Oral Answers to Questions

Mark Francois Excerpts

Monday 22nd October 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mark Lancaster]

I am confident that it will get better, partly for the reasons I have just outlined. We are focusing very hard on the offer to our service personnel to ensure that people stay. That is not only about pay—we have talked about the pay award—but the opportunities we give to our service personnel and the training they receive. There are very few professions in this country where one can join with limited qualifications and then leave with a degree-level apprenticeship. That is the sort of offer we make in the armed forces, and we are determined to continue.

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

Capita’s Army recruitment contract has been an unmitigated disaster, so as a member of the Select Committee I was very relieved to hear the Secretary of State say in evidence to us last week that if necessary he would be prepared to sack it. The sooner the better. May I ask the Minister of State, who we all respect, whether there is any good news at all on Army recruitment that he can share with the House today?

[Mark Lancaster]

As my right hon. Friend says, the Secretary of State was very clear, in the evidence he gave to the Select Committee, that there is always the option of ending the contract. I am pleased to say that there is good news. This is a long process, from application stage to delivering a soldier who is trained perhaps a year later, but we are now seeing applications at a five-year high, so the hopper is being filled at a rate not seen for the past five years. Equally, the conversion rate—managing to get applications converted and on to training—is also improving. At the start of the pipeline there are very positive signs indeed.

Combat Air Strategy

Mark Francois Excerpts

Tuesday 17th July 2018 Commons Chamber

[Gavin Williamson]

I hope to avoid the many problems relating to currency projections by ensuring this new fighter is built in Britain. It is a great advantage to have the pound sterling. How do we bring the benefits to Scotland and every other part of the United Kingdom? Some 2,000 companies across the United Kingdom benefit from combat air. We are happy to have discussions with the devolved institutions about how to encourage them and work with them to build their industrial base for combat air.

This is a great opportunity for the whole of the UK. We are a world leader in this sector: other countries turn to us for leadership. That is what we are providing; that is what we will deliver, and we will provide the jobs and prosperity that come with it.

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

I very much welcome this statement, in which the Secretary of State mentioned the Typhoon. From memory, we are contracted to buy about 160 across three tranches. When the older tranche 1 aircraft retire, rather than sell them off, will he consider keeping them as a war reserve to provide mass for our Royal Air Force if we are ever involved in a peer-on-peer conflict?

[Gavin Williamson]

My right hon. Friend actually makes a very valid point about our ability to maintain the mass of aircraft. I want to pay tribute to Sir Stephen Hillier, the Chief of the Air Staff, who has driven forward so much of the Tempest project, as well as driving forward the utility of the Typhoon aircraft. We will certainly be looking at that to make sure we maintain the utility and mass of the Typhoon force.

Veterans and Soldiers: Statute of Limitations

Mark Francois Excerpts

Monday 25th June 2018 Commons Chamber

[Leo Docherty]

I agree entirely with my hon. and gallant Friend. This is a strategic necessity, and it guards against the wholesale enfeeblement of our capacity to deploy military power abroad and to execute with resolve our foreign policy and our security policy.

I seek humbly from the Minister two things: first, confirmation that urgent action will be taken by the Ministry of Defence on bringing forward a statute of limitations; and secondly, confirmation that the Government will fulfil their manifesto pledge and ensure that, when troops deploy abroad on combat operations in the future, they come under the law of armed conflict and the Geneva convention.

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this very important debate. I note that, by rough count, there are some 50 Members in the Chamber this evening, which shows the strength of feeling on this issue. I am also pleased to see the Secretary of State for Defence in his place on the Front Bench.

The Defence Committee, on which my hon. Friend and I both serve, has now agreed to look into this complex issue. If the Committee can find a way through this legal minefield, does my hon. Friend agree that Ministers—bearing in mind the manifesto commitment—would be morally obliged to take notice and act on it?

[Leo Docherty]

I commend my right hon. Friend for his knowledge of the subject and agree entirely with his point. We must show resolve, and the Ministry of Defence must deploy its whole effort to find a legally viable path to fulfil our collective manifesto pledge.

In conclusion, I would like to reflect on the damaging impact that the issue has on the morale and trust of those who have served and continue to serve. I have had a lot of correspondence on this subject, as one would expect, because of the petition and this debate. I am alarmed by the number of conversations I have had that involve the use of the word “betrayal”, but what alarms me more is when senior non-commissioned officers and officers who have served dozens of years all around the world in the most intensive and brutal operational environments tell me, after a lifetime of service, that on no account will they let their children serve as they have done. That pains me deeply.

Fundamentally, this is a matter of trust. It is about the Government fulfilling their duty of care to their soldiers, and it is about us collectively repaying the trust our soldiers have in us.

NATO

Mark Francois Excerpts

Wednesday 20th June 2018 Commons Chamber

[Gavin Williamson]

I have been very generous in taking interventions. Will the hon. Gentleman let me make some progress?

We need to look at how we ensure NATO is able to respond swiftly to changing threats not in months, not just in weeks but in days and hours, and not simply on land, sea and air but in the new grey danger zones of cyber-space and space itself. For that to happen, our alliance must keep changing and adapting to deal with new threats. NATO must reform itself structurally so there are far fewer barriers to action, and it must reform itself politically so nations can swiftly agree on measures to take and on how to use the power at their disposal decisively, particularly when it comes to cyber and hybrid attacks, which often occur beneath the normal threshold for a collective response.

Lastly, NATO must maintain the mass needed to assemble, reinforce and win a conflict in Europe at short notice. We need to look at how we can forward base more of our equipment, and possibly personnel. That is why today we are looking hard at our infrastructure in Germany, particularly our vehicle storage, heavy transport and training facilities. Along with our NATO allies, we are continually testing our agility and responsiveness through exercises in Europe.

We need to do more, and we need to look more closely at how we can have the forces we need to deal with the threats we face today. The threats today are so different from the threats in 2010, but we should not underestimate our adversaries’ intent and willingness to use military force.

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

I see that the Chancellor of the Exchequer is no longer with us, but it will not have escaped his notice that this is a very well attended debate.

When the Defence Secretary gave evidence to the Select Committee on Defence, he told us it would take 90 days to mobilise our war-fighting division and deploy it to the Baltic states in an emergency. Can he give the House any reassurance that we are looking at that again in the Modernising Defence programme to see whether we can come up with ways of responding more quickly if the situation requires?

[Gavin Williamson]

We must not look at this issue in isolation. We need to look at it as an issue that every NATO member has to face and deal with. We have to work incredibly closely with our allies, whether it is Germany, Poland or Estonia, on how we can be more responsive and how we can ensure that we have the capability to react to those changing threats.

NATO is only as strong as its weakest link, so every NATO member must do what it needs to do to give its people the modern equipment, the skills and the support to cope with the challenges that lie ahead. We need a future force that is able to respond rapidly and globally, a force that can operate in the full range of combat environments and across all domains, and a force to provide leadership in NATO, European formations and coalitions.

We must never hesitate: sometimes we will have to lead others, and sometimes we will have to act alone. We have to have the capability and the armed forces to be able to do that. NATO must do more to up its spending, to speed up its response and to reinforce its capabilities, but to succeed in this darker and more dangerous age, it must show one quality above all—resolve.

As in the old days of the cold war, adversaries new and old are seeking to divide us, to undermine our values and to spread lies and misinformation. Our response must be unity. We must stand firm and we must stand together, speaking with one voice and holding fast to the vision that united us in the days of old against aggression, against totalitarianism and against those who wish to do us harm. And we must be ready to stand in defence of our security and our prosperity.

The UK should be immensely proud of the role it has played in the alliance since its inception and of the way it has helped lead the organisation during the most challenging period in its modern history, but, as I told our allies the other day, we are not looking backwards. Our eyes are firmly fixed on the future and on how we can make sure NATO remains the world’s greatest defensive alliance, the guardian of free people everywhere and the guarantor of the security of future generations.

In its great charter, NATO commits

“to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.”

Those are British values. They are at the heart of our nation. For the past 70 years, brave British men and women have given their all to defend our nation. We are determined to do everything in our power to ensure the alliance continues to guard our great liberties for another 70 years and beyond.

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[Nia Griffith]

The Labour party wants absolute, full co-operation with European partners. We recognise that we are leaving the EU, but in every other respect we want to be fully European. We want to have full co-operation within NATO and the Council of Europe.

We are living in an increasingly unpredictable world, with a very unpredictable—and, at times, isolationist—United States Administration, so it is all the more important that the UK uses its voice.

[Mr Francois]

I do not know whether the House is aware, but I was born in the constituency of the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), so I ask the hon. Lady: if the right hon. Gentleman were to become Prime Minister, would it be his intention to declare our nuclear deterrent to NATO as it is currently declared?

[Nia Griffith]

We have made our position on the nuclear deterrent absolutely clear. We support the nuclear deterrent and we support NATO. That is our party policy.

I think that I had just mentioned the isolationist US Administration.

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[Richard Benyon (Newbury) (Con)]

It is a great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Wakefield (Mary Creagh), who is a member of the United Kingdom delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and it is a great privilege to lead that delegation, whose membership includes former Cabinet Ministers. We have three former Defence Ministers, a former party leader, other former Ministers, and Members of Parliament with a real interest in—and knowledge and experience of—defence issues, including one holder of the Distinguished Service Order. My friend the hon. Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon) is the deputy leader.

The assembly currently has a key role. Many Members have spoken today of the need to connect people in this country with defence and help them to understand what our relationship with our allies is all about. We have the job of holding NATO to account, informing our fellow parliamentarians—with whom we can discuss many of the issues that we raise in the various committees on which we sit—and also enabling people in this country to understand this great alliance, its values, and its vision for our security. In 2019 we will welcome hundreds of NATO parliamentarians to London, and I look forward to that.

The Royal Air Force was created 100 years ago, as a result of a new technology which had created the first new battlefield for millennia. Today we face the same scenario with the cyber threat. At a recent meeting in this building, we heard from Mark Galeotti, a senior researcher at the Institute of International Relations in Prague and a renowned Russia expert. He worked with my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Mr Seely), who produced a fascinating paper entitled “A Definition of Contemporary Russian Conflict: How Does the Kremlin Wage War?”

As others have pointed out and as we know ourselves, conventional wars are expensive in terms of both blood and treasure. We know that the cost of one missile that we fire at a building in Syria can run into seven figures, and we know that we are not alone: Russia, too, suffers from unrest as the coffins come home. Cyber is a cheap war to wage, and an effective means of attack: we saw the impact of the NotPetya attack on Ukraine. It is important for us to look at our defence posture in this day and age, and to consider how we respond to this new battlefield. We have defined our defence in sea, land and air, but we now need a very clear cyber posture as well. We should also follow the advice of Lord Hague, who, in a recent article, referred to a re-evaluation of article 5 of the NATO treaty. That might be something for my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State to take to the Brussels summit.

We need to look carefully at infrastructure as well. Those of us who were cold war warriors will remember that the infrastructure in West Germany was constructed around moving troops very fast, and we know how difficult it has been to establish the Enhanced Forward Presence because of simple factors such as bridges, road widths and border controls.

In the few minutes that I have I want to touch on burden sharing. My right hon. Friend the Member for Sevenoaks (Sir Michael Fallon) made a very important point. The United States is far and away the biggest supporter of the alliance, and we must help NATO-friendly members of Congress by saying precisely as the Secretary of State said earlier: that we recognise that Europe has to step up. We have the benefit of the commitment made at the Wales summit and it is a disgrace, frankly, that some countries are not stepping up to that. My figures are that six countries now do spend over 2%, which is good, and the virtue of that certainly lies with the United States, Britain, Romania, Poland, Greece and the Baltics, but there are laggards and I am going to name them, particularly Belgium and Spain. Belgium has cut its defence spending to below 1%, and I think that is wrong.

[Mr Francois]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that, given the circumstances that he has outlined so clearly, there is an even greater responsibility on us in the United Kingdom to try to up our spending to show the Americans that some of the Europeans are playing the game?

[Richard Benyon]

It is very useful that we have accepted in this debate that the 2% is a floor—not a flaw, I add to help my hon. Friend the Member for South Dorset (Richard Drax)—and that as the threats change we may have to raise it.

We must be a critical friend of NATO. In terms of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Sir Hugh Bayley’s voice is in my head when we talk about trying to hold NATO to account for its failure to produce decent, sensible audited accounts. We have a strength in that regard because we are a significant contributor to the alliance; it enables us to do that.

May I finish by paying tribute to the shadow Secretary of State and those Labour Members who are committed to defence? We must work with them on a bipartisan basis, because I do not want to go into an election in which a party that could enter government does not believe in the value of our alliance, does not believe we should keep our nuclear deterrent, and does not believe that article 5 means what it says. Article 5 is the greatest security that has been delivered to our peoples rich and poor, old and young, down the ages since the horrendous carnage of the second world war. That bipartisan nature of our defence debate is very important now, and I hope we can continue to value NATO now and in the future.

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[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

For the record, they are both great movies.

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon). She always speaks on these matters with great common sense, and her speech this afternoon is no exception.

In March 2018, the Defence Committee paid a visit to the United States of America, as part of which we held meetings in the Pentagon and the State Department, with some of our opposite numbers on the House Armed Services Committee and with the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee, too. During our visit we experienced a great deal of American interest in what one might call the “Baltic states scenario.” Many of our interlocutors placed a strong emphasis on the readiness of US, European and NATO forces to respond to potential aggression against the Baltic states from a resurgent Russia. That raises the question: what might an assault on the Baltics look like? The Russian annexation of Crimea and de facto invasion of parts of eastern Ukraine provide at least some pointers towards what we might expect to see in the event of Russian adventurism and an attempt to intervene in the Baltics. If that were to come to pass, we could expect to see multiple elements of so-called “hybrid warfare” employed by Russia.

To begin with, any such assault might contain an element of maskirovka—strategic deception—perhaps by seeking to draw NATO’s attention away from the area prior to intervention, for instance, by creating a crisis in the Balkans. That might well be accompanied by the agitation of Russian minorities in the three Baltic states, where they represent approximately a quarter of the Latvian population, a quarter of the Estonian population and an eighth of the Lithuanian population respectively.

[Richard Benyon]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that this has already been trained for? There have already been cyber-attacks on countries such as Estonia, which have locked down many of their public services. So this is happening.

[Mr Francois]

My right hon. Friend is right about that, and it is no mistake that NATO’s centre of excellence on cyber-warfare is now located in Estonia.

As I was saying, such an attack would no doubt be accompanied by a considerable disinformation campaign, the widespread employment of deception and fake news, and quite possibly the appearance of large numbers of “little green men”, as we saw in both Crimea and Ukraine, perhaps under the guise of so-called “local defence units”. That would very likely be accompanied by Spetsnaz and other special forces activity, potentially backed up by airborne or air assault forces. It is worth noting that the Russian 76th guards air assault division, based at Pskov, is located only 100 km from the Estonian border.

Any such intervention would probably be covered by a wide-reaching air defence umbrella, including highly capable air defence systems, such as the S300 and S400, to help establish an anti-access area denial—or A2/AD—shield, designed specifically to prevent NATO air power from intervening. In any such scenario, speed would be of the essence, as we saw in Crimea, where the key elements of annexation were effectively carried out in a matter of days. Russia’s likely aim would be to present NATO with a fait accompli, to undermine the article 5 guarantee, which Russia would no doubt regard as a meaningful victory.

How should we best respond to this? In May, the Select Committee took evidence from the Secretary of State for Defence, who is in his place, including on our readiness in the UK to respond to a Baltic scenario. He explained that our two high readiness formations, 16 Air Assault Brigade and 3 Commando Brigade, could be deployed to the Baltics in a matter of days, although it would have to be by air and therefore assumes that air heads would still be in friendly hands. In response to questions, he further explained that it would take about 20 days to deploy a mechanised brigade, whereas to deploy a full war fighting division, as envisaged in SDSR 2015, would take about three months, by which time the conflict could very well be all over. It is obvious from those timings that we would need our NATO allies, especially US air power, to seek to hold the ring until heavier reinforcements could arrive.

What is to be done? First, NATO would have to be prepared to fight and win an intense information campaign, in which television cameras would arguably be more powerful than missiles. The Skripal case showed that in fact the west was prepared to stand together quite impressively in response to Russian misinformation, expelling more than 100 Russian diplomats. I believe that really hurt the Russians.

[James Cleverly (Braintree) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that in the era of hybrid warfare and conflict in front of cameras, it is more important than ever that our service personnel feel that if they make difficult decisions in the moment they will be protected through their lives? I raise this because of the intrusion of cameras in conflict.

[Mr Speaker]

May I gently say that the time limit will have to be reduced for subsequent speakers at this rate? I say that not by way of complaint, but as a piece of information to the House.

[Mr Francois]

I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. In fairness, I understand that the Secretary of State is looking into what can be done on legacy investigations.

Secondly, NATO needs to improve its logistics and its ability to move assets, including heavy armour, to the Baltics in a timely manner. The UK has expressed particular interest in one of the 17 EU projects under PESCO—the permanent structured co-operation framework—specifically, the initiative to look at military mobility across Europe. Would it be worth establishing a NATO stock of flat-bed railway cars that European armies could share to move forces across Europe more quickly?

Thirdly, we need to enhance our collective forward presence by having more countries take part in the rotation of units to share the burden. Importantly, we also need more air defence units in that capacity. As has already been suggested, we may also wish to review our basing of units in Germany, because by remaining there they could have a considerable deterrent effect.

Fourthly, NATO should consider devolving to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe—SACEUR—the authority to sanction precautionary troop movements in a crisis, even when unanimous authority from the NATO ministerial council may not be forthcoming. That was much the case during the cold war, and we may have to re-learn that lesson in the protection of the Baltics.

In summary, as I argued earlier, in response to an act of aggression in Salisbury, the west showed admirable determination and collective will to stand up to Russia. We now need a similar combination of determination, backed up by sound military planning, to effectively deter aggression against NATO’s eastern flank. I hope that we will see evidence of all that at the summit in July.

Oral Answers to Questions

Mark Francois Excerpts

Monday 11th June 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Ellwood]

I would be delighted to speak further with the hon. Lady on this matter to see what more can be done.

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

I warmly endorse the Secretary of State’s tribute to the Chief of the Defence Staff, but Sir Stuart Peach did say last week that he was deeply uncomfortable about the process of legacy investigations into veterans. I understand that several years ago, the Ministry of Defence did a lot of detailed staff work into the practicability of the statute of limitations. Would the Secretary of State promise the House that he will ask to see that work and perhaps be able to take it forward?

Historic Allegations against Veterans

Mark Francois Excerpts

Tuesday 15th May 2018 Westminster Hall

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

I will briefly make three principal points. First, without the bravery and sacrifice of British troops—supported by the Ulster Defence Regiment and the Royal Ulster Constabulary, GC—there would never have been a peace process in Northern Ireland.

[Stephen Pound (Ealing North) (Lab)]

The right hon. Gentleman is a most distinguished Minister, and I respect him for that. He talks about bravery and sacrifice. He should also refer to discipline. I have never met anyone in the armed forces who ever felt that every single soldier, sailor and airman always acted with total and complete probity. There are some people who breach the code. Does he honestly think that an amnesty, which would exclude every single person, should be allowed? Should he not listen to the words of David Cameron following the Saville report, maybe study Ballymurphy and have a look at some of the incidents that quite clearly have to be investigated? By all means do not penalise the elderly, but also do not try to put everybody into the same category.

[Mr Francois]

All these cases were investigated at the time. That is exactly the point. They have already been looked into, and the people concerned have already been cleared.

Tony Blair said, “This is not a time for clichés, but the hand of history is upon us”. Well, that hand of history, if it were there, was only there because of the tremendous bravery and sacrifice of all those British Army personnel on Operation Banner for three decades in the run-up to 1998.

[Gavin Robinson (Belfast East) (DUP)]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Francois]

I am afraid I will not.

Secondly, the Government consultation was originally going to include an option for a statute of limitations, but that was pulled at the eleventh hour. Why? Was it because of political pressure from Sinn Féin? Why did the Northern Ireland Office suddenly buckle and take that out of the consultation, so that it was no longer a formal option to be considered?

Thirdly, we all want to see the power-sharing Executive restored in Northern Ireland, but not at any price. There will be no equivalence in this system. There is no point in saying, “Oh, but the terrorists will be investigated as well,” because they have been given letters of comfort by Blair—they are off the hook. But the letters received by British servicemen who were investigated and told they were in the clear do not count, do they? They are still being investigated by the PSNI. We saw what a farce the Iraq Historic Allegations Team was. It was so bad that it had to be closed down by my right hon. Friend the Member for Sevenoaks (Sir Michael Fallon) when he was Defence Secretary.

The proposals from the NIO are morally disgraceful. I have never been so annoyed with my own Government. We need a statute of limitations for Northern Ireland, Iraq and Afghanistan, and we need it soon.

EU Defence: Permanent Structured Co-operation

Mark Francois Excerpts

Thursday 26th April 2018 General Committees

[The Chair]

Should the shadow Minister carry on now, Minister, or do you want to answer some of the questions?

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

On a point of order, Mr Bone. I used to serve on this Committee back in the day. I seem to remember that the format was that hon. Members asked one question at a time. Perhaps the world has moved on, but the hon. Member for Caerphilly might be better off asking his questions in more digestible packages, so he could get better answers.

[The Chair]

That probably is a point of order. The answer is that the shadow Minister is in order, because I have the discretion to take the whole series in one go. I thought that would be quicker for the Committee, but if we want to slow it down, I can add an extra half an hour for questions on to the end. If we would prefer to do it that way, and the Minister would like to respond to questions individually—

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[Mr Francois]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Bone, not least because I believe you have had a passing interest in European matters in the past—

[The Chair]

Order. When I am sitting here, I have no views on anything.

[Mr Francois]

That is a first.

Alongside my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot, I serve on the Defence Committee. Before Easter, we took evidence from a number of witnesses, including Earl Howe, the Minister of State for Defence, on initiatives relating to further European integration on defence. I speak today in a personal capacity, and I will speak only briefly, so my remarks do not necessarily represent the views of the full Committee, not least because we have not yet released our report on that subject, although it is not far away.

The 2009 Lisbon treaty, which I remember debating on behalf of my party in the House, created the legal framework for permanent structured co-operation—PESCO—which permits closer co-operation on defence issues among EU member states. In December, 25 EU countries, with the exception of Denmark, Malta and the United Kingdom, formally launched PESCO. As part of the new arrangements, EU member states agreed to create a new military planning and combat capability—MPCC—to be used initially for non-executive common security and defence policy missions. Historically, the United Kingdom has been opposed to any type of Euro headquarters that might act as a rival to the NATO command structure reporting to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe—SACEUR. However, the Minister has been able to reassure us that the MPCC is of a relatively small and modest scale, and that, at least as it is currently configured and empowered, it is therefore unlikely to represent a serious challenge to SACEUR’s command centre. The Minister has reassured the Committee very well there.

The EU nations also resolved to create a list of 17 projects that will allow for greater European co-operation under PESCO. They cover a variety of subjects, including a European medical command, a deployable military disaster relief capability package, an armoured infantry fighting vehicle and indirect fire support—sometimes referred to as Euro artillery. Included on that list is a project relating to military mobility, which aims to speed up the transfer of military assets across the European Union, particularly at a time of crisis. I understand that the UK has sought especially to have some involvement in that project, which I think the Minister told us is Dutch-led.

This topic was of particular concern to the previous SACEUR, General Ben Hodges, who is on the record as having said that he believes the European Union has an important role to play in improving the fluidity of the movement of troops, including NATO troops, on the European mainland. Does the Minister wish to proffer anything further to the Committee about that project, as it is the one that the UK has specifically asked to opt into?

As the UK will be leaving the European Union in 2019, I understand that we will be participating in PESCO and projects such as the mobility project as a third country. I further understand that the EU is likely to finalise its guidelines on third-party participation in PESCO and related projects by the end of this year. The Minister touched on that in his opening speech, but is there anything further he can say about how those guidelines are evolving? On what basis will the UK be permitted to co-operate in the future?

Under the auspices of PESCO, there are also plans to establish a European defence fund, which will allow for investment in common European procurement programmes; and, as previously mentioned, a European defence industrial development programme, which could involve the co-financing and joint development of defence projects by up to 30%. Again, I understand that it may be possible for the UK defence industry to participate in such programmes on a case-by-case basis. Can the Minister say anything more on that subject today? Might he venture some thoughts on any such future procurement programmes in which the UK might want to be involved but is not involved in at the moment?

I note the Minister’s optimism about Galileo. We may yet be successful, but we have to accept the possibility that we may not. If that unfortunately turns out to be the situation, I would like some reassurance from the Minister that we will seek to recoup the United Kingdom’s extremely meaningful investment in the Galileo project. In short, if they will not let us play, we want our money back.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil rightly pointed out, the European Scrutiny Committee described PESCO as an important political development, and I believe it has twice recommended that the issue be debated on the Floor of the House. The Minister said it is a matter for the usual channels, but as we have representatives of the usual channels with us this afternoon, may I take this opportunity to convey my view, as a member of the Defence Committee, that the European Scrutiny Committee is quite right? It would be appropriate to debate this matter on the Floor of the House, perhaps some time in the autumn, in the run-up to the finalisation of the guidelines on how the United Kingdom is intended to participate. In simple terms, we might have some more meat on the bones by then—no pun intended, Mr Bone—so that would seem a suitable time to allow a debate in the House.

The Opposition spokesman referred a couple of times to the risk of a lack of influence. I understand his point, but I seem to recall that before the referendum, it was often suggested that if we left the European Union we would lack influence and would be isolated and without friends or allies. I suggest that the response to the Salisbury incident, when our allies in the United States, across the European Union and indeed in Commonwealth stood shoulder to shoulder with us and expelled well over 100 Russian diplomats in response to that outrage, rather gives the lie to the suggestion that by leaving the EU we will be friendless.

[Wayne David]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way on that point?

[Mr Francois]

Yes.

[The Chair]

Order. I let the right hon. Gentleman get away with that, but Salisbury seems quite a long way from this very specific debate. Perhaps he might want to move away from that subject.

[Mr Francois]

I will follow your guidance explicitly, Mr Bone.

In summary, PESCO represents an initiative by European Union members to collaborate more closely on defence. To take the Minister’s optimistic approach, if this initiative were to lead to an increase in European defence spending in NATO, surely it would be a welcome one. However, it is very important that these developments do not evolve into a rival organisation to NATO, which has done so much to keep the peace in Europe for more than 70 years.

Oral Answers to Questions

Mark Francois Excerpts

Monday 23rd April 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mark Lancaster]

It is important that, through the Army 2020 review, we begin to bring units together because that gives greater stability. What I would say to the hon. Gentleman’s constituents is that it is not only the REME that they can join in the armed forces.

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

Capita’s performance on Army recruiting has been distinctly sub-optimal, such that throughout the Army it is now almost universally known by the unfortunate nickname of “Crapita.” Given the company’s half-a-billion pound loss this morning, given that it has debts of £1.7 billion, and given that it is rumoured to be preparing a £700 million rights issue, what assurance can the Minister give the House that we have a plan B in place in case it were unfortunately to go the way of CarillionAmey?

[Mark Lancaster]

May I start by thanking my right hon. Friend, not least for his report, “Filling the Ranks”? It has made a major contribution to addressing some of the issues that we have faced over recruitment, some of which are way beyond the realms of any contract with Capita and are a result of the changing dynamics of the British population. But I accept his broader point that there have been challenges within this contract. If he is asking me if I am confident that we have a business continuity plan in case things go absolutely awry, which I do not think they will, then yes.

Ministry of Defence

Mark Francois Excerpts

Monday 26th February 2018 Commons Chamber

[Sir Edward Leigh]

There is clearly a problem, one I hope the Minister will deal with later. Why does it take so long to recruit? Are we putting off potential recruits with our very slow processes?

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

Just before my hon. Friend moves on from the issue of recruitment, does he agree that the performance of the Capita recruitment partnering project contract has been distinctly sub-optimal, and that if this continues for very much longer the Ministry of Defence would be wise to seek an alternative?

[Sir Edward Leigh]

My right hon. Friend is of course a former Minister for the Armed Forces and really does know what he is talking about. The Government should listen to him.

There is a problem with morale. Those who perceive service morale as low increased by 12% on the previous year in the Army and 15% in the Royal Marines in 2017. The overwhelming majority, 74%, feel proud to serve—we are proud of them for feeling proud to serve—but only a third feel valued by their service. What is the point of training men and women if we fail to keep them?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon). As a former Defence Minister, I too can attest to being on the receiving end of a rolling barrage of parliamentary questions. This points to her great assiduity when it comes to defence matters, which she has demonstrated again in her speech this afternoon. I am glad to have been called to speak on the Defence estimates, which, for reasons I will explain, include an important change in the Government’s defence policy. I therefore believe that the estimates need to be increased. In giving important evidence to the Defence Committee last week, the new Secretary of State for Defence argued that “state on state” threats were now the primary threat to the security of the United Kingdom. This is an important shift in the Government’s position, and it has the logical knock-on effect that defence expenditure should now be increased to meet these new circumstances and the far more serious challenge that they represent.

It is important to put this change into historical context. I shall begin by going back to the 1980s, when the Berlin wall was still standing and the cold war was at its height. Britain, then as now, was a key member of NATO, and we spent about 5% of our GDP on defence, principally to deter the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw pact countries. As the Chairman of the Defence Committee, my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), has pointed out in the House before, in the 1990s after the wall had come down, we, like other countries, took a peace dividend. This reduced our defence spending to between 3% and 3.5% of our GDP.

As we entered the new millennium, the horrific events of 9/11 led to massive shifts in strategy. The United Kingdom became involved in expeditionary conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, where our forces became increasingly optimised to fight wars with a counter-insurgency element, at reach, against technologically inferior but nevertheless very determined enemies. As a result, and with the MOD already under considerable financial pressure, we optimised our force mix accordingly while deprioritising areas such as anti-submarine warfare and air defence to the point where, today, we have only 19 frigates and destroyers and have seen a major reduction in fast jet squadrons. As the process continued, by the time of the 2010 strategic defence and security review and the accompanying national security strategy, it became the Government’s policy that there was no existential threat to the security of the United Kingdom. With echoes of the 10-year rule of the 1930s, state-based threats to our security were effectively seen as no longer relevant. However, the events of the past few years have shown those assumptions to be highly erroneous.

The activities of a resurgent Russia in annexing Crimea and effectively invading parts of Ukraine have shown a Russian willingness to use military force on the European landmass in order to achieve its political objectives. We have also seen heavy Russian involvement in Syria, which the House was discussing a little over two hours ago, and massively increased Russian submarine activity in the North sea, the north Atlantic and the GIUK gap. Russia has also exerted pressure on the Baltic states, which are now members of NATO and covered by the article 5 guarantee. All of that is occurring at a time when we have reduced our defence expenditure further to where it sits today: barely 2% of our GDP.

[Mrs Moon]

I wonder whether the right hon. Gentleman is going to address our undersea cables and the risks posed by Russian submarines in particular. I was recently at a meeting at which Defence Ministers from several states expressed grave concerns about the number of Russian submarines that they were seeing off their coasts and alarm at those submarines seeking the undersea cables that come ashore in their countries. Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of that issue?

[Mr Francois]

I am sure that the Minister may want to say something about that when he replies, but he will be constrained, because it is difficult to discuss the exact details of such matters in an open forum. However, when I served in the Ministry, I was certainly aware of a potential threat to those undersea cables, and everything that I have understood since then leads me to believe that that threat has increased, not decreased, so the hon. Lady makes an important point. The Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Nick Carter, sounded a timely warning in his recent very good speech to the Royal United Services Institute about growing Russian military capability and areas where we need to bolster our own Army in response.

In the United States, the recently published defence strategy, authored by Secretary Mattis, has declared that state-on-state competition, particularly with Russia and China, is now viewed as the primary threat to the security of the United States and its allies. That important change in policy was then echoed to some degree by our Secretary of State for Defence in his evidence to the Defence Committee only last Wednesday, and it is really important that the House appreciates what he said. During the sitting, he explained that the threat to the United Kingdom from other states, such as Russia and North Korea, is now greater than the threated posed by terrorism, telling the Committee:

“We would highlight state-based threats… as the top priority”.

He went on to say that state-based threats have

“grown immeasurably over the past few years.”

When I put it to the Secretary of State at that hearing that what he was announcing—the primacy of state-based threats to our security—was a massive change in focus and that it would have a knock-on effect on how Britain’s military was structured and its readiness for war, he replied unequivocally, “Yes it does.”

That means that the defence review that is currently under way—the modernising defence programme—is now taking place against a significantly revised strategic background, in which deterring military threats from other states such as Russia, North Korea and, to a lesser extent, China is now to become the primary focus of this country’s defence policy. This new context brings with it certain important implications.

First, we absolutely must retain our independent strategic nuclear deterrent as the ultimate guarantee of our national security. All three states I just mentioned are nuclear armed, and it is important that we retain our deterrent to deter any nuclear threat against us.

Secondly, if we are to deter state-on-state threats, clearly we must bolster our conventional defences. Joseph Stalin is reputed to have said, “Quantity has a quality all of its own.” We can no longer rely on advances in technological capability always to give us the edge in any future war. We also need to make sure we have sufficient mass—the number of platforms—to deter our potential enemies. That means, for instance, rebuilding our air defences and bolstering our anti-submarine warfare capabilities to help to protect the sea lines of communication across the Atlantic, which will be vital in any conflagration on the European mainland.

[Robert Courts (Witney) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend is making a powerful speech, and I am interested in his comments on rebuilding our air defences. Is he as encouraged as I am by the announcement last week of the combat air strategy? Does he also agree that, given the enormous cost of modern aviation programmes, we will have to look at doing one of two things? We will either have to take a very serious strategic look at what kind of aviation military capacity we want and then to plan accordingly or, if we want full-spectrum military capability, it will ultimately mean more money.

[Mr Francois]

I agree with my hon. Friend. He is right that the Secretary of State for Defence announced the new combat air strategy at the Committee, but what he announced on state-on-state threats was even more important. If we now have to deter Russian aviation capability as a state-on-state threat, it will be extremely expensive but, as my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) wisely reminded the House in his excellent introduction to this debate, the first duty of Government, above all others, is the defence of the realm. Our whole history as a nation reminds us that we forget that at our peril.

Thirdly, we must seriously consider how we could reconstitute forces in a national emergency. We must accumulate war reserves in order to show that we have the ability to sustain a fight if we were ever to get into one. As just one example, the Committee took evidence from BAE Systems executives a few months ago. When we asked how long it would take to build a Typhoon from scratch, we were told it would take four years or, if they attempted to accelerate the process, perhaps three years at best.

Those long lead times for manufacturing sophisticated modern military equipment mean that, in reality, we would likely have to fight a so-called “come as you are” war, which involves using equipment that is either immediately available or that can be reintroduced into service at short notice. It follows from this that we should now adopt a practice of mothballing highly expensive and complex equipment when it goes out of service—rather than disposing of it all, often for a pittance—so we have the ability to reconstitute at least some mass, should that be required if the skies were ever to darken again.

Fourthly, in light of the new strategic situation of state-on-state threats, spending 2% of our GDP on defence is simply not sufficient. We helped to deter Russia during the cold war by spending 5% of GDP on defence. If we now have to deter Russia again, we will simply not be able to do so by spending only 2% of GDP on defence —our allies also need to make a greater contribution. If we are to maintain an independent nuclear deterrent, bolster our conventional forces and build up our war reserves, we obviously need to spend something much nearer to 3% than 2% on defence. If we will the ends, we must also will the means.

Finally, I went to the cinema recently to watch Gary Oldman’s wonderful portrayal of Winston Churchill in “Darkest Hour”—he got the BAFTA and I very much hope he gets the Oscar, too. That film brought home graphically what happened to our nation after the policy of appeasement in the 1930s and our having run down our armed forces to the point where they were unable to deter war. I humbly suggest that my friends the “pinstripe warriors” of the Treasury, as I call them, should be taken en masse to watch that film as part of their continued professional development, in the hope that that might yet bolster our overall determination as a nation to defend ourselves.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

It is. As an example, we have to look only at the sale of Airbus in the United States market. As part of that deal, it had to build a plant in Alabama, I think. We have the mindset in this country that somehow the ticket price looks cheap, but we are not thinking about the loss in tax revenue going back to the Exchequer and the fact that the defence industrial base is suffering.

Some decisions in 2015 were very strange. The Navy has been mentioned, and I accept that naval platforms are far more capable than they were 10 or 20—and certainly 50—years ago, but people are fixated on the number of hulls. The Government came up with the novel idea of having a cheap alternative through the Type 31e. This was literally just to deal with the idea that we have a certain number of hulls. I asked what the Type 31e is capable of doing. It cannot do NATO tasks and it is not clear what weaponry will go on it. Lo and behold, when I looked at the Ministry of Defence budget, I saw that there was no budget line for it at all—it has a £1.3 billion price tag on it—so again, how will it be paid for?

The Secretary of State needs to look not just at asking for more money, which the budget clearly needs, but at some of the ill-thought-out decisions. Take the P-8, for example. Buying off the shelf from the United States might look like a simple solution, but as I understand it, sonar buoys and missiles cannot be fired from the P-8 as it is configured, so we will have to redevelop the programme, adding more costs in. This is about looking at whether we have to revisit some decisions and take things out of the budget. I think that will be the case if we are to fit the budgets,

The issue of numbers is always contentious. When we were in government, I remember the hue and cry from the Conservative Front-Bench team—the right hon. Member for New Forest East was part of it—when we froze training days for the Territorial Army. The cost was £20 million. From looking at the headlines and at the way some Conservative politicians were going on, one would have thought that the world had stopped. If a Labour Government had slashed the defence budget by 16% and sacked people or made them redundant, as this Government have, they clearly would have been condemned.

It is the same old story. I understand the point that the right hon. Member for New Forest East made about arguing for defence—I have argued consistently for it in this House—but these are political decisions. When I was in the Ministry of Defence in 2010, I did not hear Conservative politicians stand up and say, “No, we do not need extra expenditure.” We were being condemned because we were not spending enough. In 2010, I did not see a single poster or anything in the Conservative manifesto saying, “We are going to slash the defence budget by 16%,” but these are the real facts and we cannot ignore them.

Let me turn to recruitment, which my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend touched upon. I do not like to say, “I told you so,” but the decision on the Capita contract for recruitment was criticised at the time. My hon. Friend the Member for Gedling raised complaints, asking why armed forces personnel were being taken out of recruitment centres and why such centres were being closed in some areas. The position we find ourselves in now was bound to happen. We have heard some of the stories. The recruitment process is not only taking a year, but given the rate at which people are being failed, it is no wonder the Government are not meeting the targets. It is now time to revisit the contract and put uniformed personnel back into recruitment centres. The Capita contract should be scrapped, because it is completely failing to deliver what was outlined.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend talked eloquently about reservists. It is time to rethink Army 2020. It was never going to work. It was political cover so that when the Government were cutting the Army to 82,000, they could still give the impression that they had an Army of more than 100,000. The issues my hon. Friend raised are not the only concern. I have never had an answer to the question about how we get formed units. How do we get training whereby regulars and reserves can train side by side to go on operations? I have not seen any evidence that that is happening in practice. If, in addition, it is costing what my hon. Friend says it is, it might be time to revisit it and see whether those resources can be put elsewhere. Let us come back to the suggestion that Ministers were asking advice from the Army about this. They were not; it was a political decision imposed on the Army.

[Mr Francois]

Before the hon. Gentleman moves on from recruitment, may I ask whether he accepts that the other main problem with Army recruitment is the very large number of people who are being failed on medical grounds, often for very minor medical ailments that date back to their childhood? For instance, in the year to February 2017, some 10,600 people—both regular and reserves—who wanted to join the Army were told, “No, you cannot join on medical grounds.” At the same time, the regular Army was 3,000 recruits short. Does he believe that the MOD should look at that area again?

[Mr Jones]

That situation was predictable when the system was set up. What is worse, I have heard stories about young people who have nearly got to the end of the selection process but do not get called back in, but then get a telephone call from some Capita call centre saying, “I’m sorry, you’ve failed. That is it.” I am sorry, but that is not the way to treat people who have tried to join the armed forces.

The right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois) makes a good point. When we had senior non-commissioned officers stationed in recruitment offices, they could work out how to handle the recruits and use their breadth of experience to explain what life in the armed forces is like. This situation could have been avoided. Unless something has changed radically in the last few years with injuries, I agree with the right hon. Gentleman. I had case in which someone had a childhood knee injury. That person had to wait six months for a decision and then the knee injury was flagged up as the reason why he could not join the armed forces. That cannot be acceptable.

[Mr Jones]

My hon. Friend raises a very good case from personal experience. This needs to be looked at. I would scrap the contract and take it back in house. The old system perhaps needed tweaking, but it was delivering.

[Mr Francois]

I am sorry to hammer the nail, but this is very important, and we have the Secretary of State on the Front Bench at the moment to hear this. Is the hon. Gentleman aware that in some cases, people have been failed and prevented from joining the Army for relatively minor issues such as asthma? Paula Radcliffe and Sir Chris Hoy would have failed on the same grounds.

[Mr Jones]

That prompts the question, “How are the tests being done, what criteria are being used and how are they being interpreted?” The problem is partly that if we have a civilianised and, as it has been described to me, bureaucratic, tick-box process, common sense does not kick in, and perhaps common sense is what we need as well.

The problem is that we need to look at the size of our armed forces from a strategic point of view. What do we actually need? A decision was taken suddenly that the answer was 82,000—the Army was told that that is what it would get because the budget required it—but we need to look at the strategic needs of our armed forces. Members of the Royal Navy are under severe pressure in terms of deployment. With smaller numbers, there is a bigger turnover of individuals. In addition, people are doing constant back-to-back tours, which is not good for morale or family life. If that is happening, the chances of people staying long term will clearly be affected.

We need to look at our Navy. The idea that we have a Navy that cannot deploy and that we have ships that are laid up—my hon. Friend the Member for Gedling said that we are not deploying ships—is a damning indictment. The sight this week of HMS Mersey, an offshore patrol vessel, escorting three Russian vessels through the English channel summed it up in one. We need to think seriously about what we need. The hon. Member for Gainsborough said that we are a maritime nation, and that it is about not just kit, but people.

British Armed Forces: Size and Strength

Mark Francois Excerpts

Wednesday 24th January 2018 Westminster Hall

[Leo Docherty]

I am sympathetic to the hon. Lady’s point, and I know the Minister is particularly well positioned to respond to it. The other difficulty with SDSR 2015 was the depreciation of sterling and the ongoing fluctuation of Trident within the MOD budget, which have caused considerable problems. Taken in the round, that means that the MOD budget has a black hole of £2 billion or thereabouts. That is why we are here today. That black hole has been driving the discussion about possible cuts. I would like to lay it clearly on record that I think all of us in the Chamber agree that any form of capability cuts is an entirely untenable prospect that we should resist.

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this important debate at this critical time. On resources, does he agree that given the recent stark warning from the Chief of the General Staff on a resurgent Russia, we in this House have a role in deterrence, and that includes deterring the pinstripe warriors of the Treasury from leaving us without sufficient resources to fund our defence adequately?

[Leo Docherty]

I entirely agree with my right hon. Friend. It is our duty to make it clear to the Treasury that there is a large cohort of Members of Parliament who are absolutely determined to ensure that the Ministry of Defence has a sound financial settlement and is properly resourced.