Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy

Mark Tami Excerpts

Tuesday 9th February 2021 Commons Chamber

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the publication of the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy.

I thank the Backbench Business Committee for allotting this debate today. Let me begin by expressing my gratitude for what the armed forces do for our country. They do not just watch our backs and keep us safe at night; they are our back-up and who we call upon to step forward in times of need, which is no better exemplified than during the pandemic.

The origins of this integrated review date back to the Queen’s Speech in December 2019, billed as

“the most radical reassessment of our place in the world since the end of the Cold War”.

Simply put, the function of any review of this kind is, first, to assess the current and emerging threats and opportunities that we face; secondly, to define the UK’s ambitions on the international stage; and, finally, to upgrade our soft and hard power credentials so we can continue to defend our interests and support those ambitions.

The world is a more dangerous place since the last comprehensive review in 2015. The Chief of the Defence Staff recently described

“the strategic context as uncertain, complex and dynamic; with the defining condition being one of chronic instability.”

The causes of this era of instability are, first, the West, including us, having become risk-averse, increasingly unclear what we collectively stand for, believe in or, indeed, are willing to defend.

Secondly, authoritarianism is on the rise across the world. Ever more states and non-state actors are abusing our dated international rules-based order to pursue their own agendas. Finally, advances in technologies and our growing reliance on data have altered the very character of conflict, allowing attacks on our way of life to be exacted below the threshold of traditional military response.

So how should Britain respond? We should have an integrated review so that we can clarify our long-term strategy relating to China, to Russia, to extremism that is once again on the rise. What are our intentions to help to resolve hotspots such as Yemen? What is our post-Brexit security relationship with the EU? Currently there is none. What are the latest assumptions about the security consequences of climate change and of future pandemics? Most fundamentally, what are our ambitions to repair our frail, rules-based order? Our history, connectivity, international reach, and soft and hard power strengths have traditionally allowed us to step forward when other nations hesitate. Today we hold the G7 presidency, and with the United States just last week reaffirming its resolve to lead the west in confronting global instability, we are overdue in clarifying what “global Britain” means.

The absence of a review is having consequences. Without confirming our international role, our interests and our ambitions, how can the Ministry of Defence craft a requisite defence posture? How can our defence industry plan for the future? In updating our military architecture, we must also be frank about our current capabilities. We should be honest. We perpetuate the myth that our incredible professional armed forces can meet all their taskings and that they have all the kit they need. In reality, that is not the case: our forces are overstretched; sadly, they are now underpaid; and they are often lacking the equipment or the number of platforms to do the taskings that we ask of them.

Yes, the Royal Navy has two incredible aircraft carriers, but our surface fleet is now too small to protect our post-Brexit maritime trade interests. In the Army, our main battle tank and our Warrior armoured personnel carriers are now more than 20 years old, waiting for the green light of the integrated review to know whether they will get upgraded or not. The Royal Air Force has just introduced a formidable F-35 stealth fighter. Unfortunately, we are now only purchasing 48 of 138, because the money is no longer available.

[Mark Tami (Alyn and Deeside) (Lab)]

The right hon. Gentleman makes a very important point. If we reduce the order, not only does that reduce the actual number of aircraft; it also affects workshare and the work going forward. I represent an area that includes Sealand, which has a direct interest in the F-35, which is obviously a vital aircraft for this country’s defences.

[Mr Ellwood]

I agree with the right hon. Gentleman; there are knock-on consequences to delaying decisions, and to changing the promises and commitments that were made in previous reviews.

Yes, the MOD received an additional £16.5 billion in December for the rest of this Parliament, but the Office for Budget Responsibility confirms that there is a £7 billion shortfall in the 10-year equipment plan. Of course we want to seek to retain full-spectrum capability, but investment in the new cyber and space programmes has been paid for by cuts to our conventional capabilities. If the pandemic has taught us anything, it is the need for resilience and flexibility. I therefore stress that it would be a grave error to reduce the size of the Army by the speculated 10,000 troops. I suspect that the Whips might have a problem if that were put to a vote in this House.

Let me step back; what Britain has traditionally brought to the table is our leadership. Our diplomatic reach, agency work and overseas aid programmes have allowed us to offer workable solutions to problems and to lead the alliances to fix them. I am genuinely concerned that Whitehall has lost the bandwidth—or, indeed, the appetite—to do this. I hope that the publication of the integrated review will prove me wrong.

Finally, I want to turn to China, our biggest geopolitical long-term threat, which warrants its own chapter in the review. For decades, the west has turned a blind eye to China’s human rights abuses and democratic deficit, hoping that it will mature into a global responsible citizen. Well, we now realise that that will not happen. China’s conduct in the pandemic, in Hong Kong, in the South China sea, along with its continued abuse of World Trade Organisation rules and the way it has saddled dozens of countries with debt confirms that it is pursuing a competing long-term geopolitical agenda, which, left unchecked, will progressively see our world splinter into two spheres of influence.

Economically, technologically and militarily, China will challenge and possibly overtake US dominance in our lifetime. Militarily, China’s navy grows by the size of our Navy every single year. It is now introducing its own fifth generation air force, and its army is now the largest in the world. It is sending more rockets into space than all the other nations combined and perfecting space-based weapons.

In my view, cold war two has already begun, but we are still in denial and too timid to call it out, because of China’s mighty economic clout. This time, it will not be a build-up of military hardware, troops and nuclear weapons either side of an iron curtain. It will be fought on two very different fronts. First, nations will be forced to take sides, and China is winning here. It is neutralising countries by ensnaring them in long-term debt, controlling states by owning their data and paralysing the international apparatus, such as the United Nations, so removing global scrutiny. Secondly, it involves so-called short of war operations, bypassing direct military engagement through the use of cyber weapons to hit societies directly, as every aspect of our lives goes online. This is the modern battlefield: interference in our critical national infrastructure, including eventually satellites; misinformation via social media; and data theft, including personal data. This is the new reality that the integrated review must address.

I hope that I have articulated to the Minister why this review of all reviews in our generation is arguably the most important for us to publish. It was a brave Churchill in 1946 who warned the west in his iron curtain speech of the advancing Soviet threat. This review offers our Prime Minister today an opportunity to do something similar, starting by expanding the G7 permanently to include Australia, India and Korea, which would represent more than half the world’s GDP, the basis on which we could reform our international trade and security standards. For China’s Achilles heel is its economy. Global trade is critical for China’s advancement. During the last war, the UK and the US got together to write the Atlantic Charter, which formed the basis for so many of the Bretton Woods organisations that built up our world order and which has served us so well for the past few decades. They now need attention. Perhaps it is time for us to look at an Atlantic Charter 2.0. Again, this is something on which the integrated view could focus.

In conclusion, it is time to up our game. The integrated review is a critical statement of intent, re-establishing our post-Brexit credentials and setting out a coherent vision of the UK’s place in the world. It is vital that the Government produce this roadmap, because it is currently missing. I hope that the Minister and the Government are listening carefully to the impressive list of parliamentary colleagues who will be speaking today, no doubt supporting this publication. I hope that there will be no further delay in the integrated review. It must be not another exercise to salami-slice capabilities, manpower, or indeed defence spending but a genuine appraisal of our defence posture and the formal confirmation of our nation elevating its global ambitions and its desire to play a more proactive role on the international stage.