Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Strasburger Excerpts

Thursday 15th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to oppose Amendment 379 and support most of Amendment 471, inadequate though it is. My views may not be the same as those of my noble friends on the Front Bench, of course. We all value the right to protest, but rights are not a shield for criminality. The Government and Policing Ministers have been very clear that live facial recognition is being developed and deployed as a targeted, intelligence-led tool to identify known or wanted individuals or criminals on watch lists. It is not a blanket surveillance tool of the public. The Home Office has opened a consultation and asked for stronger statutory rules and oversight precisely to ensure proportionate lawful use.

Amendment 379 would in effect tie the hands of senior officers at the very moment when targeted identification can prevent or stop serious crime. If a protest contains people who are wanted for violent offences, sexual offences or other serious crimes, the ability to identify them quickly and safely is not an abstract technicality; it is how we protect victims and uphold the rule of law. To say that demonstrations are somehow sacrosanct and must be free from tools that help catch criminals is to place form above substance. That is not to dismiss legitimate concerns about privacy and bias. We should legislate a clear statutory framework, independent oversight and robust safeguards, and I know that the Government are consulting on exactly that path.

I will want to see strong action to correct mistakes and address suggestions that it cannot tell the difference in some ethnic groups. That has to be remedied if that allegation is true. But the right response is to legislate proportionate limits and accountability, not to pre-emptively ban a narrowly targeted operational capability at protests and thereby risk letting wanted suspects slip away. For those reasons, I urge the Committee to reject Amendment 379 and instead press the Government to bring forward the statutory code and independent oversight that the public rightly expect.

Amendment 471 is a different kettle of fish—and possibly “off” fish as well. The amendment is far too liberal and fails to protect the public from out-of-control public authorities. I will explain why. As a person relieved of ministerial duties in 1997, I found myself a rather bored Back-Bencher on the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000—the famous RIPA. The Minister at the time—I think it was Alun Michael—was waxing lyrical about how it would tackle serious crime, terrorism and paedophiles. He mentioned how it would help the police, the National Crime Agency—or whatever it was called then—MI5, MI6, HMRC and a couple of other big national government departments.

We were all in agreement that it was a jolly good thing for these agencies to have that power. Then something the Minister said prompted me to table a Question on what other public bodies could use RIPA powers, and we were shocked to discover that there were actually 32, including at that time something called the egg inspectorate of MAFF, responsible for enforcing the little lion mark on eggs. Schedule 1, listing the public authorities with phone-tapping powers, has expanded a bit since those days, and it now numbers 79. However, that is not the correct number because one of the 79 entries says “every local authority”, so we can add another 317 principal local authorities to that list. I think “every government department” covers all the agencies and arm’s-length bodies under their command, so they also have access to RIPA. In other words, a worthy proposal to let some key government agencies have power to snoop on our mobile phones to detect serious crime, terrorism or paedophilia has now become available, to some extent, to hundreds and possibly thousands of public bodies.

The relevance of this is that if we agree that facial recognition technology can be extended beyond the police, immigration, the National Crime Agency, the security services and possibly a few other big government departments that are concerned with organised crime, people trafficking and immigration, I believe our civil liberties will be at stake if local authorities and some others get to use it as well. If local authorities get the power of facial recognition, I am certain that they will abuse it. A Scottish council uses RIPA to monitor dog barking. Allerdale district council, next to me in Cumbria, used it to catch someone feeding pigeons. Of course it would be brilliant, in my opinion, to catch all those carrying out anti-social behaviour, such as riding dangerously on the pavement with their bikes, not picking up dog mess or generally causing a disturbance. But that is why I think this amendment does not go far enough.

We do not need codes of practice and safeguards—we need a complete ban on all other public authorities using it until it has been tried and tested by the police and we are satisfied that it does not cause false positives and is operationally secure. Then, if it is ever extended to other public authorities, it must be solely, as proposed new subsection (1)(a) says,

“used for the purpose of preventing, detecting, or investigating serious crimes as defined under the Serious Crime Act 2007”.

If we do not have these protections, local councils will end up checking our recycling, what library books we take out and what shops and pubs we use, and will justify it by saying it will help them deliver a better spatial strategy or design services to user patterns.

I look forward to the Liberals going back to their original roots as real liberals and bringing forward a better amendment that will protect our liberties.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to support Amendment 379, to which I have added my name, and to very strongly support it. But before I do, I hope the Committee will forgive me if I digress very briefly to tidy up a matter that arose in Committee on Tuesday. I made the point that the police have the duty to facilitate protest rather than prevent it, and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, intervened to ask me where he might find a justification for that statement. Well, I have good news. I have here the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s protest operational advice document, and on page 10, under the heading “Role of the police”, it says that authorised professional practice

“identifies two duties associated with the policing of protest. Broadly these require that the police must … not prevent, hinder or restrict peaceful assembly … in certain circumstances, take reasonable steps to protect those who want to exercise their rights peacefully. Taken together, these duties (the first a negative duty, the second a positive one) are often described as an obligation to facilitate the exercise of the freedoms of assembly and expression”.

I also have here a very handy flow chart entitled “Facilitating Peaceful Protest”, and I will make it available to the noble Lord following this debate.

To return to this group, it is now eight years since South Wales Police started deploying early versions of live facial recognition technology. When it did so, the technology was extremely inaccurate and there was absolutely no legislation in place to regulate or oversee the use of this mass surveillance technology—and that is what it is.

For those noble Lords who have not had the opportunity to experience facial recognition technology, I will give a quick overview of how it is used. It currently involves a large van full of electronics being parked in a location, such as a busy shopping street, where large numbers of ordinary people will walk past going about their daily business. On the top of the van are cameras pointing in all directions; they are scanning and recording the faces of all the passers-by. The technology tries to match them to a pre-prepared watch-list, which is a set of images of people the police want to find for some reason. Throughout the many hours of the deployment, something like 20 police officers will be standing around chatting and waiting for the system to decide, rightly or wrongly, that somebody whose face matches a person on the watch-list has just walked past. Several of the otherwise unoccupied police officers then detain the target and try to determine whether it is a true match.

Big Brother Watch, which I chair, has observed many deployments of facial recognition by the Metropolitan Police, and has seen many false matches happen. As well as false positives, the system is also susceptible to false negatives, where it fails to recognise somebody who is on the watch-list, and anyone who the police would like to speak to but was not put on the watch-list can wander by undetected. The Committee can form its own view on whether this is a productive use of scarce police time and money, but one thing is clear: this is a highly intrusive mass surveillance of thousands of citizens, almost all of whom are completely innocent and should be of no interest to the police.

The UK already has one of the highest densities of CCTV cameras in the world. Facial recognition technology will in time be added to those fixed cameras in public spaces. The police, your local authority, supermarkets or whoever will be able to keep tabs on who you are and what you are doing. This technology is far more intrusive than fingerprints or DNA. Live facial recognition can capture your face and location from a distance without you having any idea it has happened. It is as if you have a barcode on your forehead that can be read without your knowledge.

The collection and retention of fingerprints is tightly regulated by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Crime and Security Act 2010. Similarly, the use of DNA is strictly regulated by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. But what regulation is there for facial recognition, the most intrusive technology of the lot? Since the first deployment in 2017, absolutely no legislation, none at all, has been introduced to control this serious threat to our privacy. As we have already heard, the phrase “facial recognition” is not mentioned once in UK legislation.

Police forces, including the Met, have had a go at writing their own rules and marking their own homework, but that is obviously not their skill set; it is the job of legislators. The police’s homemade rules vary from force to force, and nobody is monitoring what is actually happening on the ground. For example, they assure us that all images they collect that do not match someone on the watch-list are instantly and permanently destroyed to preserve the privacy of innocent passers-by, but whether that always happens cannot be verified because there is no scrutiny, as there would be with, for example, DNA. This serious legislative vacuum is not the fault of the police; it is the fault of all the Governments since 2017, who were asleep at the wheel and did nothing to control the use of this highly intrusive technology.

You might ask: “Why does it matter to me? Why should I care if the state knows where I am and what I am doing? I am an honest, law-abiding, clean-living citizen. There is nothing in my life that I need to conceal from the police, my boss or my spouse”. You might be told by advocates of mass surveillance, “If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear”. Well, that claim is first attributed to the great democrat Joseph Goebbels. The Chinese state, where much of the technology for facial recognition comes from, uses it to monitor the behaviour of its citizens. It is used not just to keep track of where they are, but to assess whether they are being good citizens in accordance with the state’s definition of what a “good citizen” is.

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[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I had sought to intervene on the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, before he sat down, but the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, beat me to it. I want to ask him a simple question but, first, I am sorry that we are on different sides of this—when we served together on the snoopers’ charter Bill, we were totally united that it was a bad Bill and we worked hand in glove to amend it. Can he tell me the substantive difference between a camera and a computer watching everyone in the crowd and picking out the wanted troublemakers and those 20 policemen he talked about looking at everybody in the crowd and picking out the wanted troublemakers from their briefing or their memory? What is the real difference between them?

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

When I observed these deployments of facial recognition and looked at the 20 policemen standing around, it occurred to me that they would probably find a lot more of the people they were looking for if they just went round to their houses and knocked on the door, rather than working on the off-chance that they might walk past them in the high street.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Doocey for eliciting a very useful debate, as was the intention. I particularly welcome some of the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, but say to him that a Crime and Policing Bill might possibly be the place for discussion of the use of live facial recognition in policing. Maybe we can make some progress with the Government, we hope, responding or at least giving an indication ahead of their consultation of their approach to the legislative framework around live facial recognition. I very much hope that they will take this debate on board as part of that consultation.

As my noble friend Lady Doocey clearly stated, these amendments are necessary because live facial recognition currently operates, effectively, in a legislative void, yet the police are rolling out this technology at speed. There is no explicit Act of Parliament authorising its deployment, meaning that police forces are in effect, as my noble friend Lord Strasburger indicated, writing their own rules as they go. This technology represents a fundamental shift in the relationship between citizen and state. When LFR cameras are deployed, our public spaces become biometric checkpoints where every face is indiscriminately scanned. By treating every citizen as a suspect in a permanent digital line-up, we are abandoning the presumption of innocence. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, made that point very well. As a result, there is a clear issue of public trust.

Amendment 379 would prohibit the use of LFR during public assemblies or processions unless a specific code of practice has been formally approved by resolution of both Houses of Parliament. This is essential to protect our freedoms of expression and assembly under Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR. The pervasive tracking capability of LFR creates what the courts have recognised as a chilling effect, as described by my noble friend Lady Doocey and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. Law-abiding citizens are discouraged from attending protests or expressing dissenting views for fear of permanent state monitoring. We know that police forces have already used this technology to target peaceful protesters who were not wanted for any crime. People should not have to hand over their sensitive biometric data as the price of engaging in democratic processes. Without explicit parliamentary consent and an approved code of practice, we are sleepwalking into a surveillance state that bypasses democratic oversight entirely.

Amendment 471 would establish that LFR use in public spaces must be limited to narrowly defined serious cases—such as preventing major crimes or locating missing persons—and requires prior judicial authorisation specifying the scope and purpose of each deployment. The need for this oversight was made absolutely clear by the 2020 Court of Appeal ruling in R (Bridges) v Chief Constable of South Wales Police, which found LFR use unlawful due to fundamental deficiencies in the legal framework. The court identified that far too much discretion is left to individual officers regarding who ends up on a watchlist and where cameras are placed. We must replace operational discretion with judicial scrutiny.

The Government themselves now acknowledge the inadequacy of the current framework, which they describe as a “patchwork framework” and say it is

“complicated and difficult to understand”.

Well, that is at least some progress towards the Government acknowledging the situation. They say that the current framework does not provide sufficient confidence for expanded use—hear, hear. The former Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner made clear his concerns about the College of Policing guidance, questioning whether these fundamental issues require

“more than an authorised professional practice document from the College of Policing”

and instead demand parliamentary debate. The former commissioner raised a profound question:

“Is the status of the UK citizen shifting from our jealously guarded presumption of innocence to that of ‘suspected until we have proved our identity to the satisfaction of the examining officer’?”


Such a fundamental shift in the relationship between citizen and state cannot, and should not, be determined by guidance alone.

The College of Policing’s APP on LFR, while attempting to provide operational guidance, falls short of providing the robust legal framework that this technology demands. It remains non-statutory guidance that can be revised without parliamentary scrutiny, lacks enforceable standards for deployment decisions, provides insufficient detail on bias testing and mitigation requirements, and does not establish independent oversight mechanisms with real teeth.

Most critically, the guidance permits watch-list compilation based on subjective assessments without clear statutory criteria or independent review. This leaves fundamental decisions about who gets surveilled to operational discretion rather than judicial oversight. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, who was keen on one bit of our amendment but not the other, I say that this intelligence-led tool effectively delegates it to a senior police officer and they, in a sense, have a conflict of interest. They are the ones who make the operational decisions.

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[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for tabling the amendments and starting this important debate. Facial recognition is an increasingly important tool that helps the police, and I am grateful for the support of the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra, Lord Cameron of Lochiel and Lord Hogan-Howe. I was particularly struck by the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, on gait and movement, which point to why this is valuable.

Currently, facial recognition technology is used to identify those suspected of committing crime, those who may be in breach of a court order and, as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones said, those who are missing persons and could be found. To put some context to it, for example, there were 127 people arrested following the use of facial technology during the disturbances in the summer of 2024 around asylum protests. According to the Metropolitan Police’s figures, between January 2024 and September 2025, 1,300 people were arrested for offences including rape, robbery and GBH, and, in that period, 100 sex offenders were arrested for breaching their conditions: that is, going to an area where they should not have gone. That is quite a valuable action, tool and resource. But that does not mean—which goes to the heart of the amendment the noble Baroness moved—that the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, the noble Baroness herself and the Liberal Democrat Front Bench are not ones that need to be examined.

Noble Lords will be aware that, currently, the use of facial recognition technology is already subject to safeguards, including the Human Rights Act and Data Protection Act. The Government accept that there is a need to consider whether a bespoke legislative framework is needed. We need to get it right. We need to balance the need to protect communities from crime and disorder with the need to safeguard individual rights.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, will know, and as has been referenced in this debate, on 4 December, the Government launched a consultation: I have a copy available for the House. It is a 10-week consultation on a new framework for the enforcement of the use of facial recognition and similar technologies. The consultation explores when and how these technologies should be used, what safeguards are required to protect the issues that noble Lords and Baronesses have raised today and how to ensure that their use is proportionate to the seriousness of the harm being addressed.

I refer the Committee to page 5 of the summary to the consultation:

“The government is therefore committed to developing and introducing a new legal framework that sets out rules for the overt use of facial recognition by law enforcement organisations”.


That is a clear government objective. The consultation is about how we achieve that government objective. It runs until 12 February and I encourage all those who have spoken to submit their views.

I take Amendment 471 as a positive contribution to the consultation. Some aspects would cause difficulties, but it is a fair point to put to the Committee today. I hope noble Lords will accept that I cannot pre-empt the outcome of the consultation, which runs until 12 February. However, the clear objective, which I have read out, is to find the framework that noble Lords are seeking. We will need legislation to put in place the new legal framework, and that will come when parliamentary time allows.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

The Minister says that he cannot pre-empt the outcome of the consultation, but surely Clause 125 already pre-empts the outcome of the consultation.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I do not think that it does. We will leave it at that. There is a proper and full consultation document, a copy of which is, I am sure, available in the House for Members to look at.

I revert to my starting point. For the reasons that have been laid out by a number of Members in the Committee today, across the political divide and none, it is a valuable tool. Do the noble Lord and the noble Baroness who raised this have an objection to automatic number plate recognition? Under current regulations, every vehicle that goes past a camera at the side of the road is an “innocent” vehicle but some of those number plates will lead to crime being solved or individuals being caught. The principle is there. If they object to the principle then we will not find common ground on this. We need regulation—I have accepted that. We are bringing forward the consultation, but, ultimately it is a valuable tool to stop and prevent crime and to catch criminals.

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[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. I declare my interest as the director of the Free Speech Union.

The strongest argument for repealing the Malicious Communications Act and Section 127 of the Communications Act is that these laws were made during an analogue era and are clearly not fit for purpose during our current digital era. That is one reason why the Law Commission of England and Wales, in its 2021 report on which communications laws should be reformed, recommended that both the Malicious Communications Act and Section 127 of the Communications Act be repealed.

That has not happened, but a good illustration of just how unfit these two laws are was alluded to by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. The Times submitted FOI requests to all 43 police forces in England and Wales, asking them how many arrests were made in England and Wales in 2023 and in previous years for online offences under the Malicious Communications Act and Section 127 of the Communications Act. Of the 43 police forces, 37 responded to the FOI request. In just those 37 police forces, in 2023 12,183 people were arrested on suspicion of having committed just one of these two offences through something they had said online. That is a huge increase on the number of people arrested in 2018—just 5,502—on suspicion of committing these two offences for things they posted online. The figure more than quadrupled in a five-year period. That boils down to 33 people being arrested every day in 2023 on suspicion of having committed just one of these two offences under the Malicious Communications Act and Section 127 of the Communications Act.

That happened because of the explosion of speech which is supposedly offensive, annoying, distressing, alarming or indecent, et cetera, online on social media. This is something the framers of these laws could not possibly have anticipated, and it is causing the police to waste a colossal amount of time. In addition, the number of people who were charged—bear in mind that 12,183 people were arrested—was 1,119. The police are clearly being overzealous in responding to complaints about supposed offences under these two laws relating to things people have said online.

Another index of just how much time is being wasted is that many of the people who are not charged end up having the episode recorded as a non-crime hate incident. The Free Speech Union has estimated that, as best we can tell, something like a quarter of a million non-crime hate incidents have been recorded since the concept was introduced by the College of Policing in 2014—and that is in England and Wales alone. That is an average of around 65 a day.

One reason so many NCHIs are being recorded is that, when the police arrest someone under suspicion of having committed an offence under the Malicious Communications Act or Section 127 of the Communications Act and conclude that in fact no offence has been committed, the incident is recorded as an NCHI. As I have said before in this House, one of the penalties for having an NCHI recorded against your name is that it can show up in enhanced criminal record checks when you apply for a job as a teacher or a carer or try to volunteer for a charity such as the Samaritans. According to Policy Exchange, in a report published last year, police in the UK as a whole are spending 6,000 hours a year investigating episodes and incidents that turn out to be NCHIs and are recorded as such. That is a strong argument for repealing the Malicious Communications Act and Section 127 of the Communications Act.

I will give two examples, from the FSU’s case files, of just how absurd the police’s overzealous policing of social media has become. We went to bat for one of our members, Julian Foulkes, a former special constable in Kent. He said in a spat online with a pro-Palestinian activist that some of the pro-Palestinian marchers were once step away from heading to Heathrow and stopping people disembarking from flights from Israel. That person complained, as I understand it, and six police officers—six—turned up at Julian Foulkes’s home, arrested him, took him down to the station and would not release him until he had agreed to accept a caution. With our help, he got that caution expunged and went on to sue the police for wrongful arrest. He was given £20,000 in compensation and got an apology from the chief constable of the police force concerned. That is a good example of the kind of time-wasting that the police are being led into because of the difficulty of enforcing these analogue laws in a digital era.

The second example is Maxie Allen and Rosalind Levine, the parents of two daughters, who were arrested, again by six police officers, in front of their youngest daughter because of things they had said in a WhatsApp group that parents at their daughter’s school were members of and something they had said in an email to the head teacher of their daughter’s school. It is incredible that the police thought that six police officers were needed to take these parents into custody. Julian Foulkes was under suspicion of having committed an offence under the Malicious Communications Act. In their case, they were under suspicion of having committed an offence under Section 127 of the Communications Act. Again, in due course, no further action was taken. We helped them sue the police for wrongful arrest and they too were given compensation of £20,000.

Be in no doubt that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and my noble friend Lord Moynihan are correct when they say that the process is the punishment. Even though no action was taken and no prosecutions were made in those two cases, Julian Foulkes and those parents were caused huge anxiety and distress by what they went through before the police decided to take no further action. That is a strong case for following the Law Commission of England and Wales’s advice and repealing the Malicious Communications Act and Section 127 of the Communications Act.

Briefly, I absolutely agree with the proposal in the amendment to remove the word “insulting” from the sections of the Public Order Act in which it remains. Noble Lords will not need reminding that the word “insulting” was removed from some sections of the Public Order Act, specifically Section 5 and related provisions, by the Crime and Courts Act 2013, following a campaign by Rowan Atkinson and others which pointed out how absurd it was to criminalise insulting. In one case, a young man was arrested for insulting a police officer’s horse, as noble Lords may recall. It was an effective campaign and it resulted in the word “insulting” being removed from Section 5, but it remains in many other parts of the Public Order Act. To my mind, the same arguments forcefully made by Rowan Atkinson and others at the time for removing the word “insulting” from Section 5 equally apply to the other sections of the Public Order Act where it remains. Just as we do not have a right not to be offended, we do not have a right not to be insulted.

I close with a quote from JS Mill, which I believe is from On Liberty. Mill warned that the criminal proscription of uncivil language is intrinsically likely to protect the holders of received opinion at the expense of dissidents. He wrote:

“With regard to what is commonly meant by intemperate discussion, namely invective, sarcasm, personality, and the like”—


we could add the word “insulting” to that list—

“the denunciation of these weapons would deserve more sympathy if it were ever proposed to interdict them equally to both sides; but it is only desired to restrain the employment of them against the prevailing opinion: against the unprevailing they may not only be used without general disapproval, but will be likely to obtain for him who uses them the praise of honest zeal and righteous indignation”.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, on his courage in raising these issues. I am going to say little more than that, other than that I was instrumental in getting a sentence added to the code of conduct for members of the Liberal Democrats, which says that no one has the right to not be offended.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, set out the principles that he believes are important to secure freedom of speech by removing the words “abusive or insulting” from a number of pieces of legislation. From these Benches, we absolutely accept freedom of speech. But I want to pick up on the point that the noble Lord, Lord Young, made when he quoted John Stuart Mill. There is a second half to the sentence about the right to free speech. Mill says that

“the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others”.

It is on preventing harm to others that this entire debate is balanced.

I am sure that there are many justifications for feeling that freedom of speech is being curtailed for people who just want to express their opinion. But the reason that we have the laws we do at the moment, particularly since the 1950s, is due to the harm that has been done to others. I think there was reference made earlier to the Race Relations Act of 60 years ago; that was in the consequence of very overt racial harm done to entire communities in our society. John Stuart Mill would have absolutely supported that legislation to protect. That is what the balance is between our freedom of speech and our responsibility as parliamentarians to protect those, particularly the most vulnerable, in our society.

That is why I want to go back briefly—not quite as far back as the Race Relations Act 1965—to when the original provisions on hate crimes were first introduced by the Blair Government in 1998. There is no doubt that this was partly in response to growing concerns relating to the ineffective policing of and legal responses to racist violence, which, again, was then very evident on our streets. The noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, and her family had campaigned for this more robust legislative framework, and not just because it was much clearer that, as a society, we did not and should not accept hate-motivated crimes, especially towards particular communities and those with protected characteristics.

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[Lord Berkeley of Knighton (CB)]

My Lords, I shall speak extremely briefly, because, compared to the expertise of my noble friends on the Cross Benches who have spoken thus far, I would probably merit nothing like the status of a keyhole surgeon—more like a butcher, really—in terms of legal matters. But I would just say that what I have heard is very convincing, coming from people with such expertise. I very much look forward to hearing the Minister’s reasons for rejecting the amendment, if that is what he feels he must do.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, I am absolutely astonished. Until 10 minutes ago, I had no idea that these provisions existed—that a constable without suspicion could seize a person’s devices, interrogate their data and hold on to them more or less indefinitely. Could somebody, perhaps a Minister, tell me in what circumstances suspicionless search like this is justified?

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Anderson of Ipswich and Lord Clement-Jones, for bringing forward the amendments in question. Amendments 390 and 391 have been well reasoned, and I am particularly happy to offer my support to the principle behind them. Objectivity should be the aim of every piece of legislation, and I welcome any measures towards that end. That is particularly the case when we are dealing with laws that provide the police with powers that can be used at the expense of people’s privacy. Clause 135 does this, allowing constables to extract online information from defendants’ devices should they need to determine whether the person has been involved in an act of terrorism.

I understand the Government’s intention behind this clause, and that it may have implications for national security. However, because of the importance, we should leave as little of its interpretation to human discretion as possible. We are all aware that, while we continue to support our forces, there are occasional instances of bad faith actors and, more generally, mistakes are a natural product of human enterprise. Allowing a constable’s belief to determine whether it is necessary to retain held information is an unnecessary risk that the Government do not need to take.

Similarly, we are not opposed to the principle behind Amendment 390. Individuals who are subjected to these new powers should not have the anxiety of an indefinite investigation hanging over their heads if the authorities do not have reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed. For that reason, introducing a limit on the amount of time that information can be held without reasonable suspicion is sensible. That said, I am unsure whether three months is long enough for police forces to determine whether retention is necessary. This is especially the case given the heightened stress that a decrease in officer numbers will put forces under. Despite this, I hope the Minister can agree that a limit is a sensible suggestion and update the Committee on the Government’s position.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I have made the case and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and others can accept that case or not. If he believes that keyhole surgery is still required, he has a mechanism to begin the operation. I hope the Committee can accept the assurances I have given, based on the fact that this is an amendment to the 2000 Act. The normal practice already in place is to have codes of practice, and I am proposing, via the discussion, to have revised codes of practice, subject to parliamentary affirmative scrutiny, and that the clauses will not be implemented until such a time as both Houses give their assent to those measures. I hope that assuages the noble Lord; if it does not, he knows what to do.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

I am sorry, I must be missing something here. There is a provision to conduct a really draconian intervention on a traveller as they pass through an airport, but it is not on the basis of suspicion. On what basis does the constable, or whatever he or she is, choose that traveller rather than another traveller, if there is no suspicion involved?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I hope I can help the noble Lord. The Schedule 7 and Schedule 3 powers are exercised at pace. Some investigations, particularly those involving complex or sensitive matters, could well extend beyond three months. Evidence often emerges gradually and may be fragmented.

Statutory codes of practice provide a flexible and responsive mechanism for setting out detailed safeguards and allow for timely updates on operational and legal contexts. If we embed such details in primary legislation, with due respect to the noble and learned Baroness, that would create inflexibility and mean that we may not keep pace with changing threats or operational realities. The codes are subject to parliamentary scrutiny; they can be revised as needed and ensure robust protection. That is why I have put that argument before the Committee. If it feels that that argument is not acceptable, we will have to have that discussion later on. That is my defence against having keyhole surgery at this time.

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[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 396 in my name raises fundamental issues about this part of the Bill. My concern is about Clause 138 and its clear potential to enable facial recognition searches of the DVLA’s vast image database. That would be a dramatic change. At present, drivers’ data can be accessed only for road traffic purposes.

Amendment 396 would place a safeguard in the Bill to prevent authorised persons using information obtained under these powers for the purposes of biometric searches using facial recognition technology. It would ensure that the private images of millions of citizens cannot be repurposed to feed live or retrospective facial recognition systems without full parliamentary debate and explicit consent. Around 55 million facial images are held by the DVLA; they are collected in good faith and with a clear expectation of privacy, alongside names, addresses and medical records, for the routine purposes of getting a driving licence. Turning that repository into a police biometric pool would mark a profound shift in the relationship between the state and the citizen. Combined with live facial recognition on our streets, it would create the infrastructure for real-time, population-scale surveillance, scanning the faces of tens of millions of law-abiding people as they go about their daily lives.

In effect, most of us would find ourselves on a perpetual digital watch list, our faces repeatedly checked for potential wrongdoing. That is troubling not only because of the bias and misidentification in these systems but because it is simply not proportionate policing. The public broadly support the use of technology to catch criminals, but they also want limits and safeguards. A 2024 survey by the Centre for Emerging Technology and Security and the Alan Turing Institute found that only one in five people—just 19%—trusted police forces to use biometric tools responsibly.

That anxiety is particularly strong among women. Barely three years ago, the Casey review exposed appalling misogyny and a serious abuse of data access within policing. Against that backdrop, granting digital access to millions of female drivers’ personal details and photographs is hardly reassuring, especially when previous safeguards have failed so spectacularly. Last year alone, 229 serving police officers and staff were arrested for domestic abuse-related offences, and a further 1,200 were on restricted duties linked to such allegations. The fear is real that combining facial recognition with DVLA access could allow abusers within policing to misuse these powers to trace survivors, to remove their freedom to hide and to undermine public trust still further. We also know that this technology misidentifies members of ethnic-minority communities far more frequently, compounding injustice and eroding confidence in policing by consent.

I share the ambition for policing to use data more intelligently. Forces need joined-up intelligence systems across the entire criminal justice network, but there is a world of difference between targeted access to high-risk offender data and a blank cheque to harvest the personal information of millions of people.

Clause 138 is far too wide. It allows the Secretary of State to authorise digital access for policing or law enforcement purposes, which frankly could mean anything. What information may be accessed, and for what purpose, would later be set by regulation made under the negative procedure, giving Parliament only the most cursory scrutiny of measures, with huge implications for privacy and liberty. Such sweeping powers should not be slipped through in secondary legislation. The public did not give their driving licence photographs to become part of a national face search system. There has been no debate, no consent and no assessment of the risk to those who have good reason to remain hidden. Once civic freedoms are eroded, they are very rarely rebuilt.

When the Minister replies, I hope we will hear what the Government’s policy intention is. If their intention is to keep open the possibility of using DVLA data for surveillance, they should say so and try to justify it. We know that the police have specifically asked for this. It is not good enough to say, “This is our intention”; my amendment would ensure it cannot happen. That is the safeguard the public expect and the least this Committee should demand.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to speak in favour of Amendment 396, to which I have added my name—my notes are only two pages long. It would ensure that the DVLA drivers database was not used for a purpose for which it was never intended; namely, to search drivers’ photos for a match with images collected by live facial recognition.

Facial recognition technology could be a useful tool in fighting serious crime if it was properly regulated and supervised, which is the case with other biometric technologies such as fingerprint and DNA, but currently it is open season on facial recognition, with no statutory constraints on its use or misuse. That means that this deeply invasive, mass surveillance tool poses a serious threat to the civil liberties and human rights of UK citizens. If used in combination with the DVLA drivers database, it would be a disproportionate expansion of police powers to identify and track innocent citizens across time and locations for low-level policing needs. It would give the authorities access to the biometric data of tens of millions of our fellow citizens. It is vital that safeguards are introduced in law to prevent this happening. This is precisely what Amendment 396 would do.

In Committee in the other place, the Policing Minister said that

“police forces do not conduct facial matching against images contained on the DVLA database, and the clause will not change that”.—[Official Report, Commons, Crime and Policing Bill Committee, 29/4/25; col. 442.]

But Clause 138 allows regulations to be made at a later date setting out how driver licensing information will be made accessible to law enforcement. All that Amendment 396 does is create safeguards to ensure that the regulations made under Clause 138 cannot provide for facial recognition searches of the DVLA database. I commend it to the Committee.