Liberal Democrats had in their manifesto? I have a suspicion bordering on certainty that the wording in the coalition agreement is taken straight from their manifesto commitments.
Section 5 of the European Communities (Amendment) Act 1993
William Cash Excerpts(13 years, 7 months ago)
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Mr Hoban
The hon. Gentleman makes an important point. Under the previous Government, we saw a further deterioration in manufacturing and an overreliance on the financial services sector, creating some of the imbalances that led to the deepest recession since the 1930s. Part of the challenge faced by the Government is how to tackle those imbalances and move to a more broadly based economy, and I shall touch on that later in my speech.
We must remember that sustainable economic growth across Europe is vital to the success of the British economy. Having the right warning mechanisms in place, underpinned by sound data, will help to identify future economic crises that could harm the UK economy. Even though we are not part of the single currency and will not be joining it in the lifetime of this Parliament, we cannot consign ourselves to be bystanders in the debate.
Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)
I noticed the Minister use the expression “we will not be joining the single currency in the lifetime of this Parliament”. I thought there was a clear commitment that we were never going to join the single currency.
Mr Hoban
As I am sure my hon. Friend is aware, I am following what is set out in the coalition agreement. Like him, I do not anticipate that we would seek to join the euro.
Tonight’s debate is a consequence of the stability and growth pact. Since 1999, as a result of the pact, the Government have reported to the Commission on the UK’s economic and budgetary position and our main economic policy measures. I want to reassure the House, however, that the UK is not subject to sanctions under the stability and growth pact—the Treaty is clear that they apply only to euro area countries. The EU can make recommendations as regards our budget, as can other international organisations such as the OECD and the IMF, but, crucially, we are under no obligation to take action and we are not subject to any sanctions by virtue of our opt-out. Any recommendations made will remain just that—recommendations.
Mr Hoban
I am rather surprised that the hon. Gentleman has not congratulated the Government on taking the tough action that put the recovery on track and made sure that we have lower interest rates than Greece, Ireland and Portugal. That is a consequence of the actions that we have taken—actions that the Opposition would not take. We are tackling the legacy that they left. The problem is that the scale of the legacy is huge. That makes the recovery challenging. Today’s figures demonstrate that we are making good progress on that.
To support the economy and to continue the growth in the private sector, my right hon. Friend the Chancellor set out a new economic strategy as part of this year’s Budget. The strategy has four ambitions at its heart—that Britain will have the most competitive tax system in the G20; that it will be the best place in Europe to start, finance and grow a business; that it will be a more balanced economy, by encouraging exports and investment; and that it will have a more educated work force that is the most flexible in Europe. In pursuit of these objectives, we have announced further cuts to corporation tax, taking it down to 26% this year and 23% by the end of this Parliament.
This is alongside our decision to introduce a highly competitive tax rate on profits derived from patents and our fundamental reform of the complex rules for controlled foreign companies, making them much more territorial and making the UK a much more attractive place for businesses to locate, ensuring that we have a far more attractive tax system than either Germany or France.
This year’s Budget also deals directly with the challenge of education and youth unemployment, which has been rising steadily for the past seven years. Instead of 20,000 young people benefiting from our new work experience scheme, as we originally planned, we will increase that number fivefold to 100,000 places over the next two years. Although in Austria and Germany one in four employers offers apprenticeships, in England fewer than one in 10 does so. That must change.
That is why last year my hon. Friend the Minister for Further Education, Skills and Lifelong Learning published a skills strategy and confirmed the largest ever expansion in adult apprenticeships. At the Budget we committed to funding another 40,000 apprenticeships for young unemployed people. That brings a total of 250,000 more apprenticeships over the next four years, as a result of this Government’s policies. This will help to ensure that all parts of the country have access to a better educated work force.
This year’s Budget will help to create a more balanced economy, tackling the imbalances of the past that undermined the economy and led to the longest and deepest recession since the war. This year’s Budget gives support to the private sector and hope to those looking for work, and will stimulate job creation across Britain.
Mr Cash
One word that the Minister has not mentioned is “deregulation”. In view of the fact that 4% of GDP is lost as a result of European regulation, does he agree that we need to override European regulation, such as the working time directive, when it has the effect of increasing unemployment and preventing businesses from growing?
Mr Hoban
My hon. Friend makes an important point about the burden of regulation on business, and that is why in the Budget my right hon. Friend the Chancellor set out our plans for a moratorium on new regulations for micro-businesses and for start-ups, why the Prime Minister, along with several other European leaders, called for plans to cut the burden of European red tape, and why the Prime Minister has also required José Barroso, the President of the European Commission, to deliver on his commitment to reduce the cost of red tape for business by 25%.
We need to work on those issues to tackle regulation that hampers growth not just here in the UK but throughout Europe, because regulation is a Europe-wide issue. We need to tackle and reduce that burden if the eurozone is to grow at the levels that we expect to see in Asia and in the far east.
As I said to my hon. Friend, this Budget tackles regulation and introduces a moratorium, and that is why it stands firm on our plan for recovery. It is good for business, it is good for growth, and with the approval of the House it will form the basis of the information that we provide to the European Commission. I commend this motion to the House.
Chris Leslie (Nottingham East) (Lab/Co-op)
Many hon. Members might wonder why we are having this debate tonight. It is an incredibly important debate, but they might be forgiven for not having spotted the small print on, I think, page minus 2 under the ISBN number of the Red Book in probably seven or eight-point font, where it points out that the UK is required to submit to Brussels an annual convergence programme so that it can monitor our economic policy.
I am, however, grateful to the Financial Secretary for having written to me to draw attention to the debate this evening, the papers for which were published only at lunchtime yesterday. In fact, the motion appeared on the Order Paper only yesterday, too, and I am surprised about that, because in the parallel debate a year ago following the 2010 pre-Budget report, the hon. Member for South West Hertfordshire (Mr Gauke), now the Exchequer Secretary, then speaking from the Opposition Benches said:
“It was also very difficult to locate the report. I obtained a copy last week, but it was not available in the Vote Office yesterday. This is a point that has been made many times before”. —[Official Report, 10 February 2010; Vol. 505, c. 947.]
I am surprised that the Government have not really listened to their own Members when it comes to flagging up the importance of this particular debate, but, given that we have a motion asking the House to note “with approval” the Government’s assessment of the economy, and to conform with the requirements laid down in the various European Union treaties, I am sure that it is pure coincidence that Ministers did not flag it up or put bells and whistles around it to draw its attention to many hon. Members.
Chris Leslie
But I am quite pleased that the hon. Gentleman keeps his eye on these developments.
Chris Leslie
I am very grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s work on the European Scrutiny Committee. This is, as I say, an incredibly important debate, and more hon. Members ought to be aware of it.
Chris Leslie
We have the opportunity to divide the House on this matter, although I think that it would be a deferred Division; obviously, that is a matter for Mr Speaker.
As we go through the details of the document, we see that there are problems in it. Page 17 says that the economy is forecast to grow by 1.7% in 2011—lower than the forecast in the June Budget. Is that forecast sustainable? The Government and the Office for Budget Responsibility revised down their forecasts for growth in June and revised down expectations in November. The OBR then revised down expectations for a third time after the March Budget.
The answer to the question that I asked the Minister earlier—what was the OBR’s prediction for the first quarter of this calendar year—is 0.8%. Yet today the Office for National Statistics gave a rather comatose and limp growth rate of 0.5%. That comes on the heels of a growth rate in the fourth quarter of 2010 of minus 0.5%. Essentially, there has been a zero rate of growth—flat-lining—over the past six months.
As Stephanie Flanders, the BBC’s economics editor, said, it is
“depressing to think that the economy is treading water…in a normal recovery we would expect to see a lot of momentum at this point”.
Chris Giles, economics editor at the Financial Times, said that for there to have been any credible claim to a return of underlying growth, this quarter’s figure should have been 0.7%. He went on:
“Add in one quarter of the growth expected in 2011—about another 0.5 per cent—and the figure necessary to show the economy growing at an average pace in the first quarter is at least 1.2 per cent.
Arguably, it should be even higher, at somewhere about 1.7 per cent, if the underlying stagnation in the fourth quarter of 2010 has been recovered in the first quarter of this year.”
We are a long way from that, and that is a serious problem. Yet the Chancellor seems to think that we are on the right track; as somebody said today, if he thinks that, he needs to chuck away his satnav and get a new one.
The GDP growth figure of 0.5% for the first three months of this year merely replaces the loss of output in the snowbound fourth quarter of 2010 and suggests that the economy has no underlying momentum at all. The chief statistician at the ONS said today that we had been “on a plateau” for the past six months. Tony Dolphin, the chief economist at the Institute for Public Policy Research, says that a 0.5% fall followed by a 0.5% bounce-back is equivalent to two successive quarters of zero growth—
“as close as it is possible to come to a recession without actually being in one”.
Yet the Prime Minister says that this is “good news”—those were his words as he trumpeted this resounding success at Prime Minister’s Questions today. Even the Minister said, a matter of minutes ago, that it is good progress. I am afraid to say, however, that the document we are being asked to approve is already out of date, even though it was published only 24 hours ago. It is a bit of dead parrot. It is no more, it has ceased to be, it has expired; it is an ex-convergence programme.
It is not good enough if the Minister cannot even produce a document when he gets advance notice of ONS growth statistics that matches the realities of the economy rather than the forecasting ideas that are dreamed up in the Treasury. That is a sign that the Government do not understand the importance of growth in our economy, especially when today’s statistics showed that construction has fallen back by 7% over the past six months, with total production already falling back even from the last quarter before Christmas. Government cuts have not yet started in earnest, and the VAT increase is already biting hard.
What are the prospects for business growth? On page 14 of the document, the Treasury says:
“Credit conditions have shown signs of stabilisation”.
That is certainly not the experience of small and medium-sized enterprises: lending to businesses is in an atrocious state. It goes on to say in paragraph 2.43:
“however, credit conditions for smaller firms remain tight”.
That is an exceptional understatement. The Bank of England’s lending report shows that lending to SMEs fell by a further 3% in February. That is echoed by the British Bankers Association’s growth rate statistics on lending to small businesses, which cited a figure of minus 6% in December. So much for the much-vaunted Project Merlin. Yet the mark-ups that small businesses have to pay for loans are widening, and the banks are charging small businesses even more even though less and less lending is available. We have a serious systemic problem with our economy. Underpinning the difficulties with growth are the factors that businesses need in order to fire up the economy, and they are going wrong.
We also have to look at the Government’s failure on employment. Page 84 of the convergence programme document says:
“In line with a weaker outlook for output growth, we expect employment to be lower than forecast in November.”
The OBR predicts that unemployment will go up by 200,000 as a result of the Government’s policies. If each unemployed person costs the Exchequer about £7,800 in welfare costs and lost taxes, that could represent a loss to the Exchequer of more than £1 billion—money that the Exchequer should have coming in that is going the wrong way. In addition, inflation is undermining Government spending plans, as the document admits in terms of VAT fuelling inflation, and it is forecast that borrowing and debt will be higher than predicted in June. As a consequence, the interest that we will need to pay on our borrowing will be higher because of the inflationary costs of social security expenditure.
Mr Cash
I have no doubt that the hon. Gentleman has looked at the comparison of unit labour costs throughout the whole of Europe. It shows that in the past 10 years Germany’s costs have increased by only 2% whereas almost every other country’s have increased by massive multiples of up to 35%. Does he accept that one of the real reasons Germany is predominating in the European economy includes, in particular, the fact that its labour costs are so low, which means that it can compete in the BRIC countries, including India, China and the rest?
Chris Leslie
There are several factors underpinning the German economy. The Germans do not pursue the same degree of hard and fast austerity that we are pursuing, they have a different approach to productivity, and they are achieving higher levels of growth. Our economy needs a pro-growth strategy. I do not say that as a whim—it is a hard-headed credible necessity for reducing the deficit and getting the economy moving again. Without growth, the Treasury will be losing revenue.
Chris Leslie
It is actually based on common-sense economics. I regret that the Government cannot see that. Unfortunately, I think that they will rue the day that they neglected growth in the economy. As we know, there is anxiety in the Treasury at the flat-lining, almost comatose nature of the economy. We hope sincerely that it picks up through the next quarter, but many people predict choppy times in the second quarter of this calendar year. I refer the hon. Gentleman to the paradox that I spoke about: pursuing the austerity approach too hard and too fast undermines growth and pulls from under the economy some of the key drivers for future prosperity that support it. Cutting too far and too fast is bad not just for the economy, but for deficit reduction strategies.
The Government’s spending plans are already coming unstuck. I will wind up with this point because I know that a lot of hon. Members want to speak. On tuition fees, which we debated earlier, we know that the cuts to higher education budgets will mean that universities will charge the highest fees, which will result in the ballooning of student loan pressures and the creation of a funding shortfall. Where will that money come from? We know that the Government have U-turned on school sports and that, when it came to the crunch, even the Financial Secretary had to U-turn on the financial inclusion fund. We are glad that he did so, but it changed the spending trajectory. On forests and on any number of other spending plans, when the rubber has hit the road, the Government have been unable to fulfil many of the so-called spending cuts that they promised in their much-vaunted June Budget.
Mr Cash
Does the hon. Gentleman concede that, leaving aside the question of cuts for a moment, the motor for an economic revival comes from growth, which in turn can come only from private business and private enterprise generating the taxation to pay for public expenditure? Without that, there is no public sector.
Chris Leslie
I agree with the first part of the hon. Gentleman’s point. Of course we need a pro-growth policy, and of course the private sector has to be the engine of that. However, he suggests that the Government somehow have no role to play in encouraging and fostering growth, and that is where we differ. The Opposition believe in supporting firms in moving forward into prosperity. The laissez-faire attitude of the Conservative-Liberal alliance has moved us into wholly different terrain and proves that it does not have a credible fiscal stance.
Unfortunately, the convergence programme is a hollow document that is already out of date. Its predictions are not probable or plausible, and for those reasons I urge Members to reject the motion.
Alec Shelbrooke (Elmet and Rothwell) (Con)
I start by drawing on the last intervention by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash). He made an important point, and it was the one that I made last night. Government money is not our money, it is the public’s money generated by the private sector. We cannot simply say that we should carry on pouring in money, because it is not our money. We must think about where it comes from.
The hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) said that if certain actions had not been taken, an extra £6 billion would have come in to the Exchequer, but in our emergency Budget we cut the deficit by £6 billion. If we had not done that, there would not have been any extra money, would there? We would have borrowed an extra £6 billion instead. We would have been borrowing money, churning it out, collecting it back in and saying, “What great money generation”. We would just have been turning money around. We can get money coming in to the Exchequer only through growth, and that can occur only if the private sector is in a credible position so that it can move forward.
The Opposition’s comments are interesting, because there is a paradox in that they paint a gloomy picture but meet it with glee and struggle to keep a straight face. Of course, we know that if we had followed the previous Chancellor’s spending plans, we would have been cutting £7 for every £8 that is being cut now. The margins are small. Let us not get into a discussion about the idea that if the Government’s actions had not been taken, a further £6 billion would have come in. We cut the deficit by that amount in the emergency Budget, so there would not have been any extra money. The money that we borrowed would just have been churned out and collected back in, which would have done nothing to stimulate the growth of the economy. I agree with the hon. Member for Nottingham East that the growth figures are small, but they are growth figures. He says that they may be flat, but we know that things can be choppy. The point is that we are growing and moving forward.
Let us come back to tonight’s debate and the history of the Council of the European Union. Back in July 2008, the Council of Ministers decided that the UK had an excessive deficit and asked it to correct that by the financial year 2009-10 at the latest. In April 2009, the Council concluded that the UK had failed to correct its excessive deficit within the time set. In December that year, it adopted a recommendation that the UK end its continuing excessive deficit by the financial year 2014-15, by bringing it below 3% of gross domestic product. In 2009-10 it was at 11.4% of GDP, but the convergence document now predicts it to be at 2.6% of GDP.
That is in stark contrast to the Opposition argument that it is unnecessary to make cuts and that we should continue as before. I shall tell the House later how I actually feel about the EU’s interference in such matters, but people outside this country were saying, “You are spending too much; you need to make those changes,” and we are now doing so. Whether we should have to do that for the EU is a slightly different debate, and my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North (Mr Nuttall) was right to say that we are using parliamentary time and publishing documents containing information that the EU could quite easily find out for itself. That adds to the already bloated EU system, and perhaps indicates why it asks us for a 5% increase in its budget, which is an absolute disgrace at times of austerity.
The hon. Member for Glasgow South West (Mr Davidson) spoke of the imbalance of trade with the German economy. The German manufacturing economy is a powerhouse of Europe, and as my hon. Friend the Member for Stone outlined, we have a very low manufacturing base. The picture that that paints is that economic integration in the EU is not possible with sovereign countries generating high GDP growth and trade imbalances. For integration, countries must move to one common taxation policy. That, if anything, is proof that the euro is leading to a common taxation policy and a loss of fiscal sovereignty.
Mr Cash
As my hon. Friend may have noted, I raised that question with the Prime Minister earlier today in relation to voting against the provisions for a corporate tax base for the whole of Europe. That decision will in fact be made unanimously, and we can get rid of it with our veto. I did not get an answer from the Prime Minister, and I hope my hon. Friend continues to urge against having a tax system imposed upon us by the rest of Europe.
Alec Shelbrooke
My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has a very pragmatic view on such things, and I am sure he took great note of my hon. Friend’s question. I am also sure that the Prime Minister will listen to the mood of the country and ensure that the EU does not move towards such a common economic base.
This is crux of the matter: we are publishing documents tonight to pass back to the EU that show that the UK is in compliance with the rules. Those rules mean that we could qualify for the euro. People have often asked, “With the pound so close to parity with the euro, why don’t we join?” but we will not join because we will not fudge the figures just to get into the euro—not that we want to join—[Interruption.] Please! I would not want anyone to leave the Chamber thinking that I am pro-euro, because I certainly am not—perish the thought.
To qualify for the euro, countries must have a budget deficit of 40% of GDP and they must borrow no more than 3% of GDP annually. We know that the Italians fudged that. That is one reason why the euro is in the mess that it is in, and why it is nowhere near competing with the US dollar, or indeed the Chinese currency, in the way that people thought it would. The fact is that if the EU wants to have a strong economic case, it must go for full monetary union, which is totally unacceptable for sovereign countries.
As we know from the treaty of Rome, the original European partnership of six nations was set up to try to prevent further wars in Europe, to bring peace to the European nations, and to get everybody trading together as one bloc. That was the vision. However, I do not think that the rise of far-right parties across Europe and the increasing moves down the federalist route are coincidental. People feel that they have lost their sovereignty and identity. If the EU moves forward to a full, integrated economic policy, that will be the end of the EU, because people around Europe will vote in extremist parties to try to reclaim their national identity. I say that as a warning, with no joy. I am probably one of the more dove-ish Government Members when it comes to violence or military matters, but I fear where those moves could lead.
The Opposition’s main argument this evening has been: “You’ve got your economic policy completely wrong. You could have had more money coming to the Exchequer.” However, they have forgotten that the money coming to the Exchequer was the money they printed, pumped out and brought back in before saying, “Oh, look at all the money we’ve generated!” I do not think so. This is about creating growth, and in the document before us, an independent body has said that the Government’s policy is correct and in line with what we want to achieve, which is what the previous Government singly failed to achieve despite the warnings in December 2009.
Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)
It will be useful to remind the House of what section 5 of the European Communities (Amendment) Act 1993 actually says. Some of us were here in 1993 during the Maastricht debates, and it was rather an interesting moment when the only piece of reality in the whole of that Session occurred. That was when an attempt was made to restrain the movement towards a European Government. Section 5 states:
“Her Majesty’s Government shall report to Parliament for its approval an assessment of the medium term economic and budgetary position in relation to public investment expenditure and to the social, economic and environmental goals set out in Article 2”—
they are pretty extensive—
“which report shall form the basis of any submission to the Council and Commission in pursuit of their responsibilities under Articles 103 and 104c.”
What this really boils down to is that, in order for us to be able to continue—leaving aside the opt-out from the euro—we effectively have to comply with the convergence criteria and other criteria that are laid down by the European Union. Effectively, leaving aside the question of the European stability mechanism—my hon. Friend the Member for Elmet and Rothwell (Alec Shelbrooke) knows that I totally agree with the extremely important point that he made earlier—the bottom line is that we have been moving inexorably, regrettably and avoidably towards deeper and deeper European integration, with more and more requirements and obligations being imposed on us.
As Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee, I and other colleagues here tonight—my hon. Friends the Members for Daventry (Chris Heaton-Harris) and for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg), and the hon. Member for Luton North (Kelvin Hopkins), a distinguished member of the Committee from the other side of the House—know the sheer, massive extent of the invasion and the vast range of impediments that are put in our way as a result of decisions taken not by this Parliament but by other countries, by the European Commission and by the European institutions. So this is an important debate, and the Minister will understand why I objected to the idea that it should be shunted off to some innocuous Committee, well controlled by the Whips, without having any real opportunity for the whole House to participate.
I can make my points briefly. Some have already been made and others I have made myself in the past, so I do not need to elaborate on them. First, I very much agree with the suggestion that this undemocratic process affects the daily lives of the people of this country and inhibits our ability to grow our economy, particularly when at least 4% of our gross domestic product is lost through excessive European regulation of small and medium-sized businesses. I find it utterly absurd—it is incomprehensible to me—that the Government cannot simply say, “Look, we’ve tried. We’ve gone ahead. We’ve tried to negotiate, but they are not listening. We are going to have to override the European legislation.” I think it negligent not to do so.
I received a letter from the Prime Minister only a few days ago, reminding us that the European Council
“agreed on the need for robust actions to support growth”.
He went on to refer to reducing
“the overall burden of regulation including exemptions for micro-enterprises from future regulations”.
In my right hon. Friend’s absence, I have to say—he will know that I would say it anyway—that “future” regulations are not the issue. The real question is about existing regulations. I do not need to go through them all again—I have written pamphlets about them, as have many others—and we know that there is a vast array of completely negative regulations that cause a vast amount of difficulty for small and medium-sized businesses. We are not going to achieve the private enterprise that will be needed to pay for the public sector that is needed unless we get out of that vicious circle. That is point No. 1.
Point No. 2 is that the consequences of not having sufficient growth and of having the deeply regrettable legacy of the deficit will mean that riots and protests—not only in other countries, but in our own—will grow as the pain bites into the economy and into people’s daily lives. This will lead to an increase in the potential for parties of the far right to gain traction. I do not think that the policy pursued on the stability and growth pact can be described as anything other than a disaster area because there has been no stability, no growth and no pact. I wrote an article about that in The Times five or more years ago, but it is exactly the same now. Nothing changes. That is terribly depressing, which is why we must have the political will to do something about it.
The Europe 2020 strategy is another re-run of the vast amount of verbiage that accompanied the Lisbon agenda, which those involved had to admit was a complete disaster. It is words, words and words; it is nothing to do with the practical question of generating growth. I mentioned Brazil, India and China earlier. The plain fact is that we have to compete with these other countries and it is impossible to do so when looking at the question of unit labour costs in those countries and then looking at the European Union and noticing that Germany had an increase of only 2% in the last 10 years, compared with 30% in most other EU countries. We are in a completely impossible situation. I say this with the greatest respect to my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary, but I did not hear anything in his speech to respond to this situation except for the fact that he said we were getting close to achieving the parameters laid down by the EU for the excessive deficit procedure.
Let me ask a question that I asked before the general election and again during it. It is simply this: what is the true level of our debt? Suppose that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had risen to make his Budget speech in the House the other day and said, “The first thing I must tell the House is that we will have to knock £6 billion off the figures that I am about to announce because we will be bailing out Portugal—and, by the way, our budget contribution to the European Union will rise to £10 billion, so we had better start factoring that in as well.”
Some Members may not know—I do not think many people do—that a spat is going on between the Office for National Statistics and Eurostat about the formulation of our figures in relation to the deficit. I am looking into it, but it is the sort of thing that really troubles me. If we do not get the figures right, and if the Eurostat figures are imposed in a way that makes it difficult for us to accord with the parameters of the rules, that will be another matter that should concern us.
There are many other issues that I could raise, but let me end by dealing with the question of looking to the future. The plain fact is that Germany has now taken pole position in the European Union. The European Central Bank—which has not been mentioned tonight, and to an extent I understand why—has been more or less working in a German environment, if I may put it in those general terms, and has become the owner of vast quantities of bad assets. Another problem is being stoked up there. As was pointed out in a very interesting article in The Economist a few weeks ago, all that is part and parcel of Germany’s pole position at the heart of Europe and also the heart of the problem itself. We cannot afford to work on the basis of a system—to which the Government have foolishly agreed—in which we would not be isolated, but would be engaged in the process of a two-tier Europe because we had agreed to a treaty that will have a serious adverse effect on us. We must renegotiate these treaties and return to a European Free Trade Association-type arrangement, so that we have independence and, with it, the ability to deliver an economy that the British people deserve.
European Summit
William Cash Excerpts(13 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Urgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)
(Urgent Question): To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the decision described as the draft decision in the motion to approve the treaty change on the European financial stability mechanism without a referendum, which was passed by the House yesterday, is now under review.
The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr Mark Hoban)
I am grateful for this opportunity to make a statement to the House about Portugal and the European stability mechanism. I understand that hon. Members are concerned about the events that unfolded in Portugal, which has faced difficult challenges for some time.
Yesterday, the Portuguese Prime Minister resigned after Parliament rejected his austerity Budget. However, let us be clear: Portugal has made no request for assistance, and I hope that hon. Members will understand that it would be inappropriate for me to engage in any speculation about what may happen. It is not for me to say whether Portugal should ask for help, just as I would not tell it how to run any part of its economy. However, I assure the House that we will keep hon. Members informed of any developments.
Hon Members may wish to reflect on the fact that, as my right hon. Friend the Chancellor said yesterday, our deficit is larger than Portugal’s, but market rates in the UK are similar to those of Germany. That reinforces the fact that it is right to pursue the course that we set last year to tackle the deficit.
My hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) has also raised questions about the European stability mechanism. A strong and stable euro area is important for British business. Over 40% of our exports go to the euro area, but we are not a member of the monetary union, and it is not our responsibility to deal with the euro area’s problems. That is why we have welcomed the progress that has been made on the European stability mechanism. In the design of the ESM, we had to ensure that there was no transfer of powers from the UK to the EU. We would never have accepted that.
The treaty change applies only to euro area member states. There is no transfer of power or competence from the UK to Brussels. The ESM puts no obligation, legal or political, on the UK to contribute. That is why we have supported the agreement, which makes the euro area’s responsibilities absolutely clear. In 2013, the European stability mechanism will come into effect. Also in 2013, the European financial stability mechanism will come to an end, and the UK will not be part of it.
Several countries, including Germany, have strong views about how the ESM should be designed, but that cannot change the fundamental aspects of the mechanism, because the ESM will be developed under article 136 of the treaty and it can apply only to member states whose currency is the euro. The UK cannot join the ESM without joining the euro. As my hon. Friends know, that will not happen in the lifetime of this Parliament.
Furthermore, we have ensured that the recitals—the preamble—to the draft decision by the Heads of State and Government at the December Council meeting stated that article 122, which was used to create the temporary funding mechanism,
“will no longer be needed”
and “should not be used” to ensure financial stability for the euro area as a whole once the permanent mechanism is in place.
Should there be any suggestion of amending the draft decision at the European Council, the Prime Minister could not legally agree to it without first coming back to the House for additional approval after a further debate. The House and the other place would have to ratify any change to the treaty.
Mr Cash
I asked the question, first, because the existing European financial stability mechanism, to which we are potentially exposed in respect of Portugal, was described in the report of the European Scrutiny Committee, which I have the honour to chair, as “legally unsound”; and, secondly, because it involves the United Kingdom underwriting approximately €8 billion to eurozone countries until 2013.
The motion for a treaty change to create the new mechanism, which was passed yesterday, provides for amending article 136 of the European treaty without a referendum, but the amendment prescribes strict conditionality. What are those conditions? The motion that was passed yesterday now appears to be vitiated. Will the Government renegotiate the decision so that the European stability mechanism, if proceeded with at all, is agreed by the British Government with unanimity only if the legally unsound existing European financial stability mechanism, to which we are wrongly exposed, is repealed? The United Kingdom would thus not be required to contribute to the bail-out of other eurozone countries such as Portugal, which would amount to approximately €4 billion. That course of action is open to the Prime Minister in his negotiations at the summit today, and it would relieve the hard-pressed British taxpayer.
If my proposal were accepted, I feel sure that the Government would have an improved chance of obtaining the European Scrutiny Committee’s clearance for any new decision and the passage of any subsequent Bill required under the House’s procedures. Will my proposal be accepted?
Mr Hoban
My hon. Friend and I have debated this subject before, and my right hon. Friend the Minister for Europe opened a lengthy debate on it on 16 March. The Government are clear that the European stability mechanism is an important tool, but it is for the euro area to fund it. The ESM will lead to the extinction, as it were, of the EFSM. I do not feel it appropriate to engage in further speculation on events elsewhere.
Budget Responsibility and National Audit Bill [Lords]
William Cash Excerpts(13 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Chris Leslie
Perhaps this is where I differ from the hon. Gentleman. I think that a slightly dry and narrow focus on the accountancy issues in the draft charter for budget responsibility, as well as a monetary policy focus at the Bank of England and in the charter, with no or scant focus on the real economy—economic growth, employment and some of those very important issues that affect all our constituents—would be a deficiency in the role of the OBR.
Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)
The shadow Minister and I took part in a debate the other day that goes to the heart of these questions. Does he not agree that although fiscal policy is regarded—with qualifications as the result of the motion the Government put before the House the other day—as exclusively a matter for the House of Commons, unfortunately and disastrously, European economic governance affects the question of growth and the issues that go with it? Does he not agree that his proposals would be overtaken by the proposals that are going through the European Union?
Chris Leslie
I understand where the hon. Gentleman is coming from. I hope that he would acknowledge that we have tried to table a constructive set of amendments because we do not believe that a purely fiscal mandate for the Treasury or the OBR is wide enough. His view is that growth and fiscal policy will also be influenced from beyond these shores and especially by European Union policy. That may well be true.
Mr Cash
I do not wish to correct so much as to advise the hon. Gentleman that my position is exactly the opposite. Fiscal policy remains in this House and should do so, despite what the Government did the other day, and economic growth should also be determined here and not in other arenas. In the Public Bill Committee, he referred to judicial authority as a result of the interpretation of the statutory duties imposed in this place. Does he really want the Supreme Court to apply its determination of its ultimate supremacy over both fiscal policy and economic growth?
Chris Leslie
No, I do not. That was one reason why we raised this issue in Committee. The Bill sets out tests on the responsibilities of the OBR and the Treasury yet there was not really an adequate response from the Minister about the justiciability of those tests. For example, the Minister gave no cut-and-dried answer to the question of a member of the public who might wish to sue the OBR on its efficiency or effectiveness, what sort of legal process that might entail and where it would eventually go. The hon. Gentleman makes an important point.
In a cynical moment in Committee, I raised an eyebrow about the fact that 10 clauses are necessary to establish the OBR. I queried whether we needed 10 clauses to do that. The Bill contains a number of embellishments that, in a more sceptical moment, made me suspect that it was slightly padded out to make it appear to be a grander piece of legislation when a couple of clauses and a schedule would probably have done the trick. Perhaps I was unfairly cynical.
Chris Leslie
I would recommend that all hon. Members take a look at the draft charter for budget responsibility, which has several interesting facets. I have no doubt that the Minister will explain, in layman’s terms, what is meant by a
“rolling, five-year forecast period”
in relation to the cyclically adjusted current balance. Some hon. Members might find it difficult to envisage how that rolling forecast will operate in principle. Many of us can understand the concept of a fixed year or a fixed date against which a set of targets are to be judged, but if the horizon shifts continually, that is different. It would be interesting to hear the Minister explain that when she responds.
Mr Cash
I am sure that the hon. Gentleman also has in mind clause 6(3), which imposes the following obligation:
“The Office must, in the performance of its duty…act consistently with any guidance included in the Charter”.
As he well knows, I am rather particular about the words used in legislation. I like to know, first, what they mean and, secondly, what their consequence would be; I do not think that is unreasonable. I worry about the extent to which he would effectively be taking away from this House or, for that matter, from the Minister, any responsibility whatsoever for any aspect of the running of the macro economy. I have sympathy with his objective, but I am worried about how it fits into the framework of these provisions.
Chris Leslie
I would not want the hon. Gentleman to misunderstand the point of our amendment. It would, in essence, ensure that the charter for budget responsibility had a wide enough definition to give the new Office for Budget Responsibility, if it is indeed an independent body, more latitude to look across the wider set of economic indices and make its analysis and assessment of the impact of the Treasury’s policy on the ground—in the real world and the real economy—instead of looking merely at the desiccated issue of deficit reduction.
Chris Leslie
I look forward very much to those pre-appointment hearings and the reports of them. It is important to have people who understand the real economy. That is the gist of our amendments. We are worried about these matters.
Chris Leslie
I suspect that the Economic Secretary will make that point in her retort, when she eloquently resists all amendments, as is her usual pattern of behaviour. However, it is not clear enough that growth and employment are matters that the OBR can comment on and analyse. I absolutely would not want to give it the power to determine the mandate, but the Treasury should be big enough and ugly enough to withstand commentary from such an independent body.
Mr Cash
May we park that matter for now, without in any way undermining the hon. Gentleman’s main point about judicial authority? What he said in the Public Bill Committee was completely right—if we impose a statutory duty, we have to accept that the courts will adjudicate.
That is important enough, but how would the hon. Gentleman reconcile clause 6(3), which states:
“The Office must, in the performance of its duty…act consistently with any guidance”
under the charter with, for example, European directives that will emerge under the 2020 strategy? Under his proposals, which would prevail?
Chris Leslie
The growth mandate that we are suggesting would be a responsibility of the Treasury, not of the OBR, but it would give the OBR a duty to have regard to whatever else was in the charter. Simply inserting the fact that the Treasury had to follow a growth mandate would give the OBR the right to comment on the Treasury’s performance in respect of that mandate. Whether there are European or other influences on the Treasury’s policies and performance is a debate for another time, I suspect.
Chris Leslie
I am quite sure that there are influences, but we tabled the amendment to draw out answers to some of these questions.
Chris Leslie
If my hon. Friend will allow me, I will not give way. I have been speaking for rather a long time and I want to stop, but hon. Members may wish to make their own comments individually.
Clearly we need a proper growth strategy, but a growth mandate would also help. We need to start focusing on future growth industries and maximising our comparative advantage. We need to cast forward with a growth strategy not just for a decade, but for several decades. We need to focus on skills and, yes, a fiscal strategy, but we also need to focus on job creation, and a growth mandate with the clarity for the OBR to make its own assessments would certainly be a step in the right direction.
Mr Cash
Some time before the general election, as the financial crisis was developing—particularly in relation to the banks—there was a certain amount of talk about the idea being put forward by the then Opposition for an office for budget responsibility. I remember participating in some of those debates, and saying that I thought that it was an extremely good idea to have a much clearer picture of how we organised our finances. However, at that time the true level of debt was not being revealed by the then Government. We had reason to believe that the actual amount of debt was very different from what was being put forward. That had significant repercussions for the question of how we should deal with it. The OBR, or whatever else was going to be put in place, would have had to deal with the reality of the debt.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
Order. The hon. Gentleman knows what I am going to say. I do not want to spoil what he is going to say on Third Reading, so it might be better if he stuck to the subject of the amendments. That would be more useful to us at this stage.
Mr Cash
I am very glad to be able to follow that advice. In order for the provisions contained in the amendments to be inserted in the Bill, it is essential for the House to be aware of the implications of judicial authority, the assertions of the Supreme Court in that context, and the sovereignty of Parliament. There is, for example, the question of fiscal policy and the charter, which is set out in clause 1(2) and to which the question of economic growth and job creation would be added by the amendments. Clause 6(3) states:
“The Office must, in the performance of its duty under section 4, act consistently with any guidance included in the Charter by virtue of this section.”
I am deeply worried about the legal status of the charter in this context.
As for fiscal policy, I remind the House that the other day, probably for the first time since 1640—Pym and Hampden and all that—the Government passed a motion saying that we were only primarily responsible for it. I voted against the motion—as did my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North (Mr Nuttall) and a number of others—but the whole House should have voted against it, because in fact we are exclusively responsible for fiscal policy, and that is what the Bill is supposed to be based on.
What worries me particularly is the inconsistency with fundamental questions that are in the background, involving the primacy of European law, sovereignty and judicial authority. I need make no further points, because in a nutshell, if those issues cannot be reconciled with what is in the Bill, and if the duties of the Office for Budget Responsibility are to examine and report on the sustainability of the public finances, to prepare “fiscal and economic forecasts”, to make assessments and analyse sustainability, and to act consistently with the charter as a matter of law, we are surely entitled to ask: which law will prevail?
Obviously, I agree with all the ideas that are being presented. We all want an efficient economy, we all want jobs and we all want growth. We cannot survive without growth, and we cannot generate the revenues to pay for the public sector without that growth in the private sector. What worries me is that all those ideas are being imposed through a Bill, rather than through the judgment of Ministers who are accountable to the House of Commons, and should not be required to refer back to the judicial authority of the courts or the alleged primacy of the European Union.
I fear that we are embarking on one of those Lewis Carroll-type situations. I am reminded of “The Hunting of the Snark”. Members may recall the phraseology. We know that we want it, we know it is there, but the question is, what is it going to do? I have a serious problem with the Bill for that reason. I fear that we are engaged in a process of wishful thinking rather than achievement, and that we are being locked into a withdrawal from parliamentary accountability—and, as some Members may know by now, I regard that as the ultimate test of our democratic system.
Ian Murray
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash). At the end of his contribution he referred to wishful thinking. Labour Members certainly think the Chancellor’s gamble with the UK economy is wishful thinking. The recent reduction in GDP came as a shock to everyone, and serves to highlight some of the wishful thinking indulged in by those on the Treasury Bench.
I think that everyone supports the establishment of the Office for Budget Responsibility. One of the best measures taken by the Labour Government was the courageous step of making the Bank of England independent. We have all seen the benefits of that, in good times as well as bad, as it can now make decisions for the benefit of the economy, rather than the benefit of the Government.
In the establishment in law of the OBR, the Bill should focus on more than just deficit and debt issues. Clause 1(1) states that the Treasury must look at
“the formulation and implementation of fiscal policy and policy for the management of the National Debt.”
That narrow focus takes us away from what we need most, which is economic growth. It does not even give the OBR the ability to take account of various specific objectives the Government may want to achieve, such as on child poverty or unemployment, or in terms of the impact on the economy of decisions made by the Chancellor and his team.
Justine Greening
Ultimately, a key clause—I think clause 5—sets out that it is at the OBR’s discretion to decide how to carry out its duty. A fundamental building block of the OBR’s credibility is its independence. I assure the hon. Gentleman that the risks he mentions, such as the concern that the OBR might not carry out robust analysis, are mitigated by other safeguards in the Bill. For example, one duty of the OBR will be to produce a report on the accuracy and robustness of its forecasting. As he will be aware, there are also non-executive directors who will be there on a day-to-day basis to challenge how effectively the OBR works and every five years, at a minimum, there will have to be a completely external peer review of the OBR’s workings.
I think we have managed to strike a balance by setting up the OBR in the way I have described—on the one hand by giving it independence, so it has that key element of credibility, and on the other by including some safeguards, in terms of its structure, its management and the review, so that, if for some reason it does not produce the quality of forecast that we need, those safeguards will be in place to ensure that we tackle the issue. Let us not forget that the OBR is accountable not just to Parliament, but to the Chancellor, because it produces the official forecasts.
Finally, amendment 4 suggests another new related role for the OBR, which as we have heard would be to assess the Government’s growth mandate. As I said in response to amendment 1, the Government seek to achieve their economic policy objectives through a range of policy tools and frameworks, not just through fiscal policy, but the OBR has been established to increase the credibility of the Government’s economic and fiscal forecasts and to hold the Government to account for their economic and fiscal policies.
That highly valuable role is recognised by a wide range of domestic and international commentators. The hon. Member for Swansea West mentioned the Institute for Fiscal Studies, and it warmly welcomed the establishment of the OBR, which, through its role, has already provided forecasts of key economic variables. In its November report, the OBR set out forecasts for the next five years, covering a range of key macro-economic variables, such as GDP and its forecast growth, inflation, employment, average earnings, unemployment and the output gap. In addition, the OBR will have the freedom to consider the impact of Government policy on economic growth and employment within our regions and nations, and in line with its main duty. I therefore consider all the amendments to be unnecessary, and I hope I have addressed the issues that hon. Members have raised.
Mr Cash
I do not want to put my hon. Friend on the spot, but I am troubled by a motion that the Government tabled in relation to a European document. I have an idea that they did not really mean to do so, but I just want to make the situation completely clear. The motion said that the Government and the House of Commons were only primarily responsible for fiscal matters and direct taxation. Will the Minister be kind enough to get that out of the way, so that we might now know that they are exclusively and solely, not merely primarily, responsible?
Budget Responsibility and National Audit Bill [Lords]
William Cash Excerpts(13 years, 9 months ago)
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Justine Greening
I agree absolutely. Far too often we fail to make the point that the penalty for not dealing with the deficit today will be to hand on even bigger debts to our children tomorrow. They will not thank us, and should not thank us, if we fail to address the urgent crisis that we have come into government to tackle.
Before I get into the detail, I would like to set out again the Government’s broader fiscal objectives. This coalition Government believe that fiscal policy should ensure that the national finances are sustainable. As I have just said, sustainable public finances mean that future generations will not need to pay for the services enjoyed by all of us today. Sustainable public finances mean that the economy can expand and grow without the fear of tax hikes and spending cuts in the future. Sustainable public finances also mean that monetary policy can operate effectively and stabilise the economy, when needed. With that in mind, we have taken decisive action since taking office.
In May, we had immediate reductions to in-year spending, which bought us much-needed breathing space in the sovereign debt storm raging across Europe. The emergency Budget in June was the moment when fiscal credibility was restored. At the Budget, my right hon. Friend the Chancellor set out the Government’s fiscal mandate. Our first goal within the mandate is to balance the structural current deficit by the end of a rolling five-year forecast period.
Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)
My hon. Friend may remember that before the election, a number of us took grave exception to the fact that the then Government were not telling the truth about the full extent of the debt. Will she give us an assurance that this Government will tell the truth to the British people, in line with the National Audit Office and Sir Michael Scholar, so that they know what the Budget deficit really is?
Justine Greening
My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. The way to provide that guarantee and certainty is to pass the Bill before us today, which sets up the Office for Budget Responsibility—but does so, critically, as an independent organisation that will make its own forecasts. In so doing, it will contribute to being independent of Governments and provide credible official forecasts for the first time in our country. That will give us the certainty we need. I will come on to explain later how we ended up needing official forecasts to be done independently, referring to the problems that had arose prior to this Parliament.
Court of Auditors 2009 Report
William Cash Excerpts(13 years, 9 months ago)
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Justine Greening
Yes, I do. The Government thought it totally unacceptable that EU officials received a 3.7% pay rise when our Government had to propose a pay freeze for public sector workers. We are not the only member state taking difficult decisions such as that. The debate the hon. Gentleman is referring to is the one we have already actively engaged in, which is about not only the level of the EU budget, but what we spend that money on and ensuring it is spent on the right things that deliver the right priorities for people on the ground, whichever member state they are in.
We are about to engage in a debate, which is important for the longer term, on how we change that mix of investment to make it more significant. It is called the debate on the financial perspective, and the hon. Gentleman will be aware that that relates to the seven-year plan, whereas early last year we debated the budget for 2011. We have a chance to have that more fundamental debate about how we spend money within Europe. The Government are keen to lead that debate at EU level.
Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)
My hon. Friend—a member of the coalition Government—knows that I am one of her greatest fans. Having said that, is she aware, as I know she will be, that the irregularities by Bulgaria and Romania in relation to pre-accession funds amount to 81% of all the cases, and that there is also this yawning hole concerning cohesion funds? Really, this is totally unacceptable. I have been involved in such debates for 26 years. Nothing has changed.
Justine Greening
My hon. Friend is right to raise that issue, for lots of different reasons. Two spring to mind. The first is the macro level of the argument, which is that new members joined the EU during the ’80s. Those member states got cohesion funds to help to develop their economies. There is a question as to the effectiveness of that spend. We are about to embark on investment in a new group of countries that are coming in. The assumption about and the argument made for the accession countries is opening up markets, but we need to see those economies develop for that business model of the EU to work.
My hon. Friend will be pleased to hear that yesterday I met the Bulgarian Minister who oversees the EU funds in Bulgaria. His entire job is administering those funds. He has been in place for about a year. For the reasons that my hon. Friend mentions, I was keen to talk to the Minister about Bulgaria’s perspective. He made the point, which I thought was right, that in the past people said to countries like Bulgaria, “You’re not spending the money that we are giving you.” His point was that those countries are keen to have it spent effectively, because that is in their interest.
Clearly, countries such as Bulgaria are at an early stage of putting in place the structures and processes. The Minister talked to me about the work that they are starting to do at national level and at regional level to enable better financial management of EU funds. That is a move in the right direction. The question for other member states is what we can do at pan-EU level to make that easier. We should get rid of unnecessary complexity and consider what we can do to help those member states to get along the road to stronger financial management faster. I believe they want to do so.
States such as Bulgaria understand that it is important for their relationship with other EU member states to be seen to be stronger financial controllers of the money that they are getting. They understand why that is important, not only in the medium or long term, but in the short term. The challenge for us is to ensure that we improve the framework within which they are working, and transparency is part of that.
I am aware that I have taken several interventions. In part, that is forcing me to jump to bits of my speech that I will come to shortly anyway. Perhaps I can make a little progress and talk to the House about what I think we need to do, some of the steps that we are taking, and what a better system of financial management at EU level would look like. I shall begin with a little more background to the European Court of Auditors report and go on to the discharge negotiation, of which this debate is an important part—in other words, how we get those accounts signed off.
On the report, it is fair to say that there are some improvements. We have had a positive statement of assurance on the reliability of the EU’s accounts, but as we can see and as we have already discussed tonight, everybody agrees that much more needs to be done. The pace of change is too slow, and we see no discernible trend in the right direction. We want to see financial management clearly supporting and controlling spend by the EU.
I shall set out the steps that the coalition has already taken to drive through improvements since we took office in May. It is worth reminding the House that the European Court of Auditors report relates to 2009, prior to the time that the coalition Government were in office. In October, when I was in Brussels having some of my meetings in relation to the EU budget, I took the opportunity to meet the Commissioner in charge of financial management in the EU, Commissioner Šemeta, to talk about our concerns and some of our ideas, and to push the case for transparency and sound financial management. I believe the Commissioner was receptive, and I think he understood that in his role, that needs to be a more fundamental priority than it has been for Commissioners in his position in the past. Since then, we have had a firm but constructive line throughout the negotiations among the member states. Let us not forget that they are responsible for management of 80% of EU funds spent.
The Government and other like-minded member states have pushed for concrete processes in several areas. First, at the pan-European level we must have further simplification of what are excessively complex rules that often hinder, rather than help, strong decision making that drives strong value for taxpayers’ money. We must push EU-level auditing toward a more risk-based and proportionate system. Simply checking through receipts in member states that are randomly selected really will not work in future. We need to move towards a system where the European Court of Auditors operates a risk-based approach, where the focus is on member states for which there seems to be evidence of poorer and weaker financial management, and where we understand exactly where the management is breaking down in those processes and control systems. We are keen to ensure that what we do at the level of the European Court of Auditors is done more effectively than it has been in the past, and I plan to meet the European Court of Auditors to discuss those issues.
We are also encouraging member states to take greater responsibility for the funds that they implement, which, as I have said, is the vast majority of the budget. In practice, that means that we are lobbying for member states’ annual summaries to be upgraded and published. The UK is currently one of only four member states that publish the sort of consolidated statement that we are debating today. We want more transparency, which we think will drive better financial management; it is not the only consideration, but a key one. The Government have pursued that agenda at the domestic level because we think that it is worth while, so we are pursuing it at the EU level. We need those annual summaries to be published and to contain more meaningful information so that people can use and interpret them.
Justine Greening
We are doing slightly more than talking a good talk. I share my hon. Friend’s concern that one key thing driving the budget up was the previous Government’s disastrous approach to negotiating the common agricultural policy, which saw us give away a huge chunk of our abatement and, over this Parliament, will cost the British taxpayer about £10 billion. That is totally unacceptable. He says that it is important we bear down on excesses, and I agree. That is one reason why we led the debate to stop the European Parliament’s proposal for a 6% rise in spending. We achieved that, and we are now trying to ensure that, when we go into the longer-term debate about the financial perspective over the next seven years, which starts in 2014, we begin to see real-terms reductions. Countries such as France and Germany are backing us up on that, and those are the first steps towards delivering what we want.
My hon. Friend is right that we need to go beyond words and start delivering, and that is absolutely what we want to do. For tonight, the key aspect is how we can ensure that, when we have “decisioned” the funds, the final building block, which is about financial management, is delivered professionally, robustly and with an integrity that companies would recognise. We have to move towards a better system than the one we have picked up.
We are also keen to see some quickly taken measures and short-term gains, such as a one-stop shop that provides better information to those member states implementing EU funds, and a published scorecard of recovery orders against member states. That sort of transparency will start to change the culture, but we have to question how we have reached the position of poor financial management in which we find ourselves. The answer is partly down to culture, which has to change and improve at the EU and member state levels.
Sound financial management is critical, and it brings us closer to our overarching aim, which is a budget that delivers value for money for British and EU citizens. As I am trying to get over, that is not a negative agenda, because securing better value for money is a positive thing to do. It is what we are doing; it is what taxpayers want to see us doing; and it is what all member states should want to do themselves. We believe that we have a positive agenda, and it is not just about picking or prioritising the right objectives. Last year, our excellent debate in the House about the EU budget was a good chance for Members to discuss those objectives. We should return to that over the coming months, but critically we have to ensure that, when we have “decisioned” EU money, it is spent and implemented effectively.
As I said, only yesterday I met Mr Donchev, the Bulgarian Minister overseeing the administration of EU funds in Bulgaria. I am pleased that alongside such meetings, including the meeting that I plan to have with the European Court of Auditors, and the work that we are doing with the European Commission and MEPs in the European Parliament, there is a sense that people are receptive to the need to improve financial management and want to see that happen.
I am keen and grateful for this House’s support for the Government in pursuing that agenda, because that is vital. It was important that we could go into the negotiations saying that as a Parliament we stood behind the motion on bearing down on the EU economy and our decision that a 6% rise was unacceptable. We can learn lessons from that. We as a Parliament need to stick together and show solidarity in tackling these issues. That is one step that we must take.
Even my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash), in his role as Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee, has a role to play, together with his fellow-chairmen of scrutiny committees across Europe, in pushing this sort of issue to the top of the agenda. We have to be prepared to say in all channels that we must get an EU budget that becomes affordable, that is spent on the right priorities, and that is managed in the right way. His role is also vital in being able to back up some Governments while perhaps pressing those for whom this has been less of a priority to put it further up their list of priorities in future.
Mr Cash
This is not in any sense directed at my hon. Friend personally, but one of the big problems in implementing the Lisbon treaty is the increased functions of the EU. Increasing functions increases expenditure, and increasing expenditure has tended to increase the amount of irregularities. I am sure she will understand my concern about the manner in which we are Europeanising not only our own domestic economy, with European economic governance and all the other things that go with it, but inviting ourselves into the arena of a black hole where other member states do not understand the rules and do not much care about them either.
Justine Greening
My hon. Friend will know that Conservative Members, in particular, had a range of concerns about the Lisbon agenda.
Justine Greening
Let me pick my words more carefully. My hon. Friend is right that Conservative Members had deep concerns about the content of the Lisbon treaty at the time. That is one reason why, as a party, we pushed to have a referendum before going into and signing off on the Lisbon treaty. It is a matter of deep regret that the previous Government chose not to give the British people their chance to have a say on the changes that were proposed via the Lisbon treaty.
The challenge in my role is to ensure that, in terms of where we are today, I stand up for our interests in Britain. One way we need to do that as a Government is to tackle some of the fundamental weaknesses in how the EU works, but my particular concern is financial management, not only at the EU level but at the member state level as funds are spent.
I am sure that other Members will rightly want to have their say on this, so before I finish let me quickly turn to the issue of fraud, which is of great concern to the Government and to hon. Members. I want to be absolutely clear that of course any level of fraud is completely unacceptable. We fully support the work of the Commission and of the European anti-fraud office, OLAF. I am pleased that the European Court of Auditors reports very low levels of fraud in the UK. In 2009, we had a rate of just 0.19 of 1% of spending, but it is still too high. The Government and I will focus on that as we look at how we can tackle this problem. We are therefore deeply concerned that, according to the latest OLAF report, the level of fraud seems to be increasing at the European Union level.
It would be wise for me to point out that the Commission’s figures have to be interpreted with care. As we know, fraud and irregularities are not the same thing. Irregularities make up the bulk of the available figures. To my mind, irregularities are also a serious concern, because they are payments that have been made outside the rules. We should not find that acceptable. The figures quoted by OLAF for suspected fraud are increasing. It is not possible to say that fraud is increasing, but there are indications that that may be the case. Even an increase in suspected fraud is unacceptable. The best way to tackle fraud, irregularities, waste and the lack of priorities is ultimately to have better systems, financial processes and financial controls, and a better regime for financial management in the first place.
Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)
I do not need to speak for very long on this matter, for the simple reason that I have been making the same speech about different auditors’ reports for the last 26 years. I am afraid that nothing much has changed. The Economic Secretary is a very dedicated Minister and I have great enthusiasm for what she seeks to achieve. She puts the best possible face on the situation, but unfortunately nothing changes: plus ça change.
The reality is that the British taxpayer is, as the Minister has rightly admitted, under severe duress. We are having to cut back and implement austerity measures, but at the same time this report—which, for the 16th consecutive year, has not been signed off—demonstrates that there are serious errors and mistakes in the system. Those errors consist not merely in the manner in which the accounts have been presented, or in the fact that irregularities and fraud have been identified, but in the very system that has been created. Because of the nature of the problem and its range—and the fact that the documents relating to this debate run to 1,035 pages—it is impossible in 90 minutes to do more than give a general survey of where the whole problem lies.
I mentioned Bulgaria and Romania. The European Scrutiny Committee said that it was inappropriate for them to be brought into the accession procedure when they were, for all the reasons that we identified, which included the fraud that exists in those two countries. I am glad that the Economic Secretary has had a meeting with the Minister responsible for audit in Bulgaria, but I have to say that I do not think that the culture in that country will change very much because of a meeting. The cohesion funds—from the figures that I have already given—are clearly exploited and seriously misused. They represent a significant proportion of the problem. We have a serious problem that is deeply entrenched in the system.
As the Minister knows well, I proposed that we should not only reject the proposals put before us in a debate some months ago, but reject the increase in the budget, and I am glad that the House agreed to do just that. But that is only one side of the equation. The other is the vast sum of money being allocated for the purpose of running this failing European Union. I do not ask the Minister to agree with me on that point, because it would be politically incorrect to do so, but the reality is that it is a failing system. However, I do not need to rehearse the arguments that I have already given for why that is.
One of the elements at the heart of that is the responsibilities of what is called OLAF, the European anti-fraud office. I would like to refer to OLAF’s mission statement, which is on page 729 of this mammoth bundle of motion documents. I can barely hold it up, actually—but fortunately, my wrists are quite strong. The mission statement says:
“The mission of the European Anti-Fraud Office…is to protect the financial interests of the European Union, to fight fraud, corruption and any other irregular activity”.
Hon. Members should note the last words, especially when people talk about actual proven fraud. And by the way, with regard to the cohesion funds, the documents that the European Scrutiny Committee has examined note that the survey in question is only a sample survey—that is something that always fills me with considerable reservations—not a full audit of the kind that one might have expected from the National Audit Office. Indeed, I would go further and say that if we made it Government policy to insist that no standards lower than those of the NAO and the Comptroller and Auditor General should be applied to the European Union, we would really be getting somewhere. Frankly, if the NAO had the opportunity to have a go at these 1,035 pages, plus all the supporting documents, or if it had the opportunity at least to get entrenched in the system, as I have said many times in the past that it should, so that NAO standards and principles were applied to those audited accounts, we might just begin to see some relationship between costs and benefits.
The reality, however, is that vast sums of money—our net contributions and all the rest of it—are poured into that black hole, and it does not work. I am not going to enlarge on all the reasons, which worry me, for our slow economic growth, which in my opinion have something to do with the fact that what we have out there is a dead parrot. The European Union is a system that is incapable of growth—indeed, growth is liable to decrease, compared with that in China, India and the rest—and on top of all that, we have the problems of audit and irregularities that the report demonstrates.
The statement on OLAF’s mandate says:
“In pursuing this mission in an accountable, transparent and cost-effective manner, OLAF aims to provide a quality service to the citizens of Europe.”
OLAF’s mandate covers
“all EU expenditure and part of the revenue side of the budget. It includes the general budget, budgets administered by the Union or on its behalf, certain funds not covered by the budget but administered by EU agencies”—
perhaps that includes the External Action Service, which I hope we will look at in due course—
“and extends to all measures affecting the Union’s assets.”
That is a very big remit, and I have my reservations about that state of affairs.
The statement continues:
“OLAF’s status is hybrid in nature. It is part of the Commission”.
Would we have much confidence in the NAO if it were part of the Government? I very much doubt it. OLAF is supposed to be responsible for
“developing and monitoring the implementation of the EU’s anti-fraud policies. However it has a measure of budgetary and administrative autonomy, which reinforces the total independence with which OLAF conducts investigations.”
Mr Nuttall
Does my hon. Friend agree that one of the problems is that it apparently takes 25 months on average—more than two years—for OLAF to conduct its investigations, and that only 56% of cases have led to follow-up action?
Mr Cash
That is the problem. It is easy for us in this House to make scattergun criticisms of bureaucrats, civil servants and the rest of it, but the real problem is that if something does not work, we have to mend it—and there is no evidence of that happening.
I had an exchange with Lord Kinnock when he was responsible for these matters, and set up the new OLAF arrangements. He got a bit shirty with me in a Select Committee some years ago. People like Marta Andreasen were thrown out, and even before then, there was another chap whose name I cannot remember—
Mr Cash
Exactly. The trouble is that the moment anyone starts to get to grips with what is going on, the steel shutters come down and people are thrown out of the European institutional arrangements simply for asking questions that would be regarded as completely normal in any proper democratic system. That is the essence of the problem.
As I have said, I could enlarge at great length on the contents of these 1,035 pages, and every word would be entirely relevant because they are so important. Huge sums of taxpayers’ money and resources are being churned into this failing quagmire. This is not just the ranting of a Eurosceptic; it is the reality of what affects the daily lives of the people of this country, and we seem to be prepared to go along with it.
Mr Davidson
Does the hon. Gentleman accept that part of the difficulty of conveying these issues to the electorate is that the sums involved are so enormous? It is difficult for people to understand sums of £10 million here and £100 million there. As the Chair of the European Scrutiny Committee, would he consider undertaking a piece of work that looked at the value for money provided by a European operation in this country? An example would be the European schools, some of which are situated here. Why does not he compare the cost of a European school with the cost of a normal school? It would make sense to people if they could see the extravagance that the European Union applies in such circumstances. That would bring it all home to people far more than any number of quotations involving zillions.
Mr Cash
I rather agree. It would be very nice for me to be able to make a comparison between the different kinds of school systems, but this is not only about schools; it is about everything that moves. The reality is that this all-pervasive, all-encompassing ectoplasm has managed to work its way into every nook and cranny of our lives. It slips under doors and through windows, and it is absorbing us to the point at which we are being totally Europeanised. Within that framework, our taxpayers’ money is being absorbed into the bloodstream of the European Union, and the monitoring and accounting are inadequate, which is what this European Court of Auditors report is all about.
Mr Davidson
I was making a much more specific point a moment ago. I was referring not to schools in Europe in general but to the schools that are run by or on behalf of the European institutions themselves, of which there is at least one in the United Kingdom. A comparison of that school with a similar-sized school elsewhere in the UK would be enormously informative to parents and everyone else. Such an exercise would help to overcome the difficulties that we have in explaining the magnitude of the sums involved.
Mr Cash
I certainly agree with the hon. Gentleman’s concern. If he would like to write to me about it, I would be more than happy to take the matter up in the European Scrutiny Committee if we have an opportunity to do so. We are going through a process of reinvigorated European scrutiny, as I hope he has noticed, and we are determined to get to the bottom of certain issues. This is one of them.
I do not want to take up too much time, because many others want to speak. I will simply make the general point that this is a failing system with a failed accountancy system, and the taxpayer is being badly affected by the way in which these matters are being conducted. There are always paragons of virtue, but this system falls so far below the threshold of what is required that the whole thing needs shaking up. In a nutshell, I would like to see principles of the same kind that apply to the National Audit Office applied to the European Union, so that the people there can be roasted when they get it wrong.
Loans to Ireland Bill
William Cash Excerpts(13 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Chairman of Ways and Means (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 7, page 1, line 7, at end insert—
‘(3A) Any loans made under this Act, and any repayment of principal or payment of interest received thereunder, shall be denominated in sterling.’.
Amendment 4, page 1, leave out lines 8 to 18.
Amendment 6, page 1, line 18, at end insert—
‘(7A) Before determining the interest to be charged on any payments under this Act, the Treasury must specify the rate of interest by order; and the Treasury may not make such an order unless—
(a) the House of Commons has determined by resolution the rate of interest to be charged; and
(b) the order provides for that specified rate to be charged.’.
Amendment 8, page 1, line 20, at end insert—
‘(8A) All loans made under this Act shall be repaid by 8 December 2040.’.
Amendment 10, page 1, line 20, at end insert—
‘(8A) Before any loan or binding offer of a loan is made, or guarantee given, under this section, the relevant agreement must be laid before, and approved by a resolution of, the House of Commons.’.
Clause stand part.
Mr Cash
I have just abstained on Second Reading for one simple reason. I had intended to vote for it, but I remain gravely dissatisfied by the answer that I received from the Chancellor regarding the increase in the amount specified in clause 1. I do not want in any way to misrepresent what he said, but as I understood it, it was that that was all right because it was about exchange rates. However, anybody who examines clause 1 carefully will notice that subsection (4) states:
“The Treasury may by order made by statutory instrument substitute a greater amount for the amount for the time being specified in subsection (3)”,
which is £3.25 billion.
The next two provisions simply determine whether any increase will be subject to affirmative or negative resolution. An order would be made under the negative resolution only if the increase is to do with exchange rates, but I can see nothing to say that an increase under subsection (4) would be affected by subsequent provisions. I was bound to take great exception to that. It is a serious matter, because we simply do not know what the greater amount would be. We are totally exposed, subject only to affirmative resolution, which cannot be amended. Such a measure would simply go through on a whipped vote, just as the rest of the Bill doubtless will. That is why I abstained on Second Reading.
Amendment 3 addresses the definition of “Irish loan”. I was staggered when I looked carefully at the Bill, because clause 1(2) states that “Irish loan” means simply
“a loan to Ireland by the United Kingdom.”
The background is the recent debates on economic governance, and the origins of the European financial stability mechanism and the alternative eurozone facility, which as someone pointed out is as much as €440 billion, which is easily enough to cope with the Irish situation. There is a very close interconnect at all points between the so-called bilateral loan proposed in the Bill and the mechanism that I described.
The difficulty is that there is an overall determination to do as much as possible by way of integrating with Europe when it is quite obvious to anybody that this is the time for us not only to step back, but to desegregate from the European venture. I believe very strongly that the technique that is consistently employed in all spheres of activity is to say, “We don’t like what goes on in the EU, but we can just go along with it. Alternatively, to satisfy the Eurosceptics or Eurorealists, as they prefer to be called, we can make parallel arrangements along the lines of what we would have done if we were in the eurozone.”
The research paper helpfully supplied by the Library states:
“It is worth noting that the bilateral element”—
assuming that that is what the Bill is—
“of the UK’s support is broadly equivalent to what the UK would have provided if it were part of the eurozone-only EFSF.”
In other words, we would have provided the loan anyway. The Minister may well say that that is not his intention, but that is what Library researchers believe, and they are often right.
Mr Redwood
A portion of the total loan package is contingent money for Irish banks—they may or may not need it. Is my hon. Friend worried that they could come back for even more, and that clause 1(4) could allow an extension of our loan for Irish banks?
Mr Cash
Yes I am. Treasury civil servants are exceedingly clever and may know of pitfalls, but they might not fully explain them to Ministers. Of course, the Minister takes ultimate responsibility, but the question is: what is the effect on the daily lives of the people whom we represent? That is the issue on which we have to concentrate.
Under the circumstances, I am extremely dubious about the way in which the whole thing has been put together. In particular, I would mention what I will call the mechanism, as compared with the facility. I had an exchange earlier about the mechanism with the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, the right hon. Member for Edinburgh South West (Mr Darling), who said, “This is all going to be done by qualified majority voting.” However, that is not the case. Within the mechanism as it is set out, the request comes from the member state; it is only the final arrangement that requires qualified majority voting. Indeed, the EU sent in the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund in flagrant contradiction of the provisions of article 3 of the regulation in question.
In fact, the EU was operating the provision as if it were already law, when it was not. That it is typical of the European Union. It keeps on telling us about the rule of law, but when it suits, it completely ignores the law. What happened was unlawful. I also believe that it was unlawful in respect of article 122, which was the legal basis used to create the mechanism. I do not need to go into detail, but article 122 concerns natural disasters, energy supply and things of that kind. Anyone who looks at article 3, article 122 and the other provisions that they mention would reasonably conclude that they should not be used for the purposes of sorting out an unmitigated mess that was created by banks, as well as by the Government of Ireland and other parts of the European Union. Therefore, I am afraid that the answer that I received from the former Chancellor—that there really was no alternative to what was done, because such decisions are reached by qualified majority voting—does not stack up. If what happened was unlawful, it should have been resisted and, because of the consequences, it should, if necessary, have been taken to the European Court.
Mr Redwood
My hon. Friend has great legal expertise. I understand that the European Union is trying to negotiate an amendment to article 122 of the treaty in order to put the matter beyond doubt. Would that be retrospective, or could that undermine the current position?
Mr Cash
That is a very good question. I doubt very much whether an attempt to make the provision retrospective would remedy the mischief.
I am afraid that the question of illegality taints the Government’s position as well, and I shall explain why—the Minister will know all the detail, because I think that he was the Minister responsible. There is provision for the European Scrutiny Committee under Standing Order No. 143 regarding scrutiny and scrutiny reserves. It so happens that the European Scrutiny Committee was not set up until November—a few weeks ago. However, I have here a table setting out the dates that shows that the date of deposit was 25 May 2010. The decision was taken on 9 May at ECOFIN, which happened to be 48 hours before the coalition was pushed through. In the case of ECOFIN’s decision on the financial stability mechanism, the table states unequivocally that there was an override of both the European Scrutiny Committee and the Lords. On both counts, the then Government and the current Government breached the scrutiny arrangements. Indeed, it is quite extraordinary that the explanatory memorandum that accompanies the documents in question, and which should have been presented much earlier, was presented on 15 July. I know that the Minister will not dispute that, because it comes from Government documents. There is a serious worry about the manner in which this matter has been manipulated.
Just before the proceedings began, we were presented with another document, which reinforces my concern. If my amendment 3 were accepted, the Bill would read: “In this Act, ‘Irish loan’ means a loan to Ireland by the United Kingdom other than a loan by virtue of any provision by or under the European Communities Act 1972.” I am very familiar with the way in which interweaving goes on, not only as Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee but because, for the past 26 years, I have watched this process of integration and the manner in which, by extremely clever and adroit manoeuvring, we get further and further integrated into these arrangements. The mechanism is an open-ended invitation until 2013, as I ascertained during an exchange with the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Until 2013, we are stuck with the present arrangements.
I am sometimes a bit of a Cassandra, in that I make prophecies—more like predictions—about certain events, find out that I was right and then find out that nobody took any notice until they had happened. On this occasion, I am going to say that it is extremely likely that, if Portugal gets into really deep trouble—and perhaps Spain, too—that will happen before 2013. If this greater amount is interwoven into the stabilisation mechanism, or even if it is not, the mechanism itself will entrap us in the arrangements which, although not yet permanent, will go on until 2013.
I also think that the Government are struggling a bit in relation to article 122, under which this measure was introduced—unlawfully, in my opinion—because the Commissioner responsible, a Mr Sefcovic, has stated that the Commission is still considering whether to use article 136 or article 122. Against that background, the Van Rompuy Committee is sitting and might already have concluded that it would be appropriate to have a permanent mechanism in place only under article 136, and therefore only by reference to the eurozone. That would be a plus, but it would not alter the fact that, between now and 2013, we are at risk.
I am concerned about the deficient wording in clause 1(2), because not excluding what might be done under the European Union effectively leaves it open to the European Union’s continuing to weave its way into the arrangements, despite the fact that they are described as a bilateral loan. Some people might say, “Ah, but you have to understand that when the explanatory notes talk about a bilateral loan, they mean that.” It does not say that in the Bill, however. Furthermore, we have had some unpleasant experiences with explanatory notes in the European Scrutiny Committee recently, as anyone who wants to read the report that we have just issued will see. The explanatory notes in question were positively misleading, and distorted the legal position. That is a matter that we will be pursuing in Committee, when we ask whether parliamentary sovereignty or judicial supremacy should prevail. I do not need to go into the detail of that now, but the fact that a bilateral loan is mentioned in the explanatory notes has been severely vitiated by our experience of the explanatory notes to the European Union Bill.
Mr Cash
I happen to agree with that, which is why I did not vote against the Bill, but I must say that this is not a matter of merely academic interest, because the consequence that I mentioned at the beginning of my speech, which led me to abstain, is that there is no restriction on the greater amount. I wait with enormous interest to hear whether the Minister will differ from the Chancellor of the Exchequer on that, but when it is an open-ended provision for a greater amount, I would like to know what that greater amount’s limit would be.
In the context of the interlocking aspect to which I have just referred, I remain deeply concerned that the amount could be greater, and that this matter could get caught up in the complicated ongoing negotiations—I recognise that the Chancellor and his Ministers have had some very complicated negotiations. I remain worried about the direction in which we seem to be going, therefore. It would be so simple for the Government to give me either a direct assurance, which I would regard as a second-tier response, or a specific agreement to accept my amendment just to get me off their back. I would regard such an agreement as a useful way of dealing with the situation, but I bet I do not get that.
Mr Dodds
We will listen with interest to what the Minister has to say, but, just to be clear, is the hon. Gentleman’s argument that the greater amount under clause 1(4) could be used to increase not only the amount of the loan to the Irish Republic, but interweaved with the financial stability mechanism to provide money for other countries? Is that his argument, or is it specifically about the loan to the Irish Republic?
Mr Cash
The provision appears to apply to the Irish component, but because of the implications of what I am saying and the interlocking aspects in the kaleidoscope, it is extremely difficult to work out exactly what is intended by such opaque words. What I am asking for is very modest: simply the removal of all doubt by making it clear that any such loan would be
“other than a loan by virtue of any provision by or under the European Communities Act 1972.”
If all doubt were to be removed in that way, it would be the end of the story and there would be no problem, so why not do it? I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Another issue arises under paragraph 6 of the summary of key terms document. The paragraph covers events of default, and sub-paragraph (h) states that one event of default will be
“the Borrower”—
Ireland—
“not being or ceasing to be a member of the European Union”.
Why would such a provision be wanted if it were not integral to the fact that Ireland is a member of the European Union? I do not think I need to advance the case any further as it is very simple: if we would exclude Ireland from the arrangements by virtue of its ceasing to be, or not being, a member of the EU, that must have special significance, otherwise it would not be stated. That is another exceedingly worrying feature.
Paragraph 8 refers to the governing law, and it states:
“The credit agreement and any non-contractual obligations arising out of or in connection with it will be governed by English law.”
Paragraph 9 is on enforcement, and the document’s authors have clearly thought a lot about this matter, and the more they think about it the more worried I get, because they are transposing their thinking into the provisions of the Bill and this document:
“The English courts will have exclusive jurisdiction in relation to any dispute including a dispute relating to non-contractual obligations arising out of or in connection with the credit agreement.”
That gets to the heart of the problem, because anything that within law is under the jurisdiction of the European Union and within the framework of the European Court under the European Communities Act 1972 cannot be excluded from that jurisdiction by such words in a document of this kind that is “for information purposes”—hence our European Scrutiny Committee report on the relationship between parliamentary sovereignty and the judiciary. Therefore, merely writing in such a document that something will be governed by English law and that the English courts will have exclusive jurisdiction in relation to any dispute is not worth the paper it is written on.
If it is within the European Union legal framework, that means the European Court will get its hands on it. It may be that if there was a dispute or default or any of the other difficulties that could arise from the agreement in the Bill as enacted—as I rather suppose it will be—that will in no way alter the fact that ultimately, as long as parliamentary sovereignty prevails in the light of the European Communities Act, the Supreme Court will not prevent it from falling within the framework of the European Court of Justice.
Of course, it would be open to any future parliamentary Bill to try to unravel the arrangement, but what a pity it would be if we found that the fast-track arrangements we are experiencing today led us to the situation that I have described, simply because we were not prepared to listen to the argument that could resolve the problem by excluding the European jurisdiction. The legal advisers, the Treasury officials and the Minister may well be wrong. If they are wrong, we are in deep trouble. If they are doubtful, perhaps they could listen to those of us who have been proved right on a number of past occasions.
These are my final words—not from Cassandra, but from me. When things go wrong, it is much better to have taken advice beforehand and keep ahead of the curve, rather than allowing the curve to catch up with us.
Kelvin Hopkins (Luton North) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash); I very much agree with what he has been saying. He is clearly much more erudite on these matters than me, but I understand what he is saying—that today, we are making to our closest friendly neighbour country a bilateral loan which has nothing to do with the European Union and which is not part of the panoply of EU arrangements. I am happy to go along with such an arrangement.
The right hon. Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood) has said many times that, if there are problems in the eurozone with the eurozone, they should be sorted out by the eurozone, not by countries outside the eurozone. I agree with him very strongly. This is a country that is our closest neighbour, with which we have deep, long historical relations—very friendly relations now, we are pleased to say. Indeed, I have many Irish constituents who are concerned about their country. We are making a friendly gesture to a neighbouring country—our nearest friendly neighbour—that happens to be in the eurozone, which we happen not to be.
We do not want to be in a situation where, if another country gets into difficulty, it says, “You made a loan to Ireland—you can make a loan to another country in the eurozone.” That would not be acceptable.
Mark Durkan
On amendment 3, tabled by the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash), the amendment of itself does not preclude the fear that he and my hon. Friend the Member for Luton North (Kelvin Hopkins) have that at some point in the future there might be a loans to Spain Bill, a loans to Portugal Bill or something similar. The amendment would not preclude the possibility of any other such bilateral loans being arranged in future. I do not believe that the amendment, which is commended to us in those terms, will serve the purpose for which it was tabled.
Mark Durkan
I know that the hon. Gentleman made that point, too, and I want to turn to it. He carefully quoted and referred to a number of points in the loan agreement, which was made available at the start of the debate. The summary of key terms refers to a number of matters, and the hon. Member for Stone seemed to say that those references alone mean that the bilateral loan is being interweaved with the wider EU and IMF support packages to Ireland. However, hon. Members should bear in mind a point that the Chancellor made on Second Reading—that one advantage of the bilateral loan arrangement is the place that it gives the UK at the table when it comes to arranging and overseeing the restructuring plan that is to take place in relation to the Irish banking sector.
The key terms include, under the heading “Other Terms”, at paragraph 1(d):
“no amendments to the facilities provided by the IMF, European Financial Stability Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Fund or Sovereign bilateral lenders or to the Memoranda of Understanding that would have a material adverse effect on the Borrower’s ability to restore its capacity to access the capital markets.”
Given that the purpose of the loan arrangement is to make sure that Ireland can go to the bond markets on its own as soon as possible and get money at competitive rates, it is clearly in the House’s interests, as the UK will be providing this loan, to make sure that the loan terms are protected against any undue terms coming from the other loans being made available in this context.
Several hon. Members have mentioned the role of the European Central Bank. We can look at the history of this situation and question the role of the ECB on a number of occasions. First, it kept interest rates very low—at times against the express wish and request of the Irish Finance Minister—which helped to contribute to the problem. Secondly, as many hon. Members have mentioned, there is the open-ended nature of the Irish Government’s guarantee to the banks. Again, the ECB seems to have been the primary body urging a guarantee of that extent. Thirdly, there is the whole issue of the need for the bail-out and the creation of circumstances in which the Irish Government have had to seek it. Again, many people have questions about the precise role and performance of the European Central Bank in all that. Hon. Members have asked serious questions about the ECB, and we know that a much bigger loan facility is being granted through the EU and the IMF, so surely the House will want to know that the terms of the bilateral loan and its operation will not jeopardise the interests or purposes for which it is being made available. It therefore makes sense for the key terms that are summarised in the document to refer to the restructuring plan that is to be undertaken in relation to the banks.
The document makes it clear that “conditions precedent” will include “finalisation by the Borrower”—namely Ireland—
“after consultation with the Lender, of a restructuring plan in relation to its banking sector with the IMF, European Commission and European Central Bank”.
That is not the interweaving that the hon. Member for Stone has discussed, but a sensible, diligent precaution on the part of the House in providing for money to be borrowed. The “Other Terms” also include at paragraph 1(c):
“no amendments to the Restructuring Plan that would have a material adverse financial impact on the UK operations of Anglo Irish Bank, Allied Irish Banks and Bank of Ireland”.
Again, it makes absolute sense for the House and the Government, who are responsible to it, to make clear cross-reference to what else is happening under the restructuring plan and to what other lenders might urge in relation to other parts of the plan in terms of key interests that the House needs to protect, including those of the banking sector in Northern Ireland and the contribution of the Irish banks to the wider UK economy.
Mr Hoban
Amendment 3, which my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) moved by, would ensure that the Bill did not apply to any loan made by the United Kingdom to Ireland under the European Communities Act 1972. Let me give him a second-tier assurance that the Bill applies only to the UK’s bilateral loan to Ireland. Any EU loan made to Ireland through the financial stability mechanism would not be a loan from the UK to Ireland and would not be subject to the Bill.
There is no interweaving or interlocking, and therefore the amendment is unnecessary. My hon. Friend referred to paragraph 6(h) of the loan agreement. I am sure he will understand that the funding Ireland gets is dependent on it being a member of both the International Monetary Fund and the European Union. If it were no longer a member, it would no longer receive the funding and therefore there would be a problem. Amendment 4 would remove the power to increase the cap on the loan and adjust the cap for exchange rate fluctuations. I hope that the comments made by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor remove the need for anyone to push that amendment further.
Amendment 6 would require the interest rate on the loan to be approved by Parliament. That is not appropriate. The interest rate for each tranche of the lending to Ireland will be a fixed rate that is set by adding a margin of 2.29% to the sterling seven-and-a-half-year swap rate at the time that the disbursement is made. That is set out in the loan agreement and gives certainty to us and to the Irish Government, who would want to have certainty when accepting and voting on this package.
My hon. Friend the Member for Clacton (Mr Carswell) said that the amendment would enable the loan interest rate to be reduced. It could also lead to the loan interest rate being increased to the detriment of the Irish Government and their economic recovery. It is important that there is a clear, definitive statement about what the rate is. We have published the summary of key terms of the loan agreement to help colleagues understand what the rate is and how it will be set. The rate is set with the Republic and within the range of interest rates agreed with other multilateral bodies. It would be a big mistake and irresponsible of the Labour party to vote for amendment 6, because it would create uncertainty and instability where we want certainty and stability for the Irish Government. I question whether what the amendment proposes is the right thing to do. The loan rate is agreed and clear, and it is in the summary of key credit terms. The Irish Government have signed off on those key terms. That is the rate they are expecting to get. Amendment 6 would create unnecessary uncertainty and I therefore ask my hon. Friend to withdraw it.
Mr Cash
For the time being, I have decided against pressing amendment 3 to a Division.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 6, page 1, line 18, at end insert—
‘(7A) Before determining the interest to be charged on any payments under this Act, the Treasury must specify the rate of interest by order; and the Treasury may not make such an order unless—
(a) the House of Commons has determined by resolution the rate of interest to be charged; and
(b) the order provides for that specified rate to be charged.’.—(Mr Carswell.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Chris Leslie
I thank the hon. Gentleman. Just at what I thought was my moment of great glee, he took it away from me. Nevertheless, I will take some satisfaction from what the Government have decided.
I was trying to listen carefully to the Minister’s statement on amendment 2. As a lone traveller trying to amend the legislation, I might have misread the wording of clause 2, but I still do not quite understand the sequences of subsection (4), which states:
“No report is required to be prepared or laid in relation to a period if—
(a) no payments…are made…
(b) no sums…are received in the period, and
(c) no amount of principal or interest in respect of an Irish loan is outstanding at the end”.
I could not see any circumstances where paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) would simultaneously apply. For example, if no amount of principal or interest were outstanding, how could there be any circumstances where, under paragraph (a), payments had been made or, under paragraph (b), sums had been received? Surely if no report is required when no amounts are outstanding, the conditions under subsections (4)(a) and (b) are redundant. Looking at the drafting of subsection (4), it would be easy to imagine the parliamentary counsel becoming entangled in an arcane discourse on ontological logic. There are several twists to the double negatives set out in the drafting.
As a layman reading subsection (4), I could not see why paragraphs (a) and (b) were necessary, when they must be concurrent with subsection (4)(c), given that (4)(c) states that there is nothing left owing, according to my reading of it. If each of the three paragraphs were alternatives, or contrasting, perhaps using the words “either” or “or”, that might make sense. They are conjoined, however, by the non-contrasting linkage “and”, suggesting that each of the three conditions must be fulfilled simultaneously, and I am not quite sure that I follow that. Perhaps the Minister needs to walk me through it one more time. I do not wish to press this matter to a vote, because I am sure that there is a higher drafting power at work here, but as I read it, I could not see any circumstances in which paragraph (c) would be true simultaneously with paragraphs (a) and (b).
In general terms the reports will be important, not least because we need to see the terms of the loan that the people of Ireland will have to repay, as well as the amounts of money that the British people will have in return for adding to our national debt. There is a whole series of other questions to which I would eventually like answers. For example, what is the aggregate amount of interest that we expect to be paid by the Irish Government, and what is the impact for us in this country?
As I have said, it is a shame that the summary of the terms of the credit facility was deposited only at the eleventh hour, and I hope that we will have another opportunity to scrutinise it at another time. For the time being, however, that was the purpose of amendment 1, and I am grateful to the Minister for his acceptance of the first amendment that we tabled.
Mr Cash
I have much the same curiosity as the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie). I was a bit puzzled by the drafting of this provision, and I wanted to find out what the Minister had in mind. I am not sure that he has left me any more satisfied than I was when I started out, however, because my experience over the past 26 years of the dogged fashion in which Ministers operate is that they just say, “We’re not going to make the amendment.” They do not usually explain the position satisfactorily either.
Having said that, it seems to me that if there is nothing to report, we should just not bother with the reports. Subsections (1), (2) and (3) will be necessary. It is possible that, in due course, the concerns that I raised on an earlier amendment might need to be included in the report. That was the case, for example, in relation to the reports on the Maastricht convergence criteria, despite all the footling remarks that were made during the debate on Maastricht, when we were assured that this, that and the other would not happen. When we came to the convergence reports, and got into the whole business of the golden rule, the stability and growth pact and all the other shenanigans and wriggling, we were proved right over and over again.
Chris Leslie
I just want to pick up the hon. Gentleman’s point that if there is nothing to report, there is no need to have any reports. I believe that it would be of interest to the House if, even when no payments were made, a report were still produced to set out that fact. That might seem a small point but, for example, in the unlikely event that default became an eventuality, the lack of a payment being received might be of interest. That was also part of the rationale behind deleting subsection 4(a) and (b).
Mr Cash
I think I might agree with that too, but I think that is catered for by subsection (3)(a), which says that each report must include details of
“any payments made by the Treasury”.
One could have said, “payments, if any,” but for practical purposes I think subsections (1), (2) and (3) would be sufficient. I am not particularly fussed about it; I just wanted to table a probing amendment. I got the usual stonewalling operation from the Minister. I have got used to it over the years; it makes no difference to me and it makes no difference to him.
Mr Hoban
I think the hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan) has a second career beckoning as a parliamentary draftsman. He has summed up the situation exceptionally well.
In subsection (4) all three paragraphs—(a), (b) and (c)—have to apply if no report is to be published. If amendment 2 were made, removing paragraphs (a) and (b), payments could have been made in the period but they would not be reported if there was no balance outstanding at the end. Therefore we must ensure that all three are true before we allow no report to be published. I hope that provides clarification.
I hope I am not seen by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) as someone who seeks to stonewall his inquiries, but having imposed a duty on the Treasury to report, it is right that that duty be extinguished when the loans are repaid; otherwise someone will say, “Yes, the loans have been repaid, but your Act requires you to make those reports.” It is right that the duty to report is extinguished when the loan has been repaid, and that is simply the purpose of—
Mr Cash
Perhaps a little bit of irritation, which is not usual in my case, is beginning to burgeon, because a number of questions that I tabled weeks ago about the legal advice regarding the stabilisation mechanism still have not been answered, and when I use the word “stonewall” I mean just that. When I do not get an answer, and I am told that I will get the answer as soon as possible but I still do not get it, and I have to put in a reminder but I still do not get it, there is something going on; I know that. They do not want to disclose the legal advice; they do not want even to disclose whether in fact it was given, or when it was given. I would like to know the answer to those questions because as Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee—
The Second Deputy Chairman
Order. This is an intervention. It is a very long intervention. The hon. Gentleman has clarified what he meant by stonewalling, but perhaps we might leave the considerations about the European Scrutiny Committee for another day, because it is not particularly relevant to the amendment that we are discussing now.
Mr Cash
I, too, hope that this Bill succeeds, because it is important to help Ireland. I would like to see Ireland as part of a new configuration of the European Union, rejoining this country on a different footing from the arrangements that currently prevail in the European Union. The European Union is increasingly in its death throes and I hope that this does not lead to an implosion. We have seen riots in the streets here in the United Kingdom, in Greece, in Portugal and in Italy—there were riots in Rome only yesterday. The situation is extremely grave and a lot of it results from the very point made by the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) about growth. The plain fact is that under the current arrangements there is no growth. Until powers are repatriated we will not get the sort of oxygen into the small business community that will be able to fill the gap between the requirements of the Irish economy and those of the UK economy.
In the meantime, we are considerably exposed to the indebtedness of the Irish banks. The amount that we have made available, small as it is comparatively but great as it is from the point of view of the British taxpayer, has been justified, but that is without prejudice to my concerns. They are that the former Chancellor of the Exchequer’s explanation of how the financial stability mechanism came to be put through remains unsatisfactory. He could have referred the whole question to the European Court, because this was unlawful and remains so. I sent a note to the Chancellor of the Exchequer on this very question as he was going off to an ECOFIN meeting. I regret to say that the explanatory memorandum produced by the Government on 27 July—perhaps it was 25 July —endorsed the decision taken by the former Government, and that speaks for itself.
I am also deeply worried about this business of the “greater amount” under the provisions that we have already discussed because, irrespective of what the Chancellor said about the exchange rate, the reality is that the amount of the increase is simply a matter of whether or not it is carried by the affirmative resolution. It is only when the exchange rate issue comes into play and we are therefore just dealing with a fluctuation in the amounts to be made available that we revert to using the negative resolution. Therefore, the Bill still provides that this “greater amount” is an open-ended commitment, and I hope that the Government will keep this closely under surveillance. I have heard nothing from the Front Benchers to dissuade me from that view.
Finally, we need to deal with the question of the Euro-ectoplasm and the way in which the kaleidoscope of European legislation in conjunction with all the other arrangements that have been made parallel to this so-called “bilateral loan” weave together, because there is a serious risk that the European jurisdiction applies here. I did not press my amendment to a Division for reasons relating to another vote that did not, in fact, transpire along the lines anticipated.
Be that as it may, the Bill is understandable from the point of view of the Irish economy. However, the Irish Government and the Irish banking system have to take the blame for allowing their economy to get so far out of kilter, and that point needs to be made on the Floor of this House. We are helping them, but we are doing so without prejudice to the fact that they got themselves into the same kind of mess as the Labour Government did on our economy. This is not a day for excuses or congratulation; it is a day for a bit of sober reflection. If people spend what they have not got, they end up with it catching up with them. There is a great deal to be said for prudence, but not of the former Prime Minister’s kind.
Loans to Ireland Bill
William Cash Excerpts(13 years, 11 months ago)
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Mr Osborne
I said in an earlier statement to the House that I was seeking to do that, and I had hoped that hon. Members were paying attention to what I said at the time.
The legislation that we shall pass today will allow the UK to be ready in the new year to meet its commitments to one of our closest international partners. As has been noted, the legislation before the House is narrow in scope—it is explicitly a Loans to Ireland Bill—but it is still enabling legislation. It sits alongside the actual loan agreement, which sets out in detail what we will offer Ireland. To ensure that Members have as much information as possible available to them for today’s discussion, a summary of the key terms of the loan agreement, which was agreed with the Irish Government only this morning, has been available in the Vote Office for more than an hour now.
Mr Osborne
If my hon. Friend will allow me, I will make a bit of progress and then of course take some further interventions.
In my remarks today, I intend to address both the substance of the legislation and the loan agreement, but before that let me briefly say something about how we got here. Over the course of this year, it became increasingly clear that the situation in the Irish economy was unsustainable. Their sovereign debt markets had effectively closed and had little prospect of re-opening. Ireland’s market interest rates had risen to record levels, and Irish banks had become almost wholly reliant on central bank funding to maintain their operations, with no obvious prospect that that was going to change. This situation simply could not go on. We had been monitoring the situation for many months and had engaged in confidential discussions with our partners in the G7 and at ECOFIN about possible solutions.
Over the weekend of 20 November, Ireland’s Prime Minister made a formal request for international financial assistance. The UK, alongside the International Monetary Fund, the EU, the eurozone and some other member states—Sweden and Denmark—made an agreement in principle to take part in putting together an assistance package for Ireland. Since then, the various interested parties have been working round the clock with the Irish authorities to put together a package. Officials from the British Treasury have been in Dublin in recent days ensuring that our interests and concerns were represented, and I want to thank them for their hard work. At the end of November, Ireland agreed with the IMF and the EU a three-year financial assistance package worth €85 billion.
Mr Cash
The document to which my right hon. Friend just referred is “for information purposes only” and is clearly not intended to be construed as part and parcel of the Bill. So can he explain why in the document the “conditions precedent” to the arrangements interweave the so-called “bilateral loan” with the European financial stability mechanism, and why an attempt is then made to bypass that by referring to the “Governing law” as “English law”?
Mr Osborne
I am going to discuss some of the conditions attached to the loan. The particular condition that my hon. Friend refers to ensures that the UK is protected if other parties to this international agreement change their arrangement with Ireland in some way that materially affects our ability to be repaid. That condition gives us an ability at that point to step in.
Mr Osborne
I know that my hon. Friend is assiduous on these points, but I think that on this occasion he is not correct. This is simply a fall-back mechanism for us to say that if Ireland in some way renegotiates its loan from the eurozone, from the EU or from the IMF, it is a condition of our loan to Ireland that we can step in at that point and examine our situation. That protects the British taxpayer and has absolutely nothing to do with European law or anything else; it is simply there to make sure that other parties to this international agreement must have due regard to what they are doing, and how that might have an impact on the ability of the British taxpayer to be repaid.
Mr Osborne
My hon. Friend is pre-empting my speech. I shall get on and explain exactly what those two subsections mean.
As I said, there is no expectation that we will have to make further loans to Ireland in the future. Subsection (4) is intended to prevent an increase in the size of the loan, unless an order is made by statutory instrument, but because the loan is denominated in sterling, a mechanism is needed to accommodate potential changes in the exchange rate in the period between the publication of the Bill and the signing of the loan agreement—that answers my hon. Friend’s point—which could happen in a matter of days. This is not about the exchange rate risk over the coming years—that risk is borne by Ireland—but merely a mechanism to deal with the fact that we are publishing the Bill before we sign the loan agreement, for the reasons that I set out earlier.
The Bill allows the Treasury, under subsections (5) to (7), to make an order once the Bill is in force to increase the limit, as long as that is done solely to take account of exchange rate fluctuations between now and 30 days after Royal Assent, without further Parliamentary procedure.
Mr Cash
I am sure that my right hon. Friend will understand my saying that it would have been so much simpler if what he has just said had been specified in the Bill, instead of a blanket wording referring to substituting a greater amount. We would have then known that that was only intended to allow a margin of error depending on currency fluctuations. Subsection (4) is absolutely clear that there is no restriction.
Mr Osborne
My hon. Friend will be very focused on what I am about to say, so if he does not mind I shall make a little progress, and then I shall be happy to take an intervention.
Let me turn briefly to the arrangements for a permanent stability mechanism for eurozone economies. The European Council this week is expected to discuss the matter. Both the Prime Minister and I are very clear that when it comes to putting in place a permanent mechanism, the UK is not part of the eurozone and so will not be part of that mechanism. The president of the euro group has accepted that the UK will not be part of the permanent stability mechanism, and that the European financial stability mechanism, which the previous Government agreed in May and of which we are part, will cease to exist when that permanent eurozone mechanism is put in place.
We will seek to bring to an end the use of the mechanism established in May for the resolution of sovereign debt problems. It was established under article 122 of the Lisbon treaty and originally intended to provide support for member states following natural disasters. European Finance Ministers, including my predecessor, chose to apply that article in May to deal with the eurozone crisis at that time, but that temporary solution should not become a permanent way of doing things, and the time has now come for the eurozone to put in place its own mechanism for dealing with the imbalances in the eurozone. That needs to be part of a comprehensive solution whereby countries address their own problems more decisively, including in their banking systems. We in Britain have shown the way.
Mr Osborne
My hon. Friend makes a very good point. There was a debate—it was pretty widely reported, so I am not betraying anything that was not read by everyone throughout the world—about whether to address the solvency issues, and whether there should be a contribution—or a haircut, to use the jargon—from senior debt holders in the banks or, indeed, sovereign debt holders. The international community’s view, with which we absolutely agree, is that such a contribution risked a very serious contagion that might spread through many different banking systems, not just those of the countries to which my hon. Friend refers. So the decision was taken not to require a private sector bail-in from senior debt holders in the banks or, indeed, sovereign debt holders.
As part of a comprehensive solution, the eurozone needs to come to a rapid conclusion about its mechanism, draw a distinction, as it has sought to, between existing debt and potential future-issued debt, create a credible mechanism and work out how a single currency zone that does not have a single fiscal policy or a political union will deal with its imbalances.
Mr Osborne
I see the speed with which my hon. Friend leaps to his feet at that point, but I shall take his intervention in a moment.
The eurozone needs to address that situation, and we need to ensure that it gets it right, because that is absolutely in our interests. Individual countries also need to address their problems. Portugal has a long-standing problem with its economic productivity, which the Portuguese Government are determined to address. The Irish banking system has caused enormous problems for the Irish Government, who are now addressing that. In a bipartisan debate, this is a slightly partisan point, but I think that the UK has demonstrated over the past six months that, by its own efforts, a country can earn market credibility, improve its credit rating and improve international confidence in its economy. We need the eurozone to sort out its mechanism, but individual countries in Europe also need to take decisive steps to deal with the particular problems that their economies face. Let me give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash), and then I must conclude to allow others to speak.
Mr Cash
I have put a number of questions, as yet unanswered, to my right hon. Friend on that very issue, but I am glad that he has given, at any rate, a partial answer to one of them. The mechanism’s transfer from what appears to be an unlawful basis in article 122 of the Lisbon treaty to the new proposals under article 136 will involve only the eurozone and represent an important step in the right direction. Does my right hon. Friend not accept, however, that much could happen over the next two or three years, between now and 2013, while the mechanism in which my right hon. Friend’s predecessor engaged, and which I believe to be unlawful, continues? We could be locked into a Portuguese or a Spanish black hole. We do not know yet, but there is a danger.
Mr Osborne
First, I am dealing with the situation as I found it, and as I found it we were committed to that mechanism under qualified majority voting, but I am trying to extricate us from that. Secondly, the permanent arrangements might come into play sooner than 2013. That is a subject for discussion at the European Council, and, certainly as far as we are concerned, the sooner we get on with it, the better. I am doing everything I can to ensure that the UK is extricated from the commitment that was entered into, and we are making good progress.
Mr Cash
When the shadow Chancellor says, as the Chancellor said, that the process was triggered by a qualified majority vote, I am sure that he would agree that that is not strictly true, because it resulted from a request by a member state. The final solution or arrangements are made by virtue of a qualified majority vote at the end. That is a qualification, but it does not alter the fact that, on the basis it was explained to us, article 122 was almost certainly unlawful and the use of article 136 would have been a better route. However, we appear to be entrapped into article 122 for the current purposes.
Alan Johnson
I believe that the hon. Gentleman will seek to address that in his amendment to clause 3, which we will discuss later. On the specific issue, there is no doubt that the mechanism was decided by qualified majority voting. All 27 European member states were part of that. I know from experience of negotiating in Europe over many years that it is a pretty turgid process and one has to be on one’s toes. My right hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West can speak for himself, but I think he got a very good deal for this country on Greece.
The Chancellor must take responsibility for the deal that he has negotiated and not try spuriously to blame his predecessor, as he did again in his evidence to the Treasury Select Committee on 8 December. He had a choice about whether the UK should contribute to the Irish rescue plan. In principle, he has made the right choice, but before us today is a hastily drawn-up Bill that does not set out the terms of the loan, the interest rate or the repayment schedule. Colleagues from all parties will want to explore and probe those matters in Committee, and we particularly want to get to our amendments on clause 2, so a goodly proportion of the time available to us this afternoon may be better spent on that. It is therefore not my intention to detain the House for long on Second Reading.
Alan Johnson
No, I will not give way—perhaps later.
I am also curious about the following piece of distorted logic. In the Treasury Committee, the Chancellor said that it was okay to set austerity aside in order to make a loan to Ireland because of the promise of repayment. He said that this loan “adds to our debt” but
“We’re getting back a very important asset which is a commitment from the Irish government to pay us back with interest.”
What puzzles me is which part of that definition of a sensible loan did not apply to Sheffield Forgemasters. [Hon. Members: “Oh.”] I am sorry that Government. Members groan about British manufacturing industry. My right hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Brightside and Hillsborough (Mr Blunkett) raised this issue during the Chancellor’s statement on 22 November. Why does the Chancellor agree a huge loan to Ireland on the basis he cited but reject a modest £80 million that would be paid back with interest and boost the opportunity of British manufacturers to have a substantial stake in the civil nuclear energy supply chain, which is currently dominated by overseas companies? At a time when we are looking for jobs and growth, the logic of that escapes me.
My third concern is the prospect of each eurozone country being bailed out as its economy falls into crisis without addressing the root causes of the continent’s problems.
Mr Cash
Is the shadow Chancellor aware that serious discussions are going on about increasing the €400 billion facility, and probably doubling it? In response to my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering (Mr Hollobone), is not the whole European Union, not to mention the world at large, confronting a very dangerous and difficult situation?
Alan Johnson
Yes, but that is a matter for the eurozone. If the Chancellor is right in his prediction that perhaps this can ensure that we come out of the €60 billion mechanism, the facility and the other moneys, then fine, but as we are making a big contribution—more than we would have done had we paid the amount that a eurozone country would have paid to rescue Ireland—we must be in a position to influence this debate.
Mr Andrew Tyrie (Chichester) (Con)
Until the shadow Chancellor’s last few words, I was looking forward to saying that I agree with just about everything that has been said from both Front Benches. None the less, there is a good deal of cross-party consensus about what is being discussed.
The Chancellor is faced with a difficult situation: a regional currency crisis that is largely not of his making, a close neighbour with strong historical ties in the eye of the storm and an inherited financial commitment to assistance at the European level.
The Treasury Committee took advantage of the Chancellor’s appearance before us last week to cross-examine him on these matters in some detail. That appearance, his speech today and particularly the terms sheet, which we have just received, have given us a good deal of information, and I am grateful to him. I am relieved, according to that information, that any increase in the loan, which is permitted by the legislation, will be debated on the Floor of the House.
We now know the price of the loan for the first time, broadly speaking. It looks sensible, although I notice that it can be varied under the enabling legislation. As my hon. Friend the Member for Rochester and Strood (Mark Reckless) has pointed out, we have discovered from the terms sheet that the loan is junior in the debt hierarchy to support through the EU mechanism. It would be useful if the Minister, in the winding-up speech, told us whether the Irish can repay the loan early without penalty. I do not think that that is what is stated in paragraph 5(c) of “Other Terms” in the loan agreement—I have obviously had very little time to read it—but there is also a reference to “exceptions” in the bracketed part of the sentence.
A number of hon. Members and I would like to know whether the Government have considered purchasing assets held by the National Asset Management Agency, as an alternative to part or all of the loan.
As far as I know, this bilateral loan has no direct precedent. The UK has gone further than was needed to fulfil its legal obligations. The Chancellor made a strong and persuasive case, which was supported by the Opposition. However, I think that that decision needs close scrutiny, as does the decision, which straddled the previous Government’s tenure, that left the UK with extra contingent liabilities as a result of the mechanism. We may have been put in the unsatisfactory position of making EU budget payments to bail out the eurozone, even though we are not a member of it.
It is important to bear in mind that demand for a bail-out originated not with a request from Ireland, but from the fear among eurozone members of contagion spreading from Ireland to Portugal and Spain. Most hon. Members agree that bailing out the eurozone is primarily its business and not ours. It is true that the collapse of the zone would generate shockwaves throughout the region, and possibly the world. However, the eurozone does have the capacity to bail out weaker members and, to the extent that the stability of the whole financial system is at stake, our contribution should usually be made via the International Monetary Fund. It is for those reasons that I was relieved when the Chancellor confirmed before the Select Committee that the legislation will be unique to Ireland and does not contain enabling powers for further bilateral eurozone bail-outs.
Mr Tyrie
I appreciate that. The Chancellor has referred to 2013 on a number of occasions, and my hon. Friend has referred to the possible unlawfulness of the mechanism on a number of occasions, including in private discussions.
This is a crisis of the eurozone, for which UK taxpayers are footing part of the bill. The UK will have to engage with members of the eurozone to limit the damage now and to construct something better for the future. I will touch on a few of those points in the moments that remain. I recognise that the problems to which I refer may be intractable. First, as the Chancellor has said, the senior creditors have been exempted from a haircut. The Chancellor told us that this was because of the risk of contagion. He is probably right, but the resulting moral hazard is large and will have to be addressed.
The second issue that I wish to raise, which naturally none of the authorities wants to talk about, is the fact that even the measures for Ireland and for Greece may not prevent default. The crisis may be one of solvency, not liquidity. That has a bearing on the lender of last resort provisions for the eurozone. It is possible that a sovereign default could trigger a banking crisis and even failure in parts of the eurozone, because banks hold a large amount of sovereign debt on their balance sheets. Such a bank failure could be highly toxic.
It is worth bearing in mind that the great depression of the 1930s was triggered as much by bank failures after 1931 as it was by the stock market collapse of 1929. I do not want to play the role of Cassandra, but I plead that contingency planning at European level be done now for the risk of such a bank failure. On the basis of the eurozone’s responses to the crisis so far, I am not optimistic that that planning is being done. The eurozone is fearful of leaks, and those doing the work would be terrified of that possibility. I have no doubt that that would inhibit their work. In addition, pessimism on such issues in European circles does not exactly make such work a career-enhancing prospect for the eurocrats who would have to do it. Let us just hope that they are doing that work.
The third problem that I wish to refer to—I shall leave it at that given the time available—is the long-term future of the eurozone itself in a world in which the bond markets have discovered that the no bail-out clause is toothless. I should say at this point that I have never opposed the eurozone on ideological grounds or on grounds of principle, but I have been wary on practical grounds, particularly the ground that the no bail-out clause may turn out to have no clothes. That is exactly what has happened.
Mr Darling
The circumstances in which Ireland finds itself are complex, but there is no doubt that one problem is that a common interest rate right across Europe is perhaps inappropriate for an economy that is rapidly investing in an asset bubble. However, I do not have the same phobia about the euro that many Conservative Members still have, 20 years on.
Mr Cash
I am extremely grateful. Did the right hon. Gentleman take legal advice on whether, as I said at the time, the use of the financial stability mechanism was an unlawful deal? Article 122 of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union deals with natural disasters, energy supplies and so on, and it has absolutely nothing to do with financial mistakes or misjudgments. Really, the whole thing should never have gone through, and he should have repudiated it on those grounds.
Mr Darling
Yes, but as I said earlier, because of QMV, the deal would have gone through anyway. I also do not agree with the hon. Gentleman’s analysis or that the legal position was that clear-cut.
Chris Leslie (Nottingham East) (Lab/Co-op)
Let me say on behalf of Her Majesty’s Opposition that we welcome the debate, in which plenty of views have been expressed from different parts of the Chamber on what is an incredibly important matter. Many Members in all parts of the House—including my right hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Mr Darling), the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the hon. Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie), the Chairman of the Treasury Committee—have voiced, perfectly reasonably, their anxieties about the loan to Ireland.
Clearly these are troubled times for the world economy and for the eurozone, and we must sincerely hope that we will not find ourselves here again. The Opposition recognise that there are interdependencies between Britain and the Irish nation in respect of economic trade, direct relationships between our banks and financial investments across Ireland. Moreover, it is our only land-bordered nation state. We therefore have a duty to support the principle and spirit of the legislation, because a failing Irish economy would create harm here in the United Kingdom.
Chris Leslie
I think we shall have to take the issues as they come before us. I understand the hon. Gentleman’s anxieties, but, on balance, given the choices that we face, we consider it incumbent on us, as a responsible Opposition, to support the Government on Second Reading.
Let me make a couple of points—briefly, because I am conscious of the time and the need for us to debate the amendments, not least those that I have tabled in respect of clause 2.
The events in Ireland remind us starkly of the principal facts that Ministers have, I am afraid, preferred to hide hitherto. First, the credit crunch was a worldwide, international crisis, not simply something in the United Kingdom. Secondly, the failures of banks that gambled excessively not just with our money but with the money of the Irish people and others are at the root of our present predicament.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer has done well in spinning the line that it was all the fault of my right hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Mr Brown), the former Prime Minister—that he was somehow personally responsible for single-handedly causing the credit crunch in the UK before jetting off to Washington and starting the banking collapse there, then flying to Ireland via Spain, Portugal, Greece and the rest of the developed world, spreading banking catastrophe from continent to continent. However, the Bill—perhaps uncomfortably for the Chancellor—reminds us of the ridiculousness of the coalition’s revisionism, and reminds us that the rewriting of history can occur only if we believe in the gullibility of the public, as I suspect the Chancellor does. Although the Government think that may be able to fool all of the people all of the time, the truth is now overwhelmingly obvious, and proves beyond doubt that the greed of profiteering bankers has required the poor, beleaguered taxpayer, here as well as across Ireland and Europe, to bail them out of the mess that they created.
I am afraid that we heard no apology in the Chancellor’s hour-long, technical speech, and no expression of regret in respect of his free-market deregulatory exaltations of the “shining example” shown by the Irish economy. Perhaps that was an error, but sadly he did not acknowledge it. We are not convinced, either, that the Chancellor stands chastened or reflective in regard to his ill-judged comments about the Irish economic miracle”. Perhaps even we could have expected him to have some conception of the risks posed by the simple “austerity at all costs” principle underpinning his economic policies, but that was not there either.
Fundamentally, the problem is this: if the Chancellor of the Exchequer does not understand the causes of the deficit, he is certainly not the right person to fix it. My constituents, like those of the hon. Member for Wellingborough (Mr Bone), find it difficult to understand how, given that we were supposedly on the brink of bankruptcy, we can find £3.2 billion for the Irish loan, but nothing for Sheffield Forgemasters.
Sadly, however, we must recognise that the measures before us today are a result of the fragility of the worldwide economy. We hope that, eventually, the Chancellor and the Prime Minister will step up and show a little more leadership, especially in Europe, rather than using bail-outs and loans as sticking plaster. We hope that they will pay more attention to the root causes of what is happening to the economy, and will recognise that we cannot just cross our fingers and pretend that collective austerity will do the trick in all cases. My right hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West is absolutely spot on when he talks about the inadequacy of that proposition. How will the European Union regain the market’s confidence in a longer-term trajectory back to stronger revenues and economies? Where are the growth strategies to build longer-term prosperity?
We have to accept, however, that the case for the loan to Ireland outweighs the case against it. There are risks that need dealing with, including the risk of contagion throughout the eurozone bond market. The ongoing crisis risks shrinking our export market potential in the long run, and as a consequence that risks creating losses for banks in the UK—banks of course that we own. So on balance and for those reasons, we do not oppose the Bill at this time, but in the time remaining we hope to scrutinise the detail in Committee.
Finance Ministers’ Meeting (Ireland)
William Cash Excerpts(14 years ago)
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Urgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
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Mr Speaker
Order. There is much interest and little time, so in questions and answers alike I require brevity.
Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)
The €440 billion eurozone facility can be used without infringing either UK liability or sovereignty. The Darling guarantee mechanism with qualified majority voting involves, unnecessarily, both UK liability and sovereignty. Where it is in our national interest and we can afford it, why not provide a UK-Irish but non-EU loan?
European Union Economic Governance
William Cash Excerpts(14 years ago)
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The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr Mark Hoban)
I beg to move,
That this House takes note of European Union Documents (a) 9433/10, Commission Communication on reinforcing economic policy co-ordination, (b) 11807/10, Commission Communication on enhancing economic policy co-ordination for stability, growth and jobs – tools for stronger EU economic governance, (c) 14496/10, Proposal for a Council Regulation (EU) amending Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, (d) 14497/10, Proposal for a Council Directive on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States, (e) 14498/10, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area, (f) 14512/10, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, (g) 14515/10, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, and (h) 14520/10, Proposal for a Regulation of the15 European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and co-ordination of economic policies; notes the Report from the Task Force on Economic Governance in the European Union; notes with approval that budgetary and fiscal information will continue to be presented to Parliament before being given to EU20 institutions; and approves the Government’s position, as endorsed by the Task Force that any sanctions proposed should not apply to the United Kingdom in consideration of Protocol 15 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU.
I welcome the opportunity to set out the Government’s position on the Commission documents to be debated this evening and our broader position on the co-ordination of economic policy in the EU. As right hon. and hon. Friends will be aware, the European Council last month agreed the report of the EU Economic Governance Task Force chaired by Herman Van Rompuy, and we support its work and conclusions, none of which encroaches on Parliament’s economic sovereignty. I want to be clear about that so that there can be no confusion about our position.
Let me deal first with surveillance. Macro-economic surveillance examines the budget plans of member states, and has been around for more than a decade. There is nothing new in that, and a number of international bodies do the same, such as the OECD and the International Monetary Fund. Does the fact that the EU is doing so mean that we will be subject to sanctions? No, it does not, because under protocol 15 of the existing treaty, sanctions do not apply to us.
Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)
Is my hon. Friend aware that the same Mr Van Rompuy has today issued a vicious attack on Eurosceptics throughout Europe, saying that what they argued amounts to a national lie?
Mr Hoban
I have not seen Mr Van Rompuy’s comments. As hon. Members will recognise, I have been rather tied up in the Chamber for most of this afternoon.
Let me continue to make the Government’s position clear. Will we have to present our Budget to Europe before we present it to the House? No. Will we have to give Europe access to information for budgetary surveillance that is not similarly shared with organisations such as the IMF, or that is not publicly available on the internet? Again, the answer is no. Will powers over our Budget be transferred from Westminster to Brussels? Again, the answer is no.
Mr Hoban
I simply do not take the view that giving the Commission more information is going to be a problem. This goes back to the intervention by my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin), who asked whether there is to be an increase in EU jurisdiction as a result of this measure. No, there is not. All that the EU will do is make recommendations, but they will not bind us or be imposed on us. We can simply ignore them. There will be no increase in EU jurisdiction as a consequence of this measure.
Mr Cash
The explanatory memorandum dealing with the jurisdictional question, which was supplied to the European Scrutiny Committee on 23 October, states, under the heading “Impact on United Kingdom Law”:
“The Regulations once adopted would be ‘binding in their entirety and directly applicable in all Member States’. However, in accordance with Article 1 of the proposed Regulation, the Regulation on enforcement measures will apply (only) to the Member States whose currency is the euro.”
That is made absolutely clear by the Minister’s own document that he supplied to the Committee.
Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)
This debate and the Minister’s remarks remind me of what Alice said in “Through the Looking-Glass”, when she referred to Humpty Dumpty and his rather scornful tone:
“‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said…‘it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.’
‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you CAN make words mean so many different things.’
‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master—that’s all.’”
That is the essence of the question of European economic governance. We have been told that it is good for us, that it does not affect us and that it does not make a difference. However much one gets into the interpretation of those words, the European Scrutiny Committee’s report makes it clear that there are significant differences, in aggregate, between different parts of the regulations and directives. If the proposal is accepted by the Government, they will effectively cross the Rubicon and similarly, by acquiescing in ever-greater European governance over our economy, they will significantly undermine our ability to govern ourselves. We need less Europe, not more.
The proposals extend to the United Kingdom, as a member of the European Union, thereby raising questions of sovereignty. Under the aegis of the forthcoming Bill on the European Union, my Committee will hold an inquiry so that we can sort out once and for all whether it is the House of Commons, Parliament and that sovereignty which governs the country, or whether it is the European Union. Under Standing Orders, the Committee’s duty is to report to the House, not to the Government, on matters that we regard as requiring debate by reason of their legal or political importance. The scrutiny reserve remains in place until the debate has taken place, and thereafter Ministers can, and no doubt will, vote and/or agree the proposals, but may continue negotiations.
I was glad that the Minister’s explanatory memorandum stated specifically, on several vital matters, that the Government would
“seek to ensure in negotiations”
that matters of concern would be improved. In doing so, the memorandum by definition conceded that these issues have not been resolved entirely, that negotiations could improve them, that they do make a difference to the United Kingdom, its Government and its Parliament and that they have to be remedied. As Chairman of the Committee, I have placed in the Library a note in my name on all these matters, so anyone who wishes to look at them may do so.
I was puzzled by the Prime Minister’s response to a question that I asked during his statement to the House on the outcome of the European Council meeting. He accepted that the matter was complex and required a greater opportunity for exchange of opinions and explanation, but he also said:
“This is not a new framework.”—[Official Report, 1 November 2010; Vol. 517, c. 614.]
I find that extremely puzzling, however one construes it, given the evidence before us and the specific reference to a new surveillance framework in the taskforce report and in the presidency conclusions that he signed off. The truth is that the Commission intends to exert peer pressure on all member states of the European Union. The taskforce report of 21 October preceded documents being placed in the Library, following an urgent question I asked, emblazoned with the word “limité”, which means very restricted circulation. They included a letter of 9 July from the Chancellor of the Exchequer to other member states. It might be thought that there was every reason to present those documents to the European Scrutiny Committee, even if they were not specifically depositable. The Committee does not operate by website.
A substantial question on whether the UK is affected has been dealt with in a note that I received from the Library, from which I shall quote, on increased macroeconomic surveillance. It says:
“It is proposed that a greater role is played by the Commission in macroeconomic surveillance. This surveillance mechanism would be distinct from that currently taking place under the SGP”—
the stability and growth pact—
“because it is non-fiscal in nature; it will focus on countries’ broader macroeconomic positions in relation to the rest of the EU.”
The note goes on:
“The idea of deeper macroeconomic surveillance was put forward in March this year as part of the…Europe 2020 proposals”,
which were, of course, under the previous Government. The note continues:
“As originally envisaged, the deeper surveillance framework would apply only to the euro area countries; however, the Commission proposals of 30th June”—
after the general election—
“and the Task Force Report of 21st October”
both apply to “all Member States”. That is a matter of considerable concern. Why have the coalition Government agreed to extend the framework to all the member states, whereas the previous Government appear to have confined it exclusively to the euro area? As my hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Mr Clappison) said, the taskforce recommends deeper macroeconomic surveillance, with the introduction of a new mechanism underpinned by a new legal framework based on article 121. The Minister’s explanatory memorandum specifically refers to the legal impact and therefore the jurisdiction of these matters, as I have already mentioned, which clearly shows that there is a legal impact on the UK. Therefore, by definition, the proposed mechanism affects the UK and hands over jurisdiction in these matters to the European Court of Justice for interpretation and construction.
Furthermore, it is possible, and even likely, that the stricter reporting requirements will apply to the United Kingdom under the macroeconomic surveillance proposals, particularly if the UK were placed in an excessive imbalance position. We have always conceded, right from the beginning, way back to the time of the Maastricht rebellion, that there would be no sanctions because of the opt-out that we achieved. The fact that the Government continuously state that it is a victory not to have had sanctions imposed is merely a statement of the obvious. I go further. I would be grateful if someone could tell me which member states have ever paid any fines or had any sanctions imposed upon them under any of these arrangements. The answer is none, and there are those who argue that there never will be.
We are in a difficult situation with regard to how we will vote on the motion. Serious questions arise, and I was concerned when I read the letter and the appended document from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, which I had to extract by way of an urgent question, for which I was most grateful, Mr Speaker. In that, there is a description of economic governance, the words of which would not be easily understood. It states:
“Democratic legitimacy is vital to everything that the EU does, and Ministers need to be accountable both to other Member States and to their electorate.”
I find that a new and strange doctrine, and a rather dangerous one. I had no idea that Ministers were accountable to other EU member states. It is conceded, and I agree, that the United Kingdom Budget will be presented first to the UK Parliament, but the essence of the problem is that in the compilation and the construction of the Budget, a series of data and statistical information would have to be provided. That in itself creates the framework that constricts our ability within our parliamentary process to act on our own terms and in line with the principles that underpin our parliamentary Government—that matters of taxation and spending and the formulation of them depend upon the House of Commons, not upon the European Union.
Given the significance that has been attached to these ideas, they represent a drift and an acceptance of European economic government through the surveillance framework by increasing the powers available to the Commission. This does not in any way alter the degree of intrusion into the construction of our Budget before it is presented to Parliament. One of the most difficult aspects is that far from our having a need for much less European economic governance, we are having more. As we move further forward and become more absorbed into this arrangement, we have to ask what is actually happening in the EU itself. As one of the other national European scrutiny committee chairmen said to Mr Van Rompuy when I was in Brussels the other day, “Will the European Union go bankrupt if we refuse to obey your rules?” Other member states are beginning to get the message, which is why I think Mr Van Rompuy issued that assault on Euroscepticism throughout Europe. He is getting the message that people in national Parliaments are not prepared to accept, for example, the fact that their economies have failed because of the EU’s refusal to deregulate and repatriate. I mention in brief the Deputy Prime Minister’s remarks on that subject, because he clearly stated that there would be no repatriation, despite what my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister asserted in his speech to the Centre for Policy Studies in 2005.
We need to generate enterprise for small and medium-sized businesses. There is the failure of the Lisbon agenda, massive unemployment, of more than 20% in some countries, riots, protests and a sense of failure, despair and democratic hopelessness. This is reflected—
Mr Speaker
Order. The hon. Gentleman is straying very considerably wide of the matters under discussion. I know that he is a sensitive fellow and will be aware of the significant number of other Members who wish to contribute, so I feel sure that, in bringing his remarks to a fairly early close, he will focus on the matters that are before us, rather than those that are not.
Mr Cash
I entirely accept that and will bring my remarks immediately to a conclusion.
Rules and regulations will not turn the European Union into a thriving economy with which we trade. It is said that 50% of our trade is with the European Union, and that the proposals before us are necessary to achieve stability in the European Union. The crucial point is that, underneath all those rules and regulations and the determination to achieve European economic governance, we are going the wrong way, not the right way. The measures do affect us. We need more enterprise, more small businesses, more deregulation and repatriation. I am not surprised, therefore that in a recent opinion poll 80% of people said that they wanted the repatriation of powers from the European Union.
We are being more and more absorbed by a failed European Union. Under this coalition, roadblocks are being put up to prevent us from sorting that out, and the new surveillance framework is part of the problem, not the solution. I shall vote against the motion.