Oral Answers to Questions
Stephen McPartland Excerpts(2 years, 2 months ago)
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Stephen Morgan (Portsmouth South) (Lab)
The Minister for Security (Stephen McPartland)
Antisocial behaviour is a menace to society. This Government have committed to stamping it out everywhere that it occurs. In our communities, we have already ensured that local agencies have the flexible tools to tackle it through the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. Of course, people are not just subject to abuse offline; despicable instances such as the racism online following the Euro 2020 final are why this Government will also tackle harmful content online through the Online Safety Bill.
Stephen Morgan
Portsmouth police go above and beyond to keep communities safe as I saw at first hand when I joined them on patrol at the Camber and the Hotwalls last month. However, they face an uphill battle following a 10% drop in the region’s police community support officers and police officers since 2015. Will the Minister confirm today when the Conservatives will finally get tough on crime and give my local force the resources that it so desperately needs?
Stephen McPartland
My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has been very clear about ensuring that, with the police uplift programme, there are 20,000 more police officers, and that is making a huge difference. Local police and crime commissioners are responsible for working with local authorities to ensure that they tackle antisocial behaviour locally, so I think that the hon. Gentleman should direct his comments to his local police and crime commissioner.
Richard Graham (Gloucester) (Con)
The boundaries between antisocial behaviour, gangs, drugs, and knife crime are increasingly blurred. An unwelcome recent trend in my constituency of Gloucester is that of an increase in young people’s involvement. None of us wants to see children criminalised, but we need to act, not least in order to protect other young people. Can the Minister arrange a meeting where best practice on how to tackle this growing problem can be shared with many of us in this Chamber who have similar problems?
Stephen McPartland
I know the work that my hon. Friend has done to try to reduce antisocial behaviour within his own community, and I know that he has been working hard. He supports violence reduction units. There is a huge amount of money and investment going into sharing best practice among forces to ensure that we also protect these individuals. We know the huge problems that county lines are creating up and down the country, and there has been a massive investment in breaking county lines on which this Government have been leading the way.
Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)
While the Conservative party has spent the summer infighting, our country and our communities have been left fearful about the plight of antisocial behaviour that is rife across Britain. Because of a lack of legislative support, families and the most vulnerable in our communities are left suffering from fireworks and nuisance into the early hours of the morning without any help, including in my constituency of Bradford West. Car theft has gone up, burglary has gone up, individual theft has gone up, car crime has gone up, and dangerous driving has gone up, and all the while families are feeling unsafe to walk the streets of Britain. The Government have simply gone and are nowhere to be seen. Can the Minister explain why, after 12 years in Government, the Conservatives have failed so badly?
Stephen McPartland
I am astonished. The reality is that antisocial behaviour in the year to March 2022 is down 37%. [Interruption.] My hon. Friends may also be intrigued to hear that, nationally, burglary is down 24%, neighbourhood crime by 33%, and vehicle offences by 28%. That has been made possible by the commitment the Government have made to increasing police numbers by more than 20,000. Perhaps the answer is that Conservative police and crime commissioners deliver for their communities.
Jonathan Gullis (Stoke-on-Trent North) (Con)
National Security Bill (Seventh sitting)
Stephen McPartland ExcerptsTuesday 19th July 2022
(2 years, 4 months ago)
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The Chair
I am sure that the Minister, the Clerks and I are most grateful for that point. I certainly cannot answer it immediately, and the Minister does not look as if he is going to—
The Minister for Security (Stephen McPartland)
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for pointing out that typo. That is very important to us all, and I will carry on talking while I wait for some information. I think that is an important point. As we know, the Bill is evolving and will continue to evolve. We will ensure that any potential errors are corrected throughout its passage. It does look as though it should say “section 26”, so we will definitely fix that.
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East for his eagle eyes.
The Chair
The learned Clerk also agrees that it should read “section 26”. We are most grateful to the hon. Gentleman for pointing that out.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 27 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 28
Offences by bodies corporate etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)
Clause 28 deals with offences committed by bodies corporate. It is a significant clause. I imagine that this legislative area will continue to need to evolve as threats continue to emerge. The clause asserts that where a corporate body commits an offence under part 1 of the Bill
“the officer, as well as the body, is guilty of the offence”.
Finding the right balance here will not be straightforward, but this will become a key battleground, as the Government acknowledged with the National Security and Investment Act 2021.
In its report, the Law Commission outlined that classified evidence, which it was considering, could be explained using the following hypothetical example. P, an IT services company headquartered in a foreign state, has a managed services contract for a large Department. As part of that contract, P creates back-ups in the UK of the Department’s corporate email and file storage system. P is compelled under the foreign state’s national security legislation to share that information with the foreign state’s intelligence services, which use it to target UK interests. Worryingly, that will not be an uncommon scenario; we see such examples regularly in the UK press, and a range of stakeholders need to be alive to the risks. I am afraid to say that the Government have been too slow to respond.
In December 2020, the US Department of Homeland Security issued a data security business advisory, which
“describes the data-related risks American businesses face as a result of the actions of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and outlines steps that businesses can take to mitigate these risks. Businesses expose themselves and their customers to heightened risk when they share sensitive data with firms located in the PRC, or use equipment and software developed by firms with an ownership nexus in the PRC, as well as with firms that have PRC citizens in key leadership and security-focused roles…Due to PRC legal regimes and known PRC data collection practices, this is particularly true for data service providers and data infrastructure.”
The advisory was issued as a result of several new laws passed in China in recent years—not least the national intelligence law of 2017, which compels all PRC firms and entities to support, assist and co-operate with PRC intelligence services, creating a legal obligation for those entities to turn over data collected abroad and domestically to the PRC.
A UK employee working for a Chinese company will need really robust legislative support in pushing back against the obligations placed upon Chinese businesses by those new laws under the Chinese Communist party. For that reason, we welcome clause 28, and believe that the provisions are sufficiently broad to include anyone in a company who may commit an offence under part 1 of the Bill, and to provide clarity in this space, with a need to consider employees who stand to find themselves in a difficult position due to the Chinese legislative framework.
Subsection (5) will allow the Secretary of State to make regulations to improve the clause through secondary legislation. I have said that I recognise that legislation will need to be dynamic if it is to be effective, but any such regulations should be laid under the affirmative procedure, and must be debated and actively approved by both Houses of Parliament. I hope the Minister will confirm that that will be the case.
Stephen McPartland
The clause provides that where a body commits an offence under part 1 of the Bill
“the officer, as well as the body, is guilty of the offence”
if it is attributable to the officer’s consent, connivance or neglect. The provision is based on a similar one in the Official Secrets Act 1911. For example, where a body commits an espionage offence of obtaining protected information under the direct guidance of the head of the body, both the body and its head would be guilty of the offence. Clause 28 mirrors the provisions found in section 36 in part 3 of the National Security and Investment Act 2021, which makes suitable provision for when an offence under that part is committed by a body corporate.
It is worth noting that in a similar provision in the 1911 Act, a director would automatically be held liable unless they could prove that they did not consent or were unaware. Rightly, the provisions move beyond that burden of proof: the prosecution must now demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that an officer was culpable in such a case, which provides more safeguards. This is therefore an important provision to ensure that both companies and relevant officers can be held liable for their involvement in state threat activity, and that where there is wrongdoing on the part of an officer of the company that officer can be appropriately prosecuted for the offences.
For an officer to be held liable, they must consent or connive to the act or be negligent in relation to it, which is a higher bar than simply being unaware of the act, as the prosecution would need to demonstrate not just a lack of awareness but that, in being unaware, the person was failing to properly discharge their duties. The clause goes on to define a number of terms, such as a “body” and an “officer of a body”, and it provides that the Secretary of State may make regulations to modify the section in relation to
“its application to a body corporate or unincorporated association formed or recognised under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom.”
That may be required as a result of differences in the nature of bodies corporate, their structures or their terminology under the laws of foreign jurisdictions. This ensures that bodies corporate outside the UK that commit offences under part 1 of the Bill can still be caught under these offences.
I will refer to the example given by the hon. Member for Halifax. We have tried throughout the Bill to demonstrate that the offence will be based on an individual acting directly or indirectly on behalf of a foreign power, and on whether they should reasonably know that that behaviour is on behalf of a foreign power. I understand her point about foreign-owned companies, but the Bill does not say that whole companies are acting on behalf of a foreign power. As she rightly says, there will be a whole range of UK individuals engaged in completely legitimate activity within the UK, and we do not want to give employees of those companies any problems.
The regulations will involve technical, rather than substantial, changes, so they will not widen the scope whatsoever. That is why they will be made under the negative procedure.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 28 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 29 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 30
Consents to prosecutions
Stuart C. McDonald
I beg to move amendment 63, in clause 30, page 23, line 16, at end insert—
“(c) in Scotland, only with the consent of the Lord Advocate.”
This amendment would require the consent of the Lord Advocate to prosecute certain offences.
Stuart C. McDonald
Clause 30 puts in place one of the protections that the Minister has referred to a few times, including when we were debating the offences of disclosure and the breadth of the foreign power condition. The protection in question is the requirement of consent to certain prosecutions, with that consent coming from the Attorney General in England and Wales, and from the Advocate General in Northern Ireland.
Our amendment 63 simply asks why there is no equivalent requirement of consent from the Lord Advocate for prosecutions in Scotland. It might be a conscious choice—if so, it would be useful to hear what the thinking is behind that. It could also be another mistake, because I notice that section 8 of the 1911 Act requires consent to prosecution, but only the Attorney General is mentioned. Section 12, which provides an interpretation, states that the expression “Attorney General” is taken “as respects Scotland” to mean the Lord Advocate, and “as respects Ireland” to mean the Advocate General for Northern Ireland. That is a slightly dated way of doing things, because if we mean the Lord Advocate, we should say that.
On the clause itself, I have absolutely no objection to the idea that consent for prosecution is an appropriate step. As I say, our amendment simply asks what the provision is in relation to Scotland.
Stephen McPartland
Let me quickly answer those points. Clause 30 provides that the consent of the Attorney General is required in England and Wales, and that the consent of the Advocate General is required in Northern Ireland. I understand that the Lord Advocate is not included because the Lord Advocate has a constitutional role as the head of the criminal prosecution system under the Criminal Procedures (Scotland) Act 1995, and all prosecutions on indictment are taken by, or on behalf of, the Lord Advocate. It is technically not necessary to include the Lord Advocate, because all offences in relation to Scotland are prosecuted by the Lord Advocate under Scots law, so I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.
Stuart C. McDonald
Very educational; I have learned something new. I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 30 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 31
Power to exclude the public from proceedings
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Holly Lynch
I wish only to add that I imagine we would all agree that transparency in this legislative area should be the default, especially given the need to raise awareness of the challenges we face as a country and the individual responsibilities that we all share in combating those challenges with the arrival of these new offences. That said, it is of course right that clause 31 provides power to the court to exclude the public from any part of proceedings or offences under part 1, or for proceedings relating to the aggravation of sentencing, or other offences where the foreign power condition applies, should the evidence being considered deem it to be in the interests of national security to do so.
Stephen McPartland
As the hon. Member said, clause 31 provides those protections. It builds on the Official Secrets Act 1920, which gives the court the power to exclude the public from any proceedings if the publication of any evidence to be given would be prejudicial to national security. However, the passing of the sentence must still take place in public.
One important point is that the decision to exclude the public will be made by the court, not the prosecution. It is also important to reiterate that the power does not grant the use of closed-material proceedings. Therefore, as is the precedent in our criminal justice system, the defendant and their legal team will have access to all the evidence, as they would in other criminal proceedings.
I will end by reassuring the Committee that the clause is not meant to limit the transparency of our justice system or the independence of the judiciary, but to ensure that—only where necessary—the courts themselves have the power to protect the United Kingdom’s national security.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 31 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 32
Power to impose prevention and investigation measures
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 57, in schedule 4, page 111, line 1, leave out paragraph 12.
This amendment would remove the power to require participation in polygraph sessions.
That schedule 4 be the Fourth schedule to the Bill.
Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Gray. I have a question on paragraph 8 to schedule 4, entitled “Electronic communication device measure”. It is eminently sensible, when one is considering how an STPIM might be constructed, that one looks at all the restrictions that that may involve. However, when we get to sub-paragraph (6)(c), which refers not to computers or telephones but to other equipment
“designed or adapted, or capable of being adapted, for the purpose of connecting to the internet,”
I want to ensure that there is clarity, and that the provision will be defined in a cogent way.
As we move further into the internet of things, one’s fridge or toaster will be designed for the purpose of connecting to the internet. That might sound glib or flippant, but we may get to the point when half the white goods in any individual’s home are internet enabled. Given that there could be huge sensitivities in the deployment of STPIMs, the last thing that we want to see is a police constable or bailiff removing half the items from someone’s house, when that clearly is not the intention but those items nevertheless fit the category in paragraph 8(6)(c).
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful for Members’ contributions and look forward to trying to answer as many of the questions as I can. I will start with the clause and then come to the amendment and some of the questions.
Part 2 and clause 32 mirror the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011—TPIM—and allow the Secretary of State to impose by notice
“specified prevention and investigation measures on an individual”
if specific conditions are met; I will refer to them as STPIMs going forward. The STPIMs mirror the equivalent counter-terrorism measures: well-established tools that have been in use for over 10 years and have been subject to vigorous examination by the courts, including with regard to European convention on human rights compliance. The courts have never found that a TPIM in its entirety should not have been imposed, or that any of the provisions of the TPIM legislative framework are not ECHR compliant. That should give us all reassurance, and give Parliament confidence that the measures will be applied sparingly and only where necessary and proportionate.
I will not go through the exhaustive list, but the Government have publicly committed to provide operational partners with the tools that they need to combat state threats. To be very clear, STPIMs are a tool of last resort; the Government’s preference is to prosecute under any means possible first and foremost, and STPIMs are to be used only when all else has failed and no other options are available to us. I hope that that provides some reassurance as well.
Holly Lynch
I was reassured by some of the detail in these clauses about that point, but the impact assessment from the Home Office says:
“It is assumed that the prosecution rate of state threats investigations is 33 per cent. This is an internal estimate from CPS, based on prosecution of previous OSA 1911-1939 cases.”
Based on where we envisage we might have challenges in securing prosecutions, I wonder whether STPIMs are also for the other side of a prosecution, as well as for when we cannot secure prosecution and get there in the first place.
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for that point. I understand that our responsibility is to scrutinise the legislation to make sure that, as the hon. Member for Dundee East made clear, we do not open up a can of worms that can lead to greater and greater unintended consequences, but the reality is that the provision is to be a last resort.
If we are talking practically, counter-terrorism police are responsible for enforcing STPIMs. The amount of resources required to enforce and monitor a TPIM or STPIM is so great and so large that, as Members can imagine, it is not something that any of the agencies or anybody in Government wants to do, so it is not something that we will look to push. First and foremost, this is about prosecution by any means possible.
To give some kind of hope and clarity, I would like to make the point that the number of TPIMS currently in use is less than four. The number of TPIMs that have been used throughout the 10 years of their existence is less than the clause number that we started on today. I hope that gives some reassurance on how limited the measures will be, and on how few occasions they will be used.
We have been looking at the specific time limit, and we are including a specific condition to have a maximum of five years for the duration of an STPIM. Again, that is to mirror what is in the TPIM legislation. Additionally, subsection (4) requires the Secretary of State to publish factors that she considers are appropriate to take into account when deciding whether to restrict a person’s movement in the UK—for example, ensuring that they have access to appropriate medical facilities.
Part 1 to schedule 4 sets out 16 measures. Right hon. and hon. Members will know there are 17 measures in TPIM legislation for differences around drug testing, but we do not believe that is applicable in this case. The measures have to be tailored to the specific threat that an individual poses.
I want to touch on the polygraph measure, as it has been raised by a number of colleagues. It is designed to allow the Secretary of State to require an individual to take a polygraph test at a specific date, time and location. The purpose of the measure is to assist operational partners to assess whether an individual is complying with the other measures under their STPIM. The outcome of the session may be used to make changes to the individual’s suite of measures—for example, removing or adding specific measures to prevent or restrict their involvement in state threat activity. Again, this measure is expected to be used exceedingly rarely.
Let me reassure the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East that the polygraph session cannot under any circumstances be used to gather evidence for a future prosecution. I am stating on the record that polygraph measures cannot be used to gather evidence for a future prosecution, and I hope that that provides reassurance.
Stephen McPartland
Under the way the law system works, that might provide some kind of information, but it will not be used as evidence. The operational partners would then have to go off and identify the evidence in order to find out how they could do that, because breaching a notice is a criminal offence, so they would need the evidence in order to then go to court to demonstrate that.
Mr Jones
I understand what the Minister is saying, but I have a real problem with this; I think the Government are opening up an argument for lawyers who want to defend people. Obviously, if somebody is prosecuted for breaking an STPIM, then in discovery, the lawyer is going to ask, “Was a polygraph test done? Does the individual know they have done it?” I am worried about putting this in, because there is a controversy about polygraphs allowing the defence an opportunity to undermine the process. I understand why the Bill is belt and braces, but I am not sure that this part of it is going to be helpful.
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful to the right hon. Member for his point, and I understand it, but polygraph measures are currently used in the management of sex offenders in this country, and the Bill will operate very much on the same principles. He should remember that in this legislation we are not trying to create new bits and pieces for controlling an individual; operational partners have found these tools effective over the past 10 years, so we are trying to mirror what is already out there. That is the purpose of the legislation.
The hon. Member for Halifax asked about foreign nationals. Our ambition is to prosecute using any means possible, including deportation, so if that is not available, we would look to use one of the measures in the Bill. Because we would look at deportation and everything else as an option, we would expect the measures in the Bill to apply more to British citizens than they would to foreign nationals. As I have stated, counter-terrorism police are responsible for looking after and enforcing the measures. We talked about the number of TPIMs; I am not allowed to give the exact figure, but I have given an indication of how rarely they are used. We imagine that STPIMs will also be used very rarely.
On the right hon. Member for Dundee East’s point about the internet of things and trying to future-proof the legislation, under paragraph 8 of schedule 4 we can restrict access to electronic devices, and as such restrict access to electronic currencies. We talk about cryptocurrency, but cryptocurrency is already becoming a bit old-fashioned. Before I took on this role, I launched an all-party parliamentary group on digital currency and potential bearer currencies run by central banks; cryptocurrency is already becoming something of the past and we are now moving on to bearer currencies managed by digital banks. It is about safeguarding and future-proofing, and under paragraph 6 we can restrict the transfer of property, so we could restrict a transfer of funds in that way.
Stewart Hosie
Before the Minister moves on, can I add to the point that the right hon. Member for North Durham made about polygraph tests? The Minister said that polygraph tests will not be used to secure a criminal conviction; that is true but, as he said, the STPIMs are measures of last resort in lieu of a conviction if it is not possible to secure one. The polygraph measures in paragraph 12(1)(a)(ii) of schedule 4 refer to
“assessing whether any variation of the specified measures is necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in foreign power threat activity”.
A STPIM is not a criminal conviction, then, but it is in lieu of a criminal conviction; therefore, the Minister cannot be right when he says the polygraph test would not be used to do something, because it could well be used to vary the conditions and possibly to toughen the STPIM—
Stewart Hosie
I just wonder if the Minister could go a bit further on that point.
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful to the right hon. Member for highlighting that point; I very much enjoy the suggestions that are made in this Committee. I understand the points he is making, and one of the things I have tried to demonstrate throughout the Bill Committee is my willingness to listen and try to work cross-party to get the legislation through.
Stephen McPartland
I am always willing to write to the Committee, as the right hon. Member knows. I am happy to go away, think about this issue and then write to the Committee, so that I can put in writing the safeguard that I do not want a polygraph test to be able to lead to future prosecutions. I think that would work.
Holly Lynch
Before the Minister moved to the polygraph point, he was talking about cryptocurrencies and said that they are already quite a dated concept; however, my proposal is that we add cryptocurrencies to the list, in paragraph 5 on financial service measures, that includes postal orders, cheques and bankers’ drafts. With that in mind, it might be worth making an explicit reference in that list to whatever form of digital currency or cryptocurrency, given that we know it is a focus for hostile state activity.
Stephen McPartland
The hon. Lady makes a very good point. As she knows, I am always prepared to improve legislation so that we are happy with it on a cross-party basis, it goes through the House and we can support our intelligence communities. I am very happy to look at that issue. I did not even know we could still get postal orders and bankers’ drafts.
Let me give some examples of how STPIMs could be used, specifically for the right hon. Member for North Durham—I know that he would like that. If a British national were recruiting, talent spotting and reporting for a foreign intelligence service, and the evidence to prove the foreign power links was too sensitive to be used in court, meaning that a prosecution was not viable, an STPIM that might prevent harm could include a financial order, to prevent the person from accessing funds from the foreign intelligence service; a restriction on contact or association with individuals, to prevent the person from being debriefed by the foreign intelligence service handler; and electronic communications device measures, to ensure full coverage of devices used by the subject. That is one example of how an STPIM could be used.
Another example relates to a British national working in one of our defence companies, and would prevent sensitive technology transfer. Suppose a disgruntled British national employee of an advanced technology company is seeking to market specialised, valuable and unclassified knowledge to foreign companies. The investigation and disruptive conversation means that the individual is moved to less sensitive work and their company computer access is restricted, but they cannot be dismissed. They remain disgruntled, but prosecution is not viable. In that case, we could disrupt travel to prevent an individual from meeting foreign representatives abroad, so that they could not pass the secrets over to them, and we could restrict contact and association with individuals in the UK for the same purposes.
This example relating to the intimidation of dissidents is particularly important. Suppose a senior member of, for example, a cultural organisation from a foreign Government based in the UK is seeking to exert pressure on dissident diaspora through intimidation, harassment and damaging rumours. The individual cannot be expelled or deported, so victims are afraid to make criminal complaints for fear of recrimination in their home country. The STPIM could be imposed, because prosecution is not viable—the victim will not testify or make a statement. We could put measures in place to prevent an individual from associating with the victim or members of their family. We could prevent serious violence by ordering the subject to relocate to an alternative area in the UK. The STPIM could be justified in closed court proceedings, because it would prevent any identification of the victim. I hope the right hon. Member for North Durham enjoyed those examples.
Mr Jones
I did, actually—I am very grateful to the Minister. He has set my mind running in terms of the possible uses of the measures. There is open-source evidence of the intimidation of protesters against the Chinese Government at universities, for example, by Chinese nationals here in the UK. Proving that those individuals were working directly for the Chinese Communist party or a people’s front, for example, is difficult. Could the Minister envisage the measures being used to prevent that type of harassment, by individuals who are intimidating or trying to close down legitimate protest against the Chinese Communist party, of legitimate protesters on university campuses?
Stephen McPartland
I can genuinely understand and imagine a pathway in which that could be the case. However, as I say, because of the huge amount of resources involved in an STPIM, we will try any other means possible, through normal criminal procedures, to prosecute individuals for harassment under normal criminal law. We will be doing everything we can to not actually use an STPIM. We want to prosecute these people. The Government’s first line is prosecution, and the last resort is an STPIM, when there is no other option available to us.
I will also ensure that we add crypto to the list one way or another, but I have to work out how we define it.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 32 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 4 agreed to.
Clause 33
Conditions A to E
Holly Lynch
I will keep my remarks brief. Conditions A to E, set out in subsections (1) to (5), provide a clear framework that the Secretary of State must work within, with conditions that would then be tested by the court. I listened carefully to my friend the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East. His amendment probes whether clause 33 should apply the civil standards of proof in relation to the decision to impose prevention and investigation measures, by proposing that “reasonably believes” be replaced with
“believes on the balance of probabilities”.
In considering that, as the hon. Member said, we look to Jonathan Hall’s evidence in this Committee’s first sitting, and then to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, and we can see that the wording has pretty much been copied verbatim to this Bill.
With that in mind, and given Mr Hall’s assessment that the measures have not been overused, the lower numbers subject to TPIMs and the reality of just how resource intensive they are, I am satisfied that “reasonably believes” is justifiable, but I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to the points raised by the SNP spokesperson.
Stephen McPartland
Clause 33 mirrors TPIMs, in that it specifies the conditions that must be met in order for the Secretary of State to impose prevention and investigation measures on an individual under an STPIM. Condition A is that the Secretary of State must reasonably believe that the individual is or has been involved in foreign power threat activity. Condition B is that some or all of the foreign power threat activity is new. That ensures that when a notice has expired after the five-year limit provided by clause 34, a further notice may be imposed only where the individual has re-engaged in further foreign powers threat activity since the start of the five-year period.
Conditions C and D outline the two limbs of the necessity test for imposing the measures, so the Secretary of State must reasonably consider, first, that the notice is necessary for protecting the UK from the risk of foreign power threat activity, and secondly, that it is necessary to prevent or restrict the individual’s involvement in foreign power threat activity by imposing the specific measures.
Those two conditions provide an important safeguard that makes it clear not only that must it be necessary in general terms to impose measures on the individual, but that, in addition, each individual measure that is imposed must be necessary in its own right. Condition E requires the Secretary of State to have obtained the court’s permission before imposing measures on an individual. The function and powers of the court on such an application are set out in clause 35.
In urgent cases in which the Secretary of State considers that measures must be imposed immediately, the case must be referred to court for confirmation immediately after measures are imposed. In practice, we expect the emergency power to be used very rarely. The conditions are designed to ensure that STPIMs are used only where they are necessary and proportionate, and they cannot be imposed arbitrarily. There are also several stages at which the courts will be involved in the STPIM process, including granting permission before a notice may be served or confirming one that has been made in an urgent case. The automatic substantive review of the decision to impose the STPIM and all its obligations and a right of appeal against decisions taken in relation to the STPIM provide checks and balances to the decisions taken by the Secretary of State, so I encourage fellow members of the Committee to support the clause.
I thank the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East and the right hon. Member for Dundee East for tabling their amendment. It proposes amending one of the conditions for imposing an STPIM by changing the wording from the Secretary of State “reasonably believes” to
“believes on the balance of probabilities”.
I reassure the hon. Gentleman and the right hon. Gentleman that in the development of the measures consideration was given to the conditions that must be met in such cases. The Government consider reasonable belief of a person’s involvement in foreign power threat activity to be the appropriate test for STPIMs. Foreign state intelligence operatives are highly trained, sophisticated and equipped to obfuscate in relation to their activities and avoid Government security measures. Given that, it is important that the threshold is not too high.
Stuart C. McDonald
The Minister appears to be saying that the test is slightly different from the balance of probabilities, but from Jonathan Hall’s evidence, he seemed to think they were pretty much the same. I want to tease out whether the Minister thinks that this test is essentially the same as the balance of probabilities, but with a slightly different formulation, or is it a lower test?
Stephen McPartland
I am going to give in to the hon. Member and say I think that the standard of the balance of probabilities test is slightly higher than reasonable belief, but we are dealing with incredibly sophisticated actors who are very highly trained. In this country, reasonable belief is used throughout in relation to war, and we have gone with the reasonable belief definition because of the nature of the people we are dealing with, the nature of the threats to national security and the nature of state threats, but I accept the point the hon. Gentleman is making.
Stewart Hosie
If the Minister is saying that the “reasonably believes” test in conditions A, C and D is appropriate for the reasons he has just given, why is condition B so hard and fast? The Bill states:
“Condition B is that some or all of the foreign power threat activity in which the individual is or has been involved is new foreign power threat activity.”
There is no evidential test, such as the Secretary of State having a reasonable belief about some or all of the foreign power activity. What is the rationale for having the slightly reduced test in conditions A, C and D, but no test at all in condition B?
Stephen McPartland
As I am a kind and forgiving person, I will answer and say that we have condition B because, throughout the legislation, someone has to have engaged in activity on behalf or in support of a foreign power. That is one of the key tests throughout the Bill, the foreign power test. That is the reason for it.
My view is that “reasonable belief” strikes the right balance, and the threshold mirrors that of TPIMs, which have recently been amended by Parliament in the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021. I ask the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East to withdraw the amendment.
Stuart C. McDonald
I am grateful to the Minister for answering the question. We will give that answer further thought before consideration on Report, but in the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 33 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 34
Five year limit for Part 2 notices
Holly Lynch
Kirkintilloch East. Thank you for that, Mr Gray—make sure that is in Hansard.
I thank the hon. Member for amendment 56. Clause 34 stipulates that a part 2 notice can remain in force for a limit of five years. There are a number of overlapping clauses in this part of the Bill, focusing on reviews and the ongoing considerations about the necessity of a TPIM. When we get to clauses 39 and 40, I will speak to the importance of the TPIM review group, which Jonathan Hall made very clear in his evidence is essential if we are to learn anything from the lessons of TPIMs. On clause 34, could the Minister confirm the due regard that the Secretary of State must have for other agencies and the review group when considering whether to extend a part 2 notice?
Stephen McPartland
I will start with the clause and then deal with the amendment. Clause 34 provides for when a STPIM notice comes into force, how long it will remain in force and how many times it can be extended. It sets a five-year limit in total. Once a notice has been imposed, it remains in force for one year. Unless renewed, it will expire after that time.
If the Secretary of State believes that conditions A, C and D, which we have just discussed, are met, it may be extended for a further year up to four times, taking the total to five years. A further STPIM notice cannot be imposed after this time unless new foreign power threat-related activity is uncovered. I would also like to make it clear that the notice is reviewed every quarter. Those measures ensure that STPIMs cannot be imposed indefinitely, and there are constant safeguards throughout their imposition.
The one-year period and the five-year limit balance the need to protect against threats to the UK from individuals, and allow further extensions to be granted if there continues to be evidence of the risk of involvement in foreign power threat activity. The provisions do not just look back, but recognise the important work that our security services and police would need to carry out both before and after a notice expires. I would therefore appreciate the Committee’s support for the clause.
Amendment 56 relates to the time limits placed on part 2 notices. Like hon. Members, the Government agree that it is important to ensure that individuals are not placed on STPIMs indefinitely. That is why we have included two important time-limit safeguards. The first is that STPIMs can be extended only after a year if the conditions on which they were imposed are still met. In particular, the approach we have taken contains a number of points where positive action is required to keep an STPIM in place. That important safeguard ensures that an STPIM cannot remain in force when it is no longer appropriate.
Secondly, STPIMs can be extended on only four occasions. The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East asked why we had not opted for two occasions, mirroring the original TPIM legislation. That is because of evidence over the last decade from our operational partners about what they feel is appropriate and necessary. We are mirroring their experience with TPIM notices over the last decade, and we will work with them on STPIM notices.
The one-year period and the five-year limit balance the need to protect against further threats. Given the safeguards I have outlined, I ask the hon. Member to consider withdrawing his amendment.
Stuart C. McDonald
I am grateful to the Minister, because he did not just say, “Well, we’re just cutting and pasting from TPIMs.” He did provide an explanation of the thinking behind the five-year limit. I will take that away and give it further thought. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 34 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)
National Security Bill (Eighth sitting)
Stephen McPartland ExcerptsTuesday 19th July 2022
(2 years, 4 months ago)
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Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)
As the shadow Minister says, these clauses put in place some important oversight and a scrutiny mechanism in relation to state threats prevention and investigation measures. On the whole, the oversight and scrutiny mechanisms appear to work, but I have some questions to put to the Minister for clarification.
First, to pick up on a point made by the shadow Minister, why is it the function of the court to determine whether the Secretary of State’s decision was “obviously flawed”? I was slightly surprised by that standard and not familiar with it at all. What is the difference between an “obviously flawed” decision and one that is merely “flawed”? Is not the simple requirement in clause 35(6) to apply judicial review principles in itself sufficient to let the court know what it is supposed to do?
Secondly, clause 35(4) allows the court to have its hearing on the Secretary of State’s application “in the absence of” the relevant individual and even without that person being notified of that happening. I can well understand that there will be some reasons why that may appear to be necessary, but the Bill does not provide any guidance at all to the courts as to when it would or would not be appropriate to proceed in that way. That struck me as quite a strange way to do things. It just says that the court may consider the application
“in the absence of the individual”,
without providing any guidance as to when that would be appropriate and the reasons the court should have for doing that.
That question is even more pertinent when the court hears an urgent case under schedule 5, which says that the Secretary of State must serve the part 2 notice on the individual and then, immediately after, refer the measures to the court. Given that the part 2 notice has been served on the individual and is enforced because of urgency, it seems strange that there would be justification for the court to consider the reference under the part 2 notice without the individual being present or even aware of the hearing. The individual will have been served the notice, so why does the hearing then need to proceed without them even being aware of it? Why would that power be necessary?
Finally, on the review hearing, clause 38(3) gives the court a broad power to simply
“discontinue the review hearing in any other circumstances.”
There is not much in the Bill that sets out why the court might want to do that and what factors would prompt a court to behave in that way. When is it envisaged that that would be necessary and why is there no more detail about that in the Bill?
The Minister for Security (Stephen McPartland)
I will respond to the questions as I go through my speech. I am always happy to take interventions.
Clause 35 mirrors the terrorism prevention and investigation measures and sets out the function and powers of the court on an application by the Secretary of State to obtain permission before imposing measures on an individual, as required under condition E of clause 33. The clause means that the court must apply judicial review principles and consider
“whether the relevant decisions of the Secretary of State are obviously flawed”.
The hon. Member for Halifax asked how many times decisions have been considered “obviously flawed” by the court and the answer is never; hopefully that gives some reassurance.
The Secretary of State will put the draft part 2 notice before the court. If the court considers that the decisions that conditions A, B or C are met were obviously flawed, it may not give permission to impose the notice. If the court considers that the decisions relating to condition D were obviously flawed, the court can give directions to the Secretary of State on the specific measures while otherwise permitting the notice to be imposed—again, there are more safeguards.
The court may assess the Secretary of State’s application without the potential subject of the measures being aware. That is important because, as the hon. Member for Halifax made clear, it prevents the individual from receiving notice that the measure could be imposed on them and obviously stops them running away and absconding.
Once the measures are imposed, the subject will of course have the right to an automatic full review by the High Court where the individual will be present and have legal representation. For any closed proceedings in the review hearing, there will be a special advocate to act in the subject’s interest. I have checked that the special advocate cost will be met by the Home Office for both parties. The review hearing is where the court will apply a high level of scrutiny to the Secretary of State’s decisions. The Government feel it is right that, rather than at the initial stage of obtaining court permission, the full scrutiny takes place at the second stage of court review, after the individual has had an opportunity to seek legal advice. We will come on to that in more detail.
Clause 36 gives effect to schedule 5, which makes provision for urgent cases in which the Secretary of State may, under clause 33(5)(b), impose measures on an individual without first obtaining the permission of the court. This provision has long-standing precedents: there are similar provisions relating to TPIMs in the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 and to control orders in the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005.
This urgent and exceptional power has never been used since the TPIMs regime was introduced. In all cases, it has been possible to obtain court permission in advance, and that will always be the preferred option. We do not expect the regime in this Bill to operate any differently. We have tried to put in place safeguards throughout the whole Bill. As I have said, the STPIMS are a last resort and it is all about trying to find other ways to prosecute.
As we know, the power will be used in rare and exceptional cases when there is an operational need to avoid any delay in taking measures that are considered necessary to protect the UK from a foreign power, threat or activity. We will come to oversight in later deliberations on this part of the Bill. To help the hon. Member for Halifax, I will say that I absolutely expect the person appointed to review the operation of this part to comment on the appropriateness of any use of the urgency process. I hope that provides reassurance.
Clause 37 ensures that there is timely and clear progress towards a full High Court review. The basis of the clause is, in essence, to ensure that in each case, when measures are imposed, a prompt and clear timeline is put in place, with the steps that need to be taken towards the subsequent full High Court review. The directions hearing must take place within seven days of a part 2 notice being served on the individual or, in an urgent case, within seven days of the notice being confirmed. Directions must then be set for a full review hearing to take place as soon as possible. The proceedings leading up to the full review hearing will be agreed by all parties.
The clause is not about the court considering the restrictions or the nature of the evidence; it is there more to ensure the speedy process of the approach to the full hearing. It is important that the hearing takes place speedily within that seven-day period, so that there is a direction of travel to ensure that subsequent oversight is well prescribed.
On clause 38, the involvement of the court is an important safeguard for the rights of the individual subject to the measures, and full judicial oversight of the process of imposing measures is key. As I alluded to earlier, clause 38 provides for a full High Court review to take place automatically in every single case in which state threat prevention and investigation measures are imposed. This will happen automatically, with no need for the individual to initiate the proceedings, in each case in which measures are imposed, subject only to the provisions that allow the discontinuance of proceedings included in subsection (3)—for example, if the person does not want the review to take place. Only the individual or court may make the decision to discontinue the proceedings, and the individual will always be able to make representations in respect of a proposal to discontinue.
At the full review, the function of the court is to review the decisions of the Secretary of State that conditions A, B, C and D were met at the time she made the decision and continue to be met at the time of the review. To remind the Committee, the decisions are that they reasonably believe the individual is or has been involved in foreign power threat activity; that some or all of that activity is new foreign power threat activity; that they reasonably consider that the imposition of STPIMs is necessary to protect the UK from the risk of action that constitutes foreign power threat activity; and finally, that they reasonably consider that it is necessary, for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in foreign power threat activity, for the specified measures to be imposed on the individual.
Clause 38 requires the courts to apply the principles that are applicable on an application for judicial review. As Committee members will be aware, the courts take the view that judicial review is a flexible tool that allows for differing degrees of intensity of scrutiny, depending on the circumstances and the impact of the decision in question on the individual concerned.
As well as setting out the functions of the court in a review, clause 38 sets out the powers available to the court, which may overturn the Secretary of State’s decisions in their entirety if it finds that they were unlawful. If the court finds that it was necessary to impose measures but one or more of the measures imposed was unlawful, the Bill is clear that the court may quash the particular measures or direct that they be varied, while also directing that the rest of the notice comes into force. That will provide a balance between being able to protect the UK and ensuring that the measures imposed represent the minimum necessary interference with the rights of the individual.
In addition to the function and powers of the court, clause 38 also makes provision for circumstances in which the review may be discontinued. The court must discontinue the review if the individual requests it—for example, if they do not wish to challenge the case against them. However, as a further safeguard, the Bill specifies that before the court may discontinue proceedings under the power the individual subject to the measures and the Secretary of State must have the opportunity to make representations.
It is imperative that the correct checks and balances are in place to govern the operation of STPIMs, and the Government consider that clause 38, together with other provisions in the Bill that provide the requirement for court permission before the imposition of measures and subsequent rights of appeal, will deliver rigorous end-to-end judicial oversight of the decisions taken by the Secretary of State in the exercise of her powers. The continuous involvement of the court will provide a key, important safeguard for the rights of the individual subject to the measures.
In summary, clauses 35, 36, 37 and 38 are exceptionally important for the Bill and I urge the Committee to support them.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 35 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 36 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 5 agreed to.
Clauses 37 and 38 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 39
Criminal investigations into foreign power threat activity
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Holly Lynch
Clause 39 creates a requirement on the Secretary of State to consult the chief officer of the police force that is investigating or would investigate any offence, acts or threats in clause 26(3) that could fall to have been committed by the individual, on whether there is evidence that could realistically be used to prosecute the individual. During the evidence session, it was asked whether STPIMs would be easier to secure than a prosecution, so I welcome the provision in clause 39 that a prosecution has to be considered before the move to a part 2 notice—to be fair to the Minister, he was clear about that earlier in today’s discussion. The clause will also give the chief officer a statutory duty to consult the relevant prosecuting authority.
I am mindful that there is a difference between consulting a chief constable for the purposes of information gathering with a view to securing a prosecution and the ongoing necessity of managing someone in their force area who is subject to an STPIM. Will the Minister confirm whether the Civil Nuclear Constabulary or Ministry of Defence police, for example, would be consulted under subsection (2), given their roles in protecting prohibited places, regardless of the fact that they do not have any of the regular responsibilities of the other forces in England and Wales beyond their specific duties? The chief officer must also keep the investigation of the individual’s conduct under review, with a view to bringing a prosecution for an offence, acts or threats under clause 26(3), and must report on that to the Secretary of State while the part 2 notice remains in force.
Stephen McPartland
Clause 39 sets out the detailed requirements relating to the interaction between criminal investigations and the imposition of the STPIM notice. I want to make it very clear that it is always the Government’s preference and priority to seek the prosecution of those engaged in state threat activity. Where we can prosecute, we will. However, we accept that there are and will continue to be dangerous individuals whom, despite our best efforts, we cannot prosecute, which is why we need preventive measures to protect the UK from the threat posed by that small number of dangerous individuals. We believe the provisions in the Bill represent the most appropriate, proportionate and effective powers for dealing with this risk.
The commitment to prosecution is properly reflected in clause 39, which deals with criminal investigations. It requires, before the imposition of an STPIM notice, prior consultation with the police as to whether there is
“evidence available that could realistically be used for the purposes of prosecuting the individual for an offence”
relating to state threats. The police must consult with the relevant prosecuting authority on the same matter before responding to the Secretary of State. The provision will ensure that STPIM notices are not imposed on an individual when prosecution for state threat offences is viable instead. The police will continue to investigate and will refer the case to the prosecuting authorities if sufficient evidence comes to light.
Clause 39 makes the ongoing review of the investigation of the individual’s conduct with a view to prosecution a statutory requirement. As mentioned, there should be absolutely no doubt about our absolute and unwavering commitment to prosecute individuals where possible, which is reflected in the clause. The counter-terrorism police will continue to have full responsibility for overseeing this matter but, if necessary, they will engage with all other forces to ensure a full case for prosecution. The better our chance of getting a full prosecution, the better our chance of not having to use a STPIM notice.
The Government believe prosecuting to be the best way to move forward. The only situation in which prosecution does not result will be when a case has not passed the relevant test in the code for Crown prosecutors. Our ambition is to prosecute at every single stage and use STPIMs as an absolute last resort.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 39 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 40
Review of ongoing necessity
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Holly Lynch
Clause 40 introduces a review of ongoing necessity, meaning that the Secretary of State has a duty to keep under review the necessity of a part 2 notice and the measures imposed under it while the notice is in force. Through case law, a parallel system was established for TPIMs, following the Court of Appeal ruling that
“it is the duty of the Secretary of State to keep the decision to impose a control order under review, so that the restrictions that it imposes, whether on civil rights or Convention rights, are no greater than necessary.”
We welcome the clause. In Jonathan Hall’s 2020 review of counter-terrorism legislation, he gave a review of the TPIM review group—the TRG—meetings, at which officials from the Home Office, counter-terrorism police and MI5 review the necessity and proportionality of TPIM measures, consider variations, discuss exit strategies, are updated on the prospects of criminal prosecution and consider the outcome of practical and ideological mentoring sessions. He said:
“The Home Office official chairing the meeting injected a proper degree of challenge to the ongoing management of the TPIM subject, including on the possibility of relaxing certain measures, and impact on family members. The TRG is conducted using a draft agenda which now requires consideration of each measure in turn: this is a clear improvement over the previous practice of considering the measures as a whole. Following my observations in previous reports, I am pleased to say that there is greater analysis of whether prosecution for terrorism offending is a reasonable alternative to a TPIM.”
In the first oral evidence session, Mr Hall said:
“The first message from the TPIMs is that you need to have a strong chair of the TPIM review group, or the equivalent”––[Official Report, National Security Public Bill Committee, 7 July 2022; c. 5, Q2.]
for the STPIMs.
The clause says only that a Secretary of State must keep the notice under review. Will the Minister confirm that an STPIMs review group will be a key feature of the ongoing assessment of an STPIM? How often will it meet? Will he confirm that the review group will be a primary mechanism for providing information to the Secretary of State, allowing them to make informed decisions?
Stephen McPartland
I will detain the Committee on this clause for only about an hour and a half. [Laughter.] I can feel the excitement. The Government recognise the disruptive nature of the measures on a person’s life. That is why the notice should remain in place only for as long as necessary and the measures imposed should remain tailored to the threat.
Clause 40 provides for an important safeguard by placing a duty on the Secretary of State to keep under review the ongoing necessity of both the STPIM notice itself and the measures specified in it. Regular monitoring to consider how the individual is responding to being on a STPIM, reviewing whether any new evidence has come to light for a prosecution to be possible and considering whether any changes are needed by varying the restrictions will remove any doubt that, while it remains in force, an STPIM notice will be assessed to ensure that it remains necessary at all times.
There were a few questions from the hon. Member for Halifax; I will try to answer them as best I can. There will be quarterly reviews and the individual will be able to appeal, as we discussed earlier in the debate. She is correct that reporting will be done quarterly. The review will be accountable to the Secretary of State and will be chaired by an expert civil servant and attended by operational partners. Here is the bit that the hon. Lady and our friends in the SNP will be most keen to hear about: as with TPIMs, there will be an independent reviewer to ensure that clause 40 and the whole of the STPIMs regime will be implemented correctly. I hope she can support the clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 40 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)
National Security Bill (Fifth sitting)
Stephen McPartland ExcerptsThursday 14th July 2022
(2 years, 4 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate National Security Act 2023 View all National Security Act 2023 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 14 July 2022 - (14 Jul 2022)
The Minister for Security (Stephen McPartland)
Although the Bill provides a range of offences specifically targeted at state threats activity, it will not always be appropriate or possible for harmful activity to be prosecuted under the Bill. Where offences already exist on the statute book that deal effectively with the relevant state threats activity, there is no need to create a similar offence in the Bill. For example, the offence of murder deals effectively with state-sponsored assassinations.
While the Bill provides a suite of offences and accompanying tools and powers, there remain cases in which it will be difficult to secure prosecution due to the covert nature of the activities and the difficulties involved in presenting admissible evidence to a court to illustrate all the components of an offence beyond reasonable doubt. In some cases, however, it might be possible or more appropriate to charge the individual with another offence on the statute book.
The aim of the aggravating factor in clauses 16 to 18 is to ensure that in such scenarios the state threats element is acknowledged in court and offenders are sentenced accordingly. The state threats aggravating factor will apply in cases where the foreign power condition—to which I have referred a number of times in Committee—is satisfied. Currently, if someone is convicted of an offence and it is known that the offence was linked to state threats activity, the judge may take that into account, but there is no formal mechanism to require the judge to factor that in when making a sentencing decision, and there are no clear definitions to enable the court to apply that consistently. This is in contrast to terrorism, where there is already a statutory requirement to acknowledge a terrorist connection when considering the seriousness of certain offences. That has been effective in cases such as those of the murder of Jo Cox MP, and Lee Rigby, where the seriousness of the offences was aggravated by the sentencing judge because of the terrorist connection, so a higher sentence was imposed.
The Government believe that the state threats aggravating factor should be available in relation to any offence. A state threat is a unique national security threat that can take a wide range of forms. We must ensure that our justice system is able to acknowledge all forms that such activity might take, and be able to penalise it accordingly.
Clause 19 ensures that the aggravating factor can apply to those who are convicted of offences in service courts. The service courts system applies to those who are bound by the Armed Forces Act 2006—for example, serving members of the armed forces. The state threats aggravating factor will apply in the same way in service courts as it does in civilian courts, in that if an offender pleads guilty to or is found guilty of an offence—for example, theft—and the foreign power condition is met, the offender’s sentence will be aggravated accordingly.
Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)
I support the proposals. My concern, which is one I will express throughout the passage of the Bill, is the Bill’s relationship with the Official Secrets Act 1989, under which the maximum penalty is two years. The Minister or his officials might not know the answer now, but I am happy for him to write to me. How will the two Acts intersect? Clearly, if someone has committed an offence, they will want to be found guilty under the Official Secrets Act, under which the sentencing powers are limited, as opposed to under the Act that this Bill will become. That will be the problem with the Bill—I still cannot understand why the Government did not do both: what they promised, which was the full reform, and a Bill for a new Official Secrets Act.
Stephen McPartland
As the right hon. Gentleman knows, we are reforming the first three Official Secrets Acts, but not the 1989 Act, with the Bill. We will write to him with the information to explain how that is going to work.
In summary, the aggravating factor provides another tool for prosecutors to deploy, and helps to future-proof the Bill by ensuring that our judicial system can respond to any evolving state threats and activity in the future.
Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Ms Ali. I very much welcome your early judgment call on jacket wearing; we are all eternally grateful.
Clause 16, as the Minister outlined, inserts new section 69A into the sentencing code to provide a new aggravating factor for sentencing when the foreign power condition is met in relation to an offence. The court will make its determination on the basis of the usual information before it for the purposes of sentencing, which may include the evidence heard at trial or evidence heard at a Newton hearing following a guilty plea. If the court determines that the foreign power condition is met in relation to conduct that constitutes the offence, it must treat that as an aggravating factor when sentencing the offender and must state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.
We are introducing a measure that will mean that, if an individual is found guilty of an offence that is not outlined in the Bill, but the foreign power condition can be proven, a judge may aggravate their sentence. On Second Reading, the Home Secretary provided a serious recent example to highlight why she felt the measure was needed, and we very much recognise the merit in that.
However, I note that a sentence would be aggravated only up to the maximum available for the original offence. I have sought a legal opinion about whether there is a precedent for aggravating an offence beyond the maximum sentence where deemed appropriate. Although the judge ultimately has discretion to sentence beyond the sentencing guidelines, it is far from common practice and will be subject to appeal.
I want to work through the application of the measure. For example, if someone acting on behalf of a foreign state were to commit a section 18 assault against someone who was going to speak at an event against that Government as a means of preventing them from honouring that commitment, it might be possible to prosecute them under some of the new offences in the Bill. If that is not the case and they are prosecuted for the section 18 assault, the foreign power condition having been met and the sentence aggravated, it is still subject only to the maximum sentence for a section 18 assault. I feel that the weight of the very serious sentences in this Bill will not be felt by the perpetrator in that instance.
Will the Minister outline why we are not able to push the sentences under clauses 16, 17 and 18 further? Will he comment on whether the usual so-called early plea discount will be ruled out in cases where the foreign power condition is met?
Clause 17 introduces the measure for offences in Northern Ireland, and clause 18 makes a corresponding provision to the one in clause 16 for sentences to be aggravated where the foreign power condition is met for offences in Scotland. Clause 19 amends the Armed Forces Act 2006 to make corresponding provision for service courts considering the seriousness of a serious offence for the purposes of sentencing. The case for tougher sentencing is even stronger in those circumstances, given that people serving in the armed forces and acting on behalf of our nation potentially have a level of access to the UK security apparatus that others do not have. We recognise the seriousness and necessity of these measures, and fully support them, but will the Minister address the points I have raised?
Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Ali. I have one very short point. I am very supportive of these measures. Clause 18, as we have heard, relates to Scotland. As I understand it, it operates and is drafted similarly to other aggravations in Scottish criminal law. I just want to be absolutely sure that the Government are collaborating closely with the Scottish Government to ensure it fits with the schemes in Scottish criminal law. What discussions has he had with compatriots up there?
Stephen McPartland
I am very grateful for hon. Members’ responses and support for these clauses, and I will try to provide clarity on the points made by the hon. Member for Halifax.
Serious offences that have a state threat component, such as murder and violent offences, already have significant penalties, as the hon. Lady said, and the aggravating factor will therefore allow for those sentences. However, she is right that for lower-level offences such as harassment, stalking or common assault, this would be a useful example of how these powers can be used if someone is not able to use some of the other clauses, so that they can identify that this person is part of the problem, and the person can at least be prosecuted for something, whereas at the moment it would not really be possible to prosecute them.
Also, the aggravating factor allows for an increase in the sentence, but within the sentencing code. The hon. Lady is correct that if it was a one-year sentence under the guidelines, the aggravating factor would be a maximum sentence of one year.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 16 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 17 to 19 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 20
Powers of search etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this, it will be convenient to consider the following: Government amendment 12.
That schedule 2 be the Second schedule to the Bill.
Stephen McPartland
Robust investigative tools are crucial to enable the police effectively to counter threats by state actors, which operate using highly sophisticated means and often have access to significant resources and are skilled in tradecraft.
Clause 20 introduces schedule 2, which provides the police with powers of search and seizure when investigating threats posed by state actors to the UK and its interests. These powers replace the power of search in section 9 of the Official Secrets Act 1911.
Under the existing powers and those provided in schedule 2, the police can act on a reasonable suspicion that a relevant act has been, or is about to be, committed. This threshold is a crucial element within the provisions to enable the police to act with the necessary speed to counter state threats activity.
Mr Jones
Can the Minister clarify what he means by “reasonable”? I know what it means in law, but I also know that there is a reasonableness test in the existing section 7 of the Act, which the security services say is not enough? So why is it okay here and it is not okay when it comes to clause 23?
Stephen McPartland
The difference is that under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, or PACE, the police need to be able to identify in this situation that a crime has been committed, whereas for this measure the police are trying to intervene earlier, so that they can stop a crime from being committed. Effectively, that is what the difference is.
We will debate clause 23 when we get to it—
Stephen McPartland
No, no—we will debate clause 23 when we get to it. I will be very happy to talk about clause 23 then.
Stephen McPartland
No. [Laughter.]
As I was saying, clause 20 introduces schedule 2 to the Bill. Under the existing powers and those provided by schedule 2, the police can act on a reasonable suspicion that a relevant act has been, or is about to be, committed.
The threshold is a crucial element within the provisions to enable the police to act with the necessary speed to counter state threats activity. General search and seizure powers, such as those provided under PACE, are comparatively restrictive because they do not allow the police to act pre-emptively when there is intelligence to indicate that an offence is about to be committed. So, both the Ministry of Justice in 2014 and the Law Commission in 2020 reviewed the existing power, concluding that it was necessary and that reliance on PACE powers alone would limit the ability of the police to disrupt and investigate state threats.
These powers may only be used to deal with the most serious offences covered by this Bill, as well as where state threats activity involves violence or constitutes a serious threat to life or public safety.
Turning to the powers themselves, part 1 of schedule 2 legislates for powers of search and seizure as they apply in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. They provide for the police to gain access to material likely to be evidence of a relevant act, which covers specific offences or certain acts or threats under the Bill.
Where the relevant act has been, or is about to be, committed the powers in part 1 of this schedule are different, depending on the nature of the material sought to reflect the enhanced safeguards that are required to protect confidential material.
Under paragraph 2, for non-confidential material, the police can obtain a warrant to enter and search premises and to seize and retain material. There are two key conditions that a court must be satisfied are met for such a warrant to be granted: first, that a relevant act has been, or is about to be, committed and, secondly, that the material sought on a premises is likely to be evidence of that act and is not confidential material. Should the police apply for an all-premises warrant, an additional condition applies: it must not be reasonably practicable to set out all the premises that the person of interest occupies or controls, but that may need to be searched. To access confidential material, a production order must be obtained, should this course fail or be unavailable through a warrant.
Stuart C. McDonald
I broadly welcome the provisions. As the hon. Member for Halifax said, they are extensive powers, so I am very sympathetic to her suggestion that they should be subject to review in the same way that other parts of the Bill are. I appreciate that those extensive powers are modelled on the equivalent provisions in terrorism legislation. I have no problem with those provisions being borrowed from such legislation, but they need to be justified in their own context. The Minister has usefully set out why exactly they are needed here. The SNP is broadly supportive of that.
I have a couple of questions. I am not familiar with the idea of allowing police officers or sheriffs to order a person to explain material that is seized. I see that is borrowed from terrorism legislation. However, I wonder how that works alongside the right not to require someone to self-incriminate, particularly when there is an emergency power for police officers to require an explanation—if that is not complied with, it can be a criminal offence. I am interested in how that works; I assume it works in the context of the terrorism legislation, but it would be interesting to hear a bit more about that. I am also interested in the idea of what a “great emergency” amounts to. That is not a concept that I have seen before. Are we talking about threat to life and limb, essentially? I am not sure about that.
My only other point is that how the provisions on search and seizure apply depends largely on how the foreign power condition operates. I said at the outset of our debates on clause 1 that I have some difficulties with how broadly some aspects of the term were drawn. For example, the non-governmental organisations I referred to during that debate and journalists working for a foreign state broadcaster can be brought within the foreign power condition, meaning that they are subject to the search-and-seizure powers. We can probably come back to that in the context of clause 1, but it is relevant to our discussion. It could be those people who are searched or who have documents seized under the schedule, including confidential journalistic material.
Those are a couple of points to emphasise, but we broadly support what is in the clause and the schedule.
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful for Members’ support. To sum up, the important thing is to recognise that between 2017 and 2022, the powers relating to great emergency have been used seven times in England and Wales and once in Scotland, and they have never once been used by a senior police officer during that five-year period. This will not happen weekly or monthly; it will be a very rare event. We are trying to mirror the legislation that has proven to be successful in the Terrorism Act 2000. The seven days figure also mirrors the legislation in that Act. I totally accept the point made by the hon. Member for Halifax: if the judge has the evidence in front of him and wants to make it a different time period, that is then a judicial decision as opposed to any other kind of decision.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2
Powers of entry, search and seizure
Amendment made: 12, in schedule 2, page 62, line 9, after “rules” insert “and magistrates’ courts rules”.—(Stephen McPartland.)
This amendment enables Northern Ireland magistrates’ courts rules to make provision about proceedings under Schedule 2.
Schedule 2, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 21
Arrest without warrant
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephen McPartland
Currently, the police must rely on the powers of arrest and detention available under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as we discussed earlier, when tackling state threats activity. In contrast, under the Terrorism Act 2000 the police have enhanced powers to facilitate early disruption and the investigation of acts of terrorism and terrorism-related activity.
The enhanced police powers are available for terrorism investigations and have proven very effective at tackling the threat. We consider the risks posed by state threats to be similar and to require enhanced powers and tools. Clause 21 creates a new arrest power whereby a constable can arrest without a warrant anyone who they reasonably suspect is or has been involved in foreign power threat activity. If an individual is arrested under clause 21, the further provisions in the clause and in schedule 3 will apply. We will debate the latter powers shortly.
The police must currently arrest an individual for a state threats offence under the arrest power in PACE. On arrest under PACE, the constable must specify the offence that the person is suspected of committing or being about to commit. For example, that could be foreign interference under clause 13 or obtaining or disclosing protected information under clause 1. As we all know, state threats actors are highly trained operatives, with police often needing to rely on sensitive intelligence to build their case and understand the threat that the suspect might pose to UK national security.
In some circumstances, police might have evidence to suspect an individual’s involvement in state threats activity but might not yet have the full picture to determine the intended offence. In such circumstances, where police have the intelligence to indicate that state threats activity is imminent, police can deploy the arrest power in order to prevent that person from committing the activity. That early disruption by the police is critical in saving time and ensuring that the activity is not allowed to occur. That prevents harm to UK national security and potentially prevents harm to people’s lives.
The clause is modelled on the similar arrest power that operates under the 2000 Act, which has been shown to be effective in providing the police with an early disruption tool. I ask the Committee to support the clause.
Stuart C. McDonald
The provisions are for very significant powers of arrest and people can remain under arrest for a quite striking period of time, so we should be cautious. The key issue for me is subsection (1), because arrest without a warrant is justified not by the suspicion of a specific event set out in the Bill, but by involvement in foreign power threat activity. Will the Minister say a little more about why that decision has been made?
We will obviously get to clause 26 and the definition of “foreign power threat activity” soon, but it is a much broader concept than being under suspicion of one of the particular offences in the Bill. It could be somebody providing assistance or support to individuals, or known to be involved in certain types of conduct. Why have these powers of arrest without warrant been drafted differently compared with the powers on search and seizure? The search-and-seizure powers relate to specific offences under the Bill. The power of arrest without warrant applies to a much broader category of people. Given the significance of the powers, and how long people can be detained for, it is important that we push the Minister a little bit further on why the Bill has been drafted in this way.
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful for the contributions and the general support. On safeguards, the powers mirror the powers in the Terrorism Act 2000, which are very important and have proven to be very disruptive, as well as useful and effective in keeping the country safe. It is critical that the police have strong powers of arrest and I outlined the reasons for that. Currently, a person can be detained for 24 hours. These provisions allow a detention for 48 hours, which would have to be reviewed periodically after 12 hours, so there are safeguards. The provisions mirror the 2000 Act, which has proven very effective and very disruptive.
On the question asked by the hon. Member for Halifax, the detention clock stops if the individual goes to hospital. If a warrant is refused, they can only be detained for 48 hours. These may appear to be very significant powers, but a person is not going to be held for a huge number of days.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 3
Detention Under Section 21
Holly Lynch
I beg to move amendment 45, in schedule 3, page 70, line 27, at end insert—
“(1A) A place designated by the Secretary of State under sub-paragraph (1) must be subject to an independent inspection by—
(a) Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, or
(b) a different person or body appointed by the Secretary of State.”
I will speak to amendment 45, tabled in my name and those of my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley and the shadow Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper). I will also address the wider schedule 3 powers.
The amendment reflects the place of detention powers at the start of schedule 3, which gives the Secretary of State the power to designate places at which persons may be detained under section 21. The Minister’s predecessor was asked repeatedly whether he could clarify what types of buildings could be designated places of detention beyond police stations on Second Reading. In response, he said:
“I do not think that this is an appropriate forum in which to discuss the detail of such measures, but I hope I can reassure my hon. Friend on that particular point. As I have said, this is to allow for cases in which such capacity is required owing to operational need, and it cannot be outside the United Kingdom.”—[Official Report, 6 June 2022; Vol. 715, c. 636.]
I am still not convinced about the provisions based on that response.
Mr Jones
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Ali. I have some sympathy with the amendment as I am always against things that give Ministers or the Executive broad powers. As my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax has already said, the powers seem to be unlimited. We are talking about national security and the confidence that we should have in our agencies to act in our interests, with the best of intentions and proper oversight, so the amendment is important. What does “any site in the UK” mean? My hon. Friend said that that was quite a broad power, and I want to ask about sites in the UK that are not under the control of the UK Government, such as US sites. Could Mildenhall airbase, a US airbase in the UK, be designated as one of these sites? I raise that because it limits UK authorities’ oversight and jurisdiction.
People may ask why that is important, but I am very conscious that we should always ensure that civil servants, Ministers and others have historical knowledge and take into account what happened in the past. I served on the Intelligence and Security Committee when we did our inquiry into detainee mistreatment and rendition in 2018. I have to say, it did not make for pretty reading. We did not shy away from the facts, and the actions of our agencies and certain Ministers—including some Ministers in the Government I served in—did not come out of that report very well. Guidance and regulations were put in place to ensure that did not happen again. I would like some clarity about whether such bases could be designated under this measure? Some of those sites could potentially have been used for what the ISC report on rendition highlights. They certainly were abroad, but this is about sites that are actually in the UK.
Stephen McPartland
I looked at the amendment in a lot of detail, and I discussed it with my officials and challenged them. I think the hon. Member for Halifax makes a very, very important point and has a strong case, and she will be delighted to know that, although I will resist the amendment today, I will commit to consider it and whether the Bill should clarify that only sites located in the UK can be designated as places of detention. I share her concerns about the possibility of rendition and stuff outside the UK. I will go into a bit more detail for her, and hopefully that will help the right hon. Member for North West Durham—
Stephen McPartland
Sorry—North Durham.
I am grateful for the way the hon. Member for Halifax has tried to help us improve the Bill. She has been constructive throughout.
Paragraph 1 provides a delegated power for the Secretary of State to designate places where someone may be detained after arrest for foreign power threat activity under clause 21. If arrested under PACE, suspects are taken to a designated police station and held in a custody cell, unless they are being questioned, when they will be in an interview room. When arrested under the Terrorism Act 2000, suspects are taken to a TACT custody suite. If a TACT suite is not available—for example, because the nearest one is located too far away—as an alternative a police station can be used.
There are five TACT suites in England and Wales, one in Scotland and one in Northern Ireland. Currently, they are all located inside police stations. Police use TACT suites in the first instance because they are designed to hold suspects for longer periods and address their specific personal needs. They are also designed to take into account the operational requirements for handling those suspects. For example, they are bigger and they ensure that, when multiple arrests have been made, suspects cannot communicate with other. The staff are also specially trained to deal with those types of suspects.
Under the designation power in paragraph 1, the Secretary of State will issue a certificate to the chief officer in charge of a facility to affirm its accreditation. The designation will be published through the routine Home Office circular update, so it will be publicly available to view. In order for a facility to be designated, it must meet the technical standards of custody suites set by the Home Office and Ministry of Justice. The power means that a bespoke custody suite or other suitable facilities built or identified in the future outside a police station, where they meet the standards above, can be designated as a place of detention by the Secretary of State. That is just future-proofing.
Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services already independently assesses the effectiveness and efficiency of police forces. It already regularly inspects police custody conditions and, in 2019, published a joint inspection with Her Majesty’s inspectorate of prisons of TACT custody suites in England and Wales.
Maria Eagle
The Minister has just given a great deal more information than is written in the Bill. Paragraph 1(1) states:
“The Secretary of State may designate places”,
and, at sub-paragraph (2), that
“a reference to a police station includes a reference to any place”
so designated. That could be a square in the middle of a field. Will the Minister consider inserting into the legislation some of the detail that he has just put on the record to make it clear that a specific power is being taken to designate more custody suites?
Stephen McPartland
As I have said, I am very interested in the amendment and am looking at possibly doing something along similar lines. I am trying to get the facts out. I heard what was said about the response on Second Reading so I am trying to be open and transparent and to put stuff on the record, in the official record of the sitting. I am doing the best that I can to be open, so that people are not concerned about rendition or people being taken overseas.
Maria Eagle
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way again. I am glad to hear about the amendment, but that is of course about inspecting such places. As he is doing more work, does he mind also taking away the suggestion that I have just made? He might like to make it clearer in the legislation that we are talking about custody suites and not about squares of ground in the middle of a field or any other such place.
Stephen McPartland
I am always happy to take away the hon. Lady’s suggestions.
My initial concern with the amendment is that, as drafted, it adds little value, just a statutory requirement for Her Majesty’s inspectorate to fulfil a role it is doing already. I note all the concerns of hon. Members, however—
Stephen McPartland
I have given the right hon. Gentleman the blink and he still wants to intervene.
Mr Jones
It takes a lot to get that in a Bill Committee. My hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood is right—this needs clarifying in the Bill. When the Minister goes away to think about it, will he look at and ask officials about the issue of those sites that are in the UK, but outside the control of Her Majesty’s Government? I will not say too much, but we occasionally work with organisations and countries in certain places in the UK, but do not control what goes on there. Will he reflect that when doing his work?
Stephen McPartland
I will come back to the right hon. Gentleman on that. As I have said, we will be designating sites and that information will be publicly available. I am not sure that he would want to make the information about the sites he mentions publicly available.
Mr Jones
But that is not what the Bill says at the moment, as my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood said. It gives sweeping powers to designate things, and I am always against giving such sweeping powers to the Executive—whether it is the present Government or the Government I was a member of—or to anyone. When the Minister comes back, clarification would be welcome, even if that is for the Bill to require publication.
Stephen McPartland
I hear what the right hon. Gentleman says. If the hon. Member for Halifax is kind enough to withdraw the amendment, I commit to considering it further. I will look to provide further clarity in the legislation.
Holly Lynch
I am very grateful to the Minister for the spirit in which he has responded, taking our concerns about this element of the Bill seriously. I am reassured by his commitment, that he understands what we are trying to achieve with the amendment and that he will seek the best way to deliver that in the Bill.
Slightly separately, the clarity and detail that he has been able to provide about the minimum standards for the places of detention were welcome. In addition to putting that on the record today, however, I think that he has understood the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood on the need for it to be put on the face of the Bill and that he will continue to have a positive personal impact on some of the detail of the provisions. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Stephen McPartland
I beg to move amendment 13, in schedule 3, page 81, line 26, leave out sub-paragraph (3) and insert—
“(3) In any other case, paragraph 19 material must be destroyed unless it is retained under any power conferred by paragraphs 20 or 21.”
This amendment and Amendments 15, 18 and 22 make provision for the indefinite retention of fingerprints, data and other samples taken from a person who is or previously has been convicted of a specified offence.
Stephen McPartland
As we have discussed, clause 21 provides for a state threats power of arrest. If an individual is arrested under that power, the further provisions in schedule 3 will apply. As part of that, schedule 3 provides for a new regime whereby biometric data, such as fingerprints and DNA profiles, that are collected on arrest for foreign power threat activity may be retained for an initial period of three years, with the option to extend the retention period for a further two years where considered necessary. A similar provision is made in schedule 9 for those subject to state threats prevention and investigation measures, or STPIMS. These are the same timeframes and procedures that operate for arrest under the Terrorism Act 2000—once again, we are trying to mirror the terrorism legislation.
The group covers a number of technical Government amendments to the biometric regimes in schedules 3 and 9. I turn first to amendments 13, 15, 18, 22, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 36, which relate to the indefinite retention of biometric data in certain circumstances. Again, the amendments put the new retention regime in line with what already operates for arrests made under PACE and the Terrorism Act. The law rightly sets strict limits on how long biometric data, such as fingerprints and DNA, can be retained where a person is investigated but ultimately not convicted of an offence. In certain circumstances, including under the Bill, biometric data taken in the course of an investigation can be retained for longer periods, and further retention of that data can be authorised, but the principle is that the data will be deleted unless further retention is specifically provided for. Where a person has been previously convicted of an offence, their biometric data can be retained indefinitely, subject to the requirement for ongoing review that is set out in the Data Protection Act 2018.
Both the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Terrorism Act 2000 allow for the indefinite retention of biometric data taken during an investigation, if it is found that an individual has previously been convicted of a recordable offence. This means that if an individual has previously been convicted of any offence that could carry a term of imprisonment, their biometric data taken during any new investigation can be held on the police national database indefinitely, irrespective of the outcome of that new investigation.
Maria Eagle
Generally, these are very sensible measures. There has obviously been some major redrafting of the schedule for the Government amendments to be necessary, and it would be interesting to hear why that is. I am looking at Government amendment 18, which says:
“For the purposes of paragraph 20, a person is to be treated as having been convicted of an offence if…the person has been found not guilty of the offence by reason of insanity”.
Why is that instance included here? The person has been found not guilty by reason of insanity. They have not admitted the offence, unlike in the situation described in proposed new paragraph 20A(1)(a)(i), whereby a person has received a caution and admitted the offence. By contrast, this person has been found not guilty.
Stephen McPartland
I know, and I will write to the hon. Lady, because I do not know the answer.
As we have already discussed in Committee, state threats activity poses a serious and enduring risk to UK security, and the Bill must provide law enforcement agencies with the tools they need to combat hostile activity. Indefinite retention of biometric data enables the police and the security services to use the data to support investigations into state threats offences and other criminal activity. That mirrors the approach taken in PACE and the Terrorism Acts.
Given that threat, it is right that where an individual with a previous conviction for a recordable offence is arrested under the state threats arrest power in clause 21, or is subject to a STPIMs notice, biometric data taken under those regimes should be retained indefinitely. Accordingly, the amendments provide for indefinite retention of biometric data in these circumstances in schedules 3 and 9 respectively.
Out of an abundance of caution, the provisions were not included when the Bill was introduced while we considered the questions raised by the Gaughran judgment. Based on the UK response to that judgment, I am pleased to confirm to the Committee that these provisions are indeed compatible with the European convention on human rights and, therefore, should be included in the Bill.
As highlighted, state threats investigations can be complex and resource-intensive. By bringing forward the amendments, we are strengthening the ability of the police to use biometric data to support criminal investigations. Not agreeing to the amendments would create a position where the police’s ability to retain biometric data of a person with a previous recordable conviction would be more restricted than in other cases.
Aligning our approach with that of TACT and PACE ensures consistency in respect of biometric regimes. The requirement for ongoing review of retention, in accordance with the Data Protection Act 2018, ensures that interference with the right to respect the private and family life of persons to whom the data belongs is necessary, proportionate and in accordance with the law. I will now speak briefly to the remaining amendments in the group, which are comparatively minor and technical.
Stuart C. McDonald
Before the Minister moves on, I get the general thrust of why those amendments have been tabled but my concern is the inclusion of people who have accepted a caution or even a youth caution. It seems quite extreme to make them subject to lifelong retention of significant information on them. They have not been tried and the fact that they have had a caution means that, presumably, the circumstances were not the most serious. Does he have anything to say about those circumstances?
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful for the intervention. What we are trying to do is to mirror what is in TACT and PACE to keep the regimes identical so there are not different ones for different areas. Obviously, if someone has accepted a caution, they have in essence accepted that they were guilty of an offence—they have just not proceeded to court.
Maria Eagle
Would not an additional safeguard in those circumstances be to ensure that before a youth caution is offered and accepted in any given case, it is made clear to the individual concerned that if they were to accept it, it would mean the retention of their data for their entire life? In those circumstances, the individual concerned could consider whether they really wanted to accept the caution or go for a trial.
Stephen McPartland
The hon. Lady makes an important point. I would add that it is “may” be held indefinitely not “will”. There is still an element of choice and discretion.
Maria Eagle
The Minister is correct about that, but perhaps the individual who may be considering accepting a youth caution and their adviser ought to be advised, before they do so, that there “may” be a consequence of biometric data and so on being kept for that person’s entire life, so they can make a proper decision about whether they want to accept the caution in full knowledge of the potential consequences.
Stephen McPartland
My understanding is that that what happens under TACT and PACE, and that would be the intention for what would happen under this legislation, so the regimes mirror each other.
Amendments 16 and 17 to schedule 3 separate the reference to the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland from those in England and Wales in the list of chief officers who can extend the period of biometric retention. They make no practical change to the provisions.
Amendments 14, 25 and 27 address some unnecessary duplication in the list of databases against which biometric data obtained under the powers in schedules 3 and 9 can be searched. Amendment 26 provides that data obtained under the powers in schedule 9 can be searched against data taken under the provisions of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011.
Stuart C. McDonald
I do not need to say much more. The Minister understands from my intervention that I have some reservations about the lifelong retention of the materials. I shall give that further thought. Other parts of the relevant amendment are perfectly sensible, so I will not oppose the amendment at this stage. Further thought should be given to it, though. The Government have explained a number of times how they are copying what is in the counter-terrorism legislation, which is fine and understandable but does not in of it itself justify the measures in this sphere of behaviour. I will look at the matter again. I want to put on the record that I am slightly uneasy about that type of provision.
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful for the support for the amendments.
Amendment 13 agreed to.
Amendments made: 14, in schedule 3, page 82, line 22, leave out “or 42”.
This amendment removes reference to paragraph 42 of Schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 from a list of provisions under which fingerprints, data and other samples may be taken. Reference to paragraph 42 is not needed because its contents are already covered by paragraph (e).
Amendment 15, in schedule 3, page 82, line 26, leave out sub-paragraph (2) and insert—
“(2) Paragraph 19 material may be retained indefinitely if—
(a) the person has previously been convicted—
(i) of a recordable offence (other than a single exempt conviction), or
(ii) in Scotland, of an offence which is punishable by imprisonment, or
(b) the person is so convicted before the end of the period within which the material may be retained by virtue of this paragraph.
(2A) In sub-paragraph (2)—
(a) the reference to a recordable offence includes an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom where the act constituting the offence would constitute—
(i) a recordable offence under the law of England and Wales if done there, or
(ii) a recordable offence under the law of Northern Ireland if done there,
(and, in the application of sub-paragraph (2) where a person has previously been convicted, this applies whether or not the act constituted such an offence when the person was convicted);
(b) the reference to an offence in Scotland which is punishable by imprisonment includes an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom where the act constituting the offence would constitute an offence under the law of Scotland which is punishable by imprisonment if done there (and, in the application of sub-paragraph (2) where a person has previously been convicted, this applies whether or not the act constituted such an offence when the person was convicted).
(2B) Paragraph 19 material may be retained until the end of the retention period specified in sub-paragraph (3) if—
(a) the person has no previous convictions, or
(b) the person has only one exempt conviction.”
See Amendment 13.
Amendment 16, in schedule 3, page 83, line 37, leave out “and Northern Ireland”.
This amendment and Amendment 17 clarify the identity of the specified chief officer of police in Northern Ireland.
Amendment 17, in schedule 3, page 84, line 5, at end insert “, and
(c) the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, where—
(i) the person from whom the material was taken resides in Northern Ireland, or
(ii) the chief constable believes that the person is in, or is intending to come to, Northern Ireland.”
See Amendment 16.
Amendment 18 in schedule 3, page 84, line 5, at end insert—
“20A (1) For the purposes of paragraph 20, a person is to be treated as having been convicted of an offence if—
(a) in relation to a recordable offence in England and Wales or Northern Ireland—
(i) the person has been given a caution or youth caution in respect of the offence which, at the time of the caution, the person has admitted,
(ii) the person has been found not guilty of the offence by reason of insanity, or
(iii) the person has been found to be under a disability and to have done the act charged in respect of the offence,
(b) the person, in relation to an offence in Scotland punishable by imprisonment, has accepted or has been deemed to accept—
(i) a conditional offer under section 302 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995,
(ii) a compensation offer under section 302A of that Act,
(iii) a combined offer under section 302B of that Act, or
(iv) a work offer under section 303ZA of that Act,
(c) the person, in relation to an offence in Scotland punishable by imprisonment, has been acquitted on account of the person’s insanity at the time of the offence or (as the case may be) by virtue of section 51A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995,
(d) a finding in respect of the person has been made under section 55(2) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 in relation to an offence in Scotland punishable by imprisonment,
(e) the person, having been given a fixed penalty notice under section 129(1) of the Antisocial Behaviour etc. (Scotland) Act 2004 in connection with an offence in Scotland punishable by imprisonment, has paid—
(i) the fixed penalty, or
(ii) (as the case may be) the sum which the person is liable to pay by virtue of section 131(5) of that Act, or
(f) the person, in relation to an offence in Scotland punishable by imprisonment, has been discharged absolutely by order under section 246(3) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
(2) Paragraph 20 and this paragraph, so far as they relate to persons convicted of an offence, have effect despite anything in the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 or the Rehabilitation of Offenders (Northern Ireland) Order 1978 (S.I. 1978/1908 (N.I. 27)).
(3) But a person is not to be treated as having been convicted of an offence if that conviction is a disregarded conviction or caution by virtue of section 92 or 101A of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.
(4) For the purposes of paragraph 20—
(a) a person has no previous convictions if the person has not previously been convicted—
(i) in England and Wales or Northern Ireland of a recordable offence, or
(ii) in Scotland of an offence which is punishable by imprisonment, and
(b) if the person has previously been convicted of a recordable offence in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, the conviction is exempt if it is in respect of a recordable offence, other than a qualifying offence, committed when the person was under 18 years of age.
(5) In sub-paragraph (4) ‘qualifying offence’—
(a) in relation to a conviction in respect of a recordable offence committed in England and Wales, has the meaning given by section 65A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and
(b) in relation to a conviction in respect of a recordable offence committed in Northern Ireland, has the meaning given by Article 53A of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (S.I. 1989/1341 (N.I. 12)).
(6) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4)—
(a) a person is to be treated as having previously been convicted in England and Wales of a recordable offence if—
(i) the person has previously been convicted of an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, and
(ii) the act constituting the offence would constitute a recordable offence under the law of England and Wales if done there (whether or not it constituted such an offence when the person was convicted);
(b) a person is to be treated as having previously been convicted in Northern Ireland of a recordable offence if—
(i) the person has previously been convicted of an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, and
(ii) the act constituting the offence would constitute a recordable offence under the law of Northern Ireland if done there (whether or not it constituted such an offence when the person was convicted);
(c) a person is to be treated as having previously been convicted in Scotland of an offence which is punishable by imprisonment if—
(i) the person has previously been convicted of an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, and
(ii) the act constituting the offence would constitute an offence punishable by imprisonment under the law of Scotland if done there (whether or not it constituted such an offence when the person was convicted);
(d) the reference in sub-paragraph (4)(b) to a qualifying offence includes a reference to an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom where the act constituting the offence would constitute a qualifying offence under the law of England and Wales if done there or (as the case may be) under the law of Northern Ireland if done there (whether or not it constituted such an offence when the person was convicted).
(7) For the purposes of paragraph 20 and this paragraph—
(a) ‘offence’, in relation to any country or territory outside the United Kingdom, includes an act punishable under the law of that country or territory, however it is described;
(b) a person has in particular been convicted of an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom if—
(i) a court exercising jurisdiction under the law of that country or territory has made in respect of such an offence a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is not guilty by reason of insanity, or
(ii) such a court has made in respect of such an offence a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is under a disability and did the act charged against the person in respect of the offence.
(8) If a person is convicted of more than one offence arising out of a single course of action, those convictions are to be treated as a single conviction for the purposes of calculating under paragraph 20 whether the person has been convicted of only one offence.”
See Amendment 13.
Amendment 19, in schedule 3, page 84, line 21, at end insert—
“(ca) the Chief Constable of the Ministry of Defence Police,
(cb) the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police Force, or”.
This amendment enables the Chief Constables of the Ministry of Defence Police and the British Transport Police Force to make a national security determination in relation to fingerprints, data and other samples.
Amendment 20, in schedule 3, page 89, line 36, leave out paragraphs (j) to (l).
This amendment removes reference to the Royal Navy Police, the Royal Military Police and the Royal Air Force Police from the definition of “police force”. Those forces should not be included in that definition because members of those forces do not have the power to obtain fingerprints, data or other samples under Schedule 3.
Amendment 21, in schedule 3, page 90, leave out lines 1 to 3.
This amendment removes reference to the tri-service serious crime unit from the definition of “police force”. Members of that unit should not be included in that definition because they do not have the power to obtain fingerprints, data or other samples under Schedule 3.
Amendment 22, in schedule 3, page 90, line 3, at end insert—
“‘recordable offence’ —
(a) in relation to a conviction in England and Wales, has the meaning given by section 118(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and
(b) in relation to a conviction in Northern Ireland, has the meaning given by Article 2(2) of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (S.I. 1989/1341 (N.I. 12));”
See Amendment 13.
Amendment 23, in schedule 3, page 90, leave out lines 6 to 24 and insert—
“‘responsible chief officer of police’ means—
(a) in relation to fingerprints or samples taken by a constable of the Ministry of Defence Police, or a DNA profile derived from a sample so taken, the Chief Constable of the Ministry of Defence Police;
(b) in relation to fingerprints or samples taken by a constable of the British Transport Police Force, or a DNA profile derived from a sample so taken, the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police Force;
(c) otherwise—
(i) in relation to fingerprints or samples taken in England or Wales, or a DNA profile derived from a sample so taken, the chief officer of police for the relevant police area;
(ii) in relation to relevant physical data or samples taken or provided in Scotland, or a DNA profile derived from a sample so taken, the chief constable of the Police Service of Scotland;
(iii) in relation to fingerprints or samples taken in Northern Ireland, or a DNA profile derived from a sample so taken, the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland.”
This amendment and Amendment 24 make provision identifying the responsible chief officer of police in relation to fingerprints or samples taken by a constable of the Ministry of Defence Police or the British Transport Police Force.
Amendment 24, in schedule 3, page 90, line 24, at end insert—
“(2) In the definition of ‘responsible chief officer of police’ in sub-paragraph (1), in paragraph (c)(i), ‘relevant police area’ means the police area—
(a) in which the material concerned was taken, or
(b) in the case of a DNA profile, in which the sample from which the DNA profile was derived was taken.”—(Stephen McPartland.)
See Amendment 23.
Question proposed, That schedule 3, as amended, be the Third schedule to the Bill.
Holly Lynch
I want to conclude some earlier remarks that I made as part of the discussion on amendment 45 and the discussion on some of the Government amendments. There is an awful lot going on in schedule 3. I repeat the point: it is massive—it is 32 pages of powers. An ongoing consideration of the implications of all those powers is quite a significant undertaking. That is why I come back to making the case for new clause 2, which would ensure that part 1 of the Bill is subject to the same ongoing scrutiny as part 2, under clause 49, and as counter-terrorism legislation, which a great deal of this Bill is already based on.
We have talked about part 1 of the schedule; the delay in the exercise of rights under part 2 should also be kept under review, alongside the points about the retention of biometrics that were made by right hon. and hon. Members. Even if the Minister cannot share with the Committee some justification for all the measures today, I very much hope he will discuss that further with the Intelligence and Security Committee in the deliberations on the Bill that he has promised to have with the ISC.
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her support. I know that we will debate things later on. As I have said, we are currently in discussions about how we can securely provide further information to help to provide further clarity. I cannot say more than that.
Question put and agreed to.
Schedule 3, as amended, accordingly agreed to.
Clause 22
Border security
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephen McPartland
Under schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, counter-terrorism police have the power to stop, question and, if necessary, detain and search individuals travelling through the UK border. As part of a schedule 3 examination, counter-terrorism police are able to retain protected materials by following a lengthy authorisation process. Protected materials include confidential business and journalistic material, as well as legally privileged material. The powers are a vital tool for counter-terrorism police and form part of a range of national security checks that enable the determination of whether a person at a UK port or border area has current or previous involvement in hostile state activity.
The use of protected materials in investigations, particularly confidential business material, can be a helpful insight into a person’s involvement in hostile state activity, whether it be espionage or a disinformation campaign. To use protected materials seized during a schedule 3 examination, an examining officer must currently seek authorisation from the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, who is a serving or retired High Court judge. In most cases, the material must not be examined or used for investigations until authorisation has been granted. Currently, that can take up to six weeks.
Clause 22 will remove the definition of confidential business material—material defined as acquired in the course of trade—from the definition of protected material under schedule 3. This will remove the requirement for the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to authorise the retention of copies of confidential business material. The Bill will replace that authorisation process with a new safeguard: the requirement for a counter-terrorism police officer of at least the rank of superintendent to authorise access to such material.
The clause will bring the schedule 3 safeguards for confidential material into line with those that apply to schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000. It will mean that police do not face lengthy and unnecessary delays to examining material in a schedule 3 stop.
Mr Jones
I have some sympathy with this clause; the Investigatory Powers Commissioner has a big job on their hands anyway. I wonder whether the Minister could say whether he has given any thought to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner not just looking at the material and giving it authorisation but having retrospective powers to dip in and see whether things have been done correctly.
Stephen McPartland
I will take that idea away and consider it. We do not want to enable somebody at the border to say that something is confidential material so that the police cannot look at it for up to six weeks. That would just be the easiest defence. We are dealing with incredibly sophisticated experts and they will know what to say to ensure that the material will be held in abeyance.
The Government are only amending the safeguards for confidential business material and will not change the authorisation safeguard for other material within the definition of protected material or confidential journalistic material, for which judicial authorisation is a proportionate safeguard. I am sure Members agree that it is only right that the security services should be able to use critical information in real time during a schedule 3 examination to address live national security risks posed to the UK. I assure Members that this essential amendment to schedule 3 to the 2019 Act will strengthen and streamline state threats investigations to disrupt and deter hostile state activity.
Holly Lynch
The drafting of clause 22 is complicated and I have had to speak to a number of experts to try to unravel it. It amends schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, as the Minister outlined. In essence, it allows examining officers a right to confidential material that would currently require the authorisation of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. I am grateful to the commissioner, Sir Brian Leveson, in his capacity as the independent reviewer of schedule 3, and his office for their insight on the clause.
If I have understood it correctly—I am sure the Minister will correct me if I have not—the clause amends schedule 3 to the 2019 Act to reflect the position of schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000. Schedule 3 subjects are far more likely to possess confidential business records than those stopped under schedule 7. That means the requirement for judicial approval is engaged in the majority of schedule 3 stops. It is therefore important to assess whether the requirement for a judicial authorisation in such cases is necessary and proportionate, taking into account both the sensitivity of the category of protected material and the purpose of the statute specifically to counter hostile state activity.
The Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office said
“We are not aware of any other statute that requires judicial authorisation for the retention of confidential business records acquired direct from a person in a public setting such as a port”.
The closest is perhaps schedule 1 to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, commonly known as PACE, although this is restricted to material on private premises. There is no requirement in PACE to seek judicial authorisation to seize or retain confidential business material found during the search of a person in a public place, or if such material is unexpectedly encountered on private premises.
Confidential business records are protected in PACE as “special procedure material” because they have a degree of special sensitivity that Parliament has decided merits certain access requirements in the context of criminal investigations. The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 does not include any similar requirement for judicial authorisation to acquire confidential business records using covert investigatory powers. The sensitivity of this category of material is not the same as that of legally privileged or journalistic material, the safeguards for which will not be affected by the proposed amendment to schedule 3—I hope the Minister can confirm that that is the case.
The statutory purposes in schedule 3 go well beyond criminal investigations and include national security or protecting life and limb. On that basis, it seems unlikely that the interests of the business, trade or profession would outweigh the interests of national security in any circumstances, or that judicial authorisation should be necessary for the retention and use of confidential business records in circumstances that might prevent death or serious injury.
Having considered those points in the round, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner has concluded that the Home Office’s proposals to replace judicial authorisation for confidential business records with one of internal authorisation from a senior officer strike the right balance and align the definition of confidential material with that of the 2016 Act. Inevitably, that view has very much shaped our judgement on clause 22, but I suggest that it is another area where keeping the provisions under review to mitigate any unintended consequences is the responsible thing to do.
Let me turn to who has the powers to make and retain copies of confidential material. Page 35 of the explanatory notes outline that “examining officers” have that power. However, schedule 7 to the 2000 Act defines an examining officer as a constable, immigration officer or a customs officer. In paragraph (j) of the policy background section of the explanatory notes, it states that part 1 amends schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019
“to allow counter-terrorism police officers to retain copies of confidential business material…without the authorisation of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. This will allow counter-terrorism police to progress operations and investigations into state threats…at the required pace and reflects the position in schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000”.
Paragraph 17 of schedule 3 to the 2019 Act, on the power to make and retain copies, confirms that the examining officer, only when they are “a constable”, can retain copies when necessary and potentially needed as evidence in criminal proceedings. The references to various different roles in the different supporting documents to the Bill make it a bit of a mess. I was listening carefully to the Minister, but I would like further clarity about who has the powers. Given that we have references to examining officers—who can have different roles—to counter-terrorism police specifically and to an examining officer who can be a constable, I wonder whether the Minister can tidy it up for us on the record and be explicit about who has the powers at the border.
Stephen McPartland
My understanding is that the amendment of the authorisation safeguards to access confidential business material in schedule 3 brings it completely into line with other policing powers. It is not likely that access to confidential business material would be subject to a higher level of safeguarding where there is already consistent precedent set by PACE 1984, the IPA 2016 and schedule 7 to the 2000 Act. As we have said, it does not affect legal, profession or journalistic material, and the provisions are reviewed by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as part of their statutory function. Only trained counter-terrorism officers will be able to use the powers. I hope that provides the clarity that the hon. Lady requires.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)
National Security Bill (Sixth sitting)
Stephen McPartland ExcerptsThursday 14th July 2022
(2 years, 4 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate National Security Act 2023 View all National Security Act 2023 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 14 July 2022 - (14 Jul 2022)
The Minister for Security (Stephen McPartland)
This is the clause that many of us have been looking forward to. I am not going to take interventions during my speech; I will set out the reasons why I believe the clause is correct, then I will listen carefully to speeches from hon. Members and then sum up.
Collaboration with key international partners is a vital part of intelligence and national security work. We cannot maximise our national security capabilities and keep people safe without sharing intelligence and benefiting from the capabilities and expertise of our close and trusted allies. Those individuals who work on behalf of the UK are highly skilled and experienced in ensuring that UK activity is necessary and proportionate. Domestic and international law is applied to all activities and there are robust safeguards in place.
The Serious Crime Act 2007 creates offences when an act is done that is
“capable of encouraging or assisting”
an offence and the person “intends” or believes that their act may encourage or assist an offence. Those offences, which were predominantly introduced to ensure that law enforcement had the tools to tackle those orchestrating serious organised crime, are complex and create an incredibly low threshold for liability. There is no minimum level of contribution to the offence that may be encouraged or assisted. The contribution can be small, it can be indirect, and there is no need for an offence to be ultimately committed.
At present, the UK intelligence community and armed forces are required to apply those complex offences to the many and varied scenarios in which they work with our international partners to help protect the UK. They exercise significant caution in their engagement with partners to prevent SCA thresholds being met and the risk of liability for individuals being realised. The impact of that approach is that vital and otherwise legal intelligence opportunities are currently being delayed or missed as the SCA risks are worked through.
There is also an important point of principle here. The Serious Crime Act offences mean that it is the individuals working within intelligence, security and military organisations who carry the risk of liability, despite operating within all authorisations and in the interests of UK national security.
The Committee heard oral evidence from both Sir Alex Younger, the former head of MI6, and Sir David Omand, the former head of GCHQ, on the fairness and appropriateness of individual officers carrying this risk. They believe that the liability risk sitting with individuals is “not right”, and is “morally wrong”. The Government agree with them and do not think it is right or fair to expect the risk of liability to sit with individuals who are acting on behalf of our intelligence services or armed forces for their authorised purposes. Instead, responsibility should sit with the UK intelligence community and the armed forces at an institutional level, where they are subject to executive, judicial and parliamentary oversight.
The clause removes criminal liability for offences of encouraging or assisting crime, but only where the activity is necessary for the proper exercise of the functions of the security and intelligence services or the armed forces in support of activity taking place overseas. This is not a broad general immunity from prosecution; rather we are amending a targeted piece of legislation in response to specific operational issues that are impacting the ability to keep us safe today.
The clause means that in instances where an individual has operated in good faith and in compliance with proper processes they would not face the risk of liability for the offences under the SCA. The risk I have outlined would be removed for activity that we ask of individuals in the course of their roles in keeping us safe.
I am confident that the SCA amendment is appropriate and proportionate, because the UK has one of the most rigorous intelligence oversight regimes in the world. There are myriad safeguards and processes in place that manage the way that UKIC and the MOD work with and exchange information with international partners to prevent potential wrongdoing.
I also have confidence in those we are providing protection to. They are expert and highly trained men and women undertaking intelligence and security work, whose judgment and skill we should respect and have faith in. Of course, those working with our international partners will still need to comply with all other domestic and international law and be beholden to the statutory frameworks and policies that govern the UK intelligence community and armed forces activity.
The policies include the overseas security and justice assistance guidance and the Fulford principles, the implementation of which is assessed by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner annually and reported to the Prime Minister. That means that clause 23 does not in any way make torture legal, for example. UKIC’s activities also remain under the regular inspection of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office—
Stephen McPartland
I am not giving way. And they are regularly scrutinised by the Intelligence and Security Committee.
Stephen McPartland
The right hon. Gentleman will have the opportunity to make his own speech, and I will listen.
Let me also be clear that clause 23 will not enable activity by individuals who, acting outside the proper functions of their organisations, contribute to criminal activity by others or commit criminal offences themselves. We will retain the ability to prosecute anyone for other offences should their behaviour in support of international partners amount to a criminal offence. Further, it will not remove the ability to challenge the UK intelligence community or armed forces on their activities through judicial review, civil damages claims, or a complaint to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal in relation to the use of intrusive powers.
To conclude, clause 23 is really about supporting UKIC and armed forces officers, who we ask to undertake vital work on our behalf, by ensuring that when they work with our partners in good faith, according to wider domestic and international law, and in support of vital national security aims to keep this country safe, they do not risk personal criminal liability for any actions of that partner state. Responsibility for any action that we cannot support should surely sit at an institutional level, which is what will be the case under clause 23.
Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)
It will come as no surprise to the Minister—we have had the opportunity to discuss this—that we are extremely concerned about clause 23, which amends the Serious Crime Act 2007. We have had the opportunity to discuss this privately with the Minister and his predecessor, and with the UK intelligence community directly, and I am minded of just how much detail of those conversations we might want to put on the record. The clause was a big focus for Members from across the House on Second Reading. As the Minister knows, crucially, it did not have the support of members of the Intelligence and Security Committee, which has statutory responsibility for oversight of the UK intelligence community.
The Labour Party will always work with the intelligence services to find solutions to any barriers that they face in undertaking their invaluable work and keeping the UK safe. As things stand, we have been unable to get an operational understanding of exactly what is broken and requires fixing. I have heard directly from the security services about why they believe they need clause 23—the Minister has sought to outline that again in his contribution. Schedule 4 to the Serious Crime Act allows for a risk of liability to individuals conducting their proper functions on behalf of the UK intelligence community. An offence can arise where support—for example, intelligence sharing—provided in good faith later makes a small or indirect contribution to unlawful activity by an international partner. The security services are keen to convey that their caution in this regard is having an operational impact that requires a resolution.
Stephen McPartland
I wanted to be very clear earlier—I wanted to make a point. I agree that the Government will give the ISC examples.
Mr Jones
That is very welcome, but we do not just want that in writing—we want to have the agency heads actually come and speak. I think we have a meeting with them scheduled for some time in October. We would like to get them to come and argue why they need these changes. We need that as well.
The Minister might need to give it a bit more thought, too. I accept that he is new to his post, and he obviously has time to look at this over the summer—depending on what happens at the beginning of September. I know that I have poked fun at the Minister, but we get on well, we have worked closely on other Committees and I even got him promoted on a Committee once, which he was eternally grateful for. Can he just look at the oversight, too? If the Bill does go through, what are the oversight mechanisms for it?
Maria Eagle
It would be a very high bar to get over. If we are being told—there was an element of this in the evidence we heard—that there is a chilling effect on individuals trying to do their jobs, those individuals may need to be a bit better trained in what the law says, what it means and what they are able to do. In any event, whatever the law ends up being—whether it is this Bill, or what we already have—it is not a bad thing for those who operate at its margins to know precisely what they can and cannot do. I worry slightly that having a complete carve-out from liability might swing activities a bit too far in the other direction.
There are pros and cons to any way of doing this. I do not want the Minister to think I am being hostile; I am certainly not. I just want us, as the House of Commons, to be sure, when we consider this further, that this way is right and will work better than what we already have. I, for one, cannot see how this will be better than what we already have; I think that in many ways it will be worse.
Stephen McPartland
It has been a great pleasure to listen to the debate and Members’ speeches. I can feel the frustration in the room. I share that frustration, because I have been told by the intelligence services that we need clause 23 because the schedule it amends is having a damaging impact on critical operational activity aimed at keeping the UK safe. That is the reason why we need clause 23. I wish that we could tell the Committee everything, and that we could just all agree to it, but that is what I am told by the intelligence services, so I have frustration too.
I will try to answer some of the questions, and then sum up. We have been asked about section 7 authorisations. Some of the Committee have been in their roles a little longer than I have been in mine, so they will be aware that section 7 authorisations can be sought only by SIS and GCHQ—not by the MOD or MI5—so this is about trying to create reassurance across all the UK intelligence community.
On section 50 and the reasonableness defence, the defence has never been tested in the context of activity of the intelligence services and the armed forces, so we feel it is more appropriate for them to demonstrate that their actions were carried out as necessary in the proper exercise of their functions.
Maria Eagle
If what the Minister says is accurate—that the defence has never been tested—how can he say that it does not work?
Stephen McPartland
What I am trying to say is that we want our UK intelligence services to be focused on keeping us safe and not to worry about whether or not they will be able to deal with a long court case on their actions. As things currently stand, the UK is—
Sally-Ann Hart
Let me give an illustration of the issue. If my hon. Friend saw someone in need of cardiopulmonary resuscitation on the floor, would he give them mouth-to-mouth and pump their chest? Is that something he would do? Would he do it if he thought he could be prosecuted for causing grievous bodily harm if he broke a rib? That would be his defence. That is a simplistic example to illustrate the issue.
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her intervention. I do not think I would be any good at giving anybody CPR. However, I understand the spirit in which she made the intervention and am grateful for that.
Stephen McPartland
I do not want to get distracted, because this is very serious. I will give way to you in a minute, Kevin; I want to get this point across. [Interruption.] Sorry—I will give way to the right hon. Member for North Durham in a moment.
As the law stands, a member of staff acting in the proper exercise of their organisation’s functions would bear the burden of proving that they had acted reasonably when there is no precedence as to what “reasonably” means in those circumstances. The provision would change that position so that the prosecution would need to prove that a member of staff’s actions were not necessary for the proper exercise or function of their organisation, taking into consideration all the information about the legitimate ways in which those functions could be exercised.
Mr Jones
The Minister has just said that the reasonableness test has not been used. The Attorney General would also have to get over that bar. Alongside that sits the old consolidated guidance—now the Fulford principles—which is quite clear about what actions officers should take in certain circumstances to avoid what we had before. If it has not been tested, I cannot see what the problem is.
Stephen McPartland
The problem is that the UK’s intelligence services are telling us that, every single day, their operatives are second-guessing themselves on operations to keep this nation safe. I believe what they are telling me.
The provisions in section 47 of the Serious Crime Act mean that a person need only believe their activity will encourage or assist such an act, but they might also be reckless as to whether the act is done, with all the necessary elements required for that particular offence to be committed—the offence does not have to be committed. We are talking about the intelligence operative’s state of mind at the time of sharing intelligence. That is what is relevant.
Mr Jones
If that is the justification, why do we not just bin the consolidated guidance and the Fulford principles, on which such judgments are based? The rendition inquiry has great examples of where we passed on information knowing that it would be used for rendition and torture. I have been assured by the agencies, and I have no reason to doubt them, that there has been a huge training programme to ensure all officers fully understand the consolidated guidance and the new Fulford principles. This is clutching at straws, frankly.
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful for the right hon. Gentleman’s point of view.
Clause 23 is primarily aimed at removing the risk and fear of prosecution from individuals within these organisations when undertaking their necessary authorised duties. Sir Alex Younger said:
“Through this legislation and other measures, we can make sure that these risks are attached to the appropriate person or people or entity. I am much less comfortable as a leader about the idea that we therefore ask individual men and women in the UK intelligence community to suck it up. I do not think that is right.”––[Official Report, National Security Public Bill Committee, 7 July 2022; c. 14, Q26.]
We have already had a conversation about the difference between theory and practice, and the reality is there is a risk that individual UK IC officers will face criminal sanctions for doing their job. I agree with Sir Alex Younger that that risk should not exist.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 23 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 24
The foreign power condition
Stuart C. McDonald
I beg to move amendment 54, in clause 24, page 19, line 5, at end insert—
“(2A) The conduct in question, or a course of conduct of which it forms part, is not to be treated as carried out for or on behalf of a foreign power if financial or other assistance of a foreign power under subsection (2)(c) is provided otherwise than specifically for the conduct or course of conduct.”
This amendment ensures that organisations that receive funding from foreign powers are not guilty of offences if that funding was not for the conduct or course of conduct that would otherwise amount to the offence.
Holly Lynch
I will speak to clauses 24 and 25 and, having heard the contribution from the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, about his amendment 54.
Clause 24 provides for the foreign power condition that is fundamental to almost all the new offences created by the Bill. I appreciate that the Minister has confirmed that we will see the detail of a foreign interference registration scheme before we return to Committee in September, but it will be particularly interesting to see how the provisions in clause 24 interact with a registration scheme, and what an asset that stands to be if it is done properly.
Clause 24(1) provides that the condition is met if a person’s conduct or a course of conduct is carried out for or on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit, a foreign power. In addition, for the condition to be met, the person must know, or reasonably ought to know, that the conduct has that relationship to the foreign power, which I think is clear enough.
Subsection (2) sets out a welcome but non-exhaustive list of different types of relationship between the foreign power and the person engaging in the conduct that would result in a person being considered to be acting for or on behalf of the foreign power.
Under this clause, conduct is deemed to be carried out for or on behalf of a foreign power if it is instigated by a foreign power, it is directed or controlled by a foreign power, it is carried out with financial or other assistance from a foreign power, or it is carried out in collaboration with or with the agreement of a foreign power. It strikes me that thousands of people in the UK could meet all the foreign power stipulations in subsection (2) without ever engaging in any criminality—for example, if they work for a legitimate state-owned company, such as an airline operating out of the UK, or in a foreign embassy. I am keen to see the detail of the registration scheme, so that we have transparency and clear lines about what is welcome and entirely appropriate conduct on behalf of a foreign power and what is not.
Subsection (6) states that is not necessary to identify the particular foreign power that the person intends to benefit. That provision is intended to cover when a person attempts to help a foreign power, but has not yet determined the particular foreign power. I can see how this part of the clause rightly captures the conduct of someone motivated by financial gain, who seeks to sell information or intellectual property to the highest bidder, or perhaps by a desire to cause harm to the UK as a result of a grievance.
For the reasons I have outlined, I imagine that we will come back to clause 24 when debating further parts of the Bill. It would have been advantageous to consider the clause alongside the detail of the foreign influence registration scheme. We will have to undertake that separately, but we recognise that clause 24 is fundamental to this legislation.
Clause 25 defines a foreign power for the purpose of clause 24 and sets out the persons and bodies that comprise a foreign power. We welcome the much-needed update and clarity of what constitutes a foreign power for the functioning of clause 24 and the new offences created by the Bill. I note that the Law Commission’s report, “Protection of Official Data”, made a clear case for replacing “enemy” with “foreign power” and looked to the Canadian Security of Information Act 2001 and the US Congress’s Espionage Statutes Modernisation Bill, which was introduced in 2010, as starting points.
The Official Secrets Act 1911 provides that it is an offence for a person to make or obtain
“any sketch, plan, model, or note”
or
“any secret official code word, or pass word…or other document or information which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy”.
The Law Commission felt that as the term had been drafted with enemy states in mind, it was unclear whether a court would construe “enemy” broadly enough to encompass non-state actors, such as an international terrorist group. It was further concerned that the inclusion of the term “enemy” had the potential to inhibit the ability to prosecute those who commit espionage. We have already heard quotes from Sir Alex Younger’s testimony last Thursday. In response to a question about how threats to the UK have changed, he said:
“What I would call grey threats…often presented us with real challenges, particularly when actors or states felt themselves at war with us and we did not feel ourselves at war with them.”––[Official Report, National Security Public Bill Committee, 7 July 2022; c. 11, Q21.]
I therefore welcome the change from enemy to foreign power to ensure that we can secure prosecutions against the right people.
That said, concerns were raised in submissions to the Law Commission’s consultation and I wonder if the Minister can respond to those. Guardian News and Media gave the following example:
“If a journalist obtains information that a nuclear defence installation is unsafe, that concerns have been reported to the appropriate authorities, but have been discounted, and the journalist then proceeds to investigate whether the information is true, they should not be placed at risk of prosecution. Under the existing wording of section 1 OSA, the ‘of use to the enemy’ requirement would it is submitted make such a prosecution unlikely, however if that wording were changed to a foreign power, and a foreign state-owned institution was thinking of bidding to decommission the plant, this could catch the journalist. Such activity by a journalist should not be considered to be espionage.”
Again, it would have been advantageous to consider this clause alongside the foreign influence registration scheme, which will presumably be clear about who needs to register and why, aligned with subsections (1) and (2) of clause 25, but I hope that the Minister can respond to the concerns raised in that example.
Stephen McPartland
We have already spoken in some detail about the foreign power condition, but I will now specifically address that condition and the meaning of “foreign power”. In doing so, I hope to cover some residual concerns from our first day in Committee and some concerns that I have heard today.
Throughout the Committee’s sittings so far, I have tried to demonstrate that I am listening and am trying to work with colleagues across party lines to get to a position in which we are providing what the United Kingdom’s intelligence community needs and are comfortable that we have scrutinised the Bill. The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East may be reassured when I get to the end of my speech, just as the hon. Member for Halifax was reassured about her amendment earlier.
Stuart C. McDonald
I just want to repeat that I find that potentially worryingly broad. If somebody does something motivated by the interests of the people of country Z, I worry very much that they could suddenly be treated as if they were benefiting the Government of Z. The foreign power condition would therefore be met and they could be guilty of espionage for whatever act they had undertaken. It just seems incredibly broadly worded. Someone who is simply doing something for the benefit of a people could be caught up in this legislation.
Stephen McPartland
I think the intention that we are trying to get across is clear. I understand that the hon. Gentleman has a concern about how broad the scope is, so if he gives me a few moments, I will try to move on to that point.
My view is that clause 24 forms a key concept that will determine the circumstances in which activities will come within the scope of the Bill or beyond it. Amendment 54 seeks to make it explicit that those who receive funding from a foreign power legitimately will not be guilty of an offence under the Bill where that funding is entirely unrelated to the harmful conduct. I want to reassure the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East that this reflects the intention of the provision. The provisions are designed to provide that the funding of an organisation must have a sufficient link to the offence in order for the foreign power condition to be met and an offence to be made out; a tangential link will not suffice. To help contextualise that, and reflecting on Tuesday’s debate, I thought it would help to provide a bit more detail on how the foreign power condition interacts with the offences.
Using the offence of obtaining and disclosing protected information as an example, the offence will be made out only if all the limbs of the relevant test are satisfied. This means that a person would commit an offence only if they obtain, disclose or carry out other specified conduct in relation to protected information. That conduct is for a purpose they know, or reasonably ought to know, is for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK, and the foreign power condition is met in relation to that conduct.
I want to be really clear that a person who engages in the harmful conduct above would commit the offence only if they have a purpose prejudiced in relation to that specific conduct. So it is not sufficient to prove that a person has a genuinely prejudicial position against the UK; the conduct has to be carried out with that prejudicial purpose.
The same is true of the foreign power condition. The foreign power condition has been designed to apply in relation to the conduct that is caught within the offence. So where the foreign power is satisfied because the conduct in question, or a course of conduct of which it forms part, is for or on behalf of the foreign power, the defendant must also either actually know or should know that to be the case.
The hon. Member cited the example of an NGO that receives funding from a foreign power. My and the Government’s interpretation is that there would have to be a link between the funding they receive and any activity that they carry out that could meet the offence for that activity to be for or on behalf of the foreign power. So the NGO would also have to know the conduct was linked to this funding, or they should know that it is. They should not be convicted of an offence unless that link was demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt in a court of law.
I want to be really clear. The foreign power condition, as a standalone concept, is not a statement of wrongdoing. So a person can meet the foreign power condition while carrying out wholly legitimate activities. It is an issue only if the foreign power condition is met in relation to harmful conduct specified in the Bill. In the case of a person who obtains or discloses protected information, the offence is designed so that a person would commit the offence only if they had a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK and then either knew or ought reasonably to have known that they were acting for or on behalf of the foreign power in relation to that conduct. For example, they had an arrangement with the foreign power under which they would obtain or disclose that protected data, or they intended the foreign power to benefit from obtaining or disclosing of protected data.
So the foreign power condition would not cover a case where a foreign power incidentally benefits from activity. Nor has it been designed to apply in cases where a person receives general funding from a foreign power not linked to the relevant conduct. But clearly it is right that a person can be prosecuted for an offence where all the relevant conditions, including the foreign power condition, are satisfied and can be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
I hope the Committee is reassured that the intention behind our provisions and the hon. Member’s amendments align, but I recognise the importance of ensuring that the legislation clearly gives effect to that intention, and while I do not think the hon. Member’s amendments are the answer, I will consider further whether there is any more that we can do to ensure that this intention is properly reflected in the legislation.
Having set out the conditions under which acts in the Bill will be considered as linked to a foreign power, I now turn to clause 25, which gives meaning to the term “foreign power”. The Bill follows the Law Commission’s recommendation to replace the existing link of “an enemy”, as set out in the Official Secrets Act 1911, with a definition of a foreign power. As we have already debated, the concept of an enemy no longer serves to reflect the modern age. The change from “enemy” to “foreign power” is accompanied by a wider set of changes in the structure of the Bill, such as the foreign power condition itself, which ensures that the Bill’s provisions are appropriately targeted at the harmful activity that we need to combat.
It is important that the legislation captures the various components of a state that could seek to influence or direct harmful activities in or against the UK. As such, a foreign power will include a Head of State acting in his or her public capacity, a foreign Government or parts of the Government, or person exercising such functions, a local government organisation, an agency or authority of a foreign government, part of Government or local government, and a political party that is a governing political party of a foreign Government.
Clause 24, and indeed the Bill as a whole, recognises and respects the unique circumstances and nature of politics in Northern Ireland. Accordingly, clause 25 excludes a political party that is both a governing political party in the Republic of Ireland and a political party registered in Great Britain or Northern Ireland from the definition of a “foreign power”. This reflects the fact that there are political parties that contest elections in the Republic of Ireland and in the United Kingdom, and ensures that the provisions in the Bill do not inadvertently impact cross-border politics. The foreign power definition provides the parameters within which persons and bodies will comprise a foreign power for the purposes of the Bill and is a critical part of ensuring that the provisions in the Bill address the right harmful activity.
Stuart C. McDonald
I am grateful to the Minister for setting that out. It is particularly helpful to hear his views on the NGO scenario and his explanation of the requirement for some sort of link between the financial arrangements and the specific conduct being complained of. The reason for tabling the amendment is that we did not think that that was necessarily clear enough on the face of the Bill. We will give further thought to whether this aspect needs to be tidied up, so that it is absolutely clear, and I am grateful for his undertaking to look at that as well. I will have to work through some of the other scenarios as well, but it has been helpful to get quite a lot of that on the record. We shall give it some further thought, but in the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clauses 24 and 25 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)
National Security Bill (Third sitting)
Stephen McPartland ExcerptsTuesday 12th July 2022
(2 years, 4 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate National Security Act 2023 View all National Security Act 2023 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 12 July 2022 - (12 Jul 2022)
Stuart C. McDonald
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Gray. I welcome the new Minister to his place and wish him all the best in his new role. I certainly foresee this experience as being thrown in at the deep end, but it is a Bill on which there is broad consensus, so I hope that it is not too much of a baptism of fire and that he enjoys it.
It is nice to be able to join colleagues. I was sorry to miss the evidence session last Thursday, as I was indisposed, but I have read the transcript, and the session seemed to prove incredibly useful. I therefore did not miss the usual experience I have at around this time of a Bill Committee, when I think, “If only I had been able to hear or read that evidence before drafting my amendments, they might have been slightly different.”
Let me reiterate our position: the vast majority of provisions in the Bill are welcome and probably long overdue. Clause 1, like clause 4, implements part of the Law Commission’s review recommendations. The clauses are broadly welcome and should stand part of the Bill. Our amendments to clause 1, like most of the handful of other amendments we have tabled, are simply designed to probe whether the offences are drawn tightly enough. The crimes that we are talking about are serious—the offence in clause 1 can lead to life imprisonment. I do not think that anybody on the Committee would say that that is not appropriate when a person steals or hacks protected security information at the behest of a foreign Government and puts the lives of UK citizens at risk.
The amendments are simply designed to ask whether the offence might catch conduct that it was not intended to catch, particularly behaviour that might embarrass the Government but is not in any genuine sense prejudicial to our safety. The shadow Minister put that question to the Law Commission witnesses last Thursday. Professor Lewis responded that such questions are probably legitimate in relation to the Official Secrets Act 1989 and leaks, but the offence is different in this case because of the requirement to be acting for a foreign power. She said succinctly:
I think we are in a slightly different realm here: the realm of espionage and not the realm of leaks.—[Official Report, National Security Public Bill Committee, 7 July 2022; c. 52, Q98.]
On the whole, I absolutely accept that point, and I fleetingly considered withdrawing some of the amendments, but there are questions about whether that distinction is 100% correct. There are legitimate concerns—they were raised on Second Reading and in the written briefings provided to MPs in advance of it—that the clause also catches behaviour that is more akin to a disclosure under the 1989 Act.
Article 19 and the Campaign For Freedom of Information argue that some of the broad concepts used in clause 1 combine in a way that puts civil society organisations and journalists at risk. I am grateful to those groups for their Second Reading briefings, which have largely prompted my remarks this morning. They point to several features of the clause that cause difficulty. First, it covers material that does not bear a security classification, and information is in scope even if it is not restricted but the person receiving it reasonably believes that it should have been.
Secondly, the concept of “safety or interests of the United Kingdom” is essentially determined by the Government of the day, so it is a policy of the state and, potentially, a broad concept. Thirdly, as well as not being confined to hostile states, the foreign power condition appears to be met simply by obtaining funding from a friendly Government who are pursuing perfectly reasonable aims.
That combination of factors gives rise to concerns for NGOs and journalists. I will give some hypothetical examples of each, which I have borrowed from Article 19. Let us say that an NGO in the UK has some general overseas funding from a friendly Government to campaign on climate change. The Government of the day decide that fracking or new coal are essential for UK interests—who knows where we might be in a few months’ time? The NGO is provided with leaked information undermining that policy—perhaps about the safety record of the company being lined up to operate the plan—and publishes it. Has the NGO involved committed a criminal offence? The way the clause is worded suggest that it might have.
The right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) made the point that lots of excellent organisations receive funding from overseas foreign powers, as they are currently defined. In fact, a list would include ActionAid, Anti-Slavery International, Article 19, Client Earth, Global Witness, Index on Censorship, Media Defence, the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, Privacy International, Reprieve—from which we heard evidence last week—and Transparency International. The funders of those NGOs include organisations such as the Danish International Development Agency, IrishAid, New Zealand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the US State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, and the US State Department’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons—there are many more in that vein. That is why we have concerns about the effect of clause 1 on NGOs.
In contrast, if a different NGO—one just across the road—had published that document online, it would not be committing an offence, not just because it does not receive any such foreign funding, but because the 1989 Act is more specifically about the subject matter or material that leads to an offence of disclosure—namely, it would have to relate to security and intelligence, defence, international relations and law enforcement. Environment or energy policy—or fracking, in my example—would not be covered. The punishment under the 1989 Act would be two years’ imprisonment, not life, so there is real inconsistency between the disclosures caught by the Bill and those caught by that Act.
My second example relates to journalism. What happens if, rather than directly publishing the leak, the NGO passes it to a journalist who reports the leaked information as part of their story? If that journalist is employed by a UK news organisation, all is well, because the foreign power conditions are not met. However, if the journalist works for another Government state broadcaster—even a friendly one—the foreign power condition is adequately met. One reporter commits no offence at all; another reporter—who perhaps works for Danmarks Radio or any other state broadcaster—commits an offence that could mean life imprisonment.
Our amendments offer different ways of addressing that. Amendment 46 would reintroduce the test of damage. Interestingly, the Law Commission’s proposals for reform of the 1989 Act recognise that damage can sometimes act as a public interest test, and that it is a concept worth keeping in relation to offences that could be committed by journalists or citizens generally, even if the Law Commission was arguing for removing it in relation to other disclosure offences.
Our amendments would also clarify what interests are protected by that serious offence, and would match the clause up with what is protected by the 1989 Act. Amendment 48 mentions simply “critical” interests—meaning security, intelligence, defence, international relations and law and order.
There is another alternative that I will come to later, which relates to fixing the foreign power clause so that NGOs are not caught if they get funding from benign foreign powers for perfectly reasonable purposes. Those are different alternatives, and I would be interested to know whether the Government accept that those two scenarios are caught by the clause. If so, what is their response?
The Minister for Security (Stephen McPartland)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Gray, and to be here in Committee. I will start with the clause and then deal with the amendments tabled by—let me see if I can get this right—the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East.
Stephen McPartland
Thank you.
I will quickly respond to some of the hon. Gentleman’s points. There are a variety of protections throughout the Bill. One is that someone has to be doing activity designed to benefit or help a foreign power in order to commit an offence. Secondly, most of the offences in part 1 of the Bill need sign-off from the Attorney General. Thirdly, the Crown Prosecution Service has to be satisfied that prosecuting is in the public interest. Those are three very large protections that exist throughout the Bill. As we go through the Bill clause by clause, we must always remember those three big principles.
I will start by referring to the recent case of the individual working in the British embassy in Berlin who was extradited and charged, and to the conviction of a Ministry of Defence contractor in 2020 under the existing espionage legislation, which indicate the threat that is posed by those looking to harm the United Kingdom by committing espionage. Clauses 1 to 3 create four separate but overlapping offences to ensure that the Bill proportionately covers the wide range of threats and harms that constitute espionage, without capturing legitimate activity. The clauses are supported by other provisions in the Bill, including the “prohibited places” provisions, by building on and modernising our existing tools in the Official Secrets Acts 1911, 1920 and 1939. The new provisions continue to criminalise harmful activity while reducing the risk of loopholes that can be exploited by sophisticated state actors. I will speak later to clauses 2 and 3, and to the “prohibited places” regime.
Before I get into the detail of the offence set out in clause 1, it is important to flag that, along with other offences in the Bill, it will apply only in circumstances where there is a clear link between the activity and a foreign power. This is provided for by the foreign power condition, which we will discuss in more detail later. In essence, a person’s conduct must be carried out for, on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit a foreign power. This responds to the recommendation, made by the Law Commission in its 2020 “Protection of Official Data” report, to move away from outdated concepts.
Stuart C. McDonald
The foreign power condition includes activities carried out with the financial or other assistance of a foreign power. The concern is that if an NGO gets regular funding for environmental or human rights work, it would be accidently caught by the foreign power condition. A journalist who works for a friendly state broadcaster would also be caught by the foreign power condition. We still think that such scenarios are a concern.
Stephen McPartland
As I said earlier, we have three huge protections. One is that activity must be for, or on behalf of, a foreign power. I understand the point the hon. Gentleman is making, but there are another two layers on top of that protection. The first is that the Attorney General’s consent must be obtained. Secondly, the Crown Prosecution Service must be satisfied that prosecution would be in the public interest. Those are three very strong layers of protection that would help protect an NGO if it were to do something inadvertently.
Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)
I welcome the Minister to his place. Having such protections in place is all very well, but the real issue is the chilling effect this could have in the kinds of circumstances that the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East has set out. It is not right, is it, for us to criminalise activity that we do not really want to criminalise, but then say, “Well, the Attorney General will sort it out later in each individual case.”? That is not really a very good way of legislating.
Stephen McPartland
We are not talking about legislating in that way. If the hon. Lady will forgive me, we are saying that there are three layers of protection. The first layer is that people would be deemed to be obtaining or disclosing protected information for, or on behalf of, a foreign power. The next layers would involve the Attorney General and the Crown Prosecution Service. The hon. Lady, as a lawyer, will be very well aware that the CPS always determines whether it feels it is in the public interest to prosecute. People will not be caught up by accident, and I think we are getting into theoretics by going further and further down that line.
Ben Everitt (Milton Keynes North) (Con)
I am struck by the hypothetical example given by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and—
Ben Everitt
Okay, we will just go with Cumbernauld. The hypothetical example referred to a Government of the day diversifying their energy sources so that, potentially, they were less reliant on fuel and power from a possibly hostile foreign state. The Minister has detailed the extra layers of defence that will act in the public interest. Does he agree that in the hypothetical example cited we would want some protection from foreign interference in Government policy—a democratically elected Government of the UK?
Stephen McPartland
My hon. Friend is correct. Three tests must be met for someone to be prosecuted: conducting harmful activity with regard to information that is protected effectively, knowingly prejudicing the safety or interests of the United Kingdom, and acting in a way that benefits a foreign power. Forgive me, but I do not believe that an NGO will accidentally fail all three of those tests.
Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)
But it may, because subsection (1)(b) states that a person commits an offence if
“the person’s conduct is for a purpose that they know, or ought reasonably to know, is prejudicial”.
An NGO might think that putting something into the public domain is in the public interest. They may not even take into account that that disclosure may damage UK security. For example, in this morning’s newspapers—
Stephen McPartland
That example demonstrates how important the Bill is, because it sets out that activities that are illegal will still be illegal if actors are acting in a particular manner. The Bill is trying to bring current provisions up to date to provide our intelligence services with the toolkits they need to keep our nation safe and secure. I believe that the three tests are strong enough to help provide those protections.
Mr Jones
I accept that, but just take this morning’s example cited on the BBC of the alleged illegal acts by the SAS. Someone has got the information, put it in the public domain and may feel that it is in the public interest for it to be scrutinised. Will that damage our interests? Yes, it will. The Government might think that that disclosure will help a foreign power or damage our interests—and I would argue that possibly it will—but that is not to question the judgment of the individuals who have decided that the allegation should be in the public domain.
Stephen McPartland
I understand the right hon. Gentleman’s point, but I believe that we have three very strong tests that must be applied: the information must benefit a foreign power, the Attorney General must consider the case, and the CPS must decide that it is in the public interest to prosecute. Those three tests and protections run throughout the Bill.
Stephen McPartland
Current events demonstrate that we never protect the Government from embarrassment!
Before I get into the detail of the offence itself, it is important to flag that, along with other offences in the Bill, it will apply only in circumstances where there is a clear link between the activity and a foreign power. That is provided for by the foreign power condition, which we will discuss in more detail later. It responds to recommendations in the Law Commission’s 2020 “Protection of Official Data” report about moving from outdated concepts such as “enemy”.
Clause 1 enhances our ability to tackle the threat of espionage by introducing a modern offence to capture those unlawfully obtaining, copying, recording, retaining, disclosing or providing access to protected information. Protected information is any information, document or other article that is or could reasonably be expected to be subject to a form of restriction of access in order to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom—for example, if the information is stored within a secure Government building or has a form of restricted classification. Protected information can cover a wide range of Government material, including information such as raw data, documents such as committee reports and other articles such as memory sticks.
Protected information includes, but is not limited to, classified material. That is important, given that serious harm can be caused by obtaining or disclosing seemingly non-sensitive information that, if used in a certain way by sophisticated state actors, could be capable of damaging the United Kingdom’s national security. However, I want to be clear that the definition will not cover truly benign items such as the lunch menu of the Home Office canteen.
Like the existing espionage provisions, and as recommended by the Law Commission, clause 1 will require that a
“person’s conduct is for a purpose…prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.
The term
“safety or interests of the United Kingdom”
has been interpreted in case law as meaning the objects of state policy determined by the Crown on the advice of Ministers, which includes national security. That enables the United Kingdom to respond to threats targeted against its wide range of interests.
Amendment 46 would require that a person’s conduct be instead for a purpose that they know, or ought reasonably to know, is damaging to the safety or critical interests of the UK. That would create a higher evidential threshold to secure prosecution in an area that is often difficult to evidence due to the sensitive nature of the information that may have been obtained or disclosed. Put simply, we would have to explain why it caused damage, which may require evidence that compounds the damage. That would provide challenges to our law enforcement agencies and courts, and is likely to result in fewer prosecutions being pursued, offering further opportunities to those looking to harm our country through acts of espionage. The use of “prejudicial” mitigates some of that risk.
Maria Eagle
I am grateful to the Minister for setting out the difference between those two words, but can he give us an example? The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East gave a theoretical example to illustrate why he tabled the amendments. Can the Minister give us an example of something that is prejudicial and not damaging?
Stephen McPartland
I will come on to that in a bit. I will provide an example shortly.
Stephen McPartland
You are very welcome. I would not want to get it wrong.
Amendments 47 and 48 would introduce and define the term “critical interests”. In the amendments, “critical interests” is defined to include security, intelligence, defence, international relations and law and order. Although I recognise that the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East tabled the amendments to attempt to specify exactly what should fall under UK interests in order to add clarity, I must stress that it limits the scope and utility of the clause 1 offence and risks creating loopholes that could be exploited by those looking to harm the UK. There is also the risk that the offence would become quickly outdated as the UK’s interests naturally and properly evolve. Notably, the list does not include economic interests or interests relating to public health, to name just two areas that would be overlooked by such a definition. Those are areas that are targeted by hostile actors and should rightly be protected.
The safety or interests of the UK test is used not only in clause 1, but in several other offences throughout part 1 of the Bill, such as sabotage or entering a prohibited place with a purpose prejudicial to the UK. There is a risk that creating a notably different test under the clause 1 offence would confuse the legal interpretation of the tests under those other offences and may have a significant impact on their operational utility.
Finally, I reiterate that the test of a person conducting activity
“prejudicial to the safety or interests”
of the UK already exists and is understood in the courts. Just last week at an oral evidence session, the law commissioner invested considerable time and effort in reviewing this area of law, outlining their support of the Government’s decision to retain that term. They commented that the
“safety or interest of the state is consistent with a lot of the wording that already exists within the Official Secrets Act…and it avoids what might risk being an unduly narrow focus on national security.”––[Official Report, National Security Public Bill Committee, 7 July 2022; c. 52, Q97.]
Moving away from the amendments, it should be noted that instead of using “enemy”, as in the espionage provisions, the offence in clause 1 includes a foreign power condition. That moves the offence away from labelling countries as enemies, which is less relevant in the 21st century.
The hon. Member for Garston and Halewood asked about the difference between prejudicial and damaging. The damage requirement would require the court to demonstrate harm and explain why it is damaging, whereas prejudice is broader and could include reducing future opportunities. That will also mitigate some of the risks associated, as I have said. It provides a wider test so that we can intervene at an earlier stage of a plot or something else that would affect our national security.
I turn to the extent of the provisions under the 1911 Act. An activity that takes place wholly outside the UK would be an offence only if it is committed overseas by a UK national or officer, such as a Crown servant. Technological developments in a more global world mean that it is now more likely that information that warrants protection to safeguard the safety or interests of the UK may be vulnerable to activity that takes place outside the UK by a wider range of actors—for example, a locally engaged security guard working in a UK embassy stealing papers, or the theft of information held there digitally via cyber means.
To keep pace with the modern threat, the extraterritorial jurisdiction for the offence has been expanded so that the offence can be committed anywhere in the world and by anyone, regardless of their nationality. The extraterritorial jurisdiction is a critical reform within the offence as a better defence for the United Kingdom against a modern espionage threat, whose global nature is not reflected in the current provisions in the espionage offence of the Official Secrets Act 1911.
Another key difference from the existing offence is the increase in the maximum penalty available to life imprisonment. The emergence of modern vectors such as cyber means that espionage has the potential to cause a greater level of harm than was possible in 1911 when the United Kingdom’s espionage offences and penalties were first drafted. In the most serious cases, an act of obtaining or disclosing protected information can result in the loss of life or can gravely undermine the United Kingdom’s ability to defend itself from a range of threats. This demonstrates the United Kingdom’s resolve to make it more difficult and detrimental for hostile actors to undermine our country’s interests and safety by committing acts of espionage.
Although we will come to this in more detail later in Committee, I want to flag a key safeguard that applies to prosecutions to this and other serious offences in part 1. Given that state threat activity and the United Kingdom’s response can have a significant impact on the safety and interests of our country and wider international relations, the Attorney General’s consent, as I said earlier, must be obtained in the case of England and Wales before a prosecution is taken forward. In Northern Ireland, the consent of the Advocate General must be sought.
I stress the importance and need for reform of the espionage laws in the Official Secrets Acts 1911, 1920 and 1939. Recent and ongoing events make it clear that the threat from state threat activity, particularly acts of espionage, is of continuing concern and we must have robust protections in place. The introduction of the offence of obtaining or disclosing protected information as a core part of the Bill provides measures to tackle the harmful espionage activity that the United Kingdom faces. That is why clause 1 is so vital. I encourage my fellow Committee members to support it and I ask that the hon. Member withdraw his amendment to it.
The Chair
Before I call the shadow Minister, it might be helpful if I clarify the order of debate that I normally expect to see. The person who has proposed an amendment moves it. By and large, anybody else then takes part in the debate, including the shadow Minister. The Minister replies to the debate and then the proposer gets a short whack at the end. On this occasion, I will call the shadow Minister, and then the Minister will have an opportunity to reply before the proposer rounds up.
Stephen McPartland
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Lady and I thank her for her kind words. She asked a number of questions, which I will do my utmost to answer.
Protected information is information, documents or other articles to which, for the purpose of protecting UK safety or interests, access is restricted, or it is reasonable to expect that access would be restricted. The hon. Lady’s example of taking a photograph inside the House of Commons would not be considered that. Throughout the Bill there are three tests. First, would the activity assist a foreign power? Secondly, would the Attorney General give consent? Thirdly, would the Crown Prosecution Service consider it to be in the public interest to prosecute? Taking a photograph inside the House of Commons or of something a bit more restricted than the Home Office lunch menu would not come under the provision.
The hon. Lady referred to the director general of MI5; this is about giving the Home Office, the intelligence services and the intelligence community the tools they need to tackle the wider threat. The British public trust the UK intelligence community to do the job and to have the powers. People often worry when other agencies get wider powers, but that is not what is happening in the Bill.
On being able to intervene at an earlier stage, the provisions in the Bill provide a toolkit to allow the intelligence community to intervene earlier in some matters in order to work with people to stop them progressing into specific acts that would break the law. It will help people who may be going down the wrong path, as well as helping the intelligence community to act at a much earlier stage.
Stuart C. McDonald
I am grateful to everyone who has taken part in the debate and to the Minister for his response. As I say, I absolutely accept the case for a clause such as this one. However, the Minister’s explanation of the protections in place in respect of the two scenarios that I outlined falls a long way short of what I would regard as satisfactory.
I outlined three solutions or protections. One was the foreign power condition; I have explained already why both the NGO and the journalist in those scenarios would meet the foreign power condition, so that does not work. Thereafter, we are left with the Attorney General and the Crown Prosecution Service. That offers no protection at all. From the point of view of the rule of law, people need to know whether they have broken the law or are committing an offence that is punishable by life imprisonment. We cannot leave that journalist or NGO in that position by saying it all depends on what the Attorney General or the Crown Prosecution Service thinks.
I have no idea whether the Attorney General or the Crown Prosecution Service would regard that NGO and journalist as having committed an offence that they would want to prosecute. As Members have said, that leaves a big chilling effect on that NGO and journalist. They have no certainty that they will not be prosecuted for the activities they undertake. They open themselves up to the possibility of life imprisonment for what, on the face of it, has all the characteristics of a disclosure of information, which should be dealt with, if at all, under the Official Secrets Act 1989 rather than in this Bill.
Stuart C. McDonald
That is a fair point. In the light of the lack of satisfactory safeguards we have heard this morning, we may have to revisit that question. There is an issue of scope in relation to sticking that into the 1989 Act, but I do not see any reason why we could not include it in some of the offences in this Bill. Unless the Government can come up with better safeguards than have been offered this morning, we are going to have to revisit that.
I urge the Minister to go away and think about this issue. I am actually more worried about those two scenarios now than I was at the start of the day. I am not absolutely sure that the amendments that I tabled are the right ones, so we will revisit the issue on Report. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2
Obtaining or disclosing trade secrets
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephen McPartland
Clause 2 provides for an offence of obtaining or disclosing trade secrets. It will be an important tool for law enforcement and the intelligence agencies to detect, deter and protect modern espionage activity. It will introduce an offence to criminalise the illicit acquisition, retention or disclosure of sensitive information with a commercial, industrial or economic value linked to its secrecy for, on behalf of or to benefit foreign states.
There is an inherent link between economic prosperity and our national security; we cannot ignore one and expect the other not to suffer as a result. We must respond to the fact that our adversaries and competitors are already acting in a more consolidated way, taking a whole-state approach to state threat activity. It is crucial that we ensure our legislation covers the wide range of threats and harms that constitute modern espionage.
For the purposes of this legislation, a person commits an offence if they obtain, copy, record, retain, disclose or provide access to a trade secret; additionally, the person’s conduct must be unauthorised and they must know or ought reasonably to know that their conduct is unauthorised. As with clause 1 and a number of other provisions in the Bill, there must also be a link to a foreign power, such as an intention to benefit that power or to direct tasking by that power.
The clause provides for a maximum penalty of 14 years’ imprisonment or a fine, or both. That reflects the severity of the conduct and the potential damage to the UK, its businesses and our economy, as well as being comparable to existing similar legislation.
Stephen McPartland
The legislation takes civil offences and makes some of them criminal. That case would remain a civil offence. What we are doing is providing the intelligence services with the tools they need to prosecute people who hand over trade secrets in the criminal system. For example, MBDA in my constituency builds Brimstone missiles, which are currently being used in action. If some of those secrets were to be removed and handed over, that would be difficult for the people using those missiles and for the country. There are clear examples of how the loss of trade secrets threatens the country and our allies’ lives.
Stephen McPartland
My understanding is that the action would have to be done on behalf of or for the purposes of a foreign power. If it was done unknowingly, it would be for the lawyers and the Crown Prosecution Service to decide how to proceed.
Maria Eagle
In the example that my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham gave of a person obtaining information and trade secrets and selling them to a competitor business, if that business had a complex ownership structure that led back to, say, China, would that be enough for the person to fall foul of the legislation?
Stephen McPartland
I appreciate the question and understand the spirit in which it was asked. However, one thing that we must be careful of is laying out exactly what someone must do to fall foul of the legislation. If we did, in that example, the Chinese would create that structure and be in a position to use it ensure that anybody acting on their behalf would not fall under that power. We must provide the intelligence agencies with the tools that they need to interdict and decide whether such people can be pursued and taken to court. As we have seen, it is difficult to get anybody on espionage. However, as we have said throughout proceedings, we do need the foreign power condition, or to reasonably know, and reasonableness is a huge test within English law, so a person would have to reasonably know that what they are doing would benefit a foreign power.
The offence under the clause is first and foremost a national security offence. We have created a definition of “trade secret”, found in subsection (2), which is intended for use in the state threats context. The introduction of the definition in the offence will help to address the increasingly diverse set of tactics employed by state actors to undermine the UK’s national and economic security and target a wide range of information.
There is no specific criminal offence in UK law that directly criminalises the threat to trade secrets by or for the benefit of foreign states. We have trade secrets regulations that transpose European law, but they serve a different purpose. We have therefore modified the definition of “trade secret” to ensure that it is suitable for our specific purposes. For example, as well as requiring that protections are in place that would limit the utility and potentially impose obligations on businesses, the definition in the Trade Secrets (Enforcement, etc.) Regulations 2018 does not account for information with a potential value. We are seeking to capture early-stage ideas such as research as well as established ideas that are more likely to be subject to protective measures.
Subsections (1)(b) and (3) set out in the instances in which a person’s conduct is unauthorised and what that means. The clause uses the term “unauthorised” because it focuses on the consent of the person with the power to give that consent. We want to make it absolutely clear that legitimate conduct is not captured by this offence. For the purposes of this offence, a person’s conduct is unauthorised if they are not entitled to determine whether they are able to carry out the conduct in question—for example, if they disclose a trade secret to a foreign power and they do not have the permission of the person who does have the power to make that decision. An example of where someone is not captured by the offence could be a team of researchers who are working with a foreign power, but although the information they control amounts to a trade secret, their research partnership authorises them to share that information with the foreign power.
Stuart C. McDonald
That is one of a couple of issues that I have. I would like the full information on why the offence can take place only outside the United Kingdom if it is in respect of possession by a United Kingdom national, as opposed to a UK resident or any other description of persons. I do not know whether the Minister can answer that now, but it would be useful to understand it.
Stephen McPartland
I will come back to the hon. Member on that point.
The clause applies overseas where the conduct takes place outside the UK. That includes both a UK national overseas and a UK company based overseas, provided that it is incorporated or was formed, if unincorporated, under domestic law. The clause brings forward an important offence that will form part of a modernised toolkit for our world-class intelligence agencies and law enforcement. It is proportionate to the threat posed by this activity, and imposes no restrictions or obligations on UK businesses, but offers further protections for them, and the UK as a whole, against modern espionage activity. We cannot promote economic prosperity without enhancing our national security and responding to the modern threat posed by espionage.
Stuart C. McDonald
I have three short points building on what Members have already raised in relation to this clause.
First, as raised by esteemed colleagues from the Intelligence and Security Committee, there is a question mark over what happens if somebody recklessly starts dishing out trade secrets, not directly to somebody in way that meets the foreign power condition but in a way that makes that inevitable or very likely. That does not seem to be caught by the clause at the moment, so that is something for the Minister to think about.
Secondly, as I have already asked, I want to understand why the offence is only committed “wholly” abroad if the trade secret is in the possession of a UK national, not, for example, a UK resident who is not a national. The Government have made a conscious choice about that drafting and I am interested to know why.
Finally, the clause states that the offence is committed if
“the person’s conduct is unauthorised”.
Do we need to be a little more explicit about what we mean by authorisation and authorised by whom? I can imagine situations where, for example, the person who we want to prosecute might say, “Actually, my conduct is authorised. It is authorised by the laws of my country,” which may be considerably different from the laws of this country. Does that need to be clarified? That might be implied in the phrase
“the person’s conduct is unauthorised”
but it may be something the Government want to look at.
Stephen McPartland
Earlier, we talked about sentencing guidelines. My understanding is that we are not in a position to give more detail on that yet. That is something I have discussed with the Ministry of Justice, as we will come to later.
With regard to the offence, one issue we have is the offence is designed to catch overseas activity with a strong link to the UK. It has been set at the threshold of a UK offence, so if we extend who it will to apply to, that will end up extending the scope of the offence. It is almost as if we have tried to put a safeguard in place to protect and control it, and the more we extend it, the more it will extend the scope of the offence and bring more and more within its scope, so that is the position we are in.
Jess Phillips
As a point of clarification, how will it apply to somebody who has indefinite leave to remain, who is not a lawful British citizen in the United Kingdom but very much operating here?
Stephen McPartland
It applies in the sense that if that person were to commit murder, they would be prosecuted in this country under the laws applying to murder.
Stephen McPartland
Effectively, it would apply in the same way. As I have said, with all these offences the Advocate General has to sign them off, and the Crown Prosecution Service as well.
Jess Phillips
In actual fact, on a number of occasions I have handled cases where someone with ILR in the UK has committed murder abroad and there was absolutely nothing that could be done about it.
Stephen McPartland
I have nothing further to add.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3
Assisting a foreign intelligence service
Stuart C. McDonald
I beg to move, amendment 49, in clause 3, page 3, line 30, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b) and insert
“activities which are prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.”
Holly Lynch
As we have heard, the clause introduces a new espionage offence of assisting a foreign intelligence service. A person commits an offence if that person
“engages in conduct of any kind, and…intends that conduct to materially assist a foreign intelligence service in carrying out UK-related activities.”
Once again, we are broadly supportive of the clause. As highlighted by the Government’s own integrated review in 2021, threats to Government Departments, national infrastructure, British business and private individuals are growing and becoming ever more complex as states become more assertive in advancing their aims. The clause goes a long way towards updating the threat posed by modern-day espionage and the changes are long overdue. The Intelligence and Security Committee’s 2020 Russia report stated:
“The current legislation enabling action against foreign spies is acknowledged to be weak. In particular, the Official Secrets Acts are out of date—crucially, it is not illegal to be a foreign agent in this country.”
Nevertheless, it is important that the Government clarify a number of different aspects of the clause. I highlight two recommendations from the Law Commission’s 2020 review of the Official Secrets Act. Recommendation 12.5 stated:
“In any new statute to replace the Official Secrets Act 1911, the requirement that the defendant’s conduct was capable of benefitting a foreign power should continue to be objectively determined. There should be no requirement to prove that the defendant personally knew or believed that his or her conduct had such capability.”
Will the Minister confirm that that requirement is compatible with the new offence established in clause 3?
The Law Commission also highlighted the danger of an individual unknowingly assisting a foreign intelligence service and then still being charged and convicted with the same offence as an individual who actively sought to assist a foreign intelligence service. This defence is currently accounted for in the Official Secrets Act 1989, as my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham discussed. I appreciate that that Act is not being updated by this legislation, but the principle still stands. The Law Commission’s recommendation 12.24 stated:
“The ‘defence’, currently contained in section 1(5) of the Official Secrets Act 1989, of not knowing and having no reasonable grounds to believe that the material disclosed related to security or intelligence, should continue to apply.”
It is naive to think that foreign intelligence services advertise who they are and what they are planning to do with any information they are given by someone or in any engagement they may have. The duping of individuals is a somewhat common tool in espionage tradecraft. Let us say that an overseas business research company commissions a UK national to explain how the UK’s parliamentary processes work, but it transpires that the business research company was working for a foreign intelligence service. Under clause 3, could the UK national still be tried for assisting a foreign intelligence service?
We welcome the exemptions in subsection (7) that create an appropriate space for democratic obligations and diplomacy to take place, especially as the Bill makes no distinction between countries that are our allies and those that are hostile and seek to undermine the UK’s interests. However, I also note that the offence is explicit about the definition of a foreign intelligence service. On first reading, I had concerns that where someone is sharing information with a former member of intelligence services, the definition might not extend to criminalising that conduct. As the old saying goes, once a KGB officer, always a KGB officer.
However, given that the definition included in subsection (9) outlines that “foreign intelligence service” means
“any person whose functions include carrying out intelligence activities for or on behalf of a foreign power”,
I understand that anyone sharing information with former KGB officers, for example, would be committing an offence. I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm that that is the case.
Stephen McPartland
That was a range of great examples, and I will do my best to address them. The whole purpose of the clause is to provide our world-class intelligence agencies and law enforcement with the tools to respond appropriately to activity conducted in and against the UK by foreign intelligence services that wish to cause us harm. Although the Government understand and appreciate the intention behind the amendment, we propose to reject it.
The distinction between activities taking place inside the UK and those taking place overseas was deliberate. For activity taking place overseas, clause 3(4) requires the conduct to be
“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.”
That is to ensure that we target the most harmful activity overseas that has an appropriate link to the UK. For activity taking place inside the UK, there is currently no requirement for the activity to be prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK. However, taking into account the defence in clause 3(7), foreign intelligence service activity carried out in the UK without even informal agreement or assent is inherently prejudicial to the UK’s safety or interests. Having to prove beyond a reasonable doubt why that activity is prejudicial risks creating a high evidential threshold that could, as we try to meet it, potentially compound the damage caused.
Clause 3(4)(a) has been drafted to ensure that the offence can prevent a wide range of activities from occurring and prevent threats from developing. Any legitimate activity would be covered by the three elements of the defence in clause 3(7), so there are appropriate safeguards in place. If a foreign intelligence service carried out activity in the UK and its conduct did not fall under clause 3(7), we must be able to call it out for what it is and prevent further harm from being caused. The current construction of clause 3(4) allow us to do exactly that, and the amendment risks reducing the operational utility of the clause as a whole.
We cannot allow the UK to become a hotbed for foreign intelligence services running covert and deceptive operations. I understand the examples that have been given, and I am looking into some of them, but the reality is that we need to be in a position to protect the intelligence services and give them an opportunity to go out there and deal with these people and the threats we face. As I have said, we have three protections throughout the whole Bill. We are coming up with lots of examples, but by answering each of them specifically, we will just provide our enemies and state threats with ways to work around the offence.
Stuart C. McDonald
I am grateful to the Minister for his response, but it is important to work through hypothetical examples so that we can understand the scope of the Bill. I absolutely get his explanation as to why there is a distinction between activity inside and outside the UK, and he briefly mentioned the idea of a friendly foreign intelligence service—in my example, the Estonian intelligence service—having permission to engage in the activities that I described. That may well be the solution. I will take away what the Minister has said. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Stephen McPartland
I beg to move Government amendment 1, in clause 3, page 4, leave out line 1 and insert—
“In proceedings for an offence under this section it is a defence to show that the person engaged”.
Stephen McPartland
The amendment clarifies that clause 3(7) contains a defence, rather than an exception, because it may be unclear which of the two it is as currently drafted. In doing so, two changes must be made to the clause. One will insert new wording to show that clause 3(7) is a defence, and the other will insert subsection (7A), which states that the defendant must adduce some evidence to establish that a matter in clause 3(7) is satisfied. The prosecution will then be required to prove that it is not met beyond a reasonable doubt.
We tabled the amendments to provide clarity to the operational community and to make absolutely clear the intention behind the offence. Clarifying that clause 3(7) is a defence places an evidential burden on the defendant to adduce evidence that one of the three conditions in subsection (7) applies to them. If someone raises a defence under subsection (7), the prosecution will need to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the defence does not apply.
There are three separate elements to subsection (7). If it is an exception, the prosecution would be required to prove in all cases beyond reasonable doubt that none of the three elements applies. That would potentially be challenging to evidence, given the wide range of circumstances under which the matters in the clause may arise. In effect, the prosecution would have to prove a negative. Where an offence is believed to have been committed and a prosecution is pursued, subsection (7) being an exception would mean that all three conditions would need to be shown not to apply in each case that is brought forward for prosecution. That is not our intention, and the amendment will mean that defendants must raise a defence under subsection (7), and the prosecution must then prove beyond all reasonable doubt that it does not apply.
We have worked closely with our operational partners, law enforcement and the Crown Prosecution Service on this amendment to provide greater clarity about the scope of clause 3. By tabling this amendment to subsection (7), we can more clearly represent the policy intention behind clause 3 as a whole.
Holly Lynch
I have the Minister’s explanation. We considered the implications of Government amendments 1 to 4 earlier, and on that basis we are satisfied.
Amendment 1 agreed to.
Amendments made: 2, in clause 3, page 4, line 8, leave out “is” and insert “was”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 1.
Amendment 3, in clause 3, page 4, line 10, leave out “is” and insert “was”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 1.
Amendment 4, in clause 3, page 4, line 10, at end insert—
“(7A) A person is taken to have shown a matter mentioned in subsection (7) if—
(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and
(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.” —(Stephen McPartland.)
This amendment provides that a defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the defence in clause 3(7).
Clause 3, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 4
Entering etc a prohibited place for a purpose prejudicial to the UK
Stephen McPartland
I may dwell on this clause slightly longer than others, because it is the first of a number of clauses regarding a regime to protect sensitive sites in the UK. There has been a range of examples and questions. To the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood, the simple answer is yes.
With regards to the Pokémon examples of the hon. Member for Halifax, the answers again are about—this very much determines the whole scope of the clause—prejudicial interest and people doing something accidentally. To fall foul of the clause, someone needs to have prejudicial interest against the UK. In the examples, people have wandered in and done something accidentally; they would not be prosecuted under the clause.
The right hon. Member for North Durham gave the example of strapping a camera to an eagle; if that is something that someone can do, fair play to them. However, if that camera strapped to the eagle were then to record activity in the place, and that was prejudicial to the UK, the person would be prosecuted. If they just wanted to strap a camera to an eagle to see what happened, the intelligence services have the opportunity not to prosecute someone, because, given the protections throughout the Bill, the Attorney General would have to sign off on whether to prosecute, and the Crown Prosecution Service on whether that was in the public interest.
I understand the point made by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East on ability to have lawful protest, and for lawful protest not to be restricted. It has been reflected by other Members and I raised it with the Department last week.
Sally-Ann Hart (Hastings and Rye) (Con)
It is absolutely right that people have the right to protest, but the attention of the Minister and that of the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East to the recent cases in which, for example, Extinction Rebellion protestors were found not guilty of criminal damage, despite the judge directing jurors that there was no defence in law. Likewise, the protestors who toppled the Colston statue were found not guilty. We have to be careful: jurors might find people not guilty, but we have to protect the ambitions of the Bill.
Stephen McPartland
I understand my hon. Friend’s point, which is that we have to be careful to provide the intelligence services with the tools they need to protect our protected sites. I may not agree with the purpose of protest, but I agree with the ability of everybody to protest lawfully. People will start to fall foul of this clause when they try to scale the walls of a restricted site and to impede lawful activity going on at the restricted site—when they start to move from protest towards criminal activity. That will be captured.
Mr Jones
I am not sure it will. Let us take the Faslane peace camp as an example. I totally disagree with what those people are arguing for, but if somebody there took a photograph and put it out on social media to make a political point, would they be caught under the Bill? Is not that prohibited under the Bill?
Stephen McPartland
No, because they would not be doing something designed to prejudice the United Kingdom.
Stuart C. McDonald
That is useful and it might answer my question. The offence is committed if somebody approaches or is
“in the vicinity of a prohibited place”.
That obviously covers the peace camp. Is the Minister saying that at that stage there is nothing prejudicial to the UK’s safety and interests, and that such action only becomes prejudicial to UK safety and interests when people take further action, along the lines that he suggested?
Stephen McPartland
Yes. The intention is that people have to do something prejudicial to the UK’s interests to fall foul of the clause.
Prohibited places are inherently sensitive sites that are likely to be the target of state threat activity. Unauthorised access to such sites could be a precursor to harmful acts such as espionage or sabotage, and it is important that we have the tools and powers we need to adequately protect those sites.
Mr Jones
I think the Minister just said yes to my question and the question of my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood about a person with binoculars. Does that fall under clause 5(1)(a)(i), which refers to an offence being committed if a person
“accesses, enters, inspects or passes over or under a prohibited place”?
Would somebody on a hill several miles away with a pair of binoculars be classed as inspecting an area? Is that why the Minister says that is covered in the Bill?
Stephen McPartland
Yes, that is the intention. Remember that the Official Secrets Act 1911 refers to sketches. We are trying to reform that Act and the others to get to a point at which we help our intelligence services to come up with ways of dealing with some stuff that could technically be considered out of scope. The idea behind the clause is that we will be able to give the intelligence community the tools they need to deal with somebody inspecting a site or doing something prejudicial to the UK’s interests.
Mr Jones
I come back to the fact that if we looked at the Official Secrets Act 1989 and had one big Bill, it would have been far better than this one. Will the Minister clarify that somebody with binoculars would be classified as “inspection”? My hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood asked whether a person looking at a site through binoculars would be captured by this offence, or whether they would have to be writing something down. What is the situation with the old-fashioned sketches mentioned in the 1911 Act? Would they be covered?
Stephen McPartland
The purpose is to cover activity that is prejudicial to the United Kingdom’s interests. For example, if someone were bird watching and they looked at the site through their binoculars, they would not be captured by the offence because they would not be doing anything prejudicial to the United Kingdom’s interests. However, if they were sketching a site to identify how they could break into it or to record activity going on there, that would be prejudicial to the United Kingdom’s interests, so the clause covers that. It is a case-by-case situation.
The current prohibited places provisions fall under the espionage offence within section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1911.
Stephen McPartland
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention and am happy to give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Hastings and Rye.
Sally-Ann Hart
Does my hon. Friend not agree that “other recordings” would include a sketch?
Stephen McPartland
Sketches are included, because a sketch would have to be inspected. The question was: are sketches included? The answer is yes.
The Chair
Order. This really must not become a conversation. Minister, you might perhaps wish to conclude your remarks. We cannot have a conversation backwards and forwards across the Chamber.
Maria Eagle
I regret having to ask more than once, but I am just not quite clear from the Minister’s answers. Perhaps he could write to the Committee if it is not totally clear; that would not be a problem. In subsection (1)(a)(i), does inspecting include looking from a distance—not over or under—say through binoculars that magnify, if someone is doing that with a malign intent, so they are caught by subsection (1)(b), which are the other requirements of the offence?
Would just looking through binoculars from a distance—not taking videos or photographs—and just doing notes or a sketch still be covered, or are we creating a lacuna? That is the only question I seek an answer to. I am afraid the Minister has not been totally clear on how looking through binoculars is covered. We are not inspecting the sketch—we are inspecting the site through the binoculars. Is that not right? In which case, is it still okay for this person to do a sketch? It is not clear.
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful for the intervention and shall try to clarify. It is clear that the provision is not exhaustive, but the reality is someone has to inspect the site, whether that is through binoculars or making a sketch, and the purpose of that activity—that inspection—is to be prejudicial to the interests of the United Kingdom.
Stephen McPartland
I will move on to amendment 50. The condition inserted through amendment 50 removes the term “safety or interests of the United Kingdom” in the context of protests. It is the Government’s view that this is detrimental to the offence under clause 4 as it limits the range of conduct that would be considered prejudicial to the UK and risks creating loopholes that hostile actors could use to exploit using protest as a tool to disrupt sensitive sites in the UK. It is also likely to mean that sites that are not directly involved in the safety of the UK would not be afforded any protection where protests are being inappropriately used to disrupt the lawful functioning of the site. It is crucial that we retain the existing term if we are able to effectively protect the UK’s most sensitive areas from harmful activity.
In addition, the effect of amendment 50 would be that no offence would be committed by protesters if their conduct were not, as a matter of fact, prejudicial. In practice, this would not have any further effect on safeguarding protest activity because if the activity were not in fact prejudicial, a person cannot know, or be in a position where they ought reasonably to know, that that is the case. The amendment may be designed to ensure that no offence is committed unless actual damage results from the conduct, but it would not have that effect and the Government would not support a narrowing of the offence along those lines. While I understand the intention of the amendment, I do not see any requirement for it, given the fact that sufficient safeguards for legitimate protesting activity are already in place.
It is important to say that we will work with the police and the College of Policing ahead of commencement of the provisions to ensure that those implementing these clauses have the appropriate training and guidance to use these powers proportionately. I do not support the amendment and ask that the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East withdraws it.
Finally, clause 5 provides a second offence to capture harmful activity within the reformed prohibited places regime. A person commits this offence if, without authorisation, they engage in conduct at a prohibited place and they know, or reasonably ought to know, that their conduct is unauthorised. A person’s conduct is unauthorised if the person is not entitled to determine whether they may engage in the conduct, or if they do not have consent to engage in the conduct from a person entitled to give it—for example, if they walk past signage stating that access to the site is prohibited without authorisation, or if they take pictures from outside the site in spite of clear signage that that is not permitted.
Holly Lynch
This is a question I asked members of the UK intelligence community because I could not answer it: does a list of prohibited places exist in the public domain? Such a list might equip someone with the information prior to arriving at a site and enable them to determine whether a place is prohibited. It is not clear to me whether a list exists. Can the Minister clarify?
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her intervention, and I will certainly look at that. A number of sites will be prohibited in law, and some sites will not want people to know exactly where they are and what they are doing because they will become targets. Once again, there is a balance to be struck in relation to provision for the intelligence community.
Holly Lynch
I completely accept the sensitive nature of the subject and why we might not want to put such information in the public domain, but with respect to the “ought reasonably to have known” defence, I wonder whether we should ensure that people are equipped with the information that a site is indeed prohibited before they find themselves, perhaps accidentally, in a compromising position. How can we ensure that all that is communicated appropriately and sensitively so as to protect people from accidentally falling foul of these stipulations?
Stephen McPartland
It goes back to the reasonableness test: is the person conducting a reasonable activity, or is the activity prejudicial to the United Kingdom’s national security interests?
For a person to be guilty of the offence, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the person knew, or reasonably ought to have known, that their conduct—for example, in entering the prohibited place—was unauthorised, which provides protections. Unlike the clause 4 offence, there is no requirement that the person have a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom to commit this offence. That ensures that action can be taken in cases when a person has knowingly carried out unauthorised conduct at a prohibited place, such as trespassing, without having to consider whether that person has a purpose prejudicial to the United Kingdom’s safety or interests, which requires a higher threshold of potential harm to be demonstrated.
To take account of the fact that a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom does not need to be proven, there are differences between the conduct caught under the offence under this clause and the offence under clause 4. For example, this offence does not criminalise the inspection of photographs of prohibited places, and it is not capable of capturing conduct in the vicinity of a prohibited place.
The Government do not consider it proportionate or necessary to capture the inspection of photographs under this offence, given that inspecting a photograph that has already been taken of a prohibited place cannot be classed as inherently unauthorised activity. Given the wide range of legitimate activities that could be undertaken in the vicinity of a prohibited place, and given that there is no inherent need for walking past a prohibited place to be authorised, the offence under clause 5 does not capture activity in the vicinity of a prohibited place.
The second prohibited places offence under clause 5 is a crucial addition to the tools our law enforcement agencies and courts can use to capture the full range of harmful activity that can take place at prohibited places. Even though this offence is not aimed at capturing the most damaging activity around those places, as clause 4 does, and attracts lower penalties, it is equally important that we introduce an offence that can capture activity that may seem less severe, but is still capable of interfering with and damaging the operations and security of the United Kingdom’s most sensitive sites.
This offence should be seen as part of a tiered approach alongside the new police powers to protect those sites, which I will come to, and it will ensure that law enforcement has a range of tools and powers at its disposal to protect those sites.
Stuart C. McDonald
The debate has been useful, particularly in relation to protestors, and it is useful to know that, apparently, the Minister’s view is that protestors approaching or being in the vicinity of a prohibited place will not necessarily engage the clause because, at that stage, the activity is not prejudicial to the interests of the United Kingdom. Something more is required before that part of the test is engaged. We might need to explore that further on Report, but for now it is important that we say protestors are not so interested in the Pokémon players. We can revisit that on Report. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 6
Powers of police officers in relation to a prohibited place
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephen McPartland
The powers set out in clause 6 allow for a police officer to exercise specific powers in order to protect prohibited places. A person commits an offence if they fail to comply with an order imposed under the police powers in relation to a prohibited place. Those powers include the ability to order a person who has accessed or entered a prohibited place or is in the vicinity of one to leave it immediately. Under these powers, a police officer may also arrange for the removal or movement of a vehicle or device from a prohibited place or an area adjacent to a prohibited place.
Alongside the police powers, the clause provides that is an offence to fail to comply with an order given by a constable under those provisions. As an example, if a person is circling the perimeter of a prohibited place and taking detailed photographs of the infrastructure and activities within, the police may order this person to cease to engage in that activity and leave the area immediately, given that they are carrying out an inspection of the site and their activity is in an area adjacent to the prohibited place.
In order to exercise any of those powers, a constable must reasonably believe that doing so is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. For example, exercise of the powers may be necessary for the prevention of activity that could harm or disrupt the operations or functioning of a prohibited place. In most instances, we consider that the use of these powers will be intelligence-led and that the police will be called to prohibited places where there is a concern identified from the site itself.
The aim of the police powers in relation to prohibited places is not to impede legitimate activity, such as lawful protest, but rather to catch and deter activity around prohibited places that is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK. That includes activity that is harmful to and disrupts or impedes the functioning or operations of a prohibited place, such as scaling fences, blocking access points or wider disruption to the critical and sensitive work being conducted at these sites. Ahead of implementation, my officials will work with the police and the College of Policing to ensure that clear guidance and training are in place to ensure that the powers are used reasonably and proportionately to protect these sites.
The additional powers are a critical part of the reformed prohibited places regime and provide significant operational utility, given that they enable law enforcement to prevent harmful activity from taking place at these sensitive sites—activity that could be a precursor to state-threat offences such as espionage or sabotage. Without their inclusion, the UK will be less equipped to counter hostile activity as it happens, which will leave these sites more vulnerable to state-threat activity or wider threats that do not have a state link.
Holly Lynch
Subsections (1) and (2) set out the powers that police constables can exercise to protect a prohibited place, which include ordering a person to cease their activity or move away from the site. Subsection (3) provides that a constable must reasonably believe the use of those powers to be
“necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.”
This includes prevention of activity that could harm or disrupt the operations or functioning of a prohibited place in a way that could jeopardise the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.
The clause gives the police powers to direct people to stop using devices and leave the area, but when I discussed its detail with a recently retired senior police officer he observed that the clause seemingly does not confer on the constable the power to seize the device or any video or images or, indeed, sketches or footage off the back of an eagle taken by the device. Can the Minister explain whether that is the case? If so, would the clause not benefit from an addition to prevent any such sensitive material from leaving the scene with a person instructed to take it with them?
I find it curious that all police officers tend to be referred to as “constable” in legislation, despite the fact that constable is just one of several possible ranks. Indeed, there is some variety in the responsibilities for keeping sites defined as prohibited places safe. The Civil Nuclear Constabulary, overseen by the Civil Nuclear Police Authority, is the armed police force in charge of protecting civil nuclear sites and nuclear materials in England and Scotland. The Ministry of Defence police is responsible for law enforcement and security of military bases in the UK; as it says on the tin, it reports into the Ministry of Defence.
Will the Minister confirm that the powers conferred in clause 6 extend beyond those officers serving in regular police forces that report to the Home Office? It is the specialist forces sitting outside of those structures that tend to pick up the lion’s share of the responsibility for protecting prohibited places. Could he confirm that the powers apply to all officers, regardless of rank, and where the military also provide defences at their own sites, or are at least partnering in that work? Could the Minister explain whether the powers extend to the military, or are exclusively for police officers?
Finally, the powers conferred will also allow a constable to arrange for the removal of a vehicle from a prohibited place “or an area adjacent” to it. Does the Minister envisage any further guidance on what constitutes “adjacent to a prohibited place” to assist a constable in determining distance, proximity, and so on, in making those judgments and communicating those clearly in a reasonable way to members of the public?
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for the very good points she has raised. My understanding is that the powers currently apply only to police officers, not to members of the military. It is very clear throughout the clause that it refers to “a constable”, and it is referenced as “Powers of police officers”.
Mr Jones
Is that not a hole in the legislation? We are coming on to Cyprus next, where it is not civilian police that do security there, and I can think of a few others around the world where it is done by the military. Therefore, should those powers not also be given to the military?
Stephen McPartland
Both the right hon. Member for North Durham and the hon. Member for Halifax made a very good point. We will take that away and look at it. If they want to strengthen the Bill, we are happy to work with them to do that.
Antony Higginbotham (Burnley) (Con)
Would my hon. Friend agree that there is a difference between providing force protection for a site and providing constabulary and law enforcement duties?
Stephen McPartland
My hon. Friend makes a good point. We must also bear in mind that it is not our intention to introduce search-and-seize powers under these police powers. This is part of the tiered approach we referred to earlier, with the police being able to warn people to go away before they fall foul of the law. There is the opportunity to give them that warning before any arrest.
Mr Jones
I agree with the hon. Member for Burnley, but there are also sites that are benign, so it is not a force protection point but a constabulary duty that is carried out by members of the armed forces. Therefore, I think they need these powers if this is a comprehensive suite of powers.
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful to the right hon. Member. As I said, that is certainly something that we will look at and come back to.
National Security Bill (Fourth sitting)
Stephen McPartland ExcerptsTuesday 12th July 2022
(2 years, 4 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate National Security Act 2023 View all National Security Act 2023 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 12 July 2022 - (12 Jul 2022)
The Minister for Security (Stephen McPartland)
I beg to move amendment 5, in clause 7, page 7, line 3, at end insert—
“(ca) any land or building in the United Kingdom or the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia which is—
(i) owned or controlled by the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service or GCHQ, and
(ii) used for the functions of the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service or GCHQ;”.
This amendment and Amendments 7 and 8 make provision for sites used by the intelligence services to be prohibited places.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 6 to 8.
Clause stand part.
Clause 8 stand part.
Stephen McPartland
Amendments 5 to 8 make critical additions to the definition of “prohibited place” in clause 7. The sites used by the UK’s intelligence services are some of our most sensitive locations and must be afforded the measures and protections given by the wider prohibited places provisions. These measures will mean that those who commit unlawful conduct can face prosecution under either of the two new prohibited places offences in clauses 4 and 5. Moreover, the police will have powers to stop people engaging in conduct in relation to a prohibited place that may harm the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. While the Government initially intended to add these sites by way of regulations, on reflection we concluded that it would be preferable to give Parliament the opportunity to debate the provisions up front—lucky me!
The amendments make provision for sites used by the intelligence services to be prohibited places under the meaning of “prohibited place” in clause 7. Under amendment 5, any land, building or part of a building used for the functions of the intelligence services will be designated only if it is also owned or controlled by those services. That offers safeguards so that places used temporarily for the functions of the intelligence services would not be designated; that would not be proportionate. I will not dwell on amendments 6 to 8, which are consequential, centralising the definition of a building for the purpose of the clause and providing a definition of GCHQ.
Turning to clause 7 stand part, section 3 of the Official Secrets Act 1911 sets out the places that are, or can be by declaration, a prohibited place under existing legislation. They are mainly defence-related sites or those that are used, or can be used, in times of war. Clause 7, which replaces those provisions, defines what sites will be prohibited places for the purposes of the two offences in clauses 4 and 5 and the police powers in clause 6, and it has been drafted to continue to capture the majority of the sites that are set out as prohibited places in the existing provisions.
The language and drafting has been simplified to ensure that there is clarity about what is or is not a prohibited place under the clause, removing long lists of terms that are less relevant for modern legislation. The definition in the clause includes Crown land or a vehicle in the UK or the sovereign base areas of Akrotiri or Dhekelia used for UK defence purposes or for the defence of another country. That covers the range of defence sites, including military barracks, bases and military headquarters.
Limiting prohibited places to Crown land in the UK or the sovereign base areas ensures that the provisions retain a focus on places important for UK defence, and that the range of sites covered does not become disproportionate or impractical. The definition is extended to sovereign base areas in Cyprus because there are several military bases there that are important for UK defence and should be covered by these provisions, as they are now.
Clause 7 also ensures that we can continue to capture defence vehicles as prohibited places. A vehicle used for defence purposes would include military transportation that is either sensitive in itself—for example, aircraft, vessels, submarines or tanks—or used for the purposes of transporting sensitive defence technology, equipment or weaponry. That may include trains or convoys used for the purposes of transporting weaponry. It is crucial that those vehicles are afforded the protection that the prohibited places regime provides.
Clause 7 also designates Crown land or vehicles in the UK or the sovereign base areas used for the purposes of the defence of a foreign country or territory. It is imperative that these provisions extend to and protect the sites and vehicles that the UK’s allies use and operate. For example, there are several military bases in the UK out of which our allies operate; those need to continue to be afforded the protection given by the prohibited places regime. Lastly, clause 7 covers buildings or vehicles designated by regulations made under the clause 8 designation power.
Clause 8 provides for the Secretary of State to declare additional sites as prohibited places by way of secondary legislation. In order to do so, the Secretary of State is required by the clause to reasonably consider the designation necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. The designation can be made either by listing specific sites or vehicles or by introducing a description of sites or vehicles. Any site that met such a description would thereby be designated—for example, the listing of UK defence vehicles would capture military aircrafts, tanks, submarines and vessels. The clause maintains our existing ability to designate sites while ensuring it is appropriately modernised and futureproofed, as recommended by the Law Commission.
When deciding whether a designation to declare an additional prohibited place through the power in clause 8 is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom, the Secretary of State must have regard to certain matters, including the purpose for which the place is used; the nature of the information held, stored or processed on the land or in the building or vehicle; and the nature of any equipment, technology or material that is located on the land or in the building or vehicle. That requirement provides safeguards to ensure that only sites at risk of harmful activity can be designated as prohibited places.
The power to designate additional prohibited places is limited to land or buildings in the United Kingdom or the sovereign base areas in Cyprus, or any vehicle. Although it may seem broad to enable the designating of any vehicle around the world as a prohibited place, in most instances it would be possible to capture harmful activity at such vehicles only within the United Kingdom or in countries with which we have extradition agreements, given the difficulty of enforcing the offence overseas. It is beneficial to be able to designate a vehicle anywhere in the world because, unlike land or buildings, vehicles are clearly capable of being moving targets at different locations.
In the near term, the Government intend to designate as prohibited places certain sites in the nuclear sector, including major licensed nuclear sites. Specific nuclear sites such as Sellafield and Dounreay are currently designated as prohibited places under the existing provisions of the Official Secrets Act 1911. The Government want to ensure that sites in the sector continue to be afforded protection under the reformed prohibited places regime. Consultation is currently ongoing with the nuclear sector to ensure that the range of places that require designation as prohibited places are captured and that the impact of any designation is fully considered before a decision to designate is made.
Given that in rare cases it may be necessary to rapidly designate a site as a prohibited place in response to intelligence about an imminent threat at a certain location, the reformed designation power is subject to the negative parliamentary procedure. The power could be needed to rapidly designate, for example, medical research facilities used during a public health crisis that may be the target of state threat activity. Even in such rapid cases, the Secretary of State must still reasonably consider designation necessary to protect the safety or interest of the United Kingdom and we would expect that, where reasonably practicable, the Secretary of State would consult with the landowner.
A designation power to declare additional prohibited places is a crucial part of the reformed regime. By futureproofing the provisions in such a way, we can continue to capture and deter those who seek to conduct harmful activity at the United Kingdom’s most sensitive sites, as the threat landscape will undoubtably evolve over the coming years. I ask the Committee to support the inclusion of clauses 7 and 8 in the Bill and to agree to the amendments.
Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)
Let me take clauses 7 and 8 and Government amendments 5, 6, 7 and 8 together. As the Minister has outlined, clause 7 defines a prohibited place for the purposes of clauses 4 to 8. The definition includes Crown land and vehicles used for defence purposes; places used for the invention, development, production, operation, storage or disposal of weapons; and land, buildings or vehicles designated by regulations made under clause 8.
Clause 8 provides for the Secretary of State to declare additional sites as prohibited places by way of secondary legislation. This will ensure that additional sites that are vulnerable to state threat activity can be designated when it is considered necessary. The Committee will note that, historically, the list of prohibited places has had a strong, if not total, military focus.
We just need to read the legislation to be struck by how dated it is. The Official Secrets Act 1911 defined a prohibited place as:
“any work of defence, arsenal, naval or air force establishment or station, factory, dockyard, mine, minefield, camp, ship, or aircraft belonging to or occupied by or on behalf of His Majesty, or any telegraph, telephone, wireless or signal station, or office so belonging or occupied, and any place belonging to or occupied by or on behalf of His Majesty”
and so on. While reflective of the contemporary climate and the threats posed to the UK, this list has long been out of date. We therefore welcome this expansive update for defining what a prohibited place is, as well as giving the Government the ability to adapt the list where there is a reasonable case to do so. In the light of that, we recognise that Government amendments 5, 6, 7 and 8 complement the clause in that aim.
That said, I did probe the Law Commission during last Thursday’s evidence session on this point. It is important that this legislation is laid in such a way that it is not used by Government or future Governments to infringe on other democratic freedoms. During the consultation period of the Law Commission’s report on the Official Secrets Act, a number of stakeholders expressed concern about giving the Home Secretary such powers to designate a new site as a prohibited place.
The Trinity Mirror raised concern that an unchecked power to create designated sites based on national security may create a new criminal offence without parliamentary debate and could potentially stifle legitimate investigations in the public interest. WhistleblowersUK stated that the list should not end up being widened to include council officers or schools, for example. It would be incredibly worrying if a Home Secretary interpreted this power to allow himself or herself to mark places that served a purpose in the execution of an unpopular Government policy, for example, as a prohibited place. I outlined these concerns to Dr Nicholas Hoggard of the Law Commission, who provided some reassurance. He said,
“What is good to see about the powers under this Bill is they are quite principled powers. The basis on which the Secretary of State can define something as a protected place is much more transparent. There are just three limbs that are easy to understand. That basis for affording the Secretary of the State the power is much more useful. It is more transparent, but it also enables us to capture within the offence places where
there is actually a real risk of harm arising from hostile state activity. On that front, I would say the power is good in so much as it aligns with the spirit of our recommendation. The fact that there will be parliamentary oversight of this process is important. It was a fundamental feature of our recommendations, and the negative resolution procedure is an important part of that process. The Secretary of State’s powers are more effective than is permitted under the current law, but also there is sufficient oversight.”––[Official Report, National Security Public Bill Committee, 7 July 2022; c. 51, Q96.]
I look to the Minister for the same political assurances: that such powers would not be used should the Government find that to declare somewhere a prohibited site would serve a purpose in the execution of an unpopular Government policy, for example. Having gone through the prohibited places National Security Bill factsheet on the Government website, I have already asked the Minister what information should be in the public domain to confirm that somewhere is a prohibited site.
I completely accept that somewhere might be so secure that extensive signage and its inclusion on any such list might not be appropriate. However, in the event of our Pokémon GO example, it is about being able to check without needing to travel to a prohibited place to observe the signage to find out, which might itself bring someone in scope of earlier offences. I want to ensure that the status of such a site, the restrictions and the consequences of not adhering to those restrictions are appropriately and clearly communicated to the public.
Before closing, I want to bring the Minister’s attention to clause 7, where we have sovereign based areas overseas for UK defence purposes. He has made the undertaking to consider military powers within the earlier clauses on police powers. It is my understanding that the Ministry of Defence police would not provide that service to these sites deemed to be prohibited places within clause 7. Once again, he might need to write to us to work through some of that detail further.
Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)
Clause 7 and the Government amendments to it seem to make sense; my concern is about clause 8. I read the exchange that the shadow Minister referred to, when she asked the Law Commission about the broad powers in clause 8; it was one of the very rare occasions when I was not absolutely convinced by the answer that came back. At the end of the day, clause 7’s definition of “prohibited place” is very defence oriented, and it will now be defence and security oriented. But clause 8 opens the definition up to any sort of land at all and the nebulous concept of the safety or interests of the United Kingdom: if the Secretary of State considers it reasonably necessary for the safety of UK interests, a place can be added to the list.
I worry about immigration detention facilities or a fracking site being added to the list. Regardless of the rights or wrongs of the policy, that is a fairly significant extension to how the whole policy area operates. That is where our concern lies. Has it been opened up too broadly? I appreciate that the Minister says we need flexibility and to be nimble, but I worry that we have left it too open to potential—abuse is probably too strong a word—overgenerous interpretation.
Stephen McPartland
I commit to write to the hon. Member for Halifax—and the whole Committee—to answer her point about the police. I totally accept the genuine concern I am hearing from across party lines about what safeguards are in place to ensure that a place is designated for reasons of defence as opposed to Government embarrassment. The safeguard is that the power to designate only be exercised may if the Secretary of State reasonably considers it necessary to do so in order to protect the safety or interest of the United Kingdom.
Holly Lynch
There is that difference between safety and interest; it would be quite easy for a Home Secretary, if she has an unpopular deportation policy—to give a topical example—to argue that that it in the UK’s interest rather than its safety. That gives us cause for concern.
Stephen McPartland
I appreciate that. We have heard this morning and in previous sittings about that tension in respect of the Government interest and defence. There is case law that defines it. The purpose of the Bill is to provide the intelligence services with the tools they need to keep the country safe. They feel that they need these tools to do that. There are safeguards. The idea behind the number of factors is that there are a variety of checks on the Secretary of State, so they would have to demonstrate all the way through that they have considered that multitude of factors and that it was necessary for the defence of the country.
On the point made by the right hon. Member for North Durham, I cannot believe I am going to say this but I cannot tell him what I have been briefed, for national security reasons. The reality is that in these clauses we have moved away from designating places to categories. One of the categories is unavowed sites. That means that some of the sites that he suggested would be covered by the category.
Stephen McPartland
Another query raised was about oil and metal, which I understand are already in the existing provision for use in defence. That is why we refer to those areas. Finally, we are not designating military bases abroad, other than sovereign bordered areas, purely because of difficulties with jurisdiction and making that work.
Amendment 5 agreed to.
Amendments made: 6, in clause 7, page 7, line 4, leave out
“(including a part of a building)”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 7.
Amendment 7, in clause 7, page 7, line 24, at end insert—
“‘building’ includes any part of a building;”.
See Amendment 5.
Amendment 8, in clause 7, page 7, line 37, at end insert—
“‘GCHQ’ has the meaning given by section 3(3) of the Intelligence Services Act 1994;”—(Stephen McPartland.)
See Amendment 5.
Clause 7, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 9
Power to designate a cordoned area to secure defence aircraft
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to consider the following:
Clauses 10 and 11 stand part.
Stephen McPartland
The power set out in clause 9 allows a constable to designate a cordoned area around a military aircraft, part of an aircraft or related equipment. Regrettably, there have been several aircraft crashes over the past several years, including an F-15 aircraft crash in Lincolnshire in 2014. In such cases it is common for sensitive technology or material to be dispersed, and a specific power to cordon an area will ensure that such material is sufficiently protected until it can be removed.
Under the clause, a constable may designate an area under the cordon power only if they consider it expedient for the purposes of securing an aircraft, parts of an aircraft or equipment relating to such an aircraft, used for military purposes. The clause goes on to describe the process for designating a cordoned area this power, including ensuring that the boundary is appropriately marked and that a written record is made of the relevant decisions.
Members will appreciate the interest that hostile actors would have in accessing military technology. A cordon power that allows us to protect sensitive military aircraft technology beyond prohibited places—for example, in the event of a crash—is a tool that our armed forces and police can use to prevent harmful activity from taking place if sensitive technology is exposed and becomes vulnerable to access or inspection.
Clause 10 sets out the duration for which a designation of a cordoned area made under the clause 9 power may have effect. The end of the cordon must be specified in the designation, and initially an area can be cordoned only for a maximum period of 14 days. The initial period of the cordon specified in the designation may, in many cases, be adequate for the secured military aircraft, parts or related equipment to be safely removed. Should the process take longer—for example, if more time than originally anticipated is required in the event of a criminal investigation or an investigation by the Defence Accident Investigation Branch—the duration can be extended up to a maximum of 28 days from the point of the initial designation. Setting out the duration for which a designation of a cordoned area may have effect is an essential provision as part of the wider military aircraft cordon power. It prevents the provisions from being implemented for longer than is justified or proportionate.
Clause 11 provides the police with the powers to enforce a cordoned area that has been designated under the clause 9 power. The powers are similar to those that the police are able to use to protect prohibited places under clause 6. They include requiring a person not to carry out specified conduct, such as entering or inspecting a cordoned area; requiring a person or persons in charge of a vehicle or device to leave a cordoned area or an adjacent area immediately; and arranging for the movement or removal of a vehicle from a cordoned area.
It is especially important to have powers in relation to an area adjacent, given that people are able to take photographs, videos or other recordings of a crashed aircraft that is within a cordoned area from outside the cordon perimeter. The powers to prohibit such activity allow for enhanced protection against the threat that may be posed when sensitive technology or information is exposed—for example, hostile actors may still be able to gather potentially damaging information from outside a cordon through the use of long-range cameras, or may use photos and videos obtained by others and posted on social media.
Alongside the powers I have outlined, clause 11 will make it an offence to fail to comply with an order given by a constable under the powers. There may well be instances in which a person has a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with such an order, so the clause includes a defence to protect those who have a legitimate reason to be within a cordoned area.
The police powers in relation to a cordoned area in clause 11 are crucial, as they give our law enforcement agencies the tools needed to deter hostile actors from accessing the sensitive defence technology or material that may potentially be exposed—for example, following the unfortunate event of a military aircraft crash.
Holly Lynch
Clause 9 provides a power for the police to create a cordoned area around a defence aircraft, presumably, as the Minister outlined, if it has crashed or had to make an emergency landing outside a prohibited place. We agree that the powers in clause 9 are entirely appropriate and that the ability to cordon off scenes of that kind is necessary to ensure that the aircraft and any equipment or material relating to it can be sufficiently protected until removal has been completed. Under subsection (2) a constable may designate an area under the cordon power in subsection (1) only if they consider it expedient for the purposes of securing an aircraft used for military purposes, or part thereof, or equipment relating to that aircraft.
I have explored this clause with a recently retired senior police officer, and I will relay his query. Why is this provision needed, given that the police already have the ability to cordon off such areas through common law powers? Where is the gap that needed to be closed by the clause? What does it do that was not there previously? The Minister may outline the differences we have missed; further to that point, the explanatory notes make it clear that the power will not be applicable to aircraft other than those used for military purposes. Say, for example, a civilian fixed-wing light aircraft has raised espionage concerns, having flown over a prohibited place without clearance before making an emergency landing: although it would not be a military aircraft, I would be quite comfortable with clause 9 powers being used in such circumstances. Will the Minister consider that in his response?
Antony Higginbotham (Burnley) (Con)
I wish to speak briefly to the clauses. In Lancashire, we are home to BAE Systems Air, in Samlesbury and Warton. That is a significant manufacturing and assembly location for the fourth generation Typhoon aircraft, the fifth generation F-35 and, looking ahead, potentially the sixth generation of the future combat air system. Manufacturing and assembling those aircraft brings a requirement to test them and put them in the air. With any new aircraft, we run the risk of some kind of emergency landing, so the clause is entirely necessary and proportionate to allow the police to put a cordon in place, should that be required. We have to remember the highly sensitive nature of some of the aircraft, recognising in particular that many contain not just UK technology but technology from our friends and allies around the world.
Not that long ago, as we may all remember, one of the F-35s fell off the deck of the Queen Elizabeth carrier as it was meant to be taking off. On the news, we all saw that other allied warships had to go towards the area to ensure that unfriendly or hostile states could not go to find that aircraft on the seabed and try to take some of its technology. The clause seems to do something similar: it will ensure that in the event of an emergency, we have the ability to protect a site so that we can clean it up and investigate it in a controlled way. That control is important, because hostile states are always looking at ways to take advantage of unforeseen circumstances.
Will the Minister confirm that the area where the cordon is put in place will be as tightly defined as possible? We must recognise that in Lancashire, for example, where such events might happen, there is a significant amount of farmland and land used for other things, so we must try to find a balance. It is about proportionality and recognising that although a site is controlled—not just in terms of where it is but recognising that parts might be spread over a significant area—the land might have another use. Will the Minister confirm that the Government expect there to be a balance and that an area will not be so widely defined that it becomes unusable for a significant number of people?
I was pleased to see that there is a 14-day limit for the cordon zone in clause 10, with the potential to expand it to 28 days if needed. That properly tries to balance the different access requirements that the police will have during the clean-up. We all recognise that these will sometimes be complex sites to try to clean up. I very much welcome the clause. For an area such as Lancashire, which has aircraft test flights all the time because of BAE, it will put lots of residents’ minds at ease that if the worst happens, there is a controlled, legislative way to make sure that the site is managed.
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his helpful contribution. The maximum time period is 14 days because we are trying to put in place a limit. The idea is to restrict the areas as tightly as possible to protect the sensitive material without having an impact on other issues. A cordon around the military area will cover a much tighter area. There are already other cordoning factors, which is why the provision is not wider in scope.
The clauses have been drafted because of the experiences in Lincolnshire with the crashed F-15 aircraft in 2015, and the gaps during that period. My understanding is that the pilot lost control of the aircraft, successfully ejected and crashed into farmland adjacent to a village. Once the fire was extinguished, because there were no fatalities Lincolnshire police left it to the relevant military teams to run the area. As result, potentially sensitive debris was left vulnerable to harmful hostile actors over quite a wide range of areas. The purpose of the clauses is to address the direct experience of what happened during that unfortunate aircraft accident.
The hon. Member for Halifax asked a range of questions, including one on civilian light fixed-wing aircraft. The answer is that the provision currently applies only to military aircraft and does apply to foreign aircraft. The powers in the Bill enhance the powers in common law to try to compensate for what happened with that F-15 aircraft. Although the hon. Lady made an incredibly good point about search and seizure powers, as it stands they are not included in the clauses. I will go away and think about that point and ask my officials to look into it in more detail.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 10 and 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12
Sabotage
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Holly Lynch
Clause 12 is a substantial addition to the Bill so warrants further consideration. It introduces a new bespoke offence of state-sponsored sabotage, capturing activity conducted for, on behalf of or for the benefit of a foreign power, resulting in damage to property, sites and data affecting the UK’s interests and national security, which we are happy to support. What has taken the Government so long? It is an extremely welcome provision.
The need for a specific criminal offence of sabotage on the UK’s statute books is long overdue. The necessity for it has increased over time. Over recent years, the nature of sabotage—most notably, the nature of cyber-attacks and sabotage—has changed rapidly. Subsection (3) outlines all the ways in which the act of sabotage can manifest. Subsection (1)(b) is explicit, covering a person’s intent and whether they are
“reckless as to whether their conduct will result in damage”.
As MI5 director general Ken McCallum highlighted,
“cyber is no longer some abstract contest between hackers in it for the thrill or between states jockeying for position in some specialised domain...cyber consistently bites on our everyday lives.”
I was struck by the evidence provided by Paddy McGuinness, the former deputy national security adviser, when I asked him about clause 12 last week. He said:
“one of the difficulties with this grey space activity…is that if you have a presence for an intelligence purpose, you can flick it over and turn it into a disruptive or destructive attack. That is where that preparatory bit is quite important, too: understanding that the simple fact of engaging and being present quickly takes you towards sabotage. I think these are absolutely vital powers.”––[Official Report, National Security Public Bill Committee, 7 July 2022; c. 24, Q47.]
The sense that someone engaged in espionage on behalf of a hostile state could just as easily be instructed to engage in sabotage reminds us why the new offences are necessary as a package of measures. A report published by Lloyd’s of London only last month crystalises the threat posed by cyber-attacks and sabotage. The report, entitled “Shifting powers: Physical cyber risk in a changing geopolitical landscape” and written in partnership with the Centre for Risk Studies at the University of Cambridge, warned that:
“Whilst most cyber-attacks are digital, physical cyber-attacks–defined as virtual attacks which trigger physical disruption–are becoming increasingly commonplace. The rise of state-sponsored cyber-attacks is a significant focus for businesses and governments, driven by an evolving geopolitical landscape in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.”
The UK’s national cyber strategy, published in February this year, also demonstrates the potential threat posed by cyber-sabotage. It states:
“The threats we face in and through cyberspace have grown in intensity, complexity and severity in recent years. Cyber attacks against the UK are conducted by an expanding range of state actors, criminal groups (sometimes acting at the direction of states or with their implicit approval) and activists for the purpose of espionage, commercial gain, sabotage and disinformation.”
From this, we can see that cyber-activity could be prosecutable under a number of the new offences, but I know that the ability to robustly take on sabotage with clause 12 is welcome to those on the frontline of mounting the UK’s defences.
Although outside of scope of the Bill, I will briefly make the point that the Computer Misuse Act 1990, which was the first major legislative attempt to tackle cyber-crime and criminalise hacking, is now also long overdue an update. May I suggest that we have another look at that legislation alongside the Bill and the provisions in this clause, to ensure that we are meeting the cyber-challenges we face as a nation as robustly as is required?
Existing legislation largely fails to accommodate for state-sponsored acts of sabotage. The Criminal Damage Act 1971 defines sabotage as:
“A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property belonging to another intending to destroy or damage any such property or being reckless as to whether any such property would be destroyed or damaged shall be guilty of an offence.”
We therefore welcome the foreign power condition in subsection (1)(d), which will allow police to bring to justice those who work for or conspire with hostile Governments to prejudice the safety or interests of the UK.
We welcome that the offence will link to the preparatory conduct offence to give law enforcement and the intelligence agencies the powers to intervene at an early stage. Despite the changing nature of sabotage, we also welcome that the clause contains provisions to tackle acts of physical damage on sensitive sites, such as critical national infrastructure, property belonging to Her Majesty’s Government, military buildings and sites, other defence assets, or acts that impact goods, systems or services supplying the UK, such as data centres or undersea cable infrastructure. If I have not been clear enough, we very much welcome the addition of clause 12 to the Bill.
Stuart C. McDonald
I echo much of what the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Halifax, said. As ever, I have slight concerns about the breadth of the foreign power condition and how that might interact with sabotage—for example, if a protest on behalf of one of the aforementioned non-governmental organisations causes some damage to a site. Of course, such protestors should face criminal law, but I would hope it would be general criminal law rather than the sabotage offence set out in clause 12 and the heavy sentence that comes with that.
For all the reasons set out by the shadow Minister, we support the inclusion of clause 12. The Minister moved the clause formally, but it would be useful for us to talk it through because this is a new departure for us, and it would be interesting to hear the Government’s thoughts on the nature of the offence.
Stephen McPartland
I will go through clause 12 in a bit more detail. As hon. Members have outlined, the clause makes provision for an offence of sabotage. It is designed to capture intentional reckless activity resulting in damage to assets including property, sites and electronic systems where the person is acting in a way that they know or should know is prejudicial to the UK’s safety and interests.
A state-linked saboteur poses as much of a potential risk to the UK’s national security as someone undertaking terrorist activities. Working to further the interests of a foreign state by damaging something of importance to the UK is sabotage and therefore should be reflected as such.
Although there are offences in legislation that cover similar activities, sabotage as a crime is not an offence under domestic legislation, which was a surprise to me. The existing related offences were not developed to address the specific threat of state-linked sabotage, and the new offence more appropriately addresses the threat that this type of state threat poses. For example, none of the existing offences has a link to a foreign power. Clause 12 resolves those issues by giving law enforcement and the intelligence agencies the tools to tackle sabotage that is carried out for a purpose that the saboteur knows, or should know, prejudices the UK’s safety or interests.
Stephen McPartland
Clause 13 provides for a criminal offence of foreign interference. It is and always will be an absolute priority to protect the UK against such interference. The principal aim of the clause is to create a more challenging operating environment for, and to deter and disrupt the activities of, foreign states who seek to undermine UK interests, our institutions, political system and our rights, and ultimately prejudice our national security.
Clause 13 will act as a tool for disruption and deterrence, raising the cost to foreign states of carrying out interference activity by holding those responsible to account for their actions. I noted the concerns expressed by the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood very clearly. I have raised that issue myself, and it is something that we will talk about in the Home Department, because I understand those concerns. I will address the issue of recklessness later in my remarks. Reference was also made to the foreign power condition, which we will debate in much more detail later in our proceedings.
On the foreign influence registration scheme, I have spoken to hon. Members about that. The Home Secretary has committed to its formal introduction during Committee proceedings, and I put on record that I would like it to introduced during Committee proceedings in the Commons, so that it can be debated properly and dealt with here before being considered in the House of Lords. Donations from shell companies will be dealt with in the economic crime Bill.
We know that states around the world, including the UK, conduct open and transparent influence activities, such as using diplomacy to shape and align policy to benefit shared interests. That is a welcome part of transparent international engagement and is vital to the UK in achieving its interests. However, some states seek to further their strategic interests by going further than overt political influence, such as through cultivating and manipulating relationships with individuals and entities in the UK where power and influence lies and undertaking deceptive lobbying operations to shape public policy making. Although not necessarily hostile, those “interference” activities are typically non-transparent and outside the norms of diplomacy.
In our approach to legislating against foreign interference, we have chosen to target the intended effect of the foreign interference rather than the specific method used to achieve that result. We considered whether it would be more appropriate and effective to create specific offences, such as a bespoke “hack and leak” and disinformation offences, but that approach risked leaving gaps in our ability to prosecute foreign interference. Disinformation campaigns seek to sow discord and undermine public confidence in our institutions and values. Often, the damage caused by disinformation cannot be measured until long after the information is in the public domain. Our approach to foreign interference is intended to enable harmful behaviour to be disrupted at an early stage, before significant damage occurs. That is yet another reason to focus on the intended effect of foreign interference, as opposed to focusing on specific actions and methods of a state actor.
Clause 13 has been constructed with three conditions that must all be met in order for a person to have committed an offence. As is the case throughout the Bill, there must be a link to a foreign power, that is to say where conduct is undertaken for, or on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit, a foreign power. A person must intend that their conduct, or that a course of conduct of which their conduct forms a part, will have a specific effect. I will now turn to those effects to more detail.
The first stipulated effect is interfering with the exercise of a convention right as it has effect under the law of the United Kingdom. The aim of encompassing such intended effect is to catch activities that interfere with a right that is already protected from unjustifiable domestic interference under UK law such as freedom of speech. It has been evidenced that foreign states have engaged in activity that seeks to intimidate or threaten diaspora communities to stop engaging in lawful protest activities, or to embrace their home country or face punishment. It is our aim that such hostile activity can be stopped through this targeted approach.
The second and third effects look at affecting the exercise by any person of their public functions and manipulating whether or how someone uses services provided in the exercise of those public functions. The first of these two effects could relate to the functions of a person who holds public office, such as a Member of Parliament. The type of activity this effect could capture, subject to the other legal conditions being met, is conduct that seeks to affect a political decision. The second of the two effects could be manipulating whether or how any person makes use of vaccination services. In isolation, this is of course not a crime, but sophisticated and well-resourced state actors will choose topics that divide public opinion and pit us against one another. As I have already touched on, this clause focuses on the person’s intention, as opposed to the vector or means they use to achieve it. That is at the very core of what foreign interference is.
The fourth and fifth effects capture conduct that manipulates whether, or how, any person participates in a political or legal process under the law of the United Kingdom respectively. Examples of the type of activity that we consider those effects capturing, subject to the other legal conditions being met, would be threatening a member of a jury in order to prejudice a trial, stealing evidence of a crime in order to disrupt an investigation, or intending to secure the election of candidates with views favourable to, or favoured by, the foreign power.
The sixth effect is consistent with other offences in the Bill and could cover foreign interference in UK defence and security interests or trade deals being negotiated with countries around the world.
In addition to the foreign power condition needing to be met and an intention to cause one of the effects in subsection (2), the person’s conduct must meet at least one of three specific conditions: A, B or C. Condition A is that the person’s conduct constitutes an offence or, if it takes place in a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, would constitute an offence if it took place in England and Wales. That reflects the potential for foreign interference to be conducted through a range of methods, all with different outcomes. In seeking to bring about one of the effects in subsection (2), a foreign state actor could, in theory, commit an offence such as fraud or bribery in the course of their conduct.
Condition B is met when a person’s conduct involves coercion of any kind. The term coercion captures aggressive and violent forms of conduct such as damaging or destroying, or threatening to damage or destroy, a person’s property, or damaging or threatening to damage a person’s reputation. In addition, the term “coercion” also encompasses activity that causes spiritual injury to, or place undue spiritual pressure on, a person. This term follows existing precedents, as debated during the passage of the Elections Act 2022.
Condition C is met when a person’s conduct involves making a misrepresentation. A misrepresentation may include making either a statement or by any other kind of conduct and may be either expressed or implied. This covers a misrepresentation as to the person’s identity or purpose, as well as presenting information in a way that amounts to a misrepresentation, even if some or all of the information is true. As the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated, information can be weaponised. The new offence of foreign interference is a significant step forward in the UK’s response to tackling state-sponsored disinformation. We believe that the vast majority of state-sponsored disinformation captured by this clause will be done so by meeting condition C.
It is right that the framework we have devised consists of three high legal tests, which must all be met for an offence to apply. That is an effective and appropriate way to safeguard against capturing legitimate forms of influence or undermining and eroding the freedoms and values we are actively seeking to safeguard.
Additionally, this clause provides that the offence applies regardless of whether a person’s conduct takes place in the United Kingdom or elsewhere. This important component reflects the threat landscape of the 21st century and enables activity conducted overseas to be captured. I must reiterate that if this component did not apply to the clause as drafted, vast swathes of hostile activity could go unpunished, which could ultimately undermine the UK’s safety and interests. The provision in clause 13(10) is consistent with other offences in the Bill.
As I have said, clause 13 is not about restricting the rights and liberties of the British people. It reinforces such protections and privileges we care so deeply about. As I have noted, the offence consists of a framework with three explicit legal conditions that must all be met in order for a person’s conduct to be caught. Furthermore, the measures underpinning this clause also include the requirement of Attorney General consent in England and Wales, and Advocate General in Northern Ireland, in order to bring forward a prosecution.
Turning to the penalty, we propose a maximum of 14 years’ imprisonment on conviction, or a fine, or both. That reflects the seriousness of the harm that state threats can have on the UK and its interests. This is about activity that intends to interfere in our democracy, and we must not be complacent in ensuring that sentencing judges have available to them penalties that can reflect the potential harm caused by this type of conduct.
Therefore, the best way of tackling the significant threat we face from hostile activity by states is to ensure that we have appropriate and proportionate measure that do not overshadow our freedoms. As previously stated, I am committed to ensuring that we have a full suite of provisions in our arsenal to protect our national security. I hope the Committee will agree on the clear requirement for clause 13.
Government amendment 9 creates a bridge from the offence in clause 13 to the priority offences in the Online Safety Bill, which will strengthen the Government’s response to the state-sponsored disinformation that seeks to undermine the UK’s interests. The new offence of foreign interference will criminalise state-sponsored disinformation affecting the UK, allowing us to disrupt and deter foreign actors engaging in disinformation campaigns against the UK. As well as prosecuting perpetrators where possible, we need online platforms to take action against the content. Designating the offence as a priority offence in schedule 7 to the Online Safety Bill will require online platforms to guard against and act swiftly to remove content that amounts to an offence.
The risk assessment and safety duties provided for in the Online Safety Bill include the use of proportionate measures to reduce and manage the risk of harm to individuals and prevent users from coming across priority illegal content on the service. Where priority illegal content is present on the service, providers must minimise the length of time for which it is present and also swiftly remove the content on being alerted to it.
Officials in the Home Office and the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport continue to work closely with Ofcom and platforms to ensure that guidance is produced to allow platforms to take proportionate steps towards removing state-sponsored disinformation. To comply with these duties, platforms will have to consider the design and features of their service and the operation of their algorithms. In the context of the foreign interference offence, that could include measures to ensure that platform manipulation, such as engaging in artificially co-ordinated messaging campaigns, is more difficult, thus mitigating the risk of co-ordinated inauthentic behaviour and disinformation more broadly.
While amendment 9 ensures robust action on state-sponsored disinformation, it must be set in the context of a regime that will also defend freedom of expression and the invaluable role of a free press. Platforms and Ofcom will have duties relating to freedom of expression for which they can be held to account. Platforms will not be able to arbitrarily remove harmful content. They will need to be clear what content is acceptable on their services and enforce the rules consistently. Users will have access to effective mechanisms to appeal the removal of content without good reason.
It is right for the Government to go further in addressing disinformation and wider information operations undertaken and amplified by foreign states. Amendment 9 will address the most concerning information campaigns being amplified by foreign powers who are seeking to advance their interests and harm the UK.
On the point about recklessness, my understanding is that we are trying to get the balance right between legitimate and illegitimate restrictions. The concern was that including recklessness would possibly widen the scope and would then move into the political and diplomatic arenas. There is a reason—it may not be the best one, but there is a reason.
Amendment 51 seeks to modify condition A subsection (4), so that conduct outside the UK is within the scope of condition A where such conduct would amount to an offence in any part of the UK, not just England and Wales. Condition A
“is that the person’s conduct constitutes an offence or, if it takes place…outside the United Kingdom, would constitute an offence if it took place in England and Wales.”
Conduct taking place in Scotland or Northern Ireland that constitutes an offence in Scotland or Northern Ireland would be covered here. It is only where the conduct takes place outside the UK that the criminal law of England and Wales is currently used as the benchmark. The clause has been drafted this way for operational effectiveness and to ensure no unintended or complex consequences where, for example, a prosecution is brought in one part of the UK but relies on a charge from another part of the UK. We expect the amendment would have little practical impact on prosecutions.
However, that said, I accept the spirit of the amendment and I personally believe that we should be seeking to legislate for all parts of the UK. If the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East will withdraw the amendment, I propose to take the point away to consider further. In particular, I want to ensure that there are no unintended practical difficulties for investigators and prosecutors that may make bringing charges for foreign interference, which can often emanate from overseas, harder than necessary. Another consideration is ensuring that any amendment does not affect the utility of our Government amendment to add the offence of foreign interference to the Online Safety Bill, where platform operators will be under a duty to guard against and swiftly remove content that amounts to an offence of foreign interference.
I will consider those points and hope to be able to come back favourably at a later stage. I ask that the hon. Gentleman withdraw the amendment.
Stuart C. McDonald
On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment made: 9, in clause 13, page 12, line 13, at end insert—
“(12A) In the Online Safety Act 2022, in Schedule 7 (priority offences), before the italic heading “Inchoate offences” insert—
“Foreign interference
32A An offence under section 13 of the National Security Act 2022 (foreign interference).”—(Stephen McPartland.)
This amendment amends the Online Safety Act expected to result from the Online Safety Bill currently before Parliament to make foreign interference a priority offence for the purposes of that Act.
Clause 13, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 14
Foreign interference in elections
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 10 and 11
That schedule 1 be the First schedule to the Bill
New clause 3—Reporting on disinformation originating from foreign powers—
(1) The Secretary of State must appoint a person or body to review the extent of disinformation originating from foreign powers which presents a threat, or potential threat, to national security.
(2) A review under subsection (1) must include an assessment of the extent of foreign interference in elections.
(3) A review under subsection (1) may include—
(a) examining the number and scale of offences committed, and estimating the number and scale of instances where an offence is suspected to have been committed, under—
(i) section 13, where Condition C is met, and
(ii) section 14,
and,
(b) any other matters the person or body considers relevant to the matters mentioned in subsections (1) and (2).
(4) The person or body appointed under subsection (1) may be the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, or another person or body the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(5) A review must be carried out under this section in respect of—
(a) the 12-month period beginning with the day on which section 13 comes into force, and
(b) each subsequent 12-month period.
(6) Each review under this section must be completed as soon as reasonably practicable after the period to which it relates.
(7) The person or body must send to the Secretary of State a report on the outcome of each review carried out under this section as soon as reasonably practicable after completion of the review.
(8) On receiving a report under subsection (7), the Secretary of State must lay a copy of it before Parliament.
(9) The Secretary of State may pay to the person or body—
(a) expenses incurred in carrying out the functions of the reviewer under this section, and
(b) such allowances as the Secretary of State determines,
except where financial provision is already made to the person or body for the discharge of the person or body’s functions, of which this section may form part”
Stephen McPartland
The clause provides for substantially increased maximum penalties where a person commits any of the existing electoral offences set out in schedule 1 and the person’s conduct meets the foreign power condition found in clause 24. I will also deal with amendments 10 and 11 and new clause 3 in the course of my speech.
As I touched on in highlighting the necessity of clause 13, activity that interferes in our elections, political processes and democratic events reflects the most egregious form of state threats activity. It is therefore absolutely right that we have the tools and powers at our disposal to be able to deter, disrupt and withstand the actions of foreign states who seek to harm the UK and its interests. The clause’s primary aim is to provide for substantially increased maximum penalties where a person commits any of the existing electoral offences set out in the related schedule and the person’s conduct meets the requisite foreign power condition. That will help to create a more challenging operating environment for those who seek to do the UK harm, raising the cost to foreign states of carrying out interference activity by holding those responsible to account for their actions.
We have constructed a provision that applies to a range of existing electoral offences under the Representation of the People Act 1983 and the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. The offences remain unaffected, but, where the foreign power condition is met, a substantially increased maximum sentence will be available. For example, existing offences under the Representation of the People Act criminalise interfering with elections—for example, undue influence in section 114A, bribery in section 113, and tampering with ballot or nomination papers in section 65—but the maximum penalties available do not reflect the significance of malign political foreign interference at the hands of a foreign power. Where a person commits any of the existing electoral offences set out in schedule 1 and their conduct meets the requisite foreign power condition, the maximum sentence available to the court will be substantially increased.
As I mentioned, part 1 of schedule 1 sets out a table that lists the relevant electoral offences in column 1 and the specified maximum term for each relevant offence in column 2. Part 2 of the schedule provides for necessary amendments to the Acts from which the offences are taken, where the clause applies. Let me turn briefly to the table in part 1 of schedule 1. In respect of the relevant electoral offences from the Representation of the People Act 1983, there will be a seven-year maximum sentence for offences relating to personation, postal and proxy voting, tampering with nomination papers, and handling of postal voting documents by political campaigners. There will be a four-year maximum sentence for offences relating to providing false statements in nomination papers, bribery, treating, and undue influence.
In respect of the relevant electoral offences from the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, there will a four-year maximum sentence for offences relating to information about donors, providing a false declaration about source of donation or a false declaration as to residence condition, failing to return donations, evading restrictions on donations, failing to comply with requirements about recording donations, providing a false declaration in a donation report, donating to individuals and members associations, loaning to individuals and members, donations to recognised third parties, and donations to permitted participants. There is also a two-year maximum sentence for an offence relating to incurring controlled expenditure in contravention of restriction.
These offences and associated penalties have been determined following robust engagements between the Home Office, other Departments and law enforcement agencies, highlighting that the provisions under the Representation of the People Act 1983 and the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 signify the most egregious conduct associated with political and electoral interference. Therefore, if such conduct has been carried out for, on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit, a foreign power, it fundamentally changes the seriousness of the conduct already criminalised, and therefore requires a greater and more severe sentence. Obtaining the strongest possible deterrence is essential to deliver our broader objectives of pushing back on state threats and making the UK a hard operating environment in which to conduct hostile activity.
The offences in clause 14 are excluded from clause 16 —dealing with the aggravating factor where the foreign power condition is met—to aid investigations and create clarity for prosecutions. Many of the offences in the Bill have the foreign power condition built in, such as clause 13, and we have replicated that approach for the offences in part 1 of schedule 1. Many of the offences under part 1 of schedule 1 have a time limit for investigations. We have removed that to reflect the complexity of state threat investigations, but that also means that we must exclude the offences contained in that schedule from clause 16.
I now turn to Government amendment 10, which is concerned with the relevant electoral offences referenced in clause 14 and contained in part 1 of schedule 1 to this Bill. For context, clause 14 provides for substantially increased maximum penalties where a person commits any of the existing electoral offences set out in the related schedule and the person’s conduct meets the foreign power condition in clause 24. These offences are currently found solely in the Representation of the People Act 1983 and the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. The relevant electoral offences in part 1 of schedule 1 in the RPA are applied in several pieces of secondary legislation. Where that is the case, the Interpretation Act 1978 effectively cascades the effect of clause 14 so that it will apply to the applied versions of the offences without the need to include an express provision in clause 14.
Government amendment 10 proposes to include certain offences contained in the Electoral Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1962 as relevant electoral offences. Those are offences that are akin to the offences from the RPA that are already set out in the schedule. Given the complexity of electoral law, it was right for us to ensure that we have fully considered what else we ought to include in relation to foreign interference in elections, given the threats that we face in this space. That is why the amendment includes the Electoral Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1962. That piece of legislation is specific to Northern Ireland and contains its own stand-alone offences. Many of them are akin to those in the RPA—for example, personation, bribery and treating. Because they are stand-alone offences and not applied versions of the RPA offences, it is necessary to include them expressly in the schedule of offences to which clause 14 relates.
Although the current list of relevant electoral offences under part 1 of schedule 1 has been determined following extensive engagements with wider Government, law enforcement and the devolved Administrations, it is evident that these additions need to be made to clause 14 to respond fully to the threat posed by foreign interference in elections. These changes will ensure a complete and coherent footprint across the whole United Kingdom in responding to foreign interference in elections. It is right that the Government have considered our approach for dealing with foreign political interference and are seeking to expand the list of relevant electoral offences in order to provide greater protections against foreign interference in elections. The amendment does just that and I hope the Committee will support it.
Separately from the amendment, the topic of shell companies being used to make donations to political parties and to hide foreign donations was raised extensively on Second Reading, so it is right that I address what the Government are doing in that area. First, there are strict rules that ensure that foreign money is prohibited from entering through proxy donors, providing a safeguard against impermissible donations by the back door. It is also an offence to attempt to evade the rules on donations by concealing information, giving false information or facilitating the making of an impermissible donation. Under this clause, substantially increased maximum sentences will apply to those offences where the foreign power condition is met.
Secondly, UK electoral law sets out a stringent regime of donations and spending controls to safeguard the integrity of our democratic processes, and only those with a genuine interest in UK electoral events can make political donations. This includes registered UK electors—including registered overseas electors—UK-registered companies, trade unions and other UK-based entities or otherwise eligible donors, such as Irish citizens meeting prescribed conditions who can donate to parties in Northern Ireland. The recently passed Elections Act 2022 introduced a restriction on ineligible foreign third-party campaigning above a £700 de minimis threshold.
Transparency is the best form of disinfectant with regards to who is donating or contributing to political parties, and that is why all political parties, recognised third-party campaigners and candidates must record their election spending and report this to the Electoral Commission or local returning officer. This information is publicly available. In addition, political parties, third-party campaigners and candidates are required to record all contributions over £500. It is also right that the Electoral Commission publishes information about larger donations online for transparency.
New clause 3 would require the Home Secretary to create an independent body for monitoring disinformation originating from foreign states, producing a report to be laid before the House on an annual basis. The new clause would duplicate existing work being carried forward by Government to ensure that the threat posed by disinformation spread by foreign states is monitored effectively. It is, and always will be, an absolute priority to protect our democratic and electoral processes from foreign interference. That is why the Government have robust systems in place to protect UK democracy, bringing together Government, civil society and private sector organisations to monitor and respond to attempted interference, in whatever form, to ensure our democracy stays open, vibrant and transparent.
The intelligence agencies produce and contribute to regular assessments of state threats, including potential interference in UK democratic processes. We keep such assessments under review and, where necessary, update them in response to new intelligence. Where new information emerges, the Government will always consider the most appropriate use of any intelligence they develop or receive, including whether it is appropriate to make it public.
Ahead of major democratic events, the Government stand up the election cell, which brings together capabilities and expertise from across Government to address complex risks that threaten our democratic processes. The cell works closely with the Electoral Commission, police, and devolved Administrations to ensure rapid information sharing and a response that covers key risks, including electoral logistics, policing, counter-terrorism, cyber-security, disinformation and electoral interference.
During major democratic events the DCMS-led counter-disinformation unit works with the election cell and plays a pivotal role in the protection of elections by working with a range of partners to understand the extent and reach of disinformation across a number of risks, including foreign interference. The Government are keen to do more to tackle state-sponsored disinform-ation. That is why we have now also put forward an amendment to make the foreign interference offence a priority offence in the Online Safety Bill. That will require companies in scope of the regime to conduct regular risk assessments for the presence of content that constitutes an offence and to put in place proportionate systems and processes to mitigate the possibility of users encountering this content. That will include disinformation spread by foreign states that is intended to undermine our democratic, political and legal processes.
Furthermore, the Online Safety Bill’s advisory committee on disinformation and misinformation will provide cross-sector expertise on disinformation and misinformation and advice to Ofcom about how providers of regulated services should deal with disinformation and misinformation. It will advise Ofcom on how it should exercise its transparency powers and its duty to promote media literacy in relation to disinformation and misinformation. This could include recommendations relating to disinformation originating from a foreign power, for which this amendment seeks to establish an independent review.
However, the Government can see merit in considering whether additional oversight is required for state threats legislation, including the offence of foreign interference, and we will come to a broader amendment in this regard later in Committee. In view of the significant cross-Government work in this area and the need to consider the most effective way of ensuring transparency and oversight of state threats legislation more broadly, I ask the hon. Member for Halifax to withdraw her amendment when the time comes.
In closing, the construction and inclusion of a provision for foreign interference in elections reflects how seriously the Government take the threat posed by hostile activity by foreign states. I am sure the Committee is committed to ensuring that we have a holistic and effective suite of measures to tackle such corrosive activity and to counter its malign impact. I hope the Committee will agree that there is a clear requirement for clause 14.
Maria Eagle
I have a couple of points to ask the Minister about. The clause is a generally necessary and helpful provision. It provides for the offence of preparatory conduct, and makes it an offence to do things that are not an offence at the moment. The point, however, is that it helps law enforcement to intervene at an earlier stage, before the preparatory conduct has turned into the capacity to commit whatever it is that is being prepared for. It must be difficult for those seeking to disrupt such activities to have to sit around and wait for an offence to be committed before putting a stop to the preparatory conduct.
The purpose of the clause is clear, and it will be a useful addition. However, will the Minister explain why the clause covers preparatory conduct for various offences, but not all the offences in the Bill? Why does it not cover preparatory conduct with the intention of committing a new foreign interference offence, for example, because it does not? What is the reasoning behind that offence being left out of the clause?
It would be helpful for us to hear from the Minister what the thinking is in that regard. If it is good to have an offence of preparatory conduct to prevent at an early stage offences that might otherwise be committed that would be quite serious, why not for the foreign interference offence?
Stephen McPartland
The clause provides a disruptive tool to tackle preparatory activities carried out by those who seek to cause us harm. Malign actions by states have the potential to cause significant damage to the UK and its interests, and it is therefore vital that the law can intervene at an early stage when preparatory activities are under way. That is already provided for under the Official Secrets Act 1920, and the Law Commission has recognised the importance of maintaining the provision.
The offence covers preparatory conduct in two scenarios. The first is preparation to commit acts that would constitute one of the following offences: obtaining or disclosing protected information, obtaining or disclosing trade secrets, entering a prohibited place for a purpose prejudicial to the UK, and sabotage. The second is preparation to commit state threats activity that involves serious violence, that endangers life or that creates a serious risk to the health and safety of the public. The offence of preparatory conduct covers those who are preparing to carry out harmful acts themselves, and those who make preparations for another person to commit the acts.
Importantly, the preparatory conduct offence is committed only where there is an intention to commit a relevant act and that can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt—I hope that provides some reassurance. The element of intention provides an important safeguard that will prevent the offence from capturing legitimate acts, or acts undertaken by individuals who did not engage intentionally in state threats activity. In addition, consent will be required by the Attorney General, or the Advocate General in Northern Ireland, before a prosecution can be brought under the offence.
When preparatory acts are caught at an early stage, it may be unclear exactly what the perpetrator intended as the ultimate outcome—for example, an act of sabotage or obtaining trade secrets. The offence may therefore be committed if there is a general intention that the preparatory conduct will result in harmful state threats activity of a general nature. That is in line with the approach taken by Parliament when it provided the offence of the preparation of terrorist acts under section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006. A requirement to demonstrate that the preparatory act was undertaken with the intention that specific harmful state threats activity result would, in many cases, constrain the offence in a way that would be wholly undesirable and potentially allow state actors to evade the law.
Those caught preparing to harm us could face a maximum sentence of up to life imprisonment. The Committee will be aware that the ultimate decision on the length of the penalty faced will be decided by the courts, taking into account the severity of the preparatory activity and the harms that were intended to result from it, which could include long-lasting damage to the UK or the loss of life. I totally understand what the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East said about life imprisonment being a heavy penalty, and the courts would not give such a sentence for some of the examples that he described. But the courts could impose life imprisonment if someone was preparing to commit murder and the courts would want to treat some activities in the same manner, because if someone had another person assassinated, the court would want the full ability to impose a life sentence in those circumstances.
We know all too well that state actors operate using sophisticated methods, and that they can cause unimaginable harm. I therefore stress the importance of clause 15 as a key tool in our fight against states who seek to harm us. Where we can disrupt state actors at a preparatory stage, we must do so, before they have the opportunity to manifest their intentions to cause harm to our nation. As we discussed earlier, the ability to deal with the offence already exists in the Official Secrets Act 1920, and the proposed offence in the Bill modernises its terms. With regard to why the offence is to be expanded to apply to some rather than others, we believe that we have carefully assessed the link between the two, and we do not think it is necessary or appropriate to extend the offences to apply to foreign interference or assisting a foreign intelligence service at present. That is something that we will continue to look at.
Effectively, we need to continue to get the powers on the statute book to help the intelligence services and provide them with the toolkit that they need to help keep us safe.
On amendment 52, which seeks to raise the threshold—
Maria Eagle
I was trying to work out the Minister’s answer to me. The foreign interference offence in clause 13, which we have debated, covers a wide range of harmful activity, including manipulating legal or political processes, interfering with fundamental rights. Why is the offence of preparatory conduct not applying to those activities? What is the reasoning, because it would be an important disruption tool for authorities to try to prevent foreign interference, would it not?
Sally-Ann Hart
Clause 13 on foreign interference refers to a person committing an offence
“if…the person engages in conduct intending that the conduct, or a course of conduct of which it forms part”
so that would include preparatory conduct, because it is a course, so the conduct goes from beginning to end. There will be preparatory conduct. Does my hon. Friend agree that that might scoop up the relevant particular point?
Stephen McPartland
My hon. Friend makes a very good point. At the end of the day, my understanding is that the offences are designed differently, which is why we were unable to capture the relevant preparatory activity as part of the offences themselves. I am not a lawyer, but effectively those offences are designed differently, and that is where we are.
Amendment 52 seeks to raise the threshold of that which be proven to show the preparatory nature of the clause. Those who intentionally engage in preparatory conduct, as specified under clause 15, pose a significant risk to national security, and that will be true regardless of whether or not their actions materially assist the ultimate outcome. For example, if a security guard in the employment of a foreign power leaves a door open to facilitate access into a prohibited place by a hostile actor, that would constitute a preparatory act. If the hostile actor then used an alternative route to access the site, for example, cutting through a fence, the guard’s act would not have materially assisted them and his acts would go unpunished. I am sure that the Committee would agree that that would be an unacceptable outcome.
Furthermore, the offence enables disruptive action to be commenced at an early stage, to provide the greatest chance of avoiding the harmful activity occurring. It will not always be possible to determine the end goal of a person’s conduct, and thus whether their preparations are of material assistance. Indeed, in some cases, an individual may not even have decided the precise harmful acts that will result from their conduct, but rather will have the intent that their preparatory conduct will bring out harmful activity in general. However, in order to be caught by this offence the individual must have the intent that their conduct will bring about one of the relevant harmful outcomes. I hope that reassures the Committee that the offence cannot be used to prosecute those who undertake actions without any awareness or intent that it could support the commission of a relevant act.
The amendment would undermine the utility of what is otherwise a key preventive tool. Therefore, I do not support it, and I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw it.
Stuart C. McDonald
I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation. I particularly take his point about the door being left open, and that ultimately ending up not making a material contribution to what happened thereafter. I will go away and think again about the issue, but I think the Minister’s explanation was very helpful. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 15 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)
Fire Safety Bill
Stephen McPartland ExcerptsWednesday 24th February 2021
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Fire Safety Bill 2019-21 View all Fire Safety Bill 2019-21 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Commons Consideration of Lords Amendments as at 24 February 2021 - (24 Feb 2021)
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for concluding bang on time. As the House knows, this debate is limited to three hours, and one of those hours has now passed. I did say at the beginning of the debate that there would be a time limit of four minutes on Back-Bench speeches. I make no criticism of the Minister or the shadow Minister—if I were going to criticise, I would have stopped them long before now—and I appreciate that both hon. Members have taken a lot of interventions and dealt with a great many different matters, so it was necessary to spend the first hour in this way. But that does mean that, although there will be a limit of four minutes for the hon. Members for Stevenage (Stephen McPartland) and for Sheffield South East (Mr Betts), after that, the limit will be reduced to three minutes.
Stephen McPartland (Stevenage) (Con) [V]
It is a pleasure to be able to speak in this debate. I would also like to send my best wishes to my right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire).
It is a great pleasure to see the Minister in his place and responding to this debate. I listened to him very carefully and I detect a hint that there could be a compromise, for which I and my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Itchen (Royston Smith) have been calling for many months now. We are very keen to work with the Government. We are very keen for the Government to table an amendment in lieu, to accept our amendment today or, if the Minister feels so inclined, even to move our amendment to a vote to test the will of the House, but I imagine that, sadly, we will not have the opportunity to vote on what is called the McPartland-Smith amendment today.
I would like to pick the Minister up on the point he made about this Bill not being the correct place for the amendment. I believe it is, which I will come on to in a moment. I would also like to put on record that I, my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Itchen, those who have supported our amendment and the leaseholders themselves are all very clear that we have never asked the Government to pay for the full costs of remediation, or the taxpayer to bail people out. We just want the taxpayer to provide a safety net for leaseholders to ensure the fire safety works are actually undertaken; it has been nearly four years.
We want to be in a position whereby the Government provide the cash flow up front, and then they can levy those who have been responsible within the industry to recoup those funds over the next 10 years. That is our plan and objective. We would love to work with the Minister and the Government to get this resolved in the Lords. I say to the Minister today that their lordships have already agreed to re-table the amendment if it is not accepted. It will be tabled in the Lords on Friday. I am sure we will be back to discuss this later on—in a few months. So I hope that we can work in the in-between time to come to some solution together.
I am very proud to be the Chairman of the Regulatory Reform Committee. The Fire Safety Bill does amend the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005. The reason why the Bill is so important is that it creates a financial obligation on leaseholders to pay freeholders for the costs of remedying any fire safety defects on external walls and doors, such as cladding, but not limited to cladding, so it can include fire safety breaks and a whole variety of other issues. I assume that this is an unintended consequence. The Government do not want leaseholders to pay—that is very clear from what the Minister said earlier—but they are not sure how they can resolve the problem and get the works fixed without leaseholders actually paying.
From my point of view, we are very keen to ensure that leaseholders are not responsible. In terms of dealing with that order, we have to amend the Fire Safety Bill, because we cannot wait for the Building Safety Bill. The Fire Safety Bill creates this legal obligation. It creates the position whereby a fire authority, which is a competent authority, can order a freeholder to do the works. They have 21 days to agree to do the works and provide a timescale, or that is a criminal offence. Once they have had this direction from a competent authority, the leaseholders are then required to refund the freeholder for the works that are done. Up and down the country we already have thousands of leaseholders who are on the verge of bankruptcy—some have already gone bankrupt—just waiting and, before they actually get to the costs of remediation, paying £15,000 a week for waking watch in blocks of flats and excessive insurance premiums. The costs are huge.
I urge the Government to accept our amendment, to let us vote on it, or to work with us to ensure that we resolve this issue in the Lords and that leaseholders do not have to pay.
Mr Clive Betts (Sheffield South East) (Lab) [V]
First, may I send my best wishes to the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire)? When he was Secretary of State, he and I discussed our respective illnesses, and I really feel for him and his family at this very difficult time.
The Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee has discussed the issue of cladding remediation and fire safety works on many occasions. In June, we made it clear that
“residents are in no way to blame”
for defects from cladding
“and it is our view that they should bear none of the cost of remediation.”
We repeated those sentiments in our prelegislative scrutiny of the Building Safety Bill. Again, we said:
“The Government must recommit to the principle that leaseholders should not pay anything towards the cost of remediating historical building safety defects…for which they were not responsible.”
That is very clear.
The question is who should pay: the initial developer—the Government could help to co-ordinate action against them—the taxpayer, of course, or the industry as a whole? Unfortunately, the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Stevenage (Stephen McPartland)—I very much agreed with the sentiments of his comments—and by the Labour Front Benchers seek to place responsibility on the freeholder.
For reasons that the Minister gave, those amendments cut across the contractual relationship between freeholder and leaseholder. The hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake), who raised this issue a number of times in the Select Committee when he was a member, showed that freeholders are often quite small companies that, where they were not responsible for the initial development, simply collect ground rent. If faced with the cost of remediation, they would simply walk away. Those amendments will not get the work done. That is the fundamental issue. We want to see it done without leaseholders having to pay for it.
Turning to who should pay, certainly, the Government have put on the table £3.5 billion in addition to the £1.6 billion, but that does not include anything other than cladding remediation. All the other works, which for many leaseholders are as substantial in cost as cladding remediation, are not covered, and of course that funding does not cover buildings below 18 metres.
The Government have come up with a loan scheme for buildings below 18 metres, but that places the loan charge on the freeholder. Surely, we are back to the same problems: if we cannot interfere with the contractual relationship between the freeholder and the leaseholder—according to the Minister, with respect to the amendments before us from the Opposition and the hon. Member for Stevenage, we cannot—then surely that is a problem for the Government’s loan scheme too, and if freeholders are going to walk away from a direct charge on properties, as the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton said, they will walk away from a loan too. That is a real problem that the Government have to address.
I welcome that the Government are going to introduce a levy and a financial contribution from the industry, but we appear to be in a position where they cannot tell us whether the money raised from the levy will be in addition to the £3.5 billion or whether it will be taken from the £3.5 billion—in other words, that the Treasury will get some of that money back. That, to my view, would be wrong. The Minister is going to come to the Select Committee on 8 March; hopefully, we will be a bit wiser after that visit.
Finally, we have talked a lot about leaseholders, but what about social housing tenants? The National Housing Federation says that there is £10 billion of remedial work to be done in the social housing sector, and more for council housing properties, yet the only automatic right that social housing landlords have to any funding is for help with the removal of ACM cladding; everything else they are likely to have to pay for. Tenants are going to have to pay through rent increases, cuts to future maintenance or cuts to the house building programme, none of which is acceptable. So we have a perverse situation where the social housing landlord, as a freeholder, could be ensuring that tenants have to pay for the remediation of properties next door that have been subject to the right to buy. That cannot be right.
All these matters need resolving. We hope that the Minister does so on his visit to the Select Committee.