(1 year, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberI will make a little progress, if I may. I appreciate that there are a large number of Government amendments, hence the need to make some progress. I would like to reassure the House that they are intended to ensure that the measures in the Bill will work as intended, and in most cases they reflect issues raised in Committee.
I will briefly summarise our amendments relating to parts 1 to 3 of the Bill. First, and importantly, our new clause 15 requires the Government to publish an annual report on the implementation and operation of parts 1 to 3, which includes reforms to Companies House.
I will give way to the right hon. Member on that point, because her many speeches in Parliament have led to some of the changes we have made.
I am very grateful that the Government have listened to our representations on accountability. I would simply say to the Minister that there is also a new clause down on this issue—new clause 16, put together by Back Benchers from across the House and members of the all-party parliamentary groups—which has more detail. Would he be willing to incorporate the detail of that amendment into his new clause? At the moment, his new clause 15 seems a little vague, and we would just like to button it down a bit better.
Again, we discussed this at length in Committee. The right hon. Member’s perspective is that we should be very prescriptive about how the registrar—Companies House—should operate and set out specific things it should do. We would prefer those at Companies House to do what they think is right. They are the experts at making sure the register is accurate, and we have given them the resources to do it, which is crucial. I think it is wrong to specify exactly how the registrar should do its job. We are parliamentarians, not experts in registers and Companies House.
I am extremely grateful to the Minister for giving way again. This is not telling Companies House what to do; it is the information that Parliament would want to hear. I think that, in discussions with him, he actually suggested we set out in greater detail the sorts of areas we wanted to cover, and that is what we have attempted to do in our new clause. It is not a question of instructing Companies House; it is a question of enabling Parliament to really hold Companies House to account on the breadth of issues for which it will be responsible.
I am happy to respond to the right hon. Member’s new clause later when we have debated it. I have read it, and it sets out some interesting ways of doing this. I absolutely agree with the principle of Parliament holding Companies House to account, which is why we want it to report annually on the implementation and operation of this legislation. That is how I think we should do it. I think we want the same thing, and I am happy to have an ongoing discussion with her. Many of the things she has listed in her new clause are already reported on by Companies House, so I think it is important that we do not overly prescribe how Companies House should operate, in my view.
My right hon. Friend is right about keeping our legislation up to date. He says that with great authority. We must recognise that those who seek to perpetuate economic crime are always innovating, and unless we are aware and informed, we will not move our legislation and processes on with that. There is also a vital point about the information that comes to the House. Today, we are debating reporting and information. There will be further debate tomorrow about the appropriateness of the structures through which that information is assessed.
New clause 16 seeks to specify further some of the information that should be brought forward and, crucially, calls for a detailing of instances—or maybe even numbers, depending on the reasons—in which exemption powers under the Bill are used by the Secretary of State. The Minister will be aware of the concerns that we raised in Committee about the need for Parliament to have transparency even on the number of uses of exemption powers under the Bill.
My hon. Friend is making an excellent contribution to the debate. The point is that the Government’s new clause 15 simply reflects reporting on the process of implementation—[Interruption.] That is how I read it, and that is how the Minister spoke to it. If I am wrong, I am happy to be corrected. Through new clause 16, we are trying to hold the whole of Companies House’s works to account and ensure that it delivers what we have in mind in being at the front end of fighting economic crime through the data that it collects.
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. We should be ambitious for the registrar and for Companies House in tackling economic crime and being a beacon around the world for how a nation should do that. She makes an important point about where the new clause goes further than the Government’s proposal. Along with the report and the data in it, importantly, there would be recommendations about whether further legislation should be brought forward in response to that report and the information in it. That is extremely important, because that is where Parliament will have to make choices about whether it chooses to take further action.
Issues of concern that the report may draw attention to, and which we could encourage the registrar to look at, could include investigations of unusual patterns of directorships and companies registered at one address. All of that would also enable Parliament to hold Companies House to account for its performance. We are willing to work with the Minister to strengthen the Government’s new clause so that it becomes more purposeful and effective—and, in doing so, collectively achieve the outcomes that we intend for the Bill.
I turn to further amendments tabled by Labour Front-Bench Members. New clause 22 seeks to disqualify any individual convicted of a serious breach of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998, such as a deliberate refusal to pay the national minimum wage, from serving as a company director in future. In Committee, the Minister stated that it was
“right to identify the scale and nature of the problem before we legislate”.––[Official Report, Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Public Bill Committee, 3 November 2022; c. 240.]
He said that he was “keen to do so.” He also said:
“There have been 16 people convicted under the National Minimum Wage Act 1998. I want to do some further research on that to see what has happened to those people and their director qualification or disqualification. That might inform debate more clearly.”–[Official Report, Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Public Bill Committee, 3 November 2022; c. 233.]
Since then, we have not heard a satisfactory answer to the central question: should an individual convicted of an offence for a serious breach of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998, such as a deliberate refusal to pay the national minimum wage, be prevented from serving as a company director?
Does my hon. Friend agree there can be absolutely no objection to that approach? In the Minister’s opening remarks, he said that the reforms will give Companies House much more proactive capability. If the Minister sees that, and if we want that, what on earth is the objection to putting it in legislation so that Companies House knows darn well that that is what we expect of it?
The Minister has heard what my right hon. Friend says. If that is what Parliament wishes and intends, we should have the courage to put it in the Bill. The amendments tabled by my right hon. Friend and by the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness and others—including new clauses 17 and 19 and amendments 102 and 103—are important, and we support what they are calling for. Separately, we strongly encourage the Minister to look at amendment 101.
I thank the Minister for his confirmation. The legislation is not as tight as we would like it to be, but if he puts his intentions on record, that does take us a step further.
Amendment 107 would require a limited partnership dissolution notice to be published on the registrar’s website and to remain published for a minimum of 20 years. The Minister has previously said that he would like to explore with Companies House the feasibility and costs associated with introducing that requirement. I should be grateful if he confirmed that he has concluded those discussions, and tell us what decision he has reached.
New clause 20, which we support, concerns resourcing. It would raise Companies House fees to £100 to help to properly fund the fight against crime. The current fee of just £12 makes this country the sixth cheapest place in the world in which to set up a company. The Treasury Select Committee recommended a fee of £100. Will the Minister tell us what his plans are? Having a plan to resource Companies House is fundamental to achieving the goals of the Bill.
I thank Scottish National party Members for their amendments, whose arguments are similar to ours. In particular, we support new clause 36 and amendment 109, which deal with reporting and unique IDs—although we think that some minor changes might be made to new clause 36—and would also support any attempt to push them to a vote.
New clause 26, which is being debated today but will be subject to a decision tomorrow, would amend provisions in the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 to require the introduction of open registers of beneficial ownership in each of the UK’s overseas territories. There should be no double standards in the legal requirements for transparency of beneficial ownership across different parts of the UK, including the overseas territories. We have witnessed too many scandals involving money being laundered through territories for whose administration the UK is ultimately responsible to accept the idea that we must simply leave them to their own devices. According to the spin that the Government chose to put on the wording of the 2018 Act, its obligation had been met simply by the publication of a draft Order in Council, regardless of when, or even whether, such an order might actually come into force. The result is that we are here yet again, nearly five years later, still discussing how to ensure the implementation of registers to the same standards across all the UK’s territories. Surely it should not have been beyond the wit of Ministers, even in this Government, to have sorted this out by now. [Interruption.] With the exception of the Minister who is present today.
My hon. Friend is raising a really important point, which has been put into some question by a judgment of the European Court of Justice by an action relating to a shell company in Luxembourg. I know that this is not entirely in the Minister’s control but it is particularly important because, although the Crown dependencies agreed in 2018 or 2019 to publish registers of beneficial ownership, we never passed the legislation because we got their agreement verbally. I am really concerned that they will now go back on that in the light of that judgment. It will be interesting to hear the Minister’s views on that.
I thank my right hon. Friend for her intervention and for the discussions that we had on this matter prior to the Report stage.
In summary, this legislation is essential, but as we have heard from across the House today, there are still areas in which it must go further if we are to catch up after years of being on the back foot on economic crime due to years of inaction. These are thoughtful and purposeful amendments that will improve the Bill, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.
I think I heard the Minister acknowledge that Companies House needs more resources, and that those resources should be raised not through a one-off fee when setting up a business but through ongoing registration fees. I also think I heard him say that he rather likes our proposal to increase the fees every year to reflect inflation. I think he substantially agrees with the thesis of new clause 20, so this is a great opportunity for him to endorse it so that Companies House is able to start budgeting right away.
I heard the Minister make the valid point that he wants to ensure the budget is worked from the bottom up, and that an arbitrary number should not be put into legislation. I have sympathy for his point of view, but I want him to understand the urgency of the matter. I want him to appreciate that we have waited long enough for this Bill, and that the Treasury Committee will therefore not allow this measure to be kicked into the long grass. We will continue to scrutinise progress, and we expect that progress to be urgent and rapid.
At this point in the cycle, I cannot believe there is not a resource budget. Even within the constraints of the Bill, there should be a budget because the negotiations will be starting. It would be interesting if the Minister could reveal that figure.
My second point, with which the Minister might agree, is that we so under-resource the enforcement of existing anti-money laundering regulations in this country that, even if this figure of £100, which the Treasury Committee and other Committee came up with, proved too much, which I doubt, setting up an economic crime fighting fund would mean that other enforcement agencies, such as the National Crime Agency and the Serious Fraud Office, could use those resources to provide better defences against economic crime.
The right hon. Lady makes some excellent points. Once the Minister does this work, it may well turn out that £100 is a good starting point. Other things are budgeted for, and I understand the budget for the work that is under way is £20 million for the financial year just ended. A further £63 million is expected to be needed up to 2024-25 and was allocated in the last spending review.
Forgive me if I am cynical about the budgets for public sector computer procurement projects, as they sometimes come in somewhat over budget. I urge the Minister in his response to new clause 20 to make sure that he can move swiftly to change the amount that it costs to set up a business, while making sure that it remains competitive in terms of economic parameters. It is not every day that Back Benchers say to Ministers, “Here’s some more money for you. We think this is going make the UK much safer and a centre that is less vulnerable to economic crime.” That is the purpose behind our support for this new clause.
I welcome the Minister to his place. I enjoyed working with him for a number of years on the Back Benches. We have co-operated well, and I look forward to that co-operation continuing now that he is a Minister. I am pleased to be working closely with his successor at the all-party parliamentary group on fair business banking, the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (Simon Fell), who has tabled a number of the amendments put forward by the APPG.
I join others in welcoming the Bill. I welcome the fact that we are having this debate. This could be legislation that fundamentally transforms the landscape that has enabled economic crime to flourish in the UK. It could be the moment when we, in Britain, through the decisions that we make here in Parliament, give a message loud and clear to the world that there will be zero tolerance of money laundering fraud and other economic crime in our country. It could be the moment when, by acting against economic crime, we lay the foundations that would enable our financial sector, and with it our economy, to flourish and grow. As I have often said, we will never achieve sustained economic growth on the back of dirty money, but we could achieve it as a trusted jurisdiction that openly and firmly rejects illicit finance. It could be all of those things.
The Bill before us is welcome; it enables us to have these debates and to legislate, but in its current form it fails in too many ways. First, as it currently stands, I fear that it cannot achieve its stated purpose. Omissions and loopholes mean that there is a real danger that we could be setting up a new Companies House that will fail. One library filled with dud information will simply replace another. Secondly, in my view and that of the all-party parliamentary group on anti-corruption and responsible tax, which we will certainly make clear in tomorrow’s debates on new clauses, the Bill is too cautious and unambitious in its scope. It fails seriously to tackle the challenge that we in Britain face because of the exponential growth of economic crime. It is worth the House remembering what that is. Every year, economic crime costs this country somewhere in the region of £300 billion. That is a conservative estimate—in fact, I think it is a gross underestimate. That is 14.5% of GDP.
To look at just the fraud element of that, reported fraud affects one in 11 adults. I have been a victim of fraud that I have never reported, and we all know that there are victims of fraud who do not report it. One in 11 adults are affected, so this is a massive issue. That figure of £300 billion is double what we spend on the NHS. We are talking about mega sums that get lost in the UK economy every year and impact on all sorts of things: the quality of our public services, the raising of taxes, the economy as a whole and the reputation of the UK. There is an endless impact, and we have to tackle it.
I ask the Minister, as we did in Committee, to put aside the natural instinct to resist amendments tabled by Back Benchers. Our purpose is simply to strengthen the Bill, so that when it is passed, it can support our shared mission across the House to eradicate money laundering, fraud and other economic crime. I urge him and the Government to support our amendments, and I hope that Members in the other place will reflect on our debates today and in Committee when they consider the Bill in detail over the coming weeks.
I welcome the new clause that the Minister has tabled in relation to the accountability of Companies House. However, if he were to accept new clause 16, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Feltham and Heston (Seema Malhotra), it would improve what he wants to do and the information that we in Parliament expect to receive about the performance of Companies House.
I warmly support all the new clauses tabled by members of the all-party group. As the right hon. Member for South Northamptonshire (Dame Andrea Leadsom) said, those measures would strengthen the duties of Companies House, which is really important; giving powers is one thing, but duties really matter. Those duties would ensure that we can validate the information contained in Companies House and that it has the integrity it needs to fulfil the purpose for which it is intended.
I look forward to tomorrow’s debate on important issues such as the reforms to corporate criminal liability, the strengthening of support for whistleblowers, tackling the growing problems associated with SLAPPs and introducing new powers that could help us to seize as well as freeze the assets that the Government control from people they have sanctioned.
I will focus my comments today on two sets of amendments that we in the all-party group are convinced are necessary to ensure that the reforms work and that the appropriate resources are in place to properly fund the reforms. Otherwise, our legislation is in danger of simply gathering dust on the shelves of the Library.
I am always interested in what the right hon. Lady has to say. We have shown that we are willing to engage with her suggested amendments, although we perhaps draft them in a different way, and the debate we had in Committee has been useful and fruitful for both sides.
On the question of duties, which my right hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire (Dame Andrea Leadsom) also referred to, I point Members to clause 1. It is very clear that the registrar
“must… seek to promote the following objectives.”
The first is to ensure that documents are delivered to the registrar. The second is to ensure that the documents delivered are accurate. The third is to ensure that those documents do not create a “false or misleading impression”, and the fourth is to minimise the extent to which companies and others carry out unlawful activities. That is a duty—the registrar must do those things—so Members’ concerns should be assuaged by that clause.
It is an important clause—I agree with the Minister on that—but equally, if we introduce a duty to ensure that persons with significant control of companies are who they say they are, it will strengthen the Bill. It will not undermine or contradict any of its clauses; it will simply strengthen it. With all my experience in this House as both a Minister and a Back Bencher, I know that if we are not very specific about what we place in legislation, we come back to it in subsequent years and regret that lack of determination. We see that particularly in our attempts to fight economic crime; so many times we think we have achieved something, then we come back and find it has not worked.
I turn to the first set of amendments that we in the all-party parliamentary group think are necessary, many of which have been tabled by the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness. We have tabled several amendments to create new duties on Companies House, rather than giving it powers, the most critical of which is about corporate service providers. If the Minister does not accept that, I predict that we will end up creating another database that is infected with falsehoods and errors, and will simply reinforce in people’s minds across the globe the growing acceptance that the UK is the best place to hide and launder dirty money.
The disease of not listening troubles me. I am not saying that the Government are not listening, but they are not listening enough. On my right hon. Friend’s point, there are still thousands of properties in London and across the country that have unknown offshore owners and we do not know where the money comes from. Will the Bill, or its previous incarnations, do anything to resolve that issue? I am not convinced that it will.
My hon. Friend makes an important point, because we legislated last year to create a register of properties that are owned through corporations in foreign jurisdictions, but I understand that Companies House is having real difficulty in establishing it, because it is very difficult for it to assess the real beneficial owners of trusts and companies incorporated somewhere such as the British Virgin Islands. That is why the amendments tabled by the Labour Front Bench to ensure that company service providers are located here so that we have better control and supervision are hugely important.
Last week, as I am sure the Minister saw, Danske Bank agreed to forfeit $2 billion in the US courts as part of an agreement to resolve the criminal liabilities facing it. On top of that, civil litigation has led to a fine of more than $400 million and individual employees could yet be charged by the US courts. That is massive. It is worth reflecting on the words used in that court verdict, including that
“Danske Bank, the largest bank in Denmark, deliberately disregarded U.S. law of which it is well aware, facilitated the laundering of criminal and suspicious proceeds through the United States, and placed the U.S. financial network at risk, all in the name of its bottom line.”
The judgment also says that it
“lied and deceived U.S. banks to pump billions of dollars of suspicious and criminal funds through the U.S. financial system… If you want to use the U.S. financial system, you must play by the rules. If you don’t, we will hold you accountable.”
The right hon. Member is raising a very important case, which she rightly says I have referred to on many occasions, and I welcome that fine. One of the things I know she will be debating tomorrow is corporate criminal liability, which I think would have a profound effect on companies willing to turn a blind eye to that, as Danske Bank did.
May I raise a couple of points about what the right hon. Member said earlier? It is always the Government’s position on this Bill that any overseas company service provider needs a UK branch and needs to be regulated by a money laundering supervisor. That is not something we were asked to do, but something we very much wanted to do.
On the point made by the hon. Member for Bootle (Peter Dowd), which the right hon. Member mentioned, about the register of overseas entities, the onus is on the entity itself to register the person who is the enterprise’s beneficial owner. If it does not do so—and it has to be done by the end of this month—it cannot sell or lease the property, and there are sanctions available such as fines, or potentially criminal prosecutions can be taken forward. That is the method of making sure we have such information.
On the last point, the Minister is right that such companies cannot sell or lease the property, but I think it is probably almost impossible to verify whether the data they provide is accurate, because it is based on the incorporation of an entity in a foreign jurisdiction. That is the problem, and as I understand it from discussions I have had with those at Companies House, it is a problem it is currently facing.
I think the Minister and I would both wholeheartedly endorse the words of the court in the United States—I hope he would; I am sure he would—but let us start by recognising the truth. UK limited liability partnerships and companies were the preferred vehicle for all those clients, most of whom were not Latvian at all but were called non-resident clients—the Russian kleptocrats, drug smugglers, people smugglers and all those sorts of people—who used the Latvian branch of Danske Bank. It was UK company formation agents who worked closely with that Danske Bank branch in setting up those shell British registered companies.
To give one example in today’s context, it was a UK registered company, registered by a UK company service provider that set up Lantana Trade with an address in Harrow, and that company then set up a bank account in the Latvian branch of Danske Bank. According to the whistleblower in the Danske Bank case, the real beneficial owner of that company, which of course has now been dissolved—surprise, surprise—was Igor Putin, Putin’s cousin. The real purpose of setting up that company was to launder money stolen from Russian citizens out of Russia, and our company service providers facilitated that.
We know from an analysis of the FinCEN files submitted to various Committees by the people we have mentioned before—Simon Bowers and Richard Brooks, two very good investigative journalists—that the UK stood out in the FinCEN files as the jurisdiction where there was the largest concentration of companies about which suspicious activity reports had been filed. Over 3,000—3,267—shell companies revealed in the FinCEN files were UK companies. We know that just four of the largest company formation agents in the UK were associated with over half of those 3,267 companies, and they were named in those leaks. We also know that an address in Potters Bar was used by over 1,000 companies featured in that body of leaks. So again, company service providers facilitated the creation of companies that then appeared in that massive FinCEN leak.
My final example comes from a story last week in The Guardian and concerns the infamous Mr Usmanov, the Putin ally whose wealth is said to amount to £14 billion—I have seen different figures in different publications. He claims to have divested himself of most of his UK assets before he was sanctioned on 3 March last year, seven days after Russia invaded Ukraine, but ever more evidence is emerging suggesting that while he has created companies and trusts, using our company service providers to do so, with nominee owners, nominee trustees, nominee shareholders, nominee directors, he remains the real beneficial owner and controller of his assets.
This concerns not just his homes—Beechwood house in Highgate, said to be worth over £80 million, or the 16th century Sutton Place estate in Surrey—but his investment in Everton football club, now bottom of the league. He claims to have sold his interest in the club to his friend and long-time colleague Farhad Moshiri. Our professionals helped to structure these transfers of assets; our company service providers were involved. Yet when Everton was interviewing potential managers after 2016—after he claims to have sold his interests, but before he was sanctioned—Usmanov was always there. According to The Guardian, one candidate to become Everton manager said Usmanov stated during the interview that he owned the club, and another candidate said Usmanov left him with the impression the club belonged to the tycoon. Even Frank Lampard said that when he attended his interview
“Mr Usmanov was on Zoom call with Mr Moshiri”.
I have chosen just three examples, but there are too many bad apples among our company service providers, the people we are proposing to entrust with providing verified, reliable data for the new Companies House register.
We also know that, as colleagues have mentioned, the current system for supervision is broken. The Treasury commissioned a report that found that 81% of the bodies responsible for the legal and accountancy sectors were not supervising their members effectively on anti money-laundering regulations.
My right hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. Does she agree that the US model is worth looking at? Law enforcement agencies that are successful get a percentage of the proceeds of their success back to recycle to employ more people to do more enforcement. It is a virtuous circle, whereas our rather hands-off approach is perhaps less effective.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right and I will refer to that a little later in my contribution.
There is another report on HMRC’s supervision of company service providers. It looked at 672 of the company service providers and only 95—14%—were found to be compliant with checking that AML regulations were enforced by their members. More than half—352—were non-compliant, but only a third of those 352 were ever deemed to be non-compliant and were pursued through the courts; they received an average fine of £8,000.
This litany of ills demonstrates why we need to sort out the supervision of company service providers before we enact the legislation, and that is why our amendments in the name of the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness are so important. We need to be certain that the company service providers have been properly checked and supervised before we let them loose on verifying data for the new register.
The Treasury is already reviewing the supervision mechanism. I saw just recently that consultation on that review will start in the second quarter of 2023. What I am saying to the Minister is: where there is a political will, there is a political way. There is absolutely no reason why the review should not be completed and implemented concurrently with implementation of the legislation contained in the Bill. By putting that in the Bill, we would make certain—with my greatest love for every civil servant in the country—that that gets enacted. If we do not do that, we will end up with another dud register. We are giving him and the Government a pragmatic and practical suggestion that will simply make the Bill work as it is intended.
We have wrestled with a similar issue on tax agents, where it has become clear that people are filing tax returns on behalf of their clients when they are neither competent nor perhaps have the right ethics to hold that power. However, it becomes hard to sort that out once they are existing in the system and filing returns. Does the right hon. Member agree that it would be much better to get only the right people authorised in the first place and that, by doing that up front, we would not have to come back afterwards to try to kick off people who have a heavy investment in carrying on?
The hon. Member makes a valid point, as he always does. That is a parallel argument for ensuring proper supervision and regulation and then checking and disciplining people in a professional capacity so that we get rid of the bad apples right across the piece. I was thinking about lawyers, because I think that only one case has been taken by the Solicitors Regulation Authority against one firm of solicitors on implementation of AML regulation. It is pathetic how little has been done in that context.
I turn briefly to the resourcing of the regulatory enforcement agencies and new clause 20. Our failure properly to resource these agencies is a disgrace. We should all share blame for where we are to date. In the USA, Biden sees economic crime as a security issue. As we now know from Russian activity in relation to the invasion of Ukraine, it is a security issue, and yet, if we look at our records, expenditure in the USA is going up by 31%, whereas here in the UK it has been cut by 4%. That is absolutely crazy. The Americans are much more aggressive and assertive in pursuing economic crime in both the civil and criminal courts. There is the Danske bank case, and there is the HSBC case that involved the Mexican drug cartel—the Minister will know about that. In America, in 2012, HSBC was fined $1.4 billion. In Britain, by 2021—nine years later—we managed a fine of only £64 million. Let us also look at the case of Standard Chartered—a UK bank. There again, the USA fined it $842 million. What we did in the UK? A fine of £102 million.
Let us look at the implementation of the Bribery Act 2010—legislation that we all think is working quite well—with a “failure to prevent” duty in it. In the UK, we have seen 99 criminal convictions since its introduction. In America, where there is a similar legislative framework, 236 criminal convictions—more than twice as many—have been completed.
Despite our timid approach to pursuing economic crime, and despite our pathetic response, it still pays to pursue it. In the five years between 2016 and 2021, the enforcement agencies brought in £3.9 billion to Treasury coffers. So it is not just a good thing for all those other arguments we have given; it also helps to support the public finances.
It is pointless passing laws and then failing to agree appropriate funding that would enable the Government to put those laws into practice. Our amendments aim to do just that, at—I stress this fact, which I think the hon. Member for West Worcestershire (Harriett Baldwin) mentioned—no cost to the taxpayer. We are doing it through raising the fees, which do not appear on the public sector borrowing requirement. We are not doing it by demanding any bit of public sector funding towards that cost.
It is absurdly low, whatever Members feel, to pay £12 to set up a company. To put that into context—this is a figure I used in Committee, but I will share it with the House—it costs £1,220 to get a visa for a skilled farm worker. We have just got the priorities completely, crazily wrong. If we look at the cost of incorporating a company across the world, even in those jurisdictions that are not the best, the British Virgin Islands charges £1,000 to set up a company and Jersey charges £425 to set up a company. In America, it varies from $570 to $1,400. Luxembourg—not my favourite jurisdiction—charges €1,100. It is only Greece and Slovenia who charge less than the UK.
We propose £100. That is a figure slightly imagined rather than grounded in fact, but it is the figure the Treasury Committee chose and the figure that the House of Lords’ Committee on fraud put forward, so we thought it was a better one. I do not accept that it is a barrier to any business, whether it is run by women or men. I just do not accept that argument at all. If you are setting up a business and you do not have £100, you have to question, whatever the nature of the business, the motivations for establishing it.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that if the Minister does not agree with new clause 20, he is in effect asking for powers without giving the House any confidence that we can actually summon the resources to implement those powers if we so grant them?
Absolutely. The Minister always assures us that he will be on top of it, but he will not be there forever, much as he might like to be. We therefore have to embed these issues in legislation, otherwise we will never to the position where funding for the enforcement of economic crime will be a priority for a Government of any colour. That is why setting it here is really important. I have to say to the Minister that I just do not believe that the figures are not around. I think that by this stage in the cycle, he will have figures that demonstrate how much is required. If we have more duties, it may go up. That is not a bad thing, because if it goes up it means we will be more effective at policing the system, and therefore preventing and detecting.
I will give way to the hon. Member for Amber Valley (Nigel Mills) and then I will give way to the Minister.
I am not sure I should pull rank on the Minister, but I am grateful to the right hon. Lady. Does she agree that it is not just the set-up fee we need to get at the right level, but the ongoing annual registration fee? Ensuring companies have the correct records on an ongoing basis is as important as having them on day one. There is probably a lot more money to be raised for Companies House with an annual fee, rather than a one-off at the start.
If that has been proposed, it has not been proposed in the Bill. I am not hostile to that; it is a perfectly good suggestion. At the moment, all we have is a fee which we are trying to tie to inflation so it does not get caught up in annual arguments over priorities in the Budget. However, if there is a proposal, it would have been nice to see it. If there is a proposal to fund it in a different way, that would be great.
My hon. Friend the Member for Amber Valley (Nigel Mills) has made absolutely the right point: as I said earlier, there are annual fees as well as incorporation fees, and we should look at both elements.
On the question of specifying a fee in the Bill, as the right hon. Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge) says, we do not even know yet what duties will be required of the registrar, because the Bill has not yet passed through both Houses. The registrar may end up having more duties that will cost more to perform, so it is impossible to say right now what resources she will need. As the right hon. Lady says, we may discover further down the line that more will be required, so why would we set out the fee in the Bill rather than in regulations, where we can vary it more easily?
My simple response to the Minister is to invite him to share with us the current budget estimate for Companies House, if the Bill is enacted in its present form, and to tell us what that will mean. I just cannot believe that the information is not in the mix somewhere, but the Minister is not choosing to share it with us Back Benchers at this point.
Well, an estimate must be available, because we know where we are in the cycle. We know that somewhere or other this is being discussed. If the estimate changes, there is nothing to stop us changing the new clause at a later date.
More importantly, if 100 quid is too much, if the registrar does not need that much, or if the Minister wants to change the law and move from charging a fee on incorporation to charging an annual fee, I can see the logic of that, but presumably he would still have to come back to the House to put that in legislation—
Okay. But if the fee is too much, I still suggest that the Minister looks at subsections (5), (6) and (7) of new clause 20. We hope that he will set up an economic crime fund. Any surplus that results from raising the fee to 100 quid could then be well used by the NCA, the Serious Fraud Office or another agency with access to the fund. Our new clause would ensure that the money is ringfenced for use against economic crime, rather than being taken away by the Treasury and used for other purposes.
We also suggest that the Minister comes back to us on the issue of penalties to fund the fight against economic crime. Since 1984, all forfeiture proceeds in the USA have gone to an assets forfeiture fund. Just think what it will do with the $2 billion it has got out of the Danske Bank criminal settlement! We do not have that system in the UK: at the moment, something like 40% of the current fines and penalties go towards fighting economic crime. That is too little: it should be 100%.
There are precedents. The Information Commissioner has announced a new arrangement with the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport whereby it can retain the money that it accesses through penalties to support its arguments and its work against the big tech companies. The Gambling Commission accepts contributions to compensate victims or payments to charity, rather than imposing a fine: that is another ringfencing hypothecation. Ofwat’s penalties levied against Southern Water were used to reimburse customers.
I have spoken for too long, Mr Deputy Speaker, but I have focused on two of the issues that I consider most critical among today’s group of amendments. That is not to say that the others do not matter—they do—but these are practical, common-sense proposals that are supported by the all-party group, and I know from conversations with Members that they command wide support across the Chamber. There is no badge of honour for Ministers in the Government if they fail to listen to their Back Benchers.
More importantly, we have to make this reform work. If we ignore these proposals, we will risk consigning much of the reform to the dustbin. The fight against economic crime is utterly vital. We all know that this is a once-in-a-generation opportunity. We know what the problems are, and we know that the solutions are multifaceted and complex. For heaven’s sake, let us work together and do what we can to make these reforms effective, efficient and fit for purpose. In that spirit, I will wait for the Minister to cheer me up by saying that he will accept these amendments from by Back Benchers of all political parties.
I rise to speak to new clauses 17, 18, 19, 101, 102 and 103 in my name, and to support new clause 20 in the name of my friend the right hon. Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge). I am grateful to her and to members of the all-party groups on anti-corruption and responsible tax and on fair business banking for their support. I should say that I do not plan to press any of those new clauses to a vote today.
The Bill is the second part of a package designed to prevent the abuse of the UK’s corporate structures and to tackle economic crime. It is a good Bill which will go a long way towards achieving its aims, and I certainly welcome the Government new clauses and amendments, but we have to go beyond “good”. Those who seek to exploit our open economy and our corporate structures to enrich themselves—whether organised criminal gangs, fraudsters, kleptocrats or even terrorists—are better than “good”. They are singularly motivated to find opportunities to enrich themselves and their clients, and to abuse our systems in doing so. They are good at it because it is a profitable endeavour for them, and because it is unfortunately too easy for them to exploit the systems in which we operate.
That is an operational matter for Companies House; it is not for me as the Minister. The registrar clearly has a responsibility to ensure the integrity of the database, and how she seeks to do that will be up to her.
Amendment 101 is clearly key. The Government are committed to ensuring that the checks carried out by ACSPs are robust. ACSPs will be required to carry out checks to at least the same standard as the registrar, who will be able to query any suspicious information. The registrar will establish a robust scrutiny process with AML supervisors for onboarding ACSPs. If necessary, she can suspend or de-authorise an ACSP to exclude it from forming companies. The vast majority of accountants, lawyers and other agents who make filings on behalf of companies operate to high standards. It would be disproportionate to block them all from making such filings while the Treasury works through the reform of the supervisory regime—something that we all clearly want it to get right.
New clause 34 requires the Government to report on the number of foreign corporate service providers that have been registered at Companies House. Clause 63 gives the Secretary of State the power to permit the authorisation of foreign corporate service providers subject to equivalent AML regimes abroad. That is obviously in the context of a potential trade deal that is not currently on the table.
On amendment 104, tabled by the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston, I cannot agree with this fifth objective for the registrar. The Bill already places a legal duty on the registrar to seek to promote the objectives, which inherently demands proactivity. Tentative use of her powers would result in the registrar being in danger of failing to satisfy the duty.
On the accuracy of existing data, I thank the hon. Member for Glasgow Central (Alison Thewliss), whose new clause 36 would have the registrar ensure the accuracy and veracity of all register information prior to the commencement of the Bill’s reforms. Clearly, that constitutes many millions of pieces of information, with many thousands being added every day—the analogy of painting the Forth bridge springs to mind. If we were to do what she asks and the registrar were to fulfil the requirements of the new clause, it is unlikely that the beneficial reforms of the Bill would ever be realised, because of the duty it would place on the registrar.
I have been told that I need to make progress, but I thank the right hon. Lady—my former partner in fighting economic crime—for her amendment on Companies House fees, which is clearly key. It is critical that the registrar is sufficiently funded to carry out her duties.
The right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill (Liam Byrne) is wrong to say that the Bill does not provide extra resources to Companies House to implement the measures, because clause 90 sets out exactly what areas will be taken into account when fees are set. The Bill gives the Government more flexibility to increase the fees and charges by broadening the range of functions that can be funded through those fees. The Government are reviewing funding arrangements in the context of the reforms and are committed to ensuring that Companies House is fully resourced to perform its new role and functions. As I said earlier, Companies House levies a range of fees, not just the up-front charge on incorporation, and I confirm that we are exploring a range of options about how fees will evolve.
New clause 22, on the national minimum wage, tabled by the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston, seeks to ban those convicted under the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 from being appointed as directors. The national minimum wage enforcement team at HMRC, whose resources have been doubled over the last six years, as have the penalties for non-compliance, already refers appropriate cases to the Insolvency Service, which, as part of its normal remit, considers director disqualifications where appropriate. Indeed, three people were disqualified in 2021 for such transgressions.
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Barrow and Furness (Simon Fell) for his new clause 18, which would require a person who controls more than 5% of the shares in a public company to disclose that information to the registrar. I very much note his concerns about shareholder transparency. However, we must balance transparency concerns and the benefits of having additional information against imposing undue burdens on businesses.
Will the Minister accept any of the amendments or new clauses brought forward by Back Benchers today?
As the right hon. Lady knows, new clause 15, which we tabled today, is based on some of the debate we had and the ideas she brought forward in Committee. So I say to her that she should keep bringing forward the ideas, and we will certainly consider them.
The Companies Act already requires traded companies to maintain up-to-date lists of their shareholders and report any changes in shareholders above 5% on an annual basis.
New clause 37—and indeed amendment 112—on phoenixing, which was debated by the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North (Gavin Newlands), requires the registrar to block the registration of companies that share common characteristics with more than three companies wound up in the preceding five-year period. Successive companies being wound up in this manner is known as phoenixing. We feel there are provisions that will be implemented through this Bill that will provide safeguards against such behaviour. Suitable coverage is already provided by the existing rules, and there are new powers in the Bill that give the registrar of companies a power to compel people to provide information in the context of the examination of information on the register, and to interrogate and share that data with other authorities.
(1 year, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI appreciate the Minister’s response. To pick up on a couple of his points, he said that there are already remedies available, but as we have seen there are far too few for employees who suffer at the hands of a nasty business owner. We have all seen such cases on the news or from our own case loads.
The Minister mentioned the regulations governing covid loans. Clearly, that is a very specific example, and he makes a fair point, but that is not the case for all public moneys. However, this is a probing provision and would require further work before I sought to test the Committee or the Chamber with a vote. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 71
Suspicious Activity Reporting: risk rating
“(1) The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 is amended as follows.
(2) After subsection 339(1) insert—
‘(1ZA) An order under subsection (1) must prescribe that a risk rating be included as part of a disclosure.’”—(Dame Margaret Hodge.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I will be on my feet for a bit, so I will try to be succinct—I know that Members have other things to do this afternoon. [Laughter.] It may be impossible for me. I want to say quite a lot about this new clause.
New clause 71 is about reforming of the suspicious activity reports regime. Ministers will accept that the SARs regime is a central tool in our defence against money laundering, but I hope they also accept that the current system is broken—it is not working. The new clause would introduce a new risk rating system, which would transform the efficacy and efficiency of the current regime.
SARs are very valuable and a vital source of intelligence. They are made mainly by financial institutions, but also by solicitors, accountants or estate agents, and they report suspicious activity. They have been absolutely instrumental in a range of successful actions against criminal activities, locating sex offenders, tracing murder suspects and identifying those involved in online child abuse, and they have shown how young women are trafficked into the UK. They have also been instrumental in closing down fraud and money laundering.
To give one example of a successful case involving fraud, a vulnerable elderly man in his 80s was the victim of a fraudster who had gained his personal details through a cloned website, when the elderly man believed that he was making a genuine investment. The reporter who saw the transaction going through was suspicious when the fraudster tried to impersonate the victim and access his main funds. He reported the transaction, and the UK Financial Intelligence Unit, which operates the SARs regime, received that report. The unit immediately passed it on to the enforcement agency—I wish this happened every time—which visited the victim in his house. The agency was then able to quickly contact the institution where the transaction was supposed to take place. It reported that the suspicious activity was wrong and confirmed the real identity and bank details of the elderly man, which all prevented him from losing in excess of £80,000.
This scheme is therefore important, and it is successful when it works well. However, at present, the sheer volume of SARs and the limited resources available mean that the information is not analysed and often simply not used. In evidence to the Treasury Committee, Mark Steward, the director of enforcement at the Financial Conduct Authority, said:
“More needs to be done in order to get more out of the valuable data that is in there. Otherwise, it just sits there.”
Graeme Biggar, also giving evidence to the Treasury Committee, as director general of the National Economic Crime Centre, said:
“Twenty years ago, we got 20,000 suspicious activity reports in, largely from banks. This year, we would not be surprised if we got three quarters of a million, and the number of defence against money laundering SARs, where we are told in advance and given the option to refuse permission to proceed, is going to double, we think, this year. The sheer volume coming through is really significant and very hard to deal with.”
According to research from Spotlight on Corruption, only 118 people handle the SARs. That is one employee to 4,250 SARs. The Australians, who have a similar enforcement regime, and who have also experienced an explosion in SARs, have a staff complement of one to 1,400—three times better than our own. The Committee has often talked about the relative budgets for enforcement of the UK and the USA. The USA has increased funding of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network by 30%, and its staffing by 50%. The Minister should recognise that the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s budget is now 15 times larger than the National Crime Agency, although our population is only five times smaller than America’s.
The Financial Action Task Force review in 2018 said SARs should be reformed, and SARs were criticised by the FATF. The Treasury Committee report in 2019 talked about SARs reform. In 2017, the Government had announced a reform programme for SARs, led by the Home Office together with the NCA. That reform programme constituted action 30 in the economic crime plan. The intent was to have an IT transformation, better analytical resources and capabilities, and an improvement in SARs processes. That SARs programme was reviewed by the Government’s Infrastructure and Projects Authority, and was given an amber rating in 2021. So reform started in 2017, the programme was given an amber rating in 2021, and today, in 2022, it is not complete and there is no timetable from the Home Office—maybe the Minister can help with that—or a target date for completion, which was a criticism the Treasury Committee made of the programme. Delivery was originally promised by December 2020, but we are two years on from that and we are a long way from seeing SARs completed.
In that context, new clause 71 introduces a risk-rating regime. I do not think anybody thinks that is a crazy idea, and I hope the Minister will—just for once—adopt one of the suggestions that the Opposition have made in Committee. I hope he will not say that we do not need the legislation. We are nearly six years on from when the reform programme was announced, and reform has not happened. The Government cannot, despite the best efforts of right hon. Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip (Boris Johnson), ignore legislation, although they seem to be ignoring the desire to reform the SARs programme.
If Ministers want action, which they have consistently said they seek with the Bill, they should accept new clause 71. If they simply see this measure as party political, they should not. We do not deal with the funding issue in the new clause, but we will ensure that the focus is on the most significant SARs. That will lead to more enforcement. I urge the Minister to adopt our new clause.
It is a pleasure to speak briefly in support of the new clause tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking. It would amend the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 such that any disclosure made as part of the suspicious activity reporting regime must include a risk rating. My right hon. Friend outlined very effectively the reasons why the new clause is important. Much of the evidence in our meetings at the outset of the Bill, which set out the context and stakeholder views, it was clear that the SARs regime was failing. The databases of referrals were going unreviewed and unlooked at, because the resources were not there. There was no effective means that we could see of prioritising SARs fed into the NCA.
SARs is an essential tool in our defence against money laundering, but if the system is not working, something needs to happen. Having an extra step in the process to help with prioritisation, look at risks and deal with those identified as higher risk would help, as my right hon. Friend outlined, to bring in quality, at a time when we know that quantity is the new battle. She said that the current estimate is three quarters of a million referrals, which is extraordinary. Given the scale and types of economic crime, the number of referrals is likely to get worse, not better. That is a good thing if we are starting to highlight and refer more cases as we start to clean up our systems. However, we then need to deliver on that; otherwise, the downside is that we will reduce confidence among those doing the referrals that anything will actually happen.
Nigel Kirby of Lloyds Bank said in his evidence to the Committee:
“I think the SARs regime and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 itself actually need—well, not necessarily to be turned upside down, but to be looked at as a whole.”––[Official Report, Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Public Bill Committee, 25 October 2022; c. 19, Q26.]
I think we have some agreement that the system itself is important, essential and necessary but that it needs wholesale reform to make it more efficient and effective and to ensure that it does what we ask of it.
We all think that SARs is a helpful regime. I wonder whether the Minister has been given the information by the NCA. It got more than half a million SARs, but how much of that data did it use to get the millions that it got in? That is a heck of a lot of data, which should yield a huge amount of valuable information.
First, not every SAR leads to an actionable offence. Many of them are simply, and quite rightly, reports. They are reports because there are suspicions, but suspicion does not necessarily mean guilt. Many times these are companies that are taking on clients or that have clients who are suspicious, and they want to be sure they are doing the right thing so, responsibly, they report in. We should not confuse the absolute number of reports with a level of criminality. That would not be fair on the British population, those doing the reporting or the NCA, which is looking into these things.
I am trying to untangle what the Minister said. If he is open to further discussions, I do not think that there is a rating regime. All we are saying is that there should be a rating regime so that the most urgent cases come at the top. My understanding is that that does not exist. There may be some form of triaging that I am not aware of. We just want to introduce a rating regime. If he is willing to engage in discussions before Report, I am happy not to put the matter to the vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 72
Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision: powers and duties
“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations set out a further power and duty for the Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision.
(2) The power referred to in subsection (1) is the power to impose unlimited financial penalties on Professional Body Supervisors that fail to—
(a) adopt an effective risk-based approach to anti-money laundering supervision;
(b) impose proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for non- compliance with anti-money laundering requirements; and
(c) fail to separate their advocacy and regulatory functions.
(3) The duty referred to in subsection (1) is the duty to publish the details of any sanctions imposed on Professional Body Supervisors, and its reviews of Professional Body Supervisors with data disaggregated by body rather than by sector.”—(Dame Margaret Hodge.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 74—Failure to prevent fraud, false accounting or money laundering: director liability—
“(1) If an offence under section [Offence of failure to prevent fraud, false accounting or money laundering] is committed by a body corporate and it is proved that the offence—
(a) has been committed with the consent or connivance of an officer of the body corporate, or
(b) is attributable to any neglect on the part of an officer of the body corporate, the officer (as well as the body corporate) commits the offence.
(2) For the purposes of this section, ‘officer’ means—
(a) a director, manager, associate, secretary or other similar officer, or
(b) a person purporting to act in any such capacity.”
I will speak for a little longer on new clause 73, but hopefully we will get through the others more quickly. It is probably one of the most important new clauses that we have tabled. It sits with new clause 79, which we will come to a little later. If we can make progress on this issue, we will be putting some better meat on the bones of what is still quite timid legislation.
We all want to do all we can to prevent economic crime from occurring in the first place. Prevention and early intervention is obviously the best, cheapest and most effective way of tackling the problem of dirty money. We want to stop it happening in the first place. We also all know that much economic crime takes place because lawyers, company service providers, accountants, bankers or estate agents either enable or collude with bad actors, helping them or turning a blind eye to the things that they do, thus enabling money to be laundered, crime to be committed, and our systems to be used to commit financial crimes.
There is currently too little in our laws and regulations that will stop the enablers—accountants and all the others—supporting and enabling economic crime. Companies and individuals are not held to account for what they do. The new clause aims to put a halt to that. We need to reform our outdated corporate liability laws so that not only companies but senior managers can be prosecuted if they fail to prevent fraud, false accounting and money laundering. It is not because we want to have endless prosecutions, or to fill prisons with these enablers, but because the threat of criminal prosecution will act as the best and most vital deterrent in preventing professionals from helping criminals to launder and manage their dirty money.
As we have said time and again in Committee, most professionals act with integrity. Those professionals with integrity have absolutely nothing to fear from the new clause. Indeed, the majority, who act responsibly, should welcome the change, because it will help us to clean up their profession, get rid of the bad apples and restore our reputation as a trusted jurisdiction. The Minister knows very well—I am trying to find the right Minister—
Both Ministers know that reform has been promised, and delayed, for a long time. The 2015 Conservative manifesto committed to making it illegal for companies to fail to put in place measures to prevent economic crime. The 2017 Ministry of Justice consultation on corporate liability reform sat for three and a half years. Inexplicably, it found that there was not enough evidence to pursue reform. I can only imagine that the Ministry was strongly lobbied. It said there was not enough evidence despite the fact that 76%, or three out of four respondents, said that the identification doctrine, which we will come to, inhibits the holding of companies to account for economic crime, and that two out of three respondents thought that corporate liability reform would result in improved corporate conduct. Despite all that, the Ministry chose not to pursue reform.
We then got the Law Commission’s review in 2022. It found that the current situation was “highly unsatisfactory” and that, on the status quo on corporate liability, “the identification doctrine”—for fraud and money laundering, the way in which we determine whether the people involved represent the “directing mind and will” of the company and can therefore be held responsible—
“is an obstacle to holding large companies criminally responsible for offences committed in their interests by their employees.”
The commission said that the status quo is “unfair” and that if the law remains unchanged it
“will continue to enable large companies to be acquitted for conduct which would see small businesses convicted.”
It also stated that that
“could diminish confidence in the criminal law”
and, finally, that the status quo incentivises poor corporate governance and
“rewards companies whose boards do not pay close attention.”
Given all that, I cannot think of a stronger indictment of the status quo.
There are endless examples of where our failure to modernise our criminal liability law has led to failure in the courts. The Barclays bank action is probably the most infamous, or famous, of them all. In 2008, during the financial crisis, Barclays wanted to avoid nationalisation and entered into a deal with Qatar, from which it received more than £11 billion and a loan of £3 billion. The bank, however, also set up what was called an advisory service agreement—in a sense, as I can say under parliamentary privilege, it was a bribe—and, under it, £322 million was given to those who facilitated the deal between Qatar and Barclays bank.
The Serious Fraud Office tried to prosecute the bank and its chief operating officer with charges of conspiracy to commit fraud and charges involving “disguised commissions”—in my interpretation, bribes. The court threw out all the charges, saying that the alleged criminal dishonesty of senior officers “could not be attributed” to Barclays. So the chief executive could not be held responsible for what the bank did, because the chief executive was not the bank, but reported to the bank. It was a crazy judgment. The court also dismissed cases against other individuals, as they could not be defined as the “directing mind and will” of Barclays.
There was, then, a Barclays fiasco, but there were other examples, such as the LIBOR rate-rigging scandal. No criminal prosecutions were brought, although the individuals prosecuted gave evidence that their managers knew what they were doing, so the company itself was liable. If the Minister for Security will allow this comparison, the US brought criminal enforcement action against 12 of the banks in the LIBOR scandal—British banks—and extracted $3.4 billion in criminal fines. Other examples include HBOS—to which the Under-Secretary often refers—Serco and the tagging contract, London Capital & Finance, and so on and so forth.
In 2022, four parliamentary Committees called for the reform of corporate criminal liability legislation. In February 2022, the Treasury Committee urged the Government to
“act quickly in bringing forward any legislation flowing from the Law Commission’s review. In the meantime, corporate criminals will continue to be able to escape prosecution for economic crimes.”
I probably do not have to quote this one, as the Minister might remember it, but the Foreign Affairs Committee called for
“reform of outdated and ineffective corporate criminal liability laws which mean that it is difficult to hold large companies to account for economic crimes.”
Anyway, I thought it was a speech in favour of the intent of this new clause.
Failure to prevent offences have proved effective elsewhere, as the Minister himself has said. We use them to tackle bribery and tax evasion, and the Minister always raises the best example when he refers to what used to go on in the construction industry. In my youth, people would regularly have terrible accidents on construction sites, some of which were fatal. It was only when a duty was introduced for those who ran construction companies to ensure the health and safety of their workers in the workplace, meaning it would be a criminal offence if they failed to do so, that miraculously, overnight, deaths on building sites came almost to a 100% halt. We have lots of examples of where a failure to prevent does not end up with people being locked up but does change behaviour. That is what we are trying to do.
I have lots of examples of areas where the Bribery Act 2010 has been successful and this is not one. This is the last legislative opportunity we will have in this Parliament to put into effect something that Members across the House think is important. There is so much evidence from so many bodies emphasising the importance of this bit of legislation. I cannot see any argument for delay. Before they reached their great, really important roles on the Front Bench, both Ministers argued passionately, frequently and loudly for this reform. I hope they will accept the new clauses, together with new clause 79, on the identification principle. With the inclusion of those three new clauses, we can hold our heads up high and say that we have done good work in Parliament.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Robertson. I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking. The passion and eloquence with which she spoke was exemplary in terms of reminding us about what is at the heart of the Bill and one of the top priorities that we want to achieve. I do not want to say much more; how can I follow that?
New clause 73 would introduce a new offence of failing to prevent fraud, false accounting or money laundering, and new clause 74 would extend that offence, so I shall take them together. In effect, the new clauses would extend current failure to prevent offences beyond bribery and tax evasion to other economic crimes, money laundering and fraud. The offences would be applicable both to companies themselves and to senior managers or directors.
The Labour Front Bench team welcomes the new clauses tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking as vital to help to drive cultural change and corporate governance standards for the prevention of economic crime in the UK. They would also standardise criminal rules for holding companies to account across different economic crimes.
The call for this change is supported by a number of stakeholders, including Spotlight on Corruption, which made the following argument in written evidence to the Committee:
“Most urgently, a new failure to prevent fraud offence would help address the UK’s serious fraud epidemic. Fraud accounts for 40% of all recorded crime, but fraud prosecutions have fallen from 42,000 in 2011, to 13,500 in 2021 in the last decade, a 67% decrease. According to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS): ‘an extension of the “failure to prevent” model to fraud, false accounting and money laundering would be unlikely to require companies to do more than what they would already be expected to do under the current law (which relies on the identification doctrine) but it would enable prosecutors to hold them to account more effectively where they fail to do so’. The heads of the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) and the CPS have both recently called for new failure to prevent offences.”
I refer the Minister, in addition to the stakeholders that support the call for change, to his own words on Second Reading. I will not replay his greatest hits—that my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking has already done so—but he has stated clearly that he sees this offence as “the No. 1 measure” that we need. The Opposition fervently hope that both Ministers will agree with their former selves that this is the No. 1 measure we need in the prevention and detection of economic crime. We urge the Conservative Front-Bench team to accept the new clause as a necessary and urgent provision to tackle economic crime that would have support across the board.
I am delighted to speak on the new clause. As the right hon. Member for Barking correctly identifies, it touches on many areas that my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary and I have spoken about on numerous occasions, and we are not alone in having done so. Section 172(1)(b) and (d) of the Companies Act 2006 speaks about the interests of employees and of the community being the responsibility of directors as well, so having an emphasis on directors’ responsibility in corporate legislation is not new. My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary has also spoken about it in building safety legislation, which the right hon. Lady cited.
There are many different examples of our recognition that the interests of the whole of society and of the whole United Kingdom are better protected when directors understand that they are there not simply to advance shareholder value, but to further the interests of the whole community of their employees and wider society in actions and responsibilities they undertake. Although I see all of the responsibility laid out and I take very seriously the point the right hon. Lady made, we still need to do a little bit of work on how this can be made to work. There are arguments, some of which hold water, about whether the 2017 money laundering regulations include elements that already cover some of these areas, and there are arguments about whether the Law Commission will want to look at different bits of this. I can assure the right hon. Lady that I will look at this extremely seriously, because she is absolutely right that the Bill offers an opportunity to introduce different reforms. I will look to make sure that any opportunity is fulfilled as quickly as possible.
I am grateful for that. The hon. Gentleman referred to the Companies Act 2006—I cannot remember which section. In the days when Tony Blair changed our jobs every year, I was lumbered with taking through the biggest Act in Parliament. We deliberately put that section in, in the face of massive opposition. At the time there was a front page story in the FT that said, “How dare you talk about any interest but shareholder interest?” But the provision has stood the test of time, I am pleased to say, and I am glad to hear him cite it.
I do not want to embarrass Ministers today by putting the issue to a vote. I know that they feel strongly about this, but so do we—really strongly. The Bill will not pass any litmus test of its potency if the new clause is not included. I know there will be resistance because the professions that would be subject to the new potential criminal liability are very strong in lobbying. They are probably strongly lobbying the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, as well as the Treasury and other Government Departments. I say to Ministers that they have to resist that lobbying with every bone in their bodies, because this is not an attack on any profession. There ought to be a new offence that cleans up the profession, and we will pursue this issue right through every phase and stage of the Bill’s passage.
I want to say one final thing to the Minister. Of course we need to make the new clause work, but for goodness’ sake, we have the same offence in the Bribery Act and the tax evasion legislation, and it works perfectly well.
The right hon. Lady makes a very important point about vested interests. We have previously discussed the influence of people who may not be keen on these kinds of clauses. I would say to anybody in the financial services sector who is making these claims that there are potentially huge benefits from preventing fraud across the board, because 70% of online fraud, which costs banks a lot of money, comes from platforms, and this kind of legislation could make the platforms responsible for removing content. So the sector could see benefits as well as potential new obligations.
I am grateful to the Minister for reinforcing my argument. I would add simply that the same is true of the online harms Bill. If we had director liability there, I think we would see a lot of the online harms disappearing, but that is for next week.
On how the new clause would work, we can mirror processes that take place in other bits of legislation. To say that it is already covered is a nonsense, because we would not have had the failure of the Barclays case and all the other cases that I cited to the Minister had we already put in place legislation that was appropriate for ensuring that companies and their directors are held to account. I will not put the matter to a vote, but this is a hugely important issue. I look forward to our debating it further at other stages during the course of the Bill. I wish Ministers well in their attempts to get it past the Government, but if they do not, Parliament will do so. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 75
The Economic Crime Committee of Parliament
“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations establish a body to be known as the Economic Crime Committee of Parliament (in this section referred to as “the ECC”).
(2) The ECC will consist of nine members who are to be drawn both from the members of the House of Commons and from the members of the House of Lords.
(3) Each member of the ECC is to be appointed by the House of Parliament from which the member is to be drawn.
(4) The ECC will have the power to meet confidentially.
(5) The ECC may examine or otherwise oversee any regulatory, enforcement or supervision agencies involved in work related, but not limited to—
(a) tax avoidance and evasion by corporations;
(b) illicit finance;
(c) anti-money laundering supervision;
(d) tackling fraud;
(e) kleptocracy and corruption; and
(f) whistleblower protection.”—(Dame Margaret Hodge.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I have been promoting accountability for years now. In the work that I did with the Minister as we thought about how we could tackle economic crime and turn round the tanker, we always said there were four ways in which we had to respond. One was through having not more regulation, but smart regulation. The second was through tough enforcement. The third was through broad transparency—the ruling of the European Court of Justice last week is an absolute nightmare that could create real difficulties for us in the economic crime space. The fourth was accountability, and with the new clause we are suggesting a way for us to have that accountability.
There is interest in this subject across the House. The hon. Member for Hitchin and Harpenden (Bim Afolami) has written a paper on these issues. Can we find a mechanism for holding the regulatory bodies properly accountable to Parliament for what they do?
A lot of these questions arose when I chaired the Public Accounts Committee and we first started looking at tax avoidance. The rule is that everybody should be equal before the law in tax, but there was always a suspicion that sweetheart deals were being struck with certain big corporations and high net worth individuals. In fact, early on we came across one involving Goldman Sachs; on the back of a story in Private Eye, we uncovered a sweetheart deal. To this day, though, I do not understand whether Google is paying the correct tax or whether there is a deal there, and I could say the same about a lot of the big multinational companies. Because of the confidentiality of taxpayers’ interests, Parliament has no way to get the information that it needs to assure itself that the tax authorities are treating all taxpayers equally.
I have worked with all the agencies in this area—the NCA, the Serious Fraud Office, the Metropolitan police and so on—so whistleblowers, or just people who come across something that is wrong, often come to me, and I give the case to one of the agencies—and that is the last I ever hear of it. I always pursue the cases, but all too often I get the response, “Oh, there are security reasons for you not being given the information.” There was the Savaro case, which I referred to BEIS at the time. It went through BEIS and I still do not know whether anybody was pursued. Certainly, there were people behind that explosion in Lebanon, which led to so many deaths and loss of property.
I think that Parliament needs a better hold on what is happening and better accountability around how those agencies are operating. In the new clause, we suggest that we mirror the Intelligence and Security Committee, which meets under Privy Council terms. The proposed economic crime committee could be a Committee of both Houses, meeting under Privy Council terms and overseeing all the regulatory bodies in this space—in financial services and economic crime. It could call for papers relating to individual cases, which would remain confidential because the ECC would meet in private. The ECC could then produce reports on systemic changes that are necessary, arising from consideration of those individual cases.
I think that that would massively improve accountability, as well as the performance and effectiveness of the agencies. With that information, members of the ECC would have a better understanding of what, if anything, they needed to do as legislators to improve the situation. I believe that this committee will happen one day, but I am proposing it today as a new clause in this Bill. I know that the hon. Member for Hitchin and Harpenden and those who support him in this mission would be happy to support me today, and I hope that Ministers give it a good hearing.
I am happy to support new clause 75, tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking, which would require the Secretary of State by regulation to establish a body to be known as the economic crime committee of Parliament.
The new clause is driven by and based on the fundamental principles of transparency and accountability. Our call for those two principles to be adhered to is important because it recognises that the structures for reviewing progress, and scrutinising and reviewing economic crime, are simply not good enough. There is too much siloed thinking. This aspect of scrutiny does not sit neatly within BEIS, the Treasury, the Home Office, or the Ministries of Defence and of Justice; it really spans the waterfront, yet those Departments are all vital parts of what should be a systemic approach to tackling economic crime.
The proposed committee would consist of nine Members drawn from the House of Commons and the House of Lords, with each member of the ECC appointed by their respective House of Parliament. The ECC would have the power to meet confidentially; it could examine or otherwise oversee any regulatory enforcement or supervision agencies involved in work related to, but not limited to, tax avoidance and evasion by corporations, illicit finance, money laundering, fraud, kleptocracy, corruption, and whistleblower protection.
We welcome the new clause as it would introduce a vital mechanism for transparency and accountability within the Bill. If the Minister does not agree with it, we hope that he will acknowledge that the existing mechanisms are unfit for the kind of joined-up, systemic, expert-driven scrutiny that is needed to keep pace with and keep ahead of economic crime. Throughout this Committee’s proceedings, my colleagues and I have tabled amendments and new clauses designed to increase the scrutiny and transparency of the measures that the Bill will introduce, so as to ensure that when they are implemented, they are as effective as possible. If the Minister is not able to support the new clause, Parliament and the country more broadly would need him to come up with something better.
I am sure that, in that spirit, the Minister also accepts that scrutiny by the Executive is different to scrutiny by the legislature.
What we are seeking is scrutiny by the legislature. I take what he said, and will reflect on it. There is cross-party support for this concept; whether we have got it quite right is open to debate, and we will have to find another means of getting it debated in the House. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 76
Whistleblowing: economic crime
“(1) Whistleblowing is defined for the purposes of this section as any disclosure of information suggesting that, in the reasonable opinion of the whistleblower, an economic crime—
(a) has occurred,
(b) is occurring, or
(c) is likely to occur.
(2) The Secretary of State must, within twelve months of the date of Royal Assent to this Act, set up an office to receive reports of whistleblowing as defined in subsection (1) to be known as the Office for Whistleblowers.
(3) The Office for Whistleblowers must—
(a) protect whistleblowers from detriment resulting from their whistleblowing,
(b) ensure that disclosures by whistleblowers are investigated, and
(c) escalate information and evidence of wrongdoing outside of its remit to another appropriate authority.
(4) The objectives of the Office for Whistleblowers are—
(a) to encourage and support whistleblowers to make whistleblowing reports,
(b) to provide an independent, confidential and safe environment for making and receiving whistleblowing information,
(c) to provide information and advice on whistleblowing, and
(d) to act on evidence of detriment to the whistleblower in line with guidance set out by the Secretary of State in regulations.
(5) The Office for Whistleblowers must report annually to Parliament on the exercise of its duties, objectives and functions.” —(Dame Margaret Hodge.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
This new clause relates to another issue on which there is cross-party support: reform of whistleblowing. It has been put together for me, although it is in my name, by the hon. Member for Cheadle (Mary Robinson), who leads the all-party parliamentary group for whistleblowing. I must put it on the record that she has been a fantastic campaigner in this area and an outspoken champion for the countless courageous individuals who have dared to speak out. As she rightly says, for most of those individuals whistleblowing has shattered their lives, with many losing their health and livelihood. What we are talking about here is really important.
Our new clause would introduce an office for whistleblowers, which would protect the whistleblowers and ensure that their disclosures are investigated and information provided is passed to the relevant authorities. In clause 4, we set out ways in which whistleblowers would provide that service. I think that the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton is the Minister replying to this debate; I know that he is passionate about this topic, because he has said so on lots of occasions—most recently on Second Reading on 13 October, when he said:
“We do not protect or compensate whistleblowers, and that is wrong. Those people do the right thing and come forward but—not to put too fine a point on it —we hang them out to dry.”—[Official Report, 13 October 2022; Vol. 720, c. 309.]
He went on to say:
“It is pointless having lots of law enforcement people charging around not knowing where to look. Whistleblowers tell us where to look. Some 43% of all financial crimes are identified through whistleblowers, yet it is something we do not talk about. We do not just need more regulators; we need somebody to point us in the right direction. Regulators will always be watchdogs, never bloodhounds. We need the bloodhounds in the organisations who are willing to speak up if things are going wrong.”—[Official Report, 7 March 2022; Vol. 710, c. 121.]
Hear, hear to that, but let us have some action arising out of those passionate words.
Whistleblowing plays an absolutely key role in addressing economic crime, whether it is for money laundering or other crimes. Think of the Panama papers 2016—we would never have had them—or the Paradise papers, the Russian and Troika laundromats, the Azerbaijan laundromat, the FinCEN files and the Pandora papers. Let us look at just one of those—the Panama papers—which were 11.5 million legal documents held by the Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca. It basically made its money by creating offshore companies and bank accounts to launder and hide the money. The story was given to a German paper, then 370 journalists got involved in investigating the data, working in 80 countries.
Just think what came out of that. Twelve current and former world leaders were named in those papers. There was a $2 billion trail to Putin through his close friend Sergei Roldugin, known as Putin’s wallet. The money went all over the world, including into an upmarket ski resort in Leningrad owned by a company funded by this dirty money and where Putin gave his daughter a sumptuous wedding. The Icelandic Prime Minister resigned off the back of the papers. The Pakistani Prime Minister was removed from office due to allegations of corruption and fraud.
Through the leak, some £1.2 billion of tax revenue was restored to 23 national Governments. In the UK, there was an extraordinary list of the rich and powerful, from Kevin Keegan to Nick Faldo, Lewis Hamilton, Tiger Woods, Gary Lineker, Madonna, Keira Knightley, Simon Cowell, Nicole Kidman, the Barclay brothers, Stuart Gulliver of HBSC, and political figures like Arron Banks, Michael Ashcroft and the right hon. Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg). They were all named and exposed.
Going back to my Public Accounts Committee days, the work we did all came from whistleblowers in the area of economic crime. I referred earlier to the Goldman Sachs sweetheart deal. That emerged from a whistleblower—a lawyer working in His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. We had a very frustrating session. We knew something was going on, and we interviewed the head of tax at HMRC, but he would tell us absolutely nothing. I then got a bundle of papers from a lawyer who was working there, and in that bundle was a sheet of paper that had on it two things. It said that a meeting was held by the head of law, and he had said that the head of tax had shaken hands on the deal, which the head of tax had denied at the Treasury Committee. He also said that the deal was unconscionable.
We called back the head of tax and head of law and interrogated them. They still said nothing. Then my hon. Friend the Member for Norwich South (Clive Lewis) said to me, “Put the guy on oath. He might tell you something.” That had never happened in a Select Committee. I turned to the clerk, who told me that I could put him on oath, and said, “Go and find a Bible.” It took them 20 minutes to find a Bible. But the point is that all that from a whistleblower led to the trail that I think has certainly ended up with me being on this Committee considering the Bill today.
What is so terrible about that story is that the then head of tax left public service, and I asked the person who became the permanent secretary in HMRC every time she appeared before the Committee, “Are you looking after that whistleblower? Is he okay?” She always gave me assurances that he was, but actually they raided his computer and telephone. His marriage broke up, and in the end life became so intolerable that he had to leave public office. It is one of the things I feel great shame about really—that I was not able even in that position to protect him, even though it was his revelations that enabled us to start discovering what was going on.
Whistleblowing helps everywhere. It is a vital way of revealing wrongdoing in all sorts of sectors. It was a child sex abuse whistleblower who helped reveal the child sexual exploitation in Rotherham. The NHS is full of workers who blew the whistle on things such as the lack of personal protective equipment. The Public Accounts Committee saw another example, relating to Serco, where a GP contract was done in Cornwall but they were lying about their performance. A whistleblower came to us, but Serco’s response was simply to rifle through everybody’s lockers to try to find out who the whistleblowers were. Serco was not interested at all in the fact that the information it provided was inaccurate, or in trying to improve the quality of the service.
Interestingly, whistleblowers in America are treated very differently, particularly on the issue of compensation. To give one example, in the JPMorgan case, there was a $45 million settlement after two whistleblower employees at a Georgia mortgage broker alleged that the bank had scammed a programme that was intended to make it easier for veterans to qualify for loans, and had submitted fraudulent claims to the Government. The whistleblowers were awarded $11 million. Facing the same charges, Wells Fargo later settled for $108 million. A whistleblower revealed massive robo-signing at the four banks that were the country’s largest mortgage providers. The companies had allegedly relied on a company called Docx to forge signatures on thousands of mortgage documents. The suit was settled for $95 million, and the whistleblowers received $18 million for helping to expose the fraud.
The Minister well knows the facts that I will give him now. In 2018, 40% of whistleblowers reported going on sick leave—that is the pressure in the workplace. Only 4% of whistleblowers who bring claims under the current legal structure succeed. Of the 1,041 whistleblower reports submitted to the FCA in 2021-22, only three have resulted in any significant action. The Minister must agree that enough is enough. We in this country cannot go on failing to treat whistleblowers with the respect, support and advice that they deserve. Our new clause starts the process of reform. It does not do everything—for example, it does not do financial compensation—but it is a start.
Finally, please do not just say, “We are looking at this.” Do not tell us you will come back. This is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity.
The right hon. Lady makes an interesting point about how compensation works in the USA. She will be aware that Protect, the most high-profile whistleblower organisation in the UK, is against a compensation scheme similar to that in the USA. There is good reason for that: very few whistleblowers in the USA actually get compensation, which is one of the flaws in the scheme. Does she agree that we must think carefully about how we introduce whistleblower reform? It needs to be well thought through, rather than simply rushed.
I agree that we have to think carefully, but setting up an office for whistleblowing, which is what our new clause would do, could be the start. We might get some proper expertise in there, so as to think through some of the more complex issues.
Minister, grasp the opportunity and agree with our proposal. It would set up a new office—a central place for any would-be whistleblower to come for advice. It would support regulation in organisations. It would be a central place for setting standards, monitoring, evaluating and reporting. It would ensure that those who inflict or suffer detriment will be properly held to account or properly compensated. An office for whistleblowers would drive up standards across both the private and public sectors, increase transparency and restore public confidence. Whistleblower discrimination is a global problem, and the new office would set a global standard here in the UK.
I think this is the last occasion I have to address the Committee, so I thank all Members for their contributions. We have had very constructive debates throughout the days that we have looked at the Bill. I thank the officials for all their work in these areas.
Not for the first time, I am very sympathetic to the new clause and to the previous one on failure to prevent. Nothing I have seen or heard since I started as a Minister only a few weeks ago has changed my mind on the things I have said in the House and other places about the need for whistleblower reform and failure to prevent reform. There is no conspiracy behind the scenes here. There is a difference between arguing against the principle of something and arguing against the provisions of something. That is where we probably differ a little.
As the hon. Member for Glasgow Central said, I have said before that 43% is the stat for the discovery of financial crime. In my experience, it is much higher than that—about 100%. Everything I have dealt with has been brought to the attention of authorities through whistleblowers, not least Ian Foxley, my constituent who was very important to the case on GPT Special Project Management Ltd that the right hon. Member for Barking referenced. He was the bloodhound in that case. We need those bloodhounds.
Since taking over as Minister with whistleblowing in my portfolio, I have asked officials to prioritise this review and to get it moving properly, and that is what we have committed to do. There are differences in where we go with it: do we do something to address the cases like Ian Foxley’s and the others the right hon. Lady references? Sally Masterton addressed those cases. Do we do something longer term and more complex? It is either low-hanging fruit or something more radical.
My hon. Friend the Member for Cheadle has done fantastic work in this area. I am keen to engage with her and my hon. Friend the Member for Weston-super-Mare (John Penrose) to make as much progress as we can as quickly as we can. Ian Foxley’s case is interesting because he was prevented from getting compensation. He was very successful in getting that case highlighted and the authorities successfully prosecuted it, but he was denied compensation because the PIDA rules on what it describes as an employee did not cover his particular category. That is a relatively easy issue to fix and something I want to look at.
The other part of the current legislation is around prescribed persons. There are 80 prescribed persons at the moment: people to whom others can make a protected disclosure. We are extending that this week when I introduce a statutory instrument on extending the number of prescribed persons to whom whistleblowers can go to seek assistance. Indeed, some of those prescribed persons are in this room. Members of Parliament are prescribed persons, as are some Ministers, but so too are our agencies. That is probably my biggest concern.
I took the case of Sally Masterton, who was key to highlighting the HBOS Reading scandal, which I have referred to many times in Parliament, to the Financial Conduct Authority. When I asked Andrew Bailey, who was then the chief executive of the FCA, whether he had followed his own whistleblowing procedures in relation to Sally Masterton, who was terribly mistreated by Lloyds Banking Group, he refused to answer the question because I was not a relevant person, under the relevant legislation. That is quite astounding, when it was Parliament that legislated to introduce the whistleblowing protections in the first place.
There are things that we need to do quickly that would address many of the problems, but we have done much. We have improved the guidance on what a prescribed person needs to do. We have a requirement on people to make public annual reports on what they have done in terms of whistleblowers, but I am keen to hold regulators’ feet to the fire in this area. I ask the right hon. Member for Barking not to pre-empt the review that I am urgently undertaking, because she knows how serious I am. I would like to bring forward effective reform very quickly, and to effect change more quickly. I fear that the new clause would delay the reform, when we can make progress by other means.
I hear what the Minister says. I simply say to him that finding legislative time will be a battle, so I hope that he has some mechanism to get the reform through.
There are things that we can do without primary legislation that could move much more quickly.
I hear that. This matter will be debated by others on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 79
Identification doctrine
“(1) A body corporate commits an offence listed in Schedule 8 where the offence is committed with the consent, connivance or neglect of a senior manager or senior managers.
(2) An individual is a ‘senior manager’ of an entity if the individual—
(a) plays a significant role in—
(i) the making of decisions about how the entity’s relevant activities are to be managed or organised, or
(ii) the managing or organising of the entity’s relevant activities, or
(b) is the Chief Executive or Chief Financial Officer of the body corporate.
(3) A body corporate also commits an offence if, acting within the scope of their authority—
(a) one or more senior managers engage in conduct, whether by act or omission, such that, if it had been the conduct of only one representative, that representative would have been a party to the offence; and
(b) the senior manager who is responsible for the aspect of the organization’s activities that is relevant to the offence — or the senior managers collectively — fail to take all reasonable steps to prevent that offence being committed.”—(Dame Margaret Hodge.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
This goes with the failure to prevent, so I will not speak to the new clause. It literally just sorts out the legalese to ensure that we can get at companies and their directors.
Yes, because I want it on the record. I am just conscious that Members want to get on, and that the argument is the same.
We fully welcome the new clause, which we think is very important to ensure that all perpetrators of economic crime are caught and dealt with.
I merely point out that, while the new clause addresses many of the points that the right hon. Member for Barking has raised before, it also raises many of the same challenges. For that reason, I will object to it.
I will not at this point press the new clause to a vote, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 80
Forfeiture of recoverable property obtained through economic crime
“(1) Where the conditions in paragraph(2) are fulfilled, a notice may be served in accordance with subsection(4) by the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Director of Serious Fraud Office, or the Director General of the National Crime Agency (hereafter, ‘the Director’) upon the holder of an account held at a bank in the United Kingdom.
(2) The conditions mentioned in paragraph(1) are that—
(a) the Director has reasonable grounds to believe that property held in the bank account is recoverable property obtained as a result of an economic crime offence;
(b) in relation to the bank account or any property in the bank account, a consent request has been made to an authorized officer under Section 335 of the Proceeds of Crime Act;
(c) an authorized officer refused the consent requested;
(d) a court has granted an extension of a moratorium period for 186 days under section 336A of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002; and
(e) a court has granted approval to the Director to serve the notice.
(3) A notice under this section shall be a notice by way of representation and shall—
(a) state the name of the holder of the bank account to whom it is addressed;
(b) specify the details of the bank account and of the property or part of the property in the bank account which in the opinion of the Director is recoverable property;
(c) state a date on which, and a place and time at which, the holder of the bank account is required to attend a hearing of the Court to show cause why the property so specified is not recoverable property and should not be forfeited; and
(d) be served on—
(i) the holder of the bank account, and
(ii) the bank at which the account in question is held,
and if an address for service on the holder of the bank account is not known, service on the bank only shall be taken as sufficient for the purposes of this paragraph.
(4) In this section and section [ Forfeiture of recoverable property obtained through economic crime: summary procedure ]—
(a) ‘economic crime offence’ means an offence listed in Schedule 8 of this Act; and
(b) ‘recoverable property’ has the meaning given in section 304 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.”—(Dame Margaret Hodge.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 81—Forfeiture of recoverable property obtained through economic crime: summary procedure—
‘(1) If the person on whom a notice under section [Forfeiture of recoverable property obtained through economic crime](3)(d)(i) served (the “respondent”) fails to attend the hearing as required by the notice, the Director may apply forthwith for a forfeiture order, and the Court may make such an order, without further notice to the respondent.
(2) If the respondent appears (whether in person or by a legal representative) at the hearing, the respondent may—
(a) at the hearing, satisfy the Court that the property is not recoverable property; or
(b) request that the question of whether or not the property is recoverable property be determined at such later date as the Court may order.
(3) If the respondent makes a request under subsection(2)(b), the respondent must provide an affidavit in answer to the notice within the period of 21days beginning with the date on which the matter is placed on the list, satisfying the Court that the property is not recoverable property.
(4) Unless the respondent satisfies the Court that the property is not recoverable property obtained as a result of an economic crime offence, the Court shall, upon the application of the Director, make a forfeiture order in relation to the property specified in the notice or any part of it.
(5) Property which is forfeited pursuant to a forfeiture order under this section shall be paid into the top slice of the Asset Recovery Incentivisation Scheme run by the Home Department.’
I will speak to this very quickly, too. This is an interesting new clause, because its purpose is to tackle the issue of suspicious wealth remaining frozen in bank accounts and serving no useful purpose. We propose a new, more straightforward, pragmatic solution to deal with suspicious wealth, enabling our enforcement agencies to confiscate the moneys in the bank and repurpose them so that much of the wealth can be used to fund and strengthen our anti-money laundering enforcement capacity and perhaps be given back, in some cases, to the nations from which it has been stolen.
When a banker sees a suspicious transaction, he or she is required to ask for consent from the police to allow the transaction to go ahead. If the police officer refuses consent, the moneys can be frozen in the bank account. Under our new clause, the money would then remain frozen for six months, and the director of the Serious Fraud Office could apply to the courts to confiscate or seize the moneys. They will be granted that application unless the respondent proves to the court that the funds do not have a criminal origin. The onus is on the respondent to prove that he or she has obtained the assets legitimately. The SFO does not have to prove that the respondent committed a criminal activity; it is up to the respondent to prove that the funds are legitimately and honestly acquired and are not linked to acts of criminality. The new clause is modelled on unexplained wealth orders.
This would add an important new weapon to our arsenal in the fight against economic crime, as it provides for the non-conviction-based confiscation of frozen assets. Although they are not my favourite people, the people of Jersey have introduced a very similar law and recently managed to secure £1.7 million that was frozen in accounts there. That was money paid to Lieutenant General Jeremiah Useni, who had held office in the Abacha regime in Nigeria, and the allegation was that it was the proceeds of corruption. Although he tried to get his money back, he could not, and a lot of the £1.7 million went back to Nigeria.
The British Bankers’ Association thinks that we have up to £50 million held in frozen accounts, untouched. We need a little touch of boldness from the Minister. He should not just accept the message of “resist” that he gets from his officials. He should give good consideration to this sensible, practical, good idea of seizing money stolen by bad people and giving it back to the citizens who have been robbed, or repurposing it to strengthen the fight against economic crime.
We welcome these new clauses, which would give effect to the Government’s stated intention to unlock the proceeds of crime held in bank accounts to fund law enforcement efforts to tackle economic crime. Their adoption would also optimise the potential of the defence against money laundering regime and streamline the process of UK law enforcement identifying tainted wealth and being able to seek its forfeiture.
I thank the right hon. Member for Barking. While I agree with the intent behind her new clauses, I argue that they narrow slightly the scope in which the state can already recover much of the proceeds of crime. While they attempt to simplify, the reality is that we are already recovering large sums. I am not saying that we could not do more—we certainly could—but I am not convinced that the new clauses would add significantly to existing legislation. Last year, for example, a record £115 million of proceeds of crime were recovered under existing powers.
That is not a brilliant argument, but I will pursue this issue on Report, as we are doing with other issues around seizing and freezing assets. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 84
Compensation for Victims of Economic Crime
‘(1) The Secretary of State must, no later than 90 days from the date on which this Act comes into force, publish and lay before Parliament a strategy for the potential establishment of a fund for the compensation of victims of economic crime.
(2) The strategy may include provisions on the management and disposal of any assets realised by the government, or any body with law enforcement responsibilities in relation to economic crime, under relevant UK legislation.’—(Stephen Kinnock.)
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to prepare and publish a strategy on the potential establishment of a fund to provide compensation to victims of economic crime.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
As this is the last time I will be on my feet, I thank the Committee; it has been an excellent set of debates, and I look forward to further constructive engagement with the Government on these matters.
The context of new clause 84 is the devastation caused by Putin’s barbaric and illegal war for the lives and livelihoods of Ukraine’s population. This demands a concerted cross-party and international effort, of which the UK should be at the forefront, as the staggering costs of reconstruction are sure to remain a key challenge long after the war itself has reached its inevitable end.
The new clause would require the Government to prepare and publish a wide-ranging strategy for efforts to ensure that the necessary financial compensation is made available to victims of economic crime, wherever they may be. This could and should be applied to victims of international crimes, of which the war in Ukraine is without doubt an example, but it could be applied more broadly as a means of providing a measure of justice to the victims of any other kleptocratic regimes around the world. The new clause would provide a mechanism for compensating victims of economic crime in the UK, including the thousands, or perhaps even millions, of British victims of online scams and other kinds of fraud. We therefore commend the new clause to the Committee, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.
As this is probably the last time I will speak in the Committee, I thank you, Mr Robertson. I also thank the right hon. Member for Barking for her input into the Bill not just today, but over many years and as Chair of the Public Accounts Committee. The way in which she has championed tackling economic crime, drawn the House’s attention to it, and focused the country on the real threats that we have faced has been impressive to us all, and I am personally enormously grateful to her. She certainly helped my work enormously when I chaired the Foreign Affairs Committee, and she has now helped to focus my work as a Minister. I am very grateful that I have had the privilege of working with her.
I forgot to thank you, Mr Robertson, for chairing the Committee and for showing such an interest in what we are doing. I also thank the Ministers and Members of all parties who have spoken and participated. I look forward to working further to get even more into the Bill.
If anybody thinks that I was trying to soft-soap the right hon. Lady in order to shut her up in future sittings, they do not know her very well. It would have not worked, and I have not tried it. All I have done is to pay credit to somebody who has definitely earned it. I also thank my fellow Minister and the Whips, who have got us through at lightning speed.
On the new clause, the powers in part 4 already increase the focus on victims. The compensation principles of the Serious Fraud Office, CPS, the National Crime Agency and others have committed law enforcement bodies to ensuring that compensation for economic crime is considered in every relevant case, including where there are overseas victims, so I believe that the Bill already focuses on many of the aspects that we have discussed. That said, we are coming to Report. As always, I will be listening, but I have yet to be convinced about the new clause, because I believe that it has largely been covered.
(1 year, 12 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI rise to support the new clauses in the name of the official Opposition, because Parliament will need to keep a close eye on how a lot of things in this Bill are being implemented and whether they are effective at tackling economic crime. We had a lot of debate in previous sessions about powers versus duties in the Bill and said, “If they are powers, that is one thing but if they are duties, that is quite another.” If these powers are being exercised, we need to be certain of that and keep a close eye on this Bill. These useful new clauses would allow Parliament to keep a close eye on these things, because they would require the Secretary of State to publish these annual reports to give more granular and specific detail on whether the measures brought forward in the Bill are being used and are effective.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Christopher. I rise to make the simple point that the new clause is not a technical amendment; it is about an issue of principle. It is about transparency and accountability. It is not a provision that improves things at the margin; it is about making the legislation fit for purpose. Without it, the legislation will not be fit for purpose.
Throughout my history of learning about dirty money and money laundering, it has been absolutely clear to me that we have a range of tools already in legislation. As we do not have any accountability to Parliament as to how and whether those tools are employed, we do not know how effective we are in the battle against dirty money. Let me give three examples. There is now a new bit of legislation on unexplained wealth orders; it is the first time that I have known Ministers to agree to an annual report to Parliament. They agreed to it when we did the emergency legislation. I have been arguing for that for years, so I was pleased to see it, but until that moment we did not know, and we have not seen the report yet.
A better example is golden visas. We are still waiting for the report on golden visas, how they were abused, misused and used during that period, and who was let into the country on one. Another example is the amount of money that has been frozen from people who have been sanctioned by this Government. We do not have a clue how much that is. The Government put out a figure the other day for how much Russian state money had been frozen—£18 billion—but we do not have a clue how much money we have managed to get off some of the characters we know are sitting on billions.
If there is going to be effective legislation, we need clear transparency and proper accountability. That is something that the Opposition feel incredibly strongly about. We will be pressing the new clause to a Division, because it is a sensible, pragmatic and practical provision that should be in the Bill.
I thank the hon. Members for Feltham and Heston and for Aberavon for tabling their new clause. I also thank the right hon. Member for Barking and the hon. Member for Glasgow Central for their contributions. I agree with much of what they said. As they know, I fully agree that Parliament should be regularly updated on the implementation and impact of this legislation. What gets measured gets done, and it is vital that we know what is being done with this legislation.
I will speak to new clauses 26 and 28 first, because I think there may be a duplication of things that exist already. Much of the information suggested by new clause 26, such as Companies House expenditure and the numbers of companies incorporated and struck off, is already published in the Companies House annual report. Companies House already reports publicly on its activities and its regular statistical releases on gov.uk. On new clause 28, through dissolution a company is brought to a point at which it ceases to exist and ceases to appear on the register. A company can seek its own voluntary strike-off, or it can be struck of compulsorily by the registrar. In principle, that process takes place when there is reason to believe that the company is no longer in operation or carrying on business. In both cases, statutory processes ensue whereby the public generally are informed that the dissolution is in train by publications in the Gazette. There are opportunities for third parties to intervene and object to a company being dissolved.
Concerns have been expressed that unscrupulous companies choose to give the impression that they are defunct in order to precipitate their dissolution and evade creditors. That concern is ultimately misplaced, as any assets left in a company following its dissolution will not be held by the company any more, and will be passed to the Crown, bona vacantia—as ownerless property. It is also important to note the effects of the Rating (Coronavirus) and Directors Disqualification (Dissolved Companies) Act 2021, which amended the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 by introducing a mechanism for disqualifying directors of dissolved companies.
It is also worth noting that the 1986 Act includes provision not only for disqualifying directors but for ordering disqualified directors to pay compensation. That provision is in section 15A of the Act and, as amended by the 2021 Act, covers directors of both insolvent companies and dissolved companies. If a director is disqualified and the conduct for which they were disqualified caused loss to the creditors of an insolvent or dissolved company, the director can be ordered to pay compensation either for the benefit of specified creditors or by way of a contribution to the assets of the company.
The Bill introduces a new circumstance under which the registrar might seek to strike off a company that persistently fails to provide an appropriate registered office address. I assure Members that the registrar will initiate dissolution in those particular circumstances only after having assessed the risks of doing so. The normal notification procedures, by way of the Gazette and Companies House webpages, will apply.
As noted, Companies House already makes data on company dissolutions regularly available. I question what benefit the reporting proposed by the new clause would add, as it is not clear to me that the information it covers would necessarily be available to the Secretary of State. However, I acknowledge the concern about the manner in which compulsory strike-off operates. I have asked my officials to advise me on the extent to which the Bill’s new information-sharing provisions might improve safeguards and transparency in this area. I am of course happy to engage further with Members on this topic in due course.
Most of the comments related to new clause 63. I absolutely agree that there needs to be a mechanism by which progress made on the implementation of the provisions in the Bill is reported to Parliament. There should be regular reporting on the registrar’s use of the new powers. I also accept that it is important to give Parliament an early opportunity to scrutinise how quickly Companies House implements the reforms.
I believe, however, that the new clause requires further consideration. As drafted, it has the potential to place unintended obligations on the registrar. For example, it will require the registrar to report on the imposition of financial penalties before the commencement date of the regulations. It also requires the registrar to indefinitely report on the implementation of the legislation, even if it is completed in the near future.
With the agreement of the Committee, I would like to ask my officials to consider the new clause further. I hope Members are reassured that we will give it consideration. If the new clause is withdrawn, we will have further discussions about what we might put in its place.
I thank the Minister for his comments about the new clauses. I appreciate his response on new clause 63 and very much look forward to hearing from his officials about the proposed reports, but will he tell us when we will hear from them? None of us wants the measure to be lost in the course of proceedings, and we do not want it to be left to the Lords, so I would be grateful if he can tell us when he expects us to hear a response. Assuming that it will be positive, I am happy not to press new clause 63 to a vote.
On new clause 26, the Minister did not respond with the detail that I was expecting. I understand that some data is already published. We can have an argument about whether it is there, but it is easy for there to be a summary. If Parliament is looking at one document, it will want that data. It will want to review the later data in the context of the more procedural data that Companies House already publishes. I cannot see that it is onerous to publish a summary of data that already exists.
In the Minister’s response to my hon. Friend, he said that there was duplication of subsections (1) and (3). All the other things that were listed in subsections (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9) are issues on which we want an annual report to Parliament because that shows us whether the legislation is working. If there is duplication, it is not the end of the world. There is a lot of duplication in our legislation—I am sure, Sir Christopher, that you are an expert on that—but that is not a sufficient argument to put the whole new clause out of the Committee’s consideration.
I thank the Minister. To clarify, he referred to coming back on new clause 63; my question is in relation to new clause 26 and whether and how the later subsections are all going to be covered by the Companies House annual report. It would be helpful if he responded to that, because currently I am not clear that they are all covered.
In new clause 26, we are asking for an assessment of whether
“the powers available to the Secretary of State and the registrar are sufficient to enable the registrar to achieve its objectives”
and about
“making recommendations as to whether further legislation should be brought forward in response to the report.”
Yes, there may be details elsewhere, but they could be summarised for the ease of use of the report. The new clause requires
“a breakdown of the registrar’s annual expenditure”
and
“data on the number of companies struck off”.
That information may well also be elsewhere. Will the Minister confirm whether
“the number of cases referred by the registrar to law enforcement bodies and anti-money laundering supervisors”
and so on is all going to published elsewhere?
May I also draw the Minister’s attention to new clause 26(6), which is important? It asks for an annual report of the total number of companies incorporated to the registrar and
“the number of company incorporations by Authorised Company Service Providers”.
The purpose of that particular bit of information relates to our concern about the integrity and honesty of company service providers. I do not believe that is covered in the Companies House report. I accept that there may be some duplication—we got that wrong—but there are issues of huge importance in terms of accountability and the integrity of the data that we would lose if new clause 26 were simply ignored.
I thank my right hon. Friend for explicitly emphasising the importance of subsection (6). She is absolutely right. The Minister will be mindful of the importance of transparency in respect of the issues relating to incorporations by authorised company service providers. Will he confirm that all the subsections in new clause 26 will be explicitly covered elsewhere? If not, we will want to pursue the matter of how that information is going to be published by Companies House and the Secretary of State.
People can speak in whichever order they wish. If the right hon. Lady and the right hon. Gentleman rise before you do, I will call them first. Let’s suck it and see.
New Clause 44
HMRC anti-money laundering function
“(1) The Commissioners of Revenue and Customs Act 2005 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 5 (Commissioners’ initial functions), insert—
‘5A Commissioners’ Anti-Money Laundering Functions
(1) The Commissioners shall be responsible for anti-money laundering supervision.
(2) The Commissioners shall treat the function in subsection (1) as a priority equal to the functions in section 5.’”—(Dame Margaret Hodge.)
This new clause would require HMRC to prioritise its AML supervisory function.
Brought up, and read the First time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 72—Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision: powers and duties—
“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations set out a further power and duty for the Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision.
(2) The power referred to in subsection (1) is the power to impose unlimited financial penalties on Professional Body Supervisors that fail to—
(a) adopt an effective risk-based approach to anti-money laundering supervision;
(b) impose proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for non-compliance with anti-money laundering requirements; and
(c) fail to separate their advocacy and regulatory functions.
(3) The duty referred to in subsection (1) is the duty to publish the details of any sanctions imposed on Professional Body Supervisors, and its reviews of Professional Body Supervisors with data disaggregated by body rather than by sector.”
I will speak to new clause 72 first and come back to new clause 44. The Minister and the Government will know that time and again we have said we are concerned about the way in which professionals are checked, supervised and regulated in the financial services sector and that the current system is not fit for purpose. I think we all recognise that it is the professionals who play a key role in enabling the fraudsters and money launderers to successfully commit economic crimes. It is they who either facilitate, collude in or enable the wrongdoing.
Can I just say something from my own business experience? We had two very thorough inquiries from HMRC, which spent days in our office looking at our money laundering procedures. I am pleased to say that we passed the test, but HMRC really does take its job seriously.
I do not know whether I have the quote here from the previous HMRC permanent secretary—I will dig it up and send it to the Minister—but he actually said, in evidence to the Treasury Committee I think, that he did not quite understand why it was part of his job to do the supervision. I am not quoting him accurately, but the purport of what he said was that they see it as marginal and a sort of add-on—I think he used the word “add-on”—to their main function, which is to get the money in.
The position and reputation that professionals enjoy through membership of professional bodies is really important. Therefore, the professional bodies themselves should be taking steps to minimise and attack suspicious activity where it takes place, and they should be calling it out. It is in everybody’s interest to get the bad apples.
Let me give some evidence of the current failings as we see them. The 2021 review of OPBAS—the body responsible for all the professional bodies—found that 81%, or eight out of 10, were not supervising their members effectively. This review was done only on the legal and accountancy professions. Half the supervisors did not ensure that their members were taking timely action to improve their money laundering procedures where they were found wanting. A third of the supervisors did not have effective separation between the advocacy role and the supervision role, which I think is an important aspect. For a proper review, one would separate bodies undertaking supervision and bodies undertaking advocacy to ensure there is no conflict of interest.
Some 60% of the firms visited by the Solicitors Regulation Authority in 2021 were failing to comply fully with their duties to have adequate AML controls in place. OPBAS found that nine supervisory bodies of MLR are engaging in what it calls “low levels of enforcement”. The way in which those bodies respond when they find something going on is to have a quiet chat rather than issue fines and publicly censure lawyers for breaching the MLR rules. The highest ever AML fine for a law firm by the SRA was £232,500, and it was for Mishcon. If that fine had been levied by the FCA under similar powers, it would have been £5.4 million.
The Council for Licensed Conveyancers, another group of professionals who are active in this area, imposed zero fines, despite finding that two out of three of the firms it is responsible for supervising were non-compliant with AML regulations in 2019-20. To use another example, the Law Society of Northern Ireland imposed just one fine—of £1,750—in the year 2019-2020, despite it finding 228 cases of non-compliance. That is a considerable body of evidence, if I may say so, that shows that the current system is broken and not fit for purpose.
The Chartered Institute of Taxation, a group I work with a lot, found that a third of the firms visited were non-compliant, but only four firms were disciplined for failure to provide renewal forms by the required deadline and fined for failure to submit appropriate criminality check certificates or to deal with the action points that had been raised with them in the review by CIOT of their AML procedures. In three of the four disciplinary cases by CIOT, a financial penalty was imposed, and only in the fourth was the member suspended.
I know that the Government are looking at the supervisory framework but, as is the way with Governments, that could take forever. We want to implement these reforms swiftly, so we must have some assurance and confidence, particularly because of the outsourcing of the checks on individual companies, that the professionals will seek out the miscreants in their profession. We cannot wait for the review, to put it bluntly. With these measures, we have taken the least of all the options the Government have put forward and proposed it for legislation. If the Government, on reflection, want to come back with a tougher regime, that is fine, but at least we would have the minimum in place as we enact the legislation and the reform of Companies House. Our new clause says, “Action now. Toughen up the powers and duties of OPBAS—introduce greater transparency into the system, and comeback if that is needed.” We are suggesting new powers and duties for OPBAS. The power is
“to impose…financial penalties on Professional Body Supervisors that fail to…adopt an effective risk-based approach to anti-money laundering supervision…impose proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for non-compliance…and…separate their advocacy and regulatory functions.”
This is minimal, sensible and desperately needed now if we are to go ahead, with the speed that we all want, with the implementation of the legislation.
I do not propose to spend much time speaking in support of the new clauses. The arguments made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking have broadly said it all. She highlighted the high levels of non-compliance, the very low levels of fines and disciplinary measures, and the frustration of the sectors in terms of tools to really root out the rogue players who need action taken against them. The new clauses would be very effective and are much needed, for the reasons outlined—in trying to get action now, toughening up powers and providing greater transparency. For the reasons that I have outlined, I totally agree that the Bill is the right place for these measures. We should not have to wait and wait and wait for what is likely to come and will almost certainly draw the same conclusions.
New clause 44 would have the effect of amending the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 such that the commissioners would be responsible for anti-money laundering supervision, and it states:
“The Commissioners shall treat the function in subsection (1) as a priority”.
New clause 72 would introduce provisions requiring the Secretary of State, by regulations, to set out a further power and duty for the Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision. This is defined as
“the power to impose unlimited financial penalties on Professional Body Supervisors that fail”—
that fail—
“to…adopt an effective risk-based approach to anti-money laundering supervision…impose proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for non-compliance with anti-money laundering requirements …and …separate their advocacy and regulatory functions.”
We want stronger action taken against economic crime, not least because we know the scale at which it comes through the cracks, with the damage that it does to our economy. It seems to me that tightening up the roles and the performance of professional body supervisors and HMRC in some way is an opportunity that we should not miss.
The proposed clause would also insert a duty
“to publish the details of any sanctions imposed on Professional Body Supervisors, and…reviews of Professional Body Supervisors with data disaggregated by body rather than by sector.”
The sum of the two new clauses is to ensure the urgent improvement of the UK’s anti-money laundering sector. Throughout our witness sessions and Committee debates, we have heard about the lack of effectiveness of our AML system. I think that is a view also supported by the Minister. The changes are a much-needed strengthening and safeguarding against potentially rogue corporate service providers, the third parties who act on behalf of companies and can carry out the identity verification of directors.
I thank the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill and for Barking for their amendments, and I welcome the effort and energy they put into the oversight mechanisms that are so important in ensuring that the Bill is effective. That is the nice bit. They know what is coming next.
I do agree enormously on the importance of supervision, which has been emphasised, but I am afraid I cannot support new clause 44. Despite what the right hon. Member for Barking says, HMRC already has an anti-money laundering supervisory function and it does take its responsibilities extremely seriously. It supervises nine sectors and is the default supervisor for trust and company service providers where they are not already subject to supervision by the FCA or one of the 22 professional bodies.
I wish I had brought some of my previous notes with me. What evidence does the Minister have of that, apart from HMRC telling us that?
I am amazed that it did. Is there evidence of the number of visits or assessments carried out? I can remember a quote from the previous permanent secretary, who said, “It is not our core business.”
The core business of HMRC is raising money and ensuring that that money is clean. That is absolutely essential. Until HMRC works out whether or not the money is clean, it is hard to raise money. I would be hard pressed to describe my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary as a dodgy individual, but if he is going through these AML checks I think it is a good indication that HMRC is taking such matters very seriously. As I say, the checks are already being done and the responsibilities are held by branches of the Government, including HMRC and other professional bodies.
The amendments are therefore a duplication. The reality is that HMRC carried out 3,500 formal compliance inspections with businesses last year and issued over £2.5 million of penalties in 2021-22. That demonstrates that the business checks are not symbolic. They are not minor. They are extremely serious. HMRC takes them very seriously. I think the Government is entirely in agreement with the right hon. Lady that these checks need to happen, but the scale and type of reform to improve effectiveness and solve these problems is not yet clear. The Treasury will no doubt have many views when its formal consultation on the possible options opens. The consultation will ensure that the risks and implications of each option are fully understood before the Government commit to any particular model. The right hon. Lady knows very well that we need to get this right, not just to be quick.
On new clause 72, I welcome the desire to strengthen the UK’s anti-money laundering regime. I also share the support for the work OPBAS does. However, it is not yet the right time for the proposed changes, and I cannot support the suggested amendment. In June of this year, the Treasury published a review of the UK’s anti-money laundering regime, which considered the performance of the supervisory regime, including the work of OPBAS. It concluded that although there have been significant improvements in recent years, further reform is necessary to ensure effective supervision across the regulated sector. The review set out four options for reform, ranging from strengthening OPBAS to structural reform to establish a new statutory supervisor. Further policy work to develop these options is already under way, and the Treasury has committed to publishing a consultation before a decision on the direction for reform is made. It would be wrong to preclude the ongoing policy analysis and public consultation by making the changes proposed by the amendment.
I heard the Minister’s words with gloom. Initially, the Government put out a consultation with four options, and to speed it up, we decided to go with the weakest of the options—the one to which there would be the least objections. What I think I just heard him say, which is so gloomy, is that the Government will now publish a further consultation. All this stuff in the Bill will come into being and we will have absolutely no assurance that proper checking, regulation and supervision will be carried out on company service providers.
As I say, this is really a matter for the Treasury, and it has committed to publishing a consultation before the decision is made. It would be wrong of me to preclude the ongoing policy analysis and public consultation by making—
I have had many conversations with Treasury colleagues in recent weeks and months on various aspects of the challenges that economic crime poses to the UK. Many of us are committed—in fact, the Treasury is very committed—to ensuring that economic crime is reduced in this country. The support that the Treasury has given in various different ways has resulted in many things, including a very successful operation conducted this morning by the Metropolitan police that resulted in the arrest of many people connected to economic crime. That may sound tangential on the grounds that it is about fraud, but the reality is that all of it is connected. We see a very strong overlap between money laundering, fraud and various other different forms of economic crime. The Treasury, unsurprisingly, is extremely committed to making sure that economic crime in this country reduces. The Home Office and the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy are absolutely committed to making sure that we considerably reduce the level of fraud in this country.
What is important now is to ensure that we make OPBAS as effective as possible, and that we look for some of the reforms that we have started to highlight, because that means that the changes required by the amendment will be unnecessary. I hope that we can focus on that aim.
I have just been given a statistic that records that in October 2022, HMRC named 68 estate agents that had breached anti-money laundering regulations, and fined them a collective total of £519,000. We can see that the supervision of estate agents is not just conducted by my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary but by many others around the country and is taken extremely seriously.
I hear what the Minister says, but I think we will just be setting up another duff register unless we get the regulation of those company service providers toughened up at the same time as we introduce the Bill. I want to press new clause 72 to a vote.
You will not be able to do that now, and in the meantime, you must seek the leave of the Committee to withdraw new clause 44.
Thank you very much, Sir Christopher. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 50
Requirement for UK-resident director
‘(1) The Companies Act is amended as follows.
(2) In section 156B of the Companies Act 2006, inserted by section 87 of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, after subsection (4) insert—
“(4A) The regulations must also include provision to require all companies to have at least one director who is ordinarily resident in the UK.”’—(Stephen Kinnock.)
This new clause would amend the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 to require all companies to have at least one person who ordinarily resides in the UK as a director.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 49 sought to ensure that the provisions of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, which require company directors to be natural persons, would be brought into force. The Opposition welcomed the Minister’s commitment to introducing the necessary regulations to enact that measure in the near future, and we are very pleased to have that on the record. At the same time, however, the Opposition remain convinced that there is much more that the Government could and should be doing to reduce the risks of money laundering and economic crime within the company registration requirements. The new clauses we are about to discuss provide a number of different means by which the law could be further strengthened against the risk of such abuses.
New clause 50 would make it a requirement that every company registering in the UK has at least one director who is ordinarily resident here. I have already spoken in Committee about the risks that often come with a system that allows companies to register in places to which they have a tenuous connection in terms of actually doing business there. Although there may be certain limited circumstances in which it might be legitimate for a company with no UK-based directors to register with Companies House, I am struggling to see what they might be. On the other hand, I can think of plenty of reasons why the fact that a company has no UK-based directors might be considered a red flag for money laundering risks, calling for additional scrutiny from the registrar.
(2 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesAll the new clauses relate to the register of overseas entities. New clause 12 will mean that the required information that must be provided about an overseas entity, a corporate registrable beneficial owner or a managing officer will always include its principal office, rather than there merely being an option to provide its registered or principal office. The new clause will improve the quality of the information provided and align with the information required about other types of legal entities.
New clause 14 will ensure that overseas entities that provide the details of a managing officer who is under the age of 16, or who is a legal entity, must also provide details of a person who is more than 16 years old. This is to ensure that there is a person who can be contacted about the overseas entity, in addition to the relevant person who verified the information. It is possible that in jurisdictions outside the UK, individuals younger than 16 may be allowed to act as company directors, secretaries or equivalents. Directors of UK companies are required to be at least 16 years of age, so the new clause provides consistency by requiring the contact details of someone who is at least 16 years of age.
New clause 21 will update the language about penalties for non-compliance in section 34 of the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022 to reflect changes made by the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022. It will ensure consistency with the wording used in other clauses in the Bill.
New clause 13 will require overseas entities to include the title number for relevant interests in land that they hold in their application for registration, both when providing an update and when applying to be removed from the register. Overseas entities that are already registered will be required to provide this information when they next provide an update or, if sooner, when they apply to be removed from the register. The collection of this information will improve the effectiveness of the register and will help law enforcement agencies with their investigations. The information will not be made publicly available because the Government do not consider that to be appropriate, given privacy concerns.
Let me turn new clause 15. In advance of the launch of the register, the Register of Overseas Entities (Delivery, Protection and Trust Services) Regulations 2022 were made. Regulation 14 specified the circumstances in which a legal entity trustee is deemed to be
“subject to its own disclosure requirements”.
By virtue of a legal entity trustee being a registrable beneficial owner, the overseas entity must provide the required information about the trust and persons connected to it, such as beneficiaries, settlors and interested persons.
This is an issue for clarification, because it impacts on whether we move our new clause 59. Will the information that we are now going to get about trustees and beneficiaries be made public? Will it be open to the public in the same way as other information about beneficial owners is open to the public? I ask because that is what our new clause would achieve.
I will deal with that, if I can, as I go through. Essentially, trusts are often there to protect the identity of vulnerable persons, so I am not sure that the provision will do what the right hon. Member wants to do in her new clause, but we can probably discuss that when we discuss her new clause.
Without regulation 14, if the corporate trustee were not subject to its own disclosure requirements, the overseas entity would have to “look through” the legal entity trustee to find a registrable beneficial owner higher up the chain of ownership. But in the situations we are talking about it is information about the trust that is wanted, rather than information about the ownership or control of the legal entity trustee. Currently, regulation 14 therefore ensures that Companies House, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and law enforcement agencies receive the information about the trust and persons connected to it, which I think may be the point that the right hon. Member raises and which is much more useful to meet the aims of the register.
New clause 15 goes further by ensuring that a legal entity acting as a trustee is always a registrable beneficial owner whether or not it is “subject to its own disclosure requirements” and even if there is another registrable beneficial owner further down a chain of ownership. This maximises the transparency in respect of the involvement of a legal entity trust in a chain of ownership.
The provisions also provide a power to expand the description of persons who are registrable beneficial owners where the overseas entity is part of a chain of entities that includes a trustee. It is appropriate to have a power to expand the description, given that there may be complex arrangements that attempt to circumvent the requirements. The provisions revoke regulation 14 because it is no longer needed.
(2 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesNew clause 25 is a probing amendment. I am minded to have a higher fee than £50, but what does the Minister think the baseline ought to be? Is it £100 or £50, or is he not prepared to put a number on the minimum price for registering a company? By way of contrast, a provisional driving licence fee application is £34, a passport is £75.50, and citizenship is £1,330 pounds. The Government are prepared to levy a whole range of fees for a whole range of privileges to do with living in this country; £12 to register a company seems miraculously low in comparison to all the other fees that the Government are willing to charge. In all those cases, I am sure that the Government would say that they are trying to recover costs, but they are not prepared to say how much it would cost to run Companies House in such a way that it can prevent economic crime, although that is pretty crucial to the whole endeavour.
I agree with everything the hon. Member for Aberavon has said, and I support the amendments from the right hon. Member for Barking, who is, I am sure, absolutely correct in everything she is about to say; I often agree with everything she says. I draw the Government’s attention again to the written evidence from UK Finance, which says:
“Clause 89 should be amended to ensure an initial increase in registration fees within six months of commencement, and to ensure annual reporting on planned investment, fee increases and scheduled implementation of new powers.”
If we set a minimum in legislation and do not update it, the problem is that often prices increase—mostly artificially, but also through factors such as the runaway inflation that we see in the UK at the moment. It is important to commit to an annual increase and annual reporting to ensure that fees keep pace with changes in a way that is considered reasonable.
Twelve pounds to register a company is really nothing in the grand scheme of things. I ask the Minister to consider how we can better ensure that the Companies House registration scheme forms part of the deterrent. Rather than allowing the bulk creation of lots of small companies at £12 a pop, we can ensure that people say, “This is a real company. There is a real financial commitment to it.” I do not think that any company will be deterred by a fee of £100 rather than £12.
On a point of order, Mr Robertson. Why is new clause 29 not included in this group?
Thank you. New clause 29 is on a similar area of debate, so there might be a bit of repetition when we come to it. The new clauses we are discussing speak for themselves. The Minister knows full well that it is really important that we get a grip on economic crime, and that means resourcing our enforcement agencies. He often says—and I completely agree—that it is pointless passing legislation if we do not enforce it, and that means funding agencies properly. If we look at the record on enforcement, it is pretty abysmal right across the piece.
That particularly goes for Companies House. The first conviction it achieved was against Kevin Brewer, a man in his mid-60s who formed a company and stated that Vince Cable, then Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, was a director and shareholder. He formed another company and put Baroness Neville-Rolfe and the right hon. Member for Braintree (James Cleverly), now Foreign Secretary, down as directors. He did it to demonstrate that Companies House never checks the data. When he put that information in the public domain, Companies House’s response was to sue him, and he had to pay a hefty fine. I am sure that the Minister will agree that this was a case of a genuine whistleblower trying to demonstrate that the system was not working and being wrongly pursued by the authorities. It should never have happened. That is the record of Companies House to date. We hope the reforms we are discussing and debating will improve the matter.
The current position is absurd. Everybody has used figures, but the figure that I like to use is the £12 it costs to form a company against the £1,220 it costs to get a visa for a skilled worker. Our perspective is just wrong. Everybody wants to make it easy to create new companies, but any business worth its salt would not find a greater sum an inhibiter to creating a new business. We just have this completely wrong, and that is what the Opposition are trying to put right in a way that does not burden the taxpayer.
I know it is, but most of that comes from the economic crime levy. The £300 million comes from the economic crime levy; £100 million comes from the Government’s coffers. Correct me if I am wrong, but that is my understanding of it, so a third of that—£32 million or £33 million—is the Government’s annual contribution out of taxation. That is where I got the figure from. If I am wrong, I stand to be corrected, but that is my understanding.
Looking across the world, even the British Virgin Islands, our favourite secrecy jurisdiction, charges £1,000 to people who wish to create a company there; I cannot think that that has put anyone off using the BVI if they want a secrecy jurisdiction to support them. Australia charges £247; in the USA, in California, it is £150; in Delaware, another secrecy jurisdiction, it is £590; in New York, £570; Italy, £2,000; and Germany, £383. Even with our new clause, we would still be a cheap place in which to do business.
That is all I need to say at this point. We brought in new clause 40 because we think that should also be embedded. The Minister may tell me that it happens, but we think it should be embedded in legislation so that no future Government are ever tempted to take the money they earn from fees and put it towards other purposes. I hope that the Minister will accept that.
Again, correct me if I am wrong, but I have not seen anything in legislation that ensures that money raised in fees goes directly to enforcement. The Minister may want to do that, but his successors may not feel the same. The issue is never a high political priority so it is important that we get sustainability for the issue over time. That is the reason for the new clause.
It is a pleasure to speak with you in the Chair, Mr Robertson. It is fantastic for the Minister to be able to kick off today with this debate—surely there has never been a Minister as lucky as this one is in taking this Bill through Committee. Here we have an entire Opposition side of the Committee united in wanting to give the Minister the tools to do the job—the job for which he has argued for years and years in this House.
We want to send the Minister into the spending review, with his colleague the Chancellor of the Exchequer, with his hands bound. We want to ensure that he goes into those conversations with the law of the land changed, so that he is required to put up the fees for Companies House and actually has the money he needs to do the job. We know that that is not going to damage the business investment environment in this country. How? Because it could not get any worse than it is today.
The business investment level in this country over the last 12 years has now been the worst in the G7, so it is unlikely to get any worse if fees at Companies House are put up a little bit: it is already spectacularly bad. That underlines a simple point: that the level of economic crime in this country is now so infamous around the world that it could be damaging the level of business investment here. If we are known around the world—certainly, in Washington and in European capitals—as a global epicentre of dirty money, how does that help us become a great, global hub of business investment in years to come? Obviously, it does not. There is a competitive advantage to be had by becoming one of the great capitals of clean trade. Here we are, an Opposition united in wanting to help the Minister achieve that ambition and make sure that he has the resources to do the job.
In the public evidence sessions, we heard a clear set of arguments as to why these amendments need to be made. We heard that our country has now become the centre of the Russian laundromat, the Troika laundromat and the Azerbaijan laundromat. Indeed, the Security Minister and I were on the Foreign Affairs Committee together when we heard the most appalling evidence that some of the biggest money-laundering scandals have involved UK corporate structures more than anything else; I think I am right that about 40% of the billions laundered through Danske Bank came through UK corporate structures. That is truly a mark of shame, and why Bill Browder was absolutely right when said in evidence to this Committee that it is appalling—a matter of shame—that there has been only one prosecution for money-laundering around economic crime in this country. That truly is an appalling record of law enforcement.
Worse than that, we also heard from the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation that the situation is not simply bad news for economic crime, but a national security issue. When the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation tells the Committee that it is a matter of national security that we clean up the dark mass of economic crime in this country, we as Members of Parliament ought to listen and do something about it. Then we heard from a range of police specialists who said, first, that they thought the problem was getting much worse quite quickly, and secondly, that they did not have the resources they needed to enforce the law in this area.
All that evidence points in one direction: Companies House needs more money. When we took evidence from representatives of Companies House, we heard, startlingly, that they have not even discussed their budget with the Treasury for the next financial year, which is due to start in only a few months’ time. They mooted the idea of asking for cash for an extra 100 people, which the dogs in the street know is not going to be enough to enforce the measures in the Bill.
With all his native cunning and wit, the Minister needs to find a way to make the concessions the Opposition are asking for and to agree to the amendment, so that he can be the great, historic, legendary, reforming Minister who took the bull by the horns once and for all and helped make sure that this country is once more renowned around the world as a capital of clean trade—all because of the efforts, cunning and wisdom of the Minister in accepting the amendment before him today.
I am coming to that. The simple answer is that, when the fees are assessed, they are subject to regulations that are subject to parliamentary scrutiny. They are laid before the House before the fees are approved.
It is under the affirmative resolution. Different Members have suggested different figures, from £50 to £100. The right hon. Member for Barking said £1,000, as if to say, “We charge that in the BVI, therefore why not charge it in the UK?” That was the implication. What she said was that the people who look to use those jurisdictions to hide their money would be quite happy to pay £1,000, but that is exactly the point. On 99.9% of occasions, we are not just dealing with companies that indulge in nefarious activities; we are talking about not deterring bona fide businesses by setting the fee level at a fair level that does not deter business activity but does mean that Companies House has the right enforcement capability. That is what we want to get to, and we want to ensure that Companies House is able to do that.
I will touch on a couple of the points made about the SFO case last week, which I think we all welcome. It was not actually about resourcing; changing legislation made that possible. It was about corporate criminal liability and failure to prevent, which was successfully enforced in that case. That is a lesson for us all. The right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill said that there has been only one case ever of a successful economic crime prosecution in the UK, and that Bill Browder had said that. Mr Browder did not say that; there have been many prosecutions of economic crime. To clarify, he was talking about it in connection to the money that came out of Russia.
Companies House is funded by the fees that it charges. If the Secretary of State considered changing those fees, there would of necessity be an appraisal of the resourcing needs of Companies House before that could take place. Fees can be charged only to cover the costs of the activities that they are intended to fund, including enforcement.
In order to arrive at an appropriate level of fee, my Department would have to work directly with Companies House to determine the funding requirements. Of course, there has to be Government oversight of that, because that is what we are elected to do. It is right that the Secretary of State would oversee that and then present it to Parliament for scrutiny. I agree that companies will justifiably want to understand how and why a particular level of fee has been arrived at, but the mechanism for that already exists. Fees will continue to be set by regulations, and the basis for any changes will be included in the accompanying analysis and explanatory memorandum that are published and presented to Parliament for scrutiny.
New clauses 25 and 33, introduced by the hon. Member for Glasgow Central and the right hon. Member for Barking, will shortly set out intentions on the level of fees to be charged. We do not intend to enshrine a level of fee in primary legislation, as doing so would restrict flexibility that may be required at a future date. We will commit to reviewing the fees on a regular basis to ensure that they provide the funding that Companies House needs.
I cannot imagine that in his many years as a Minister the right hon. Gentleman would have ever set out a date, but it will be shortly.
Finally, I turn to proposed new clause 45 and the points made by the right hon. Member for Barking. The Bill amends the fee-raising power within the Companies Act 2006, in order to enable costs associated with investigation and enforcement to be included when setting the level of fees. Companies House is able to retain incorporated fee income under current arrangements between the Treasury and Companies House, with the arrangement reviewed periodically. Legislation does not set the level of fees, but rather the level of fees is set by our regulations. I have to say to the right hon. Member for Barking that that is under the negative resolution procedure and therefore receives parliamentary scrutiny.
If it is under the negative resolution procedure, the Minister well knows that it will not receive the parliamentary scrutiny it deserves. The advantage of the way we framed our new clauses is that the fee would automatically rise with inflation rather than any other mechanism being needed. I would have thought the Minister would welcome that because it would ensure consistent resourcing.
I do not accept that the two things—inflation and the resources needed by Companies House—necessarily correlate. Salaries do not rise automatically on that basis. As the right hon. Lady will know, Companies House reports annually and I am keen to ensure that there is the right level of scrutiny around this type of activity in terms of resourcing, as I have said to her before. Therefore I do not think an automatic inflationary increase is right, but I absolutely believe in parliamentary scrutiny and it is something that perhaps we can discuss.
Will the Minister therefore come back with an amendment that provides for affirmative resolution?
That may be something that the right hon. Lady wants to table, but this is a significant commitment, both in terms of legislation and resourcing. I cannot imagine a situation where Companies House comes to the Secretary of State or to me, as I will have some oversight over it, and say, “We need this level of resourcing, which will impact on fees in this way,” and we respond by saying, “Actually, that is too much.” It depends what they say, of course, and it is right that we have scrutiny over that, but I am sure there will be many mechanisms the right hon. Lady can use to ensure we have that level right.
I beg to move amendment 84, in clause 96, page 75, line 23, leave out “the Consolidated Fund” and insert
“a fund established by the Secretary of State for the purposes of tackling economic crime (see section 1132B)”.
This amendment requires penalties paid to the registrar to be paid into a fund for the purposes of tackling economic crime, rather than the consolidated fund.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 80, in clause 96, page 75, line 26, at end insert—
“1132B Fund for the purposes of tackling economic crime
(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations establish a fund for the purposes of tackling economic crime.
(2) Penalties received by the registrar under section 1132A must contribute to the fund.
(3) The regulations must specify the purposes for which the fund may be used including funding the activities of law enforcement agencies in tackling economic crime.
(a) funding the activities of law enforcement agencies in tackling economic crime;”
This amendment provides for a fund to be established for the purposes of tackling economic crime.
New clause 29—Report into the merits of a fund for tackling economic crime—
“(1) The Secretary of State must produce a report into the merits of a fund for tackling economic crime.
(2) The report must consider the case for penalties paid to the registrar to be ringfenced and used solely for the purposes of tackling economic crime.
(3) The report must be laid before Parliament within six months of this Act being passed.”
This new clause requires a report into the merits of a fund for tackling economic crime to be laid before Parliament.
Let us see where we get with this one—I will have another go. This is a vital amendment and I hope that the Government will listen carefully, because it would go a long way to ensuring that our enforcement capabilities, which we have been talking about all morning, really are fit for purpose and properly funded, without burdening the taxpayer—that is really important. If we tried to get competition between funding enforcement and funding other Government priorities, we would get nowhere in trying to ensure properly funded enforcement agencies.
The UK’s record is abysmal. I am going to put this on the record. The NCA has had five prosecutions each year for the last five years. That is hopeless. Money laundering prosecutions are down 35% over the last five years, at a time of exponential growth in money laundering. Less than 1% of the billions of pounds laundered annually is ever restored to us. And the number of criminal fraud cases by the SFO has halved in the last three years, although again I welcome the Glencore case, and I agree with the Minister that it shows the importance of introducing the offence of failure to prevent economic crime.
This is not a criticism of the agencies; it is a criticism of us and our failure to fund this work properly, which is what we are trying to do here. If we look at the totality of the UK’s expenditure on enforcement, we see that it is pathetic. It is 0.042% of GDP, whereas we know that the cost to the UK economy of economic crime is 14.5%, so there is an absurd relationship between our need to detect and prevent crime and our capability to do so. The FBI is 15 times larger than the NCA. We have already said that the police spend less than 1% on fraud, even though it represents 40% of crime—and that is just reported crime. And we have already said that the Americans have increased their budget, because they see this as a security threat, whereas we have reduced one.
I would welcome a comment from the Minister on this matter. My understanding is that the Government contribution to the fight against economic crime is £100 million. Out of the totality of £400 million in the budget, £300 million comes from the economic crime levy and only £100 million, over the comprehensive spending review period, comes from the taxpayer, so that is a mere £32 million or £33 million a year.
If the right hon. Lady includes what we resource—the SFO, NCA and other enforcement agencies—it is not entirely clear, but we give about £825 million a year to our enforcement agencies.
The Minister knows that that is not necessarily to fight economic crime, but to fight other crimes. I was talking about the economic crime levy and those are the figures that I have.
It is irritating but understandable that the enforcement agencies prioritise other crimes in their day-to-day work; they do not prioritise economic crime. Despite the lack of funding, a lot of money is brought in by the enforcement agencies. Between 2018 and 2021, £3.9 billion was brought in in fines, confiscation and forfeiture. If all of that had been reinvested, all of the agencies would have had an extra £748 million to fight economic crime over that period. That would have had a fantastic impact on our ability to fight, detect and prevent economic crime.
It has been said in previous debates that money from fines cannot be hypothecated in that way, but I draw the Minister’s attention to three precedents that negate that claim. In June 2022, the Information Commissioner announced a new arrangement allowing the office to keep some of the proceeds of its civil penalties to fund its work with the big tech companies. In 2019, Ofwat kept the proceeds of penalties it had raised on Southern Water to pay out to and reimburse customers. The Gambling Commission can also require payments rather than penalties to compensate victims or make payments to charities. Those are three precedents on which the Minister could build the argument that it would be perfectly appropriate for the proceeds of fines to be kept in order to resource the fight against economic crime.
I also draw the Minister’s attention to a report on fraud published by the House of Lords last week, which states:
“To support the forthcoming fraud strategy”,
which is only a part of addressing economic crime,
“with adequate resources, the Government must commit to a long-term funding strategy with an increased offer for law enforcement agencies”—
and this is the important bit—
“focussed primarily on recycling revenue collected by law enforcement agencies back into law enforcement activity.”
The House of Lords has, therefore, come to the same conclusion as we have in tabling this amendment.
The UK’s asset recovery incentivisation scheme ensures that some assets are recycled. Most of them go to the Treasury. Of the £354 million recovered in 2021-22 from confiscation orders, forfeiture orders and civil recovery orders, only 40% went back into fighting crime. If we compare ourselves with the Americans, we will see that all of their forfeiture proceeds go back into enforcement.
Under our proposal, money would be ring-fenced and it would be a cross-Government fund to finance enforcement against fraud and dirty money. The Minister knows that if the UK is to tackle economic crime effectively, far greater ambition is needed on the scale of public investment, and establishing an economic crime fund is the radical response that we need.
I would like to add some comments to the eloquent remarks of my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking.
In clause 96, the Government provide a framework for the registrar, within parameters to be set out by the Secretary of State in regulations, to impose direct financial penalties for many offences without the need for lengthy and often costly court proceedings. That is surely a welcome development, at least in so far as it should enable the registrar to take swifter action to deal with any offences involving false representations made to Companies House.
Of course, we will need to look closely at the details of how that will work in practice. In that respect, it is right that the Bill provides for parliamentary scrutiny of the relevant regulations via the affirmative resolution procedure. If the Minister could give a rough indication of when we can expect those regulations to be published, I am sure that the Committee would be grateful.
One thing that clause 96 makes clear is that any civil penalties imposed by the registrar will not exceed £10,000. I would be grateful for an explanation from the Minister about how that figure was arrived at, and whether he is confident that the power to impose a fine at that level will act as a deterrent to would-be offenders. Given the profit margins involved in some of the most serious crimes, we must ensure that the threat of civil penalties is both real and sufficient in terms of its potential to take a meaningful chunk out of criminals’ assets. I am not entirely convinced that the threat of a £10,000 fine will be taken all that seriously by some of the intended targets, but if the Minister is aware of any convincing evidence to the contrary, I would be glad to hear it.
Even if we assume that the Government make rapid progress with the regulations enabling the registrar to impose civil penalties, we must then address—not for the first time in Committee—what happens to any funds raised from civil penalties. In amendments 84 and 80 and new clause 29, my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking has once again provided the Committee with an eminently reasonable and sensible answer to that question. Taken together, these amendments would require any fines paid to the registrar to be specifically designated and ring-fenced for the purposes of tackling economic crime.
The asset recovery incentivisation scheme, introduced by the previous Labour Government, provides a template of sorts, but given the scale of the threat that we now face from economic crime, we need to go further. It is surely a no-brainer that any fees paid to the registrar, together with penalties for those who break the rules, should be reinvested in broader cross-Government efforts to tackle economic crime. That would provide a stronger incentive for tougher enforcement and a more sustainable long-term funding model for Companies House and other enforcement bodies at no additional cost to the taxpayer. Opposition Front Benchers therefore fully support these amendments. We hope that Members on the Government Benches will do the same.
I would like to press amendment 84 to a vote, but I do not intend to press amendment 80.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Will the Minister confirm whether the action of Companies House under this clause should be part of the annual report to Parliament?
I think that is a very sensible suggestion and I am happy to take that away. I would like to see a number of things in that report that are currently not there. If we look at the most recent report, we see a number of references to this particular legislation. It welcomes this legislation, and I think it is important that the body reports publicly and to Parliament, as would be the case with the measures that the right hon. Lady mentions.
Similarly, there may be reason to review the appropriate financial penalty amount, and interest or late payment amount, to deter misconduct against the register as effectively as possible. The regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure, which will provide the appropriate amount of parliamentary scrutiny of any proposed further changes.
Clause 97 will strengthen the link between civil sanctions and director disqualification by amending section 3 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, which states that the court may make
“a disqualification order against a person where it appears to it that he has been persistently in default in relation to provisions of the companies legislation”,
and that
“the fact that a person has been persistently in default…may…be conclusively proved by showing that”,
in the previous five years,
“he has been adjudged guilty…of three or more defaults”.
Under proposed new section 1132A of the Companies Act 2006, the registrar will be able to impose a financial penalty on a person, if she is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the person has engaged in conduct amounting to an offence.
Section 3 of the CDDA will be amended so that the imposition of a financial penalty can count as a default. That will provide a greater deterrent to those who seek to circumvent legislative requirements. Not only will individuals face the risk of a financial penalty but the risk of being disqualified will become more likely when a financial penalty has been imposed. Clause 98 mirrors the provisions in clause 97 so that they apply in Northern Ireland, amending the current provision in article 6 of the Company Directors Disqualification (Northern Ireland) Order 2002.
Clause 100 and schedule 4 significantly increase the amount of information that must be provided about a new limited partnership and its prospective partners, and, subsequently, when they make their annual confirmation statements or deliver notifications that report changes. Schedule 4 sets out what information must be provided, including date of birth, nationality and the usual residential address when the partner is an individual.
Clause 101 is intended to ensure that existing limited partnerships registered prior to the commencement of the Bill are equally required to deliver the relevant information set out in schedule 4. The general partners of limited partnerships will be required to provide the registrar with the required information of each person who is a partner in the limited partnership, or who became a partner on registration within a six-month transitional period.
Failure to comply with those requirements may give the registrar reasonable cause to consider that the limited partnership is no longer operating and is dissolved. That will mean that the registrar may exercise her confirmation of dissolution power, which we will debate later on. If the registrar goes through the confirmation of dissolution process, she may deregister the dissolved firm.
Clause 102 provides that the Secretary of State may, by regulations, designate a standard system for classifying the business of a limited partnership. That will make it easier to collate and sort information about a limited partnership’s activities and it aligns with the position for companies. I thank the right hon. Member for Barking for her new clause 56. Perhaps she should speak about that now, and I will respond to her points.
I am grateful to the Minister and I agree with him that what we are all attempting to do here is trying to clean up the act in the UK. Some of our amendments are pragmatic, and I just hope that the Minister will listen and take them on board.
I want to go back to first principles, from when I started working in this area almost a decade ago. It was absolutely clear that transparency is a powerful tool in preventing and detecting economic crime. Sunshine is the best disinfectant. David Cameron used that phrase when he introduced the register of beneficial ownership, saying that we had a “gold standard”. It did not quite turn out that way, but that was what he wanted. To go back to the days of 2018, the Financial Action Task Force said that Britain was
“a global leader in promoting corporate transparency”.
We should hang on to that.
In 2014, the Cameron Government said it was “particularly important” that plans to force companies to name their ultimate owners should include English limited partnerships, in order to ensure that there were no loopholes or unintended consequences. That was completely right, yet two months later, in an inexplicable move, English limited partnerships were dropped. I do not know if the Minister has an explanation—I am happy to give way if he has—but that is what happened.
New clause 56 would introduce transparency into the system. I recognise that it is not a perfect answer, but it is a huge improvement on the status quo. We want to use the mechanism of the persons of significant control register. We propose that all limited partnerships, whether they are Northern Irish, English or Welsh, would have to register a person of significant control. All limited partnerships would therefore be treated in the same way.
As the Minister knows, limited partnerships have been used time and again by criminals to move and hide dirty money. I will give just one egregious example. In 2014, the US imposed sanctions on the Rotenberg brothers, Boris and Arkady, who are known as close friends of Putin, in response to the annexation of Crimea. A later investigation by the UK Senate found that the two brothers had used an English limited partnership, Sinara Company, to pay a front figure in the art industry, a man called Gregory Baltser, a huge amount of money to get around the sanctions, buying and selling paintings worth up to $18 million. Paintings by Magritte, Chagall and Braque were sold through this intermediary, Baltser. It was all done through an English limited partnership.
When the Government tightened up on Scottish limited partnerships, criminals moved to other forms, as the hon. Member for Glasgow Central said. I quote to the Minister a Russian-language newsletter that was circulated to clients by a formation agency called LAS, which said, after the UK tightened up on Scottish limited partnerships, that there is always a way out:
“As a substitute for Scottish partnerships, we offer the registration of English, Welsh and Irish LP partnerships, which have an identical legal form and similar benefits…At the moment, the privileges of this type of partnership are that they do not fall and will not fall under the laws on the disclosure of information about controlling persons.”
Transparency International’s report, which the Minister has quoted previously in our debates, shows how the structures are open to abuse by bad actors. It analysed 1,628 limited liability partnerships used in various corruption and money laundering schemes over a 12-year period between 2004 and 2016 for the nationality of the person of significant control. Russians were the most frequent nationality, at 17%; UK nationals were 16%; and Ukrainians, 15%. Nationals from the combined former Soviet states constituted half of those in the disclosures. That is a good red flag. The benefit of the persons of significant control register is that it would provide that red flag if it was extended elsewhere.
Limited partnerships are used by formation agencies, over whom there is also a red flag. Finance Uncovered and the BBC found that the five busiest formation agencies in 2017 created 28% of all English limited partnerships created that year.
(2 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI remind the Committee that with this we are considering the following:
That schedule 4 be the Fourth schedule to the Bill.
Clause 101 stand part.
Clause 102 stand part.
New clause 56—Limited partnerships: registration of persons of significant control—
“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision about the registration of persons of significant control in relation to limited partnerships.
(2) For the purposes of regulations under this section, ‘persons of significant control’ may include persons with a right to—
(a) 25% or more of the surplus assets on winding up,
(b) a voting share of 25% or more,
(c) appoint or remove the majority of managers,
(d) exercise significant influence or control over the business, or
(e) exercise significant influence or control over a firm which would be a person of significant control if it were an individual.
(3) No regulations to which this section applies may be made unless a draft of the statutory instrument containing the regulations (whether or not together with other provisions) has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.”
I am not going to recap, because we want to make progress, but I hope the Minister is listening. We are talking about a way of improving transparency, accepting that the new clause is not the perfect answer.
English limited partnerships have no directors, but they do have individuals required to sign paperwork, and the formation agencies that help to establish such limited partnerships often hire proxies to do that. A great example of that is Ruth Neidhart, a 71-year-old Swiss national who lived in Cyprus. She is a ceramic artist, she sometimes arranges pottery painting sessions for children’s birthday parties, and she has been signing documents for a formation agency called IOS since at least early 2009. We see that see that she has signed 161 of these ELPs since 2016 and has links to IOS companies in Nevis, the British Virgin Islands, Belize and the Bahamas, all offshore firms that have been used to form UK shell companies.
Alexandru Terna, a 32-year-old Romanian who lives on a busy road junction in west London in what is described as “a modest house”, has signed 306 of these ELPs. He said in an email to Finance Uncovered, which covered the story:
“We worked only with [LAS],”
the formation agent. He added:
“We have never been involved in the management or control of any of these companies or any other company, where we were appointed as signatories.”
I thought that was interesting. Then we have the infamous Moldovan bank fraud, where $1 billion vanished from three Moldovan banks in just two days through limited partnerships—a series of Hong Kong and UK-registered companies. The new owners took over the bank in 2012, buying shares and using funds from UK limited companies.
The Government argue that these limited partnerships are not legally separate from their partners and so they cannot be beneficially owned. However, the person of significant control requirements require control—that is the issue—and not necessarily ownership. There does not have to be separate legal personality and ownership for there to be significant control, and if there is a corporate partner, there must be a human being controlling that corporate partner. The corporate partner cannot exist without somebody controlling it.
The PSC is defined as somebody with more than 25% of assets or more than 25% of voting share, or—this is another aspect of the definition—who exercises significant influence or control over the business. In practice, all the leaked documents we have seen from journalists show that formation agencies routinely create ELPs and issue clients with documents that declare them as beneficial owners, so they use that term anyway; they see them as beneficial owners. Indeed, ELPs also open bank accounts. There is somebody behind them, and we need to try to get to that person.
I accept that what we are proposing is not a perfect answer, but I think it is better than the status quo. We would get nominees putting themselves forward, and we would get company service providers declared as persons of significant control, but the same nominee appearing frequently would be a red flag, and company service providers reappearing in relation to lots of companies would also be a red flag. Remember: transparency is the best disinfectant.
I am very pleased to respond to the right hon. Lady’s speech. In relation to some of the issues we have with limited partnerships, she has set out her case very well and fairly.
Through the Bill, we are trying to make it easier for Companies House to spot exactly the kinds of red flags the right hon. Lady has referred to. She mentioned people such as Alexandru Terna. Under this legislation, for the first time, significant penalties will accrue to somebody who does not declare their partners accurately. As I have said on a number of occasions in recent days, I am sympathetic to a number of the right hon. Lady’s amendments, including new clause 56. I understand the reasons why she has tabled it.
The new clause would partially duplicate the Scottish Partnerships (Register of People with Significant Control) Regulations 2017. Scottish limited partnerships have legal personality, meaning that in the eyes of the law they are a separate legal entity and have distinct duties and liabilities to those of their partners. It is therefore possible to apply persons of significant control requirements to those entities. As the right hon. Lady said, the same is not true of English, Welsh or Northern Irish limited partnerships, which do not have legal personality. Unlike SLPs, those forms of limited partnership register with Companies House but are not a separate legal entity from their partners. The partners are the embodiment of the partnership; as such, legislating for the registration of people who have significant influence or control over an English, Welsh or Northern Irish LP is legislating for the registration of people who control other people. I will return to that point in a second.
Not having legal personality means that limited partnerships cannot own property or assets in their own name; any assets are held in the name of the partners themselves. They are a registrable legal relationship, and can be thought of a bit like a marriage: the act of registering gives the relationship legal force and bestows rights and duties on the partners, but it does not create something separate that can be owned. Like a marriage, a partnership ends on the death of a partner.
It is therefore not legally possible to apply the persons of significant control requirements currently applied to Scottish LPs to English, Welsh and Northern Irish LPs. It would be possible to draft legislation for a different regime applying a different definition of beneficial ownership, but given that the partnership only exists as a business relationship between partners and its body exists in the person of the partners, it is not apparent who, beyond the partners, should be registered. A likely outcome would therefore be all limited partnerships reporting that no person met the requirements, other than those already registered as partners.
Nevertheless, I understand that the intention of the right hon. Member for Barking is to increase transparency about who is managing and controlling a limited partnership. That is why the clauses that we are debating will increase the amount of information that is available concerning the partners of a limited partnership, and place a legal duty on partners to update those details with the registrar. In addition, the identities of all general partners must now be verified, and any corporate general partner must name an individual who may be contacted in relation to the limited partnership and whose identity must also be verified.
Although the right hon. Lady admits that her new clause is not a perfect solution, she has raised a good point. In consultation with her and officials, I will give further consideration to this matter, to ensure that there are no other means by which somebody may have undue control over a limited partnership. I am keen to work with her and discuss how we might do that.
The Minister said earlier something that I did not think was the case. I thought that corporate general partners did not have to register the person behind the company. That is the problem: people register the company without registering the person.
Absolutely, although I will clarify that with my officials. We discussed this issue before. I will confirm it later today, if I can, but I am sure that that is the case.
There is no requirement to have an economic link. The link is with the person, the general partner and the limited partners, and the UK-based address. That is the link to the UK that these measures seek to ensure.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 103 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 104 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 105
A limited partnership’s registered email address
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Very similar. It is sooner than shortly. The ban on the appointment of corporate directors will not and should not be absolute. That is why the Companies Act provides for a delegated power to create exemptions by regulations. Those regulations will address the limited circumstances under which a company will be permitted to have a corporate director. It is important that those regulations are in force before we ban the appointment of any corporate directors and are aligned with the new reforms proposed in the Bill.
I am grateful, thinking about my new clause, because it sounds like there might be movement on that. I want to ask the Minister a difficult question: what are the legitimate reasons for limited liability partnerships to have a corporate member? What on earth is a legitimate reason? I cannot think of one.
It might be an investment fund. It might be an insurance company or a collective around investment funds that derive returns for our pensions for millions of people up and down the country. It may well be that a corporate body is part of that limited partnership. I think that is perfectly reasonable, and I imagine we would expect that to be the case.
Even in that case, why not have a natural person—a named individual? I just do not get it.
That is exactly what we have. Does the right hon. Lady mean in terms of companies, or in terms of limited partnerships?
Order. We cannot have a general conversation. The person speaking is the person I call to speak—at the moment, that is the Minister.
Apologies to you, Mr Robertson. I got carried away. I am talking to limited liability partnerships. I cannot see the point of hiding behind a corporation rather than having a natural person.
There is a bit of confusion generally about the difference between limited partnerships and limited liability partnerships. I think we are talking about limited partnerships here.
Yes, as I understand it, but I will get clarification on that.
I am trying to think this through properly: I may be wrong. In the circumstances where the corporation is offshore—an offshore company owns it—would there have to be a natural person named?
Yes. There is no distinction between companies or corporate partners operating offshore to those that are operating onshore. There will be a registered officer in all circumstances.
The regulations will address the limited circumstances under which a company will be permitted to have a corporate director. It is important that the regulations are in force before we ban appointment of any corporate directors, that they are aligned with the new reforms proposed in the Bill and, most importantly, that identity verification of the officers of the corporate director can be carried out.
It is the Government’s intention that any corporate director be as transparent and accountable as a natural person and therefore we intend to make our corporate director regulations come into force alongside the regulations enabling identity verification. Introducing those regimes will be one of the implementation priorities post Royal Assent. I repeat my commitment to the Committee that the regulations will be brought forward.
I understand that the intention of new clause 57 is to ensure that limited partnerships should always have a partner who is a natural person, in order that the person might be contacted in relation to that limited partnership’s activities. Clause 108 inserts proposed new section 8K into the Limited Partnerships Act 1907: the new section places a duty on limited partnerships to have a registered officer who is a natural person for any general partner who is a legal entity and goes on to place strict duties for notifying any changes to that person to the registrar.
The duty in the proposed new section applies only to general partners and not all partners because limited partners are not permitted to engage in management activities. The objective of the new clause in the name of the right hon. Member for Barking would not be met if a limited partnership’s only natural person was a limited partner, because they would not be permitted to correspond with or act in relation to a notice from the registrar.
New clause 58 targets the misuse of limited liability partnerships in opaque corporate structures. While I sympathise with the intent, I cannot support the new clause. UK limited liability partnerships have been named in a number of international money laundering scandals. Many of those will have partners that are solely corporate structures. I am concerned about the abuse, but just as with companies, there can be legitimate reasons why a limited liability partnership might have all corporate partners. For instance, an investment company might a manage a pension fund for a limited partnership. The investment company would be the general partner and manage investments for the limited partners, which generate pension income. It is important for us to get the balance right.
That was a very useful contribution, and I thank the Minister. Through these new clauses we are simply trying to strengthen transparency so we know who is behind the corporates structures. Before the Minister was in his post, the Government themselves cited in their White Paper on corporate transparency three massive scandals: the Azeri scandal, Danske Bank and the Moldova bank fraud. All of those involved limited partnerships or limited liability partnerships, which have the features of a corporate entity acting as a partner and were located offshore in one of the secrecy jurisdictions. We are trying to get at that with these new clauses. If we have not got them quite right, I look forward to the Minister coming forward with other propositions.
It is the opaque corporate structures that hide the true identity of the individual who owns or controls a company. That is a classic way that bad people hide their dirty money. This is not an exception—I know that the Minister likes to sometimes say that, but the recent Transparency International analysis of limited liability partnerships found that one in 10 had the identical characteristics to entities that are involved in serious financial crime. That is quite high, and just another red flag. These companies were a newly formed identity, entered immediately into deals and laundered the money or were suspected of laundering the money. Very shortly after the wrongdoing, they closed the company. An awful lot of times I have come across companies with no financial history. They never submit any accounts to HMRC and claim that they have no assets in the accounts. A company might be using nominees and secret offshore jurisdictions, which we have talked about.
The other interesting thing in the Transparency International evidence, which the Minister might want to reflect on, is that out of the 1,532 companies that they looked at, 94% had at least one corporate partner with a registered address in one of 21 high-risk jurisdictions—the BVI, Belize and so on. I like to have these little stories to tell: there is the bottle laundromat that the Minister will know well, which ended up with £750 million being laundered out of Russia, stolen from the Russian people between 2014 and 2016. Some 130 companies were used. They falsified sales to Russia of bottle-making machines. They never really produced the machines, but in paying for them, they got the money out of Russia. There were three UK LLPs, all of which had two or more offshore corporate partners from one or more high-risk jurisdictions behind them.
This is not an insubstantial problem: it is a big problem. These are not just exceptional occurrences; they occur with too much frequency. What we are trying to do here is not a silver bullet, but we think it is part of the jigsaw that needs to be put together to improve transparency and therefore make things more difficult for people who engage in money laundering and other crime and for people to hide who they are. We are just saying that one natural person should be listed on the board. I am a bit unclear as to whether our proposal would actually achieve that or whether there are other ways of getting to the same objective, one that I think we probably share. I do not know why—I find it a bit odd—we in the UK are offering UK legal protection and privileges, things like limited liability or the rule of law, and sort of by accident we are offering anonymity to people offshore who are not in the least bit troubled by UK law, because they are completely beyond its reach. It seems to me that the current structure enables that to happen.
The new clauses would ensure that partners or members could no longer hide behind offshore corporate partners and members without a named individual being on the line for—held to account for—any wrongdoing. We will still, I know, get nominee directors. Trust and company service providers will still put themselves forward as the named people, or people working in TCSPs will still do it. But I think that this proposal would help with raising red flags and enabling Companies House to focus its activity on those areas where there is the greatest danger.
It is a pleasure to speak to these measures. We have had quite an extensive debate, so I will make just some limited remarks on clause 107 and new clauses 57 and 58. Clause 107 is a very important clause, inserting a requirement on registration for confirmation that a limited partnership’s proposed general partners are not disqualified under the director’s disqualification regime. It also inserts, under proposed new section 8J, a new duty to take steps to remove a general partner who is disqualified. If general partners fail to do that, they will be liable to an offence.
Those requirements are extremely important. I think that some of the debate is just on where some measures perhaps do not go far enough. In summary, we support the arguments made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking on new clauses 57 and 58.
I want to read out another contribution from Professor Berry. I think it is important to keep these contributions on the record in our discussions—recognising as well some of what the Minister has said. As Professor Berry set out in her written evidence to the Committee about the issue of corporate directors, ascertaining an individual acting as a director through a body corporate is certainly more opaque than if the director is just a natural person. The situation is very confusing, but I will read out what the professor said. She stated that
“the concept is demonstrably open to abuse, a ban”
on corporate directors
“was originally proposed in the interests of accountability and transparency, and a legal entity is incapable itself of carrying out the functions or duties of a director…Not only are corporate partners/LLP members a significant feature of wrongdoing…the attempts in the Bill to trace an individual somewhere behind them are so complex as to be unworkable in practice…impossible in practice for CH to check, and an obvious route for obfuscation by wrongdoers. E.g the concept of a named officer or of a managing officer of a corporate partner (and presumably of an LLP member), compounded by the fact that a named officer’s residential address can be redacted and they need not supply a service address.”
As the Minister reflects on our discussions and how we move forward, he should bear in mind the concerns raised by Professor Berry. Whatever is brought forward by the Government—however they have reconsidered it, and tested what it will do and mean in practice—does it pass the Professor Berry test, and meet the challenges that have been put to us regarding the legislation and what could otherwise slip through the net?
This batch of clauses we are considering introduces a range of penalties. Does the Minister agree that the use of those penalties should be part of the annual report to Parliament?
The right hon. Lady makes a fair point. As I said earlier, that is the kind of information I would like to see reported, so that Parliament and the public can see activities surrounding the legislation and the regulations clearly and ensure that Companies House is doing its job. There should be a proper conversation with members of the Committee, the wider House, officials and indeed Companies House to determine what the appropriate measures should be, but the key thing is not the measures, but the outcomes. I think the right hon. Lady, like me, would be very happy if no penalties were applied, as long as our system was 100% clean. That is what we are aiming for, and ideally it is what our measures will achieve; to me, that is the most important thing.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 111, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 112 and 113 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 114 disagreed to.
Clause 115
Notification of other changes
Amendment made: 31, in clause 115, page 99, line 1, leave out
“10A (inserted by section 114 of this Act)”
and insert “10”.—(Kevin Hollinrake.)
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 30.
Clause 115, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 116
Confirmation statements
Limited partnerships are tax transparent, meaning that the individuals that are part of the limited partnership pay tax, rather than the limited partnership itself. In many cases, the partners of a limited partnership will pay tax in the UK, either because they are individuals who pay income tax or because they are corporate entities that pay corporation tax. Where the partners are UK corporate entities, they will also provide accounting information to the registrar. However, there are some limited partnerships whose partners do not pay tax in the UK or which are not legally required to provide accounting information to the UK Government.
The clause will give the Secretary of State the power to make regulations that require the general partners of UK-registered limited partnerships to provide accounting information to HMRC, closing the current gap. General partners who do not comply with that requirement will commit an offence and be liable to a fine or imprisonment.
That sounds like a good idea, but HMRC is absolutely hopeless at using such powers. Time and again with these limited partnerships where scandals have emerged, it appears companies have told HMRC that they are dormant. They have not submitted accounts, and HMRC never checks up on them. What steps will the Minister take to make sure that those useful powers are used?
I thank my right hon. Friend for her remarks. The clause is extremely important for HMRC, providing clarity around accounts and accounting information and what tax should be due. It gives HMRC powers to request information and inserts a new section into the Limited Partnerships Act 1907 to create a new power for the Secretary of State to make regulations that require general partners to prepare accounts and, on request, make accounting information available to HMRC.
We very much support the measure. We want enhanced powers for HMRC to help with the detection and prevention of economic crime, and indeed the paying of rightful tax through better accounting information and submission of tax returns. I support the question that my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking asked about how we can ensure that HMRC uses the powers in a useful way.
(2 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI thank the Minister for his remarks, and wish to speak to this group on behalf of my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon as well. I must say that these provisions are not easy to follow, so forgive me for feeling like I will need to reread Hansard in a darkened room in order to completely follow what the Minister has said.
I do not think any of us understood a word of that. It would be really nice if the Minister could explain it in black and white, because I just could not get what that was getting at at all.
Perhaps the Minister could also explain how that is different from what we agreed last week.
I thank my right hon. Friend for her question, which the Minister may wish to answer before I continue my remarks.
We are debating Government amendment 106 to clause 84, with which it is convenient to consider Government new clause 34. It is this light; I am afraid I am reading eights for threes. I am terribly sorry.
I am not sure that what we are trying to do here is relevant to the matter that the hon. Lady raised. Amendment 114 would prevent regulations being made to allow the registrar to make information unavailable for public inspection under new section 1088 unless there are compelling reasons for the information to be withheld, which this amendment outlines.
Of course, there are instances where disclosure of information on the public register is inappropriate—I think we have all agreed that through the course of this debate—for instance, where it could lead to an increased risk of fraud and identity theft, or put individuals at risk for some reason, such as in cases of domestic abuse. There are limitations in the extent to which existing provisions in the Companies Act 2006 allow personal information to be withheld from the public register. We want to expand that to ensure that personal information is properly protected.
Clause 87 amends the Companies Act to allow individuals to apply to the registrar to suppress information relating to an individual or address and prevent it from being disclosed or made available for public inspection. That will include their residential address, signature, business occupation, and date of birth in old documents.
This is another opportunity to raise the issue, to which I have not had an answer, of Fedotov. That is how he kept his name off the—[Interruption.] It is. We just need an answer.
The answer is that any person applying under the exemption will have to prove to the registrar that there is sufficient evidence of a serious risk of violence or intimidation to protect their names or information. If necessary, the registrar will refer cases to an appropriate law enforcement agency and will have the power to revoke protection if information comes to light to suggest that false evidence has been provided.
Does the right hon. Lady honestly think that a registrar, who has a duty and responsibility to protect the integrity of the register, would assist an oligarch, for example, in trying to hide information? I think we are into conspiracy theory territory here, which I do not think will get us very far.
In general, I would agree with the Minister. However, the truth is that Fedotov did manage that. If the Minister could provide an explanation of why and how that happened, then we might get greater comfort in this Committee that those circumstances will not arise again.
I committed earlier to look into that case, and I will, but the Usmanov case, as I said, was a completely different case. The whole reason why we are bringing forward this legislation is to improve transparency and fight economic crime. The right hon. Lady’s indication that perhaps the registrar might be complicit with Russian oligarchs, who may be guilty of economic crime, is not really plausible.
These are reasonable provisions for people whom we suggest might be at risk of harm if we publish that information, and they have to demonstrate that that harm is a salient risk. They are reasonable provisions that would be used fairly sparingly in the main, but nevertheless there have to be those kinds of provisions where somebody is at risk of harm. That does not exempt the applicant from providing the information to the registrar, where it is still required by legislation, but it will no longer be displayed publicly. Critically—and this should answer the right hon. Lady’s point—information would still be available to law enforcement agencies and other public bodies. It would not be appropriate to limit the registrar’s ability to protect personal information in the way proposed by the amendment.
I just want to reiterate that all protected information, whether suppressed or not, is available to law enforcement agencies. That is the critical point. Individuals who seek to use these exemptions have to provide sufficient evidence of a serious risk of violence or intimidation, and that protection can be revoked if new information comes to the registrar’s attention that she feels casts doubt on the original assertions.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 87 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 88
Analysis of information for the purposes of crime prevention or detection
I beg to move amendment 119, in clause 88, page 68, line 15, leave out from “must” to the end of line 17 and insert
“analyse information within its possession with a view to preventing or detecting crime.”
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 120, in clause 88, page 68, line 17, at end insert—
“(1A) In carrying out the analysis the registrar must make use of its power to require additional information under section 1092A where the registrar considers that such additional information may contribute to the prevention or detection of crime.”
Amendment 116, in clause 88, page 68, line 17, at end insert—
“(1A) As part of the analysis under subsection (1), the registrar must carry out a risk assessment to identify where the information it holds might give rise to a matter of concern.
(1B) Where the assessment identifies a matter of concern, the registrar must—
(a) carry out whatever further analysis it considers necessary; and
(b) share any evidence of unlawful activity it identifies with the relevant law enforcement agency.
(1C) For the purposes of this section, a “matter of concern” includes—
(a) inaccurate information;
(b) information that might create a false or misleading impression; or
(c) evidence of economic crime.”
New clause 37—Duty to check person of significant control status—
“(1) The Companies Act 2006 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 790LP (Offence of failing to comply with sections 790LI to 790LN) insert—
“790LQ Duty to check person of significant control status
(1) This section applies when a registrable person’s identity is verified under section 1110A(1) and a risk assessment carried out under section 1062A(1A) has identified a matter of concern in relation to the registrable person.
(2) The registrar must take steps to ensure that the registrable person whose identity is being verified is a person with significant control over the company.””
New clause 38—Risk-based examination of accounts of dissolved companies—
“(1) The Companies Act 2006 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 1062A (analysis of information for the purposes of crime prevention and detection) insert—
“1062B Risk-based examination of accounts of dissolved companies
(1A) In a case where the registrar’s risk assessment under section 1062A(1A) has identified a matter of concern in relation to a dissolved company, the registrar must examine the accounts of the dissolved company with a view to establishing whether any economic crime has been committed.
(1B) The registrar must share details of any evidence gathered under subsection (1A) with the relevant law enforcement agencies.””
New clause 41—Disclosure of control of 5% or more of shares in a public company—
“(1) This section applies to shareholdings in public companies as defined by section 4 of the Companies Act 2006.
(2) A person who controls 5% or more of the shares in a public company must declare this fact to the registrar.
(3) The duty in subsection (2) applies whether the person controls the shares directly or indirectly.
(4) The registrar may impose a penalty on any person who fails to comply with the duty in subsection (2).”
This new clause would require all persons controlling 5% or more of the shares in a public company to declare the total amount of their shareholding to the registrar. This would, for example, require a person controlling shares through multiple nominees to declare the total number of shares they control.
New clause 42—Verification of persons controlling 5% or more of shares in a public company—
“(1) This section applies where—
(a) a person has disclosed to the registrar control of 5% or more of the shares in a public company under section [Disclosure of control of 5% or more of shares in a public company], and
(b) the registrar has identified a matter of concern under subsection 1062A(1A) of the Companies Act 2006.
(2) the registrar must—
(a) verify the identity of that person, and
(b) verify the number of shares that person claims to control.”
This new clause should be read together with Amendment 116 which inserts subsection 1062A(1A) into the Companies Act 2006. It would require the registrar to verify both the identity and the shareholding of a person who controls 5% or more of shares in a company where the registrar’s risk-based analysis set out in Amendment 116 has identified a matter of concern.
New clause 43—Disclosure of shares held by nominee—
“(1) This section applies to public companies as defined by section 4 of the Companies Act 2006.
(2) Any person holding shares in a public company as nominee for another person must disclose this fact to the registrar.
(3) The registrar may impose a penalty on any person who fails to comply with the duty in subsection (2).”
This new clause would require shareholders of a company to disclose the fact that they are acting as nominees. Failure to comply could result in a penalty.
The Minister is delighted. All the provisions are grouped together, so he will have to listen to me forever. The lighting is not much better, but we will see how we go—I know we are saving energy.
The provisions that we are discussing all sit together. I will start with amendments 119 and 120, with which we are trying to strengthen the duties, rather than the powers, of Companies House. During the course of the Committee’s discussion of the Bill, we have considered how UK corporate structures and vehicles are used to move, hide and launder money. When the Bill is enacted, although I hope that it will be amended to strengthen the nature of the information we get by strengthening the supervision of company service providers, Companies House will hold a wealth of data.
Amendment 119 seeks to make it compulsory for Companies House to analyse that data to prevent and detect crime. By removing some words, it would be tougher than the current wording of the clause, according to which Companies House could analyse that data, but does not necessarily have to. The clause says
“as the registrar considers appropriate”,
and, without the amendment, Companies House could and will argue that it does not consider analysis “appropriate”. We would remove that provision and say that the registrar must use the data that has been made available to her to see whether or not it can support us in our efforts to avoid crime.
I have one other thing to say about this issue. We have talked a lot in the debate about corruption and the way in which it has impacted the UK economy. As we discuss the Bill further, we have to remember the impact it will also have much more widely. According to the ONE Campaign’s latest estimate, around $1 trillion is lost every year to corruption in developing countries. A lot of that comes through the abuse of corporate structures that we have in the UK. That is just one example that demonstrates how UK corporate structures facilitate theft and corrupt activity.
I know that that is under the current regime and that much of this should go when we get to our new regime. However, I will give another example of how the abuse of UK corporate structures led to money, again, coming out of Russia, which is the bottle laundromat—another of these laundromats—that was uncovered by Transparency International. British companies were, again, at the centre. It was a money laundering operation from 2014 to 2016 where $820 million came out of Russia. Again, it involved—classically—a network of shell companies, many of them UK firms, that apparently sold bottle-moulding machines to Russia.
The right hon. Lady raises some important cases, and she is right to do so. Is that not exactly why we are trying to do this in this way? There are 4.5 million companies registered in England. Around 700,000 companies are registered every year, or 2,000 a day, and 400,000 are dissolved every year. If she is asking Companies House to analyse every single company—that is exactly what her amendment says—to determine risk, she is asking too much of Companies House and she will miss the important needles in the haystack that she refers to.
Were I asking that, that would be unreasonable but if the Minister takes all my amendments together, he will see that they and others talk about a risk-based assessment of the available data.
The amendment does not say that. It says that
“the registrar must carry out a risk assessment”,
not a risk-based approach. There is a big difference in terms of what the right hon. Lady is asking for.
But when we come to the new clauses, which we will discuss later, they say “risk-based”. It is a risk-based assessment. Perhaps the Minister could explain what the difference is.
The amendment says
“a risk assessment to identify where the information it holds might give rise to a matter of concern.”
That certainly says to me that a risk assessment would be required for every company. To me, a risk-based approach would identify various pieces of information, and Companies House would act on that information and determine whether the risk is from companies, directors or persons of significant control and act on that. That is our approach; the right hon. Lady’s approach is moving away from that.
The Minister is misinterpreting our approach. I am sorry if he reads it that way, but I agree that we are not asking for 100%. He calls it a risk-based assessment; I call it a risk assessment. Apologies for the difference in language.
If we were having this debate in my constituency, my constituents would say to me and, indeed, to the Minister, “We want to hire a police officer to stop crime.” If we look at a definition of what a police officer does, they maintain law and order in local areas, prevent crime, reduce fear of crime and improve the quality of life for all citizens. We want Companies House to stop economic crime and that is what my right hon. Friend’s amendments seek to achieve.
At the moment, the Bill says—I can’t read it because there is no bloody light! It is a thing that as you get old, your eyes aren’t brilliant:
“The registrar must carry out such analysis of information within the registrar’s possession as the registrar considers appropriate”.
We are attempting to take that wording out of the Bill to make it a duty, because otherwise we know from the other enforcement agencies and the work of other Government agencies that unless clearly directed, the real work would not be done. There would be an excuse. They would be busy doing something else. This is their key proactive role. We can go on and on about it during the course of the Bill, but I assure the Minister that the registrar should do it in a risk-based way. She should not do it, as the Bill says, as is appropriate; she should just do it. That is really the first thing.
I will quickly describe the bottle laundromat. The Minister and I are very familiar with all the stories, but other members of the Committee are not, and the stories are pretty shocking. Every time we hear another one, it is shocking. The stories reinforce the justification for the sort of interventions that Labour Members want to include in the Bill.
I think this is about a different interpretation of words.
The amendment would require Companies House to conduct risk assessments of the information and data it holds on the register for the purposes of the prevention and detection of economic crime. The amendment also creates a basis for new clauses 37 and 38, to introduce an obligation on Companies House to use all the data it collects to identify where economic crime risks lie.
I genuinely think we are quarrelling about words, not about what we want to do. On the basis of that risk assessment, or whatever word the Minister wants to use, Companies House would then decide when to use its powers proactively.
Interestingly enough, my wonderful staff have looked it up, and everybody else uses these terms. We are not alone in this. The Financial Action Task Force standards talk about risk assessments. It talks about a “risk-based approach”. Is that language better for the Minister?
It means the same to us—I think the Minister is really being a little bit pedantic here. If we bring the amendments back on Report with the words “risk-based”, perhaps we will have a better chance of getting them through.
The risk-based approach is central to the implementation of FATF’s recommendations. The UK’s AML regime and the Council of Europe use a risk-based approach, as does the private sector. I want to use a risk-based approach, and so does the Minister, so why do we not just get on with it?
We do, and it is exactly what the clause states:
“The registrar must carry out such analysis of information within the registrar’s possession as the registrar considers appropriate for the purposes of preventing or detecting crime.”
In other words, the registrar identifies a red flag and then does an investigation. The right hon. Lady’s amendment 116 says:
“the registrar must carry out a risk assessment to identify where the information it holds might give rise to a matter of concern.”
That is a non-risk-based assessment.
Order. Minister, may I intervene for a second? You will have time to respond to all this in the debate, but that is a very long intervention.
I have to say we disagree, but I will come back to this issue. I think our proposals strengthen the Bill.
I tabled my amendments to clause 88 because I do not support the wording of
“as the registrar considers appropriate”.
I have to say to the Minister that we discovered in this morning’s sitting that the company registrar has so far registered 3,000 properties for a register that has now been in place since August. In three months, she has done 3,000, but there are 138,000 to deal with. At that rate—if she does 12,000 a year—she will be there till doomsday, so putting a little bomb underneath her to ensure that she takes action is important.
My right hon. Friend is making a brilliant speech. If anything, the Minister has caused more alarm than he might have intended this afternoon by referring to the language in the Bill that says the registrar must take account of the information that she holds. There is no way that we would ask a police officer to police Hodge Hill simply with reference to the information that that police officer happens to hold. We would ask the police officer to look at the crime environment in the constituency as a whole, taking account of all kinds of perspectives, not simply the information that he or she happened to have in their little black book.
I will move on to new clause 37, which has the aim of checking that the stated person of significant control really is the person who controls the company. Powers to get information, to reject documents, to require information and to remove documents all sit in the Bill. The new clause would ensure that, through a risk-based assessment—I just reiterate that for the Minister—Companies House would proactively check that the person named as the PSC was the PSC in reality. Current legislation requires the ID verification of a company owner, but not the verification of their status as a company owner, so the risk remains that nominees will continue to be put forward as owners of companies despite the real control being elsewhere. The risk is heightened if the Minister does not move to ensure that company service providers are properly regulated, supervised and vetted before the whole system comes into force.
In the current system, there are endless examples that demonstrate the extent of the problem that the Minister and the Government are trying to tackle—we are trying to contribute to that process. One is the famous dentist in Belgium. From an interrogation of the Companies House register, we know that five beneficial owners control more than 6,000 companies, which is a huge red flag. Some 4,000 of them are under the age of two, and 400,000 companies—almost 10% of the total—still do not declare a person of significant control. We have the Azerbaijan laundromat example, where a lorry driver in Baku was named as the person of significant control and had no idea that kleptocrats from Azerbaijan were taking all the money out of the banks and money laundering it elsewhere.
There is one filing in Companies House for which I thought I would name the person of significant control. The company is called Global Risks Reduction Funding Ltd, and the name is listed as—I will take a deep breath—
“Neutral-Claimant-Federal-Witness-Director-Captain-Postmaster-Bank-Banker-Plenipotentiary-Notary-Judge-Vassalee For The Vessel-Phouthone-Thone: Siharath.”
I do not think anybody has questioned that as the person of significant control. The whole thing is absurd.
An important point for the Minister is that, in 2019, Transparency International did a quick Google search and found 23 active company service providers that were offering the service of nominee persons of significant control—that was one quick search of one directory. When Global Witness undertook research on Scottish limited partnerships, it found that 40% of the beneficial owners of Scottish limited partnerships were either a national of a former Soviet country, or a company incorporated in the former Soviet Union.
I have been tracking for some time the number of times when a person of significant control for Scottish limited partnerships has not even been registered. Does the right hon. Lady agree that it is ridiculous that there are still 201 companies for which a person of significant control does not exist at all?
Yes. The law is being broken but nobody is pursuing those who are guilty.
These are all reasons for closely monitoring data on persons of significant control. The measure would simply put a duty on Companies House to be proactive and to check the status of the person named on a risk-based basis, not just via their personal details.
New clause 38 deals with dissolution, which has been raised with me by a number of stakeholders. We know of numerous instances of bad people dissolving companies for nefarious purposes. The new clause would ensure that the registrar looks at the accounts of a company seeking to dissolve to ensure that no fraud or other crime has occurred. If the registrar found such cause for concern, she would have to pass the information on to relevant enforcement agencies.
We are all very familiar with the phoenixing of companies and the role that that practice has played in facilitating fraud. I have chosen as an example the case of Rodney and Pauline Williams, which is typical. They ran a company called Curio Bridal Boutique Ltd. They made false representations to take money out of the company and put it into another company in anticipation of winding up Curio Bridal Boutique. They took £111,000, of which they put £42,000 into the pockets of their own family. They were detected and convicted, but sadly the successful detection of such cases is all too rare and the practice happens all too often.
The Troika Laundromat—another of the laundromats that has hit us over the last 10 years or so—is another example of where a leak of documents showed how one of Russia’s largest investment banks, Troika Dialog, was central to the channelling of billions of dollars out of Russia. That leak covered 1.3 million transactions. It involved more than 1,000 UK limited liability partnerships, and it was found that the UK had been handling nearly £10 billion of dodgy Russian money. One UK-based company was found to have made payments totalling £360 million, although it filed accounts each year and dared to declare itself dormant. It then dissolved itself in 2014. That company was called Stranger Agency LLP.
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his kind words. I remember very clearly my speech in Westminster Abbey that night. He might remember that I talked about corporate criminal liability and whistleblower reform, which are absolutely essential. Indeed, at least one of those falls under my portfolio, so I am certainly committed to bringing forward those reforms when I can.
The only difference between hon. Members of the Opposition and ourselves is the means by which we would achieve the same end. On amendments 119 and 120, I am always happy to look at sensible amendments that take us forward. When Opposition Members talk about those cases, they are talking primarily about cases in the past where we did not have the powers that this Bill provides, and where we did not have the level of enforcement; we both agree that that needs improvement.
Where we differ is on how we go about this. I have serious concerns about the provisions in amendment 116, tabled by the right hon. Member for Barking, which seem to require the registrar to look at every single company on the record. That is exactly what it says. It says that the registrar
“must carry out a risk assessment to identify where the information it holds might give rise to a matter of concern.”
The registrar can do that only by looking at every single record.
I will just develop my arguments. I listened to hers at length, and I heard them very clearly. Our approach is a more workable one. I do not think her approach is workable. I think that if we listen to each other’s arguments, we are probably saying the same thing. We are trying to overlay the information that sits with the registrar herself in Companies House with information from others, such as banks, lawyers, accountants—we discussed that in earlier debates—and law enforcement agencies in order to identify where the information she holds identifies risks, so that she can then carry out an investigation.
I will develop my point a little further, and then I will let the right hon. Lady intervene.
As the right hon. Member knows, objective 4 establishes exactly that: an obligation
“to minimise the extent to which companies and others carry out unlawful activities, or…facilitate the carrying out by others of unlawful activities.”
That is quite clearly in the Bill.
New clauses 37 and 38 would require the status of a person with significant control and the accounts of dissolved companies to be checked by the registrar. The registrar would be required to carry out a risk assessment of all those companies—roughly 1,000 companies per day. Members might be thinking that every person with significant control has some connection to Russian dirty money or Russian oligarchs, but the vast majority of state-owned enterprises have a person with significant control, because they own more than 25% of those companies. For the registrar to look at 1,000 companies every single day to determine whether there is a risk, and then investigate further—that is exactly what the right hon. Lady’s new clauses would require—would not be practical.
This is becoming a rather absurd psephological debate. I have just asked my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill whether I have got the wording wrong—whether there is a great difference between risk assessment and risk-based assessment. Perhaps Government Members will tell me differently, but those two things are the same, and we should not try to locate a difference between them.
The last thing any of us wants to do is micromanage any of our organisations through legislation, but we have to look at the experience and the record of all the enforcement agencies and bodies in the financial services sector over the years. If we have colleagues of ours in the House doing that, they will meet with massive criticism. One way to tighten and toughen this up without having to get involved in the minutiae is to move from powers to duties, which is the purpose of a lot of the amendments we are debating today. If the Minister does not take seriously some of these practical suggestions, he is in danger of setting up a new system that is as open to abuse as the current system, and we will be back here in a couple of years putting it right.
All legislation needs improvement, but we must not put the registrar under a duty that makes her job impossible. That is what the right hon. Lady’s amendment would do. That is what I am pointing out to her; not that I do not think—
I cannot let the right hon. Lady intervene again. We are pressed for time. We just do not agree on this point. I think that we agree on the broad sentiment that there should be a risk-based analysis, but that is not what her amendment says.
With 1,000 companies resolved every day, it would be impractical to have a risk assessment of every single one of those companies and to then do the risk-based analysis. I think that the amendments are too directive, and I ask Members not to press them. I am happy to consider whether there is a less prescriptive formulation that we could add to the clause to have that effect. I completely understand and concur with Members’ broad objective. Of course we want a proactive regulator who determines where the risks are and acts on information, be it from journalists, private sector companies or enforcement agencies, to inform her work and to make sure that she pursues those who are most likely to be guilty of wrongdoing.
A couple of Members referred to the Russian sanctions regime. In the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 13) Regulations 2022, we broadened the designation criteria to include specified immediate family members and those with links to Russian state-owned businesses. There are, of course, things like the combating kleptocracy cell at the National Crime Agency.
New clauses 41, 42 and 43 seek to address concerns about nominee shareholders. New clauses 41 and 42 would require people who control, directly or indirectly, 5% or more of the shares in a public company to declare themselves. New clause 43 would require any person holding shares in a public company as a nominee for another person to disclose that fact to the registrar. The new clauses would put additional obligations to disclose information to the registrar on to the person who holds the shares, rather than the company to which the shares relate.
New clauses 41 and 42 would create a burden in relation to public companies that would not exist for private companies. It would not be proportionate to impose such a burden on public companies that are low risk and that have additional requirements placed on them. It is already the case in the law on nominee shareholders or proxies that a share held by a person as a nominee for another is to be treated as though the share is held by the true owner and not by the nominee. Failure to declare a shareholder is a criminal offence and if the court were to find that a person should have been registered, the person and their company would be at risk of prosecution. I hope that provides the assurance that right hon. and hon. Members need.
I know that we share the objectives, but I feel very frustrated by the inability to decide whether a risk assessment and a risk-based assessment are the same. For the life of me, I cannot see the difference. We will put it to the vote and see whether those in favour of risk-based assessments are happy to go with “risk assessments”.
That is not what the right hon. Lady has put in her amendment. It says not “risk-based assessment” but “risk assessment”.
I would say that there is no difference. In amendment 116, we have “risk assessments”. For those of us who think this is the way forward, I have to say that the Minister’s argument seems constructed rather than real.
Let me be clear. We are discussing amendment 119 to clause 88. Does the right hon. Member for Barking want to press the amendment to a vote?
No. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 116, in clause 88, page 68, line 17, at end insert—
‘(1A) As part of the analysis under subsection (1), the registrar must carry out a risk assessment to identify where the information it holds might give rise to a matter of concern.
(1B) Where the assessment identifies a matter of concern, the registrar must—
(a) carry out whatever further analysis it considers necessary; and
(b) share any evidence of unlawful activity it identifies with the relevant law enforcement agency.
(1C) For the purposes of this section, a “matter of concern” includes—
(a) inaccurate information;
(b) information that might create a false or misleading impression; or
(c) evidence of economic crime.’—(Dame Margaret Hodge.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
(2 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI thank the Minister for his intervention. The issue is not what we assume and hope might happen, but having some checks and balances on the use of powers. It is part of our responsibility on the Committee to think that through.
That is always the case. Perhaps the Minister will reflect that Usmanov was a case in point. He exploited an exemption to hide some of the information around his ownership. It is worth all of us reflecting on that. Obviously the provision has to be there for good people, but it may become yet another opportunity for bad people. The Usmanov case was a classic one. I think Fedotov was another, if my memory serves me right. Apologies if I have this wrong, but Fedotov was another one who managed to get an exemption in some way. If these things are not done properly, and are not then properly monitored, they can go wrong.
I thank my right hon. Friend for highlighting an important case in point.
I think the Minister is right about Usmanov, but on Fedotov I think it was something different. I cannot quite remember the details, but he managed to use an exemption to hide his identity. We raised it last week, and I think that officials were going to come back with a response. They may not have had time to read the letter yet, but that is more the case that one would think of.
Order. For the benefit of those following our proceedings, I remind Members of the flow of debate: the Minister will respond to the shadow spokesperson, and the right hon. Member for Barking will have an opportunity to intervene on him then.
I think that we are trying to achieve the same thing, just in different ways. We discussed this issue at length in previous sittings. Companies House is already actively working on unique identifiers. It is not credible to think that, having legislated for them, we will not implement them. A basic principle of the Bill is to be able properly to link individuals on the Companies House register, so that company directors have a better experience and so that it is easier for the public to identify the connection between directors, including persons of significant control, and companies.
I accept that great progress has been made in the Bill, but addresses and personal details are also important. We know the way in which addresses are exploited: people put 3,000 companies into one address. That is relevant information that Companies House needs to have.
Addresses are not covered by the amendment, although we discussed the verification of addresses at length the other day. We think we have struck a fair balance in terms of a company address. The shadow Minister seems to be saying that she wants the unique identifier to be searchable; we think that the person’s name should be public and searchable. I did not quite understand her point about people hiding their email addresses or names, and searching by unique identifier, rather than the other way around. We think that the searchable entity should be the person’s name, and the Bill would then make it easier to see the connections between a director’s name and the different companies with which that person is connected.
I think I have understood the hon. Lady’s question. Clearly, all directors and company service providers need to have their identity verified too. If that is what the hon. Lady is referring to, that is absolutely contained in the provisions of the Bill.
I was very interested in what the Minister said about ensuring that the authorised company service providers should be checked and supervised properly. It is really important to ensure that all the details of the individuals on the register can be found with certainty. However, we are all struggling with how to do that in quickest, most cost-efficient and effective way. Does the Minister agree that a suitable mechanism should be presented on Report—unless he would like to suggest one now—that does not waste time, keeps within the timeframe, does not require massive additional resources and enables swift action to be taken? I love the Treasury, but we should do this without having to wait for a Treasury review or reorganisation. Does he accept that that might be a way forward? We all want the same thing, and if we do not get this right there could be a huge flaw in the system we are establishing.
We are on the same page about ensuring that the system is fit for purpose. It is difficult for me to do a review when the Treasury itself is doing one and is probably better placed than I am to do it, given its wider understanding of the system.
Clauses 76 to 79 support the Bill’s overarching ambition to broaden the powers of the registrar to maintain the integrity of the register. Clause 76 provides a new power to reject documents for discrepancies. Currently, the registrar must accept documents if they have been properly delivered—that is, they meet the requirements as to their contents, form, authentication and manner of delivery, and the other requirements listed in section 1072 of the Companies Act 2006.
Documents containing information that is at odds with information that the registrar holds may none the less meet “proper delivery” requirements in their own right. If so, they must be placed on the register despite the apparent inconsistency. This clause cures that problem by enabling the registrar to reject a document if it appears to be inconsistent with other information that is held by or available to the registrar. The power is available if, due to the inconsistency, the registrar has reasonable grounds to doubt whether the document complies with the requirements as to its contents.
This is a question to aid understanding. This provision sets out the duties of the registrar in relation to documents, but the documents will actually be checked by the company service providers, will they not? That will be outsourced to those providers. I might be wrong—the Minister is looking puzzled—but that is the case if I read the situation correctly. Therefore, is this provision suggesting that there will be a check at Companies House on the work that the company service providers do? Perhaps the Minister can say a little about how that will be implemented. I thought that all that was to be pushed out to the company service providers.
Not at all—quite the opposite. Companies House has a requirement to oversee the integrity of the register, and the clause states exactly that. If the registrar feels there is an error that she is not happy with in the document, or it is inconsistent, she can reject the document whether it is filed by a company service provider or by a director of the company.
For complete clarity, there will be a risk-based system of checks on documents provided as a mechanism for ensuring the accuracy of the documents that are submitted.
Absolutely. That is exactly how we expect it to operate.
Once the registrar refuses the document, it will be treated as not having been delivered. Under clause 77, the Companies Act 2006 allows the registrar, upon receipt of an instruction from someone else and only with the relevant company’s or other body’s consent, to correct a document at the pre-registration stage if it appears to be incomplete or internally inconsistent. That power was useful when more companies filed on paper, as informally correcting material was easier than rejecting a document and waiting for it to be refiled. However, in the digital world, filings can now be rejected, returned to the filer and then refiled within minutes. There is no longer a need to informally correct a document pre-registration. Clause 77 therefore removes that power, which also encourages accuracy in filing by removing the expectation that a document can be informally corrected.
Clause 78 reduces the period of time for which the registrar must keep originals of documents that have been delivered in hard copy from three years to two years. Once that period has passed, the original documents can be destroyed as long as the information they contain has been recorded. The retention period that was previously reviewed was reduced from 10 years to three years when the Companies Act 2006 replaced the 1989 Act. The number of requests for the retrieval of filings has decreased further and steadily since then due to declining paper filings, improved image capture processes and increased confidence in digital records. It is therefore right to reduce the retention period again. The information in the documents will still of course be available electronically to users as appropriate.
Clause 79 amends the period for which the registrars in each UK jurisdiction must maintain certain records available for public inspection. The records in view are those concerning dissolved companies, including certain information regarding PSCs of dissolved companies, overseas companies that have ceased to have any UK connection, and overseas credit and financial institutions that have ceased to be required to file accounts with the registrar. The clause provides that those records can be moved to the Public Record Office two years after the relevant date of dissolution or cessation.
May I ask a question on that? It is relevant to later amendments. I do not know whether the Minister or his officials can help, but can Companies House stop a request for dissolution?
I think it can. I have tried to find its powers and cannot find them. The great example is the Savaro one. It was the UK-based company that owned the warehouse where the fire took place in Lebanon. It tried to dissolve the company, but I think the Minister intervened. I have looked up Savaro and it does still exist. It is quite important if we have a dirty company that wants to rush away. Do we have powers to dissolve it?
I am happy to raise that with officials and come back to the right hon. Lady. [Interruption.] There is some flapping about right there, as I speak.
These amendments relate to the register of overseas entities introduced by virtue of part 1 of the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022. The new clauses mirror equivalent sections in the Companies Act 2006 as amended by part 1 of the Bill, which we have already debated. They will ensure consistency between the two Acts.
The amendments will ensure that the public register contains only information that it is necessary to display, and that certain information including email addresses is not made publicly available, because of the risk that that could facilitate identity theft or other fraud. New clause 16 will ensure that personal information supplied in connection with the verification process for the register of overseas entities can be appropriately protected from public inspection. It is right to ensure that certain personal information, including email addresses, is not made publicly available because of the risk that that could facilitate identity theft or other fraud.
Again, I am really asking for information. It would be interesting to learn whether the Minister knows how many overseas entities have been registered since the enactment of the 2022 Act. It could still end up being unclear who the real beneficial owner was of an overseas entity. If someone went to an overseas entity to find out who owns One Hyde Park, and it said that the owner was a British Virgin Islands company, would the owner of that company be shown?
That does not directly relate to this amendment, but I will get back to the right hon. Lady on that point in a separate conversation. Details such as the name and company of the person verifying the information submitted by an overseas entity to the register will continue to be publicly visible; it is not our intention to change that.
New clause 17 replaces sections 22 to 24 of the ECTE Act with proposed new sections 22 and 23. As with new clause 16, new clause 17 adds to the list of information that the registrar must not make available for public inspection, to help prevent the abuse of such information. That includes categories of information that were never intended to be made available for public inspection, but were missed during the expedited passage of the ECTE Act through Parliament, such as the email address of an overseas entity. New clause 17 also includes new categories of information that an overseas entity will be required to provide as a result of other amendments that are being introduced by the Bill, including the title number of land that an overseas entity owns, and documents provided to the registrar under her new power to require further information. New clause 17’s insertion of new section 23 also means that the registrar can disclose protected information about trusts, date of birth and residential address only in two scenarios.
Amendments 12, 39, 40 and 49 are consequential on new clause 17. Under the amendments, the registrar need not retain material that must not be made available for public inspection longer than appears reasonably necessary to her for the purposes for which the material was delivered to her.
I will say to the right hon. Member for Barking that there have been over 3,000 registrations on the register of overseas entities since it was established on 1 August 2022. It is right to ensure that the public register of material concerning overseas entities contains only information that is necessary to display, and that certain information, including email addresses, is not made publicly available for the reasons that I have stated. It is also right to amend the Companies Act 2006 in a way that mirrors amendments made in the Bill, so that there is consistency between the two Acts.
That would be welcome. New clause 18 grants the Secretary of State the power to make regulations as they see fit, in order to protect material on the register. Further scrutiny will be required on what could happen in future, and the circumstances in which that power might be needed.
The perception may have been that we had opposing positions on some aspects of the Secretary of State’s powers, but we now find ourselves coming a little closer together. We are debating the Bill, which largely has cross-party support, in good faith, but there are many little ways in which things could get changed, without those changes being subject to full debate in the House. It is important that we debate that further during proceedings on the Bill. I repeat that I want to ensure that there is no devil in the detail. I appreciate the Minister committing to return to the issue in part 3, when we will have a chance to look at the matter in slightly more detail.
There was a report in The Guardian yesterday on an organisation called Wealth Chain Project. Its analysis showed that 138,000 residential and commercial properties in England and Wales are owned by offshore companies. We have managed to get 3,000 so far, so there is a heck of a lot—
There is not a direct correlation between the two, because one overseas entity might own many UK properties.
Ah, that is a valid point, and I think the article deals with it. Some entities will own more than a few properties, but—sorry, I am just looking to see whether the article does make that point. The article demonstrates the enormous importance of Executive action. That is why the Opposition feel strongly that action should take place; there is no point in just putting legislation in place. There is a desire to monitor that action, and toughen up the provision to ensure that the action happens. I hope that the Minister bears that in mind. No matter how many entities own more than one property, 3,000 is still a long way from the 138,000, assuming that figure is accurate.
I am getting muddled by all these amendments. Will the Minister or his officials provide us with a list of what information will be on the register? What will we see? If we had that, we could take a view on whether that information is sufficient for all our purposes.
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Ms Bardell. I fully appreciate the Government’s need to table amendments—the grind of Committee exposes all kinds of opportunities to improve and strengthen legislation—but this is a good example of the kind of measure that it would have been helpful to see at the beginning of the process, not halfway through, not least because we are all worried about Companies House and its capacity to hunt and root out badness. All of us have in our time, and in our own way, relied on journalists’ investigative capacity to flag bad activity. It is important to the Opposition and, I am sure, the Government, to hear from journalists and investigators on whether the measures that the Minister is introducing jeopardise or constrain their ability to conduct the investigations that they have carried out so admirably over the last few years.
I hope that the Minister will take up the suggestion of my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking and set out very clearly for us what information will be available. The whole Committee would be interested to hear, perhaps informally, from journalists on whether that information will constrain their ability to investigate; we can then decide whether to come back to this issue on Report.
(2 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI will go on to describe the categories. As the hon. Gentleman knows, an assets freeze is a type of financial sanction. Only those sanctions are relevant to someone’s ability to manage, form or promote a company. Non-asset freeze financial sanctions, such as securities and money market instrument prohibitions, can apply to a broader category of person beyond designated persons, for example, all persons connected to a particular country. To subject entire populations of countries to the directorship ban is grossly disproportionate. It would also be operationally unenforceable, as only designated people appear in published sanctions lists.
I do not understand that. I do not know whether the Minister can explain it in ordinary language. It sounds to me like people with other financial interests will not be subject to this measure. I am sorry if I am being clueless, but I just do not understand what is being excluded at this point, and therefore what is included in this very welcome amendment.
As I said in my explanation, for sanctions such as securities and money sanctions, those market instruments can affect entire populations; they do not just affect an individual. Those kinds of broad actions affect whole populations.
The right hon. Lady can intervene again if she wants further clarification.
If someone has some ownership in the securities market—I am not a financial expert, so I do not know whether I am understanding this right—and one took action on the assets, that would have an impact beyond the individual. Is that what we are being told?
No, that is not what the right hon. Lady is being told. If someone has ownership, they have an asset, and therefore if that asset is frozen they are a designated person. It is just that the instruments themselves can affect the broad category of people who may or may not own assets. What we are trying to do is target people who actually own the assets.
I am very grateful. This is really to understand it. If somebody is sanctioned, are they the sort of individual we would want to be a director of a company?
It is not a person who is sanctioned. What we are trying to say is that everybody who is subject to an asset freeze is a designated person—exactly the kind of person the right hon. Lady would want to see sanctioned. Rather than getting into a to-and-fro debate, perhaps we can write to her and explain the situation in layman’s terms.
Furthermore, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office does not currently designate people in relation to non-asset freeze financial sanctions. Although that may change in the future, a directorship ban may not necessarily be the most appropriate measure to impose on those designated for non-asset freeze financial sanctions.
What we are talking about here is financial sanctions. These matters relate to companies and financial sanctions, not to travel sanctions.
Let me explain these points further. Not automatically imposing these measures on potential future scenarios will give the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office the flexibility it needs to impose the most appropriate and meaningful conditions on people designated for financial sanctions beyond asset freezes. Without these amendments, director disqualification measures introduced by the Bill would automatically apply to anyone against whom the designation power under section 9 of SAMLA 2018 is utilised—for example, transport or immigration sanctions, or any future measures that His Majesty’s Government choose to design. Although those are extremely serious matters, such sanctions ought not by necessity impact on the person’s ability to act as a company director. Furthermore, should there be a future need to extend director disqualification measures to people subject to those broader sanctions, that can be done via future legislation as and when the need arises.
I am genuinely sorry to interrupt, and I am looking at the Minister for Security as well. It seems to me that if we consider the behaviour that somebody has done to be so bad that we want to sanction them in whatever way—through a travel ban, asset freeze or other mechanism—surely in those conditions we do not think they are a fit and proper person to start a business? I cannot see the logic of this; I cannot see where the pressure is coming from to have a distinction between the two, and why we should want it. Why are we putting this down? Why should somebody who has been guilty of a human rights abuse, who may not have an asset that we can sanction, still need to be defined as somebody who is not a fit and proper person to set up a company here? We do not want them to do that, do we?
I think the best way forward on that is for myself and the Minister for Security to have a conversation. We can set out some of the reasons why that is the case in more detail in writing, as I promised to do earlier. We can then have a further discussion from there.
I do understand that; the Minister makes a valid point. As I was saying, this is what one might describe as a probing amendment to try to get from him a sense of the proactive action the Government are going to take to go after those enablers.
The Minister is quite right to say that the powers are there, but I hope he agrees that a way to facilitate this would be to introduce a new criminal offence of failure to prevent economic crime. In that case, the enablers to whom my hon. Friend refers could be caught and rightly punished for their role in colluding or facilitating economic crime.
I will stand up and then allow my right hon. Friend to intervene.
As I understand it, if the owner of a company is an opaque company in the British Virgin Islands or another one of our tax havens, the ability to get behind that and see the person of significant control is pretty nigh impossible, so there is still a mechanism there. People could intentionally set up a company in the UK that is totally owned by a company established in the BVI. That information is not currently on the public register, although we are anxiously waiting for it to be so in 2023. There is no way of getting the persons of significant control verified, because it is outside our control.
The Minister probably did not intend to set hares running, but he certainly has with his suggestions this morning. I know he will be alive to the Foreign Affairs Committee report on illicit finance that was published under the chairmanship of the right hon. and gallant Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), who is now the Minister for Security, but I wish to share some of its headlines to underline a point that was wholly missing from the Minister’s presentation.
Let us start with the really bad news. First, the Select Committee concluded that
“assets laundered through the UK are financing President Putin’s war in Ukraine.”
Secondly, the report said:
“The Government’s unwillingness to bring forward legislation to stem the flow of dirty money is likely to have contributed to the belief in Russia that the UK is a safe haven for corrupt wealth.”
It is very welcome that the Government introduced sanctions and have brought forward this Bill, but I am afraid the Foreign Affairs Committee came to the conclusion that our sanctions regime was “underprepared and under-resourced.” We on the Select Committee found that there was not the capacity in the FCDO to match the speed and power of the sanctions regime brought into force by our American colleagues and, indeed, the EU. That is why the House was treated to the spectacle of a piece of enabling legislation that allowed us simply to copy and paste the sanctions regime from other countries into UK law.
There is a serious worry that the FCDO is not equipped to drive through the requisite disqualification of directors at the speed at which it should if it takes decisions on sanctions. I hear what the Minister says about creating some—I guess he would say—safeguards against the automatic suspension of directors, but in the absence of such a regime there is a real concern about an enforcement gap, because the FCDO sanctions and compliance team simply does not have the capacity to work things through with Companies House to ensure that the consequentials are followed through and that directors are disqualified when it is appropriate.
Among the measures that we in the House have previously invented are some of the provisions that I took through in the UK Borders Act 2007. We basically wrote into law the automatic consideration of sanctions such as the suspension of directorships. Many Opposition Members would be an awful lot more confident that bad people would be disqualified from directorships if they were sanctioned if we had some kind of legislative provision that created a duty, and therefore a burden, on Ministers and their officials to automatically consider people for the suspension of their directorships if a sanction of any description was imposed upon them.
This Committee is a chance for us to air different points of view about how we ensure that, as the Minister wants, London is a world capital of clean trade. I put this case before him so that he can reflect on it and perhaps come back to the Committee with further thoughts.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Elliott.
I rise to speak to amendment 83. I did not quite understand the Minister’s attack on or dismissal of it on the basis that it was somehow an attempt to provide a detailed way for authorities to act. That is way beyond what we are attempting to do; all we want to do is make sure the authorities are aware. The Minister and I know, from working in this policy area for a long, long time, how poor all the enforcement agencies are at sharing information. When whistleblowers and others provide information about wrongdoing, too often that falls between the various enforcement agencies, gets lost and nothing ever gets done. We are not here to tell those agencies how to carry out their work, but to ensure that there is better communication.
The amendment addresses some of the issues my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill just raised. It tries to strengthen the sanctions regime against individuals and to stop those individuals moving their assets before they get sanctioned. Under the FCDO, the sanctions process inevitably takes a long time and people know they are about to be on the sanctions list, so they have time to rearrange their affairs so their assets cannot be frozen.
All the amendment would do—it is very simple—is put a duty on Companies House to tell the enforcement authority, whether that is the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, the National Crime Agency or whoever, about any changes that may have occurred in the accounts held by Companies House of individuals who have been sanctioned and whose assets have been frozen in the three months prior to those sanctions being put in place. That is crucial, but why?
In July 2022, OFSI and other UK Government agencies, together with the Joint Money Laundering Intelligence Taskforce, issued a red alert, which I hope the Minister has had a chance to look at. His colleague, the Minister for Security, the right hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), will certainly have done that. It sets out the evasion tactics that individuals use and that enablers, whom my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon mentioned, take to support that evasion. The action that designated individuals take, supported by their advisers, includes the transfer of assets, such as shareholdings, to trusted proxies, such as relatives or friends. To quote the red alert, they will
“sell or transfer assets at a loss in order to realise their value before sanctions take effect”
and they will
“divest investments to ensure ownership stakes are below the 50% threshold”
needed for sanctions.
There are numerous other examples—the red alert includes a list of about 15 such examples—of ways that people avoid sanctions and avoid their assets being taken. The individuals may seem to have got rid of their assets, but they will retain control. They will have simply hidden their control and the form that that control takes, but in reality they will still have control. In some instances, assets have been transferred or directed to jurisdictions where sanctions are not in place, such as China, Brazil, India or the United Arab Emirates, or have been converted into cryptoassets, which we will come to later in our discussions about the Bill.
I came upon such tactics in the case of Usmanov, as we have discussed before, who dodged the sanctions, particularly in relation to his Mayfair mansion—I cannot remember how many millions that is worth. The shares in his London property firm were transferred to his Russian business empire on 21 February, less than a fortnight before he was sanctioned. The transfer involved property owned by Klaret Services UK Limited being sold to Russia’s largest iron ore company, Metalloinvest, in which Usmanov has a 49% share. That is just below the 50% threshold, although it is in Russia. That transfer is legal—he was able to act legally and within our law—and he was able to do it because we were so slow to sanction.
The sanctions against Usmanov did not cover his companies, so when he transferred the Mayfair property to a company, a different mechanism would have had to be adopted to capture its owner. As he had a 49% share in that company, it would have been difficult to pursue that. Both the shareholding in the company and the transfer mattered. Under our amendment, Usmanov would not have got rid of the property. Companies House would have had to give the enforcement agencies information about the transactions that had been undertaken in the three months prior to the sanctions, and those agencies could have taken action on it.
I always listen to the right hon. Lady very carefully, so she can be sure that I have been listening. I am keen to tie up—as the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston, put it—any loopholes that we identify in the legislation. That is one of the purposes of Committee stage.
Broadly, I think the Committee and the wider House would accept that our sanctions regime, and the supervision regime at Companies House, are not fit for purpose today—that is why we are legislating. Clearly, the actions taken by Russia in recent months have further highlighted the work we need to do and the reform we need to put in place. The comments are welcome, and I think we are all trying to get to the same end point; we just want to make sure people do not suffer unintended consequences in the process.
I think the right hon. Lady said that Companies House is very poor at sharing information. That is probably a little unfair. Currently, it is not there to share information, other than by putting things on a public register for people to seek out; that has been its role in the past. Today, it is a register—we might call it a dumb register—and that is what we are seeking to change. We are seeking to give the registrar responsibility for promoting the integrity of the registers so that people can rely on the information in them and, as it says in the registrar’s objectives, to minimise unlawful activities and the facilitation of unlawful activities.
Obviously, Companies House has not had to do this to date; it has just been a library of dud data, really. What I was drawing to the Minister’s attention—I am sure he agrees with this—is that all the enforcement agencies working in this territory are poor at sharing information. That is why the stuff we get from whistleblowers so often falls through the middle somewhere and does not get tackled. That is why we should put a duty on the agencies to share information; we would not tell them how to do it, but just say, “This is really important if we are to bear down on wrongdoing.”
I am still not sure I agree. Of course there are elements of our enforcement agencies that we are all frustrated by at times, but to my mind nobody goes to work to do a bad job. People are doing their best, often in very difficult circumstances. We all agree that we need to hold our enforcement agencies to account and properly resource them. What we are trying to do is provide them with more powers and ability, and then hold them to account for the use of those powers.
I do not know the answer to that question. When the Bill has received Royal Assent, it will facilitate exactly that process. At the moment, Companies House does not have the powers we would like it to have to bring that about. That is exactly what we are debating.
On amendment 83, I think the right hon. Member for Barking implies that Companies House knows of the changes with a company on an ongoing, dynamic basis. That is not how things work. Companies House does not have access to information until a company files an annual return. Companies do not provide information to Companies House on a daily or even monthly basis. That is not how it works.
But under the legislation, companies will have to provide information on changes of directorships and so on within 28 days, we hope—we had this argument yesterday—so Companies House will have that. I am not expecting it to go through 4 million companies, but there must be a way that the information can be highlighted by the IT system and, if we know a director is somebody who has been sanctioned, that information can be shared. Under the legislation, if a company has changed a directorship, as Usmanov did, it will have to provide that information within 28 days or whatever, and surely that will be there to share.
A change of directorship, yes, but I do not think that is the situation the right hon. Lady was describing. She was talking about a movement of assets, as I understand it. I do not know the detail of the case she is talking about—[Interruption.] May I finish? If she is trying to prevent a person from moving assets around on the basis that Companies House needs to know about that as it is happening, that situation cannot be delivered. Companies can move assets around without asking the permission of Companies House or notifying it, so her amendment does not serve any purpose in that regard.
The right hon. Lady is absolutely right that any information that Companies House is made aware of and deems to be pointing to some kind of risk should be shared with the relevant agencies. We all agree with that point, and the Bill allows Companies House to do that for the first time. That is what we are trying to facilitate, but directing it to act in a certain way on a certain piece of information will lead us down a million rabbit holes, and we do not have the time or the ability to implement that through the Bill. We have to give it the powers and then let it get on with it while holding it to account against those broader objectives.
We now come to amendment 83, which has just been debated. Does Dame Margaret Hodge wish to move the amendment formally?
I just wish to tell the Committee that I will write to Companies House and see what response I get from the chief executive or director. Subject to that, at this stage, I will not move the amendment.
Clause 32, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 33 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 34
Disqualification of persons designated under sanctions legislation: Northern
Ireland
Amendments made: 4, in clause 34, page 23, leave out lines 13 to 17 and insert—
‘(1) This Article applies in relation to a person who has, at any time on or after the day on which section 34(2) of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2022 comes fully into force, become a person subject to relevant financial sanctions and who remains so subject.’
This amendment and Amendment 6 would mean that a person who is subject to sanctions is disqualified under the NI directors disqualification legislation only if those sanctions relate to asset-freezing.
Amendment 5, in clause 34, page 23, line 23, leave out ‘designated person’ and insert ‘person subject to relevant financial sanctions’.
This amendment is consequential on Amendments 4 and 6.
Amendment 6, in clause 34, page 23, line 23, at end insert—
‘(4) In this Article —
“designated person” has the meaning given by section 9 of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018;
“person subject to relevant financial sanctions” means a person who is a designated person for the purposes of any provision of regulations under section 1 of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 that imposes a prohibition or requirement for a purpose mentioned in section 3(1)(a) of that Act (asset-freezing).’—(Kevin Hollinrake.)
See Member’s explanatory statement for Amendment 4.
Clause 34, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 35 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 36
Disqualified directors
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clauses 37 to 43 stand part.
New clause 35—Person convicted under National Minimum Wage Act not to be appointed as director—
‘(1) The Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 is amended as follows.
(2) After Clause 5A (Disqualification for certain convictions abroad) insert—
“5B Person convicted under National Minimum Wage Act not to be appointed as director
(1) A person may not be appointed a director of a company if the person is convicted of a criminal offence under section 31 of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 on or after the day on which section 32(2) of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2022 comes fully into force.
(2) It is an offence for such a person to act as director of a company or directly or indirectly to take part in or be concerned in the promotion, formation or management of a company, without the leave of the High Court.
(3) An appointment made in contravention of this section is void.”’
This new clause would disqualify any individual convicted of an offence for a serious breach of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998, such as a deliberate refusal to pay National Minimum Wage, from serving as a company director.
This is a question of clarification: if a director is disqualified, can he or she still act as a shadow director?
It depends on how the right hon. Lady defines a shadow director. If she is implying that they are a person of significant control influencing others, which I guess is what she means, I will point her to the definitions of a person of significant control. They are those who hold
“more than 25% of shares in the company…more than 25% of voting rights in the company…the right to appoint or remove the majority of the board of directors”
that might influence or control a company through other means. That means that the person is still covered under the legislation; if a person is exerting that control, they should be designated as a person of significant control and ID verified, as discussed previously. Any person who became disqualified before the clause comes into force and is disqualified at that time will also cease holding the office of director.
Clause 37 amends some yet to be commenced provisions of the Companies Act 2006 on when a corporate director can act and minimum age requirements for directors. The Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 amended the 2006 Act to establish—as the hon. Member for Aberavon said—that company directors should, in future, be natural persons except where they have met specific requirements determined by regulations. We will bring forward those regulations following the enactment of the Bill to establish the exemptions to the general natural person director rule. After a transition period, companies must ensure that any corporate directors on their boards are compliant with the regulated exemption criteria. Where they fail to do so, those director appointments will be void once the transition period ends.
The clause makes it clear that should any non-compliant corporate director continue to act in the capacity of either a de facto or shadow director after the end of the transition period, they will be held liable for the consequences of their actions as they would be if they were a validly appointed director. The clause makes a similar clarification in respect of the principles that will apply in respect of an individual who does not meet minimum age requirements for a company director. In such instances, the appointment would also be void, but those who continue to purport to act as a director or operate in a shadow capacity will continue to be exposed to personal liability none the less.
Clause 38 repeals the power for the Secretary of State to require that companies with disqualified directors who have been given permission by the court to act as a director make a statement to the registrar confirming that permission. The power is no longer required, because the Bill introduces new requirements to provide statements about disqualification and permissions to act in sections 12, 12A, 167G and 790LA.
Clause 39 introduces a prohibition on an individual acting as a director unless their ID is verified or exempted from that requirement under the regulations. It establishes a duty on a company to ensure that unverified individuals do not act as directors unless they are exempted from the ID verification requirement. Failure to comply with the duty constitutes an offence committed by the company and every officer of the company who is in default.
Clause 40 will make it a criminal offence for a person to act as a director unless their appointment has been notified to the registrar. It will be a defence for a person to prove that they reasonably believed that the notice of their appointment had been given to the registrar. The actions taken by an unverified director, or a director whose appointment has not been reported to the registrar, will remain valid to ensure that third parties who have relied on the actions of an unverified director are not unfairly disadvantaged.
We want there to be consequences for not complying with ID verification obligations, and clauses 41 and 42 help us to achieve that. The clauses allow for the disqualification of individuals where they are persistently in default of the ID verification requirements for directors and people with significant control, or where they have been convicted by consequence of such contravention. Clause 41 legislates in respect of Great Britain, with clause 42 legislating to create equivalent powers for Northern Ireland.
Finally, clause 43 makes amendments to section 246 of the Companies Act 2006 regarding addresses on public record. It is consequential to other amendments to no longer require companies to hold their own local registers of directors.
(2 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesWhat happens if it is a false statement? Who will uncover that?
I ask the question for a reason. I did not intervene during the previous debate, but the Minister might know—I certainly do—that thousands and thousands of microbusinesses are supposed to put their annual accounts in to HMRC, but do not do so, and nobody ever goes after them. There therefore may be thousands and thousands of businesses that put in false statements. Given the anti-regulatory stance that the Minister has displayed today, I am just interested in knowing who will actually check the statements and what will happen then.
I am very disappointed that the right hon. Lady regards me as anti-regulatory. I want a system that allows good, bona fide businesses to go about their daily business without unnecessary checks and balances. We cannot control everything that goes on in our society but, in the main, businesses are lawful, and undertake lawful and legitimate commercial activity.
If the right hon. Lady expects a world in which we check every single filing, nobody will be doing any commercial work in our society. The only people we will have will then be box-checkers, and where would the tax revenue come from to pay for all the things that both she and I want in our society?
We must have a proportionate balance between regulation, the cost of resourcing regulators and the needs of law enforcement agencies. That is why our belief, which I know is not entirely hers, is that we need to take an intelligence-based approach to regulation. That is the most effective way to do it.
I wholeheartedly support Labour’s new clause. There is an awful lot more that needs to be done to tighten up the measure on verification. Nick Van Benschoten, in his evidence, said:
“On the verification measures, one of the key points is that they fall short of minimum industry standards. Verification of identity is necessary but not sufficient. A key thing we have noted is that the Bill does not provide for order-making powers to allow Companies House to verify the status of directors or beneficial owners, and for that sort of requirement on company information agents and so on. That seems an odd gap.”––[Official Report, Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Public Bill Committee, 25 October 2022; c. 7, Q3.]
I wholeheartedly agree with that. It is the key part of the Bill. If we are not going to verify people on the register, there is almost no point in having the legislation. It is the verification that is crucial.
Hand in hand with that are the fines for not complying with the verification. I draw the Minister’s attention, again, to the people with significant control over Scottish limited partnerships. There has been one fine of £210 since the rules came into place. That is no kind of deterrent whatsoever. The rules need to be here, the verification needs to be right, and the sanctions for not complying must be enforced. I would say that even the sanctions are far too low.
Leaving trust and company service providers to verify identity leaves the door wide open to abuse. There is already abuse, and the Government’s position in the Bill is to continue to allow that to happen. As the hon. Member for Aberavon said, trust and company service providers have been identified in numerous Government documents as being the gap that allows money laundering and international crime. That cannot be allowed to continue in the Bill. If the Government leave the door open for the trust and company service providers, they will continue to abuse the system and the register will continue to be full of absolute guff.
I raised the issue of verification in the House, albeit, I appreciate, with a different Minister, the hon. Member for Torbay (Kevin Foster). He suggested that a decision had not yet been made on how the verification system would work. My suggestion was that it go through the UK Government’s existing verification scheme, which is used for passports, driving licences and tax returns, because that system is already up and running. The response suggested that that had not yet been decided.
However, it was drawn to my attention today that Companies House has already put out a tender for a verification system. A tender went out on 10 October and closed on 24 October for an “authentication digital delivery partner”, looking for people to come and work on this system. I am curious to know why, when we have not yet got this legislation in place, the Government have tendered the contract and closed the application process for the company to build the system.
I would be grateful for some clarification from the Minister on exactly what the status is of that £3.7 million contract, which Companies House has already put out to tender. Why has it gone out before the Bill has concluded if Companies House does not know what it is building yet, and when amendments are still being tabled? I appreciate that the Government want to move at speed, but putting the cart before the horse in this way seems quite wrong.
We would like the verification to be strengthened, but if the Government have already instructed a contractor on what it will build, why are we even here this afternoon?
I seek your guidance, Mr Robertson: we are talking about clause 60, are we not?
Yes; the others come later.
After the excellent speech by my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon, I will speak briefly. I have two things to say. We will come back to the issue of shareholders, data and the threshold, which is really important, and I will certainly come back to the issue of trust or company service providers, because Labour Members all think that it is key to get that right if we are to have any credibility about the integrity of the list.
I want to talk about new clause 27. The Minister has said a number of times that he does not want to impede business. I do not think any Opposition Member wants to impede business either. We want to have smart regulation, not too much regulation. The purpose of this debate is to ensure that the regulation is indeed smart. At the moment, there are too many flaws.
As an overriding point, we all know how important the integrity of the ID verification system is. I completely agree with that and we need there to be confidence in it.
On the point raised by the hon. Member for Glasgow Central, it is not right that a tender has gone out already. A request for information has been put out to determine some of the characteristics of the suppliers to learn what services they provide, but a tender has not gone out. Once determined, the ID verification system will be brought to the House to be approved by affirmative resolution. There will be opportunities for debate at that time to make sure it is fit for purpose, both in the framework and how it will be operated.
On the comments the hon. Member for Aberavon made about persons of significant control, first, I think he makes the exact case that we would make. A 25% threshold is pretty much the global standard, but even if it were lowered, people could find ways around it—even if there were a 0% threshold, as was suggested by Professor Elspeth Berry. That is why the definition of a person of significant control is not solely about the percentage of the shareholding of a company. There are five definitions, including one I that believe will interest the hon. Gentleman, which is somebody who, other than by shareholding,
“has the right to exercise or actually exercises significant influence or control”
over a company. Therefore, there could be zero shareholding and they would still be a person of significant control. How is that enforced? If directors allow that to happen and do not declare that they have a person of significant control, they are liable for a fine and a custodial sentence of up to two years. We do deal with that in a reasonable way.
Some valid concerns have been expressed about company formation agents. I am happy to write to the National Crime Agency to ask what it has done about them. However, not all company service providers are company formation agents; there is a distinction. A company service provider may well be a large accountancy practice, such as Deloitte, PwC or KPMG. The hon. Member for Aberavon stated that such organisations know very little about their clients and offer a blanket service, but I do not think that is fair. My accountants can verify my ID and they know a great deal about me, I can promise the hon. Gentleman.
Of course we must make sure that the system is robust, and I acknowledge that there are some concerns about the supervision of those registered as supervised for money-laundering purposes. Of course we must be sure that the system is right. As hon. Members are aware, I think, the Treasury is looking at means of improving the regime to ensure that the supervision is much better, and it needs to be. The difficulty is—we will have more debate about the issue in forthcoming sittings—whether we want to get everything perfect in the system before we start ID verification, or whether we start ID verification. In my view, it is essential that we get that ID verification done as quickly as possible. Waiting until the AML supervision regime is absolutely perfect would be a mistake, in my view. The two things should happen concurrently.
I understand the reasoning behind new clause 27. I completely agree with the idea of giving confidence to Parliament that the matters are being taken forward. I am happy to commit to return to Parliament to communicate by whatever means is preferable—written ministerial statement or oral statement—what progress has been made to ensure that Parliament has the information that it needs to hold Companies House and other agencies to account.
The Minister is finished. If someone else wishes to speak, they can stand in the normal way and indicate.
I am grateful to the Minister for saying that he will return to Parliament, but new clause 27 is designed to ensure that there is an annual report to Parliament. That means that our successors—certainly mine—will be able to hold Companies House to account over time. He knows that accountability is absolutely vital to ensuring the integrity of the system.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 61 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 62
Procedure etc for verifying identity
I beg to move amendment 108, in clause 62, page 47, leave out lines 14 and 15.
I have spoken at some length about the Opposition’s concerns about the provisions in clauses 62 and 63 to authorise third-party trust or corporate service providers—or authorised corporate service providers, as they are described in the Bill—to carry out ID checks on the Government’s behalf. Amendments 108, 109 and 110 to 112 would simply remove those provisions from the Bill in the hope of prompting a rethink by the Government.
I should like to explain the thinking behind the amendments tabled by me and my hon. Friend the Member for Feltham and Heston. The purpose of amendment 107 goes back to what I have said about the surprising lack of specific details on the proposed verification process. As I have said, it is not as though the Government have not had enough time to think through what procedures might be necessary; four consultations have already taken place on the topic. Amendment 107 would incorporate into the Bill requirements for some form of official identification, including photo ID, to be submitted to the registrar. That should not be controversial. In fact, the amendment would merely reflect international best practice guidelines, including those published by the Financial Action Task Force, the IMF and the World Bank, among others, and the commitments made in the Government’s own White Paper.
It is a pleasure to rise to speak under your chairmanship, Mr Robertson, and I do so to speak to amendment 78. The amendment is part of a batch of amendments that we will get to later. I hope that hon. Members will bear with me if I speak longer on amendment 78, so that amendments 79, 82 and 83 will not require a long explanation.
This is one of the most important series of amendments that we have placed before the Committee. The purpose is to ensure that we close any loopholes, so that we do not find ourselves back in debate in a couple of years’ time, bemoaning the fact that we failed to create watertight legislation and that we do not have the information and data that we need to hold businesses to account.
I stress that our aim is not to be bureaucratic. The last thing anybody wants is bureaucratic regulation. However, if we do not have effective, smart regulation, we will not achieve the objective, which is shared across the House, of bearing down on illicit finance and on the abuse of our corporate structure system by ne’er-do-wells. Today, we are paying the price of those who came before us, from both political parties, who thought that by simply deregulating the whole of the financial services sector, they would encourage growth in the economy. They did encourage growth, but they also made us a destination of choice for too much illicit finance. That has come into focus with the war in Ukraine and the role of Russians in bringing their financing here. That money is used to fund Putin and his allies in the attack on Ukraine.
The Government have decided to outsource responsibility for checking the unique identification of beneficial owners. I can see why they have done so. It is quicker to do it that way than to build up the necessary resources in Companies House. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon, I would have had more confidence if we had done it in house, but that was the Government’s decision. The purpose of my amendment is not to challenge that decision. However, we need to trust the corporate service providers. We need to trust both the professionals and the others involved, whether they are lawyers or accountants, to do the job properly and honestly. At present, confidence and trust are not there.
I thought that the Government were on the same page on this issue. From all the leaks, and from all the information and intelligence about how illicit wealth from all the kleptocracies has reached our shores, I thought that they understood the role played by the TCSPs. I thought they understood the role that the TCSPs play, and therefore shared our concern that we need to get that regulatory framework right before we unleash a new system that, if it is not right, could lead to us peopling the new Companies House register with dud information that we do not want.
I refer to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests as a practising solicitor and a partner in a firm of solicitors. The right hon. Lady has essentially said that everybody involved in the legal sector and financial advisers are potentially dishonest. They absolutely are not. The vast amount of people involved in the sector are honest, decent people who have a lot of regulation and try their damnedest to abide by all of it. The picture that the right hon. Lady paints is not correct.
That is not what I said. The hon. Gentleman may have chosen to interpret it that way—
No, I did not. I said that none of the professions has sufficient supervisory or regulatory capabilities, policies or practices in place to pull out the bad apples. I have nowhere ever stated that that applies to everyone, but I hope the hon. Gentleman agrees that the extent of people setting up shell companies —we are talking largely about shell companies—as vehicles to move illicit finance, whether through drugs, kleptocrats or people trafficking, is shocking.
Let me tell the hon. Gentleman my most egregious story, which has been mentioned—the Savaro story. We had this terrible explosion in Lebanon, with hundreds of people killed and lots of property destroyed. We were told that it was fertiliser held in the warehouse that was going to Mozambique. A couple of months after the explosion, I was rung up by a Reuters journalist with whom I have worked down the years, who said, “Did you know it was a UK limited company—Savaro Ltd?” He went on to say that not only was it a UK limited company, but, interestingly enough, it had told HMRC it was dormant, so it had not filled in its tax returns. It was registered in the name of a company service provider, a woman who lived in Cyprus. There were two lies in the system: a lie about the company service provider, and lying to HMRC.
I gave the usual quote and was then overwhelmed by people from Lebanon contacting me, including the Bar Association, all of whom were trying to find out the origins of what had happened. It then emerged that three Ukrainian Syrians—this was before the Ukrainian war—were the real owners. There was no way the fertiliser was going to be used in Mozambique; it was going to Assad to drop as barrel bombs on the civilian population of Syria. That is the sort of shocking outcome that comes from lack of proper regulatory control.
No. I have made clear to the Minister that we are deeply unhappy, particularly with the failure to take on board the recommendations under amendment 107 and the very important points my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking made.
Similarly, I will take the matter up elsewhere during the course of the Bill.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 62 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 63
Authorisation of corporate service providers
I beg to move amendment 81, in clause 63, page 49, line 38, at end insert—
“(3A) When an application is made under this section, the registrar may request evidence from HMRC that a fit and proper person test has been carried out on the applicant.”
This amendment allows the registrar to request evidence from HMRC that a fit and proper person test has been carried out on a person applying to be an authorised corporate service provider.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 82, in clause 63, page 49, line 45, at end insert—
“(ba) the registrar is satisfied—
(i) that HMRC has carried out a fit and proper person test on the applicant, and
(ii) that the applicant has met the requirement of the fit and proper person test, and”.
This amendment would mean that the registrar could only grant an application to become an authorised corporate service provider if satisfied that an applicant had passed HMRC’s fit and proper person test.
Government amendment 8.
Amendment 79, in clause 63, page 52, leave out from line 42 to line 28 on page 53, and insert—
“1098G Duty to provide information
(1) The registrar must carry out a risk assessment in relation to any authorised corporate service provider to establish whether the verification of identity by the authorised corporate service provider is likely to give rise to a risk of economic crime.
(2) If the risk assessment identifies a real risk of economic crime, the registrar may—
(a) require an authorised corporate service provider to provide information to the registrar; or
(b) require a person who ceases to be an authorised corporate service provider by virtue of section 1098F—
(i) to notify the registrar;
(ii) to provide the registrar with such information relating to the circumstances by virtue of which the person so ceased as may be requested by the registrar.
(3) The registrar may require information to be provided on request, on the occurrence of an event or at regular intervals.
(4) The circumstances that may be specified under section 1098F(2) or 1098G(1) (ceasing to be an authorised corporate service provider and suspension) include failure to comply with a requirement under subsection (1)(a).
(5) A person who fails to comply with a requirement to provide information under this section commits an offence.
(6) An offence under this section is punishable on summary conviction by—
(a) in England and Wales a fine;
(b) in Scotland and Northern Ireland a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale and, for continued contravention, a daily default fine not exceeding one-tenth of level 5 on the standard scale.”
This amendment would give the registrar the power to require information from an authorised corporate service provider. This would replace the current provision in the Bill giving the Secretary of State a power to make regulations requiring the provision of such information.
I will speak very briefly. It would be nice if the Minister could agree to the amendments, which are simply there to tighten up the oversight of the bodies. Amendments 81 and 82 are connected, and would force HMRC to do what it is not currently doing and carry out proper checks on the TCSPs and monitor them properly. Amendment 79 gives the registrar the power to require information. At the moment, as I read the Bill, there is no power for the registrar to challenge any of the information provided to her by any corporate service provider.
I thank the right hon. Lady for her contribution. Clause 63 introduces a requirement for third party agents who wish to provide corporate services to clients, such as incorporating companies and filing documents on their behalf, to be registered with Companies House as authorised corporate service providers. ACSPs will be required to be supervised for the purposes of the money laundering requirements at all times and to notify the registrar of any changes to supervision.
I understand and am sympathetic to the intention behind amendments 81 and 82. They are driven by concern that the UK’s AML supervisory regime is not as robust as it could be. The Government recognise that, as do I. It is being addressed by my colleagues at the Treasury, who are responsible for the supervisory regime. I am afraid, however, that the amendments would duplicate some of the regulatory obligations of HMRC, the default supervisor for corporate service providers, by adding to the role of the registrar of companies. Their effect would be to make an agency of my Department responsible for overseeing activities of another Department. Not only is that duplicative, but it is wrong for one branch of Government to mark the homework of another branch. The most efficient means to address any issues with the quality of supervision is to tackle them at source, which is work that HM Treasury is undertaking on supervisory reform. I hope I have provided clarity on why the amendments are not needed.
On amendment 79, I understand the right hon. Lady’s concerns, but I consider the amendment to be unnecessary. As I have set out, under the measures in the Bill corporate service providers will need to confirm they are supervised for the purposes of the money laundering regulations, register with the registrar and, in the case of an individual, have their identity verified before they are allowed to form companies or registerable partnerships or to file on their behalf. The ID verification checks undertaken by those providers will achieve the same level of assurance of the claimed identity as those undertaken through the direct verification route.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. Yes or no: will Companies House be able to challenge at any point information given to it by a TCSP—an authorised provider?
As I understand it, yes, Companies House will have the rights and powers to do that, though we do not at this point know to what extent it will do so. The right hon. Lady spoke in a previous debate about spot checks. It would seem sensible to take that kind of risk-based approach. Certainly, an AML supervisor would have that ability as well.
Providers will be required to declare that they have completed all the necessary identification checks when they interact with the registrar. Under money laundering regulations, all agents are required to retain records, and the registrar can request further information and ID verification checks if necessary, which I think answers the question that the right hon. Lady just asked. The agent will be committing an offence if they fail to carry out the ID checks to the required standards, or at all.
Under the Bill, proposed new sections 1098F and 1098G of the Companies Act 2006, as introduced by clause 63, will enable the registrar to suspended and deauthorise an authorised corporate service provider. The Bill will allow the registrar to maintain an audit trail of agent activity and to share it with supervisors. That will serve as a prompt to supervisors to up their game. I hope that that explanation has further clarified why the amendments are not needed.
I will look in detail later to ensure that what I asked for is there, but I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment made: 8, in clause 63, page 50, line 23, leave out “registered or”.—(Kevin Hollinrake.)
This amendment would mean that a firm applying to become an authorised corporate service provider would always have to state its principal office, rather than having the option of stating its registered office.
I beg to move amendment 98, in clause 63, page 53, leave out from line 29 to line 5 on page 54.
This amendment removes the provision enabling the authorisation of foreign corporate service providers.