EU Defence: Permanent Structured Co-operation Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateWayne David
Main Page: Wayne David (Labour - Caerphilly)Department Debates - View all Wayne David's debates with the Ministry of Defence
(6 years, 7 months ago)
General CommitteesWe now have until 12.36 pm for questions. We will start with the shadow Minister’s initial questions.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Bone. My first question is essentially a procedural question. The European Scrutiny Committee has done us all a service by forwarding us its documents for deliberation. However, as I understand it, the Committee quite rightly said that the documents are “politically important” and did not clear them for scrutiny, instead referring them to the Floor of the House. Does the Minister agree that these are such important subjects that, although we are having a discussion today, we should take this discussion forward and, before too long, have a real and meaningful debate on the Floor of the House on these important subjects?
This discussion is about the nature of the defence relationships that will be in place when we leave the European Union. Essentially, I want to extract from the Minister some clearer indications of what the Government hope to achieve in negotiations with our European partners during the all-important next few months.
We have had plenty of warm words from the Government on what the relationships should be with our European partners and the EU’s developing military and defence architecture. For example, in the “Foreign policy, defence and development” document, the Government stated that the new relationship must go beyond any existing third-country arrangements with the EU and must be
“unprecedented in its breadth, taking in cooperation on foreign policy, defence and security, and development”.
Those are indeed fine words, but other than a generalised statement of intent, what precisely are the Government’s priorities in the negotiations over the next few months? What does it mean in practice?
We know that the Government quite rightly see NATO as at the centre of our defence relationships, but as the European Scrutiny Committee has said, although the UK has not been a part of PESCO, the Government have expressed a clear interest in safeguarding their ability to participate in projects of mutual benefit under the umbrella of PESCO. As a non-EU state, the UK will lose the ability to request participation in specific aspects of PESCO operations. Denmark and Malta will have that facility, but it will not be available to the UK. How do the Government intend to grapple with that situation? Clearly, it will be unsatisfactory, given the Government’s objective.
Following on from that, the NATO Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg, has welcomed PESCO’s launch and said that it will “strengthen European defence”. At the same time, he correctly emphasised the need for complementarity between the work of NATO and of the EU’s developing defence architecture. If Britain is excluded from any form of participation in PESCO, and given Britain’s important role in NATO, surely Brexit could pose a real difficulty for creating the complementarity that Jens Stoltenberg wishes to see.
The European Scrutiny Committee has rightly said that it will follow the negotiations on the new European defence industrial development programme—the EDIDP. Given that they will not begin until January 2019, will UK industry benefit in any way from the existing arrangements, or is it solely dependent on future negotiations?
On industry, can the Minister update us on what is happening about our future participation, or lack of it, in Galileo? There has been a lot of press reportage on that, and I am sure the Minister has seen the leader in today’s Times. It is a very important issue and I would welcome some clarity on what the Government hope to achieve and how they will seek to achieve that. The Times also reports today that Airbus and the French company Dassault Aviation are seeking to co-operate on the development of the next generation of combat aircraft. I welcome the announcement of the Government’s combat air strategy, and I invite the Minister to speculate about what yesterday’s announcement means for BAE Systems and what the Government will do to ensure that that kind of transnational co-operation will not be impeded by our leaving the European Union.
Much defence industrial co-operation happens through a framework of intergovernmental co-operation. Can the Minister indicate whether there will be an increase in the number of contracts issued under the Organisation for Joint Armament Co-operation—OCCAR? We have recently seen some controversy about the mechanised infantry vehicle being agreed under that arrangement. Are we likely to see an increase in the number of such arrangements under OCCAR?
My next question relates to the military planning and conduct capability unit—
Should the shadow Minister carry on now, Minister, or do you want to answer some of the questions?
May I be helpful? I have asked a number of detailed questions and I have quite a few more detailed questions to ask. Might it be easier, and reflect the mood of the Committee, for the Minister to respond to the questions I have asked before I carry on?
I thank the Minister for his responses. It is heartening to hear a positive approach to the negotiations rather than the tub-thumping that is occasionally heard from other Ministers in negotiations, or the idea that Britain can divorce itself and have no positive relationship with our European partners. I suspect that that is what some Conservative Eurosceptics want. I am encouraged by his rational, positive approach. He is right to say that a new, positive relationship between us and our former European partners is in everyone’s best interest. We need to recognise that, and I am glad that the Minister apparently does.
I want to pursue a point he made about Galileo. It is important and is a major employer in this country. We led the way in developing the technology. I am concerned because, from what I have been told, it appears that the European Commission was under the impression that the British Government did not feel that strongly when clearly they do, and that they did not formally communicate at an early stage that they wanted participation to continue. Will the Minister comment on that observation and can he confirm that doing our own thing, as one might put it, would clearly be nowhere near as good as maintaining the co-operation in the Galileo programme that we all want and that is to everyone’s benefit?
This might be a good point for the Minister to respond, but Galileo is slightly outside the scope of what we should be talking about, so perhaps he can do so briefly.
Something the Minister touched on in his initial remarks was the military planning and conduct capability unit. It is important to emphasise that much of the co-operation we are talking about is essentially intergovernmental. The common security and defence policy is pivotal to that. Last year, we saw the creation of the military planning unit, which centralises decision making within the CSDP apparatus for the European Union. The major initiative it has taken so far is with regard to military training missions in Africa, to which the Minister has referred.
When Britain leaves the European Union, it is possible that the MPCC’s role could be expanded, which Britain has been against. Presumably, the Government would be somewhat concerned about that. Outside the European Union, will we be able to exercise any kind of influence, formally or informally, over its future work?
There is no direct comparison between the MPCC and NATO. It is not an operational headquarters. On scale, just to start, the established posts of the co-ordination cell for the three training missions number 35 posts, of which I understand currently just 12 are filled. With 12 posts filled, that does not have the feel to me of an organisation that is challenging NATO for operational control of EU missions. There are already five nationally-led operational missions. Once we leave the EU, it is not for us to dictate to our European partners how they wish to see this go forward, but given that only 12 of 35 posts have been filled by our EU colleagues, I do not sense that there is a massive drive to move it forward.[Official Report, 3 May 2018,Vol. 640 c. 6MC.]
I thank the Minister for that response but, looking to the future, things may happen if Britain is not there at the table.
My final question relates to the Government’s decision not to be the framework nation for the EU battle group in the second half of 2019. Initially, the Government were keen to provide the framework for this battle group, but then we had a statement from Michel Barnier, who is in charge of the EU negotiations for the Commission. One of our senior military chiefs indicated that
“the offer of a battlegroup in the period immediately following our exit strikes us as an unnecessary complication.”
Does the Minister wish to comment on this “unnecessary complication”, and confirm that Britain will not participate in the EU battle group in the second half of 2019? I am concerned about that, and would welcome any reassurances the Minister can give.
I can certainly confirm that it is our intention not to lead this battle group in the second half of 2019, which is after the point of our departure from the European Union. That is a perfectly pragmatic decision from military planning, because it can take some time with most countries’ rosters to prepare the appropriate battle group and be ready. An early announcement from us has simply enabled our European partners to fill that.
Equally, we must remember that we are currently involved in several EU missions, and the EU has made it clear that, after 29 March, the UK will no longer command any of those missions. That is their decision, not ours. It has an impact, for example, on Operation Atalanta, which is currently operating out of Northwood. We stand ready to ensure continuity and to do our bit until 29 March, but it is an issue for the EU. I am assured that it will take 40 weeks to move that headquarters, so the EU now has, by my own calculation, a matter of weeks to decide who will take over if we are stop running that headquarters on 29 March. Such decisions, however, are being made, effectively, by the EU.
This has been an important exchange of views. In general, I agree 100% with the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol North West. Yesterday, I had a meeting with ADS Group, which represents the defence industry, and it is desperately and genuinely concerned about the uncertainty at the moment, particularly about the customs union. I simply ask the Minister to register how important that is for the sector.
There is nothing more important than the security of this country, which depends on our having a strong relationship with our NATO allies. It also depends on us having a strong relationship with our European neighbours. That relationship needs to continue, albeit in a redefined way, when we leave the European Union. The idea that Britain can somehow prosper and be safe in splendid isolation in the modern world is a dangerous myth.
We should not lose our sovereignty, but we must recognise that to protect it, we must be prepared to pool it to secure collective security. International co-operation with our European partners is not only desirable, but essential. It is necessary to achieve that through NATO and through a new and positive relationship with European member states. That co-operation manifests itself in the growing co-operation between our armed forces, which must continue. It is important that it also continues to manifest itself in research and development, as hon. Members have said, and in our armament and procurement strategies.
Our relationship with the United States is obviously important, but I sometimes feel that this country is becoming increasingly over-dependent on it for our military equipment. Some 2,747 joint light tactical vehicles, 9 maritime patrol aircraft and 50 Apache helicopters are all from America. The Government are also buying up to 138 F-35 aircraft from the United States.
The reality of Britain in the modern world is that we cannot kid ourselves that we can meet all our military needs by ourselves and by developing our own industrial capacity. We have to co-operate, but if we are serious about preserving and enhancing our sovereign capability, we have to co-operate with other European countries too. Good examples of that have already been provided, namely the Typhoon aircraft and the Airbus A400M aircraft.
I am pleased that the European Scrutiny Committee initiated the debate, but I hope that it is merely the start of a vital discussion that we, as Members of this House, must have—not just in Committee, but on the Floor of the House. Our future relationship with our European partners must be positive and mutually beneficial. I believe it can be, but that requires the Government to have a clear strategy to achieve that goal.
That is a first.
Alongside my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot, I serve on the Defence Committee. Before Easter, we took evidence from a number of witnesses, including Earl Howe, the Minister of State for Defence, on initiatives relating to further European integration on defence. I speak today in a personal capacity, and I will speak only briefly, so my remarks do not necessarily represent the views of the full Committee, not least because we have not yet released our report on that subject, although it is not far away.
The 2009 Lisbon treaty, which I remember debating on behalf of my party in the House, created the legal framework for permanent structured co-operation—PESCO—which permits closer co-operation on defence issues among EU member states. In December, 25 EU countries, with the exception of Denmark, Malta and the United Kingdom, formally launched PESCO. As part of the new arrangements, EU member states agreed to create a new military planning and combat capability—MPCC—to be used initially for non-executive common security and defence policy missions. Historically, the United Kingdom has been opposed to any type of Euro headquarters that might act as a rival to the NATO command structure reporting to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe—SACEUR. However, the Minister has been able to reassure us that the MPCC is of a relatively small and modest scale, and that, at least as it is currently configured and empowered, it is therefore unlikely to represent a serious challenge to SACEUR’s command centre. The Minister has reassured the Committee very well there.
The EU nations also resolved to create a list of 17 projects that will allow for greater European co-operation under PESCO. They cover a variety of subjects, including a European medical command, a deployable military disaster relief capability package, an armoured infantry fighting vehicle and indirect fire support—sometimes referred to as Euro artillery. Included on that list is a project relating to military mobility, which aims to speed up the transfer of military assets across the European Union, particularly at a time of crisis. I understand that the UK has sought especially to have some involvement in that project, which I think the Minister told us is Dutch-led.
This topic was of particular concern to the previous SACEUR, General Ben Hodges, who is on the record as having said that he believes the European Union has an important role to play in improving the fluidity of the movement of troops, including NATO troops, on the European mainland. Does the Minister wish to proffer anything further to the Committee about that project, as it is the one that the UK has specifically asked to opt into?
As the UK will be leaving the European Union in 2019, I understand that we will be participating in PESCO and projects such as the mobility project as a third country. I further understand that the EU is likely to finalise its guidelines on third-party participation in PESCO and related projects by the end of this year. The Minister touched on that in his opening speech, but is there anything further he can say about how those guidelines are evolving? On what basis will the UK be permitted to co-operate in the future?
Under the auspices of PESCO, there are also plans to establish a European defence fund, which will allow for investment in common European procurement programmes; and, as previously mentioned, a European defence industrial development programme, which could involve the co-financing and joint development of defence projects by up to 30%. Again, I understand that it may be possible for the UK defence industry to participate in such programmes on a case-by-case basis. Can the Minister say anything more on that subject today? Might he venture some thoughts on any such future procurement programmes in which the UK might want to be involved but is not involved in at the moment?
I note the Minister’s optimism about Galileo. We may yet be successful, but we have to accept the possibility that we may not. If that unfortunately turns out to be the situation, I would like some reassurance from the Minister that we will seek to recoup the United Kingdom’s extremely meaningful investment in the Galileo project. In short, if they will not let us play, we want our money back.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil rightly pointed out, the European Scrutiny Committee described PESCO as an important political development, and I believe it has twice recommended that the issue be debated on the Floor of the House. The Minister said it is a matter for the usual channels, but as we have representatives of the usual channels with us this afternoon, may I take this opportunity to convey my view, as a member of the Defence Committee, that the European Scrutiny Committee is quite right? It would be appropriate to debate this matter on the Floor of the House, perhaps some time in the autumn, in the run-up to the finalisation of the guidelines on how the United Kingdom is intended to participate. In simple terms, we might have some more meat on the bones by then—no pun intended, Mr Bone—so that would seem a suitable time to allow a debate in the House.
The Opposition spokesman referred a couple of times to the risk of a lack of influence. I understand his point, but I seem to recall that before the referendum, it was often suggested that if we left the European Union we would lack influence and would be isolated and without friends or allies. I suggest that the response to the Salisbury incident, when our allies in the United States, across the European Union and indeed in Commonwealth stood shoulder to shoulder with us and expelled well over 100 Russian diplomats in response to that outrage, rather gives the lie to the suggestion that by leaving the EU we will be friendless.
We have had a wide-ranging and, I hope, informative debate. I thank hon. Members for their ongoing engagement. [Interruption.] Oh look! Let there be light. I have shed some light on this debate.
I am not sure how Hansard will deal with that.
I thank hon. Members for their ongoing engagement with these important issues. I hope that these points of information and clarification have been helpful to the Committee. Perhaps they have not been as helpful as some hon. Members would have hoped, but I can only go back to the implementation period, which I hope offers a degree of certainty and protection for their constituents.
I have probably covered most of the points raised, but I will add a couple of comments on military mobility. The UK has been supportive of military mobility initiatives, because we recognise the need to resolve common impediments that restrict our ability to deploy forces rapidly. There are various work strands across both the EU and NATO that are looking at this. Specifically on regulations, the EDA’s roadmap on military mobility looks at the legal, customs and military requirements and cross-border permissions. We have been actively involved in the development of the EDA’s roadmap and regularly attend those workshops. We are supportive of the efforts to try to simplify and standardise the legal and customs issues.
When it comes to EDIDP projects, to be honest, the programme has not yet been established so it is difficult to speculate on exactly what it will entail. That is why we are particularly keen that we should have a flexible framework—so that if and when the UK wants to participate, we will have a mechanism for doing so.
I hope I have made clear that Brexit does not affect the strength of our commitments to the defence of our continent and to humanitarian good across the world. I conclude by restating the commitment to keep the Committee abreast of developments in these issues. When I review Hansard, if there are any questions that I have failed to address, I will endeavour to write to hon. Members.
Question put and agreed to.