Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base

John Redwood Excerpts

Wednesday 11th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Justine Greening)]

I beg to move,

That this House considers that the Draft Directive to introduce a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (European Union Document No. 7263/11) does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity, for the reasons set out in chapter 2 of the Twenty-seventh Report of the European Scrutiny Committee (HC 428-xxv); and, in accordance with Article 6 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, instructs the Clerk of the House to forward this reasoned opinion to the presidents of the European institutions.

I am pleased to have the opportunity to discuss this European Commission proposal, which, as the House is aware, is potentially significant. I will highlight a few general points before turning to the specific legal and treaty issues which the European Scrutiny Committee has raised in its report and which are the subject of the motion.

I want to start by reiterating the Government’s commitment to ensuring that there is no further transfer of sovereignty or powers to the EU over the course of the Parliament. I also stress that the Government have made it clear that we will not agree to a proposal that might threaten or limit the UK’s ability to shape its own tax policy. I know that the motion focuses on whether the proposal complies with subsidiarity and proportionality, which are both important questions that I will address in turn.

[Mr John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

This is extremely good news from the Minister. Will she confirm that the UK will not consent to the so-called six-pack measures on economic governance, of which at least three clearly apply to non-euro members and represent a transfer of powers?

[Justine Greening]

As my right hon. Friend will be aware, important discussions on economic governance are under way and are being resolved. I assure him that we have no intention, as I have said, of seeing any further powers transferred to Brussels. We keep a watching brief on not only the topic that we are discussing, but across the board. I am sure he is aware of a number of areas in which we are expressing concerns to the Commission, because we are concerned that further powers may be taken by Brussels.

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[Justine Greening]

Our assessment is that it is possible to make the case that because article 115 of the TFEU relates to the effective functioning of the single market, it is relevant to consider whether the proposal would affect the single market. There is also the question whether there is any problem that needs to be addressed. We do not accept that there is, but if there were, we would have to ask whether the proposal was the right solution. That is what I mean when I talk about proportionality. We must also consider subsidiarity, and we do not believe that the two can simply be separated, because they go hand in hand.

For the Government to be reassured that the proposal complies with the fundamental principles of proportionality and subsidiarity, we would require far stronger justification from the Commission. We would need evidence that the existence of 27 different tax systems is a significant barrier to the functioning of the single market—we do not believe it is, or that the evidence is there to support such a conclusion—and directly results in all the specific tax obstacles that the proposal claims to address. We would also need evidence that the proposal is the only, or the best, way to address those tax obstacles. We will continue to raise those points with the Commission during our discussions, and we will continue to engage proactively and constructively with other member states on the important issues of policy substance, including those highlighted in the European Scrutiny Committee’s report.

As I have said, we are not the only member state that has raised significant concerns about the proposal, and we will continue to talk to others about their concerns and ours.

[Mr Redwood]

Is it not rather easier than that? We have always been assured by previous Ministers of the Crown that we have an absolute veto on tax matters, so do we not just have to say to the EU, “We have a veto, and the answer is no”?

[Justine Greening]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right to say that we can say no for ourselves, but the problem, as he is aware, is that under the treaty, a smaller group of nine or more member states—

[Mr Redwood]

Fine.

[Justine Greening]

My right hon. Friend says that that is fine, but there is a danger for our country that even that would have an impact on the tax planning that we could undertake with corporations as member states choose whether to opt in or out. We want to ensure that we are in those discussions at this earlier stage, before we get to that part of any future process. We do not know whether we will get to that stage—many member states might share our concerns—but we absolutely need to be in there now, making our case, because we do not want to end up with a smaller group of member states going down that route, which could, depending on their decisions on tax loopholes and avoidance, which are complex, lead to negative unforeseen consequences for the UK tax system’s competitiveness, which might happen even if the UK were outside any possible future proposals.

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[Chris Leslie]

I am very tempted by the hon. Gentleman’s invitation to do so. As I said, we have not changed our policy from when we were in office, and the Government have decided to pick that up. We do not wish to see the harmonisation of corporation tax rates; nor do we believe that this CCCTB proposal is justified, although there are legitimate cross-border issues that we need to discuss. For example, the CBI has raised the important issue of how businesses operate and the compliance costs that companies working on a cross-border basis can sometimes incur. It is legitimate to listen to those points, although there may be other, non-EU ways of addressing them. For example, we could make bilateral, country-to-country arrangements—through some of the double taxation treaties, and so on—to deal with those issues. Indeed, I would like the Minister to address the issue of bilateral discussions, which I understand the Treasury says in the reasoned opinion it might wish to pursue. It would be very helpful indeed if she could tell the House what negotiations the Government have already entered into along those lines.

[Mr Redwood]

Does the shadow Minister, like me, find it democratically distasteful that a 102-page draft law governing the whole of our corporation tax regime, along with supporting papers amounting to 298 pages, should get only one and a half hours of debate, and that this is all the scrutiny that we are allowed?

[Chris Leslie]

Yes, I agree with the right hon. Gentleman on that. We need to begin to readdress entirely the accountability deficit. I know that this Parliament already tries valiantly to address it—in Scrutiny Committees and elsewhere—but this is a debate about serious proposals. The Treasury is often an intermediary these days when it comes to new regulations and policy changes. It is important that we should think about the design of our Government and our Parliament in tackling proposals as they come along.

As I said, I am interested in the Government’s line. We will not take issue with them on this proposal this evening, but we want to watch where they go with it. All I am asking of the Minister is whether coalition policy is taking into account the Liberal Democrat official line.

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[Mr John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

Tonight’s debate should be a vital one because, after all, it is about sovereignty; it is about power. The might of this House of Commons in its great years was based on one very simple proposition: that only a vote of the House of Commons could impose or remove a tax on the British people. It was that power which our predecessors fought for and achieved, and it was that power which was crucial to grant the supply to the Government, who could then choose how to spend it, on the advice and with the votes of the House of Commons.

We have been assured and reassured by countless Ministers of the Crown since we joined the European Economic Community in the 1970s that taxation was always a matter for unanimity; that we would always have a veto over any tax matter; and that there was no question of the European Union interfering and choosing taxes for us or running our tax system. Under the previous Labour Government, tax was said to be a defensible red line, which they always told us they had always protected. Under previous Conservative Governments, Ministers could rightly then say that it was always a matter entirely for the jurisdiction and decision of this House of Commons.

Yet tonight, in this small and short debate, we are presented with a 102-page draft law which is a comprehensive new corporation tax system for the European Union, including the United Kingdom. Worse still, we have been warned in a friendly way by the Minister that if this country disagrees with it, a group of countries may go ahead under some other procedure and create it anyway, and they will then exert extraterritorial jurisdiction over the UK because they will try to tempt our companies away from our system to their system. As my hon. Friend the Member for Amber Valley (Nigel Mills) has just said, tax advisers and accountants will be able to play all sorts of games under this complicated system so that companies that have some activities in Britain could be tempted into the European Union opt-in system. That would mean that the British Treasury and British Ministers would no longer have jurisdiction over them; we would get back only what the sharing formula allowed, which the European Union would be in charge of.

I assume that it is because the Minister is worried about that eventuality that she has not come here with a straightforward proposal just to veto the whole thing. My advice to the Government is that this should be the issue we fight over. This proposal is so outrageous, it is such a comprehensive violation of subsidiarity, as they call it, and it is such a U-turn from the proposition that a member state has control over its own tax affairs that surely we should veto it. If we vetoed it and other countries still wanted to go ahead as a lesser group than the European Union, we should follow things through and say that it therefore does not apply to the United Kingdom and we will not operate it in respect of companies that are properly domiciled here and should be taxed here under our rules. We should set the rules for organisations and companies undertaking activity in Britain, making money in Britain and employing people in Britain. If we cannot do that, what is the point of this House of Commons? I think the Minister is in a stronger position than perhaps her officials and advisers have suggested.

We have heard, I think rightly, from my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) that the legal base is not correct. In order to justify all the statements that this is a matter for unanimity, it must come under that measure in the treaty that states that other proposals can be produced but that they require the unanimous consent of all member states. It must come under a unanimous base. Once it is a matter to be decided under a unanimous base, we can then save the European Union a lot of time, trouble and money because we can simply say that we do not wish to have a collective corporation tax system and that Britain is going to use her veto. For once, surely, the United Kingdom could have some influence over the agenda of the European Union and we could show that we mean it when we say that taxation is for national decision—that it is a matter for subsidiarity, in the EU’s language, or a matter of sovereignty, in my language.

I would like to ask my ministerial friend what the point was of this House solemnly legislating to maintain, uphold or reaffirm the sovereignty of the British Parliament if we cannot even choose our own corporation tax regime. What is the point of our going along with the negotiations to try to ameliorate, improve or abate the severity of this draft law if we are doing so in the spirit that we will end up with a law of sorts anyway? We will then hear from the Minister that instead of it being something that we have vetoed, it is something we have taken the worst out to make it a bit more tolerable so that we can go along with it. It will not be necessary for the other member states who want the measure to use a special procedure to get it, and there will be no need for us to say to them that we refuse to go along with it or comply with it.

[Mr Cash]

Does my right hon. Friend recall the words of Chancellor Kohl, who, only 10 or 15 years ago, made it clear that, on the question of the speed of the convey, which is what this is all about, he would want the front of the convey to go ahead, led by Germany, and for the other Member states to be left in such a parlous condition that they would eventually, in his words, have to catch up?

[Mr Redwood]

My hon. Friend is quite right. That also explains why the European Union is so keen to try to get the Irish rate up, because if it is to have a common system such as this, it would not want a weak link. The EU would see a weak link as a state that dared to set a more realistic and lower rate in order to attract business.

[Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

As ever, my right hon. Friend makes his points with incredible force. Does he agree if the European Union follows the policies of bail-outs and political interference with business all the time, we will keep seeing measures like this one again and again until we head towards a single centralised economic system of government?

[Mr Redwood]

My hon. Friend is right. The EU believes that imposing more complex and higher taxes is the answer to the deficit problem, whereas the answer to the deficit problem is growth, more business, more activity and more jobs. Everything the EU does by way of higher tax rates, more regulation, more interference and more layers of government prevents that from happening. That is the Greek tragedy that we are witnessing as we debate today.

The latest figures on the Greek Government website imply that the Greek deficit got a lot bigger in the first part of this year because tax revenues plummeted, because the economy is in worse recession, and because spending has gone up, both because they are not controlling it and because spending goes up in a recession. That is the tragedy of the European model—of the bail-out model and of “extend and pretend”, whereby we extend the credit and pretend it will be all right. It is not going to be all right and that approach is causing disaster, unemployment and tragedy.

[Thomas Docherty (Dunfermline and West Fife) (Lab)]

The right hon. Gentleman has mentioned several tragedies and I note with some interest that the Treasury team includes this Minister, the Economic Secretary, whose views on Europe are well known, the Chancellor, whose views are very well known, and the hon. Member for Chelsea and Fulham (Greg Hands), whose views are also very well known. Perhaps the real tragedy is that the Liberal Democrats in the Treasury team, who are not even here tonight, have forced this policy on the Government.

[Mr Redwood]

I am not sure I believe that. We have heard from the Minister that they are a happy and united team and that she is proud of the work she has brought to us. I am saying that I would like her to improve the work and to go back and make that happy team one that can perhaps make us happier. The simple answer is veto. She should say, “No, this cannot work. It is a dreadful constitutional intrusion on a country that desperately needs its own economic recovery to accelerate, that needs lower tax rates and greater tax simplification and that needs to promote economic growth.” My right hon. Friend the Chancellor is beginning to do that, but I think more measures are needed to secure the deal and make sure it works.

I am quite sure that this huge deal—the 102-page draft law—is not the way forward. My hon. Friend the Minister says that there is no proposal, but I regard a 102-page draft law as a very serious proposal. Experience has taught me never to underestimate the power and persuasion of the European Union when it wants to do something. I think that it is now on a great push to establish all the central powers it needs for the economic governance of a single-economy, single-country model, and that this is part of it along with the economic six-pack. My strong advice to my hon. Friend is that Britain can do better, Britain needs to say no and Britain needs to exempt herself from all this, as we are entitled to do, so that we keep a sovereign Parliament and a growing economy.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

I call Jacob Rees-Mogg.

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[Mr Redwood]

I am delighted if a case can be made under subsidiarity, but surely there is a much simpler case: taxation of companies and incomes was never part of the deal for the powers of the European Union. What it is trying to do is quite illegal, and all we need to do is to say so.

[Mr Jenkin]

But that was always the danger with article 5 and the subsidiarity clause. There are some very general objectives set out in the treaties, and subsidiarity is one of those catch-all arrangements that can justify stretching the meaning of other articles, as we have already seen.

How does the European Union justify the bail-out mechanism that the previous Chancellor of the Exchequer approved under article 122 of the Lisbon treaty, which was designed for natural disasters? How can a crisis in the euro possibly be classified as a natural disaster? The mechanism has, however, been allowed to go through by default.

The arrangement before us is another that will go through by default if we do not challenge it. Indeed, article 26 of the draft directive, the penultimate paragraph of the preamble, states:

“The objective of this Directive cannot be sufficiently achieved through individual action undertaken by the Member States because of the lack of coordination among national tax systems.”

It goes on to justify the objective as being

“in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity”—

and in its own terms that is very difficult to argue with.

I appreciate the European Scrutiny Committee’s points about the direct legal base, but the European Union is going for an indirect legal base. That demonstrates that subsidiarity was always a deceit. It was always something that could be a centralising, as opposed to a decentralising, concept, and if we rest our case against the proposal purely on the principle of subsidiarity we will allow the EU, rather than what we want ourselves, to determine what is imposed upon this country. If we rest our case against this proposal purely on the principle of subsidiarity, we are allowing the European Union to decide what shall be imposed on this country rather than deciding what we want for ourselves.