Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Strasburger Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 18th March 2026 Lords Chamber

By contrast, I express my support for Amendment 420 from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. I cannot see any detriment in each proscribed organisation being the subject of a specific order, so that Parliament can vote, if it wishes, on whether the proscription order should apply to a particular organisation, rather than having to reject the whole group. That should not involve any greater use of parliamentary time, because we can debate all the orders at the same time. I therefore very much hope that the Minister will accept the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, I have prepared a full speech on three amendments in this group and the Government’s behaviour regarding the proscription of Palestine Action. I have signed Amendments 420, 422A and 422B, which, if agreed, would prevent the naked politicisation of terrorist legislation ever happening again. However, I recognise that noble Lords are anxious to get on with discussing other matters, and that we are facing a long journey into the small hours.

Furthermore, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, have ably covered much of what I would have said, so I will confine myself to pointing out that the Government’s decision to proscribe Palestine Action was wrong in principle and dangerous in effect. It stretched terrorism powers to crush a protest movement, not a terrorist organisation, with a chilling effect on our core democratic rights. It felt highly disproportionate when it was being debated in this House, and that was later confirmed by the High Court. No wonder the Government needed the crude political stunt of bundling Palestine Action together with two obviously terrorist groups to force it through Parliament.

These amendments matter because proscription decisions must be, and must be seen to be, grounded, proportionate and evidence-based. These amendments protect our security while honouring Parliament’s duty to scrutinise some of the gravest powers that we give to the Government. I suspect that the proposers of these amendments may judge that the House would prefer to move on to other matters, and so may not call Divisions on them. I hope that they do but, if not, I will have to satisfy myself with the hope that the derision heaped on the Government for the proscription of Palestine Action—and the embarrassment of watching 2,700 peaceful and mostly elderly protesters being arrested on terrorism charges—will be enough to deter this or any future Government from repeating this folly.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 420 and 422B, both of which I have supported. I go to a lot of events where the right to protest is debated, and people are quite shocked when I describe how this Government bundled three organisations together so that they could push through the proscription of Palestine Action. It does not look just or fair. They do not even have to be similar or connected, as these three were not. It was interesting to listen to the entertaining noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, running through the debate on whether to proscribe Palestine Action.

These amendments are about the process: about how it is done and whether it is done in a proper way. It is not proper scrutiny and it is not what this House is for when we have a blunt choice to accept or reject all three. That is not a sensible system. Proscription is a really serious step: it criminalises people for association, for support and even for what they say. Such decisions deserve to be looked at carefully, case by case, and not rushed through or passed in a job lot. If the Government are confident in their decisions about what is and is not a terrorist organisation—I assume they were confident about Palestine Action—they should have no problem with each one being judged on its own, not in a job lot.

The amendment from the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, comes down to something quite simple. These are very big decisions that can criminalise association, affect livelihoods and follow someone for years. If we are being asked to approve that, we should be properly informed—but we were not; we had to take the Minister’s word for it and we did not have the information. We are asked to nod things through without seeing the full picture. I do not think that is a very comfortable position for your Lordships’ House to be in.

Ensuring that Parliament has a clear and well-informed picture is the whole point of this. It also adds a bit more balance. At the moment, these decisions are taken by Ministers. It need not get in the way of a fair decision, or allowing things to move quickly. If there is urgency the Government can act, but they still have to come back and justify that decision properly afterwards. It is about making sure that when we take serious decisions, they are justified on the facts, not just on suppositions.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Strasburger Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 11th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, I was going to speak on Amendments 400 and 407 in this group, but my noble friend Lady Doocey made such an excellent contribution that I will skip my speech on Amendment 400. I want to say, though, that I am not quite sure what the point is of me speaking on any amendment at this stupid time of day and with no chance of a meaningful Division to test the opinion of the House. What we are doing here is not scrutiny; it is just going through the motions. Nevertheless, I will go ahead with my speech on Amendment 407, if only to put my views on the record.

Amendment 407 is in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, who is not here. As my name is also on the amendment, I may, I believe, speak to it on her behalf. Am I correct?

[A noble Lord]

Yes.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

Thank you. Amendment 407 asks us to make a practical decision about policing and tackling violence against women and girls. It is not—I repeat, not—about taking sides in a culture war. Recording biological sex in every case is about getting the basics right: honest crime figures, sound operational decisions and better protection for victims of violence. If we do not know clearly in our police data who is male and who is female, we cannot properly track male violence, spot patterns and target resources where they are most needed.

When police forces blur sex and gender identity, the data starts to go wrong. Hardly any perpetrators of sexual violence are women, so it takes only a small number of male offenders being recorded as women to make it look—wrongly—as if women are suddenly committing many more violent and sexual offences. That distorts our statistics, makes it harder to see the true scale of male violence against women, and risks bad safeguarding decisions.

If systems shift between recording sex, gender as perceived or self-identified gender, we lose track of the trends. We can no longer say with confidence whether male violence is rising or falling, or whether policy changes are working. When the public discover that “female” means one thing in one table and something different in another, trust in policing and government data inevitably suffers.

Professor Alice Sullivan is one of the UK’s leading experts in quantitative social science. She was appointed by the Government to independently review how public organisations can best collect data on sex and gender. Her review cuts through the confusion that currently exists. It says that, when the state needs sex data, it should ask a simple factual question about biological sex—“What is your sex: male or female?”—and that that must be kept separate from any voluntary questions about gender identity. It strongly recommends that all police forces record biological sex in all relevant systems.

Some people worry that this will force trans people to out themselves to the police. It should not and it does not have to. The police already record very sensitive information—religion, disability, sexuality—while respecting confidentiality, human rights and data protection law. The sex question is about biological reality for operational and statistical purposes. Held securely in background systems, it is not a licence to broadcast someone’s history or to deny their gender identity in day-to-day interactions. Where there is a need to understand gender identity, that can be done through a separate, clearly labelled voluntary question with strict safeguards.

The choice is stark. If we do not record biological sex, we accept distorted crime figures, poorer operational decisions, broken trend data and growing public mistrust. If we do record biological sex clearly and consistently, we give ourselves honest statistics, better safeguarding and a policing system that can see and therefore tackle the reality of male violence against women and girls.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 407, on the recording of sex in police data. It is a real shame that the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, is unable to be with us because she would have introduced it very elegantly.

A year ago, in March 2025, Professor Alice Sullivan’s Review of Data, Statistics and Research on Sex and Gender came out. It pointed out:

“It is well-established that sex is a major determinant of offending and victimisation”.


The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, may have been going through the motions but he went through them very well by explaining clearly why this amendment matters. As he pointed out, it is very difficult for the Government to claim to have a target-based campaign to reduce violence against women and girls if they do not have consistent, accurate data in relation to women and girls. Although Professor Sullivan’s review was broadly welcomed by the Government, its recommendations have not yet been acted on. This amendment attempts to nudge some action from the Government.

The issue of delayed guidance is a constant problem. The Women’s Rights Network recently contacted the National Police Chiefs’ Council, inquiring whether it intends to now record sex accurately and address what it said was the “ideological corruption of data”. The NPCC’s reply says that

“updates to the collection and recording of sex and gender reassignment questions are pending subject to the issue of national guidance by the Office for National Statistics/Government Statistical Service following the UK Supreme Court ruling earlier this year”.

That is one pending answer. Individual police forces responding to a variety of organisations’ queries about the continued use of a variety of approaches to collecting sex data—including self-ID, recording a rapist as female and so on—say that they are waiting for guidance from the ONS and the GSS. Is there anyone not waiting for guidance? It feels as though this is a waste of time that is unnecessarily adding to confusion.

In Committee, I went into detail about differing and contradictory data collection practices across police forces. I will not repeat that, but recording practices vary not just between but within criminal justice agencies and even relevant government departments. As there are 40 different databases at a national level relating to criminal justice, the data that is being collected as we speak is full of discrepancies. The Home Office’s annual data requirement on demographic data, for example, advises police forces to record sex subject to a gender recognition certificate. Other mandatory Home Office standards—on police use of force, for example—require officers to record perceived gender, with a choice of male, female or other. There are also the multi agency public protection arrangements, which focus on protecting the public from the most serious harm from sexual and violent offenders, including convicted terrorists. They too conflate sex and gender in their data collection.

However, the Murray Blackburn Mackenzie criminal justice blog discovered via a freedom of information request that MAPPA provides police officers across the UK with

“51 options to record the gender identity of high-risk offenders”.

How does it help to keep the public safe, or aid operational coherence, to know whether a terrorist or paedophile is pangender, genderqueer, agender, bi-gender or gender-fluid, just to name a few of the 51 options they could fill in? I am not trying to be glib; I am just urging the Government to bring clarity and consistency to the collection of data on sex in relation to victims and perpetrators, because otherwise I think it is unfair to claim that there is anything like an evidence-based policy when it comes to sex and, indeed, gender.

We have recently had some exchanges about the new aggravated offences in relation to transgender people, and there are people who are transgender who claim that hate speech and hate crime against them has gone up. I am not challenging whether or not that is true. But to collate the data to make a case for that, one has to make a distinction in the collection of data between somebody who is transgender and somebody who says “I am a woman” who is in fact a transgender person who identifies as a woman.

I think that, for all victims concerned, let alone for understanding the nature of offenders, we need to have accurate, consistent data across all criminal justice agencies and all police forces. I hope that the Minister will at least give us an assurance that the recommendations of Professor Sullivan’s fine and important review—which is full of detail and evidence, with practical conclusions, and which the Government have welcomed—will be acted on. If we can get that assurance tonight, that would be brilliant. If there is any government reluctance to accept Professor Sullivan’s review, it would be really helpful to understand why—what the hold-up is—and maybe the Minister could explain that too.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Strasburger Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 9th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 374 seeks to place statutory guardrails on the use of live facial recognition, echoing the recent calls from the Equality and Human Rights Commission. We recognise that this technology can assist the police in tackling serious crime, but it must be used responsibly. Its rapid spread into everyday policing before essential safeguards or parliamentary scrutiny are in place raises profound constitutional concerns, particularly in the policing of dissent. Amendment 374 addresses the most contentious use of this technology, at protests and public assemblies. It would prohibit live facial recognition when police impose conditions under the Public Order Act unless and until Parliament had approved a new statutory code of practice. These are moments when people exercise their fundamental rights to free expression and peaceful assembly; rights which depend on participants feeling safe from tracking or retrospective profiling.

This Bill already tightens protest offences and curbs anonymity; layering unregulated facial scanning on top of those restrictions risks further shrinking the space for lawful dissent. Many people will have perfectly legitimate reasons to think twice before attending a demonstration if they know their face may be scanned. Without clarity on how watch-lists used at protests are compiled, people have no way of knowing whether they are being flagged for genuine risk or for the views they hold. At a protest, the chilling effect is not just about being scanned; it is the fear of political profiling. If the Government cannot clearly define who is a legitimate target for facial recognition at a peaceful assembly, then such deployments are, by definition, arbitrary and cannot meet the legal test of necessity and proportionality.

Operationally, the emerging concerns around false positives and the significantly increased risk to those from minority-ethnic backgrounds are a real headache for policing large public gatherings. Deployment without a code of practice will likely result in dozens of wrongful stops to verify identities, with confrontations that divert officers from real security threats and de-escalating crowds. We have already seen how damaging these errors can be. Just in the last few weeks, an innocent south Asian man was arrested at his home in Southampton for a burglary 100 miles away in Milton Keynes. He was handcuffed and held for nearly 10 hours because he was wrongly matched to CCTV footage by a Home Office algorithm that its own research shows produces significantly higher false positives for black and Asian faces. Last month, a man was publicly ejected from his local supermarket after staff misinterpreted a facial recognition alert.

These are not minor glitches to be shrugged off. They are serious violations that erode public trust, particularly in communities already wary of state power. The Government’s consultation is welcome, but it is far too slow for the pace of change we see on our streets. Until Parliament has set clear rules, Amendment 374 is both necessary and proportionate. We must ensure that Parliament, not oblique algorithms, decides the limit of state power. I beg to move.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, we are talking today about live facial recognition at protests and why the police must not be allowed to use it until Parliament has agreed a clear and democratic code of practice. At its heart, Amendment 374 is about power and trust. Live facial recognition is not just another camera on a street corner; it is a mass surveillance tool that can scan every face in a crowd, compare people in real time against a watch-list and permanently change what it feels like to stand in the public square. Once you normalise all that at protests, you change the character of protest itself.

If people think that simply turning up at a demonstration means that their face can be scanned, logged and potentially mismatched to a suspect list, some will decide that it is safer to stay at home. That is a direct, chilling effect on the right to protest, to assemble and to speak out against, or for, the Government. We should not let that happen by stealth through a patchwork of local decisions and internal guidance that most citizens will never see. That is what is happening at the moment.

The technology itself is far from neutral. We know that facial recognition systems can and do get things wrong. They perform differently across age groups and ethnicities. A false match in the context of a protest is not a minor inconvenience. It can mean being stopped, questioned, detained or stigmatised in front of your friends, your colleagues or your community, not because of something you did but because an algorithm made a guess. Allowing that at political protests without proper rules and oversight is an invitation to injustice.

It is not enough to say, “Trust the police. We have internal policies”. The question here is not whether any particular chief constable is well-intentioned; it is whether the state should be able to scan and track people at political gatherings without Parliament having debated, defined and limited that power. In a democracy, if the Government want tools that can alter the balance of power between citizen and state, they must come to Parliament, set out the case and accept constraints.

That is why a publicly debated statutory code of practice matters. It is where we answer basic questions that are currently left in the grey zone. In what circumstances, if any, is live facial recognition at a protest justified? Who sets the watch-lists and on what criteria? What happens to images of people who are not of interest? Are they actually deleted? If so, how quickly? Who can access them and for what purposes? What independent oversight exists when things go wrong? Until those questions are answered openly, the use of live facial recognition at protests rests on unpublished risk assessments and technical documents that ordinary citizens cannot challenge and that elected representatives cannot easily amend. That is the opposite of how intrusive powers should be operated in a liberal democracy.

We should also be honest about the precedent. If we accept live facial recognition at protests now, without a code, it will be used more often and for more purposes later. Once the infrastructure is there and the practice is normalised, it will be very hard to row back. The time to set limits is before the rollout, not after the abuses. Police should not have, without parliamentary approval, the ability to quietly turn every protest into a data-harvesting exercise, watching not just the few who pose a risk but the many who are simply exercising their rights.

The principle is simple: if live facial recognition is to be used at all in the context of political protest, it must be under a clear and democratically approved code of practice, debated in Parliament, tested against our human rights obligations and subject to real oversight and redress. Until that is in place, the police should not be allowed to deploy this technology at protests.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

This is another context where there has to be a fair balance between competing interests. One can easily see that the use of live facial recognition is a vital policing tool. However, as has been explained, it has an adverse impact on privacy. What concerns me is that the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act require not merely that steps taken are necessary and proportionate, which the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, rightly referred to, but it is a requirement that any restrictions or provisions in such a context must be prescribed by law.

I am very concerned that having police authorities and police officers exercising a pure discretion, without any statutory guidance or code of practice, may well fail that legal test of prescribed by law, because of the uncertainty and the excess of discretion. Therefore, the Government would be well advised in this sensitive context to ensure that there is statutory guidance and a statutory code of practice. The Minister may be unable to accept this amendment, but I hope he will be able to tell the House that steps will be taken to provide clear guidance to police authorities as to the use of this technology.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for tabling these amendments and to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for supporting some of the arguments that I will make in response to them. The noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones, Lord Strasburger and Lord Pannick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, have all put their finger on their concerns around the use of this technology.

I will begin by providing a view of what live facial recognition does. It allows for real-time location of individuals of interest to the police. It scans the faces of those passing a camera in real time, comparing faces against a predetermined, specific watch-list of, potentially, wanted criminals, vulnerable missing persons or individuals posing risks to public safety. If no match is made—this goes to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, made—currently, the scanned face is deleted instantly. Every deployment and every specific bespoke watch-list for that deployment must have a defined policing objective, be supported by clear intelligence and ultimately be determined by humans.

Noble Lords will be aware that the use of facial recognition technology in all circumstances, including in live facial recognition, is already subject to safeguards, including those provided in the Human Rights Act and the Data Protection Act. I agree that there needs to be a framework, which is the nub of what I think all noble Lords have said in this debate.

The noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, will know that the Government had a 10-week consultation for that very purpose—to look at the issues of a legal framework where law enforcement use of biometrics, facial recognition and similar technologies could be used. The consultation ended on 12 February. I give the House an assurance that the Government intend to respond to it by the summer; we have more or less a 12-week deadline from the end of its closing, but it will be by the summer. The consultation is clear that the Government need to design a new framework and assess how the police use technologies such as facial recognition. It needs to ensure that there are safeguards, as noble Lords have mentioned, around the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, that we protect these rights and that facial recognition technology is demonstrably proportionate to the seriousness of the harm being addressed.

We are currently considering the consultation and, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, said, that should take its course. However, we intend to set out our proposals in due course, which will be subject to scrutiny by both Houses of Parliament. I hope noble Lords accept that it would not be appropriate to pre-empt the outcome of the consultation or the proposals that Government will bring forward, which we will ensure have new legal framework for the use of facial recognition technology by law enforcement agencies.

While I think that the points made by noble Lords have real merit, I hope that, with the comments I have made and the reassurances I have given, we will save the difficult debate about regulation, how it operates and what the proposals mean for a proper legal framework for another day, which will come very soon. I hope the noble Baroness will—

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

Before the Minister sits down, could he give the House some indication of when the day will come when we have a debate on some meaningful proposals? Could he also tell the House whether those proposals will cover the use of this technology by the private sector—which is happening a lot already in retail—as well as the public sector?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

As I have tried to indicate to the noble Lord, we have had a consultation that finished on 12 February, and we intend to respond to it by the summer. Currently, what that response will be is to be formulated, so I will not give him chapter and verse on when and how. However, if legislation is required, we will look at that at the earliest opportunity, as we always do.

I cannot pre-empt the King’s Speech and I cannot give a timetable on that, but I will give a timetable when we respond to the consultation. We should remember that the Government initiated the consultation—we were not forced into it—to get to a position whereby the very issues that noble Lords have mentioned today are considered. With those comments, I hope the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

There is no question, as I understand Clause 154, of a blank cheque, and there is no question here of underhand methods. What the clause requires is that the Secretary of State produces regulations, and the regulations must specify the circumstances in which information may be made available under this section. I am assuming that in due course, the Government are going to bring forward regulations to implement this provision. Those regulations will have to be laid before Parliament, and there will be an opportunity, if any noble Lord wishes to do so, to debate those regulations. I suggest that that is the time to assess whether the regulations contain a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the public interest.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, the DVLA driver database must not be turned into a ready-made line-up for facial recognition systems. This is about more than data protection; it is about the basic relationship between citizen and state. People did not hand over their photographs to the DVLA so that the Government could quietly repurpose them for mass identification; they did so under legal compulsion to get a driving licence.

Using those images to power facial recognition searches fundamentally changes the deal after the fact. It turns a compulsory single-purpose database into an all-purpose surveillance tool, without anyone ever having given meaningful consent. Once you allow the police to run facial recognition matches against the DVLA database, you create the possibility of identifying almost anyone, almost anywhere, from a single image. That goes far beyond investigating named suspects. It enables trawling through the entire driving population to find possible matches, with all the risk of false positives that facial recognition systems already carry. A bad match here is not an abstract error. It is a real person, wrongly flagged, questioned or even arrested, because a machine thought their face looked similar.

The DVLA database is also nearly universal for adults. That makes it uniquely tempting. If we normalise using it for facial recognition in one context, it will not stop there. Today, it might be justified for serious crime. Tomorrow, it could creep into protests, public events or routine inquiries. Once the precedent is set that every licence holder’s image is fair game for search, the barrier to expanding that use becomes paper-thin.

There is also a democratic principle at stake here. When the state wants new investigative powers that are this sweeping, it should come to Parliament and ask for them openly, with clear limits, safeguards and independent oversight. What must not happen is a quiet, technical integration between the facial recognition system and the DVLA database, introduced by secondary legislation and governed mainly by internal policies and obscure memoranda of understanding. This is legislation by the backdoor, not by debate.

If we allow the DVLA database to be searched with facial recognition, we are not just making investigations a little more efficient; we are rebuilding the basic infrastructure of our democracy so that the state can, in principle, put a name to almost any face. We are doing that using images people had no real choice about providing, and for a completely different purpose. So, the line we should draw is simple and firm: the DVLA driver database is for licensing drivers, not for powering facial recognition line-ups. If any Government want to change that, they must come back to Parliament with primary legislation, make their case in public and accept strict statutory constraints. Until then, we should say clearly that turning a compulsory licensing database into a de facto national ID gallery is a step too far for a free society. That is what Amendment 380 does and I commend it to the House.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I do not support the amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made the point that there will obviously be regulations, because people do have fears about accessing the DVLA database.

At the moment, the only database that facial comparisons are made against is that of suspects, which is a substantial database of people the police have arrested in the past. It would be a bizarre outcome if the technology existed to find a serial rapist and the only way we could find them was on the DVLA database, but we buried our head in the sand and said that we were not going to look. This is just the start of an investigation, not a conclusion. No one would get charged as a result of being identified by this process, but it may well start an investigation that might exclude or include them. To not take up the possibility that you could identify them, either through the DVLA or other databases, is the wrong way forward.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Herbert of South Downs (Con)]

Okay; that is helpful. I thank my noble friend, and I am sure the Government will respond to that. But if part of the purpose of this is to ensure that it meets the concern my noble friend set out—that people may, to use his words, be prevented from getting a job because of the release of a non-crime hate incident in an enhanced DBS check—I should point out that the review has not been able to find a single example of a non-crime hate incident being disclosed in an extended DBS check and preventing someone from securing employment. We therefore think the risk of that is very low. The release is a matter for the chief constable’s discretion. Of course, the risk could be made even lower if the new, higher threshold were applied to any future decision, but again, that would be within the Government’s gift to agree. What is already a negligible risk could be made even more negligible, so that would address the concern.

The final question relates to whether non-crime hate incidents will spring back into life, to use my noble friend’s expression. My response is, not so long as I am involved with this, and I am sure I could say the same for the chief executive of the college, Sir Andy Marsh. The serious point, however, is that there clearly has been a change of mood, partly because of the way in which social media has influenced this whole matter. But such action is always within the gift of any future Government, as my noble friend conceded: no Government can bind themselves to changing practice and policy. What matters now is that we put in place a robust regime that works and ensure that the police are focused on the right things.

Therefore, I am very pleased we have this broad agreement about the way forward. I do not think my noble friend’s amendment is necessary, but it is for the Government to respond to that. We must be wary of tying up the police more on this, when we are trying to release their time. We must also be aware of the injunction of the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence: that serious incidents must continue to be recorded. We must remember why this regime was set up in the first place. Not every recorded non-crime hate incident has been trivial; they can indicate a building pattern of behaviour and that is what we have to guard against. But the new system will put in place higher thresholds to ensure that the trivial are weeded out, and that, I think, is what we all want.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, given the hour I do not want to detain the House for much longer. In fact, I have deleted the first page of my speech accordingly, and I will address the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, in a moment.

First, this amendment insists that all future incident recording guidance must have due regard to freedom of expression—and that matters. In a liberal democracy, the test is not whether we protect only speech we agree with; it is whether we protect the space for robust, sometimes uncomfortable, debate on race, religion, sex, gender, politics and many other issues.

Police guidance should start from the principle that lawful speech is not a policing problem. Further, it deals with the past as well as the future. It should require that historic non-crime hate incident records which do not meet the proper recording threshold must not be disclosed on DBS checks and must be deleted when discovered. That is vital for natural justice. If we accept that this category has been misused and overused, we cannot leave people’s lives quietly marred by data that should never have been held in the first place. I particularly address these remarks to the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence.

This is not about turning a blind eye to genuine hate crime. On the contrary, by scrapping a vague, perception-based non-crime category, we free up police time and attention to focus on real offences: threats, harassment, violence and criminal damage. We will make the system clearer for victims and for officers. We will be sending a simple message that if you have been the victim of a crime, the law is there to protect you, and if you have merely heard something you strongly dislike, that is not in itself a matter for the police.

At the moment, too many people are unsure where that line lies. They fear that expressing a lawful view on a controversial subject might bring a knock at the door or a mark on their record. That chilling effect is corrosive. It drives honest disagreement underground and pushes some people out of the public square altogether. We should be defending the right to argue and criticise, and to challenge within the law, not encouraging people to outsource every disagreement to the police.

The amendment would preserve the ability of the police to record information where it is genuinely necessary for crime prevention and public safety. It would hardwire respect for freedom of expression into any future guidance. In doing so, it would strengthen civil liberties and good policing. It says that the police are there to deal with crime, not to catalogue lawful opinions. This is a distinction worth defending and I urge the House to support this amendment.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I have listened carefully to the contributions from the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Young, on their amendments, and to other speakers around your Lordships’ House. I want to return to the difficult and sensitive issues, raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, of where the boundaries are and protecting the vulnerable versus free speech. We have debated that in some detail, with examples in Committee, so I will not rehearse those. I have two questions for the Minister about the new arrangements.

We are losing from the guidance a useful paragraph that sets out exactly that the risk of significant harm may be greater if the individual who has experienced the incident is considered to be vulnerable, and then directs people to the College of Policing as to how the police do that. I mention this to the noble Lord, Lord Young, who said that everything under the regime that is about to disappear was entirely in the view of the individual who felt that that they were being done. That has not been the case. It has been assessed by the police, following the code of practice.

Can the Minister reassure your Lordships’ House that, in deleting Sections 60 and 61 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act, the police will not lose the balance that we have in the current code that sets out how to determine a vulnerable person from one of the categories covered in the Act, including race, religion, disability and LGBT, and the real risk that a crime may be committed in the future?

The noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, spoke very eloquently. What she did not say, and everyone has assumed, is that it was absolutely obvious from the start, when the verbal attacks started on Stephen and other young people in his area, that it would not have looked like something that should have been recorded. But there is something called a course of conduct, which is very common in harassment and stalking and a number of anti-social behaviours that start to build up, and the police bring in psychologists to look at that behaviour. One of the problems is that we cannot lose that progression. If things stop being recorded, I do not understand how you can do it. There are certainly rules about not using it in DBS checks, but if you lose that information, I really fear that the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, is right to have concerns. So, can I ask the Minister if the Government—

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Strasburger Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 9th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

The answer to that is that the cumulative nature of the disruption is not what causes the oppression to worshippers at synagogues or mosques or anywhere else. We have accepted, for the purpose of Report, restrictions on the right to protest near places of worship on condition that it is relevant and that we are talking about the place of worship and worshippers being disrupted. The fact that a legitimate protest is repeated is not a reason for restricting the protests. If the rights and freedoms of others are restricted, that in itself is, under our Amendment 369, a reason for restricting protest, because there is a right to protest. It is not helped by the fact that repeated protests are seen as more difficult. I see the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about repeated protests at synagogues and mosques, but they are covered by our condition on restriction at a place of worship. I beg to move.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 369A in my name, which we have just been discussing, and to Amendments 372A, 372B, 372C and 373, to all of which I have added my name. Regarding Amendment 369A, Clause 133 seeks to create a new offence of concealed identity at protests. If this clause were enacted as it stands, the police would be empowered to ban all face coverings at a protest with only some limited exceptions concerning the person’s health, religion or work. Many other categories of perfectly law-abiding citizens may have good reasons to conceal their identities at protests—for example, those protesting against a hostile foreign state who fear retribution for themselves or their families, those who might be criticising their own religious or cultural communities, or survivors of sexual violence or domestic abuse who need to stay below the radar for their own safety. None of those is covered by the limited exemptions in Clause 133.

To solve this problem, Amendment 369A would provide a defence of reasonable excuse for the offence of concealing identity at protests, thereby putting the burden on police officers to justify why they believed that wearing a face covering at a protest made the suspect arrestable. This amendment strikes a careful balance between allowing the police to prevent public disorder and protecting the many law-abiding citizens who have legitimate reasons for wanting to exercise their freedom of expression anonymously.

I have signed Amendments 372A, 372B and 372C in the name of my noble friend Lord Marks. Clause 139 seems to have been drafted to give reassurance to Jews, Muslims and other denominations that they can attend their place of worship without feeling intimidated by protests in the vicinity of their synagogue, mosque, church or whatever. That sounds to me like a laudable objective. What is not to like? The difficulty is a severe unintended consequence caused by the drafting. The sheer number of places of worship in a country as old, religiously diverse and densely populated as Britain that could inadvertently become no-protest zones is enormous. Here in Westminster, Parliament Square and Trafalgar Square are both in the vicinity of one or more churches, and yet they frequently host major demonstrations. They could become off limits. Few if any large spaces in central London or any other city would escape the risk posed by Clause 139 of being ruled too close to a place of worship for a demonstration to be allowed. The Government may well say that this is not the intention of Clause 139, but that is exactly what the clause as drafted permits a senior officer to do.

My Lords, Amendments 372A, 372B and 372C would solve the problem by making a ban on protests near a place of worship possible only when the protest is directed at or connected with a place of worship or persons likely to worship there. Demonstrations that are unconnected with a nearby place of worship or that are in its vicinity purely by coincidence would be unaffected by Clause 139—problem solved.

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Moved by

[Lord Strasburger]

369A: Clause 133, page 176, line 10, leave out subsection (2) and insert—
“(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to show that they had a reasonable excuse for wearing or otherwise using the item at the material time.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would provide a defence of reasonable excuse to the offence of concealing identity at protests, thereby putting the burden of proof on police officers to justify why they believe that wearing a face covering at a protest made the suspect arrestable.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who contributed to this very thoughtful debate. I point out that Clause 133 already contains three reasonable excuses for the offence, but I do not understand why it contains those three and no others. For example, we have not had a convincing explanation from the Government on the example of the Iranian dissident. Amendment 369A covers all reasonable excuses: the three already in the Bill; the Iranian dissident, who keeps coming up; all the others mentioned in the debate; and any others that we have not thought of yet. I am not satisfied with the responses that I have heard from the Government and I wish to test the opinion of the House.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Strasburger Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Donaghy (Lab)]

My Lords, I am not a great legal mind, I am afraid; I am not even a legal mind. Many people would argue that I am not a great mind either, so I have questions rather than a dictatorial philosophy.

The contrast between the original amendment and the one before us is quite revealing. “Biological” was taken out of the title, yet the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, said she thought that biological sex was a material fact, so why was it taken out of the heading?

There was a very interesting reference to the gender recognition certificates, which I took a little bit of comfort from. Then, in the amendment before us, that reference was deleted. My second question is: is the reference to “official documents” being “proffered” regarded as the substitute? I would be very grateful for that clarification.

Perhaps the noble Lord on the Front Bench could answer this in his summing up: what assurances can we have that anyone accused is not forced out, even if the particular allegation is not related to sex and sexuality? How can we avoid people having to come out against their will?

I am still not sure why this issue is regarded as so vital. I am sorry, but there seems to be a lack of proportionality about this whole debate in the massive challenges that our police forces have today. Is it really that vital? I am not terribly convinced about that. I have questions more than anything, but I feel there is some disproportionality on this whole subject.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, I will not detain the Committee—

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

The noble Lord was not here at the start of the debate.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Strasburger Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 15th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to oppose Amendment 379 and support most of Amendment 471, inadequate though it is. My views may not be the same as those of my noble friends on the Front Bench, of course. We all value the right to protest, but rights are not a shield for criminality. The Government and Policing Ministers have been very clear that live facial recognition is being developed and deployed as a targeted, intelligence-led tool to identify known or wanted individuals or criminals on watch lists. It is not a blanket surveillance tool of the public. The Home Office has opened a consultation and asked for stronger statutory rules and oversight precisely to ensure proportionate lawful use.

Amendment 379 would in effect tie the hands of senior officers at the very moment when targeted identification can prevent or stop serious crime. If a protest contains people who are wanted for violent offences, sexual offences or other serious crimes, the ability to identify them quickly and safely is not an abstract technicality; it is how we protect victims and uphold the rule of law. To say that demonstrations are somehow sacrosanct and must be free from tools that help catch criminals is to place form above substance. That is not to dismiss legitimate concerns about privacy and bias. We should legislate a clear statutory framework, independent oversight and robust safeguards, and I know that the Government are consulting on exactly that path.

I will want to see strong action to correct mistakes and address suggestions that it cannot tell the difference in some ethnic groups. That has to be remedied if that allegation is true. But the right response is to legislate proportionate limits and accountability, not to pre-emptively ban a narrowly targeted operational capability at protests and thereby risk letting wanted suspects slip away. For those reasons, I urge the Committee to reject Amendment 379 and instead press the Government to bring forward the statutory code and independent oversight that the public rightly expect.

Amendment 471 is a different kettle of fish—and possibly “off” fish as well. The amendment is far too liberal and fails to protect the public from out-of-control public authorities. I will explain why. As a person relieved of ministerial duties in 1997, I found myself a rather bored Back-Bencher on the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000—the famous RIPA. The Minister at the time—I think it was Alun Michael—was waxing lyrical about how it would tackle serious crime, terrorism and paedophiles. He mentioned how it would help the police, the National Crime Agency—or whatever it was called then—MI5, MI6, HMRC and a couple of other big national government departments.

We were all in agreement that it was a jolly good thing for these agencies to have that power. Then something the Minister said prompted me to table a Question on what other public bodies could use RIPA powers, and we were shocked to discover that there were actually 32, including at that time something called the egg inspectorate of MAFF, responsible for enforcing the little lion mark on eggs. Schedule 1, listing the public authorities with phone-tapping powers, has expanded a bit since those days, and it now numbers 79. However, that is not the correct number because one of the 79 entries says “every local authority”, so we can add another 317 principal local authorities to that list. I think “every government department” covers all the agencies and arm’s-length bodies under their command, so they also have access to RIPA. In other words, a worthy proposal to let some key government agencies have power to snoop on our mobile phones to detect serious crime, terrorism or paedophilia has now become available, to some extent, to hundreds and possibly thousands of public bodies.

The relevance of this is that if we agree that facial recognition technology can be extended beyond the police, immigration, the National Crime Agency, the security services and possibly a few other big government departments that are concerned with organised crime, people trafficking and immigration, I believe our civil liberties will be at stake if local authorities and some others get to use it as well. If local authorities get the power of facial recognition, I am certain that they will abuse it. A Scottish council uses RIPA to monitor dog barking. Allerdale district council, next to me in Cumbria, used it to catch someone feeding pigeons. Of course it would be brilliant, in my opinion, to catch all those carrying out anti-social behaviour, such as riding dangerously on the pavement with their bikes, not picking up dog mess or generally causing a disturbance. But that is why I think this amendment does not go far enough.

We do not need codes of practice and safeguards—we need a complete ban on all other public authorities using it until it has been tried and tested by the police and we are satisfied that it does not cause false positives and is operationally secure. Then, if it is ever extended to other public authorities, it must be solely, as proposed new subsection (1)(a) says,

“used for the purpose of preventing, detecting, or investigating serious crimes as defined under the Serious Crime Act 2007”.

If we do not have these protections, local councils will end up checking our recycling, what library books we take out and what shops and pubs we use, and will justify it by saying it will help them deliver a better spatial strategy or design services to user patterns.

I look forward to the Liberals going back to their original roots as real liberals and bringing forward a better amendment that will protect our liberties.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to support Amendment 379, to which I have added my name, and to very strongly support it. But before I do, I hope the Committee will forgive me if I digress very briefly to tidy up a matter that arose in Committee on Tuesday. I made the point that the police have the duty to facilitate protest rather than prevent it, and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, intervened to ask me where he might find a justification for that statement. Well, I have good news. I have here the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s protest operational advice document, and on page 10, under the heading “Role of the police”, it says that authorised professional practice

“identifies two duties associated with the policing of protest. Broadly these require that the police must … not prevent, hinder or restrict peaceful assembly … in certain circumstances, take reasonable steps to protect those who want to exercise their rights peacefully. Taken together, these duties (the first a negative duty, the second a positive one) are often described as an obligation to facilitate the exercise of the freedoms of assembly and expression”.

I also have here a very handy flow chart entitled “Facilitating Peaceful Protest”, and I will make it available to the noble Lord following this debate.

To return to this group, it is now eight years since South Wales Police started deploying early versions of live facial recognition technology. When it did so, the technology was extremely inaccurate and there was absolutely no legislation in place to regulate or oversee the use of this mass surveillance technology—and that is what it is.

For those noble Lords who have not had the opportunity to experience facial recognition technology, I will give a quick overview of how it is used. It currently involves a large van full of electronics being parked in a location, such as a busy shopping street, where large numbers of ordinary people will walk past going about their daily business. On the top of the van are cameras pointing in all directions; they are scanning and recording the faces of all the passers-by. The technology tries to match them to a pre-prepared watch-list, which is a set of images of people the police want to find for some reason. Throughout the many hours of the deployment, something like 20 police officers will be standing around chatting and waiting for the system to decide, rightly or wrongly, that somebody whose face matches a person on the watch-list has just walked past. Several of the otherwise unoccupied police officers then detain the target and try to determine whether it is a true match.

Big Brother Watch, which I chair, has observed many deployments of facial recognition by the Metropolitan Police, and has seen many false matches happen. As well as false positives, the system is also susceptible to false negatives, where it fails to recognise somebody who is on the watch-list, and anyone who the police would like to speak to but was not put on the watch-list can wander by undetected. The Committee can form its own view on whether this is a productive use of scarce police time and money, but one thing is clear: this is a highly intrusive mass surveillance of thousands of citizens, almost all of whom are completely innocent and should be of no interest to the police.

The UK already has one of the highest densities of CCTV cameras in the world. Facial recognition technology will in time be added to those fixed cameras in public spaces. The police, your local authority, supermarkets or whoever will be able to keep tabs on who you are and what you are doing. This technology is far more intrusive than fingerprints or DNA. Live facial recognition can capture your face and location from a distance without you having any idea it has happened. It is as if you have a barcode on your forehead that can be read without your knowledge.

The collection and retention of fingerprints is tightly regulated by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Crime and Security Act 2010. Similarly, the use of DNA is strictly regulated by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. But what regulation is there for facial recognition, the most intrusive technology of the lot? Since the first deployment in 2017, absolutely no legislation, none at all, has been introduced to control this serious threat to our privacy. As we have already heard, the phrase “facial recognition” is not mentioned once in UK legislation.

Police forces, including the Met, have had a go at writing their own rules and marking their own homework, but that is obviously not their skill set; it is the job of legislators. The police’s homemade rules vary from force to force, and nobody is monitoring what is actually happening on the ground. For example, they assure us that all images they collect that do not match someone on the watch-list are instantly and permanently destroyed to preserve the privacy of innocent passers-by, but whether that always happens cannot be verified because there is no scrutiny, as there would be with, for example, DNA. This serious legislative vacuum is not the fault of the police; it is the fault of all the Governments since 2017, who were asleep at the wheel and did nothing to control the use of this highly intrusive technology.

You might ask: “Why does it matter to me? Why should I care if the state knows where I am and what I am doing? I am an honest, law-abiding, clean-living citizen. There is nothing in my life that I need to conceal from the police, my boss or my spouse”. You might be told by advocates of mass surveillance, “If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear”. Well, that claim is first attributed to the great democrat Joseph Goebbels. The Chinese state, where much of the technology for facial recognition comes from, uses it to monitor the behaviour of its citizens. It is used not just to keep track of where they are, but to assess whether they are being good citizens in accordance with the state’s definition of what a “good citizen” is.

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[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I had sought to intervene on the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, before he sat down, but the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, beat me to it. I want to ask him a simple question but, first, I am sorry that we are on different sides of this—when we served together on the snoopers’ charter Bill, we were totally united that it was a bad Bill and we worked hand in glove to amend it. Can he tell me the substantive difference between a camera and a computer watching everyone in the crowd and picking out the wanted troublemakers and those 20 policemen he talked about looking at everybody in the crowd and picking out the wanted troublemakers from their briefing or their memory? What is the real difference between them?

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

When I observed these deployments of facial recognition and looked at the 20 policemen standing around, it occurred to me that they would probably find a lot more of the people they were looking for if they just went round to their houses and knocked on the door, rather than working on the off-chance that they might walk past them in the high street.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Doocey for eliciting a very useful debate, as was the intention. I particularly welcome some of the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, but say to him that a Crime and Policing Bill might possibly be the place for discussion of the use of live facial recognition in policing. Maybe we can make some progress with the Government, we hope, responding or at least giving an indication ahead of their consultation of their approach to the legislative framework around live facial recognition. I very much hope that they will take this debate on board as part of that consultation.

As my noble friend Lady Doocey clearly stated, these amendments are necessary because live facial recognition currently operates, effectively, in a legislative void, yet the police are rolling out this technology at speed. There is no explicit Act of Parliament authorising its deployment, meaning that police forces are in effect, as my noble friend Lord Strasburger indicated, writing their own rules as they go. This technology represents a fundamental shift in the relationship between citizen and state. When LFR cameras are deployed, our public spaces become biometric checkpoints where every face is indiscriminately scanned. By treating every citizen as a suspect in a permanent digital line-up, we are abandoning the presumption of innocence. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, made that point very well. As a result, there is a clear issue of public trust.

Amendment 379 would prohibit the use of LFR during public assemblies or processions unless a specific code of practice has been formally approved by resolution of both Houses of Parliament. This is essential to protect our freedoms of expression and assembly under Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR. The pervasive tracking capability of LFR creates what the courts have recognised as a chilling effect, as described by my noble friend Lady Doocey and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. Law-abiding citizens are discouraged from attending protests or expressing dissenting views for fear of permanent state monitoring. We know that police forces have already used this technology to target peaceful protesters who were not wanted for any crime. People should not have to hand over their sensitive biometric data as the price of engaging in democratic processes. Without explicit parliamentary consent and an approved code of practice, we are sleepwalking into a surveillance state that bypasses democratic oversight entirely.

Amendment 471 would establish that LFR use in public spaces must be limited to narrowly defined serious cases—such as preventing major crimes or locating missing persons—and requires prior judicial authorisation specifying the scope and purpose of each deployment. The need for this oversight was made absolutely clear by the 2020 Court of Appeal ruling in R (Bridges) v Chief Constable of South Wales Police, which found LFR use unlawful due to fundamental deficiencies in the legal framework. The court identified that far too much discretion is left to individual officers regarding who ends up on a watchlist and where cameras are placed. We must replace operational discretion with judicial scrutiny.

The Government themselves now acknowledge the inadequacy of the current framework, which they describe as a “patchwork framework” and say it is

“complicated and difficult to understand”.

Well, that is at least some progress towards the Government acknowledging the situation. They say that the current framework does not provide sufficient confidence for expanded use—hear, hear. The former Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner made clear his concerns about the College of Policing guidance, questioning whether these fundamental issues require

“more than an authorised professional practice document from the College of Policing”

and instead demand parliamentary debate. The former commissioner raised a profound question:

“Is the status of the UK citizen shifting from our jealously guarded presumption of innocence to that of ‘suspected until we have proved our identity to the satisfaction of the examining officer’?”


Such a fundamental shift in the relationship between citizen and state cannot, and should not, be determined by guidance alone.

The College of Policing’s APP on LFR, while attempting to provide operational guidance, falls short of providing the robust legal framework that this technology demands. It remains non-statutory guidance that can be revised without parliamentary scrutiny, lacks enforceable standards for deployment decisions, provides insufficient detail on bias testing and mitigation requirements, and does not establish independent oversight mechanisms with real teeth.

Most critically, the guidance permits watch-list compilation based on subjective assessments without clear statutory criteria or independent review. This leaves fundamental decisions about who gets surveilled to operational discretion rather than judicial oversight. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, who was keen on one bit of our amendment but not the other, I say that this intelligence-led tool effectively delegates it to a senior police officer and they, in a sense, have a conflict of interest. They are the ones who make the operational decisions.

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[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for tabling the amendments and starting this important debate. Facial recognition is an increasingly important tool that helps the police, and I am grateful for the support of the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra, Lord Cameron of Lochiel and Lord Hogan-Howe. I was particularly struck by the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, on gait and movement, which point to why this is valuable.

Currently, facial recognition technology is used to identify those suspected of committing crime, those who may be in breach of a court order and, as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones said, those who are missing persons and could be found. To put some context to it, for example, there were 127 people arrested following the use of facial technology during the disturbances in the summer of 2024 around asylum protests. According to the Metropolitan Police’s figures, between January 2024 and September 2025, 1,300 people were arrested for offences including rape, robbery and GBH, and, in that period, 100 sex offenders were arrested for breaching their conditions: that is, going to an area where they should not have gone. That is quite a valuable action, tool and resource. But that does not mean—which goes to the heart of the amendment the noble Baroness moved—that the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, the noble Baroness herself and the Liberal Democrat Front Bench are not ones that need to be examined.

Noble Lords will be aware that, currently, the use of facial recognition technology is already subject to safeguards, including the Human Rights Act and Data Protection Act. The Government accept that there is a need to consider whether a bespoke legislative framework is needed. We need to get it right. We need to balance the need to protect communities from crime and disorder with the need to safeguard individual rights.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, will know, and as has been referenced in this debate, on 4 December, the Government launched a consultation: I have a copy available for the House. It is a 10-week consultation on a new framework for the enforcement of the use of facial recognition and similar technologies. The consultation explores when and how these technologies should be used, what safeguards are required to protect the issues that noble Lords and Baronesses have raised today and how to ensure that their use is proportionate to the seriousness of the harm being addressed.

I refer the Committee to page 5 of the summary to the consultation:

“The government is therefore committed to developing and introducing a new legal framework that sets out rules for the overt use of facial recognition by law enforcement organisations”.


That is a clear government objective. The consultation is about how we achieve that government objective. It runs until 12 February and I encourage all those who have spoken to submit their views.

I take Amendment 471 as a positive contribution to the consultation. Some aspects would cause difficulties, but it is a fair point to put to the Committee today. I hope noble Lords will accept that I cannot pre-empt the outcome of the consultation, which runs until 12 February. However, the clear objective, which I have read out, is to find the framework that noble Lords are seeking. We will need legislation to put in place the new legal framework, and that will come when parliamentary time allows.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

The Minister says that he cannot pre-empt the outcome of the consultation, but surely Clause 125 already pre-empts the outcome of the consultation.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I do not think that it does. We will leave it at that. There is a proper and full consultation document, a copy of which is, I am sure, available in the House for Members to look at.

I revert to my starting point. For the reasons that have been laid out by a number of Members in the Committee today, across the political divide and none, it is a valuable tool. Do the noble Lord and the noble Baroness who raised this have an objection to automatic number plate recognition? Under current regulations, every vehicle that goes past a camera at the side of the road is an “innocent” vehicle but some of those number plates will lead to crime being solved or individuals being caught. The principle is there. If they object to the principle then we will not find common ground on this. We need regulation—I have accepted that. We are bringing forward the consultation, but, ultimately it is a valuable tool to stop and prevent crime and to catch criminals.

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[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. I declare my interest as the director of the Free Speech Union.

The strongest argument for repealing the Malicious Communications Act and Section 127 of the Communications Act is that these laws were made during an analogue era and are clearly not fit for purpose during our current digital era. That is one reason why the Law Commission of England and Wales, in its 2021 report on which communications laws should be reformed, recommended that both the Malicious Communications Act and Section 127 of the Communications Act be repealed.

That has not happened, but a good illustration of just how unfit these two laws are was alluded to by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. The Times submitted FOI requests to all 43 police forces in England and Wales, asking them how many arrests were made in England and Wales in 2023 and in previous years for online offences under the Malicious Communications Act and Section 127 of the Communications Act. Of the 43 police forces, 37 responded to the FOI request. In just those 37 police forces, in 2023 12,183 people were arrested on suspicion of having committed just one of these two offences through something they had said online. That is a huge increase on the number of people arrested in 2018—just 5,502—on suspicion of committing these two offences for things they posted online. The figure more than quadrupled in a five-year period. That boils down to 33 people being arrested every day in 2023 on suspicion of having committed just one of these two offences under the Malicious Communications Act and Section 127 of the Communications Act.

That happened because of the explosion of speech which is supposedly offensive, annoying, distressing, alarming or indecent, et cetera, online on social media. This is something the framers of these laws could not possibly have anticipated, and it is causing the police to waste a colossal amount of time. In addition, the number of people who were charged—bear in mind that 12,183 people were arrested—was 1,119. The police are clearly being overzealous in responding to complaints about supposed offences under these two laws relating to things people have said online.

Another index of just how much time is being wasted is that many of the people who are not charged end up having the episode recorded as a non-crime hate incident. The Free Speech Union has estimated that, as best we can tell, something like a quarter of a million non-crime hate incidents have been recorded since the concept was introduced by the College of Policing in 2014—and that is in England and Wales alone. That is an average of around 65 a day.

One reason so many NCHIs are being recorded is that, when the police arrest someone under suspicion of having committed an offence under the Malicious Communications Act or Section 127 of the Communications Act and conclude that in fact no offence has been committed, the incident is recorded as an NCHI. As I have said before in this House, one of the penalties for having an NCHI recorded against your name is that it can show up in enhanced criminal record checks when you apply for a job as a teacher or a carer or try to volunteer for a charity such as the Samaritans. According to Policy Exchange, in a report published last year, police in the UK as a whole are spending 6,000 hours a year investigating episodes and incidents that turn out to be NCHIs and are recorded as such. That is a strong argument for repealing the Malicious Communications Act and Section 127 of the Communications Act.

I will give two examples, from the FSU’s case files, of just how absurd the police’s overzealous policing of social media has become. We went to bat for one of our members, Julian Foulkes, a former special constable in Kent. He said in a spat online with a pro-Palestinian activist that some of the pro-Palestinian marchers were once step away from heading to Heathrow and stopping people disembarking from flights from Israel. That person complained, as I understand it, and six police officers—six—turned up at Julian Foulkes’s home, arrested him, took him down to the station and would not release him until he had agreed to accept a caution. With our help, he got that caution expunged and went on to sue the police for wrongful arrest. He was given £20,000 in compensation and got an apology from the chief constable of the police force concerned. That is a good example of the kind of time-wasting that the police are being led into because of the difficulty of enforcing these analogue laws in a digital era.

The second example is Maxie Allen and Rosalind Levine, the parents of two daughters, who were arrested, again by six police officers, in front of their youngest daughter because of things they had said in a WhatsApp group that parents at their daughter’s school were members of and something they had said in an email to the head teacher of their daughter’s school. It is incredible that the police thought that six police officers were needed to take these parents into custody. Julian Foulkes was under suspicion of having committed an offence under the Malicious Communications Act. In their case, they were under suspicion of having committed an offence under Section 127 of the Communications Act. Again, in due course, no further action was taken. We helped them sue the police for wrongful arrest and they too were given compensation of £20,000.

Be in no doubt that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and my noble friend Lord Moynihan are correct when they say that the process is the punishment. Even though no action was taken and no prosecutions were made in those two cases, Julian Foulkes and those parents were caused huge anxiety and distress by what they went through before the police decided to take no further action. That is a strong case for following the Law Commission of England and Wales’s advice and repealing the Malicious Communications Act and Section 127 of the Communications Act.

Briefly, I absolutely agree with the proposal in the amendment to remove the word “insulting” from the sections of the Public Order Act in which it remains. Noble Lords will not need reminding that the word “insulting” was removed from some sections of the Public Order Act, specifically Section 5 and related provisions, by the Crime and Courts Act 2013, following a campaign by Rowan Atkinson and others which pointed out how absurd it was to criminalise insulting. In one case, a young man was arrested for insulting a police officer’s horse, as noble Lords may recall. It was an effective campaign and it resulted in the word “insulting” being removed from Section 5, but it remains in many other parts of the Public Order Act. To my mind, the same arguments forcefully made by Rowan Atkinson and others at the time for removing the word “insulting” from Section 5 equally apply to the other sections of the Public Order Act where it remains. Just as we do not have a right not to be offended, we do not have a right not to be insulted.

I close with a quote from JS Mill, which I believe is from On Liberty. Mill warned that the criminal proscription of uncivil language is intrinsically likely to protect the holders of received opinion at the expense of dissidents. He wrote:

“With regard to what is commonly meant by intemperate discussion, namely invective, sarcasm, personality, and the like”—


we could add the word “insulting” to that list—

“the denunciation of these weapons would deserve more sympathy if it were ever proposed to interdict them equally to both sides; but it is only desired to restrain the employment of them against the prevailing opinion: against the unprevailing they may not only be used without general disapproval, but will be likely to obtain for him who uses them the praise of honest zeal and righteous indignation”.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, on his courage in raising these issues. I am going to say little more than that, other than that I was instrumental in getting a sentence added to the code of conduct for members of the Liberal Democrats, which says that no one has the right to not be offended.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, set out the principles that he believes are important to secure freedom of speech by removing the words “abusive or insulting” from a number of pieces of legislation. From these Benches, we absolutely accept freedom of speech. But I want to pick up on the point that the noble Lord, Lord Young, made when he quoted John Stuart Mill. There is a second half to the sentence about the right to free speech. Mill says that

“the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others”.

It is on preventing harm to others that this entire debate is balanced.

I am sure that there are many justifications for feeling that freedom of speech is being curtailed for people who just want to express their opinion. But the reason that we have the laws we do at the moment, particularly since the 1950s, is due to the harm that has been done to others. I think there was reference made earlier to the Race Relations Act of 60 years ago; that was in the consequence of very overt racial harm done to entire communities in our society. John Stuart Mill would have absolutely supported that legislation to protect. That is what the balance is between our freedom of speech and our responsibility as parliamentarians to protect those, particularly the most vulnerable, in our society.

That is why I want to go back briefly—not quite as far back as the Race Relations Act 1965—to when the original provisions on hate crimes were first introduced by the Blair Government in 1998. There is no doubt that this was partly in response to growing concerns relating to the ineffective policing of and legal responses to racist violence, which, again, was then very evident on our streets. The noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, and her family had campaigned for this more robust legislative framework, and not just because it was much clearer that, as a society, we did not and should not accept hate-motivated crimes, especially towards particular communities and those with protected characteristics.

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[Lord Berkeley of Knighton (CB)]

My Lords, I shall speak extremely briefly, because, compared to the expertise of my noble friends on the Cross Benches who have spoken thus far, I would probably merit nothing like the status of a keyhole surgeon—more like a butcher, really—in terms of legal matters. But I would just say that what I have heard is very convincing, coming from people with such expertise. I very much look forward to hearing the Minister’s reasons for rejecting the amendment, if that is what he feels he must do.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, I am absolutely astonished. Until 10 minutes ago, I had no idea that these provisions existed—that a constable without suspicion could seize a person’s devices, interrogate their data and hold on to them more or less indefinitely. Could somebody, perhaps a Minister, tell me in what circumstances suspicionless search like this is justified?

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Anderson of Ipswich and Lord Clement-Jones, for bringing forward the amendments in question. Amendments 390 and 391 have been well reasoned, and I am particularly happy to offer my support to the principle behind them. Objectivity should be the aim of every piece of legislation, and I welcome any measures towards that end. That is particularly the case when we are dealing with laws that provide the police with powers that can be used at the expense of people’s privacy. Clause 135 does this, allowing constables to extract online information from defendants’ devices should they need to determine whether the person has been involved in an act of terrorism.

I understand the Government’s intention behind this clause, and that it may have implications for national security. However, because of the importance, we should leave as little of its interpretation to human discretion as possible. We are all aware that, while we continue to support our forces, there are occasional instances of bad faith actors and, more generally, mistakes are a natural product of human enterprise. Allowing a constable’s belief to determine whether it is necessary to retain held information is an unnecessary risk that the Government do not need to take.

Similarly, we are not opposed to the principle behind Amendment 390. Individuals who are subjected to these new powers should not have the anxiety of an indefinite investigation hanging over their heads if the authorities do not have reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed. For that reason, introducing a limit on the amount of time that information can be held without reasonable suspicion is sensible. That said, I am unsure whether three months is long enough for police forces to determine whether retention is necessary. This is especially the case given the heightened stress that a decrease in officer numbers will put forces under. Despite this, I hope the Minister can agree that a limit is a sensible suggestion and update the Committee on the Government’s position.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I have made the case and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and others can accept that case or not. If he believes that keyhole surgery is still required, he has a mechanism to begin the operation. I hope the Committee can accept the assurances I have given, based on the fact that this is an amendment to the 2000 Act. The normal practice already in place is to have codes of practice, and I am proposing, via the discussion, to have revised codes of practice, subject to parliamentary affirmative scrutiny, and that the clauses will not be implemented until such a time as both Houses give their assent to those measures. I hope that assuages the noble Lord; if it does not, he knows what to do.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

I am sorry, I must be missing something here. There is a provision to conduct a really draconian intervention on a traveller as they pass through an airport, but it is not on the basis of suspicion. On what basis does the constable, or whatever he or she is, choose that traveller rather than another traveller, if there is no suspicion involved?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I hope I can help the noble Lord. The Schedule 7 and Schedule 3 powers are exercised at pace. Some investigations, particularly those involving complex or sensitive matters, could well extend beyond three months. Evidence often emerges gradually and may be fragmented.

Statutory codes of practice provide a flexible and responsive mechanism for setting out detailed safeguards and allow for timely updates on operational and legal contexts. If we embed such details in primary legislation, with due respect to the noble and learned Baroness, that would create inflexibility and mean that we may not keep pace with changing threats or operational realities. The codes are subject to parliamentary scrutiny; they can be revised as needed and ensure robust protection. That is why I have put that argument before the Committee. If it feels that that argument is not acceptable, we will have to have that discussion later on. That is my defence against having keyhole surgery at this time.

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[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 396 in my name raises fundamental issues about this part of the Bill. My concern is about Clause 138 and its clear potential to enable facial recognition searches of the DVLA’s vast image database. That would be a dramatic change. At present, drivers’ data can be accessed only for road traffic purposes.

Amendment 396 would place a safeguard in the Bill to prevent authorised persons using information obtained under these powers for the purposes of biometric searches using facial recognition technology. It would ensure that the private images of millions of citizens cannot be repurposed to feed live or retrospective facial recognition systems without full parliamentary debate and explicit consent. Around 55 million facial images are held by the DVLA; they are collected in good faith and with a clear expectation of privacy, alongside names, addresses and medical records, for the routine purposes of getting a driving licence. Turning that repository into a police biometric pool would mark a profound shift in the relationship between the state and the citizen. Combined with live facial recognition on our streets, it would create the infrastructure for real-time, population-scale surveillance, scanning the faces of tens of millions of law-abiding people as they go about their daily lives.

In effect, most of us would find ourselves on a perpetual digital watch list, our faces repeatedly checked for potential wrongdoing. That is troubling not only because of the bias and misidentification in these systems but because it is simply not proportionate policing. The public broadly support the use of technology to catch criminals, but they also want limits and safeguards. A 2024 survey by the Centre for Emerging Technology and Security and the Alan Turing Institute found that only one in five people—just 19%—trusted police forces to use biometric tools responsibly.

That anxiety is particularly strong among women. Barely three years ago, the Casey review exposed appalling misogyny and a serious abuse of data access within policing. Against that backdrop, granting digital access to millions of female drivers’ personal details and photographs is hardly reassuring, especially when previous safeguards have failed so spectacularly. Last year alone, 229 serving police officers and staff were arrested for domestic abuse-related offences, and a further 1,200 were on restricted duties linked to such allegations. The fear is real that combining facial recognition with DVLA access could allow abusers within policing to misuse these powers to trace survivors, to remove their freedom to hide and to undermine public trust still further. We also know that this technology misidentifies members of ethnic-minority communities far more frequently, compounding injustice and eroding confidence in policing by consent.

I share the ambition for policing to use data more intelligently. Forces need joined-up intelligence systems across the entire criminal justice network, but there is a world of difference between targeted access to high-risk offender data and a blank cheque to harvest the personal information of millions of people.

Clause 138 is far too wide. It allows the Secretary of State to authorise digital access for policing or law enforcement purposes, which frankly could mean anything. What information may be accessed, and for what purpose, would later be set by regulation made under the negative procedure, giving Parliament only the most cursory scrutiny of measures, with huge implications for privacy and liberty. Such sweeping powers should not be slipped through in secondary legislation. The public did not give their driving licence photographs to become part of a national face search system. There has been no debate, no consent and no assessment of the risk to those who have good reason to remain hidden. Once civic freedoms are eroded, they are very rarely rebuilt.

When the Minister replies, I hope we will hear what the Government’s policy intention is. If their intention is to keep open the possibility of using DVLA data for surveillance, they should say so and try to justify it. We know that the police have specifically asked for this. It is not good enough to say, “This is our intention”; my amendment would ensure it cannot happen. That is the safeguard the public expect and the least this Committee should demand.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to speak in favour of Amendment 396, to which I have added my name—my notes are only two pages long. It would ensure that the DVLA drivers database was not used for a purpose for which it was never intended; namely, to search drivers’ photos for a match with images collected by live facial recognition.

Facial recognition technology could be a useful tool in fighting serious crime if it was properly regulated and supervised, which is the case with other biometric technologies such as fingerprint and DNA, but currently it is open season on facial recognition, with no statutory constraints on its use or misuse. That means that this deeply invasive, mass surveillance tool poses a serious threat to the civil liberties and human rights of UK citizens. If used in combination with the DVLA drivers database, it would be a disproportionate expansion of police powers to identify and track innocent citizens across time and locations for low-level policing needs. It would give the authorities access to the biometric data of tens of millions of our fellow citizens. It is vital that safeguards are introduced in law to prevent this happening. This is precisely what Amendment 396 would do.

In Committee in the other place, the Policing Minister said that

“police forces do not conduct facial matching against images contained on the DVLA database, and the clause will not change that”.—[Official Report, Commons, Crime and Policing Bill Committee, 29/4/25; col. 442.]

But Clause 138 allows regulations to be made at a later date setting out how driver licensing information will be made accessible to law enforcement. All that Amendment 396 does is create safeguards to ensure that the regulations made under Clause 138 cannot provide for facial recognition searches of the DVLA database. I commend it to the Committee.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Strasburger Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th January 2026 Lords Chamber

That was probably what I objected most to about the remarks from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra: the suggestion that “may” cause a problem is targeted and that allowing blanket designation by the police is targeted. It is the opposite of targeted; it is blanket. It chills freedom of expression, which experts say is already being chilled in this country. So I suggest that people take the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, very seriously indeed.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. I agree with everything that she said. I start by reminding the Committee that I have an interest as chair of Big Brother Watch. In this group we are considering Clauses 118, 119 and 120, which are not only draconian in their effect but very poorly drafted. In the course of my speech, I have five questions about these clauses for the Minister, which I ask him to respond to when he replies.

Clauses 118, 119 and 120 create a new offence of concealing identity at protests. However, as I will demonstrate, and as has already been said, it is vital that individuals are able to preserve their anonymity at protests. Other clauses in the Bill promote the use of highly intrusive and totally unregulated facial recognition technology at protests. We are currently in the Wild West with this mass surveillance technology. It is being used by law enforcement and private firms without any permission, regulation or oversight from Parliament. The Bill contains the first mention of the phrase “facial recognition” in any legislation, yet it does nothing to control or monitor its use. Perhaps the Minister could explain why the Bill fails again to regulate and control this mass surveillance technology?

Authorising the use of this technology, as the Bill does, without first controlling how it is used, puts the cart way ahead of the horse. The combination of this mass surveillance and prohibiting face coverings at protests, as these clauses do, has a seriously chilling effect on people’s willingness to participate in demonstrations.

There are many categories of law-abiding citizens—we heard some from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—who may prefer to conceal their identity at protests for entirely legitimate reasons, such as those protesting against a hostile foreign state who fear retribution for themselves or their families; those who prefer that their employer does not know their political views; those who criticise their own religious or cultural communities; survivors of sexual violence and harassment, who need to stay below the radar; or those who simply do not wish to be the subject of mass surveillance by totally unregulated facial recognition technology. Anonymity is an important enabler of freedom of assembly and association. It allows participants a certain level of protection against authorities singling out or identifying specific individuals.

There are serious problems with the drafting of Clauses 118 to 120. Clause 119 does not require that a person knows they are in a designated area for them to commit an offence. This compares unfavourably with Sections 12(5A) and 14(5A) of the Public Order Act 1986, which also imposes conditions on processions and assemblies. That Act includes the requirement that, at the time of the offence,

“the person knows or ought to know that the condition has been imposed”.

There is no such requirement in Clause 119, so a protestor who knows nothing of such a designation could well be arrested and prosecuted. Can the Minister explain why that is right?

Worse still, Clause 118 appears to reverse the burden of proof, which means a defendant would have the burden—presumably on the balance of probabilities—to prove that they were wearing a face covering for health or other reasons. Why is this not the criminal burden or standard? This risks people being wrongly convicted on the lower standard of proof, which is especially concerning as the offence has such wide application. Furthermore, anyone wearing a Covid-style mask in the locality of a protest, even if they are there for a completely different reason, could be caught by this offence and would not have the protections of the normal burden and standard of proof at trial. Can the Minister explain why that is the case?

Clause 119 has no limit on the types of offences that would give rise to the power to make the designation. That means that the designation could be made disproportionately, such as on the basis of only minor offences. In addition, there is no protection from the offence itself and its designation being circular, which means that an officer may justify a designation against concealing identity on the basis that they believe the offence of concealing one’s identity may be committed.

Another problem with these clauses is that the maximum sentence of one month’s custody is the same as for the offence of refusing to remove a face covering under Section 60AA of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. I think the Committee will agree that the conduct element of the Section 60AA offence—refusing to comply with the lawful direction of a police officer—is significantly more serious and by definition implies awareness of the condition, unlike the new offence. It seems disproportionate that the new offence would attract the same sentence. Does the Minister agree?

Clauses 118 to 120 are defective in many important ways. In any case, even if they were better written, they would still unreasonably and unnecessarily inhibit and have a chilling effect on lawful protests. For all these reasons, they must be strongly opposed and removed from the Bill.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I will say two things to the noble Lord in our defence. His presumption assumes that a police force in five years’ time will be dominated by right-wing Conservatives, Reform members or Socialist Workers Party members, who instruct the police force to instigate that designated area. I happen to believe— I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, would agree with me—that the police are independent of government, they have integrity, and they determine policies based on legislation.

This does not give a police officer the power to be a political commissar, whether of right or left, but gives the police the power to say, “There is potentially criminal action in this designated space; therefore, in this space we need to ensure that we can remove face coverings”. If there is another Government who he fears in the future—all of us may fear different Governments of different authoritarian natures—I guess that they will have won an election and will have 400 or so Members of Parliament, and they can pass what the heck they like anyway.

Therefore, there is an argument to say to the noble Lord that his fears are undermining the integrity and the independence of the police force, and all I am doing in this legislation is giving the police the power to take action should they, as the police, determine that they want to do it.

The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, mentioned that it does not require someone to know they are committing the offence. Clause 119(2) requires the police to notify in writing that the designation has been made, the nature of the offence, the locality to which the designation applies and the period for which it applies. So it could even be a designation in writing for a limited time and in a limited place, but it is important that we do so.

A number of noble colleagues have raised religious and medical exemptions and further loopholes. The purpose of the new offence is, as I have said, to prevent protesters concealing their identity in order to avoid conviction for criminal activity in the designated place.

The measure does provide a reverse legal burden on the defendant to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that they wore a face covering for work purposes, or religious or health reasons. But, as with any charge, that is a defence in the Bill, in the future Act, in law, that allows people to say, “I am a paint sprayer”, or that they were seeking to prevent illness that might cause further illness if they did not wear a mask, or that, potentially, they had a religious reason to wear a mask. That is a defence in the event of any charge being made. But, again, it is a defence at the time when the police officer might well say to an individual that that mask needs to be removed.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

Be that as it may, what does the Minister say to people in all the other categories which are not mentioned in the clause as exemptions? People who have work reasons or marital reasons or whatever are not mentioned as exemptions; what do you say to them about attending protests? Are they just to avoid protests on that basis?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

There are designations that we have set down in law and there are designations that are not set down in law, but the measure is a proportionate one that the police can undertake, and in the event of an individual knowing that that is happening, they can accordingly take their own measures and decide to either protest or not protest. That does not curtail the right to protest.

The measure does not ban face coverings at every protest. An individual can go to a protest; they can wear a face covering for the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, has outlined, and only if the police believe that criminal actions could be taken is that area designated. Then it is a matter for the individual, and I believe a majority of peaceful, legitimate protests will not be captured by this legislation, and the police must take great—

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The exemptions in the Bill are very clear, and I have already talked about those that relate to religious, work or health reasons. Police officers will make a judgment on those issues on the ground and, as in the experience of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, they have a significantly difficult job to do at any demonstration.

If I can give any comfort to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Baroness, all the offences under the Bill are currently under review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, as part of the review that he is undertaking, to be completed by spring 2026. I have no doubt that he will pay close attention to the comments that are made in this debate and make an assessment to government about whether the points made by noble Lords are ones that he should reflect on. I would say to the Committee—

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

I am astonished by that statement. Is the Minister saying that we should knowingly pass faulty legislation because we know that the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, will pick it up and sort it out later?

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[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, some months ago I was trying to get to Oxford Street and at Oxford Circus a large number of people were sitting on the ground, making it impossible for either end of Regent Street or Oxford Street to move. I believe they were there for several days. All I can say is that, as an ordinary member of the public, I found it extremely irritating, so I am very sympathetic to Amendment 370.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, I will comment briefly on Amendments 382A and 382C. Amendment 382A amounts to the banning of protests in almost any circumstances at the behest of the police. Proposed new subsection (2)(1B) is particularly guilty in this respect, allowing, as it does, for a protest to be banned because, in the opinion of a chief officer of police, it would place undue demands on the police. But the police, as a public authority, have a duty to facilitate protests, not prevent them. Of course, that duty to facilitate protests has resource implications for the police, sometimes serious implications. That means that the police must be provided with adequate resources by the Government, but it does not mean that, as an alternative to proper resourcing, financial corners should be cut by the Government, thus making it impossible for the police to carry out their duty to facilitate protest. But that is precisely what Amendment 382A would do. It says that protests should be banned because the police are underresourced. It would be better if it said that the police must be sufficiently resourced to allow them to facilitate protest. It does not, and for that reason Amendment 382A must be opposed.

Amendment 382C seeks to extend from six days to 28 the notice period for informing the police of a demonstration, but many demonstrations are spontaneous or are, by necessity, organised at short notice. In any case, the amendment would appear to not achieve anything, because this section of the Bill already contains a provision for late notice as soon as practicable, so there is nothing to be gained by increasing the formal notice period, unless the goal is to make it ever more difficult to organise a protest. Amendment 382C should also be opposed.

[Lord Walney (CB)]

I will briefly comment on the issue of notice periods for protests, because I have sympathy for the desire to create an ordered system where there is more notice for protests, although I struggle to see how it could be practical in some ways. But the main issue that I would like the Government to reflect on is the now fairly routine practice of the police disregarding the fact that many protests do not meet the current seven days. They may have their reasons, but they take a view to not have any form of prosecution for that. Even if they were to prosecute, the fines are relatively low and therefore not a deterrent. So any change in the notice period needs to be wrapped in with looking at the issue that this law is simply not being enforced at all officially at the moment.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Strasburger Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, I draw the Committee’s attention to my interest as chair of Big Brother Watch. I will speak about Amendments 369 and 371 in the name of my colleague and noble friend Lord Marks.

Protest is the lifeblood of any vibrant democracy, and in the United Kingdom it is one of the most powerful ways for ordinary citizens to make their voices heard. Our democratic system depends not only on elections but on the active participation of the people between elections. Protest is essential because it allows us to challenge decisions, hold leaders accountable and demand change when systems seem slow or unresponsive.

Throughout our history, protest has driven meaningful progress. Universal male suffrage in Britain was pushed forward by mass movements such as the Chartists and later reform campaigns which used strikes, mass meetings and demonstrations to pressure Parliament into extending the franchise and paying MPs so that working-class men could serve. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, that I imagine those were quite inconvenient to a few people. Women’s suffrage in the UK was won by the suffragettes only after decades of marches, processions, civil disobedience and hunger strikes, culminating in the Representation of the People Act.

Peaceful protest educates the public, sparks debate and creates the pressure necessary for reform. In a healthy democracy, disagreement is not a threat but a sign that citizens care deeply about their society. However, our right to protest is, as has already been said, under relentless attack. Through the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 and the Public Order Act 2023, the previous Government introduced multiple restrictions on our precious right to protest. Then last year, the current Government found a way to further suppress peaceful demonstrations by misusing terrorism legislation to stop protests. This led to 2,700 arrests of mostly elderly people who were protesting about what was happening in Gaza. We had the bizarre sight, week after week, of police arresting vicars and old ladies in Parliament Square when they posed no threat whatever to anyone.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Can I just point out to the noble Lord, if he will allow me to, that these people were not arrested for expressing a view about Gaza? They were arrested for supporting Palestine Action, which is a violent terrorist group.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

Not so far as I know.

It was absolutely farcical, but not very funny, when you consider that the hundreds of police officers involved had far more useful things that they could have been doing. But it seems even that was not enough for the Government. Through this Bill, they are attempting to introduce a raft of further constraints on the right of the British people to express themselves via peaceful street demonstrations.

The law surrounding protest is in a complete mess. Recent legislation has been knee-jerk and reactionary, leaving the legal landscape a complete muddle. Police often struggle to know how to police demonstrations properly, which usually leads to excessive heavy-handed policing and people being charged with all sorts of offences when they may not have been. This has also made the law extremely unpredictable: the mission creep of legislation and case law over recent years has meant that there is now a raft of serious criminal offences —that is, indictable offences—tried in the Crown Court that are no doubt adding to the unacceptable backlog in the courts. It is very easy for someone to attend a peaceful demonstration and inadvertently commit an offence or a more serious offence than they would have reasonably expected their conduct to amount to.

For example, a protester who temporarily blocks a road—as many do—would historically have been charged with wilful obstruction of the highway under Section 137 of the Highways Act. This was a summary-only offence, which used to have a maximum sentence of a fine, although this was increased to six months’ custody in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. Section 7 of the Public Order Act 2023 introduced a new offence of interfering with national infrastructure, which includes all A and B roads, with a maximum sentence of 12 months’ custody. Section 78 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 also created a new statutory offence of public nuisance, which only requires the doing of an act that obstructs a public right. This is far wider than the old common-law offence that required the obstruction to be “significant”. The effect of all the above, as an illustration, is that someone who stands or sits in a road, as part of a protest, could be charged with any of the four offences that I have just mentioned. There is no real consistency in the charging decisions between different police forces or different CPS regions, meaning that people are often charged with very serious offences for minor conduct. There have even been cases in which different people are charged with different offences arising from identical conduct at the same protest.

The various laws about protest overlap with each other and have not been developed as a coherent framework. Protesters and police are unsure about which laws apply in particular situations. This results in inadvertently heavy-handed policing, inconsistent prosecution, miscarriages of justice, waste of the public purse and clogging up the courts. More importantly, it results in a cumulative chilling effect on our democracy and a stifling of debate. It is high time that the disorganised and disjointed framework of statutes covering the democratically vital activity of protest is subject to a root-and-branch review—one that is truly independent and thorough—and that is precisely what Amendment 371 calls for.

However, since Amendment 371 was laid, the Government have announced a review of public order and hate crime legislation. It is being chaired by the noble Lord, Macdonald of River Glaven, for whom I have the greatest respect. But the terms of reference for the review seem to be focused rather narrowly and do not appear to cover the matters I have just raised—namely, the unco-ordinated and overlapping legislation on protests. I doubt that, in the short period until the review reports next month, the noble Lord will be able to examine the different approaches to arresting and charging between the different police forces. Perhaps the Minister can reassure the Committee that the current review will be broad enough to cover all the shortfalls in the existing regime I have outlined. If he cannot give that assurance, Amendment 371 will need to be passed on Report to generate the full review that is needed.

Amendment 369, if passed, will hopefully prevent future Governments cumulatively eroding protest rights, as has been customary for the last few years.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I would vote against Amendment 371. It is a difficult area and there has to be balance. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, put it very well. We get more disruption from Remembrance Day every year across the country because roads are closed and people cannot do what they want to do. There are many times in society when we do things which cause disruption to others, but, if pushed, I would be more towards the position of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, than I would Amendment 371.

I have three points to make on Amendment 371. First, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, it duplicates what is already in the convention rights, and I cannot see the purpose of that. Secondly, it says nothing about the basic dilemma, which the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, demonstrated very well: most protest is intended to cause disruption in order to attract attention. People say that causing disruption is a right in a democracy, and I agree with that entirely, but I have to say that it is one of the most inefficient mechanisms for getting an argument over. A guy shouted about Brexit outside my office for about three years. All I could hear was one word about not liking Brexit; I never heard what his argument was. I am not sure a protest ever does any of that. It just attracts attention.

Disruption does cause that attention, but making Amendment 371 the only reason why the police would have to decide whether a march went ahead and if conditions were to be imposed would not address that basic dilemma. Nor would it address the dilemma that mass disobedience has, as the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, said, achieved far more in the way of democratic change than many forms of parliamentary intervention. It is a mechanism, but a balance has to be struck. Individuals have a right, in addition to the police allowing them to do so, to make sure they can get to a hospital or that a fire engine can get through when it needs to, rather than simply when someone concludes that they will let it through.

Thirdly, the criminal law is the wrong place to state convention rights. If you are going to state them, there may be a place in law, but the criminal law is for declaring offences. If you want to start declaring rights, you might want to start declaring human responsibilities. The start of the Human Rights Act talks about human responsibilities but never got around to providing any enforcement mechanisms. All those things we ought to have as duties towards each other are articulated nowhere. Protestors can have their right to protest, but they do not have to worry about the rights of the poor child who cannot get to school or people who are trying to attend a place of worship. They have rights too, but the protestor apparently does not have to balance their rights when considering exercising his or her own.

My final point is a direct challenge to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, who I really like and respect, and the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, was quite right: it is quite unfair to criticise the police for arresting people at marches who are supporting a proscribed terrorist organisation. You may not like the proscription, but this place passed the legislation. We also passed legislation saying that it is an offence to support a proscribed organisation. Therefore, if you start waving banners about and saying you support these organisations, there will be a consequence. I do not see how it is okay to argue that the police, in taking action on the laws we passed, are doing something wrong. You may not agree with the law, but it is not right to blame the police for exercising it. That is a confusion that has arisen over the last few months, and it is one we can put right.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

The objection was to the way that terrorism legislation was misused to, in effect, suppress protest. It was misused by combining as a group Palestine Action with two other desperately terrorist organisations, so that MPs and Peers had no opportunity to decide on one and not the other two. It was a bit of a fix.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

I understand the point from the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger. My only challenge is that I do not think it is fair or accurate to blame the police for that confusion. I would stand up for the police, of course, but it would be better of this place to acknowledge that dilemma without blaming them for exercising the powers that we gave them.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I hope it does not surprise noble Lords if I confess that I have been on the odd protest in my time. I have quite enjoyed the freedom to have a protest. I have protested against the apartheid Government, against the National Front and, if the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, will bear with me, against his Government when he served as a Minister.

The right to peaceful protest is an important part of our democratic society. It is a long-standing tradition in this country that people are free to gather together and demonstrate their views, provided they do so within the law. This Government are committed to protecting and preserving that right. I hope that that gives some succour to the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Strasburger, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and indeed others who have spoken in favour.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, set out his case for the two amendments on public order. Amendment 369 seeks to introduce a statutory right to protest into the Public Order Act 1986, along with a duty on public authorities to respect, protect and facilitate that right. I understand the concerns that he has put and I accept and appreciate those concerns, but, as has been said, not least by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, these protections are already firmly established in UK law. Public authorities are required under the Human Rights Act 1998, passed by a previous Government in which I was pleased to serve, to act in accordance with the rights to freedom of expression and assembly set out in Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

However, as has been said by a number of noble Lords today, including the noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Davies of Gower, and as set out in the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, these rights are qualified. This point is illustrated by Amendments 369ZA and 369ZB, put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. On that qualification, I am not going to get into the argument between the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Blencathra, but for the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and others who have argued for the amendment today, the key point is that that right, as has been said, can be restricted only where restriction is lawful, proportionate and justified. The right to peaceful protest is also recognised under the common law and creating a separate statutory provision risks duplicating existing protections, which could lead to confusion in how the law is interpreted and applied. It might also complicate operational policing without offering any additional legal safeguards.

I have to say that I agreed with the noble Lord, Lord Goodman of Wycombe, that there is a fundamental right to protest. But I respectfully submit, as I think he argued in his contribution, that the amendment would not strengthen that commitments and might indeed introduce uncertainty into the law. That is a very valid and important point, because existing legislation under the Human Rights Act 1998 and Articles 10 and 11, qualified rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, set out the issues that again were ably outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that the right to protest exists: it is one that I cherish and have exercised myself and may even exercise myself again in the future, who knows? It is an important right, but his amendment would cause confusion and water down the ability to provide that security of protest under the existing legislation. Therefore, I ask him ultimately to not press it further.

I turn to Amendment 371, which would require the Government to commission an independent review of the existing protest legislation within 12 months of the Bill receiving Royal Assent. The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, said that the Government called the review post the tabling of this amendment. We proposed the review on 5 October last year. The Home Secretary announced an independent review of public order and hate crime legislation on 5 October last year and I suggest that Amendment 371, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, would essentially be what the Government have already ordered and would, if agreed today, negate the purpose of what the Government have already ordered and extend the review that we have already ordered still further by establishing that review in law.

We announced the review on 5 October because of the very issues that all noble Lords have mentioned about balancing the right to peaceful protest and the right to enjoy non-harassment, the right to potentially go to a synagogue, or the right to go about your daily business. Those issues are extremely important, which is why the Home Secretary has appointed the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, KC, a former Director of Public Prosecutions, as one of the people to undertake the review. His independence and expertise will ensure a rigorous, impartial review. He will have the help and support of former assistant chief constable Owen Weatherill, who brings operational experience from his role with the National Police Chiefs’ Council as lead for civil contingencies and national mobilisation. That independent review reaffirms this Government’s ongoing commitment to keep public order legislation under review.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

I am sorry to intervene so late. Could the Minister please confirm whether the review led by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, will consider the issue I was raising, which was the incoherence and overlap between the various pieces of legislation on protest?

Overseas Musicians Touring in the UK

Lord Strasburger Excerpts

Tuesday 11th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

As I said in answer to earlier questions, the Government are looking at making movement as efficient and effective as possible for all concerned. On the CITES reforms, the Government are currently consulting with the musical sector and we remain committed to making touring as straight- forward and affordable as possible. The points on merchandise that my noble friend and the noble Baroness made are extremely valid. The Government and the European Union need to look at how we make that as frictionless as possible. That does not dilute the Brexit agreement, it simply makes sure that British and European businesses can operate at a profitable level and that we can support the very acts that my noble friend is concerned to support.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that the problem that caused this issue was not just Brexit but the bungled trade and co-operation agreement, which completely left out Britain’s second-largest economic sector—the creative industries? This does not affect just musicians, it affects dancers, theatre, fashion, and so on. Is it not now time for the Government to try to put right what was done badly at the time of Brexit?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

There were a lot of things done badly at the time of Brexit. The issue is—with due respect to everyone in this House—that we are where we are. Therefore, being where we are, the first step is to engage positively on a productive reset with the European Union on issues of benefit to it and benefit to us, which retain the spirit of where we were in 2019 and where we were in 2016, but which ultimately ensure that businesses—particularly, in this case, artists—do not find themselves victims of what was a hashed settlement in the first place.

Non-crime Hate Incidents

Lord Strasburger Excerpts

Monday 27th October 2025 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Strasburger]

To ask His Majesty’s Government whether they are reviewing the measures related to non-crime hate incidents.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper, and I remind the House that I chair Big Brother Watch.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

The College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council are currently undertaking a review of non-crime hate incidents, working closely with the Home Office. The Government look forward to receiving the final recommendations of this review shortly and to working with police forces to ensure they have the clarity they need to focus on keeping our communities safe while protecting the fundamental right to free speech.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

I thank the Minister for his reply. The non-crime hate incident regime is being prolifically exploited by malicious individuals targeting people who merely disagree with them. The police are required to believe the complainant, contrary to the presumption of innocence. The target of the complaint may never know that a hate incident has been logged and that their future applications for sensitive jobs and visas may fail as a result. Now the police are saying that they will no longer investigate such incidents but that they will continue to be recorded. Does the Minister agree that we must stop secretly recording as fact what is often no more than scurrilous allegation?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Again, I say to the noble Lord that there is a review. My right honourable friend the former Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, commissioned that review in December 2024 because, self-evidently, the non-crime hate incidents regime was not working effectively. Noble Lords who were in the House for the Second Reading of the Crime and Policing Bill will have heard the noble Lord, Lord Herbert, who chairs the College of Policing, examining that issue and saying that he would bring that review forward. There are a range of things that we need to do in the review. We should not lose sight of the fact that valuable information is gained by people reporting non-crime hate incidents, but equally we should not use it to pursue events which are fruitless when police should be focusing on real crimes.