Financial Services Bill
Lord Peston Excerpts(12 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Lord Speaker (Baroness D'Souza)
In calling Amendment 190AA, I must advise noble Lords that if this amendment is agreed to I shall not be able to call Amendment 190B by reason of pre-emption.
Lord Peston
My Lords, I hope that I have heard the gist of what the noble Baroness was trying to say. She ended by asking the fundamental question, which is not only what Clause 64 is here for but what this whole section of the Bill is here for. That is not very clear. If these powers had been enshrined in statute, are we to believe that the catastrophes of the recent past would not have occurred? Is that the purpose? I cannot believe that you do investigations to prevent a catastrophe occurring; what you do is intervene and stop it. This section must therefore be there simply to say, “Look, we made a mess of things, including ourselves as policymakers and regulators, so we’re setting up this inquiry to discover what we can learn from the mess that we’ve got ourselves involved with”. I take it that that is probably the answer to the noble Baroness’s question but, like her, I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say.
Lord Barnett
As I originally put down the first “may” or “must” group of amendments, together with my noble friend Lord Peston, I have some sympathy with the noble Baroness. We were told by the Minister—I forget whether it was on the sixth, seventh or eighth day—that he had asked his officials to go through the whole Bill for the mays and musts to see which were appropriate. Knowing Treasury officials, I am sure that they will have come back with something to say whether they thought a “may” should be changed to a “must”. Was this group included in that? Perhaps the Minister could tell us. It looks as though the noble Baroness is quite right and that this is one of those occasions where the word should be “must”. I would welcome the Minister’s reply. My own experience of the thinking of Treasury officials goes back too far for me to be sure, as I last took advice from Treasury officials more than 30 years ago and I may have forgotten a bit about how they operate. However, I am sure that they are still as good today as they were then, and I would welcome the Minister telling us what they came back with to his request.
Lord Sassoon
I believe that that is the case. If it is not, I will clarify things as I reply to my noble friend Lady Noakes.
Lord Peston
My Lords, I did not catch the last few words that the Minister said before the noble Baroness asked her question. I thought he said that if the Bill is enacted, this part would enable the Treasury to set up inquiries into what happened in the past few years. Did he actually say that?
Lord Sassoon
In so many terms, yes. In reply to my noble friend’s question about the repeal of Section 14 of FiSMA, I wanted to make it clear that a gap is not left in the Treasury’s ability to arrange inquiries into events, even though they might be ones that predate the coming into force of the Bill.
Lord Peston
The provision would then become much more significant. If we pass this Bill into law and it becomes an Act then the disasters of the past few years could be inquired into by a major independent committee, which might tell us who were the real architects of the disaster and where policy failed. If the Bill is to enable that to happen—and it seems to me overwhelmingly that it must happen—then we really do need the word “must” in this case.
Lord Sassoon
I will get there eventually. If the Committee will permit me, I will address the point. I will not necessarily give complete satisfaction but we will get there.
The Bill makes a number of provisions that are intended to deliver greater accountability and carries forward the power of the Treasury to arrange independent inquiries into regulatory failures. It also provides for new duties on the two authorities to carry out investigations of their own—if necessary, at the instigation of the Treasury—and report their findings to the Treasury where there has been regulatory failure and certain other criteria are met.
I turn first to Amendments 190B and 192ZA, which probe why, if the public interest test is met, the Bill provides that the Treasury “may” require an inquiry. By changing “may” to “must”, their intended effect—as we have heard—is that in all cases where the test is met, the Treasury should have to require an inquiry. Amendment 190AA achieves the same end by a different means, specifying that the Treasury must arrange an inquiry where the two conditions in Clause 64 are met unless there is a public interest in not doing so. I agree with my noble friend that, if there is an overwhelming public interest in having an independent inquiry or in the regulator carrying out an investigation, the Treasury should step in to ensure that that happens. As it stands, the Bill gives the Treasury a little bit of discretion here. This is not about wriggling out of the need to call for an inquiry; it simply acknowledges that in reality, circumstances may dictate that even though the test is met, an inquiry or an investigation under this Bill is not necessarily the best course of action.
For example, there may already be an alternative independent inquiry going on—perhaps a parliamentary commission or other parliamentary inquiry—or an inquiry under the Inquiries Act. In the case of the provisions relating to investigations carried on by the regulator, the regulator itself may already be carrying on an investigation under Clauses 69 or 70. However, as my noble friend is aware, and as the noble Lord, Lord Barnett, has reminded us, I have already confirmed that I am giving careful thought to the wider use of “may” and “must” throughout the Bill. This is a huge exercise, taking up some mighty brains. All I would say at this stage is that although there are certainly not many cases that deserve intense scrutiny, this is certainly one of the instances that merit serious consideration. I will leave it at that. We will come back if we find any suitable candidates for changing.
Amendment 193 to Clause 79 seeks to place an explicit duty on the regulators to ensure that when a complaint against a regulator needs to be investigated, they appoint an investigator who is suitably qualified and experienced. This amendment is not necessary; it has also not been spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord McFall of Alcluith, so I will leave it at that. I shall turn to Amendments 192ZZA, 192ZZB and 192C.
Viscount Trenchard
My Lords, I, too, support my noble friend's amendment. I apologise for going back to the regulatory principles, but I continue to believe that it is a huge pity that the regulatory principles, by which both the PRA and the FCA are bound to operate, do not contain, to my mind, the very necessary principle that they should have regard to maintaining the competitiveness of the marketplace on which the United Kingdom depends so much for tax revenues, for prosperity, for employment and for all kinds of things.
I also speak with the experience of having been a member of the executive committee of a regulated firm for several dark years. I can assure the House that at least 90% of the time of an executive committee is spent discussing how to respond to regulators. There is a real fear of increased supervision and a more intrusive approach and, nowadays, many firms spend very little time talking about how to develop and to expand the business in order to provide further employment and earn more money so that the business can be consolidated and maintained in London. In the absence of, to my mind, such necessary principles, which ought to be there and by which the new regulators ought to have to abide, it is more necessary than it otherwise would have been that the regulators should act, as my noble friend’s amendment suggests and requires, “proportionately, reasonably and fairly”. I wholly support the amendment and I look forward to hearing the comments of the Minister.
Lord Peston
We are indebted to the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, for raising these matters, although we discussed similar matters last week under the guidance of the noble Lord, Lord Flight, and my noble friend Lady Hayter. The central question here is our fear—fear in the relevant sector as well—that the regulators damage our financial services sector rather than improve its performance. I think that is the theme that lies behind these matters. I have two questions, but I am bad at reading amendments, so I want to be certain about them. Presumably the new subsection proposed in Amendment 192A would come before subsections (1) to (7) in Clause 74. Am I right that it would be the lead-in?
Lord Peston
It would establish the principle which everything else must follow. That is fine; I understand what the noble Lord is saying. That leads me to ask two central questions. In Clause 73, and I think in something similar earlier, subsection (2) refers to “Relevant events” that occur in relation to,
“(b) a person who is, or was at the time … carrying on a regulated activity”.
What worries me as a matter of logic is whether we will end up with the regulator having to investigate him or herself. If these people have not met the standards, who is responsible? They are partly, of course, but this would also be an indication of regulator failure. To my way of looking at it, we have a part of the Bill that is totally bizarre. From a logical point of view, the answer to the question “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?” is that the regulator is the custodes himself, if you like. I would certainly welcome an analysis from the Minister in his reply which shows that we are not seriously involved in a logical contradiction here.
My second question is whether the fact of an investigation of the kind we are discussing is to be in the public domain. In other words, will it be publicly known that the regulator is investigating one of the things going on here? It may be that I have not read it properly, but is not that itself potentially enormously damaging, again a point that was raised last week? I should like the answer to these two questions. It may be that Treasury officials will have to do a bit of thinking about this part of the Bill when they are not thinking about the logical nature of “may” versus “must”. As I have pointed out before, there is a vast philosophical literature on this. How much of it they will have time to read, I do not know. However, the central point is to get a rational response to the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson.
Lord Davies of Oldham
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, for identifying this issue, but I must say that if noble Lords opposite do not think that the nation is expecting a Bill and eventually an Act of Parliament that tightens up regulation in the wake of the circumstances we suffered four to five years ago, then all I can say is that such a position is not tenable. The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, is indicating that the principles of the regulator should be expressed in these terms. Who can be against the principles of fairness? Of course we want and expect the regulators to act fairly, but let us remember that they may be acting under a direction from the Treasury because something has gone wrong. The idea that the first thing the regulator must do is consider the principles on which it must act rather than in fact investigate the nature of the problem, as it has been instructed by the Treasury to do, seems to put the cart very firmly before the horse.
In responding to this amendment, I am sure that the Minister will have some warm words for his noble friends who have spoken in favour of the amendments, but I hope that he will defend the basic objective of the Bill. I shall give way to the noble Lord.
Lord Newby
My Lords, I will start by giving the Government’s response to the first of these two amendments, and then come to the specific points that have been raised by a number of noble Lords.
As noble Lords have pointed out, Clause 74 provides in some detail how investigations should be conducted in order to deliver transparency and confidence, which, as I think everybody agrees, well conducted and appropriate inquiries should bring about. Amendment 192A seeks to add to these requirements by setting out that,
“the regulator must have regard to its regulatory principles”
in carrying out these inquiries, and to act proportionately, reasonably and fairly. I agree that high standards of conduct should apply as much to the conduct of an investigation as to the regulator’s normal regulatory work, but the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, will probably not be totally surprised when I say that there are two reasons why the amendment is not necessary.
First, on proportionality, we do not believe that it is necessary to put this in the Bill again because the regulator already has to have regard to the regulatory principles in exercising its general functions, and the regulatory principles include proportionality, under proposed new Section 3B. Proportionality is already built in to the way that the regulator does everything so we do not think it is necessary here.
Secondly, as the noble Lord has set out, and we have set out before, public law already requires regulators to act reasonably, and the principles of natural justice require the regulator to deliver procedural fairness. The noble Lord talked about the problem of judicial review. I think everybody agrees that if you have to initiate a judicial review, this is an extremely expensive, long, drawn-out process, but if the noble Lord’s amendment was accepted, my understanding is—I may be wrong—that if the regulator were to be challenged it would be under a judicial review anyway, so the same problem would arise. The noble Lord, Lord Flight, said that this amendment was a question of belt and braces. We agree, but in legislation you do not need belt and braces—you need a good belt or good braces, and we think we have got that.
The other thing that is possibly slightly confusing is that the investigations we are talking about in this part of the Bill are investigations into regulatory failure rather than the conduct of firms. The noble Lord, Lord Peston, asked whether an investigation would come into the public domain. The real concern, which we have debated before, relates to the conduct of business of a company—has it been misbehaving?—which is different from the issue of regulatory failure, which is what Clause 74 deals with.
Lord Peston
The noble Lord did say that this will be an investigation into regulatory failure. Therefore, the investigator is investigating himself or herself. After all, who has failed? It is the regulator.
Lord Newby
My Lords, we come to the noble Lord’s point which concerns Clause 73(2)(b). The architecture is that the regulator will look at the failure of firms and regulatory failure. We have seen this with the work the FSA did on RBS. It produced a comprehensive report on what it saw as regulatory failure. Although there were arguments about what would or would not be published, in terms of whether the regulator did a good job and whether it is capable of doing so, the answer we would draw from that investigation is that it did do quite a good job. There will be many cases when it is appropriate for the regulator to look back at what has happened in the past—
Lord Peston
I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord, but I am trying to get some sense of reality about this. It is the Treasury that considers that something needs to be done. Therefore, the Treasury must suspect something. Where, for example, does the Treasury get its information from, for it to feel that it has to issue this directive? What does the Treasury know that the regulator did not? Then it tells the regulator to look at something because it observes regulatory failure. The whole thing seems to be an intellectual mess. That is my point. It is not necessarily the point that was made by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson. Like my noble friend Lord Davies, I am keen to have a powerful and effective regulatory system. I am also keen that we do not have a botch of a regulatory system. What we have said on the previous two Committee days on the Bill is that we think quite a few aspects of this are a botched job. Is that going too far in criticising? I do not think so.
Lord Newby
My Lords, the noble Lord asks a number of questions. First, why might the Treasury have a role and why is the regulator not doing it already? There may be a number of occasions when the Treasury first gets information from somebody and wants to tell the regulator. There are some occasions when the Treasury might want to prod the regulator into action. I have been critical of occasions when I felt the regulator has not moved as quickly as I would have liked in undertaking investigations. This part of the Bill enables the Treasury to give it a kick if it is needed. The other point, which is a valid point, is that if there is a really serious problem of regulatory failure, this is not the only way in which the Treasury can make sure that an investigation is undertaken. The Treasury can appoint any kind of investigator that it wants. This part of the Bill simply explains how the Treasury operates and the rules which apply if there is a lesser regulatory failure which probably happened some time in the past, where it seems appropriate for the regulator to have a look. I understand the noble Lord’s concerns, but he should not be as worried as he is.
I will respond to the second amendment in this group, which we have not debated at great length. It seeks to add to the grounds on which the regulator may decide to postpone or suspend an investigation if the investigation did not meet the principles by which the investigator must abide. Unlike with the previous amendment, where we agree with what the noble Lord seeks to achieve but do not think that he needs to have his belt and braces, we think that this amendment could have perverse and unexpected effects by enabling the regulator to stop an investigation for any reason it wanted. For example, it could realise that an investigation was going to be very time-consuming and burdensome, perhaps because of the level of detail involved. Under this proposal, it could end an investigation and argue that it was doing so because the investigation breached its principle on economic and efficient use of resource. For those reasons, we cannot support that amendment.
A number of noble Lords, including the noble Lords, Lord Hodgson and Lord Flight, expressed broader concerns about the FSA and the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, quoted Lex in aid of that. The noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, and the noble Lord, Lord Peston, said that the FCA should have regard to competitiveness. These are broader issues that go beyond the scope of the amendments, but on the concerns expressed by Lex, I can understand why people are at this stage worrying about whether the balance that the regulators strike between the interests of the firms and those of the consumers of their products is right. We are pretty confident that it will be. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, pointed out that it is important that the regulators are rigorous and balance the interests of the firms and those of their consumers. The way in which the Bill is structured should enable them to do that and we are confident that they have that very much in mind.
Competitiveness has been debated previously and we have already agreed that we will look at this issue, particularly the degree to which the PRA and FCA should have regard to the importance of economic growth. We have said that we will return with further amendments in this area on Report, when we will no doubt have an extremely interesting debate on them. For today, however, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, will decide not to press his amendments.
Lord Sassoon
No, my Lords. I have already answered these questions. I know of no crisis. However, we would be remiss if, having identified a sensible, consulted-on extension of the regime that came in under the Banking Act 2009 to cover these other, systemically important parts of the system, we did not act. If we left even a few months, having identified what needed to be done, we would be open to very heavy criticism as a House and as a Government. Now is not the time to discuss the ins and outs of the banking reform that is proposed. However, it is certainly not the case that—as the noble Lord, Lord Barnett, put it—investment firms and banks will be in separate groups. They will not be.
As I say, if the detail of the resolution arrangements changes, then of course these clauses can be amended to take account of the new structure. We have future-proofed them as far as we can, in the sense that my noble friend, quite rightly, talks about the European approach. As I said last week but will say again, of course we are going to remain fully consistent with the European approach to these matters and indeed we are actively taking part in shaping it. The fact that we have a worked-out solution ahead of others in Europe itself puts us in a very good position to influence things, and the legislation—the proposals that we are introducing and considering today—is consistent with what is set out in the Financial Stability Board’s document on key attributes for an effective resolution regime. We have taken every possible step to ensure consistency with Europe.
Lord Peston
I am sorry to interrupt the Minister but I want to ensure that noble Lords understand what he is saying. He is saying that the Treasury has discovered two problems that can be dealt with rapidly by mending the Banking Act 2009 and he is therefore using this Bill, which is not specifically about banking, as a convenient vehicle to put those into law. That is the result of the Treasury's work; it has found those two things and feels that it ought to act rapidly. I also therefore infer, validly, that the Treasury has not found any other changes that need to be made rapidly and could well have been dumped in this Bill as well—just these. That is my interpretation—that they have found these two and we must get a move on. Am I right?
Lord Sassoon
First, my Lords, these clauses fall properly in the Bill because essentially we are giving powers to the Bank of England to resolve things. I would not like to leave the thought that we were somehow using the Bill as a Christmas tree to add on other unrelated things; this is definitely related to the purpose of the Bill because we are talking about the powers of the authorities.
Secondly, the noble Lord, Lord Peston, could be mistaken for giving the impression that somehow we just discovered these things last week or last month. As I have already said, very important new powers were put in place in the Banking Act 2009. Over a period it was then, partly after seeing the collapse of other investment firms and partly by talking to the market, a consultation process, so this is not something that has just emerged. In this area, we have nothing else up the Treasury’s sleeve, as it were. If anyone identifies any other gaps in the regime, of course we will consult on them and do all the proper things that Parliament would expect us to do.
That leaves one area that my noble friend Lord Flight asked about: the doctrine of “lender of last resort”. Fascinating and important though it is, I am reluctant to get into this area because it does not directly impact on where the lender of last resort doctrine, as he puts it, has now got to. It was the Banking Act 2009 that made sure that the authorities, including the Bank, had the full suite of powers. The Bill further improves those tools and clarifies responsibilities, but of course it does not alter the basic premise that the Bank will continue to be the lender of last resort to the banking sector and to the resolution authority for a variety of firms. As for the precise doctrine of how they operate, that is a matter for the Bank of England and should remain so. I recognise that that is clearly called into question by the events in 2007 and 2008, but I assure my noble friend that it is not affected by the substance of the clauses that we are discussing today.
Infrastructure (Financial Assistance) Bill
Lord Peston Excerpts(12 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Newby
I hope that my speech will answer the noble Lord’s question adequately.
Firms will have access to the communications and transport networks that they need, wherever in the UK they happen to be, enabling Britain to compete on the world stage.
Our national infrastructure plan published last November sets out an ambitious but credible roadmap to deliver on that vision—a pipeline of upcoming investment worth £257 billion in crucial large-scale projects, of which more than two-thirds will typically be financed and delivered by the private sector.
A number of key infrastructure projects close to starting construction are being delayed because of the difficulties they face in securing the finance and investment required, and the housing market continues to suffer from an undersupply of homes to meet the UK’s demographic needs. Even under favourable credit conditions, raising the amount of private finance required to deliver these projects and to meet our overall infrastructure investment goals would be a challenge. However, the disruption caused by the instability of international financial markets and the adverse effect that this is having on long-term debt provision have not abated. Proactive, decisive action by the Government is therefore needed now. The Bill will allow us to take that action and will bring forward the investment needed.
The principal aim of the Bill is to make investment in major infrastructure and housing schemes possible. The Government have agreed in principle, subject to strict approvals criteria, to make financial support available to infrastructure projects using the strength and credibility of our balance sheet to support the investment that we need.
Through this Bill, guarantees provided by the Government will help to ensure that where projects are struggling to access private finance due to adverse credit conditions, these projects can now go ahead. It authorises the Treasury and, where appropriate, other Secretaries of State to incur expenditure necessary for providing financial assistance.
The Bill will allow the Government to support crucial investment in key areas of economic and public service infrastructure: utilities, such as energy and telecommunications; transport, such as railways and roads; infrastructure to provide public services, such as hospitals and schools; and housing development to deliver much-needed homes.
The Treasury estimates that up to £40 billion of investment in infrastructure and an additional £10 billion in housing investment could be accelerated under the guarantee schemes using the powers in the Bill. Importantly, we will put in place strict guidelines and eligibility criteria for the schemes to protect the taxpayer and ensure that the Exchequer does not take on unacceptable fiscal risks.
Any proposal that receives a guarantee from Infrastructure UK will as a minimum have satisfied the following requirements. It must be nationally and/or economically significant; financially credible; good value for money for the taxpayer; not solely dependent on a guarantee to proceed; and ready to start construction within 12 months. Any proposal that receives a housing guarantee from the Department for Communities and Local Government will, as a minimum, need to deliver an agreed number of new homes; undergo an investment appraisal and full due diligence and be subject to ongoing monitoring requirements; meet a risk capital contribution at the outset; and provide recourse to the secured housing assets.
Since the projects that we expect to back will be structured to minimise the potential losses to the Exchequer, there will be minimal impact on public sector net borrowing as a result. The exception is under the extreme circumstances that a guarantee is called upon or other forms of financial assistance are provided, but we expect such circumstances to be rare. Furthermore, the Government will levy a commercial charge. This will cover the services received by infrastructure providers and beneficiaries of the private rented sector housing guarantee. It will ensure that companies pay a fair price for the benefits that they receive, and that taxpayers receive a fair price for any risk being taken. It will also ensure that schemes do not fall foul of EU state aid rules.
The Bill raises a number of questions. The first and most fundamental is: will it work? Is there any evidence that the guarantee being offered will really facilitate the speeding up of infrastructure projects? There is already substantial evidence that it will. Infrastructure UK has received some 60 enquiries from projects that might qualify, and more are expected. There is also strong interest across the housing sector. Negotiations on these projects are ongoing so it would be inappropriate at this point to run down a list but, as an example of the kind of thing that is likely to benefit, we have indicated that the Crossrail rolling stock and depot services procurement meets the eligibility criteria.
A number of people have asked why the Bill is necessary at all. Can the Government not already do this kind of thing without explicit legislative cover? The Treasury and Secretaries of State already have common-law powers to make guarantees, make loans and give other financial assistance. In addition, some Secretaries of State have express statutory powers to support infrastructure. However, the Treasury does not have the authority to incur expenditure in relation to guarantees on the scale that I have outlined. Moreover, there is a longstanding convention—
Lord Peston
The noble Lord was kind enough when I asked him why we needed a Bill to point me to an answer given in the other place, which I have to tell him I found completely incomprehensible. I am still stuck. Will he say in terms that we need a Bill because of the scale of the operations? Is he willing to place on record that that is the point and it is the size of the operations which requires legislation? I find that very odd but at least I would like to hear him say it.
Lord Newby
It is partly the scale of the operations and the length of the guarantees, and also because the current rules have gaps in them, as I understand them, or there are certain parts of the whole infrastructure world, as it were, that are not covered by the existing rules. To finish my sentence, there is a longstanding convention known as “Baldwin cover”, dating back to 1932, that Governments should not rest significant and regular expenditure under common-law powers on the sole authority of general supply legislation. That is the noble Lord’s point. It is significant and regular guarantees, not expenditure, that could have a very long period of operation.
Questions have also been raised about what kinds of project can potentially be covered by this legislation. In particular, the Institution of Civil Engineers has asked about what constitutes a nationally significant project—a phrase that does not appear in the Bill but did appear in last year’s national infrastructure plan. I should make it clear that projects that could potentially benefit from this Bill are not limited to the nationally significant projects identified in the national infrastructure plan. In addition to the areas covered by the plan, we will be prepared, for example, to look at waste management and university projects that are economically viable and simply want for finance. As to the scale of project that can potentially benefit, again there is considerable flexibility. A project does not necessarily have to be valued at several hundred millions of pounds to be considered.
The Bill is one part of the Government’s overall approach to ensuring that the United Kingdom invests in the infrastructure that it needs for the future. I look forward to our debate today and I commend the Bill to the House. I beg to move.
Lord Skidelsky
My Lords, as someone who has never been averse to having a go at the Chancellor of the Exchequer, I start by saying how idiotic and puerile it is for newspapers to make a lead story of which ticket he used for his journey from Chester to London. It is George Osborne’s stewardship of the economy, not his travel arrangements, which deserves censure. However, we have an infantile press.
Three big mistakes stick out over the past two and a half years. The first was the belief that cutting down government spending would automatically produce recovery. I know the Government now claim that they never believed anything so simple or idiotic, but they did, and there is plenty of evidence to prove it. Austerity is not a recovery policy.
The second has been the Chancellor’s failure to distinguish between current and capital spending. This has made the deficit seem more dangerous than it was. The prime example of this blind spot was the £50 billion cut in capital spending. The noble Lord, Lord Adonis, has drawn attention to the devastating consequences of this for the construction industry and for house, transport, education and hospital building.
The third was the Chancellor’s belief that without a severe fiscal contraction Britain would go the way of Greece: that is, interest rates would go through the roof. This was doubly wrong. First, with an independent central bank able to buy government debt in whatever quantities were needed there was never any chance of gilt yields rising to the levels experienced by Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain. Secondly, and perhaps even more importantly, a reduction in the cost of government borrowing is no guarantee of a reduction in the cost of commercial loans sufficient to offset the collapse of the private demand for loans. That is the explanation of a point mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Desai, regarding cash mountains sitting in corporations.
All three mistakes were interrelated parts of the wrong theory of the economy. Anyone who is interested in economics must start the analysis there. I am not going to go into it, but it is well known to those who are economically literate. The results have been zero growth since George Osborne took office. That was entirely predictable and was predicted by some of us. I have been saying for two and a half years—and I am not alone—that austerity would not produce growth and it has not produced growth. Now the international agencies are saying the same thing. Slowly but surely, the Government are being driven to plan B, though the Prime Minister prefers to call it plan A-plus.
It is against that background that I give a cautious welcome to the proposals in this Bill. Better late than never, better too little than nothing at all. As I understand it, the Bill aims to do three things. First, it provides for the Government to guarantee up to £40 billion or £50 billion of “nationally significant” private infrastructure investments which have to be ready to start within 12 months of the guarantee. As the Treasury explains it, the aim is,
“to kick start critical infrastructure projects that may have stalled because of adverse credit conditions”.
That is Treasury language. The guarantees might cover key project risks such as construction, performance or revenue.
Secondly, the Government will lend money directly to private investors to enable 30 public/private partnership projects worth £6 billion to go ahead in the next 12 months; I do not think that has been mentioned yet in the debate. Finally, a £5 billion export financing facility will be available later this year to overseas buyers of British capital goods; in other words, an export credit guarantee scheme of the type we are all familiar with. I would like to reinforce what the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, said. Having cancelled about £50 billion of certain public capital spending, the Government are hoping to replace it with an equivalent amount of private capital spending, much of which will never happen. That is completely illogical.
The main difference between this Bill and the British investment bank, which I have been urging, is that my bank—I call it “my bank” because I feel a certain sense of paternity in the idea, having been floating it for the last three years—would actively raise money in the private markets for its own investment projects whereas UK Guarantees, the government scheme, merely provides some finance for projects initiated by the private sector. In other words, the government scheme is still governed by the ideology that the private sector is more likely to pick winners than a state investment bank and that that is sufficient justification for waiting for the private sector to produce its projects.
Lord Peston
My Lords, the logic of what is being said is not that it is more likely to pick winners but that it already has all those winners. The only things holding them back are the risks of the projects which the taxpayer is taking over. It is a new theory to replace classical economics which—as the noble Lord well knows—says savings cause investment. Now we have loan guarantees causing investment and it is just as nonsensical as a serious piece of economics.
Lord Skidelsky
The noble Lord is quite right. The argument can be developed, but my point about picking winners and losers is that there is no empirical evidence for it being true, as a general proposition, that the state is more likely to pick losers than the private sector. We have had many examples of that not being true. The economic collapse of 2008 is a very good one.
Financial Regulators: Examinations
Lord Peston Excerpts(12 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, I certainly do not agree with my noble friend’s conclusion on this. As he well knows, one of the conclusions of the retail distribution review was that the role of financial adviser should be properly professionalised. I have seen comparisons being made between the professionalisation of financial advisers and of lawyers and accountants. Although these are matters of judgment for the FSA, the authority deems it appropriate that exams should play a part in this. I understand from the FSA that the final rules setting out the new qualification requirements were made in January 2011, two years before the requirements are to come in. On top of that, an indicative list of level 4 qualifications has been available since the end of 2009. The FSA’s research shows that, up to the spring of 2012, 71% of advisers had already qualified, and the expectation is that 93% are on track to secure the appropriate qualification in time. The final point I would make to my noble friend—again, I am sure that he is aware of it—is that, as well as taking examinations, financial advisers also have the option of an alternative assessment procedure.
Lord Peston
My Lords, having spent a great many hours with the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Flight, and others on the Financial Services Bill, perhaps I may ask the Minister whether he will remind the House of the enormous power being given to the financial regulators. I have been looking into it. It may be that never in the history of our country has anyone had the regulatory power that these people have. It is a power either to do good, of course, or to get a lot of things wrong, to the benefit of our chief competitors in Frankfurt and Wall Street. Surely the Government must take a much more positive view of what sort of people are working for financial regulators and themselves take some responsibility to see that they are people with a broad range of experience who do not wish to see our financial services sector destroyed?
Financial Services Bill
Lord Peston Excerpts(12 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Noakes
My Lords, Amendment 190ZE is in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord McFall of Alcluith. This represents the last of the amendments in our joint names which respond to the first report of this Session by the Treasury Select Committee in another place.
Clause 57 provides a welcome power of direction that enables the Treasury to direct the Bank of England when public funds are at risk. The Treasury Select Committee initially recommended that such a power be created when the Bank notified the Treasury that there was a material risk to public funds. The committee regarded such a power of direction as a necessary corollary of the leading role of the Chancellor in any financial crisis. Unfortunately, the Bank of England sought to water this down to a power of direction operating only in relation to certain instruments of crisis management. Even more unfortunately, the Government have sided with the Bank and have restricted the power of direction to the three areas listed in Clause 57(2).
The Treasury Select Committee remains unhappy with this and believes that if the legislation is to stand the test of time, it should not be restricted to the specific tools listed in subsection (2) but should be capable of being exercised in relation to tools not currently considered appropriate; for example, those tools that would be available to the Financial Policy Committee or other tools that have not yet been developed. The Treasury Select Committee believes that this power should be broader and future-proofed.
Amendment 190ZE seeks to achieve this by saying that the direction can relate to any of the powers or functions of the Bank of England, leaving the three specified tools as a non-exclusive list of such powers.
I am told that the House could not hear me in my previous position so I have moved.
Baroness Noakes
This is a probing amendment for today, not least because I think that it is too wide. For example, it would allow the Treasury to direct the Bank in relation to monetary policy functions, which would not be appropriate. Section 4 of the Bank of England Act 1946, which took the Bank into public ownership, has a general power of direction, which puts monetary policy out of scope. I believe that any Clause 57 power should similarly be constrained but I cannot see that there needs to be any further restriction on the Treasury’s power of direction when public money is at stake.
When my noble friend the Minister replies, can he also explain the relationship between the 1946 Act’s power of direction and the new powers of direction in Clause 57? The 1946 version is very broad and, monetary policy apart, seems to cover everything that is in Clause 57, and more. I do not believe that the 1946 Act power is being repealed or otherwise amended in this Bill, so I am puzzled as to the relationship.
I am aware that general powers of direction have rarely been used in practice, because their force lies mainly in the threat of their use rather than their actual deployment, but I hope that my noble friend the Minister can say what effect Clause 57 has on the existing power of direction. I beg to move.
Lord Peston
My Lords, this is a most interesting amendment, which enables us to clarify one or two aspects of the Bill. I literally did not hear the first part of what the noble Baroness was saying, so I was not joking when I suggested that she started again and she may well need to repeat what she said at the beginning.
This amendment brings into focus the relative power of the Bank of England in the areas that the Treasury is concerned with. This has worried quite a few of us throughout the proceedings on the Bill. To put it too simply, the question that emerges is: who really is in charge of the stabilisation process? Before I press that a little bit further, I take it that when in this part of the Bill we are talking about stabilisation powers, we are restricting ourselves to stabilisation powers within the financial services sector and not discussing a subject to which I have devoted most of my academic life; namely, powers to stabilise the whole economy—or, if people had followed my advice, probably destabilise the whole economy. We are not discussing the general question of the theory of economic stabilisation here. We are discussing just stabilisation.
Can the Minister throw some light on the simple question here? Who really is in charge? The noble Baroness includes in her amendment “not limited to”. However, unless this was part of what I did not hear, I do not think she said what else she had in mind that might then arise if it was not limited to these things. It may well be that she did say it and I missed or it may well be that she would like to say it now.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, is getting ahead of me. That was precisely what I was going on to explain. He is absolutely right that the power has never been used. Even at the height of the recent financial crisis, the then Chancellor felt unable to use this power to direct the Bank. Indeed, Alistair Darling’s book is rather interesting on this point. He explains in it that he was told,
“that it might be legally possible”,
to direct the Bank, but that,
“there would be wider implications of such an action. We had set great store by making the Bank independent and a public row between myself and Mervyn would have been disastrous, particularly at this time”.
The 1946 Act direction power is considered, and was considered by a Chancellor very recently, to be such a nuclear option because it is so broad that it would be very difficult to use. This means that any use of the power would likely be interpreted as the Chancellor overruling decisions and judgments that should rightly be for the Bank. This would be seen as a direct challenge to the Bank’s independence and a judgment on the competence of the Bank’s senior executives, which could cause a crisis in leadership in the Bank and a serious loss of public confidence. That line of thinking has prevented Chancellors from using the 1946 Act power in the past, as the fallout could be more damaging than the situation that they might be trying directly to address.
That risk was recognised by the Treasury Committee. That is why their report recommended that,
“the Chancellor should be granted a power to direct the Bank in a crisis which is free of the problems associated with the power under the 1946 Act”.
That is why the new power of direction in Clause 57 is designed to be a targeted and usable power. There will still be the power in the 1946 Act, for the reasons that underlie what my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, said. It is probably worth maintaining that reserve power somewhere in the system, albeit with the caveat that it is difficult to see the situation in which it might be exercised.
On the other hand, and going to the heart of who is in charge and who is responsible for what is in the new system, it was muddled and confused under the tripartite system but we want to make it much clearer in the new system that the Chancellor and the Treasury are principally there as guardians of public funds. That is why the specific direction in Clause 57 is designed that way. It is targeted. It does not allow the Treasury to overrule the Bank’s decisions and judgments; it allows the Treasury to take the decisions that are rightly for the Government to take. It is designed to allow the Chancellor to intervene to require the Bank to take specific action in a crisis management situation where public funds are at risk. That is why the power covers only the Bank’s crisis management functions, specifically the provision of liquidity and the operation of the special resolution regime. Again, I hope that that helps the noble Lord, Lord Peston, with the intended scope of this.
Lord Peston
My Lords, the noble Lord has clarified that very well. I take it that there would still be, as happens all the time, informal meetings between the Chancellor and the Governor, where the Chancellor might say, “Well, it is your decision but I am a bit worried about this or that”. Nothing will infringe on that because, as the noble Lord well knows, no system can work without informal and off the record meetings and things of that sort. This will not get in the way of what one might call ordinary human behaviour.
Lord Sassoon
No, indeed. The next time, in another context, the noble Lord challenges me about why we are not disclosing more meetings, I shall remember what he just said about informal and confidential meetings. It is important that they happen. Having seen how things happened before and how they happen now, it is striking to see the much greater regularity of meetings between the principals—they are critical—than happened at some periods in the past. That is very important as a background in peacetime as well as in crisis time.
I hope that is clear. The Bank is in charge of operating the resolution regime, but the Chancellor must agree to any use of public funds and has the final say when they are used. Even setting aside the unintended drafting of Amendment 190ZE to include a power that would be even more widely drawn than the 1946 Act, the targeted power that we have drawn is the appropriate one. If we had drawn the power more widely to allow for future proofing, as my noble friend puts it, I would be standing here defending why we had left such an important area open in the Bill. It is better to draft such a power related to the system as we know it. It is broadly future proofed in the sense that there is a clear distinction between the use of public funds and other matters, and after that helpful debate I hope that my noble friend will withdraw her amendment.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, although I believe that we are allowed to use portable electronic devices in the Chamber, I cannot in 30 seconds find it. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Barnett, that it is done on either a quarterly or six-monthly basis. I do not know whether the search was made on the OBR website or the Treasury website, but my recollection is that the OBR releases something on its website periodically. I will find the appropriate link and let the noble Lords have it.
Lord Peston
I understood him to say the other day that it was on the Treasury website and I wasted three-quarters of an hour this morning. There is lots of good stuff on it. You can spend a happy day searching the Treasury website, but it did not contain anything that the Minister had told us it did contain. We can leave it at that.
Lord Sassoon
I apologise if I directed people to the wrong website. I will find the right one, which I think might be the OBR’s own website.
Lord Tunnicliffe
I think that some of what the Minister has just said is quite a shift from what Clause 54 says. I would be delighted if he came forward on Report with some amendments that contained a duty to look at scenarios and a duty to bring forward a notification at the point of a possibility. There has been considerable debate in another place and in various committees, as to what “a material risk” means. There is a commitment in Clause 61 that it must be in the MoU, but as I search the MoU I cannot find it coming readily out to me—I shall be asking about that later. I invite the Minister to consider what he has said and see whether he can improve the legislation so that there will be no ambiguity about the test that the Bank has to apply in bringing forward a notification.
Lord Peston
My Lords, perhaps I can help the Minister—it is not a question of persuading him to say yes or no at the moment. Looking at Clause 54, I take “material risk” to mean a significant probability; “possible” is much less than that. I think that my noble friend suggests in his amendment that Clause 54 would be strengthened if we went down the “possible” line, the technical point being—and I do not press it—that there is deep philosophical argument, particularly within probability theory, about the difference between possible and probable.
I interpret the amendment to mean that if the relevant body—whether the Bank of England or another regulator—is looking at a specific part of the financial services sector, or even a specific firm within it, it should let the Government know that it is doing so and that one definitely possible outcome is a need for the use of public funds. The amendment, as I understand it, is simply an attempt to be helpful to HMG when it comes to the control of public money. The Minister may say, “We do not want to know about possibles; we only want to know when the real demand for the money is coming”. That may be his argument, but that is the difference—am I not right?—as to what we are talking about here.
Lord Sassoon
Perhaps I did not make sufficiently clear the rather obvious point that we need to look at the heading of Clause 54, “Duty of Bank to notify Treasury of possible need for public funds”. At the risk of stating the obvious—it seems that we need to come back to the obvious—this whole duty is about the notification of a possible need for public funds. If we wanted to say “probable need for public funds”, the Bill would say “probable” in the clause heading, but it does not, it says “possible”. I advise the noble Lord that we are looking at the heading of Clause 54 in part 4 on page 134 of the Bill.
Lord Peston
Forgive me. I am willing to accept that I am wrong. I agree that the top line says “possible” but “material risk” is what goes into the material section of the Bill. That seems to me to undermine the clause heading. That seems to me the real point. Why have the Government put in “material risk” if they meant possible risk?
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, there are some points where, frankly, I have to take the advice of the legal experts here, which I have done. Frequently Bills, this one included, contain constructions which follow some sort of drafting formula and are sometimes difficult to understand. As I say, my starting point is that if I really thought that the Treasury was not going to get the sort of early warning which the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, and the Treasury Committee rightly ask for, I would propose a government amendment. I take the point that “possible” appears in a heading and not in Clause 54(1) but it is very clear from the heading that we are talking about the material risk in the context of the possible need for public funds. I assure the Committee that all the advice that I have been given is to the effect that this will achieve the purpose that the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, desires. Finally, I draw the noble Lord’s attention to paragraph 13 of the draft MoU to find the interaction between the MoU and these issues. On the basis of those explanations, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Financial Services Bill
Lord Peston Excerpts(12 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Tunnicliffe
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his introduction to the total package of measures to which the amendments relate and for his explanation of specific amendments. The way in which the amendments have been grouped means that a substantial part of the detail of the overall package will be debated in two working days. Accordingly, we will look at the detail during that period and respond then. The results of the consultation are being published today. Only when we have carefully looked at those will we make a detailed response. At a general level, we welcome the bringing of these financial institutions into the resolution regime.
Lord Peston
My Lords, will the Minister clarify one or two aspects of what he said? Am I right in thinking that the amendments, in so far as one can follow them at all, are relevant when something has already gone wrong; that is, when the institution in question is in trouble and something has to be done to cope with that?
Lord Peston
Am I then also right that other aspects of the Bill are really to stop the problem arising in the first place? Would that be a valid interpretation of the whole legislation?
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, at the risk of oversimplifying matters, yes, indeed. We want a judgment-based system of regulation and supervision that makes it less likely that things will go wrong in the first place. That is entirely correct.
Lord Peston
The Minister must be aware by now that there is no way that he can oversimplify when he is dealing with me. Has a study been done of the costs and benefits of the effects of the amendments? In particular, if a crisis appears that is connected with insolvency et cetera, will costs be involved and who will bear them? I cannot find an answer to that anywhere in the amendments. Is it a responsibility of whoever is administering all this? Further, am I right in thinking that clearing houses will not be saved but essentially go out of business?
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, I can confirm that, as with just about everything that this Government and the previous Government have brought forward, an impact assessment of the measures was done as part of the consultation process. The noble Lord took us back to first principles. What we are trying to achieve in the broad sweep of the construct is for the costs to fall on the industry. The shareholders would be likely to be the first to be wiped out if an investment exchange or clearing house went out of business. That is where the costs would fall. At all times, our principal concern is to make sure that taxpayers are not exposed to material costs such as they were, very severely, in the financial crisis of 2007-08. I hope that that helps the noble Lord.
Lord Sassoon
First, my Lords, there is no question in this of anything being transferred to or from the EU. This is just a regime around the winding-up administration for the insolvency of UK clearing houses, so I assure the noble Lord that that issue does not arise. It was his Government—the previous Labour Government—who identified this general area as one that needed to be dealt with, particularly in the context of deposit takers, where the need was identified to put additional provisions in place for resolution regimes. We built on the work initiated by the previous Government and have identified other systemically important parts of the system.
We are talking about clearing houses and recognised investment exchanges this afternoon, and we will go on in a future session to talk about investment banks. We are merely saying that we have identified other areas where the authorities need to have powers similar to the ones that came out of the legislation initiated by the previous Government, and are putting that in place.
As to the cumulative amount of responsibility that we are giving to the Bank of England, we have already in the course of the very useful scrutiny of this Bill made some important changes, including putting the oversight committee in place to respond to the sort of challenge that the ever-nimble-on-his-feet noble Lord, Lord Barnett, raises. I therefore think that we have covered that issue up front in this Bill and that the Government have made some big concessions.
Lord Peston
My Lords, I will not pursue the question of more powers to the Bank of England. After its performance over the last few years, it is the last thing I would do, and I do not think this is the occasion to debate that yet again. However, I am puzzled by two things. I thought that in his reply to the noble Lord, Lord Flight, he said we should not be discussing the European angle and that that would come at some other stage. Is that right? I do not think I misheard him.
Lord Sassoon
No, I said in my reply to my noble friend this afternoon that I would concentrate purely on the European angle of these amendments, which I dealt with. I was not going to be drawn into discussing a whole range of other European matters which my noble friend’s remarks address. It is as simple as that.
Lord Peston
I take it that we are not discussing—because if we were, I would make a speech—the fact that we believe strongly in a single market for financial services but that many of the European countries go to enormous lengths to prevent our highly efficient financial services firms getting into their markets. I would not mind having a debate on that some time during proceedings on this Bill. However, I gather that in the Minister’s view this is not the moment.
Baroness Cohen of Pimlico
Might I ask the Minister for a little guidance? If we are discussing all these amendments together, I have a set of problems that I would like to discuss on Amendment 176D. Is this the moment or are we going to do all the amendments separately?
“Additional power to direct UK clearing houses
After section 296 of FSMA 2000 insert—“296A Additional power to direct UK clearing houses
(1) The Bank of England may direct a UK clearing house to take, or refrain from taking, specified action if the Bank is satisfied that it is desirable to give the direction, having regard to the public interest in—
(a) protecting and enhancing the stability of the UK financial system,(b) maintaining public confidence in the stability of the UK financial system,(c) maintaining the continuity of the central counterparty clearing services provided by the clearing house, and(d) maintaining and enhancing the financial resilience of the clearing house. (2) The direction may, in particular—
(a) specify the time for compliance with the direction,(b) require the rules of the clearing house to be amended, and(c) override such rules (whether generally or in their application to a particular case).(3) The direction is enforceable, on the application of the Bank, by an injunction or, in Scotland, by an order for specific performance under section 45 of the Court of Session Act 1988.
(4) The Bank may revoke a direction given under this section.
(5) In this section “central counterparty clearing services” has the same meaning as in section 155 of the Companies Act 1989 (see subsection (3A) of that section).”
Lord Peston
My Lords, before the Minister moves this amendment, can I ask him one other thing that intrigues me? On the bit of paper that we get every day when we meet on this, it says:
“Target for the day: to complete the group beginning amendment 190ZZA”.
Are we to take that seriously? At the rate we are going, we will be going for a very early supper.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, as ever, these things are discussed and agreed through the usual channels. I certainly take my side of the usual channels extremely seriously. The noble Lord can discuss it with his side, but I believe that is where we are headed. I thought we might have got through the previous group of amendments rather more quickly, so I do not know what time we will finish, but in only a moment I have been able to move on to Amendment 176D.
Amendments 176D and 182ZA build on the existing powers of direction that the Financial Services Authority has under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, or FiSMA. This group of amendments gives the Bank of England additional powers to direct UK clearing houses to address risks to their solvency, or indeed any other matter. Specifically, the direction could require a clearing house to make changes to its rules or introduce emergency rules, or require rules to be activated. The existing powers of direction provided for in FiSMA can be used only to direct a clearing house to ensure that it complies with the recognition requirements or its obligations under FiSMA. Here, in answer to a point that the noble Lord, Lord Peston, raised, we are talking about powers that go with the previous group of amendments, which were all to do with clearing up a mess when we got there. We are now talking about additional powers to make sure, specifically, that we minimise the chances of getting into trouble.
Providing the Bank with additional powers of direction over UK clearing houses is essential to allow the Bank to manage the considerable risks that may be posed by actions of a clearing house that is nevertheless not in breach of its recognition requirements or obligations under FiSMA. Put simply, the powers will enable the Bank to intervene as required to help to ensure that clearing houses act in a way that is consistent with the maintenance of financial stability and wider market confidence. For example, these provisions allow the Bank to issue a direction requiring a UK clearing house to refuse to accept certain investments as collateral, or to require all collateral in relation to specified types of financial transaction to be provided in cash. They also allow the Bank to require a UK clearing house to alter the rules concerning its operation in order to ensure that certain matters do not constitute events on which specified rights become available—for example, early termination rights—or to require a UK clearing house to take action or to refrain from taking action under its default rules.
Although these powers are wide-ranging, building in essential flexibility to manage new and unusual risks, they may be exercised only where the Bank is satisfied that it is desirable to do so, having regard to various clearly defined public interest tests. With one exception, the Bank of England cannot use this power to require shareholders, members or clients to recapitalise or otherwise fund a failing recognised clearing house. The power of direction relates only to the recognised clearing house itself. The exception is where the UK clearing house already has recapitalisation arrangements and agreements in place with its shareholders. In this instance, the Bank of England could use this power to direct the UK clearing house to enforce those arrangements, provided that the necessary conditions and safeguards are met. This is to ensure that the clearing house acts in a way that is consistent with the maintenance of financial stability and wider market confidence. I beg to move.
Lord Peston
My Lords, I hate to abandon a “may” and “must” debate, because it is my favourite activity. However, in this case, since we are discussing additional powers, I hate to say it but I think that “may” is simply the word that corresponds grammatically to giving the additional powers. Given the circumstances in which the amendment lists when those powers can be used, it is perfectly obvious that “must” is then implicit. Why else would these criteria be taken into account? I do not want the Minister to stop annoying the parliamentary draftsmen but perhaps for once they have got it right.
Lord Sassoon
I am very grateful to the noble Lord, as I am sure the officials will be.
Amendment 176D agreed.
Lord Peston
I admonish the Minister in a trifling way. It seems to me that the issuing of warning notices is enormously beneficial to those being regulated. That is one bit of a Bill that I do not like which I am totally in favour of. I am surprised that the Minister would even consider any backtracking on that. It is immensely beneficial to people to be told, “We are concerned about what you are doing and would like you to modify your behaviour so that it does not create a loss to the public interest”. That is one of the really good bits of the Bill.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, let me stress again that we are not backtracking at all. Our commitment to the new policy instrument remains extremely firm. It may be that the industry will come to take the view expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Peston. We will see. I have been struck by not only our debate this afternoon but our conversations in the run-up to it that because we are taking such a bold step, which I believe to be the right one and which I believe that the FCA will exercise properly, we should have the reserve power, which we do not have in the Bill, should things not turn out as I and the noble Lord, Lord Peston, expect.
I hope, on the basis of that explanation of our intention, that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Flight
My Lords, all that I was really calling for previously was for the RDC to be embodied in statute to provide this role. The amendment proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, offers something rather better because it is a duly organised and independent body that would provide the safeguard of justice. That, it seems to me, is what we all want.
Lord Peston
My Lords, I support my noble friend’s amendment, but I would like to place it in context. I start from the position that the Minister started from when he reminded us that the Bill and these regulators have not been picked like a rabbit out of a hat. There was a problem to be solved and this, even though I do not like aspects of it, is the Government’s best attempt to solve it. There was a problem in this sector of the economy, the public demanded that something be done to prevent it from happening again and the solution is regulation. Since the only alternative solution that I know about would be to nationalise the whole of the financial sector, which I would not favour, the Government are clearly doing the right thing in broad terms—even though, I repeat, there is a lot of this Bill that I do not like.
The second aspect of the context is the old adage, “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?”. The trouble is that once you go down that path, you get an infinite regress; whoever you set up to regulate the regulators, you then ask, “Who’s going to regulate them?”, and it goes on for ever. We ought to bear that in mind.
My general point is that, while I hope that the Government will either agree precisely to my noble friend’s amendment or come up with a suitably tweaked amendment of their own, we should not be naive about this. The moment the regulator starts looking at any particular organisation—and certainly when it starts considering, suggesting or indeed issuing a warning notice—the idea that this will not leak out is a bit on the naive side, to put it bluntly.
Although I support my noble friend’s amendment, I think she will agree that it does not protect us from the world in which we live, a world in which there is, in a sense, money to be made by leaking secrets. I believe that the Government ought to go down the line suggested by my noble friend and respond sympathetically, but whether or not I live long enough to see the first case that arises, I would not be in the least surprised if the first warning notice gets leaked within minutes of being sent. That should not stop my noble friend from going ahead with this, but it illustrates that some of us are rather cynical when it comes to what happens in the world in which we live.
Lord Turnbull
Can the noble Baroness clarify for me what right the accused has to make representations to this committee? Does it simply take the presentation of a case from the FCA and examine that for its strengths and weaknesses, or is representation from those accused of the regulatory breach built in? To answer the noble Lord, Lord Peston, it is a criminal offence to leak the existence of a decision notice before its appropriate time.
Lord Sassoon
With all due respect to the noble Lord, this slightly misses the point. As I have explained, within much the same remit under FiSMA, to which we have added one additional piece of protection, the FSA exercises the judgment and comes up with the structure that this Committee seems broadly happy with. It is entirely fair and proper to allow the successor body the space to come up with a decision which finds approval in decisions that were previously taken about this structure. Therefore, based on our approval of how it has done up to now, we should have confidence that it will do it again. It has heard loudly and clearly the support that your Lordships will give it if it takes that approach.
Lord Peston
I am really lost as to what the Minister is saying. Apart from the fact that he was made a very good offer—I would have thought that the Minister, in his right mind, would never reject a good offer—is he saying that this amendment is not needed because the regulators could set up committees of this sort themselves with no statutory powers behind them and that they can do exactly what is in this amendment already? Can he guarantee that it is right that each regulator can set up a committee so the only difference is that we are saying that they must and he is saying that they can? For the record, is that what he is saying?
Lord Sassoon
I am sorry that I have not been sufficiently clear. Yes, that is exactly what I am saying. In fact, I am saying more than that. Within the very similar provision for FiSMA, that is exactly what the FSA did. Not only can it do it but it has a track record of having done that. I think we should trust it to do whatever is appropriate again.
Lord Peston
My Lords, in supporting my noble friend’s amendment, I say that I am a strong supporter of the European Union, and that I hope one day to live in a country where the Government is also a strong supporter of our membership of the European Union—something that has not been the case for many years. I refer not just to the present Government but to the previous one. However, although I regard myself as a supporter of the European Union, I am well aware that often it drips into areas that are none of its business. When I first saw the amendment, I thought: what possible grounds are there for the European Union to consider supporting charities, let alone setting limits on how they can be supported? I assume that this is a probing amendment, although my noble friend has not told me so. Really the European Union has no business to be in this field; that is the message we would like to get over.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts
My Lords, my Amendment 187CA in this group relates to another aspect of the operation of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. The current wording by which the scheme operates gives it a lot of discretion in the way that the costs of the scheme are allocated. Section 213(5) of FiSMA states:
“In making any provision of the scheme … the Authority must take account of the desirability of ensuring that the amount of the levies imposed on a particular class of authorised persons reflects, so far as practicable, the amount of the claims made, or likely to be made, in respect of that class of person”.
There are two get-outs.
I make it clear that this is not about restricting the rights of consumers to obtain compensation. It is a critical and essential part of maintaining proper confidence in our financial system that there are proper and appropriate ways for people to claim and get compensation for mis-selling or other malfeasance. However, the amendment is about ensuring that the polluter pays. It has become more difficult in recent years to trace the allocations and levies made by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to the particular class of persons and businesses to which they have been applied. Often, there appears to be a shifting of the pea around the plate, with a disproportionate share landing on those perhaps least able to complain. I hope that my noble friend will listen to the amendment with sympathy. The funding system must reflect the differences in risk and instability posed to the public and to the wider economy by firms and the financial products they offer.
I make it absolutely clear that my amendment does not enforce an unacceptable level of correlation. The words “as far as practicable” will remain, and will therefore provide the scheme with a degree of flexibility—a get-out, if you like. However, the additional words, “take account of the desirability of ensuring”, are too woolly. They lead to situations where people feel that the scheme is not operating fairly. Therefore, I would like to see those words replaced by the single word, “ensure”, as a means of ensuring that the Financial Services Compensation Scheme penalises the polluter and not the wider financial community.
Lord Newby
My Lords, Amendment 187AB, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, would require the Government to notify other EU member states that the limits on compensation payments to charities in the event of a loss of their bank deposits should be reviewed. The noble Lord, Lord Peston, asked what on earth this had to do with the EU. I suspect that he, like me, had not heard of the deposit guarantee scheme directive, which is an extremely valuable piece of legislation. It means that across the EU there is a maximum harmonised limit of compensation per depositor in the case of banks or other financial institutions going bust. It makes sure that across the EU there is a common framework for paying out when organisations get into financial difficulties.
Lord Peston
The Minister said that that was a very good idea. I cannot imagine why it is such a good idea. What business is it of the European Union what the taxpayers of an individual country decide they will spend on compensating people who have lost money because of the misbehaviour of banks? Why is it a European issue? I do not want to pursue this because it is a European question that is broader than what the Bill is about. I merely made the rather tart remark that occasionally the overpaid officials in Brussels have to justify their overpaid existence by finding things to do. Otherwise, they might eventually be asked to retire—although I might say that then they get incredibly good compensation arrangements. I was just being my normal tart, nasty self.
Lord Harrison
My Lords, I came to listen to the Statement. However, it may be of interest to some of my colleagues that we on Sub-Committee A of your Lordships’ European Union economic and finance committee are studying the banking union proposals and the recovery and resolution directive. The deposit guarantee scheme is an integral part of Herman Van Rompuy’s proposals, and of the response that we have got from the four presidents. That is the reason I am here today. I was slightly taken aback when my noble friend Lord Peston mentioned charities. As I understand it, the deposit guarantee scheme is a separate matter. The proposal has yet to mature. This will be done in Brussels over the coming weeks and months. I do not know whether that helps.
Economy: Deficit Reduction
Lord Peston Excerpts(12 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, I certainly agree with my noble friend that the question of funding, particularly for SMEs, continues to be of considerable concern to the Government. That is why we have been able to use the strength of the national government balance sheet which derives from our deficit reduction plans to put in place the funding for lending scheme, to which my noble friend referred, and the UK guarantee scheme of up to £50 billion for infrastructure projects so that we can ensure that credit continues to flow.
Lord Peston
My Lords, I take it that the noble Lord’s answer implies that the Government intend to pursue continuously their ludicrous economic policy, the effect of which is that the Government engage in cuts, those cuts lower aggregate demand, the tax revenue goes down and some benefits go up so that the budget deficit increases, whereupon they engage in more cuts, and this process goes on until the economy implodes. That is the danger before us. What is required is a change in economic policy that leads to some expansion of the real economy.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Peston, and his noble friend Lord Barnett have been comparing notes, but the noble Lord, Lord Barnett, was quoting the IMF approvingly at me only a minute or two ago. On this point, only a week ago, on 9 October, a senior official of the IMF said that at this stage:
“The policy mix in the UK, which consists of adjusting fiscal policy, reducing deficits, at the same time supporting the economy with a very accommodative monetary policy is the right way to go”.
Financial Services Bill
Lord Peston Excerpts(12 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Peston
My Lords, we make the obvious point that getting it right is not the same as doing it quickly. We ought always to bear that in mind in your Lordships’ House. There is a straightforward solution to this. One is my noble friend’s suggestion for Report. Since I assume, particularly given the Leader of the House’s remarks, that we are not imminently in danger of being abolished, that we are still a self-governing House, we can therefore decide, if we wish to, one of two things: either my noble friend’s proposal, with which I strongly agree, that we would simply have Committee stage rules at Report stage for what is being proposed; the alternative is not to end the Committee stage until the Government can get their tiny mind around the Wheatley proposals and come up with their amendments.
I have read the Wheatley report. The proposals do not strike me as being intellectually very demanding—nowhere near as difficult as deciding on a railway line. Therefore, the noble Lord ought to respond positively instead of adopting this negative approach and remind himself that we will get only one chance to get this right. We ought to make sure that we do not bungle it.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I should make clear that I said that the Labour Party was broadly supporting the conclusions of the Wheatley report; not the Government’s policy because we do not know what that is yet. We look forward to seeing it. Perhaps we will support it; perhaps we will not. On the substantive matter, I welcome what I saw was the noble Lord’s support for a degree of flexibility at Report, referred to also by my noble friend Lord Peston. If it could be agreed in due course by the usual channels that for the Wheatley clauses a Committee-style procedure be permitted and the House agreed to that, then I think we could proceed with due speed.
Lord Sharkey
My Lords, this is a probing amendment. Its purpose is to allow discussion of the issues surrounding crowd funding in the United Kingdom. The informal meaning of crowd funding is probably entirely obvious. However, as far as I can tell there is no generally accepted legal or technical definition of the term. Wikipedia describes crowd funding as,
“the collective effort of individuals who network and pool their resources, usually via the Internet, to support efforts initiated by other people or organizations”.
More particularly crowd funding also refers to,
“the funding of a company by selling small amounts of equity to many investors”.
This was the meaning directly addressed in President Obama’s JOBS Act of April this year which, among other things, gave the SEC 270 days to bring in appropriate regulatory regimes for crowd funding in order to encourage its take up and its expansion.
In the UK, as elsewhere, there are essentially three possible forms of crowd funding. The first is the donation model in which funders provide money to an organisation for no commercial or financial return. The second is the lending model, in which funders provide money by way of repayable interest-bearing loans. These two models are actively used in the UK and do not seem to face significant regulatory barriers, provided that loans do not involve the provision of consumer credit. However, neither of these is suited to the more speculative form of SME or start-up enterprises: donations because enthusiasm, although often surprisingly generous, will be restricted to a fan base, and lending because many organisations will be conventionally assessed as not credit-worthy.
The third method of crowd funding, investment, is potentially a significant source of funds for start-ups and similar high-risk ventures but it faces regulatory problems in the United Kingdom. There are two kinds of investment crowd funding: the equity model, where investors receive shares in the company; and the collective investment scheme model, where investors receive a right to a share in profits or revenue but no shares. As a general rule, it is not possible for a company in the UK to raise money by crowd funding using either the equity or the CIS models. With some limited exceptions, both these models fall within the UK regulatory regime’s prohibition of such activities. That is the problem about which I would like very much to hear the Minister’s views.
Specifically, does the Minister accept that crowd funding may be a very useful way of getting substantial funds into the UK’s SMEs, an area where our banks are currently underperforming? If so, does he acknowledge a degree of urgency in setting up an appropriate regulatory framework, and can he accept that the existence of high levels of risk in investing in small companies need not necessarily mean that ordinary people should not be allowed, or even encouraged, to invest their money in such enterprises? Perhaps, in this context, it is worth remembering the conclusion for the US jobs market of the Kauffman report: that for 20 of the past 27 years, all net new jobs came from start-ups.
My noble friend the Minister will know of the report published in February this year by the Association of UK Interactive Entertainment, entitled A Proposal to Facilitate Crowd Funding in the UK. This report rehearses the benefits to business of making crowd funding more easily accessible to ordinary people. It makes, in some detail, recommendations for regulatory change in order to achieve it. In summary, the report recommends that crowd funding be permitted generally and not restricted to some qualified class of investor; that any regulation be light touch; that there should be no absolute requirement that shares be issued to investors, so that the CIS model may be applied; that there should be no upper limit on what can be raised for projects, with certain conditions applying; and there should be an investment limit per person to limit individual exposure.
Perhaps I could ask the Minister to give his views on these proposals, to consider in a general sense how we may use crowd funding to both increase and speed up the flow of funds into the SME sector, and to give some indication of the Government’s intentions in this area and of timings. I beg to move.
Lord Peston
My Lords, the noble Lord has introduced his amendment as a probing amendment, which I take to mean that it is meant to be educative. My natural tendency is to agree with him, but I have great difficulty in that I do not have the faintest idea what he is talking about. In particular, I do not know what crowd funding is. The amendment says it should have,
“the meaning given in section 417”,
but there is no Section 417 in any of the documents that I have. It would help me enormously if he could extend my education and tell me what this is all about.
Lord Stewartby
My Lords, I, too, would like some assistance from my noble friend. It is not easy to understand, in large parts of this Bill, what it is trying to get at. I raise this under discussion of Clause 6 because that is what permits the transfer of regulation of consumer and small business credit from the Office of Fair Trading to the new Financial Conduct Authority.
I have had an approach about this from the Finance & Leasing Association. They told me that they do not seek an amendment to the Bill, rather a commitment by the Government to a sensible timetable, to ensure the Government get the rules right and avoid the loss of important consumer protections. This is because the Government have set a very ambitious target date of April 2014 for the creation of a new regime for credit regulation. They propose a twin-track approach which will include a slimmed-down version of the Consumer Credit Act with enhanced powers. The Government say they want to transfer as much as possible of the CCA and associated OFT guidance into this new rule book by April 2014. However the detail of the new rule book will not be consulted on until the second half of 2013, and the final rules will only be available in March 2014. This makes the implementation of an April 2014 date virtually impossible. I would be grateful for enlightenment and assistance from my noble friend.
Lord Peston
Perhaps I may interrupt the Minister. As I listened to my noble friend, it suddenly dawned on me what we were talking about. It really does mean crowd funding and, following what my noble friend said, there is a very simple answer to it: do not do it.
Lord Sassoon
That is one way of dealing with it, but it is not the way in which the Government wish to deal with it, which I shall explain in a moment. I say to my noble friend Lord Stewartby that I have a hunch that before we pass this clause we will have a discussion about timetabling. If he will forgive me, I shall come back to the matter then, but if we do not I will make sure that I raise the timetable in question later.
Crowd funding is an innovative new source of funding for start-ups and other small enterprises. I share my noble friend’s hope that it will continue to grow in the coming years, so my answer to his first question is a resounding yes. However, on his second question, which is the subject of the amendment, while I understand my noble friend’s enthusiasm for establishing discrete legislative provision to bring this very new sector into regulation, I do not agree that it is needed at this stage and so cannot accept the amendment.
My noble friend raised the US JOBS Act. In the US, there was a very distinct problem and a pressing need, which led to the introduction of that Act. The situation is different in the UK. Among other things, there has been no clarion call from industry for more regulation. However, we should not be complacent, and the FSA is not waiting until there is a problem before doing things.
Platforms seeking to operate what are in effect collective investment schemes must obtain authorisation from the FSA. The FSA already has powers to take action against firms operating without appropriate authorisation. It is up to the FSA to work with platforms seeking to offer equity returns to their investors to ensure that they obtain relevant permissions before the activity that is most likely to apply here—arranging deals in investments—starts. This is happening already, with one such platform securing authorisation from the FSA prior to its launch.
Of course, the regulator must balance the need to allow innovative models to flourish with ensuring that consumers understand the risks involved with new platforms. In this regard, the FSA’s recent guidance on crowd funding makes clear its concerns, which are evidently shared by the noble Lord, Lord Peston. This is the right sort of regulatory response. It shows that we should not rush to create new regulated activities here.
I am also concerned that amending the Bill in this way could create confusion that stifled the growth of the new sector. There are currently many forms of crowd funding. We do not yet know precisely what definition my noble friend had in mind, but the vast majority of these platforms ask customers to make donations rather than investments. They have been very successful in doing that. The world’s largest crowd-fundng site, Kickstarter, for example, which will launch in the UK very soon, raised more than $100 million for creative projects in the past year. A platform such as that does not pose the same risks to investors, who expect no money in return for their donation, so we have to be mindful of the risk of legislating in a way that does not fully take account of the breadth of the businesses in this new area.
In conclusion, although industry standards and further FSA and FCA guidance may have an important role to play in future, my view is that the regulatory structure proposed in the Bill is suitably flexible to support the growth of the full variety of crowd-funding platforms, with a careful eye on the needs of the consumer throughout. With that, I hope that my noble friend will agree to withdraw his probing amendment.
Lord Sharkey
I thank the noble Lord for his answer. The noble Lord, Lord Peston, invited me to extend his education, but I think I should decline any such attempt. The noble Lord, Lord Barnett, did not believe that there was a definition there, and he was right—there is no definition. I shall not do it again now, but I did try to explain what forms crowd funding currently takes. Perhaps I did not give a clear impression of how important or what size it currently is, and that is my fault, but crowd funding exists and plays quite a large part in the landscape of small companies, both in the United States and already here in the United Kingdom.
I think I noticed an expression of perhaps amazement on the face of the noble Lord, Lord Peston, at the notion that people should donate $100 million to commercial enterprises for no return at all—an aspect of crowd funding that clearly he was not familiar with.
Lord Peston
I take it that if the thing goes ahead, it will be made clear to people putting money into this sort of thing that they are essentially going to a betting shop, where they may win or lose. That is what it is about. Since our country appears to be gambling mad at the moment, there seems no reason to prevent this new form of gambling from being introduced. However, as someone who knows—coming, as I have said before, from a large family of gamblers—that gambling is a total mug’s game, I hope there is someone around who tells people that crowd funding is a mug’s game.
Lord Sharkey
It is nice to know that the noble Lord, Lord Peston, approves of gambling. Returning to the Minister’s response to the amendment, I note the objections that he raises, some of which were raised by the noble Lord, Lord Peston, as well. I accept that this is a new area that is full of dangers for unwary investors, and I also accept the dangers of regulating an infant industry too early. However, we are about to see a significant expansion in this area, which we should all keep an eye on for the future. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord McFall of Alcluith
My Lords, I will be brief and precise on Amendments 148, 149 and 174 which require consultation by the Treasury on draft orders. Clause 7(3) provides for parliamentary control in relation to the proposed orders under Section 22 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and proposed new sub-paragraph (2) says that no order should be made before Parliament unless approved by resolution of each House. Given the complexity of the Financial Services Bill and the capacity for muddle and wrong-headedness by all Governments over the past years, I think there is a case for enlarging the consultation.
In the 1990s, we were in Opposition in the House of Commons and recommended pre-legislative scrutiny. A number of Ministers took up the concept and it worked. I remember being involved in a three-clause Bill in Scotland that related to raves—clubs where young people found themselves dehydrated and where a number of lives were lost. The main clause in that Bill was Clause 2. We did pre-legislative scrutiny and visited many areas of Scotland. We came back and the then Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Selkirk of Douglas, said that the Government had reflected on the matter and that Clause 2 would be removed and redrafted. The lesson is that politicians can frequently get things wrong. Why do we not get this right by taking a little bit more time and extending the consultation? That is the thrust of this amendment.
Lord Peston
My Lords, I am a bit puzzled about the wording in the relevant paragraph. Of course, I agree with what my noble friend says about consultation. However, can the Minister explain why the word “would” appears in line 5 rather than “should”? Even if the Treasury thinks the order would have the described effect, it must certainly believe that it should have the effect. What is the point of the order if it does not achieve what it is trying to achieve? I am a bit puzzled about the word “would”. My noble friend’s amendment would make much more sense if “should” were inserted instead of “would”.
That leads me to my attempt to get my mind around what would actually happen in this case. It is immensely difficult because the provision substitutes material in this Bill for material in legislation that we do not have before us, which is always a problem. However, if we ask ourselves, “When would any of this order-making process occur?”, presumably the answer would be that it would occur when various outside bodies say that this matter is not being regulated, but must be regulated. In other words, what precedes the consultation is the fact that it is not certain at all that the Treasury would take the initiative in this. It is the acting body and is therefore the one that has to act when it comes to producing the orders.
Therefore, the built-in logic behind the entire new paragraph is the consultation process. Indeed, it is also part of the spirit of the age. One can go further and say that not merely is consultation part of the spirit of the age, but that interested bodies would undoubtedly be aware of these orders. Even if the Treasury does not consult them, those bodies will ensure that the Treasury knows what they think because they will get in touch with the Treasury and say either, “What you are doing is a good thing and we would like to support you”, or, “You do not know what you are doing and you ought to do it in a different way”. What my noble friend is putting forward helps the Bill to become much more sensible in practical terms, and it would become a fortiori more sensible if we were allowed to amend the language by inserting “should” for “would”. I think that would make infinitely more sense.
Lord Davies of Oldham
My Lords, I am grateful to both my noble friends who have spoken on this issue and very much agree with the arguments they presented. Amendment 149AB in my name merely seeks to take this matter one obvious stage further. My noble friends have put the emphasis on effective consultation so that the Treasury presents a position that is the result of informed judgment. However, the other part of informed judgment is that Parliament should reach a decision on what the Treasury has arrived at regarding such an important matter as the powers to amend Schedule 6 of the Financial Services and Markets Act. The Bill significantly changes the architecture, which is a phrase frequently used by the Minister. With our amendment, we are merely seeking assurance that, after effective consultation and deliberation by the Treasury, the orders are put before Parliament, whereby its views can be heard before anything comes into effect.
Lord Peston
If the Minister will read a few lines further on in his own Bill, he will see the words,
“by reason of urgency, it is necessary to make the order”.
That can make sense only if the word “should” is used. It cannot possibly be a meaningful part of the Bill if the word “would” is used. The Treasury must believe that there is a reason of urgency for this to take place and so we infer that “should” is the right word. Otherwise, reasons do not apply, and it reads more like something happening by chance, so let it happen. However, that is not what this bit of the Bill is about. I hate to tell the noble Lord, but on this point I think I understand his Bill better than he does.
Lord Sassoon
On this occasion, I am quite confident in my use of the English language, even if the noble Lord understands the Bill better. Outside the Chamber we can debate who understands the Bill better. I am quite clear that “would” is the correct word here because it refers to something which is expected to have the effect of extending regulation. I shall not detain the Committee on what we are not discussing, so let us talk about what we are discussing.
Amendment 148 would require the Treasury to consult on the order made under Section 22 where it would result in an unregulated activity becoming regulated. The Government recognise the best practice established in this area by the Department for Business’s code of practice on consultation. I can assure the Committee that the Government will continue to observe the code wherever possible when conducting formal written consultations. However, I do not think that it would be appropriate to write this requirement into this legislation, as it is not written into many other pieces of legislation. Indeed, the Government generally consult on changes to the regulated activities order. I cannot find any case to date where the Government have introduced substantive changes without consultation. Having said that, it may not be appropriate in all cases: for example, if an urgent change needs to be made to bring an activity into prudential regulation that may cause a financial stability risk. For that additional reason, I think it would be wrong to require consultation.
Amendment 149 would require the Treasury to consult on the first Section 22A order and any subsequent orders which amend the scope of PRA regulation or which amend primary legislation. The Section 22A order sets out the scope of PRA regulation. Here, too, the Government agree—and I am happy to restate it—that it is preferable to consult, and indeed the Treasury will be consulting on a draft of the Section 22A order shortly. I do not think it is necessary to write such requirements into legislation.
It is also worth the Committee noting that both of these types of orders would be subject to the affirmative procedure in all cases. Parliament will always have the chance to consider these amendments, and to consider whether the Government have presented suitable evidence—through a consultation in the normal event—of the need for any change. I think that that backstop is an important point here.
I turn now to Amendment 149AB in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Oldham. He has tabled, I think, only one amendment out of the many hundreds that this Committee has already considered and because I made a concession on it, his batting order is going down from a 100% to a 50% success rate at a stroke. I agree with the noble Lord that orders made by the Treasury that amend Schedule 6 should be subject to the affirmative procedure as they concern changes to the PRA’s and FCA’s threshold conditions, which are the cornerstones of each authority’s regulatory approach. However, we have already provided for this. Clause 46(2), on page 130, includes orders made under Section 55C in the list of orders that should be subject to the affirmative procedure. Therefore it is a simple matter to understand that Amendment 149AB is not needed.
I move to Amendment 174, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McFall of Alcluith. I will briefly explain the purpose of new Section 141A of FiSMA. It gives the Treasury and the Secretary of State a narrow and technical order-making power to amend legislation that makes reference to the rules of either regulator or to guidance issued by the FCA where the regulator has altered or revoked its rules. This is a sensible approach to ensuring that references to rules and guidance made by the regulator in legislation remain accurate and up to date.
It would not be appropriate to require the Treasury or the Secretary of State to engage in consultations before making amendments to legislation that are a direct consequence of changes to rules or guidance made by the regulator. This would cause unhelpful delays to the process of updating the affected legislation, causing possible confusion and uncertainty for firms and other persons affected. Of course, except in cases of urgency there will already have been consultation on the substantive changes being made to the rules or guidance, as this is required of the regulators.
I hope that with those explanations the noble Lord, Lord McFall, will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Newby
My Lords, I agree strongly with the motivation behind the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell. The process for approving new entrants to the market should be streamlined to the maximum possible extent because it is clearly a flaw in the current financial services market that while in many sectors there is strong competition, in some, particularly banking, we wish to see significantly more competition. In terms of giving an impetus to the speedy processing of applications, we strongly support his view. However, I hope that I can persuade him that the Bill already makes it clear how the two regulatory bodies are going to deal with applications for firms that will be jointly regulated. In Clause 9, proposed new Sections 55E to 55G set out in detail who is to determine applications for authorisation, while new Sections 55U to 55Z1 set out the detail of the procedure which the regulators have to follow. We have already attempted to clarify who does what.
Those who are applying to become a dual-regulated firm are required to make a single application for authorisation to the PRA, and there will be a single administrative process. The PRA and the FCA will be under a duty to co-ordinate which will cover all of their functions, including those related to authorisations. They are under a duty to set out in their memorandum of understanding, in high level terms, how that co-ordination will be delivered. To deliver the duty to co-ordinate, the two authorities are required to put processes in place that will allow for efficient co-ordination. They also need to establish a process for authorisation and variation of permission, and to communicate that to firms. The FSA does this at present, and guidance is available on authorisation from its website. I do not think there is a need for an express requirement in legislation about exactly what the regulators should publish.
I shall move on to Amendment 149AC. We are aware that the ESAs are to assist in preparing equivalence decisions relating to supervisor regimes in third countries under relevant sectoral legislation, such as Article 33 of the ESMA regulation. Where EU law provides for the ESAs to have a role in determining equivalence of an overseas regulator, of course the regulators must comply with EU law and recognise that decision. However, we believe that it would be inappropriate to extend the role of the ESAs by requiring our regulators to have regard to any equivalence decisions they make in contexts that are not required by EU law. But, of course, the question is really one of whether the regulatory bodies are going to take account of the overseas regulators supervising those firms which are applying for passporting into the UK. When the FCA or the PRA is assessing a firm seeking to passport in to the UK from outside the EEA, the opinion of an overseas regulator that knows the firm, its operations and its management extremely well is quite likely to be helpful. The FCA and the PRA must also consider how the overseas regulator supervises the firm and take this into account, but in doing so, they may well wish to consider any view that the EU regulatory authorities may have about the overseas regulator.
I turn now to Amendment 150B, spoken to by my noble friend Lady Kramer. The Bill already provides that the regulators may exercise their powers of intervention, including the power to vary permission, at the request of an overseas regulator. In considering any such request, the regulators are required to have regard to whether they are required by EU law to assist the overseas regulator. The relations between the FCA and PRA and the European supervisory authorities, which are not technically regulators in the same way, are set out comprehensively in primary EU law. For example, Regulation 1093/2010/EU establishing the European Banking Authority runs to 82 articles and covers in detail matters such as the role of the EBA in settling disagreements between national competent authorities, the limited circumstances in which the EBA may direct the national competent authorities to take action, the status of the national competent authority when it attends the EBA and the sharing of information between EBA and the national competent authorities. There is considerable scope for our regulators to work with the European supervisory authorities established in EU law. So while I agree with the importance of the two sets of bodies working closely together, I do not think that this amendment is strictly necessary.
We now come to Amendment 151 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McFall of Alcluith, which, sadly, takes us back to a discussion of the use of the English language. I say sadly because the debate about whether “may” or “must” should be used has exercised some of the finest brains in the Treasury to a greater extent than almost any other provision in the Bill. I found myself getting drawn into the debate and I became extremely enthusiastic about something that I was then persuaded was not of as much significance as I had originally thought.
Amendment 151 is one of the cases where we have looked very carefully at whether we should change “may” to “must”. We have come to the conclusion that to do so would impose a disproportionate and unnecessary burden on the regulator and, indirectly, on existing and potential authorised persons. The reason for this conclusion is that the amendment taken literally—and people do sometimes take these things extremely literally—would require the regulator to consider, when taking a decision on an application for permission or whether to vary or cancel a permission or to impose a requirement on a firm, each relationship which was “relevant” to the matter in hand. The amendment does not introduce any kind of materiality thresholds; all relevant relationships would have to be considered.
Even for a relatively simple provider such as a sole trader IFA, the range of relationships that are potentially relevant to the matter could be very significant. For a complex firm such as Barclays, the range of relevant relationships would be absolutely mind-boggling. Therefore, we think it is very important to retain the “may” to keep proportionality to the level of relationships that would have to be investigated.
Lord Peston
My Lords, am I right in thinking that the noble Lord is talking about the “may” on line 27 and that he is well aware that there is a “must” on line 33? I get a bit bored with mays and musts, although I have had my fair share of them. However, I cannot make any sense of them, and if I switched them around, the Bill would look to me just as sensible or not. Could he tell us why the “must” is there?
My other question relates to the point that my noble friend Lord Eatwell made on the importance of regulatory authorities abroad. Is the position at present symmetric? In their regulations and regulated activities elsewhere, do they have a series of mays and musts to take account of what our regulatory authorities say about our firms? In other words, is there any danger that people overseas will prevent our firms competing with their firms under regulations where we are following the quite correct line—which I totally support—that competition is generally to the good? Therefore, we are broadly saying that we must welcome overseas competition rather than reject it. How much danger are we in from the mercantilist views that we know dominate French policy-making and that of others?
Lord Newby
My Lords, I can deal with the first part of that intervention more quickly and easily than the second. The first “must” in subsection (2) is there because it is an EU legal requirement. If we are asked to do something, we have to do it; we do not have the option of not doing it. There is a good reason for a “must” there.
With regard to the noble Lord’s second point, I was speculating about the Romanian or Hungarian or Finnish languages as he was speaking and wondering whether there was the same absolute distinction between “may” and “must” in every case. I am not an expert in every bit of regulation in every member state. I realise that this is a major deficiency but I do not think that it pertains very strongly to the amendments before us today. For the second time, the noble Lord has raised a potential other amendment that is not on the Marshalled List. If he will excuse me, I will go back to concentrating on the ones that are.
Financial Services Bill
Lord Peston Excerpts(12 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Drake
My Lords, the FCA’s objective to promote “effective competition” will deliver fully on the Government’s commitment to putting the consumer at the heart of the financial system only if there is no ambiguity about the FCA’s authority to tackle hidden and rip-off charges. The FCA can judge the effectiveness of competition only if it is explicitly required to take into account the ease with which consumers can identify and obtain services that are appropriate to their needs and represent good value for money. The amendment provides for that.
During the Commons Committee stage, the Financial Secretary argued that the FCA had,
“the powers and the mandate to intervene on matters of price and value for money, if the case to do so is made. It does not need bespoke powers”.—[Official Report, Commons, Financial Services Bill Committee, 1/3/12; col. 261.]
Unfortunately, experience does not reinforce such confidence. We are all too familiar with the industry’s willingness to mobilise its resources to mount a legal challenge to the regulator if ambiguity exists. When the OFT decided to investigate unauthorised overdraft charges, the banks challenged its ability to do so. Two years of uncertainty, nearly £1 million in legal fees and many other resources later for the OFT, the legal case eventually concluded with a ruling that the OFT could not assess the fairness of those charges. In respect of payment protection insurance, the banks put up a sustained legal fight before accepting that they had mis-sold a product to millions of people. The FCA ran up around £900,000 in legal fees when the industry asked for a judicial review into its judgment on PPI complaints. In the face of a powerful industry, the absence of bespoke powers may make the FCA reluctant to take action and could lead to successful challenges against the authority in the courts.
The FCA is not a price regulator but that must not be interpreted as a reluctance to act on charging structures. The FCA’s competition objective as drafted requires it to have regard to innovation, ease of entry to market, ease with which consumers can change providers and the consumers’ need for information to make an informed choice. As is so well documented, so many consumers struggle to process the information provided and there is a danger of too much reliance on disclosure and informed choice to protect the consumer, given the systemic imbalance in knowledge and understanding between consumer and provider—a view shared in Professor Kay’s recent report. Similarly, the financial needs of most people are probably pretty simple but the industry often sells the more complex products because they attract higher charges. This is not an argument against innovation but a recognition that more complex products give rise to the need to ensure that they represent good value for money.
The FCA’s authority will be strengthened by such an explicit reference in its competition objective. The public’s loss of trust following the litany of product mis-selling has to be addressed. Just look at some of those products. “Behind-the-scenes” prices reduce direct price competition as apparently low “headline” prices mask the true costs once ancillary charges, such as for unauthorised overdrafts or rejected transitions and default charges, are accounted for. Consumers need to be confident that once they have entered into a contract they will not be subject to any unexpected or nasty surprises. Which? recently published research which showed that banks’ fee structures are so complicated that even a maths PhD student found it virtually impossible to compare charges between banks and to calculate how much a bank charges for using an unauthorised overdraft. Some particularly toxic forms of payment protection insurance paid commission rates of 87% of the premium to the bank that sold the policy. That means that if a consumer pays out £10,000 on a PPI policy, £8,700 goes back to the bank in commission.
Some consumers who took out an equity release plan at the turn of the century now face substantial early repayment charges amounting to 25% of the outstanding loan. On an equity release loan of £200,000, the consumer could now face early repayment charges of over £50,000. More recently, in the sale of products to protect small firms taking out loans against rising interest rates, the FSA found a lack of clarity about the cost of stopping a product, failure to check whether a consumer understood the risk, and selling based on personal rewards rather than on the needs of those businesses. Time and time again we see products sold to consumers that are not value for money, do not meet their needs and take advantage of their lack of understanding.
Furthermore, consumer credit regulation is to transfer to the FCA, affecting a market for consumer and small business credit of about £270 billion, where vulnerability to high charges is a significant issue. The FCA’s competition objective will, I understand, apply to consumer credit products, which is another compelling reason for placing a requirement on the FCA to have regard to value for money.
Opacity and complexity in the pensions and savings market results in excessive charges, fuelled by the increasing subcontracting of investment activity to a lengthy chain of agents. Each has access to more information than the consumer, which helps them to maintain charges which deliver generous revenues for them and less real value to the customer. The recent plethora of reports on charges reiterates the evidence of a problem which we know has persisted for a long time and which the regulator has got to tackle.
The mathematics of an annual management charge is too complex for most savers. That charge is not a true statement of the total expenses ratio, and even that ratio excludes other hidden costs. As the noble Lord, Lord Turner, said in his City speech yesterday, there is far greater potential in retail services than in other sectors for producers to rip off customers. I beg to move.
Lord Peston
My Lords, this is a very important amendment. It is important in its own right, but it also exposes what is fundamentally wrong with this Bill, which is that it is based on an economics model of the rationally informed consumer.
No one doubts that there are large numbers of rationally informed consumers out there, able to take optimal decisions, but a vast amount of research has been undertaken in recent years that shows that there are considerable numbers of consumers who are not best described as part of the rationally well informed model. Indeed, one can go further. I have seen research papers that show that even for what one might call brilliant consumers, the complexity of the instruments they are dealing with is so great that it would take them several years to do all the calculations required to make an informed decision. Therefore, what is wrong with this part of the Bill is its fundamental philosophy of the rationally informed consumer.
The other point to bear in mind is that the objective of the financial intermediaries that this applies to is not, in any sense, to be helpful to anybody. Their objective is to make money. What they are looking for are instruments, some of which are so complex—like CDOs, and so on—that you have to be a genius to understand what they amount to in the first place. There are several other examples of that that have got my head spinning.
What this leads us to is a matter that arose the last time that the Committee met and the subject of duty of care was raised. You will not find anything like that in this Bill or any of the philosophy behind it. What is required in the Bill is that everybody acting as a financial intermediary should be instructed that they have a duty of care. That duty of care should involve presenting information in a way that quite ordinary people can understand and pointing out the perils of all the mistakes that can be made.
I myself am not that rational a consumer in this regard. As for the idea that I would look at every bank and work out the optimal one that I should deal with, I take the view that there is more to life. If I end up paying rather more for any financial intermediation that I am involved with, I have to bear that cost because there are other things I want to do with my time. Then again, I am not badly off and I can afford to do that. But very poor consumers need something much more. I repeat that what needs to be in the Bill is the equivalent of a duty of care on the part of all financial intermediaries dealing with ordinary consumers and an acceptance of responsibility for what they are offering them.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My Lords, I support the purport of the amendment moved very effectively by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, and supported entirely fairly by the noble Lord, Lord Peston. I confess that for 26 years I tried to deal with the British public’s legal problems as the legal eagle on the “Jimmy Young Show”. I suppose that I take a particular interest in the effect of legislation such as this on the ordinary consumer. There are a number of practices at large these days in what I call big business that leave the individual consumer way behind in terms of any fairness of dealing. The big battalions will call in aid lawyers, often paid on a conditional fee basis, and it is frankly terrifying if you are a small bloke and have a dispute with a large company. You will quickly be given the clear indication by the large company that if you do not buckle and pay up you will be crushed. I put that a little dramatically, but not much.
As it happens, I have been dealing with one of the large energy companies lately over a disputed electricity Bill. I have been astonished at the general tenor of the dealings and the way in which it so organises its affairs that if I were not an old fart of a lawyer I would easily have been overborne by its tactics and approach.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, my clear legal advice is that the FCA does not require this additional “have regard” and that there is, notwithstanding the wording to which my noble friend draws attention, a danger that if the list becomes longer and suggestive that it is intended to be exhaustive, that may give rise to legal challenge. That is the advice that I have received from the best legal advisers that the Government have to hand and it is all that I can say on the matter.
I want to wrap up this discussion by going back to some of the things that noble Lords have drawn attention to in new Section 1C on the consumer protection objective. The noble Lord, Lord Peston, for example, is of course quite right to say that some or the majority of consumers of financial services are not “rationally well informed,” to use his term. This is precisely why, among other things, new Section 1C(2)(b) refers to,
“the differing degrees of experience and expertise that different consumers may have”.
This is also why, among other things, we have discussed the important work of the Money Advice Service in improving the ability of consumers to make informed choices, which we will come back to. I therefore agree with the noble Lord’s starting position, but I suggest that the way to deal with it is not through this amendment. I could point to a number of the other provisions in the consumer protection objective which go to the heart of many of the concerns raised in this debate. Coming back to my fundamental analysis that the legal analysis on which this is based is, in the view of the Government, flawed, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Lord Peston
I am full of despair because the noble Lord seems to have missed the whole point of what we are discussing. He keeps going back to technicalities, which is exactly the wrong way to view this matter. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, who focused on why this Bill is a wasted opportunity, particularly in the way that it is being handled by Ministers. The real disaster that has hit this country is the destruction of the reputation of the financial intermediary sector. We in your Lordships’ House have a chance to do something about that. The way to do this is not to talk about technicalities and to say, “My lawyers say this, and your lawyers say that”. The way to do it is to place in the Bill a particular amendment—I do not really care where it is put. I will not object if the Minister does not like the wording as long as he makes the wording better. We have a chance to save the reputation of an industry which matters enormously to this country.
I find it very upsetting that in the last opinion poll I saw, the financial intermediaries had fallen nearly as low as politicians in terms of their public reputation—we can live with that because in some sense we do not matter. This is enormously important and I implore the Minister to listen to what his noble friend Lord Lucas said. We have a chance here to make a contribution to improve and, indeed, eventually save the reputation of a vitally important industry. This Bill simply does not do that, but it could. That is why I call it a wasted opportunity.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, we are in Committee and discussing a very specific amendment. I therefore make absolutely no apology to the noble Lord, Lord Peston, who raises extremely important Second Reading-type debating points.
Lord Sassoon
I will not give away again to the noble Lord for a minute, if he will forgive me. We are discussing a very specific amendment. I have explained why I believe it is defective. The sentiment underlying that is completely shared by the Government: we do not believe it is necessary. The noble Lord raised matters which, although somewhat different, are also related to the capabilities of consumers. I have attempted to address a very serious point by pointing out that his concern will be at the heart, right at the centre, of the new regulatory body’s objective and thinking.
When it comes to his new point, which is not the one I was addressing before, about the standing of the industry, again, I completely agree with him. However, we are now talking about a regulatory structure. The Joint Committee of both Houses has been set up and will look very quickly at some of the wider questions of integrity and standards in the industry. This morning, I am trying to focus on the specific matter of this amendment.
Lord Peston
My Lords, I find it almost impossible to cope with the way in which the Committee stage of this Bill has been handled. It is completely different to any other Bill which I have taken part in. My point was not a Second Reading point. It was germane to this specific amendment, to what lies behind it, and to the philosophy of it. The Minister’s absolute refusal to even say, “Some good points have been made and I would like to go away and think about them some more”, is what annoys me about this Committee. My experience with the Ministers that I have usually dealt is that when a good point has been made, they always say, “I will go away and think about it some more”, without making any promises. However, the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, never says anything like that. I have not heard him once in five days suggest that there is anything wrong with this Bill, or that he would like to think again. There comes a point when one has to say that, in order that people know that their Lordships have rather high standards.
Lord Sassoon
Does the noble Lord, Lord Peston, agree that the Government came forward with a package of very substantial amendments that have already been discussed in Committee? I refer the noble Lord to the number of government amendments that have already been laid and debated, and to the number of times in Committee when I have indeed said that I will look at things or have made concessions. I do not accept for one minute his statement about the attitude with which I have come to the Committee.
Finance: Loan Guarantee Scheme
Lord Peston Excerpts(12 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, the £40 billion infrastructure guarantee scheme is linked to nationally significant infrastructure projects. Typically, the promoters of those projects will not be SMEs, but of course there will be very many SMEs in the supply chain for the projects that will benefit. SMEs working in the public/private partnership space will also benefit from a possible £6 billion of additional loans that was also announced in this package, as will exporters, for whom a £5 billion export refinancing facility will be extended.
Lord Peston
My Lords, it is obvious that this loan guarantee scheme must involve immense risk because if there were no risk involved, the guarantee would not be required. How will the costs of meeting those risks enter into the public accounts, or will the Government try to fiddle the figures so that they do not eventually appear as public expenditure?
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, there will be no fiddling of the numbers by this Government on this or anything else. The position is very straightforward: the financing markets for these projects are extremely difficult but good projects are coming forward in the pipeline, and the beauty of the scheme is that we can use the strength of the government balance sheet. To answer the technical question, the infrastructure guarantees will be financial transactions and will have no impact on PSNB. A project would have an impact on PSND only if there was a non-negligible expected loss, which is not something that we anticipate. The guarantees will generally count as contingent liabilities, and that is very clear.
Financial Services Bill
Lord Peston Excerpts(12 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Kramer
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 110ZC, which stands in this group in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Sharkey. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, for her kind words. This amendment illustrates why I and, I suspect, this House and the other place had a preference for a parliamentary committee, which will report by the end of the year, over a judicial committee which will report in a couple of years, because the issue addressed in it would certainly have been resolved one way or the other by that point and, I suspect, with damaging effect. I hope that the Government will respond to the amendment by telling me that it is completely unnecessary, but it arises out of deep concern following various newspaper reports that have discussed the size of the liability that may fall on the banks involved in LIBOR manipulation. We are talking not just about the fines that come from the regulators—they are significant but small in the way of things for banks—but about the liabilities that may arise from the various actions that are now under way and others which I am sure will join them.
As the Committee will know, two cases are already under way in the United States. One is in the Southern District of New York, which is a class action lawsuit titled “In re LIBOR-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation”—the use of “antitrust” obviously has significant consequences—and the second is in the northern California district court, filed by Charles Schwab against a series of banks, including a number of UK banks. Charles Schwab claims in its complaint that “significant harm” has resulted from the mispricing of,
“tens of billions of dollars in LIBOR-based instruments”.
Its complaint outlines the methodology of comparing the banks’ LIBOR quotes with some market-based yields and CDS spreads. Some excellent work done by the securities analyst Cenkos estimates that the LIBOR quotes were understated by 30 to 40 basis points in some cases. Cenkos does a simple calculation to show that if LIBOR had been mis-stated by even five basis points over four years, on £1 trillion-worth of notional contracts, the damages would be £2 billion. We are therefore looking at multiples of billions of potential charges.
It struck us as we were looking at this and reading some of the stories about Barclays considering separating the bank into an investment bank and a retail bank—that is the direction in which we are going in this country through ring-fencing, and I am very much in favour of it—that there might be scope for organisations to decide that those liabilities generated by LIBOR manipulation could happily be sited in the retail part of banks rather than the investment part. I am afraid that that view comes with some cynicism, as many of us now would not put anything beyond the decision-making powers of some bank boards and directors.
We are seeking from the Government some stern comments to the effect that we have got this entirely wrong and that safeguards are in place. If it is not the case, we hope that someone will quickly pay attention, because the decisions that could set this process in train could happen fairly quickly. I think that every one of us here and the public at large would be shattered if that was the conclusion to this aspect of the scandal. This is in no way meant to be a comprehensive response to the amendments; it is one particular issue that struck us as being in need of immediate comment.
Lord Peston
My Lords, I listened with enormous interest to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and am sympathetic to what she said, but I cannot see how the amendment fits into this section of the Bill. If I have read it correctly, new Section 1D(2)(b) states that the integrity of the financial system includes,
“its not being used for a purpose connected with financial crime”.
As I understand it, these people have engaged in financial crime and been fined for it already. If the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, is to be believed, they will be brought before the courts to be examined some more. What unfair allocation does the noble Baroness have in mind? If some American investors have lost a great deal of money as a result of criminal activities by people connected with British banks, it would not be unfair if those banks had to meet the cost of those criminal claims. Is she saying that that would be unfair, or have I totally misunderstood the purpose of the amendment? It is most likely to be the latter.
Baroness Kramer
I would hesitate ever to say that the noble Lord, Lord Peston, had misunderstood any issue. Perhaps I can clarify. This is a probing amendment, and I cannot pretend that it is drafted with skill or placed in the Bill where, ultimately, a sophisticated legal mind— or, perhaps, the noble Lord—would put it. We felt that it was an issue that needed to be raised promptly. I fully accept that if courts decide that there is liability, that liability will be met, but if the institutions are dividing themselves into separate pieces and there is flexibility on where the liability is then allocated—into a retail entity or the investment banking entity—that is of acute interest.
Lord Peston
This sounds a bit like tax avoidance in a new version. If they separate the institution into two parts, they will then claim that there is a part that is not guilty. Is that the point of the amendment?
Baroness Kramer
I think that this is an issue that I will hand off to the Minister.
Lord Sassoon
If the noble Lord, Lord Davies, would permit me to complete the argument, I have explained that the FCA has an integrity objective, under which standards of professionalism need to be maintained by those in the industry. Within the overall integrity objective the FCA already has a mandate and powers to deal with these issues. It will specifically have powers to impose standards, including training and qualification, on individuals. Training, qualifications and minimum standards will be of considerable importance to the issue of re-establishing a proper banking culture. They are matters which will be relevant to the regulators’ consideration of applications by persons wishing to become approved to carry out significant influence functions, but it is a big step from that to the FCA mandating a training regime across all areas of financial services.
The forthcoming reviews, including that of the parliamentary Joint Committee, will show whether my analysis is right, or whether the committee believes that the FCA needs additional powers. To answer at least one of the challenges from the noble Lord, Lord Barnett, I refer back to the existence of the committee; this is going to be central to what it is looking at. I see one member of the committee nodding assent, but I think it is obvious.
Lord Peston
From what we know about the LIBOR scandal is it not valid to infer that, whoever these people engaging financial intermediation are, they are not a bunch of professionals? Is someone not going to have to be responsible for raising professional standards, or if not raising them then introducing them? I am surprised that the Government do not take this as seriously as they should.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, we take it extremely seriously and that is why we thought that it was right to set up the Joint Committee. Unlike the noble Lord, Lord Barnett, I do not doubt that it will get through its work efficiently, effectively and quickly.
Lord Sassoon
I recognise that we are giving it a big challenge and I am grateful to it for taking the challenge on, and for the terms of reference, but we should wait to see what it comes up with in this area. Even if it came up with nothing, there are adequate provisions. On another point that the noble Lord, Lord Barnett, raises, what will be different with the FCA? One of the things that will be different is that the Government are publishing new threshold conditions for all regulated firms. Indeed, they have been published today on the Treasury website in advance of the relevant clauses being debated in due course. They include tougher standards on the probity of staff and management in regulated firms. The noble Lord, Lord Barnett, is right to insist that tougher standards should be imposed by the FCA than the FSA, and that is exactly what we are doing. As ever, he is right on the ball and goes to the heart of the matter.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts
My Lords, my noble friend has moved a very interesting amendment. We may be in danger of confusing two issues. The noble Baroness referred to impenetrable language. I quite accept that, but that is a question not of financial literacy but of improving the form in which the communication is made. To try and deal with financial literacy is a much narrower issue than impenetrable language. I support her entirely, but I would also add the form and content. How often do we get a letter from our credit card company saying that it is going to amend the terms in which the credit card is offered? It is four pages of closely packed print and what do we do but drop it straight in the waste paper basket. However, the company has complied with the requirement. In those cases, the famous phrases “less is more”—less information, better focused—is what we should be all about.
That is an important point though not exactly what my noble friend was driving at. I think my noble friend was driving at something designed to deal with people at an earlier stage of their life. In particular, it has relevance to Amendment 104C, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Peston and Lord Barnett, about the unavoidability of some risk. One of the issues that has somehow got about in the world is that we can actually insulate people from risk. When we have financial literacy lessons, we need to emphasise to everybody that there is no product anywhere that does not carry some level of risk. I am looking forward to hearing the two noble Lords on this issue in a few minutes. I have only one question on my noble friend’s amendment. Who pays for all this?
Lord Flight
My Lords, at present it is effectively paid for via the charges of the FSA, which then go in a charitable form to pfeg and others and which is inadequate. However, one could turn it the other way round—one could do it how one wants. With schools teaching English literature, that is part of their budget. In my view, schools should be obliged to teach financial literacy and that should be part of their budget as well.
Lord Peston
My Lords, I am very sympathetic to the amendment and to what has been said by my noble friends. Unlike them, I am much less optimistic about what can be achieved, if anything. First, I will give the personal side. When I was at school, I was indebted, and have been indebted for the rest of my life, to my teachers for the guidance they gave me on the subjects that were taught in school. My love of English literature and my love of mathematics are two very good examples. However, if someone had said “Now we are going to have a class in finance”, I cannot believe that it would have been other than a turn-off. It would not have been what I went to school for.
Times have changed. I agree with that. However, the other thing is that is amazingly difficult to explain to people even the most elementary examples of financial literacy. To give one example, which is one of my bête noire, I come from a family of gamblers. I know that gambling is a mug’s game because to be a successful gambler, there are only two possibilities. Either one is corrupt and has some inside information or one is claiming—with the bookmaker creaming 10% off the top—that one is 10% cleverer than anybody else around, and there is absolutely no reason to believe that. When I have tried to explain that elementary proposition in financial literacy, I have found it impossible to persuade anybody at all. That is my personal experience. It does not mean that we should not try, but it does mean that there is a genuine question mark over what we can achieve. I am not saying that we should not try, but I am pessimistic.
I turn to the technical side of financial literacy. Perhaps noble Lords have read a brilliant speech given by Andrew Harvey of the Bank of England in 2009. It is on the Bank of England website. My strong advice to noble Lords is to look it up under “Speeches” rather than “Publications”. I wasted a good hour knowing that it was there but unable to find it. It is a brilliant analysis of the behaviour of financial intermediaries—which is after all the essence of financial literacy—and it is based on network analysis, which is a rather esoteric part of mathematics. I will read one paragraph from Andrew Harvey’s lecture, which I strongly recommend.
Lord Peston
Sorry—Andrew Haldane. I am not good on these things. Names are one of my Alzheimer’s problems. Mr Haldane says, in a typically short paragraph of his brilliant lecture:
“This evolution in the topology of the network”—
that is, the network of financial intermediaries—
“meant that sharp discontinuities in the financial system were an accident waiting to happen. The present crisis is the materialisation of that accident”.
Financial literacy means being able to understand those two sentences. I am not a bad mathematician but even I had difficulty with the topology of networks. That is the problem in this area. What you can teach at the level at which the noble Lord, Lord Flight, wants to teach, is very little indeed. As I said, that does not mean that we should not do it, but we should not delude ourselves that we can produce a financially literate population because most people simply do not have the mathematics to understand this kind of work. I cannot believe that anybody could write a non-mathematical explanation of what Andrew Haldane said.
Nothing I have said should stop us from trying—I am not going against the noble Lord, Lord Flight, on this—but financial literacy is not the easiest thing to achieve.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts
Does the noble Lord not agree that two or three basic things could be taught relatively easily? The first is the impact of inflation and how it affects the value of savings. The second is the impact of compound interest and the costs and returns of borrowing. Those two subjects do not require the brilliant mathematics of which the noble Lord alone is capable. Quite realistic, real-life examples could be given to people in their final two or three years at school.
Lord Peston
I have had a little experience of this. In my younger days in the Treasury we tried to persuade senior Treasury officials that capital investment projects ought to be dealt with by discounted cash flow. We were talking to senior officials who were brilliantly clever, but it was nearly impossible to teach them even about compound interest. When we had taught them compound interest, they had no idea how to convert it into discounting. Again, I am not saying that we should not teach compound interest in schools—quite the contrary. All I am saying is that it is not easy.
Lord Peston
My Lords, I very much agree with my noble friend Lady Hayter and with the noble Lord, Lord Flight, that competition is the best means of consumer protection. There are occasional counterexamples, but overwhelmingly that is what matters. However, it occurred to me while listening to the noble Lord’s reply that I do not now know which is the primary body in dealing with competition in the financial intermediary sector. Is there a straightforward answer to that? If I had been asked to guess, I would have guessed that it must be the new Competition and Markets Authority, because its remit is about competition, whereas the FCA’s remit is not. Can we have an answer to that? If we do not know the answer, could we be told the next time we meet who is the prime mover in this?
Lord De Mauley
I am pretty sure that the noble Lord is correct in his analysis, but if there is any change to that, I will write to him.
Baroness Oppenheim-Barnes
My Lords, I was delighted to add my name to that of the noble Lord, Lord Borrie, on this amendment. We go back a very long way to when I first entered the Department of Trade and Industry. The position of director-general of fair trading was coming up for renewal and my officials said to me, “Well, you will obviously want to appoint somebody from your own side, Minister”, to which I replied, “There is only one person with whom I would be entirely satisfied”. That was the noble Lord, Lord Borrie, and this has proved to be the case ever since.
This amendment is important. Perhaps I am not so happy with the term “fit for purpose” because I spent a great deal of my consumer life trying to find a better one, which I never did satisfactorily, in order that people could pursue their Sale of Goods Act rights. However, I will have more to say on this later—on Amendment 108, I think—when we reach that.
Lord Peston
My Lords, I supplement what my noble friend Lord Barnett and others have said about the built-in risk of pretty well every financial instrument that one might acquire. This amendment is very much in line with that made earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Flight, on education. Therefore, again I must add my cautionary note that it is very hard to persuade people that the world is full of risk, particularly when it comes to instruments that look risk-free—for example, a government bond, which our Government have never reneged on. However, if it is a bond fixed in nominal terms, there is always the risk of inflation so that the real rate of return is highly risky. In a second example, the date of repayment of the bond can be an issue, so that even with a perfectly honest Government who intend to pay on the due date, if you have to cash the bond in at a different date then there is risk involved. It is vital that people understand these kinds of examples.
The other risk, and I am not quite clear how we can approach it, essentially stems from the possibility that the people one is dealing with are corrupt. To take the obvious example, if you are offered a particular asset with a high nominal rate of return, is this because the financial intermediary offering you that asset is particular inefficient or because they are up to no good and the only way they can lay their hands on this money is with a high rate of interest?
It is often immensely hard to disentangle whether you are running a risk by acquiring such an asset, and perhaps the great WC Fields’s dictum is relevant here:
“Never give a sucker an even break”.
The world is full of people like WC Fields, but how is the ordinary person to know if they are dealing with one? It seems to me, therefore, that the relevant authorities have a responsibility at least to take on board their duty to be of assistance to people, partly in an educative way, and partly by controlling the behaviour of people themselves.
I very much look forward to hearing the noble Lord’s reply on the question of risk. However, to summarise, my main point is that if you are living in an area where there is no risk, then you are dead.
Lord De Mauley
That is right, my Lords. In fact, when we debated the previous group of amendments I spoke about the deliberations that the Department for Education is going through on that exact point, so I thank my noble friend for that.
The FCA will set the conduct-of-business regime within which firms will operate and the requirements with which they will have to comply. Just as the FSA does today, placing firms under detailed obligations to assess the suitability of products for individual clients, as well as specifying that warnings must be given to consumers who express an interest in buying a product that does not appear appropriate for their needs or their tolerance of risk. In addition, these requirements specify which risk factors must be highlighted in the case of specific products—for example, income withdrawals or the purchase of short-term annuities.
However, none of this means that it is the FCA that should be required to have regard to the need to educate consumers about the unavoidability of risk. The FCA is not a consumer education body—that is the role of the Money Advice Service—and neither is it an interlocutor between firms or advisers and consumers. So I cannot agree with that amendment.
The noble Lord, Lord Barnett, asked what an appropriate degree of protection would be. “Appropriate” is used to allow the FCA to differentiate between the different needs that consumers may have. The detail is set out in the FSA’s rules and will be transferred into the new FCA’s rules. I will not offer to send the noble Lord a copy of them because I suspect they might be quite voluminous, but if he would find it helpful I am sure I could send a reference to that particular point in them.
Lord Peston
Before the Minister goes on to the next amendment, my noble friend Lord Barnett’s and my amendment, if I may draw his attention to it, appears in a clause that is headed “The consumer protection objective” and refers to the FCA. How can the Minister make the illogical leap of saying that that does not concern the FCA? It says categorically in the clause that it concerns the FCA; its acronym appears under the consumer protection objective, in the words,
“the FCA must have regard to”.
It therefore seems entirely reasonable that the FCA should have regard to what my noble friend and I have suggested. You cannot possibly say that someone else should have regard to it, when the FCA is clearly a body that must do so.
Lord De Mauley
My Lords, I hope I have explained that the FCA is doing that through its conduct-of-business regulations and that the issue of education is dealt with in the ways that I have explained.
Lord Peston
As a matter of elementary logic, though, the Minister cannot wriggle away and say that the FCA is doing it some other way. This amendment is about consumer protection and the FCA must have regard to that. I would like an answer to why the Minister will not accept an amendment that says that the FCA must have regard to it in this specific way.
Lord De Mauley
My Lords, I think that I have said that the FCA has regard to it, but I cannot go much further than I have.
Lord De Mauley
I am sorry that the noble Lord is confused. I do not see the confusion that he does. Perhaps I may move on to Amendments 105A and 106.
Lord Peston
I would still like a rational answer to what I have put to the Minister. The least he can do is to say that he would like to think about it and come up with the right answer. Apart from anything else, it would do him a world of good.
Lord De Mauley
My Lords, I think that I have given the right answer but I am happy to write to the noble Lord, Lord Peston, if I can express it in a way that he might find more acceptable.
On Amendments 105A and 106, it is important to note that if we are to create the conditions in which consumers can make better choices for themselves, we need to address some of the asymmetries of information between consumers and providers that still prevail in financial services. I think that that is a point that noble Lords are making. That is why the Government added new subsection (2)(c) to new Section 1C, which will be inserted by Clause 5, before the Bill’s introduction to the parliamentary process. This provision requires the regulator to consider,
“the needs that consumers may have for the timely provision of information and advice that is accurate and fit for purpose”.
This provision complements the FCA’s new power to require firms to withdraw a financial promotion and disclose the fact that it has done so, as well as a new power to disclose at an early stage to the public that disciplinary enforcement action has commenced against a firm or individual. The FSA will carry out a root-and-branch review of transparency and disclosure on the part of firms and the regulator to be completed ahead of commencement of the Bill.
I agree with many of the points made by the Committee in terms of the improvements that we want to see, but I do not agree that Amendments 105A and 106 are necessary. I argue, for example, that referring to information being “fit for purpose” is, in modern idiom, a better way of achieving the aims that we all share. “Fit for purpose” is an umbrella term that includes, for example, information being legible, intelligible and appropriately presented. Information could not be fit for purpose if it was not also those things.
“Fit for purpose” is also broader and allows the regulator to differentiate between the needs of different consumers, to adapt its approach and perhaps to place additional requirements on firms where it considers this necessary. There may be requirements that we cannot anticipate at this point. Using a broad term such as this therefore gives flexibility and allows the regulator to be responsive to changing circumstances and market conditions. Being too exhaustive in the Bill could be unhelpful. However, it is also not appropriate, as the detailed requirements will be set out by the FCA in its rulebook.
I therefore argue that Amendment 105A is unnecessary, as fit for purpose already captures information being intelligible and appropriately presented. Amendment 106 could restrict the FCA’s ability to design a regime on the provision of information to consumers, as “intelligible” is a narrower term than “fit for purpose”.
Baroness Liddell of Coatdyke
My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord McFall in this amendment but I greatly regret the fact that the amendment is necessary. One of the reasons for my regret is the appalling reputation that the financial services industry is earning now as a consequence of the events of the past few years. It is a vital industry for the United Kingdom. It was based initially on the probity of the United Kingdom, which now has to be seriously questioned. It should not be necessary to put into a Bill a duty of care on vulnerable people. It should be a matter of course.
When my noble friend Lady Hayter began this afternoon’s debate, she referred to the issues that have caused such convulsions in the past few months and have led to a serious loss of trust in financial services in general. It would come as no surprise that some particularly vulnerable people, especially the elderly, would nowadays prefer to put their money in a sock under the bed because it is about the only place where it is likely to be safe.
If we are going to restore the integrity of the financial services industry, we as a Parliament must be prepared to show that we are prepared to speak up for the vulnerable. Those of us whose careers have taken us into the other place have had to deal with constituency cases. Quite frankly, a number of times I have felt like sending for the police when I have had constituents in with instruments that they have been sold, which, in many cases, have taken their entire savings away from them. You get not just the City spivs who you see on television programmes but people who live in a community selling wholly unsuitable products.
I suspect that the Minister will say that this legislation is not necessary. I urge him to reconsider that. If we do not put the consumer back again at the heart of the financial services industry, we will lose the competitive advantage that I hope we still retain despite the events of the past few years. We have to overstate to convince people that their interests are at the heart of what this country stands for in terms of financial services regulation.
Lord Peston
I support my noble friends, particularly my noble friend Lady Liddell. This takes us back to our earlier remarks today on the need for a professional body for the financial intermediary. I was very disappointed at the way in which the Government did not seem to recognise that as a matter of great concern. As I understand it, doctors have a professional body in the first place and, secondly, they have a code of conduct. Therefore, this sort of thing is not necessary for them because they know that that is how they have to behave. This is true of a number of other professions.
However, one group of people who claim to be professional—the financial intermediaries—have nothing like this at all. I think I am right in saying that there is no professional body whatever. The Government seem perfectly happy with that. They do not seem to see that they should at least encourage them to set up a professional body with a code of conduct, et cetera.
My noble friend Lady Liddell puts her finger on it when she says that we really should not be discussing this issue and that it should be taken for granted that the sort of things referred to by my noble friend Lord McFall could not happen. In a decent society, that should be the case. However, it is not the case. One of the great things about this House, until we are all thrown out, is that your Lordships accept their responsibilities, although our successors may not. It is important to draw attention to what responsibilities should exist in society. I believe that the Government should respond positively to my noble friend’s amendment.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara
My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord McFall. I declare an interest as chair of the Consumer Credit Counselling Service, the country’s leading debt advice and debt management charity. I want to focus in particular on people who struggle with debt, often because they have got into arrears with their credit cards or personal loans and other consumer credit products, but also because of mortgage arrears, rent arrears and, increasingly, fuel and utility debts and council tax.
CCCS has helped more than 1.5 million people in the past three years and about half of them told us that unemployment or reduced income were the main reasons for their debt problems. People also say that life events such as illness or separation can quickly overwhelm family finances and cause or contribute to mounting debt. What they find is that debt is rarely a problem in isolation. There are nearly always other factors that need to be addressed, including the link between problem debt and depression. Nearly half of CCCS clients said they had been worrying about their debts for a year or more before seeking help from a debt advice provider. Around a third of people said that their debt problems had weakened their relationships or led to a break-up. Nearly half said that debt had shattered their self-confidence to support themselves and their families.
The pre-crash boom in consumer credit, which peaked in about 2007, also remains a key part of the UK debt narrative. Even after several years of near zero lending, the total outstanding secured and unsecured debt is still some 91% higher than it was 10 years ago—so it is a pretty bad picture. Research for CCCS by the Financial Inclusion Centre concluded that some 6.2 million households are currently either already in financial difficulty or at risk of getting there, and it is going to get worse.
The IFS estimates that real median household incomes will fall by 7.1% between 2009-10 and 2013-14 as a result of low growth and fiscal tightening, the largest decline since the 1974-77 fall of 7.5%. Unemployment remains at a stubbornly high 8.3%, or 2.65 million people, although it has just reduced. Youth unemployment sits at 22%—more than one in five young workers is without a job. This is particularly worrying as we know that time spent not in employment, education or training as a young adult can have a scarring effect as well as reducing earnings.
At the same time, we are experiencing an extended period where households are facing rising costs for essential goods and services. Food, fuel and transport costs are rising sharply and we will sooner or later face a rise in interest rates, which are unnaturally low at present. Figures from the Financial Inclusion Centre show that if living costs rise by more than £50 per week, it would double the percentage of households—which is currently 30%—who have no spare cash at the end of the month.
There is surely sufficient evidence in what I have said that the idea that consumers should be required to take full responsibility for their decisions does not accord with what happens in the real world. My noble friend Lord McFall made this point very eloquently, and we strongly support his idea that in considering what degree of consumer protection may be appropriate, the FCA must have regard to the differing ability, disability and vulnerability of different consumers.
However, it goes further than that. The FCA has also got to take into account what the CCCS and FIC research tells us about the way people’s history and the impact of family issues, illness and relationships interact with their credit arrangements. Families are being squeezed hard at both ends, with incomes and expenditure under pressure. The Bill ought to be amended to reflect less of the theory of caveat emptor and be more reflective of what is happening on the ground.