Peaceful Protests

Lord Strasburger Excerpts

Thursday 25th April 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Strasburger (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for calling this very important debate and I declare my interest, as recorded in the register, as chair of Big Brother Watch. I thank Madeleine Stone of Big Brother Watch for the excellent briefing that she provided parliamentarians about the UN toolkit that we are debating today. I also thank Professor Peter Fussey for his guidance; he was an important contributor to the UN toolkit.

The very worrying subject of this debate is just part of the Government’s assault on the privacy of ordinary, law-abiding citizens. Another example of the Government’s propensity to spy on us all is their smuggling into the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill a last-minute amendment enabling the Government to snoop on all our bank accounts. The pretext for this suspicionless financial snoopers’ charter is benefit fraud, for which authorities already have ample powers. This would affect every one of us, with our bank accounts being repeatedly scanned on secret criteria, set by the Government, and the banks forced to hand over unlimited amounts of information. This financial snoopers’ charter is not linked to serious crime or to any crime at all. This House must stop it in its tracks.

The trigger for this debate was last month’s publication of the UN toolkit, Human Rights Compliant Uses of Digital Technologies by Law Enforcement for the Facilitation of Peaceful Protests. Protests are important in a democracy, because they empower people who disagree with their Government’s actions. Those citizens may feel isolated and powerless, but public demonstrations show them that they are not alone and that there are thousands who agree with them. Those in power may try to ignore dissent but, if there are enough protesters, the Government will feel the need to come up with reasons why the protesters are wrong. That is when the debate begins, which is good. Protests also provide an essential voice for minority groups, who otherwise would not be heard.

I return to the UN toolkit, which challenges the UK police approach to biometric identification technologies such as facial recognition. It states very clearly:

“Facial recognition technologies and other biometric identification technologies must not be utilised to identify or track individuals peacefully participating in a protest”.


It also states that protests should not be used as a surveillance opportunity, which I and the Liberal Democrats also support. The reason given by the UN is simply that the use of this technology at protests represents a significant threat to the rights to freedom of expression and association. The inevitable “chilling effect” will mean that members of the public are less willing to engage in their right to protest, as they fear the loss of anonymity and possible reprisals, either now or in the future.

This is in line with the 2023 judgment of the European Court of Human Rights that Russia’s use of facial recognition technology to identify protesters was unlawful. Since this ruling, Russia has continued to use the technology to target protesters against the war in Ukraine and those attending the funeral of the political dissident Alexei Navalny.

However, despite the UN and ECHR rulings, police forces in the UK are already using facial recognition technology to monitor and identify peaceful protesters, in a total legislative vacuum. No primary legislation or regulations cover the use or oversight of this technology, so the police are writing their own rules, with no consideration of the human rights of their targets. This is a totally unacceptable state of affairs.

Facial recognition technology is wholly intrusive. It is the equivalent of stamping a barcode on every citizen’s forehead so that they can all be identified from a distance. Less intrusive identification methods, such as using fingerprints or DNA, are heavily prescribed in their use and the retention of their data. But, scandalously, there is nothing to control the use of facial recognition technology, which poses the most serious threat to human rights of all these technologies.

Facial recognition technology was used by police in Cardiff to monitor an entirely peaceful protest. The watch-list fed into the system contained mostly individuals not wanted for any criminal activity. It was just monitoring law-abiding citizens exercising their right to peaceful protest. The Appeal Court found that South Wales Police had unlawfully deployed the technology, but that has not stopped it being used at peaceful protests.

Current police policy, which, in the absence of any legislation, they have written for themselves, covers identifying people who “may cause harm”—whatever that absurdly broad phrase means. It can be used to include just about anybody. This do-it-yourself police guidance sets no criminal threshold for the use of live facial recognition and can be used to justify any kind of use, including surveillance and identification of peaceful protesters.

Amazingly, this is only the second time that facial recognition has been debated in Parliament in the eight years since the police started trialling it. As a result, there is no democratic mandate for the use of this technology. The Science and Technology Committee called for an “immediate moratorium” on its use, which has been ignored. There has been sustained criticism of the legislative vacuum from parliamentarians, academics and rights groups. The independent review commissioned by the Met criticised the force for failing to consider the impact on human rights and relying on an inadequate legal basis. Four Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioners have found that the existing legal position is not fit for purpose.

I have a number of questions for the Minister. If he feels unable to answer them all today, will he write to me and the other speakers in this debate with his answers? How do the Government justify taking the opposite approach to that of our allies and the UN guidance, instead mimicking the Russian police state practice of using facial recognition to identify protestors at peaceful protests? Will the Government commit to complying with the UN toolkit, which prohibits using facial recognition to identify those participating in peaceful protests? How have the Government evaluated the chilling effect on peaceful protests of using facial recognition, including at the Coronation?

Furthermore, what recourse is available to citizens who are wrongly placed on the facial recognition watch-list or are misidentified by the technology? Big Brother Watch has examples of innocent people, including a 14 year-old boy being mistakenly identified as a criminal, with seriously traumatic effects, possibly lifelong. The UN model places a clear responsibility on states to ensure proper oversight of advanced surveillance technologies at protests. With the likely abolition of the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner by the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill, who will conduct this oversight?

Lastly, when will the Government wake up from being fast asleep at the wheel on this vital matter and legislate? We need a robust and clear domestic legal framework, governing the use of digital technologies by law enforcement that conforms to international human rights law.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Lord Strasburger Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 20th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Strasburger (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I apologise before appearing—or, more precisely, not appearing—before your Lordships in this manner, but I understand that there has been a failure in the parliamentary network and I cannot appear in video; it was either by telephone or smoke signals, so I will settle for the phone.

I should begin by declaring my interest as chair of Big Brother Watch, which campaigns for the privacy and freedom of speech of the citizens of our country and seeks to protect them from unwarranted intrusion by the state into their lives and their data. Big Brother Watch has managed to rapidly prepare a briefing for parliamentarians about this Bill, and I commend it to Members of this House. It sets out five areas of concern, which I will cover later in my contribution.

However, Big Brother Watch had to work at pace to complete the briefing for this Second Reading because the Government published the Bill only on 8 November, just eight working days ago. I wonder what the reason could be for this rushed processing. Could it be that the Government want to avoid the thorough examination that this detailed and complex Bill needs? If so, the small number of Members who are ready to speak about it today—just 11, including the Minister—suggests that this strategy might have worked. Therefore, my first question for the Minister is to ask for an explanation of why so little time has been given to prepare for this Second Reading.

I sat on the Joint Committee that carried out the pre-legislative scrutiny of the original Investigatory Powers Bill in 2015 and 2016. The noble Lord, Lord Murphy of Torfaen, whom I am pleased to follow in this debate, was the chair of that committee and a very good job he did too. My view eight years ago was, and still is, that bulk data collection—that is, the interception or collection and indefinite storage of everybody’s innocent internet, phone and computer communication—is a serious intrusion on every citizen’s privacy and requires very strong judicial oversight.

Those who support this mass surveillance seek to reassure us by saying that if you have nothing to hide you have nothing to fear. However, in truth do we not all have something to hide that we would prefer to keep to ourselves? That is why we shut the toilet or bedroom door behind us. That is why we do not speak in public about troubling issues in our family or friendship circle such as addictions, unwanted pregnancies, financial woes and the like. There are some things that we just feel are private—the kind of information that, in the wrong hands, can be used to demean or blackmail any of us. That detailed knowledge about every individual in the country could be used by an unscrupulous Government—who are considering ignoring laws and treaties, for example, if that rings any bells. They could use it to identify all citizens of a particular religion, political persuasion, sexual proclivity or whatever, to single them out for disadvantageous treatment or worse—much worse.

The state is collecting this personal information about us all and we cannot predict who in a future Government will get their hands on it and might totally misuse it. All I can say with certainty is that East Germany’s Stasi would have thought that every day was Christmas if it could have laid its hands on such a rich source of intimate data about all its citizens. Therefore, we must achieve a balance between the privacy needs and rights of individual citizens and protection of those same citizens from terrorists and serious and organised crime. It is not an easy balance to get right. I fear that the Government are still erring in favour of capturing too much data about innocent citizens—of course, the vast majority of us.

There is another very strong reason for not engaging in the collection of everyone’s data. The problem is that the useful information about terrorism or organised crime gets buried in a blizzard of useless data about the vast majority of us who are innocently going about our lives. In 2016, the Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill heard startling evidence about the problem that this causes for security services from a gentleman called Bill Binney, a retired technical director of the United States National Security Agency and a bit of a folk hero in the intelligence community because he predicted with great accuracy when the Russians would invade Afghanistan just by analysing the patterns of their military signals. However, later in his career Mr Binney concluded that the NSA’s policy of collecting the data of all American citizens was unconstitutional, so his team devised software called ThinThread. It used smart collection to pick out for inspection only the communications of known terrorists, those they were talking to—and who those people were talking to.

The management of the NSA instead chose to go down the road of collecting 100% of the data through a highly expensive project, Trailblazer—which was later abandoned—and ignoring Bill Binney’s method of giving the analysts a much smaller but richer and more relevant set of data. The consequence was that the NSA missed the data that it already had in its systems which would have alerted it to the plot to attack the twin towers on 9/11. If only the NSA had known that it had it and had looked at it. We know that the NSA did have it because shortly after 9/11, Mr Binney’s team ran its ThinThread software against the NSA’s database at the time of 9/11 and found six of the 9/11 conspirators and their command centres. Mr Binney shocked the committee by revealing that 9/11 could, and should, have been prevented—if only the American security analysts had not been swamped with useless information.

The price paid by the American people for their security services’ predilection for bulk data collection was very high indeed. Yet here we have in this Bill the continuation of that folly by our own intelligence services. I invite noble Lords to recall the terrorist attacks of the last 20 years and that, almost every time, it was later revealed that the perpetrators were known to the police or the intelligence services. Our people being swamped with irrelevant data must have contributed to the failure to further investigate these suspects before they acted.

The Government will no doubt argue that the advent of artificial intelligence makes it more possible for them to search for needles in haystacks. That may well be so, but some of that advantage will be negated by the massive explosion of data volumes they are now collecting from a wide variety of sources, especially social media and video. The fact remains that they are still holding, and have available for inquiry, huge amounts of data about all of us in this House and in this country—all of it at risk of being misused. Bill Binney’s solution was to immediately encrypt the 99.9% of the data that was of no interest to protect it from snooping, official or unofficial. In the UK we have none of that protection.

The Investigatory Powers Act, to the credit of the then Government, sought to reassure the public that there are limitations on the use of personal data by law enforcement and the security services, and how those limitations are policed. However, it is worth noting that it was also disclosed that several intrusive powers have been used on the British people for many years, without any such constraint. That was because they had been in use without the consent or even the knowledge of Parliament. If it had not been for the brave whistleblowing of Edward Snowden, the contractor to the American National Security Agency, the scandal of the UK’s surveillance powers would not have been revealed to Parliament and may never have been addressed.

We need an Edward Snowden-type whistleblower every few years to keep our security services and our Government honest, because the safeguards that are in place to ensure compliance by the security services and prevent misuse of these highly intrusive powers seem to be inadequate, as illustrated by the TechEn case. This was a very serious breach of the statutory safeguards in the Investigatory Powers Act and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. It was the subject of the scathing judgment against the Security Service and the Home Office by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal in January this year. MI5 admitted that it had been aware, since May 2016, that there was a very high risk it was in breach of its statutory obligations concerning the holding of personal data under both Acts. It also admitted that it should have immediately reported to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal but failed to do this for three years.

The Investigatory Powers Tribunal found that

“there were serious failings in compliance with the statutory obligations of MI5 from late 2014 onwards”—

that is, two years earlier than MI5 admitted—and that those failings should

“have been addressed … by the Management Board”.

It was also strongly critical of the Home Office’s failure to inquire further into MI5’s long-standing compliance failures, after being made aware of them several times since 2016. The tribunal found that the Secretary of State breached their duty to make adequate inquiries as to whether the statutory safeguards were being met, and that warrants were issued after late 2014, through to 5 April 2019, that were unlawful and did not meet the safeguarding requirements imposed by the Investigatory Powers Act and RIPA. Other breaches of the safeguards were alleged, but we do not know the tribunal’s verdict on them because they were covered only in the secret part of the judgment.

As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, whom I also thank for this thorough review, points out:

“MI5’s previous non-compliance has led to it being the subject of particularly rigorous oversight by IPCO with four extraordinary inspections taking place in 2019”.


He later warns that the TechEn case is a

“salutary reminder of the principle underlying the IPA: that exceptional powers require strong and independent external oversight”.

We would do well to remember those words when we come to consider the Bill in detail. There is clear, authoritative evidence that all is not well with the compliance mechanism in the Investigatory Powers Act. Some of us predicted this during the Bill’s consideration in this House. We also called for judicial authorisation to manage the risk of these suspicionless electronic surveillance powers, which are on a scale never seen before in a democracy. Instead, the Government set up a much weaker double-lock system, and now we see the consequences. So my second and third questions for the Minister are: what are the Government’s plans to seriously improve compliance with the Investigatory Powers Act, and will they now recognise that the current supervision regime is failing and needs to be replaced with much stronger arrangements? On a related matter, my fourth question is: when will the Government introduce regulation of a highly intrusive technology that is running riot in policing and security with absolutely no rules, safeguards or oversight—namely, facial recognition?

I turn to this Bill. There are five primary concerns that will be covered in detail in future stages in this House. As has been discussed, it weakens the safeguards against the intelligence services collecting bulk datasets of personal information by potentially harvesting millions of facial images and mass social media data. The Bill’s creation of a vague and nebulous category of information where there is deemed to be a low or no reasonable expectation of privacy is a concerning departure from existing privacy law, in particular data protection law. Such an undefined category requires agencies that are motivated to process such data to adjust safeguards according to unqualified assertions about other people’s expectations of the privacy of their data. On the contrary, data protection law is constructed according to the sensitivity of the information rather than guesswork about the individual’s expectation of privacy concerning personal information. In my view, this provision needs to be worded more tightly.

It weakens safeguards when authorities harvest communications data—for example, membership of and Facebook posts to a racial equality group could be seen as data available to a section of the public as defined in this Bill, and therefore the authorities may wrongly believe that they consequently possess lawful authority to obtain associated communications data from the platform. Once again, more precise wording is needed.

Thirdly, it expressly permits the harvesting and processing of internet connection records for generalised mass surveillance, which is a much wider purpose than originally envisioned.

Fourthly, it increases the number of politicians who can authorise the surveillance of British parliamentarians and members of other domestic legislative bodies. Politicians are not above the law but, given their important constitutional role, spying on them must require the highest authority—namely, that of the Prime Minister.

Fifthly and finally, it attempts to force technology companies, including those overseas, to inform the Government of any plans to improve security or privacy measures on their platforms so that the Government can consider serving a notice to prevent such changes. I am sorry to say that the Government must be suffering from delusions of grandeur if they think that Apple, for example, will agree to desist from improving the privacy protection of its products or to produce an iPhone with downgraded privacy features especially for the UK. Superior privacy for its customers is one of Apple’s main selling features, and it is not going to forfeit that to please the current Government in a small part of its worldwide market.

We have much to discuss when this Bill reaches its Committee stage. In the meantime I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to my four questions at the end of this debate.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords—

Live Facial Recognition: Police Guidance

Lord Strasburger Excerpts

Monday 4th April 2022 Lords Chamber

[The Lord Speaker (Lord McFall of Alcluith)]

The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, will now contribute remotely.

[Lord Strasburger (LD) [V]]

My Lords, this technology is used by the Chinese Government to micro-manage the lives of its citizens, so its use here needs strict rules and effective oversight. In the absence of legislation, the police have tried to regulate themselves by writing their own rules, but these are so vague that almost anything goes: targeting people who “may cause harm”, whatever that means. When will the Government do their job and legislate to control the risks of this technology?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I have outlined the conditions in which it should be used. To compare its use with how China looks at its people is really taking a leap forward. As I have just pointed out, I think that its use when fair, proportionate and for a policing purpose is absolutely reasonable.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Lord Strasburger Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 15th March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Strasburger (LD) [V]]

My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, who has made several powerful speeches during the passage of this Bill. I shall speak to Amendment 81 in my name. It requires the Government to devise a perpetrator strategy to prevent, identify and assess perpetrators. It would increase the number of rehabilitation programmes and better tackle attitudes before they lead to a crime. It goes without saying that it is far better to prevent repetition of domestic abuse before it occurs. Even better, we should aim to prevent abuse happening in the first place.

At a time when violence against women is sadly in the headlines once again, we have a duty to do all we can to prevent crimes that can be entirely predictable, as we have heard, and often follow a multitude of warning signs, as the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, illustrated in her four examples and as other speakers have done. Domestic abuse is a crime hidden in people’s homes. Behind the doors of ordinary homes, tens of thousands of victims live in pain and fear with their own families. Domestic abuse is a terrible, secret crime.

Several noble Lords have used the phrase “murder in slow motion” because when domestic abuse reaches its logical end, often after years, the murder is so very predictable. And yet it still happens, time after time—women mostly, dying after years of injury at the hands of the men they loved. The Bill sets out to help those victims when they leave their abuser and report them—when they have had enough.

However, Amendments 73 and 81 seek to prevent the crimes happening in the first place, so that victims do not have to leave and perpetrators can see what they are doing and choose to stop before another tragedy, of which there are so many, ending in injury, pain or death. We need to step in before children who witness this tragedy grow up and take everything they have learned into their own relationships, playing out the same tragedy again 20 years down the line.

Good-quality perpetrator programmes help those who assault, coerce or frighten those closest to them to stop. The best programmes help perpetrators realise that they do not do it because anyone makes them; they do it because they choose to, and they can choose not to. Good perpetrator interventions have stunning success rates, which I and other noble Lords have already rehearsed in this House. How can we possibly fail to do everything we can to stop the pain, the destruction and the transfer of this tragedy down through the generations? The Government must do everything they can to discover the best of these programmes, roll them out over the entire country and fund them in such a way as to make them a part of a well-used and reliable method of reducing this sickening secret crime.

We must do more. In their sex and relationships education classes, the children of this nation must be taught not only what good relationships look like and how to treat their future partners with respect, but also what an abusive relationship looks like. Then they will be able to recognise when a relationship of their own, which may have started well, begins to sour. Once we have shown them what it looks like, we should tell them where they can get help, what they can do, how they can stop it, or how they can escape it and who they can call.

In Committee, the Minister responded to this amendment with an assurance that a perpetrator strategy will be included within the forthcoming domestic abuse strategy. It has also emerged that a total of £25 million of initial funding is available. However, the Minister’s statement was rather short on important detail and I hope she will be able to fill the gaps in her reply. I invite the Minister to tell the House the Government’s position on the following matters, for all of which I provided her with advanced notice.

Will the Government not only fund behaviour change interventions but stimulate changes across public service delivery to better detect and prevent abuse in the first place? Will the perpetrator strategy set measurable targets? Will the Government lay out plans to stimulate social change to end any lingering tolerance of abusive behaviour? Will the Government commit the Home Office to work with other departments to shape the perpetrator strategy and ensure their buy in? Will they consult experts outside government across public services and the specialist women’s sector?

Will the perpetrator strategy contain clear guidance on quality for commissioners to ensure that there is no risk of public money funding poor practice? Will the perpetrator strategy set out the Government’s funding intentions for the next three years? Above all, will the Government no longer allow perpetrators to fly under the radar and abuse time and again? We must stop asking: “Why doesn’t the victim leave? Why doesn’t she keep her children safe?” We must start putting responsibility to change on those who are being abusive, until the abuser can ask himself: “Why don’t I stop?”

I look forward to the Minister’s response. If necessary, I will test the opinion of the House, depending on what she has to say.

[Baroness Sanderson of Welton (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendments 73 and 81. I applaud the intentions of both amendments but will raise a couple of practical points. I hope that they do not seem inappropriate after the shocking testimony of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the very powerful and moving speech by my noble friend Lady Bertin.

In relation to establishing a register, the aim of adding serial abusers and stalkers to ViSOR is to make it easier for agencies across the country to identify and monitor perpetrators. In principle, this seems sensible. It puts the burden on the perpetrator, not the victim, and, given that many high-harm perpetrators are repeat offenders, it could help manage the risk. However, there are concerns from some working on the front line as to whether it would achieve that goal in practice.

ViSOR is a vital tool for the police, prison and probation services, but its effectiveness depends on the quality and timeliness of the information recorded within it. If we are to extend it, then there must be questions about who goes on it, how long they stay on it and, given the potential size and complexity of such a database, how we ensure that it is fit for purpose. Will it be able to do the job for which it is intended? No one has yet found satisfactory answers to these questions. As I said, I applaud the intention, so I would be grateful if my noble friend the Minister could outline some of the alternative ways in which the Government can and will strengthen oversight in relation to perpetrators.

The call in Amendments 73 and 81 for a perpetrator strategy is more straightforward. Thanks to the innovative work of SafeLives and its partners in the Drive project, we know that targeted intervention programmes work. As they say, domestic abuse is not inevitable. We can and must stop it recurring and, indeed, occurring in the first place. I question whether we need to call for this on the face of the Bill, given that the Minister has already assured us that it will be part of the forthcoming domestic abuse strategy. However, like others, I do not question the need for it. As recent events have shown us, the focus should be on the perpetrator, not the victim.

Like others, I put on record my deepest sympathies for Sarah Everard’s family and friends. We all hope that something good can come out of something so unfathomably bad, but we should never forget that at the centre of this national debate is a very personal tragedy and a private grief.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Lord Strasburger Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 6th sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 6th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 10th February 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Strasburger (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group but I will focus my remarks on Amendment 167, to which I have added my name. This is a good Bill and it contains many well thought out provisions to help victims and survivors of domestic abuse, but it deals almost exclusively with the support of those victims after the abuse has occurred. That is commendable, but it is not enough. Surely we also need measures to stop abuse happening, so that there are fewer victims and there is less harm done to them and their children.

Amendment 167 focuses on the perpetrator rather than the victim to prevent repeat occurrences with the same victim or, as often happens, with fresh victims. If we want to reduce domestic abuse, we need to change the focus. Instead of asking “Why doesn’t she leave?”, we should be asking “Why doesn’t he stop?” We should be changing the dynamics of abusive relationships, making it clear that responsibility lies with the perpetrators of domestic violence and giving them tools to deal with their behaviour.

We already know, and we have heard again today, that high-quality interventions can substantially reduce or even stop violence and coercive control, which leads to happier and safer lives for victims, their children, and future generations. Amendment 167 calls for urgent research on the assessment and identification of perpetrators. Domestic violence does not come from nowhere. It often builds over time until outbursts of violence become commonplace. For example, we already know that non-fatal strangulation is a common signal of future, more serious violence and even murder. This research should lead to an increasing number of high-quality rehabilitation programmes, which should be checked for quality and based on best practice. The opportunity to make use of such a programme should no longer be a postcode lottery based on whether an appropriate charity is funded in your area. It currently amounts to a postcode lottery as to whether the one or two women who will be killed this week by their partner will be you, your daughter, your sister or your mum.

We should be ambitious in tackling the foothills of domestic abuse issues. Specialist work that challenges abusive attitudes and behaviours should be part of every school curriculum, so that every child knows what an abusive relationship looks like. We can teach the next generation to recognise the warning signs, so that they can avoid ever entering into such a relationship —either as an abuser or a victim. For those children who know all too well what domestic abuse looks like, we can give them the vocabulary and a place to talk about it, and chances to seek help to stop it.

We know that working with perpetrators brings success. The University of Bristol’s three-year study of over 500 cases, as we have heard earlier, shows an 82% drop in physical abuse and an 88% drop in sexual abuse. Similar dramatic drops in stalking and controlling behaviours are also seen after high-quality perpetrator programmes.

Domestic abuse leads to whole families living with the constant presence of fear at home. It leads to victims in a constant state of high alert, concealing physical and emotional damage, terrified almost every moment of every day, but with nowhere else to go. It leads to children feeling frightened, powerless, confused and angry, and their taking responsibility for events over which they have no control. They are unable to concentrate at school, unable to make friends, afraid to go home and afraid not to.

Domestic abuse leads to abusers feeling that the only way they know of staving off loneliness is to carry on controlling, beating, hurting, screaming, shouting and threatening, because no one who had a choice would ever live with them. Perpetrator intervention can reduce and even eliminate this pain, violence and death which leaks from relationship to relationship and generation to generation. We know this and now we have the chance to act on it. Amendment 167 is that chance, and I hope the Government will accept it into this Bill.

[Lord Polak (Con)]

My Lords, one is always left stunned and moved when listening to my noble friend Lady Newlove. I rise to support Amendment 167 in the name of my noble friend Lady Bertin and others. I congratulate her on her clear and persuasive introduction.

As I said last week when moving Amendment 176 in my own name, to truly tackle domestic abuse we must be bold. We need to take a holistic, whole-family approach, with targeted interventions to support adult victims to rebuild their lives, to support children experiencing domestic abuse and to ensure that perpetrators have access to quality programmes to prevent offending and reoffending. It is the quality programmes for perpetrators that Amendment 167 is addressing.

We know from MARAC data that there are at least 53,000 high-harm perpetrators in England and Wales at any given time. We know too that the Drive project which noble Lords have spoken about, set up by Respect, SafeLives and Social Finance, is probably the best-funded perpetrator intervention programme. It has suggested that it is working with just over 2,000 of the highest-harm perpetrators who pose a risk of murder or serious physical harm. It is important, it is praiseworthy and it is life-saving work, but 2,000 out of 53,000 is not even scratching the surface. As my noble friend Lady Newlove explained, so many are in danger now.

This timely and vitally important Bill is very welcome and has so much support, but this amendment is crucial. It is crucial that efforts are made to improve and enhance current perpetrator programmes, but it is also crucial to dramatically increase the number of programmes. I look to my noble friend the Minister to find a way to welcome this amendment, as it will enhance this vital legislation. As my noble friend Lady Bertin rightly said, it has support not only across this House but from countless organisations on the front line, from children’s organisations to the police, LEAs and—perhaps most tellingly—survivors themselves.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Lord Strasburger Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 5th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Strasburger (LD) [V]]

My Lords, given this Government’s abysmal performance in much of what they touch, particularly their dithering response to the pandemic and their anti-democratic treatment of Parliament, this admirable and urgently-needed Bill comes as a pleasant surprise, and I welcome it wholeheartedly. Even more encouraging are reports from the other place that the Government engaged constructively on the Bill during its passage there and accepted many amendments to improve it. I hope we will see more of that attitude from the Government during the Bill’s passage through this House because there are many gaps that need to be filled to make it into an excellent Bill.

Most attention will rightly be focused on protecting and supporting the victims of domestic abuse and their children, but the vast majority of perpetrators of domestic abuse are men, particularly so for the more serious crimes, so I feel a duty, as a man, to do something to tackle the problem at source through a national perpetrator strategy to prevent repeat offending and even perhaps head off the initial crime before it happens. If we can do that, even with moderate success, we will save many victims from having to endure abuse in the first place. So I will be supporting amendments to introduce a national perpetrator strategy to address and correct the behaviour of abusers on a long-term basis. That needs to exist alongside high-quality support for victims and an effective criminal justice system.

We know that a quarter of high-harm perpetrators are repeat offenders, and some have six victims or more. In England and Wales there are approximately 400,000 perpetrators causing medium or high levels of harm, including murder, yet only a tiny percentage—less than 1%—receive specialist intervention that might prevent future abusive behaviour. There is a growing body of research to demonstrate the effectiveness of quality-assured intervention. One study of 12 intervention programmes found a reduction in the number of women whose partners tried to assault them from 54% to 2%. Other studies have shown smaller but still significant reductions in offending. Survivors are strongly in favour of interventions for perpetrators. The right interventions at the right time can stop abuse occurring, recurring or escalating.

Currently these programmes are patchy, and are limited in terms of the range of perpetrators that they can reach safely. The pre-legislative committee on the Bill noted the need for investment in perpetrator programmes and for co-operation with expert providers. I believe that attempts were made to add a requirement for a national perpetrator strategy in the Commons, but they failed. We must correct this defect in the Bill so that many potential victims can be saved from domestic abuse or repeat abuse before it occurs.

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Strasburger Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 22nd July 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Strasburger (LD) [V]]

My Lords, this squalid little Bill would end our participation in Europe’s greatest post-war achievement: freedom for all of us to live, love and work without hindrance anywhere in 27 countries. I deeply regret its loss.

We have to wonder how we have plummeted so far since the heady days of the London Olympics. In just eight years, that pride in our country and the welcome we gave to the world have given way to division and cynicism. What has changed is that the cabal of leave campaigners, who cheated and lied their way through the referendum, went on to capture the Conservative Party and then the Government. They have not changed their shameful methods. They are still peddling the beguiling but delusional myth of British exceptionalism, claiming that everything they do is world-beating when it manifestly is not. The hard truth is that their stewardship has taken us into the relegation zone of the world Covid league. When they combine that with a hard Brexit, we will tumble out of contention altogether. Our excessive death toll from the virus was caused by the PM’s absence in February while rearranging his marital affairs, his dithering over lockdown in March and his adviser’s barely concealed fetish for herd immunity.

Yesterday’s ISC report described Russia as

“a muddy nexus between business and corruption and state power”,

but this sounds a bit familiar closer to home. Here, we have rushed planning decisions to help party donors, huge untendered PPE contracts with unsuitable companies and the ruling party being dangerously close to wealthy, Kremlin-connected Russians. Indeed, Mr Johnson has a penchant for oligarchs’ hospitality. At the risk of gifting them kompromat in 2018 he cavorted with them, without his security detail, but with a former Russian spy, at an Italian palazzo. At the same time, the citizens of Salisbury were reeling from Russia’s use of deadly nerve agent on their streets.

The Prime Minister’s chief adviser, who, remarkably, retains his post while being literally in contempt of Parliament, and whose mantra is “Never admit mistakes, never apologise, never resign”, has three years in Moscow on his CV. Is it then any wonder that these people buried the ISC report before the election, or that they are still resisting the cross-party calls for an investigation into Russian interference in the referendum? What on earth could they possibly have to hide?

Metropolitan Police: Live Facial Recognition

Lord Strasburger Excerpts

Monday 16th March 2020 Lords Chamber

Tabled by

[Lord Strasburger]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what discussions they have had with the Metropolitan Police about the use of Live Facial Recognition deployments; whether the watchlists for such deployments are composed exclusively of serious criminals; and what is the definition of serious criminals for this purpose.

[Lord Foster of Bath (LD)]

On behalf of my noble friend Lord Strasburger, and with his permission, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in his name on the Order Paper.

Policing and Crime Bill

Lord Strasburger Excerpts

Ping Pong (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 18th January 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hollins (CB)]

My Lords, many victims of phone hacking, harassment and press intrusion are relying on part 2 of Leveson to proceed and to provide answers to suspicions of corruption between the press and public officials, including the police. Many noble Lords will have received correspondence from the Hillsborough Family Support Group and from Jacqui Hames. Those letters are quite concerning and show the need for further understanding of what happened and what went wrong so that we can appreciate whether adequate measures are in place to ensure that that kind of activity does not happen again.

My family has an interest in part 2 being carried through, as promised by our previous Prime Minister. Dozens of other families and individuals have been affected and also want answers. It does seem fair that we have the inquiry. The misinformation by some newspapers leading up to the close of the consultation may indeed have led to a very large number of formulaic responses. I hope that Her Majesty’s Government will have the wisdom and moral courage to stand up for what is right in this situation and to go through with part 2. I find it very difficult to believe that financial privilege is really the reason for the current caution in this matter. I support the amendment.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill. On two occasions, this House has previously considered the subject of whether Leveson 2 should proceed and, on both, came down firmly in favour of it going ahead. Whether or not the noble Baroness decides to test the opinion of the House today, it is important that the Government be reminded that your Lordships’ House is not going to let the matter drop.

Some very pertinent questions remain unanswered. I draw the House’s attention to just one of the terms of reference for Leveson 2 and the important issues that remain unresolved. The sixth term of reference is:

“To inquire into the extent of corporate governance and management failures at News International and other newspaper organisations, and the role, if any, of politicians, public servants and others in relation to any failure to investigate wrongdoing at News International”.


It is essential that, in such a vital industry as the press, the extent and nature of corporate governance and management failures be established. This is underscored by the fact that many of the leading executives are still in post, have returned to their post or retain key roles in the industry. These include the chief executive of News UK, the editor-in-chief of Associated Newspapers and the director of legal affairs at the Telegraph, who had the equivalent post at Trinity Mirror during the phone hacking scandal and its cover-up.

The questions that need addressing are as follows. First, how did it come to be that phone hacking and the unlawful blagging of personal data persisted on such an industrial scale at certain titles for so long; in the case of News UK and Trinity Mirror for at least 10 years, and for several years after journalists at both companies were first questioned by the police under Operation Glade in early 2004? Secondly, how and why was phone hacking and the unlawful blagging of personal data covered up at some of the largest newspapers, in the face of emerging evidence that executives knew about the practice and some findings and admissions in the civil courts to that effect? Thirdly, is it appropriate that no executive has lost their job over the corporate governance and management failures that took place? Has there been a cover-up of the cover-up of wrongdoing?

I will not delay the House further as I suspect noble Lords would like to move on to other matters. Suffice it so say that there are several other topics that Leveson 2 is scheduled to examine and they are of equal importance to the one I have highlighted. Leveson 2 is needed to inquire into suspicious matters affecting our police, our newspapers and our politicians. Since the completion of part 1 of Lord Leveson’s inquiry, the case for part 2 has become even stronger.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as a regular adviser to the press on regulatory matters. It has not yet been mentioned today, but your Lordships may wish to take into account that, since Leveson was instituted, there have been large numbers of criminal trials and civil proceedings in which the conduct of the press and the police has been on trial. I am far from convinced that the time, expense and use of judicial resources that will be required by Leveson part 2 are therefore justified. However, your Lordships do not need to decide that issue today—it is the very matter under consultation by the Secretary of State. If the Secretary of State’s answer is unsatisfactory to noble Lords, this House and the other place are perfectly entitled to, and no doubt will, reconsider the matter.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, mentioned the unsatisfactory element of the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill: that it appears to give Lord Justice Leveson a veto over the views of Parliament. I hope that when considering the consultation issues, the Secretary of State will privately talk to Sir Brian Leveson and take his view as to whether he thinks, with all of his enormous experience, that Leveson 2 would be justified. I cannot support the Motion of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Lord Strasburger Excerpts

Monday 11th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Janvrin (CB)]

I speak to Amendment 3, in my name, and note my interest as a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee. A lot of the points made by the committee have already been taken on board by the Government following discussions and scrutiny in another place.

In the committee’s report on the draft Bill, we recommended that privacy protections should form the backbone of the legislation around which the exceptional powers are then built. This is absolutely crucial to the whole purpose of the Bill. Following scrutiny in another place, the Bill introduced in this House now has in Clause 2 provisions on “General duties in relation to privacy”. I hope that your Lordships welcome the inclusion of the new clause, which crucially includes the requirement that intrusive powers should be used only when the information being sought cannot be obtained by other less intrusive means.

However, the Bill still lacks a clear statement at the beginning about the right to privacy. This is the purpose of the amendment in this group in my name. We propose inserting a new subsection at the very start of the Bill, which places an individual’s right to privacy at the forefront of the legislation. I note that this amendment is similar to Amendment 2 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, which attempts to achieve something similar, although I suggest that the amendment in my name is the more straightforward of the two options before us.

Finally, I think that this short but necessary amendment is compatible with the more detailed provisions already existing in Clauses 1 and 2.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, it is a good idea to remind ourselves at times like these that we live in a democracy, and part of what defines a democracy is that our Government do not rule us and we are not their subjects; they govern on our behalf, and with our consent. So when our Government ask us to hand over prodigious quantities of our information that reveal in detail how we live our private lives, we must take great care.

We all have something to fear from these surveillance powers, for none of us can guarantee the benevolence of future Governments. The surveillance programmes run by our Government now go far beyond anything George Orwell imagined. The more personal data are dredged up and stored, the more the risk of misuse. Now that most of us carry smartphones, government agencies and the police have unprecedented access to location information about where we are 24 hours a day, seven days a week. They can also get their hands on all the information on our phones and computers: our contacts, our diaries, our emails, our web browsing, our social networking and everything we do on the internet. Their access to our lives has expanded massively in the past 10 years. In addition, there are myriad new databases that create digital dossiers about our lives which are held by private companies and public bodies, including our banks and our doctors, and the Government have access to all of them.

In short, far from going dark, as is often claimed, the police and security services are enjoying a golden age of surveillance. If government agencies were offered the choice of current capabilities or pre-internet capabilities, they would overwhelmingly prefer their surveillance abilities today. Listen to the words of Wolfgang Schmidt, who was a lieutenant-colonel in the Stasi in Berlin. When he first learned of the extent of surveillance currently carried out on their populations by the British and American Governments, Schmidt thought carefully and then said:

“You know, for us, this would have been a dream come true”.

Some proponents of bulk surveillance tell us, “You have nothing to fear, if you have nothing to hide”. It has been said that the original maker of that claim was Joseph Goebbels. Many people’s response is simply, “I don’t have anything to hide, but I don’t have anything I feel like showing you either, and the way I live my life is none of the state’s business”.

I fully support the amendments in this group. They seek to give effect to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s—

[Lord Ashton of Hyde (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. We have a great number of amendments to deal with today. I respectfully ask the noble Lord to address the amendments.

[Lord Strasburger]

That is exactly what I was just doing.

I fully support the amendments in this group. They seek to give effect to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s demand that privacy protections should form the backbone of the legislation around which these surveillance powers are built as exceptions to the privacy norm.

Clause 2 was the Government’s answer to the ISC’s demand, but it is incomplete and insufficient and needs to be seriously beefed up. The amendments in this group give full effect to the ISC’s reasonable requirement that privacy should be the backbone of the Bill by, among other things, incorporating the 10 tests devised by the Royal United Services Institute review. I commend these amendments to the House.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

I, for my part, am entirely content with Amendment 3 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Janvrin. I marginally prefer it to Amendment 2. It may be doubted whether either is strictly necessary, but let us have the simpler one. With the greatest respect, I regard Amendment 1 as entirely superfluous. It unnecessarily overcomplicates things and in large part it overlaps with other provisions in the legislation. It just is not a good idea. It is all very well to treat this legislation with some element of scepticism, but, please, not cynicism. That is the way this is approached in that context.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Strasburger]

My Lords, Amendment 17 in my name would provide for a statutory public interest defence for the offence set out in Clause 3. Clause 3 effectively reproduces the RIPA Section 1 criminal offence of phone hacking, of which the Prime Minister’s director of communications, Andy Coulson—among others—was convicted when he was editor of the News of the World.

I invite the House to support the amendment in this group proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, which provides access to justice for victims of phone hacking and incentivises the adoption of the Leveson reforms which the Government have stalled on. But there is another matter which must be considered and which my amendment addresses—the absence of a statutory public interest defence for voicemail interception or any other type of breach of Clause 3.

Let us consider a situation where suspected serious wrongdoing is being investigated by a journalist or NGO and that journalist or NGO has no faith that the police will adequately investigate the matter; for example, a case of police corruption or, more practically, a case where the police have failed to investigate a case such as that of Jimmy Savile. In such circumstances, if the journalist or NGO intercepted voicemail messages which showed the corruption or illegality, and then exposed it, that person should have a defence that he or she can rely on.

Amendment 17 provides for this. The CPS can of course choose not to prosecute under the public interest arm of the “threshold test for prosecutors”, but that is not good enough. Prosecutors make their decisions on the public interest element after reviewing a file of evidence produced for them by the police and after an investigation which addresses the separate question of whether there is enough evidence to pass the first, evidential arm of the threshold test. Such a police investigation could last for months, if not years, and will involve interviews under caution, search warrants and perhaps arrest. That is a real disincentive to investigative journalism.

If there is a statutory public interest defence, the police will be able to see at an early stage that however much evidence they gather to prove that the act took place, or indeed even in the case of an admission, they will not be able to defeat the defence if the facts are clearly made out and their investigations will be curtailed. The benefit of a public interest defence therefore is not so much that it will allow investigators in the public interest to be acquitted at trial, or even that the CPS will choose not to prosecute on the evidential arm before even having to consider the public interest, but that the police will abandon investigations where the public defence is clearly made out in the facts. That will have the benefit of removing the chilling effect of potential police investigations and possible prosecution from investigative journalists who we rely on on these occasions to root out wrongdoing. Perhaps I may invite the Minister to engage in a constructive discussion about whether a narrow but valuable defence can be crafted. After all, noble Lords will be aware that there is a statutory public interest defence in Section 55 of the Data Protection Act, a provision that in Clause 1 of this Bill the Government are relying on as adequately protecting our privacy.

The investigative journalist Nick Davies of the Guardian exposed the hacking scandal. Had he had to intercept voicemail messages between Andy Coulson and one of the several convicted news editors who served under him in order to bring the story to our attention, that would have been in the public interest. It would not have been right that in the absence of a public interest defence which the police knew was valid, he had been arrested and questioned by the very police force whose failures he uncovered. That is why this amendment is so important and I commend it to your Lordships.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, my noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have Amendments 16, 20, 21, 22 and 84 in this group.

Amendment 16 concerns the offence of unlawful interception, but in the Bill as drafted that applies only to public telecommunications systems, private telecommunications systems and public postal services. It does not apply to private postal services. Examples of those could be the postal services used by the legal profession such as Legal Post and DX. Can the Minister inform the Committee why private postal services are not included in that provision?

Amendment 20 relates to the provision that,

“Conduct which has lawful authority for the purposes of this Act … is to be treated as lawful for all other purposes”.

Presumably, this provision is to avoid the problem we have had in the past where, while interception or equipment interference was allowed under one piece of legislation, it was an offence under the Computer Misuse Act 1990. Presumably, that is why this provision has been included, but surely it should apply to existing legislation—and it should state that it should apply to existing legislation—not to legislation in the future.

Amendment 21 is again about any other conduct under the Bill being treated,

“as lawful for all purposes”.

Surely this should not be as broad as that. It should be restricted to what is lawful only for the purposes of this Bill.

Amendment 22 concerns the service of monetary penalty notices. Paragraph 4(4)(g) of Schedule 1 allows for an oral hearing before the commissioner, but the amendment would add that the person who applies for and is granted an oral hearing before the commissioner can be legally represented.

Returning to something that I referred to in my opening remarks, Amendment 84 is about restrictions on unauthorised disclosures which as written would prevent the Secretary of State from disclosing the existence and contents of a warrant. The amendment would allow the Secretary of State to disclose the existence and details of a warrant if she felt it was necessary in order for Parliament to carry out its functions. As I mentioned before, I do not see how the argument can be made that the Secretary of State should be involved in the authorising of warrants because she can be held to account, when she is not able, under the terms of the Bill as drafted, even to admit that such a warrant exists.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak very briefly on Amendment 16, to which I added my name, which has already been dealt with by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. Should the Government accept the logic of that amendment, they might also want to look at Clause 4(8)(b)(i), which ought also to be amended to include “a private postal service”. Like the noble Lord, Lord Grabiner, I think the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, sounds like a carte blanche for allowing private phone hacking. The noble Lord came up with better words than I could when he spoke about thinking that “public interest” and of “interest to the public” were the same. I would be very alarmed at the idea of allowing phone hacking by private bodies, simply because they thought it might be in the public interest.

The more substantial issue in this group is dealt with in Amendments 18 and 246—I refer to them as the Leveson amendments. The Labour Party has an interest in Amendment 18. Our names are not on it but our former leader, my right honourable friend Ed Miliband, was, along with the current Prime Minister, one of the signatories to the deal which has already been described and which led to amendments being withdrawn in this House and in the Commons. Failing to implement Parliament’s decision on this matter is a shameful disregard for the law on the part of the Government. The Act was passed in good faith and the Government should have implemented it, in accordance with the wishes of this House and the other place. Non-commencement is an unacceptable device to undermine legislation which has been passed.

Amendment 18 seeks gently to encourage the Government to bring into effect the law already passed, and we hope they will agree to do that. I will not rehearse the case that has been made so well already. However, it is remarkable that, as we consider a Bill on investigatory powers that sets out clearly and openly what the state and its agencies can do regarding hacking—the limits, the safeguards and the penalties for exceeding the law—private and unaccountable profit-making bodies such as the press continue to get away with things our spooks rightly would not be able to. The Government should not undermine Parliament by failing to commence Section 40 and we hope that, today, they will show their willingness to act now.

[Lord Strasburger]

Before the noble Baroness sits down, can I point out that I share entirely her concerns and those of her noble friend about journalists confusing the public interest with the interest of the public? If there were any such amendment along the lines that I suggested, it would have to be drafted so narrowly that that confusion could not exist.