Afghanistan: Inquiry

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Thursday 4th November 2021 Commons Chamber

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the proposal for an inquiry into the UK’s involvement in the NATO-led mission to Afghanistan.

This could be a very short debate if the Minister intervened and said, “Yes, we are going to have an inquiry”; then we could all go home. However, I suspect we will have to work a little bit harder than that.

I thank the Backbench Business Committee for granting this important debate on Afghanistan. This was one of the longest military campaigns in modern history. Over 100,000 armed forces personnel were deployed to Afghanistan, and 435 did not return alive. Thousands did return, but with life-changing injuries, and over 3,500 personnel from other NATO forces were also killed. About 70,000 Afghans lost their lives, although I do not think the true number will ever be known.

The campaign cost the international community trillions, but after two decades we decided to exit before the job was done, handing back the country to the very insurgency we went in to defeat. The country is now run by the Taliban, but they are not in control. It is in freefall, and the freezing winter that is approaching is likely to cause the biggest humanitarian disaster in a generation. The list of challenges we faced, and the lessons to be learned, are huge, yet the Government stubbornly refuse to hold an independent inquiry. Do they think that there is nothing to learn, or—more importantly—to explain to those who served, and to the families of the bereaved? What was it all for?

It is clear that our world is getting more dangerous, and global insecurity is increasing. Our decision to leave Afghanistan added to that. If we have any aspiration, as spelled out in the integrated review, to be a problem-solving, burden-sharing nation, we need to understand how the most powerful military alliance ever formed could not complete its mission after 20 years. If we do not analyse, appreciate and learn from our mistakes, we are likely to repeat them. More critically, this House of Commons is—let us be honest—not so versed in the details, and it will have no confidence in voting to send our troops into harm’s way, fearful of a similar outcome. We will become more risk-averse, and we will end up steering clear of overseas engagements and having no appetite to intervene. Our competitors will enjoy our self-inflicted weakness.

The first rule of war is: know your enemy. That is a prerequisite for any engagement. On my various visits to Afghanistan over a decade, I was always taken aback by the limits of international forces’ local understanding. Yes, they knew their local mission, but how that fitted into the higher commander’s intent was not clear. There seemed to be a national plan to kill the enemy, but that did not knit together with any form of strategy relating to governance, or development programmes outside Kabul. Had we done our homework, checked the archives and visited that famous Foreign and Commonwealth Office map room, we would have reminded ourselves of what and who we were taking on. We would have been in a better position to advise our allies and offer alternative solutions to courses of action that it was, frankly, a schoolboy error to pursue.

Afghanistan gained its independence from Great Britain. We learned the hard way, through three separate engagements over a century, that it is a deeply tribal country, where local loyalty trumps alliances to the centre. Policy cannot be shaped from outside the country. Since Ahmad Shah Durrani founded modern-day Afghanistan in the 1700s, it has not been run from the centre. Warlords enjoyed federated power; tribes and sub-tribes enjoyed autonomy. Why on earth did we, with all our experience of Afghanistan, believe we knew better?

In 2001, in our haste to seek retribution for 9/11, we lost our way. We allowed other agendas to blinker both our historical experience and current military doctrine, and that made a tough mission all the tougher. We ignored Afghanistan’s history, which we helped to shape, and believed that we could once again impose a western model of governance from scratch. The objective of hunting down and destroying al-Qaeda after 9/11 was widely supported, and it triggered NATO’s article 5 for the first time. That morphed into taking on the Taliban, who harboured al-Qaeda. This brings us back to that first rule of war: know your enemy.

To understand the Taliban and its origins, we must understand the mujaheddin; to understand the mujaheddin, we must understand the Soviet occupation; and to understand that occupation, we must understand that it was US foreign policy to remove the Soviets in the 1980s. That is wisdom not from history books, but from events in our lifetime. The last king, Zahir, was overthrown in 1973, and that triggered a power struggle between two diametrically opposed movements: the Communist party and the Islamist movement—the mujaheddin. Both grew in strength, with the former gaining the upper hand, but radical socialist changes sparked significant unrest, which the Soviets eventually sent in troops to try to quash. That prompted the United States, along with Inter-Services Intelligence in Pakistan, with support from China and indeed the United Kingdom, to support the mujaheddin—Charlie Wilson’s war.

From 1980 to 1989, £3 billion of covert military assistance went into east Asia to back a radical insurgency based in the Pakistani mountains. It mobilised tens of thousands of holy warriors who were willing to die for their cause. Out of the disunity of the mujaheddin rose the Taliban. It was not some distant extremist group that we knew little about, but arguably a product of western making.

Of course, the obstacles to success in Afghanistan were daunting: widespread corruption, intense grievances, Pakistani meddling and deep-rooted Afghan resistance to any foreign occupation. However, there was the colossal blanket of NATO security, and a huge development budget often described as an international aid juggernaut; US spending alone peaked in one year at $110 billion. Sadly, however, opportunities to secure long-term stability were squandered, and the west, especially the US, became over-confident following early victories.

In simple terms, where did it go wrong? First, we created an over-centralised model of governance. Secondly, we denied the Taliban a seat at the table in December 2001 at the Bonn talks. How different life would have been had they been included. Thirdly, we made no real effort to start training an Afghan indigenous security force until 2006. Fourthly, we opened up another front in Iraq—an unnecessary and costly distraction. Fifthly, we had no real development strategy to improve livelihoods and leverage the country’s vast resources.

I recall a visit to Afghanistan in 2008, when Mark Carleton-Smith, the current Chief of the General Staff, was in charge of 16 Air Assault Brigade. They took a turbine from Helmand—from Camp Bastion—to the Kajaki dam. A decade later, I flew into Kabul, and I looked out of the window and saw the same turbine lying next to the dam in its bubble wrap. That was analogous to the problems in that country.

Finally, we lost our way. We forgot why we were fighting and who we were fighting for. How could we claim that our intervention was about defending and upholding international standards and the rule of law when we crafted methods to bypass international law, such as creating detention camps, including at Guantanamo Bay?

For the first four years, Afghanistan was deceptively peaceful, as the Taliban retreated across the Pakistani border, but that time was squandered; the Taliban retrained, regrouped and rearmed. Slowly but progressively, they began their attacks, and by August 2009, General McChrystal observed, in his 60-page analysis, that we did not understand the people,

“whose needs, identities and grievances”

can differ “from valley to valley”; that the international security assistance force was “poorly configured” for counter-insurgency operations, designed instead for conventional warfare; that we were killing the enemy but not shielding the people; and that not enough was being done to train indigenous forces.

By 2014, Afghan forces were finally taking on more responsibility, and most NATO combat operations had ended, but still no formal talks had begun with the Taliban. Negotiations began in earnest in 2018, but when a deal was finally signed in February 2020, the agreement was between the United States and the Taliban; this time, the Afghan Government were not at the table. However, a US election was fast approaching, and the President, Donald Trump, wanted an announcement: “Bring our troops home.” Candidate Biden did not disagree.

The deal was done; all the Taliban had to do was wait for US troops to depart. The decision to withdraw was made, and we did not even have the courtesy to inform the Afghan forces when we departed camps such as Bagram air base. As the US forces withdrew, they took with them their contractors, who supported the Afghan forces. Of course, without ammunition, the Afghan army and the Afghan police cannot do their work. It did not take long for the Taliban to exploit the void and rout the country.

It is now clear to see what an operational and strategic blunder it was to retreat at this time. The Taliban are not a Government in waiting; they are not a monolithic organisation, so local reprisal attacks are taking place, which the Taliban themselves cannot control. As societal norms are removed, the banking system collapses and international support flees the country, we are seeing a terrible humanitarian disaster unfold. Once again, Afghanistan is a potential breeding ground for terrorism.

I noticed when I met the Taliban in Doha a couple of weeks ago just how frail they are. They say that because they are not enforcing such a ruthless interpretation of sharia law, many of them are leaving the ranks of the Taliban to join ISIS-K. That is what we have left behind. The decision to withdraw was absolutely the wrong call.

I end by looking at the wider consequences of our departure. What is the US’s commitment and staying power to defend the international rule of law? What of NATO’s function, with or without US lead? Twenty years since 9/11, are we still no better at preventing the radicalisation of individuals who believe they will be rewarded if they kill westerners? What next for those 40 million Afghans that we left behind? How do we work with the Taliban to prevent a humanitarian crisis? Finally, after this humiliation and retreat by the west, should the UK seek to play a more active role on the international stage?

I hope that our departure from Afghanistan is not the high tide mark of western post-world war two liberalism. We are seeing the erosion of western influence, the loss of faith in the idea of a liberal world order, and the rise of a rival superpower, China, which is advancing a competing ideology that could see the world splinter into two competing spheres of influence.

I encourage the Government to see the bigger picture—how on the one hand our world is becoming increasingly unstable, but on the other, the west, including Britain, has become more risk averse. We are in for a dangerous decade, and Britain should have more confidence in itself, in what we stand for, what we believe in and what we are willing to defend. As the last century illustrated, it was once in our DNA to do just that. We have the means, the hard power, the connections to lead. What we require is the backbone, the courage, the leadership to step forward.

I say directly to the Minister that cutting the defence budget last week sent the wrong signal about our commitment and our resolve. This is not the time to cut back on our troop numbers, our tank numbers and our plane and ship numbers, but that is exactly the consequence of what is happening. We have some serious questions to ask about our place in the world and what global Britain means, and that should begin with an inquiry into Afghanistan.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stewart Malcolm McDonald (Glasgow South) (SNP)]

I congratulate the right hon. Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), the Chair of the Defence Committee, on securing the debate, and commend him for the leadership he has shown in the weeks and months since the withdrawal was undertaken.

It would perhaps seem strange if we did not acknowledge the acres of empty Benches around us. Less than three months ago, this House was recalled from its summer recess to discuss the very issue we are discussing now, and today we have started the wind-up speeches only minutes after the Chair of the Select Committee got to his feet. That worries me and speaks to the reason why we need the inquiry that he has come here to ask the Government to instigate—a case he prosecuted forensically.

The SNP supports the right hon. Gentleman’s call for an inquiry. I think he is right that it is important to those who served. It is important to their families. In particular, it is important for those who went to Afghanistan and paid with their lives, whether they were UK armed forces or those who served alongside them. It was fashionable at the time of the initial withdrawal not to acknowledge the international coalition, but I think we should. Above all, we owe it to the people of Afghanistan, not just those who have lost their lives or been maimed or injured over the course of the west’s time there, but those who now face the long dark night of Taliban rule that stretches out before them. Yes, that includes in particular women and girls, minority groups, journalists and academics, but also all who tasted freedom over the past few years and have now had it rather abruptly snatched away.

It is notable that although there have been some other inquiries in different coalition countries, it is only the Norwegians who have set up a fully independent inquiry. That is something we need to do here. Yes, inquiries are expensive, necessarily so. Inquiries are slow, necessarily so. We have not had that many of them, necessarily so. But if the Government will not bring forward an inquiry on Afghanistan, then goodness knows what they will ever bring forward an inquiry on in future. They need to look at the long stretch of the mission, the motivation for why we went there in the first place, and the chaotic withdrawal, which we were recalled for less than three months ago.

I would like to put on record—the Minister and I exchanged on this last night—that I had actually thought this was a Ministry of Defence debate. As my party’s defence spokesperson, I wanted to put on record my thanks to the Defence Secretary for his conduct in the aftermath of the withdrawal. I do not think he and the Government got everything right, and the Foreign Secretary certainly did not, but I do not want to rehearse that this afternoon. It is important to acknowledge that the Defence Secretary seemed to be the only Minister who grasped the issue’s importance at the time—I will rephrase that: the only Cabinet Minister, because I do not want to be unfair on the Minister before us.

The right hon. Member for Bournemouth East touched on a broader point about political will and assessing exactly where we are with the implementation of our values. The Minister and I will disagree on much about defence and foreign policy, but fundamentally, our agreements are underwritten with the same kinds of values—on openness, tolerance and solving big issues in alliances with other countries.

I am a committed internationalist. Multilateral fora such as NATO and the European Union are, by a country mile, the best parts of the international architecture for advancing values of tolerance, liberal democracy and openness. If they did not exist, we would want to create them, and I would want Scotland to be in them and all the countries around us to be part of them. They are by the far the greatest vehicles for the kinds of values that we in this House all share. However, we must all reflect, and NATO at large must reflect, on this defeat—there is no other word for it. If there is a failure to do so and to have the kind of inquiry that the Chairman of the Defence Committee is asking the Government to initiate, those who want to overturn our values, as he mentioned, will take heart from that. Within hours, China was talking about the weakening of the west. Russia was in Kabul barely days after it had fallen, while we, in concert with others, were desperately scrambling—and failing in too many cases—to get people out quickly and alive.

Alongside an inquiry, the challenge is this: we must have a political discussion with other capitals that we are allied with about how we renew and reinvigorate the international architecture that underpins and drives the order that we have all benefited from and want to see us continue to benefit from. If we do not do that, who will benefit? It will be those who stand in opposition to our values. So the question is: what does Afghanistan and that withdrawal become? Does it become a low point for the liberal international order that we all believe in, or does it mark the point of no return? The Minister will have to answer that when he gets to his feet. If we do not have a full, independent inquiry, properly funded and properly prosecuted by a judge, with full powers of subpoena and all the rest of it, I fear that this will be a point of return, and I am sure that nobody in this House wants that.

The right hon. Gentleman has the full backing of my party for his proposal for an inquiry. Let us not shrug this off this afternoon. The debate will now, necessarily, be depressingly short; perhaps the acres of empty green Benches scream out that we need the inquiry that he asks for.

[Mr Ellwood]

I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s support. Is it worth his clarifying this point, which I did not? We have in our mind, as a yardstick, that an inquiry looks like Chilcot. Nobody is asking for Chilcot, but we are asking for something that I believe should be the norm: after every long-term military engagement, there is an assessment of what happened so that we can learn for the better. However, it does not need to take the legal approach that Chilcot was all about. That had a very different, complicated requirement.

[Stewart Malcolm McDonald]

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. I believe that the Defence Committee has started its investigation, and we on the Foreign Affairs Committee have started ours. Parliament has a role to play in doing its job and scrutinising what Government have and have not done, and making recommendations for the future. That is right and proper, but he rightly asks for something above that that can do the necessary job. I get entirely why Chilcot provides a rather unhelpful shadow over this discussion, but it cannot be used as an excuse to shrug off what the right hon. Gentleman asks us to do. This is up to the Government and up to us all. What we have shown through the lack of hon. Members’ presence in this debate is that Parliament cannot be left as the only institution to scrutinise the matter.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Ellwood]

I am grateful for all the contributions that have been made today on this important issue. I am also grateful to the Minister, who has worn the uniform and who I know takes these matters very seriously indeed. However, we have raised more questions than we have had answers to, which is exactly why we need an inquiry. I believe that there should be a default position that whenever this country goes to war or is involved in a long-term conflict, there should be some form of formal wash-up provided by the Government. If I had a private Member’s Bill opportunity, I would put one forward, but I would be worried that the Government would whip against it and that it would not get through. That is another matter, however.

The Minister talked about terrorist attacks from Afghanistan, and he was absolutely right, but we are no longer there so that threat is now very much back on the cards. The humanitarian assistance was significant, but it has been diminished because we have decided to depart. On NATO, he was right to say that there was an all in, all out approach, but that did not anticipate Donald Trump coming very close to taking the United States out of NATO. That was not the way forward that anybody imagined.

[Stewart Malcolm McDonald]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Ellwood]

I am not sure. With the indulgence of the Deputy Speaker, I would be happy to give way. I seek her guidance.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

The right hon. Gentleman is winding up the debate.

[Mr Ellwood]

Okay, I will continue. I will conclude the debate, because I know another one is following this one.

I would argue that if there were a free vote on whether we should have an inquiry, many Members of this House—particularly Conservatives, but also Members from all parts of the House—would support it. It is the right thing to do. There is work to be done on the special relationship, and we need to show that we understand the world and that we can offer alternative points of view. We will be asked to do something similar in the future, potentially in Mali, Yemen, Lebanon or Afghanistan. A Kurdistan area could develop north of the Hindu Kush, because the Taliban are not in control of the whole country. The music has not stopped there, and resistance will build up in the next couple of years. We need to understand how we can do things better and understand the political decision making that went on.

My final words are to the brave people who served and to the bereaved who still miss the loved ones who did not return. They are scratching their heads—we know that because we have talked to them—and wondering what on earth it was all for. I spoke to the Taliban in Doha, and they know that the societal change that we introduced over 20 years is too much for them to reverse. The country has moved on, and it is too large. It is demanding too many new, modernised things for the Taliban to turn back. If there is a modicum of justice there, it is that we have advanced the country a long way forward. It has been handed over to the Taliban, but the spirit of what is now there in Afghanistan will be bigger than anything the Taliban can do to undo it and turn it back to what we saw in the 1990s. We can say thank you to our troops for achieving that.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House has considered the proposal for an inquiry into the UK’s involvement in the NATO-led mission to Afghanistan.

Official Development Assistance and the British Council

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Wednesday 30th June 2021 Commons Chamber

[Sir Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow my right hon. Friend the Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Karen Bradley) and to have watched her whip the Minister into submission even before he has given his speech, which I look forward to hearing because he is a most effective Minister.

From a right-wing point of view, the point that my right hon. Friend made was very effective. My constituents in Lincolnshire are absolutely grinding their teeth at what is happening at the channel and want the Home Office to be far more proactive. This is not the right place to talk about what the Home Office should be doing, but why are people coming here? These are not nasty people; they are desperate people fleeing the most appalling war, poverty and deprivation. The channel is proving completely ineffective. In the second world war, we held back the Nazi hordes with the RAF—we stopped them, but we cannot hold people back. We are one world. If there is dire misery and poverty in the world, it will wash up on our shores.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend says that comments about Dover are not applicable to this debate, but I argue that they absolutely are. We do not explain to the British people how this money can be spent and that it does affect them directly. If we did, we would have more support for confirming the 0.7% commitment, rather than old-fashioned views about where the money has been spent—and I agree that some of it has been spent badly in the past. My right hon. Friend is absolutely right to focus on this issue, because when international development money is spent correctly, it will be supported by the British people.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

I am sure that is right. I accept that if we took an opinion poll in the Gainsborough constituency, a majority—perhaps even a strong majority— would be in favour of these cuts. I accept that, but if for a moment the Government explained what the money is spent on, they would find that the British people are kind and humanitarian. People in Lincolnshire often say to me, “Why are we giving money to India? They have aircraft carriers and a space programme.” I shall leave aside the utter poverty of hundreds of millions of people in Uttar Pradesh; why are we living through this horrible lockdown? Why are we spying on Ministers with cameras and having a complete moral void? Because of the delta variant, which has come from where? India. Whether it is the pandemic or migrants, we cannot insulate ourselves from the world. That is why we have an overseas aid programme.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

The Government would have us believe that the backdrop to this debate is the impact of covid, with the knock-on financial pressures requiring departmental budgets to be cut or correspondingly slimmed. There are indeed unprecedented financial pressures, but the overseas aid budget has a built-in mechanism to cater for any financial challenge, as we all know, because it reflects the GNI of the day. Yet here we are, the only G7 country to cut its aid budget, with dire consequences for programmes across the world and, as a P5 nation, a huge hit to our soft power credentials. We will be leaving vacuums to be filled by nations with very different agendas, or indeed by extremist groups exploiting the lack of governance.

The messaging has already been touched on, but I will just repeat the point that the Government should lead the narrative, not follow a populist and dated view of ODA spending. Let us explain to the British people what this is all about. This is what we are good at—we excel at it—and when we do well, other nations follow.

[Christian Wakeford]

Part of the problem with judging by a poll is the language used. If it asks, “Do you want a cut in international aid?”, people will say yes. However, if it asks, “Do you want to feed the world’s hungriest and support those most in need?”, I am sure that, being a generous and kind country, we would also say yes.

[Mr Ellwood]

I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend, and indeed I would go further and say that not only is that what we do, but it is required.

I come to this debate today to add a defence and security perspective. Hard power and soft power cannot be seen in isolation; they are two sides of the same coin. If our failure in Afghanistan, where we are now essentially giving up and going home, should teach us anything, it is that we cannot build and maintain peace by military means alone.

[Mr Mitchell]

My right hon. Friend is making a brilliant speech on the link between defence and development. In the case of Yemen, we have a very complicated relationship, because of course we are part of the coalition that is bombing that country back to the stone age, but we are also trying to help those caught up in the conflict. Does he not think that the one thing we ought to be able to agree on is that we should not, at this stage, be taking food from starving people there?

[Mr Ellwood]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right, and I congratulate him on the work that he is doing. There is a great example of where British leadership can be seen on the international stage. Yemen requires leadership. We have been there for some time and have not utilised our relationship with the Saudis to prevent them from doing what they have been doing. We could have better harnessed our friendships and capabilities in order to bring a conclusion to that particular challenge.

I worked as a Minister in both the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as it then was—I was Minister for the Middle East and North Africa—and the Ministry of Defence, and I can confirm how siloed our Whitehall Departments still are. I concede that things are definitely getting better, but if global Britain is to have meaning, exhibiting increased resolve to play a role on the international stage, it will require greater cohesion between our internationalist-facing Departments, which even today remain too siloed.

I would go further than the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee and introduce the role of a Deputy Prime Minister, with the arc of responsibility to co-ordinate the MOD, DFID, FCO and trade initiatives, so that we can develop grand strategies to tackle some of the global hotspots that we are engaged in. We do need to expand our Whitehall bandwidth.

[Navendu Mishra]

Does the right hon. Gentleman share my view that abolishing DFID at the height of a global pandemic was a backward step, and that the role of development is far too serious to be left to the now much larger FCDO, and without a dedicated Minister at the top table?

[Mr Ellwood]

My biggest criticism about that is what is done in practice to the Department and the important voice at the Cabinet table and at the National Security Council. Now we have only the Foreign Secretary there, not another voice, and that is what we have lost.

We absolutely need to expand our Whitehall bandwidth to be able to recognise the current challenges to which we could provide solutions and also the looming ones that are coming over the horizon. This is the point I hope the Minister will listen to. The real backdrop to this debate that we must all recognise is where our complex and dangerous world is heading. If there was one welcome outcome of the G7 summit, it is the realisation that unless the west becomes less risk-averse, regroups and reunites, the next decade will get very bumpy indeed.

I have been consistent in my clear message to this House: over the next five years, the world is getting more dangerous, not less, and more complex, not less. Authoritarianism is on the rise, new power bases are emerging, and states are starting to rearm at an alarming rate. To compound matters, we now have the growing challenge of climate change, which is already having an impact on security and governance in some of the world’s most vulnerable regions. Storms, floods and droughts will affect agricultural productivity, damage economies and lead to mass migration, most notably from Africa to Europe. This goes back to the point about where the challenge is: it is not in Dover; it is actually in Africa. Simply put, global security in our ever complex and confusing world is on a worrying glide path, and right now there is no grand plan to alter the current trajectory. The threat picture is greater and more complex than during the cold war, and it requires addressing.

The political scientist Joe Nye introduced the term “soft power” a decade ago. It is the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes we want by attracting and co-opting their support. However, in the spirit of Sun Tzu, who said:

“The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting”,

I argue here today that a new global soft power war or soft war is already at play, but we in the west have yet to wake up to its reality.

China is weaponising its immense soft power to significantly advance its influence and reach, and to promote its own interpretation of the international rules-based order. We are seeing this gathering apace across Africa and Asia through its one belt, one road infrastructure programmes and its gifting of 5G networks and military support to ensnare dozens and dozens of countries into its sphere of influence. It is also securing senior leadership positions in international organisations such as the United Nations to neutralise any criticism of its errant behaviour, and is now contributing ever more significant Chinese military forces to UN peacekeeping missions. As we have heard today, it is using its Confucius centres—now over 600 across the globe—to advance its message.

This will be China’s century, as it eventually overshadows and overtakes America as the dominant military, economic and technological superpower, yet here we are in Britain still failing to put two and two together. For a nation that usually prides itself on its place and influence in the world and its grasp of global situational awareness, I am genuinely baffled to understand why it is not reading and responding to this bigger picture. China is offering a competing authoritarian ideology and is leveraging its colossal economic growth to undercut western competition. On this current glide path, the world will splinter into two spheres of competing influence. Now is not the time to cut our defence budgets or our aid budgets as these threats increase, yet here we are doing both.

There is a phenomenal opportunity for British leadership here, made all the easier with the new US Administration, to craft a post-Brexit international role at the very moment the west is required to regroup. I urge this Government to listen to the voices here today in this Parliament and see the bigger picture, recognise the scale of the threat we face, invest in the statecraft and the hard and soft power tools we need, and expand Whitehall’s international bandwidth, for the actions we the west choose to take over the next few years could have implications for how the next few decades play out.

Oral Answers to Questions

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Tuesday 15th June 2021 Commons Chamber

[Greg Smith (Buckingham) (Con)]

What recent assessment he has made of Iran’s compliance with the 2015 joint comprehensive plan of action nuclear agreement.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

What discussions he has had with his Iranian counterpart in the last six months.

[The Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs and First Secretary of State (Dominic Raab)]

Iran is systematically in non-compliance with the joint comprehensive plan of action—the JCPOA—and, working with our European partners and with the United States, China and Russia, we expect and require a return to full compliance.

[Dominic Raab]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. It is not just the stockpile of enriched uranium, which is 16 times the permitted limit, but the operation of the centrifuges and the production of uranium metal that are of deep concern. All sides agree that Iran must return to full compliance, and there has been some progress in the talks in Vienna, but a successful outcome is far from guaranteed. Those talks cannot continue to be open-ended; we need to see a return to full compliance. My hon. Friend is also right to refer to the need for “longer and stronger”, as it is dubbed, to ensure not just that we have permanent guarantees in relation to the nuclear issue but that we address the destabilising activity that Iran sponsors. I have just got back from Iraq, where we can see at first hand the support for the Shi’a militias and what that means in practice.

[Mr Ellwood]

May I first pay tribute to the work of the HALO Trust, a British charity and the largest de-mining organisation working in Afghanistan? Tragically, 10 of its team were killed in an ISIS attack a week ago. James Cowan, the CEO, has vowed to continue their important work, and I hope that the Government will encourage the Afghan Government to improve local security so that the HALO Trust can continue that important work.

In the 1970s, we attempted to sell 100 Chieftain tanks to Iran. We took the money—£400 million—but following Iranian revolution, the tanks were of course never delivered. We need to repay that debt, because it is starting to interfere with other bilateral issues. I invite my right hon. Friend to speak to Tony Blinken, because this is to do with legacy sanctions and we need to resolve the issue.

[Dominic Raab]

I pay tribute not just to the work of the HALO Trust—I extend my condolences for the loss of life—but to all the non-governmental organisation workers on the frontline who take extraordinary risks to do incredible work.

On the International Military Services debt to which my right hon. Friend referred, we have always said that we are committed to resolving that issue. I shall not say more at this point because legal discussions are ongoing and I do not want to prejudice them.

Ethiopia

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Monday 14th June 2021 Commons Chamber

[James Duddridge]

This is an incredibly important issue, which was given a higher profile when Lord Hague was Foreign Secretary. It was raised up the international agenda. In fact, I was alongside him in a number of UN meetings when I was Minister for Africa under David Cameron, raising these issues. It does appear that sexual violence is being used more, not less. Some of that might be our awareness and our willingness to talk about it, rather than brushing it under the carpet, but it is really important that we flag that it is one of the worst areas of behaviour. We need to get away from it. I note that the House is discussing the issue in more detail—perhaps I will be able to provide more detail—on Thursday this week.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

This urgent question underlines exactly why we should not be reducing our aid budget from 0.7% to 0.5%, but this war in Tigray is a test for the west. The conflict has resulted in widespread starvation, as the Minister points out, but a state of famine has not yet been declared. The recent G7 summit called for an immediate ceasefire, but how likely is it that either Ethiopia or Eritrea will heed those words? What is clear is that if the international community stands back and does nothing, the war, the scale of the famine and the number of civilian deaths will continue to increase.

As the UN Security Council penholder for peacekeeping and the protection of civilians in armed conflict, will the UK be calling for an emergency session of the UN Security Council, and will we be offering to send independent observers, so that we can better understand the situation, given the conflicting reports and statements made by the Ethiopian Government on the one hand and NGOs on the other?

[James Duddridge]

My right hon. Friend makes very strong points, and I am reminded that if the famine-like conditions were more concentrated—were in a more defined area—they would indeed be defined as famine; this is so widespread that it is defined as famine-like conditions. We are already working with our colleagues and international observers to understand. Unfortunately, if we only do what we are doing now the situation will get worse; we must do something different. At the heart of that is finding a political solution and, hopefully, moving away from the election will be a pivot point. I am not demeaning any of the other calls for action, but without a political solution things will get worse.

Belarus: Interception of Aircraft

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Monday 24th May 2021 Commons Chamber

[Dominic Raab]

The hon. Lady raises a great point, which is that in order to exert positive influence we have to co-ordinate with our allies, so we need to broaden the group of like-minded countries willing to take that action. She can see the evidence of the initiatives we are engaged in, through the media freedom coalition, which advises states on how to strengthen legislation to protect journalists, and the financial support we give to journalists who find themselves detained. More broadly, one of the things we discussed at the most recent G7 Foreign Ministers meeting was the arbitrary detention mechanism, which effectively says that when one or other of us in that mechanism finds one of our nationals or dual nationals arbitrarily detained, we all démarche and take action to try to secure their release.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

Western flights continue to transit over this unpredictable airspace; I hope that the Foreign Secretary will make it clear that that needs to stop. For a European state to fake a terrorist threat shows how our international standards are being challenged. Other authoritarian states will be watching how the west responds—how resolute we are and how unified we are in our response. He listed a whole bunch of international organisations that will no doubt condemn what has happened, but will it affect Belarus’s behaviour? Will it change Lukashenko’s attitude? We need to make sure that we think bigger picture and recognise that a quarter of Belarus’s trade looks towards the west. I encourage the Foreign Secretary to make the changes that will affect Belarus’s behaviour in the longer term.

[Dominic Raab]

I thank my right hon. Friend, the Chair of the Defence Committee. I agree that we need to use every lever. I am not quite sure which specific one he thinks would be the decisive extra measure to bring Lukashenko to his senses, but I am very interested in continuing to talk to him about that. The reality is that Lukashenko becomes more and more reliant on Russia—I take the point that was made about that. We must not allow that to be a reason to ease up on the pressure, but we have to be realistic about how dug in Lukashenko is. We have ruled out nothing going forward. The most important thing is that we try to carry a broader group of international partners, and the reason that that is particular germane in this case is that the International Civil Aviation Organization and the Chicago convention represent an international public good.

Israel and Gaza: Ceasefire

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Wednesday 19th May 2021 Commons Chamber

[James Cleverly]

I remind the hon. Gentleman of the sequencing of the events that unfolded in Gaza and Israel. Israel’s actions were in response to indiscriminate rocket attacks from an internationally recognised terrorist organisation. Israel has the right to self-defence. We have urged it at every step to do so proportionately and to take every step it is able to take to minimise civilian casualties. I am sure that like me he is horrified when we see images of fatalities, whether they be Israeli or Palestinian, and that is why, while the issue of recognition is important, it is not for now. Now is about bringing this conflict to an end.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

I welcome the Minister’s statement, but given our history and our legacy, could Britain lean into this more? We called for a ceasefire. Let us ask the United States to join us there as well. It is difficult to see how any tactical or strategic advantage could be gained by either side from continuing this conflict. Once we get to a ceasefire, the old legacy challenges will remain and Israel will require a partner to work with. My concern is that Palestinian elections have not taken place for about 16 years and Hamas is now supported by the Iranians. It has no interest in working with Fatah in the west bank, let alone the Israelis. Does my right hon. Friend agree that perhaps the neighbouring Muslim countries, particularly those that have just signed the Abraham accords, could be invited to help to encourage Palestinians to hold fresh elections, so that we get more representative voices that Israel can work with?

[James Cleverly]

My right hon. Friend makes an incredibly important point. The UK has been fully supportive of elections for the Palestinian Authority, which are now well overdue. We have seen on numerous occasions the Palestinian Authority working and co-ordinating with the Government of Israel, and we are always supportive when that is the case. The actions taken by Hamas are not to the benefit of the Palestinian people. The solution to the conflict, both in the short term and ultimately, will be through a negotiated political solution, and I would urge the Palestinian people to choose a leadership that is respected on the international stage and able to negotiate with international partners.

ODA Budget

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Monday 26th April 2021 Commons Chamber

[James Cleverly]

Of course the whole process that we are going through is to balance the decisions that have been forced on us by economic circumstances and the impact that they would have. The whole job of the Department is to make those incredibly difficult decisions. That is the job that we do each and every year. Those decisions have perhaps come into sharper focus this year because the economic situation has forced the reduction in our ODA expenditure, but this is what the Department does: it balances the expenditure that we have at our disposal and assesses the best way in which we can maximise the positive impact of that money.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

I ask the Minister a simple question: does he think that the world will be safer or more dangerous over the next five to 10 years? We know the answer to that: authoritarianism is on the rise, power bases are shifting, and international institutions are struggling as we enter a profound and dangerous era of change. Our soft power counts, and reducing our support will leave vacuums to be filled either by countries such as Russia and China pursuing a very different agenda, or by extremism, taking advantage of poor governance and insecurity. I ask the Government not to jeopardise our seat on the UN Security Council by cutting our soft power in this way.

[James Cleverly]

I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend and the work of his Committee. He and I have discussed the integrated review, and the unpredictability and potential dangers that the future might have in store for us. That is why the integrated review is such an important document to assess our development expenditure. I absolutely hear the point that he makes about how such expenditure has an influence on our soft power standing, but he will also recognise that integrating our defence, security and diplomatic efforts is incredibly important. We enjoy a huge amount of soft power, notwithstanding this temporary reduction in our ODA expenditure. I have no doubt that once we can get back up to 0.7%, we will be able to reinforce further still the important work that we do on the international stage.

Counter-Daesh Update

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Thursday 4th March 2021 Commons Chamber

[Dominic Raab]

That is an interesting idea. Whether something under the auspices of the UN as a whole would be the right way to go is another question, but the hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to say that the new US Administration is actively engaged with partners. The President has made a clear and palpable virtue of consulting not only European partners but many others. Ultimately, many of the challenges that we are talking about result from strategic tensions that need to be resolved and, ultimately, they can be resolved only through diplomatic initiatives. The hon. Gentleman is right to put the emphasis on that, on top of the vital military work that we do and the humanitarian relief that supports and buttresses those efforts.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

Daesh is far from defeated—they are regrouping—but I join the Foreign Secretary in commending the efforts of our military in the counter-Daesh coalition. The coalition’s frustration is the absence of a viable post-operational plan, because unless the end of the conflict is quickly followed by improvements to governance and security, the enemy is free to regroup, retrain and fight again, as we see in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In Syria, tens of thousands of hard-liners are escaping from internment camps and detention camps such as al-Hol. The Syrians are asking for our support; surely we could do more to facilitate the processing of those hard-liners. With the US now focusing on another area of instability, namely Yemen, will the Secretary of State say whether we are committed to helping to secure a political resolution and a ceasefire and, if required, to leading a US peacekeeping force in that country?

[Dominic Raab]

My right hon. Friend, who chairs the Defence Committee, asked four or five questions in one; I want to try to do them justice, but I am conscious of the strictures of the Chair.

My right hon. Friend makes some really good points. On Yemen, the UK has been and remains one of the leading not just aid donors but supporters of Martin Griffiths, the special envoy, and the initiative, and we will continue that. We have made it clear that we fully support Saudi in its efforts to bring an end to the conflict and also to bring pressure to bear on the Houthis, who threaten, seek to destabilise and rely on Iran for their support.

Yemen: Aid Funding

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd March 2021 Commons Chamber

[James Cleverly]

The UK has consistently been one of the largest donors to the humanitarian appeal, and our money is keeping people alive. We are very proud of that fact. The economic circumstances we are currently living through have meant that we have to temporarily reduce the amount of money we are spending in overseas development assistance, but as has been made clear by the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, the Chancellor and others, as soon as the economic circumstances allow us to get back to where we were, we will do so.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

The humanitarian crisis is terrible, as has been said, and there are also more international terrorist attacks organised from Yemen than anywhere else in the world. The Biden Administration is rewriting their foreign policy towards Yemen. I cannot think of a better opportunity to end this tragic civil war, but I am not picking up a Yemen strategy that befits the strap line of global Britain. May I ask the Minister to match the political courage of our closest security ally in tackling the humanitarian crisis, cutting arms exports and being ready to lead any peacekeeping force, should the UN require it, once a ceasefire is agreed?

[James Cleverly]

Yemen remains one of the priority areas for the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. As I say, I spoke only yesterday to Martin Griffiths, and we discussed what further support the UK Government can provide for his work to bring about a sustainable ceasefire. The House will have heard, and indeed my Government colleagues will have heard, the suggestions my right hon. Friend has put forward. We will consider all suggestions to bring about an improvement in Yemen, but at this stage I cannot commit to the points he has made.

Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Tuesday 9th February 2021 Commons Chamber

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the publication of the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy.

I thank the Backbench Business Committee for allotting this debate today. Let me begin by expressing my gratitude for what the armed forces do for our country. They do not just watch our backs and keep us safe at night; they are our back-up and who we call upon to step forward in times of need, which is no better exemplified than during the pandemic.

The origins of this integrated review date back to the Queen’s Speech in December 2019, billed as

“the most radical reassessment of our place in the world since the end of the Cold War”.

Simply put, the function of any review of this kind is, first, to assess the current and emerging threats and opportunities that we face; secondly, to define the UK’s ambitions on the international stage; and, finally, to upgrade our soft and hard power credentials so we can continue to defend our interests and support those ambitions.

The world is a more dangerous place since the last comprehensive review in 2015. The Chief of the Defence Staff recently described

“the strategic context as uncertain, complex and dynamic; with the defining condition being one of chronic instability.”

The causes of this era of instability are, first, the West, including us, having become risk-averse, increasingly unclear what we collectively stand for, believe in or, indeed, are willing to defend.

Secondly, authoritarianism is on the rise across the world. Ever more states and non-state actors are abusing our dated international rules-based order to pursue their own agendas. Finally, advances in technologies and our growing reliance on data have altered the very character of conflict, allowing attacks on our way of life to be exacted below the threshold of traditional military response.

So how should Britain respond? We should have an integrated review so that we can clarify our long-term strategy relating to China, to Russia, to extremism that is once again on the rise. What are our intentions to help to resolve hotspots such as Yemen? What is our post-Brexit security relationship with the EU? Currently there is none. What are the latest assumptions about the security consequences of climate change and of future pandemics? Most fundamentally, what are our ambitions to repair our frail, rules-based order? Our history, connectivity, international reach, and soft and hard power strengths have traditionally allowed us to step forward when other nations hesitate. Today we hold the G7 presidency, and with the United States just last week reaffirming its resolve to lead the west in confronting global instability, we are overdue in clarifying what “global Britain” means.

The absence of a review is having consequences. Without confirming our international role, our interests and our ambitions, how can the Ministry of Defence craft a requisite defence posture? How can our defence industry plan for the future? In updating our military architecture, we must also be frank about our current capabilities. We should be honest. We perpetuate the myth that our incredible professional armed forces can meet all their taskings and that they have all the kit they need. In reality, that is not the case: our forces are overstretched; sadly, they are now underpaid; and they are often lacking the equipment or the number of platforms to do the taskings that we ask of them.

Yes, the Royal Navy has two incredible aircraft carriers, but our surface fleet is now too small to protect our post-Brexit maritime trade interests. In the Army, our main battle tank and our Warrior armoured personnel carriers are now more than 20 years old, waiting for the green light of the integrated review to know whether they will get upgraded or not. The Royal Air Force has just introduced a formidable F-35 stealth fighter. Unfortunately, we are now only purchasing 48 of 138, because the money is no longer available.

[Mark Tami (Alyn and Deeside) (Lab)]

The right hon. Gentleman makes a very important point. If we reduce the order, not only does that reduce the actual number of aircraft; it also affects workshare and the work going forward. I represent an area that includes Sealand, which has a direct interest in the F-35, which is obviously a vital aircraft for this country’s defences.

[Mr Ellwood]

I agree with the right hon. Gentleman; there are knock-on consequences to delaying decisions, and to changing the promises and commitments that were made in previous reviews.

Yes, the MOD received an additional £16.5 billion in December for the rest of this Parliament, but the Office for Budget Responsibility confirms that there is a £7 billion shortfall in the 10-year equipment plan. Of course we want to seek to retain full-spectrum capability, but investment in the new cyber and space programmes has been paid for by cuts to our conventional capabilities. If the pandemic has taught us anything, it is the need for resilience and flexibility. I therefore stress that it would be a grave error to reduce the size of the Army by the speculated 10,000 troops. I suspect that the Whips might have a problem if that were put to a vote in this House.

Let me step back; what Britain has traditionally brought to the table is our leadership. Our diplomatic reach, agency work and overseas aid programmes have allowed us to offer workable solutions to problems and to lead the alliances to fix them. I am genuinely concerned that Whitehall has lost the bandwidth—or, indeed, the appetite—to do this. I hope that the publication of the integrated review will prove me wrong.

Finally, I want to turn to China, our biggest geopolitical long-term threat, which warrants its own chapter in the review. For decades, the west has turned a blind eye to China’s human rights abuses and democratic deficit, hoping that it will mature into a global responsible citizen. Well, we now realise that that will not happen. China’s conduct in the pandemic, in Hong Kong, in the South China sea, along with its continued abuse of World Trade Organisation rules and the way it has saddled dozens of countries with debt confirms that it is pursuing a competing long-term geopolitical agenda, which, left unchecked, will progressively see our world splinter into two spheres of influence.

Economically, technologically and militarily, China will challenge and possibly overtake US dominance in our lifetime. Militarily, China’s navy grows by the size of our Navy every single year. It is now introducing its own fifth generation air force, and its army is now the largest in the world. It is sending more rockets into space than all the other nations combined and perfecting space-based weapons.

In my view, cold war two has already begun, but we are still in denial and too timid to call it out, because of China’s mighty economic clout. This time, it will not be a build-up of military hardware, troops and nuclear weapons either side of an iron curtain. It will be fought on two very different fronts. First, nations will be forced to take sides, and China is winning here. It is neutralising countries by ensnaring them in long-term debt, controlling states by owning their data and paralysing the international apparatus, such as the United Nations, so removing global scrutiny. Secondly, it involves so-called short of war operations, bypassing direct military engagement through the use of cyber weapons to hit societies directly, as every aspect of our lives goes online. This is the modern battlefield: interference in our critical national infrastructure, including eventually satellites; misinformation via social media; and data theft, including personal data. This is the new reality that the integrated review must address.

I hope that I have articulated to the Minister why this review of all reviews in our generation is arguably the most important for us to publish. It was a brave Churchill in 1946 who warned the west in his iron curtain speech of the advancing Soviet threat. This review offers our Prime Minister today an opportunity to do something similar, starting by expanding the G7 permanently to include Australia, India and Korea, which would represent more than half the world’s GDP, the basis on which we could reform our international trade and security standards. For China’s Achilles heel is its economy. Global trade is critical for China’s advancement. During the last war, the UK and the US got together to write the Atlantic Charter, which formed the basis for so many of the Bretton Woods organisations that built up our world order and which has served us so well for the past few decades. They now need attention. Perhaps it is time for us to look at an Atlantic Charter 2.0. Again, this is something on which the integrated view could focus.

In conclusion, it is time to up our game. The integrated review is a critical statement of intent, re-establishing our post-Brexit credentials and setting out a coherent vision of the UK’s place in the world. It is vital that the Government produce this roadmap, because it is currently missing. I hope that the Minister and the Government are listening carefully to the impressive list of parliamentary colleagues who will be speaking today, no doubt supporting this publication. I hope that there will be no further delay in the integrated review. It must be not another exercise to salami-slice capabilities, manpower, or indeed defence spending but a genuine appraisal of our defence posture and the formal confirmation of our nation elevating its global ambitions and its desire to play a more proactive role on the international stage.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

The four-minute limit will now come into effect. For those participating virtually, the countdown clock will be visible on the screens. In the Chamber, it will be in the usual place on the clock.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Ellwood]

Let me take a minute to thank all those who have participated in the debate, and the Minister for responding. He mentioned covid-19 and our contribution. I look forward to seeing HMS Argus repeat what it did with Ebola, helping other nations and making sure that we get the vaccinations out. I hope that he might be able to take that forward. I thank all those who contributed.

Three themes arose from the debate. First, there is a real desire for Britain to play a more active role on the international stage—to be one of those nations that step forward when others hesitate. Secondly, we must invest in our soft and hard power: do not cut the Army by 10,000, and do not cut our aid budget from 0.7%. Thirdly, the Government must publish the review. The Minister gave a month, but I noticed that he did not give a day or a year; I presume it is 2021. We very much look forward to that.

The US has stepped forward as a nation to say that it is going to be more invigorated, to re-establish western resolve. We need to be with it. This integrated review provides the road map for what global Britain means. We look forward to its publication.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House has considered the publication of the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I am sorry that we were not able to get to the many other speakers who wanted to get in, but time simply did not allow it.