Lord Sassoon
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Financial Services Bill
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Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I rise to raise an important issue concerning the conduct of the Committee stage of the Bill. On 3 October—last Wednesday—I wrote to the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, in these terms:
“The Wheatley study on the future of LIBOR has produced a series of conclusions with which the Labour Party is broadly in agreement. I congratulate both Martin Wheatley and his team for their achievement, and the Government for initiating this investigation.
I note from the statements of Treasury ministers, and from the Treasury website, that it is the Government’s intention to implement the Wheatley proposals by means of amendments to the Financial Services Bill. No such amendments have been tabled as of yesterday”.
That was 2 October, and indeed no amendments have been tabled as of today.
“I presume that such amendments will involve predominantly clauses that have not yet been debated (as suggested by reference to particular FSMA clauses in the Wheatley Report itself)”.
The Wheatley report refers to the first clause that we will debate today.
“However, it is possible that you will also need to introduce amendments to clauses already debated, in which case it would be entirely inappropriate to introduce such amendments at Report. Given the importance of these issues it is imperative that the House have the opportunity to debate these matters in the freedom of Committee, rather than under the constrained rules of the Report Stage.
May I therefore have your assurance that should the Government, as a consequence of the Libor scandal and of the recommendations in the Wheatley Report, plan to introduce amendments to clauses 1 to 5, or at some later stage, amendments to clauses at that time already debated, that you will re-commit the appropriate clauses, hence ensuring that the House of Lords has the scope for full debate”.
It has since become clear that the Government intend to introduce on Report all the entirely new material presaged in the Wheatley report. The noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, wrote to me on 2 October—the day before I wrote to him which was somewhat mysterious. He said:
“I do not believe that it is necessary to recommit the Bill, and see no reason why a substantive debate on the relevant clauses at Report stage would offer insufficient opportunity for scrutiny by the House.
Re-commitment would risk unnecessarily delaying the implementation of both these important reforms to LIBOR setting processes, and of the equally urgent reform of the UK’s financial regulation regime which we have been debating through the Committee sessions to date”.
The noble Lord’s reply does not take into account what I actually asked for. First, I was not asking for total recommitment. I was asking only for the clauses which deal with entirely new material from the Wheatley report to be recommitted. Secondly, I believe very strongly that with respect to financial regulation it is not an issue of quibbling about delay but of getting it right. These enormously complex matters deserve the iterative consideration which is possible only in Committee. I remind noble Lords that on Report they can speak only once. Thirdly, it is quite wrong to deny this House the opportunity to consider entirely new and complex material within a Committee setting. I would therefore ask the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, to reconsider his rejection of my proposal that the relevant clauses be recommitted.
If he is unwilling to do that, perhaps I may make a constructive proposal. Either he or the Chief Whip, who unfortunately is not in her place, should give an assurance that the rules of Report will be relaxed for consideration of what might be called the “Wheatley” clauses when they are introduced.
Lord Barnett
I warmly agree with my noble friend on the Front Bench, and it gives me an opportunity to refer to the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, himself. In the Recess I read with regret that he proposes to retire at the end of this year. He and I have had a few exchanges across the Floor and I will miss them, but I look forward to continuing with those exchanges until the end of the year.
Not only do I agree with my noble friend in the points he has made about the Bill, what is even more important is that the whole Bill should be dropped for the moment. There is no hurry for it and much of it will cause great damage to financial services in this country. As the noble Lord, in his new position, is no longer going to be quite so subservient to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, I certainly hope that he can tell us the truth, drop the Bill for the time being and, as my noble friend has suggested, come back to the House with a new one.
The Commercial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Sassoon)
My Lords, I thought we were going to talk about some clauses on LIBOR, but we have now strayed, in the imaginative way that the noble Lord, Lord Barnett, does, into scrapping the Bill. I can assure the House that the Government intend to carry on with this Bill according to the timetable because it is vital that we get the financial regulatory architecture right. It is an architecture that failed us miserably in the financial crisis, so we will of course press on with the Bill.
As noble Lords know, LIBOR is the most significant interest rate benchmark used by the market—not just the UK market, but globally. It underpins contracts worth at least $300 trillion, so it is imperative that market confidence in the rate is restored quickly in order to ensure that, in the future, contributors to this benchmark act with greater integrity, promoting financial stability, legal certainty and business continuity. It is important to be clear about that. It is also important to be clear that the Government have not yet announced our response to the Wheatley review, so what the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, raises is a somewhat hypothetical question at the moment. He notes correctly that my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer has indicated that the Financial Services Bill is the Government’s preferred legislative vehicle to implement new policy arising from the review. Should the Government decide to accept Martin Wheatley’s recommendations in full, we anticipate that the clauses which would implement the review will indeed be debated at the Report stage of this Bill, and the draft clauses will be published in good time in advance of that date.
As noble Lords with longer experience of the House than me will well know, recommitment is an extremely unusual procedure. Notwithstanding what the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, says, it would risk causing delay not only to these important reforms of the LIBOR setting processes but to the Bill itself. It is quite routinely the case that government amendments setting out new policy are tabled at the Report stage, and in this case, as the noble Lord has confirmed, there is broad cross-party consensus in favour of the policy. There has already been wide debate of the issues during the period when Mr Wheatley was carrying out his work. In the light of that, I believe that substantive debate on the relevant clauses at the Report stage will offer sufficient opportunity for scrutiny by the House, but I am sure that, in the normal way, the usual channels will consider the business of the House, as they always do. That is the appropriate way to carry this sort of thing forward.
This is a significant piece of legislation, which has already benefited from a very constructive approach to scrutiny from your Lordships’ House. We will do all we can to reinforce that debate including on any clauses we bring forward on LIBOR through, among other channels, briefing parliamentarians separately outside the formal debate. However, I suggest that for this afternoon it might be more productive to carry on with the sixth day of our scrutiny of the Bill.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, although I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, that it is enormously important that we improve the flow of funding to small firms, particularly given the complete failure of the Government’s attempts to improve the funding through banks to small firms, I believe that we should approach this proposal with great care. The problem with crowd funding is that crowds can often be subject to hysteria. We have seen hysterical funding levels in what might be deemed to be fashionable or popular companies: lastminute.com comes to mind, as does the recent launch of Facebook. In both cases, excessive hysteria associated with the popularity of the particular company led to investors losing quite a lot of money.
However in the SME sector, the fundamental problem for small investors is the risk to which they are exposed. They will necessarily have significantly less information than they would from a listed company. Given that lack of information, and the high mortality rate of small and medium-sized companies—thankfully they have a high birth-rate as well—it is likely to lead to a lot of not-very-well-off people losing significant sums of money.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, I will put some things to one side before I deal with the main substance of my noble friend’s argument in this short and interesting debate around crowd funding. First, for the help of the noble Lord, Lord Barnett, there is indeed no Section 417 because crowd funding has been introduced into this Bill by my noble friend Lord Sharkey. I am sure that in due course he will table a Section 417 which will make us all a lot clearer about the definition. However, for the interim benefit of the noble Lord, Lord Peston, and rather than me banging on about what crowd funding is and boring the rest of the House, I draw his attention to the FSA guidance on this topic put out in August this year. It gives a helpful short introduction to what it is all about.
Lord Peston
Perhaps I may interrupt the Minister. As I listened to my noble friend, it suddenly dawned on me what we were talking about. It really does mean crowd funding and, following what my noble friend said, there is a very simple answer to it: do not do it.
Lord Sassoon
That is one way of dealing with it, but it is not the way in which the Government wish to deal with it, which I shall explain in a moment. I say to my noble friend Lord Stewartby that I have a hunch that before we pass this clause we will have a discussion about timetabling. If he will forgive me, I shall come back to the matter then, but if we do not I will make sure that I raise the timetable in question later.
Crowd funding is an innovative new source of funding for start-ups and other small enterprises. I share my noble friend’s hope that it will continue to grow in the coming years, so my answer to his first question is a resounding yes. However, on his second question, which is the subject of the amendment, while I understand my noble friend’s enthusiasm for establishing discrete legislative provision to bring this very new sector into regulation, I do not agree that it is needed at this stage and so cannot accept the amendment.
My noble friend raised the US JOBS Act. In the US, there was a very distinct problem and a pressing need, which led to the introduction of that Act. The situation is different in the UK. Among other things, there has been no clarion call from industry for more regulation. However, we should not be complacent, and the FSA is not waiting until there is a problem before doing things.
Platforms seeking to operate what are in effect collective investment schemes must obtain authorisation from the FSA. The FSA already has powers to take action against firms operating without appropriate authorisation. It is up to the FSA to work with platforms seeking to offer equity returns to their investors to ensure that they obtain relevant permissions before the activity that is most likely to apply here—arranging deals in investments—starts. This is happening already, with one such platform securing authorisation from the FSA prior to its launch.
Of course, the regulator must balance the need to allow innovative models to flourish with ensuring that consumers understand the risks involved with new platforms. In this regard, the FSA’s recent guidance on crowd funding makes clear its concerns, which are evidently shared by the noble Lord, Lord Peston. This is the right sort of regulatory response. It shows that we should not rush to create new regulated activities here.
I am also concerned that amending the Bill in this way could create confusion that stifled the growth of the new sector. There are currently many forms of crowd funding. We do not yet know precisely what definition my noble friend had in mind, but the vast majority of these platforms ask customers to make donations rather than investments. They have been very successful in doing that. The world’s largest crowd-fundng site, Kickstarter, for example, which will launch in the UK very soon, raised more than $100 million for creative projects in the past year. A platform such as that does not pose the same risks to investors, who expect no money in return for their donation, so we have to be mindful of the risk of legislating in a way that does not fully take account of the breadth of the businesses in this new area.
In conclusion, although industry standards and further FSA and FCA guidance may have an important role to play in future, my view is that the regulatory structure proposed in the Bill is suitably flexible to support the growth of the full variety of crowd-funding platforms, with a careful eye on the needs of the consumer throughout. With that, I hope that my noble friend will agree to withdraw his probing amendment.
Lord Sharkey
I thank the noble Lord for his answer. The noble Lord, Lord Peston, invited me to extend his education, but I think I should decline any such attempt. The noble Lord, Lord Barnett, did not believe that there was a definition there, and he was right—there is no definition. I shall not do it again now, but I did try to explain what forms crowd funding currently takes. Perhaps I did not give a clear impression of how important or what size it currently is, and that is my fault, but crowd funding exists and plays quite a large part in the landscape of small companies, both in the United States and already here in the United Kingdom.
I think I noticed an expression of perhaps amazement on the face of the noble Lord, Lord Peston, at the notion that people should donate $100 million to commercial enterprises for no return at all—an aspect of crowd funding that clearly he was not familiar with.
Lord McFall of Alcluith
I support my colleague’s comments on this clause. Only last week I received a text saying that there was £2,200 waiting for me to claim as a result of that; I think, therefore, that something needs to be done. In relation to PPI, only six weeks ago both the banks and the consumer organisations had a meeting to sort out the problem with claims management simply because they said that the Ministry of Justice is not fit to look at it at this time. There are big problems here for the Minister; there needs to be consultation. If he gave us an indication today that the department was engaging in that, it would give some reassurance to those who are plagued by claims management companies at the moment.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, my comments on Amendments 147L and 147M will be brief, because we discussed both issues in some depth in earlier sessions of the Committee. Amendment 147L seeks to enable the activities of debt adjusting and debt management to be regulated under the Financial Services and Markets Act. I can reassure the Committee on this point. The effect of Amendment 147L is already achieved by Clause 6, which enables all activities currently regulated by the Office of Fair Trading under the Consumer Credit Act to be transferred to the FCA under FSMA. I hope that is a very clear answer and the direct reassurance for which the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, was asking.
I will not be quite as brief on Amendment 147M; this continues to be an important area even though we have discussed it before. The amendment seeks to add the services provided by claims management companies to the list of matters that can be regulated under FSMA. I set out in some detail in a past session of the Committee why I do not believe that the activities of claims management companies should be regulated by the FCA. The key point is that claims management companies are not financial services firms. Yes, it is correct that a substantial proportion of their activity at the moment relates to financial services, but—as the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, has pointed out—they may move their focus of attention back to, or on to, something quite different in the future. However, that does not alter the fact that they focus on financial services at the moment. It does not alter the fact that they have no place in the scope of a regulator concerned with financial services and only financial services, which is what we are talking about here.
I agree, of course, with the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, that there are a lot of detrimental practices in the sector that need to be tackled. I reiterate that work that is already under way to strengthen the existing regime for the regulation of claims management companies. Before the summer, I flagged that the claims management unit at the Ministry of Justice was doing work to strengthen the conduct of rules governing the sector. That work is proceeding apace and further steps are being taken. I will take back the noble Baroness’s comment about resources but I have no evidence that this work is being hampered by inadequate resources.
Baroness Sherlock
I am very grateful to the Minister. If the barrier is not resources, will he advise the Committee of what he thinks it is? If there is no problem, is he satisfied with the regulation at present?
Lord Sassoon
I am not satisfied with the conduct in the industry, which is why in August, since we last debated these matters, as the noble Baroness I am sure is aware, the Ministry of Justice announced that, from April 2013, claims management companies will be banned from offering financial rewards or similar benefits as an inducement to make a claim. I understand why there are concerns but, since we last discussed these matters, there has been significant progress.
As has already been noted in this debate, proposals have been consulted on to tighten the conduct rules with which all claims management companies must comply as a condition of their licence. The consultation closed on 3 October and the responses are now being considered. Again, the target date for implementation is April 2013. Also from 2013, the Government intend to extend the Legal Ombudsman’s jurisdiction to provide an independent complaints and redress service for clients dissatisfied with the service provided to them by the claims management companies with which they have contracted.
I believe that significant and important work is going on, and that that is the right approach. I hope I have been clear on why I cannot support proposals to make the FCA responsible for claims management regulation, which applies as much now as it will in future. The Government will therefore not be including the activities of claims management companies in the enabling provisions in Clause 6. With reassurance on the first amendment and the explanation of all the work going on more generally, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara
I thank the Minister for his response. I accept his assurances on Amendment 147L, and I am grateful to him for making it very explicit that the intention and the practice will be that debt management companies will clearly come under the scope of FiSMA and therefore the FCA. Perhaps I may leave with him the thought that there may be a slight divergence of view, unlikely as that may seem, within the Government. As I mentioned in my introductory speech, there is still an ongoing commitment by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills to produce some sort of protocol which will affect all DMPs. I may write to the Minister about this but it seems to me that where we have an assurance on his behalf that there will be full coverage of DMPs within the scope of the current Bill, as he mentioned, it is not quite clear where BIS and its draft protocol will lie. I should like some assurance on that but I will not contest this on that point.
If I understood the Minister correctly, I think he was making three points on Amendment 147M. The first is that, in a way that is clear to him but not, I am afraid, to me, claims management companies are not financial services companies. If they are dealing with claims, they are dealing in some sense with a form of financial service. The examples we have had, which move away from pure financial services, concerned whiplash injuries. It seems to me that these companies would not be involved if there was no money somewhere in the circuit. Therefore, if that money is available to an individual who wishes to claim for it and is being assisted by a CMC, under a very broad definition, that would be a financial service.
Lord Sassoon
I do not want to be picky on this point but would the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, contend that the legal profession, which deals with claims all day every day to recover money for people, should be brought within the regulation of the FCA? I clearly said that at the moment it is dealing with some very important matters which are financial services matters but that is very different from defining a claims management company as a financial service. Is the noble Lord suggesting that lawyers and all sorts of other people who deal with money should be defined as such?
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara
It is not for me to suggest anything. I simply wish to draw out that, simply because of the name or the fact that, on occasion, these companies do not deal strictly with financial services, they are somehow excluded from any regulatory oversight of their activities. Yes, to extend the point as the Minister does makes it seem unlikely, but they deal with financial services at the moment and are unregulated in that sense. I just want to make clear our feeling that this is something to which we may have to return.
My second point is that the Minister said that detrimental practices exist in the sector and that he was not satisfied with the situation, yet he has decided that there is no need for any further action in the Bill. That seems a little unrelated to the facts as we understand them.
Thirdly, he made the point, which we accept, that there are other activities going on here. Indeed, we hear that there will be a report shortly on the result of the consultation done by the Ministry of Justice and we may be able to look forward to action in April 2013. Therefore, I think that we need to keep this under review to see whether the movement is in the direction that we wish it to be to focus more clearly on where claims management companies are operating within the financial sector, and that the detrimental practices get sorted out. With those thoughts in mind, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Sassoon
I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Noakes for raising questions about timetabling. I am very aware that we are putting an enormous burden on industry with many aspects of the implementation of the Bill. Of course, the flood of European regulation does not wait just because we are putting our own house in order in an architectural sense through this Bill. So the Government are very well aware of the issues here.
Before I deal briefly with the specifics on consumer credit, it may be worth confirming, or announcing, the Government’s plans on the cutover date between the FSA and the new authorities. That is something that it is necessary for the industry to have certainty about, even before you get on to consumer credit. To provide the certainty that enables industry and the new authorities to proceed with their planning, we are now sufficiently advanced in the Bill process to announce that our intention is to deliver cutover to the new authorities created by the Bill on 1 April 2013.
When it comes to consumer credit, we are aware of the need to allow both the FCA and the many firms involved to manage the transition smoothly. We will continue to work closely with the FSA, the OFT and all stakeholders to identify the best approach to implementing the new regime and will consider phased introduction of any new requirements. As my noble friend rightly identifies, Clause 91 allows for significant flexibility in the approach to implementation. We will consider the best approach. As my noble friend knows, we are not final in our thinking on this. We are considering options which could involve temporary grandfathering of firms with a licence under the Consumer Credit Act who wish to transfer to the new FiSMA regime. That would deal with some of the concerns by giving both firms and the regulator more time to prepare. We will, of course, consult on the transition arrangements as well as the detailed proposals for the new FCA regime early in 2013.
I hope I have been able to reassure my noble friend that we do indeed take seriously these concerns and the timing of the basic cutover. That is why we have put flexibility into the Bill and we will use it for this purpose.
Lord Davies of Oldham
My Lords, I am grateful to both my noble friends who have spoken on this issue and very much agree with the arguments they presented. Amendment 149AB in my name merely seeks to take this matter one obvious stage further. My noble friends have put the emphasis on effective consultation so that the Treasury presents a position that is the result of informed judgment. However, the other part of informed judgment is that Parliament should reach a decision on what the Treasury has arrived at regarding such an important matter as the powers to amend Schedule 6 of the Financial Services and Markets Act. The Bill significantly changes the architecture, which is a phrase frequently used by the Minister. With our amendment, we are merely seeking assurance that, after effective consultation and deliberation by the Treasury, the orders are put before Parliament, whereby its views can be heard before anything comes into effect.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, I shall try to assure the Committee that none of the amendments is necessary or appropriate. If the noble Lord, Lord Peston, will forgive me, I am not sure that we have a procedure for oral amendments. No doubt we shall have some interesting discussions about “must” and “may” later in this Committee session. Looking at this paragraph, in my opinion, x or y “will” be the case and, when written the other way, the word turns into “would”. If an opinion is that something will be the case, then “would” rather than “should” is entirely appropriate here. However, I have now fallen into the trap of getting into a debate on this non-amendment. Of course, if the noble Lord really insists, what can I do but give way?
Lord Peston
If the Minister will read a few lines further on in his own Bill, he will see the words,
“by reason of urgency, it is necessary to make the order”.
That can make sense only if the word “should” is used. It cannot possibly be a meaningful part of the Bill if the word “would” is used. The Treasury must believe that there is a reason of urgency for this to take place and so we infer that “should” is the right word. Otherwise, reasons do not apply, and it reads more like something happening by chance, so let it happen. However, that is not what this bit of the Bill is about. I hate to tell the noble Lord, but on this point I think I understand his Bill better than he does.
Lord Sassoon
On this occasion, I am quite confident in my use of the English language, even if the noble Lord understands the Bill better. Outside the Chamber we can debate who understands the Bill better. I am quite clear that “would” is the correct word here because it refers to something which is expected to have the effect of extending regulation. I shall not detain the Committee on what we are not discussing, so let us talk about what we are discussing.
Amendment 148 would require the Treasury to consult on the order made under Section 22 where it would result in an unregulated activity becoming regulated. The Government recognise the best practice established in this area by the Department for Business’s code of practice on consultation. I can assure the Committee that the Government will continue to observe the code wherever possible when conducting formal written consultations. However, I do not think that it would be appropriate to write this requirement into this legislation, as it is not written into many other pieces of legislation. Indeed, the Government generally consult on changes to the regulated activities order. I cannot find any case to date where the Government have introduced substantive changes without consultation. Having said that, it may not be appropriate in all cases: for example, if an urgent change needs to be made to bring an activity into prudential regulation that may cause a financial stability risk. For that additional reason, I think it would be wrong to require consultation.
Amendment 149 would require the Treasury to consult on the first Section 22A order and any subsequent orders which amend the scope of PRA regulation or which amend primary legislation. The Section 22A order sets out the scope of PRA regulation. Here, too, the Government agree—and I am happy to restate it—that it is preferable to consult, and indeed the Treasury will be consulting on a draft of the Section 22A order shortly. I do not think it is necessary to write such requirements into legislation.
It is also worth the Committee noting that both of these types of orders would be subject to the affirmative procedure in all cases. Parliament will always have the chance to consider these amendments, and to consider whether the Government have presented suitable evidence—through a consultation in the normal event—of the need for any change. I think that that backstop is an important point here.
I turn now to Amendment 149AB in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Oldham. He has tabled, I think, only one amendment out of the many hundreds that this Committee has already considered and because I made a concession on it, his batting order is going down from a 100% to a 50% success rate at a stroke. I agree with the noble Lord that orders made by the Treasury that amend Schedule 6 should be subject to the affirmative procedure as they concern changes to the PRA’s and FCA’s threshold conditions, which are the cornerstones of each authority’s regulatory approach. However, we have already provided for this. Clause 46(2), on page 130, includes orders made under Section 55C in the list of orders that should be subject to the affirmative procedure. Therefore it is a simple matter to understand that Amendment 149AB is not needed.
I move to Amendment 174, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McFall of Alcluith. I will briefly explain the purpose of new Section 141A of FiSMA. It gives the Treasury and the Secretary of State a narrow and technical order-making power to amend legislation that makes reference to the rules of either regulator or to guidance issued by the FCA where the regulator has altered or revoked its rules. This is a sensible approach to ensuring that references to rules and guidance made by the regulator in legislation remain accurate and up to date.
It would not be appropriate to require the Treasury or the Secretary of State to engage in consultations before making amendments to legislation that are a direct consequence of changes to rules or guidance made by the regulator. This would cause unhelpful delays to the process of updating the affected legislation, causing possible confusion and uncertainty for firms and other persons affected. Of course, except in cases of urgency there will already have been consultation on the substantive changes being made to the rules or guidance, as this is required of the regulators.
I hope that with those explanations the noble Lord, Lord McFall, will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord McFall of Alcluith
My Lords, it was not my primary aim to promote a deeper understanding of the English language but I did enjoy the exchanges. However, I now beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Flight
My Lords, I have previously raised the issue of the potential costs of the regulatory regime, which will ultimately fall on clients. I have also raised the common sense aspect. I suggest in part a reply to the very fair points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell: why on earth should both regulators have to be involved with the approval of a bank? Approval of a bank is fundamentally about its capital, the soundness of its shareholders and the propriety of its directors. The approval stage is not really about whether what it intends to do meets all the potential consumer interest elements; it is about its safety and its propriety.
In essence, the amendments in my name would remove the need for the PRA to consult the FCA over the authorising of a bank. The subsequent amendments make corresponding alteration to the regulatory actions, such as variation of permission, cancellation of permission and imposition of requirements.
I think that I may be the only Member of this House present today who has been through a bank application process with the FSA, having had responsibility for steering the Metro Bank application. That is an issue on which I could speak in greater depth. I was surprised to have someone from BIS contact me and ask whether they could come along and talk to me about it. In many ways, the crisis was at its height at that time and one can understand the FSA being extremely cautious and changing its approach, but taking a year and a half was quite excessive. There is already much improvement in the way in which the FSA is looking to deal with banking applications, but involving another organisation that does not have prime responsibility for banking safety is unnecessary from the perspective both of costs and of the delay and complication involved in meeting the key elements required for approval of a banking licence.
Lord Sassoon
As my noble friend Lord Flight has explained, his amendments would remove the requirement for the FCA to consent to authorisation decisions taken by the PRA relating to banks and other deposit-takers, including the decision to grant or remove permission. I should say at the outset that I cannot accept this group of amendments.
My noble friend spoke about his direct personal experience, of which I am aware, of going through an authorisation with the FSA. He will understand from that that, when the FSA approaches the authorisation of a bank or other deposit-taker, it now looks both at matters that will be within the ambit of the PRA and at matters that will be within the ambit of the FCA. As he will understand, if it was to be a matter only for the PRA, it would be an authorisation process that dropped a certain amount of what is done at the moment. I know full well that the FSA’s authorisation processes were becoming very slow. I am glad that my noble friend acknowledged that it has worked hard at improving them because it is important that the barriers to new entry are lowered as far as possible.
However, I should explain why I believe that it would be unsafe to drop the FCA leg of the authorisation process. Yes, the process should be improved in the way that is happening already, but half of it should not be dropped. The PRA will be responsible, as we know, for the prudential regulation of deposit-takers, including banks, but with the FCA being responsible for the conduct regulation of such firms. The authorisation process for a deposit-taker will be led by the PRA, but the FCA’s consent will be required before an approval can be granted and before a firm can acquire permission for any new activities once it has been authorised. It will be a dual authorisation and regulation process, as we know.
It is right that these matters should be looked at before a firm starts to get into business, rather than leaving it, as my noble friend suggests, to afterwards, because it is going to be much more costly to address issues within firms following authorisation if they were to engage in activities that the FCA believed to be inappropriate in any way. This is particularly important for the FCA, which is going to be looking at many more firms than the PRA. It is not only for the safety of the system but it will ultimately lower the cost in terms of the regulatory burden on firms and, as my noble friend says, in the end on the users of financial services if problems can be nipped in the bud or sorted out before they become an issue.
One only has to look at and think about the example of PPI. I know that it is not precisely the point that my noble friend makes, but PPI shows, lest we forget it, that deposit-takers can put consumers as much at risk as any other part of the industry, if their conduct is not appropriate. The FCA will have a significant role in the authorisation process, in assessing the range of products being proposed by the applicant, its systems and controls, and its processes for treating customers fairly, including dealing with complaints, ensuring that the business is not being used for a purpose connected with financial crime and promoting effective competition in the interests of consumers.
The Government believe that these issues need to be addressed up front as an absolute requirement. As a practical matter, if we went down the route that my noble friend suggests, dealing with problems as they came up afterwards, it not only would be to the detriment of consumers but would ultimately be more costly in terms of the regulatory burden. I hope that with those explanations my noble friend will be able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Flight
My Lords, I suggest that the areas that the Minister referred to are already in the rulebook and in the legislation. Anyone going into business knows that they have to be good boys and behave appropriately. Authorisation of a bank at the beginning is concerned with the essentials: is there enough capital, is the banking plan safe and are the proposed directors proper people? That is what the FSA has now pulled itself back to looking at. I do not think that the FSA—while it still exists—is looking at all these other issues; it is looking at the fundamentals of a bank.
In my view, there is a muddle between the ongoing regulation and what matters up front. I remain of the view that there is a very strong common-sense and functional case for limiting the approval and granting of licences for banks to the PRA. I will add that I have found that a number of heavies, from both the regulatory world and related territories, strongly agree with this point and perceive dualling it up as adding to both costs and complications. However, I am sure that we can return to this matter on Report and hope I may persuade the noble Lord to think again on this point. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw.
Lord Sassoon
“Notification55Z1 Notification of ESMA
A regulator must notify ESMA of—(a) the giving by it of a Part 4A permission to an investment firm, where the regulated activities to which the permission relates are investment services and activities,(b) the giving by it of a Part 4A permission to a management company (as defined in section 237(2)), where the regulated activities to which the permission relates fall within paragraph 8 of Schedule 2,(c) the cancellation by it of a Part 4A permission of a description falling within paragraph (b), or(d) the cancellation by it of a Part 4A permission under section 55J(6), in reliance on any one or more of the conditions in section 55K(1)(b) to (d).55Z2 Notification of EBA
(1) A regulator must notify EBA of—
(a) the giving by it of a Part 4A permission to a credit institution, where the regulated activity to which the permission relates falls within paragraph 4 of Schedule 2,(b) the cancellation by it of a Part 4A permission of a description falling within paragraph (a).(2) “Credit institution” has the meaning given in section 1H(8).”
Lord Davies of Oldham
My Lords, Amendment 153A relates to that part of the Bill which refers to passporting, where a UK-authorised firm may be eligible to carry out its permitted activities in any other EEA member state, subject, of course, to its fulfilment of the requirements under the scope of the relevant single market directive. We are concerned about consumer protection for firms operating in other EEA states which originate in this country. The amendment, which is quite clear and self-explanatory, requires either the FCA or the PRA to require banks to provide clear and prominent warnings to customers where deposits will not be covered by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. Everyone will know the anxieties that have occurred as a result of the proliferation of a vast range of banking activities. This is a question of the basic operation of the bank elsewhere, and we think that the Bill should contain a fundamental identification of the obligation of banks so that customers know exactly where they stand with regard to any resources they may have committed to the banks. I beg to move.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, I completely agree about the importance of such warnings and clarity about what compensation schemes apply to particular bank accounts, which is precisely why it is already covered in the FSA’s handbook. As the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Oldham, may not be aware, section “Comp 16” of the FSA handbook requires precisely what the noble Lord requires. Firms from the EEA passporting into the UK are required to inform customers that they are covered by their home state’s scheme. Firms from outside the EEA are required to be separately authorised in the UK, so that they are covered by the FSCS. We completely agree on the importance of this and of raising consumer awareness of it. Again, lots of good stuff went on in many areas during the summer and this is another one. If the noble Lord and the Committee generally want to look at the press release, it was put out on 31 August and sets out details of the FSCS awareness campaign. The notes to editors in it make clear the different health warnings that have to be put down for UK branches of EEA banks and the precise form of words. I do not happen to bank with one of those banks; I bank with a British bank which now adds an extra page—it is not great for the environment, but the extra page sets out the details of the coverage of the FSCS and EEA banks are now required to do something similar.
The noble Lord makes a very good point, but I believe that we should leave it to the FSCS and the regulators to do what they are already doing, rather than writing inflexible requirements into legislation. The advantage of the current approach, as I am sure he will acknowledge, is that the regulator and FSCS can adapt their approach over time, but it is a useful matter for us to have spent four minutes on and I hope that the noble Lord is able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Marlesford
May I just make one very small point to my noble friend? I declare an interest straightaway as a modest customer of the national savings bank. Along with many other people, I suspect, I assumed that if one had money in the national savings bank there was no way in which one would not be paid, however much money one had in it, in the event of any sort of default. When it transpired a couple of years ago that the national savings bank had put most of its money into the Bank of Ireland, certain fears were raised. It then became clear that the rules on the limit of compensation applied to money deposited with the national savings bank, just as they did to anything else. There was an implicit guarantee by reputation, as it were, on money put in the national savings bank, and the noble Lord’s point underlines the need for implicit guarantees to be cancelled by explicit denials of obligation.
Lord Desai
I add to what the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, has said. As a depositor in the US, I had a cheque book and it said on each cheque that I wrote to what extent my deposits were guaranteed by the FDIC. It is all right for the FSA handbook to say something, but it would be much better if on my debit card or cheque book—although people do not use cheque books any more—it said to what extent my deposit was guaranteed. If it said that, it would be very good.
Lord Sassoon
I thought that I had said this, but I shall say it again. The detail of what is covered is a requirement that comes with your bank statement, which is a more appropriate place. It is better to have it attached to the bank statement than on a cheque when you are paying money out. So it is there, and it is completely clear in the rules in the FSA handbook.
Lord Desai
I do not carry my bank statement with me, but I do carry my debit card.
Lord Sassoon
“(2) For “the Authority” or “the Authority’s”, in each place, substitute “the appropriate regulator” or “the appropriate regulator’s”.”
Viscount Trenchard
My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Flight in his amendment, principally because it reads much better and is much easier to understand than the equivalent part of the Bill, which is confusing to say the least. I further agree that there is a very considerable risk that approved firms, having to apply to two regulators separately, is going to reduce the attractiveness of London and lead foreign firms to consider establishing in other centres businesses that could be established in London. There is already a perception that it is extremely cumbersome to obtain approval for significant-influence persons and that it is more difficult to do that here than in other financial centres around the world, so I definitely believe that my noble friend’s amendment would represent a significant improvement.
It is also important to ask my noble friend the Minister whether, if joint responsibilities are to be agreed between the PRA and the FCA, that would mean a single procedure. If the two regulators are made jointly responsible but operate slightly different procedures that with time become more different, it makes it much more time-consuming and expensive for regulated firms to comply with the requirements.
Has my noble friend also thought about customer-dealing functions? His amendments deal perfectly with the significant-influence functions, but the Bill as drafted also deals with customer-dealing functions, and I see no reason why these should not also be dealt with in an extremely simple and understandable manner using a form of words similar to his.
Where joint responsibilities between the two regulators are agreed, will this lead to the avoidance or elimination of the duplication of staff between them? If you have two regulators doing the same thing, you have double the people and you may have even more people who are responsible for talking to their equivalents at the other regulator. Where joint responsibilities under the memorandum of understanding or elsewhere are agreed and put into force, can that be done in a way that reduces rather than increases the number of persons necessary to carry out the process?
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, I can assure my noble friends that these matters have been carefully thought about. To some extent, the somewhat tortuous drafting is entirely to achieve a simpler and more cost-effective result, even if the drafting of the Bill is more complex than my noble friend has suggested, although I do not think he is doing it to make the drafting more comprehensible.
As with our earlier discussion about the authorisation of firms, we need to recognise that there are already difficulties in this area. My noble friend Lord Trenchard quite rightly points out how aspects of the authorisation processes in London are of concern to firms, particularly from outside Europe. I understand that. As he and I have discussed over a long period, different aspects of this go over many years. Whether it is the FCA or the new regulators, there is an ongoing challenge to make sure that the system is sensitive, appropriate and efficient, quite regardless of the new architecture. He makes an important point, but I suggest that it is a different point from the narrow but equally important one here about where best to do it in a dual-regulation, dual-supervision environment.
Amendment 165A would establish a different system for designating significant-influence functions, or SIFs. For dual-regulated firms, the PRA and the FCA would jointly make rules specifying which functions are SIFs and then put in place joint arrangements for approving individuals to perform them. For FCA-only firms, this would be done by the FCA alone. I can see the attraction of the approach which my noble friend Lord Flight is proposing. The language and the on-the-face-of-it approach perhaps appear simpler than the arrangements in the Bill at present. However, the arrangements in the Bill have been thought about, and we believe that they are preferable because they put one regulator in charge of leading the process for approving those who wish to carry out roles involving significant influence over the conduct of affairs of an authorised person. In most cases, this will be the relevant prudential regulator, although the FCA will be able to designate SIFs in dual-regulated firms where the PRA has not done so. For example, the FCA will have a greater interest than the PRA in the chief anti-money laundering officer, so it may wish to designate this function in the absence of the PRA.
We certainly do not think that the administrative process should be excessively difficult or lead to log-jams. The Government expect the two authorities to run a single administrative process for SIF applications, taking into account the statutory timeline. Indeed, the draft memorandum of understanding, published by the Bank and the FSA, makes clear that that is exactly what they will do: run one administrative process. I cannot answer my noble friend’s question about whether there will be more or fewer people. All I can say is that they have already documented a process to make it as efficient as possible.
With the explanation that this has all been very carefully thought out and that, although there is no perfect way to do it, we believe that the basis in the Bill as drafted will work better in practice for firms and for the regulators, I hope that my noble friend will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Flight
My Lords, I appreciate that this is a tricky issue to solve to the optimum, whichever route you choose to go down. I would just comment that, particularly as the drafting of the legislation is less than clear, I hope the Minister might give an undertaking that the two new regulatory bodies would issue codified statements for people wanting to seek approval as to where they should go as a first port of call, depending on their functions. This would make life easier, particularly for non-UK parties. With that proviso, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Sassoon
I am not the first noble Lord to have jumped up a bit fast this afternoon but will probably not be the last—apologies for that.
On the amendment, we need to go back over a little of the history, which is all to do with the question of who was going to be the listing authority at the time FiSMA came in. My noble friend Lord Flight refers to the past couple of years, but as I understand it—and I remember a little of this—it was unclear at the time FiSMA was enacted whether the FSA would undertake the listing functions on a permanent basis. As a result, Part 6 of FiSMA was prepared as a self-contained part of the Act and included some provisions—for example, those relating to fees and penalties—that are included elsewhere in FiSMA to apply to the FSA in its general capacity.
I suggest, on the point about the listing authority having a special status and being more flexible in order to be moved around in the future, that that would not have been considered at all if it had not related to the circumstances a decade or so ago. Since then, not only was the listing authority with the FSA through that period but, as my noble friend said, the Government considered the question, at a very early stage of the work leading up to this Bill, of the appropriate future home of the listing function. As my noble friend recognises, as a result of that consultation in July 2010, which was essentially about whether the listing function could be merged with the Financial Reporting Council, the clear view among the vast majority of respondents was that listing should be with the FCA, along with other parts of market regulation. FiSMA also includes provision for the possible transfer of the competent authority functions to another organisation.
Clause 14 gives effect to that decision. I say again to my noble friend that if it had not been for the particular circumstances of uncertainty going back a decade and more, there would not have been this anomaly. We are now tidying it up and making the listing function a core part of the FCA, as with all other major parts of its activity. I hope that, on the basis of that explanation, my noble friend will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Flight
My amendment was there to raise the matter for discussion and I am satisfied with the Minister’s response. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara
My Lords, the purpose of this group of amendments is to demonstrate that government recognises that business has a responsibility to respect human rights and sustainable development, to focus corporate behaviour on its wider social and environmental impact, to provide information to affected individuals and communities, and to inform better the investor community.
The Government have said that in discharging its general functions the FCA must act in a way that is compatible with its strategic objective—ensuring that relevant markets function well—and in a way that advances one or more of its operational objectives. I argue that these amendments would be entirely compatible with both the FCA’s strategic and operational objectives, as it would uphold the integrity of the Stock Exchange and ensure that businesses take into consideration the full impact of their operations. This approach is supported by a wide range of organisations, including Aviva Investors, the Carbon Disclosure Project, Save the Children, the Co-operative and the World Wildlife Fund.
There is of course a legal case for this. In June last year, along with every other member of the UN Human Rights Council, the UK endorsed the UN framework on human rights and transnational corporations, which enshrines the state duty to protect alongside the corporate responsibility to respect human rights. The Government, including the Prime Minister, have been enthusiastic in their support for these principles, but so far they have not spelt out how they intend to fulfil them. Listing requirements specifically relating to human rights and sustainable development would be a strong first step. The UK has a duty to protect human rights under international conventions to which it is a signatory. The human rights obligations of states under international law include the taking of effective measures to prevent human rights abuses by third parties, including companies.
The Combined Code on Corporate Governance, issued by the Financial Reporting Council, gives guidance to companies on reporting CSR-related matters. The listing rules of the London Stock Exchange require companies incorporated in the UK and listed on the main market of the exchange to report on how they have applied the combined code in their annual report and accounts. Overseas companies listed on the main market are required to disclose the significant ways in which their corporate governance practices differ from those set out in the code. The reporting obligations in the Companies Act 2006 extend to everything of relevance to the company within the terms of Section 417 of the Act. There are no geographical restrictions on what information is relevant or may be disclosed. Markets are driven by information. If the information they receive is short term and thin, these characteristics will define our markets. These amendments would serve to improve the information available to investors and all external stakeholders.
A recent survey of global stock exchanges conducted by Aviva Investors revealed that 57% of respondents agreed that strong sustainability requirements for listed companies made good business sense for the exchange. Only 14% of respondents disagreed. A lack of regulatory support was highlighted by over half the respondents as a factor that discouraged them from undertaking sustainability initiatives.
Stock exchanges play a vital role in economic development as one of the primary tools for the allocation of capital in both emerging economies and developed ones. Yet at present there is no requirement on applicants to the London Stock Exchange to provide information on their social or environmental impact, which means there are no sanctions available to the UK Listing Authority, even if a company listed on its main market is found guilty of the most grievous human rights abuses.
London is already behind the curve in this area and we suffer reputational risk if we do not act. For instance, the Hong Kong stock exchange mandates that mineral companies must: divulge the likely,
“impact on sustainability of mineral and/or exploration projects”;
reveal the,
“claims that may exist over the land on which exploration or mining activity is being carried out, including ancestral or native claims”;
and state the company’s,
“historical experience of dealing with concerns of local governments and communities on the sites of its mines”
and,
“exploration properties”.
The Shanghai stock exchange requires listed companies to commit to environmental protection and community development while pursuing economic goals and protecting shareholders’ interests. In Luxembourg, listed companies must have “high standards of integrity”, and behave in a “responsible manner”. In Malaysia, listing rules include provisions on CSR reporting, and the stock exchange has also developed a CSR framework with accompanying guidance for directors. Human rights are also referenced throughout guidance materials elaborating on the framework, most recently in a training tool for directors.
The business case for human rights and sustainable development reporting is therefore robust. The current listing requirements are in place to allow investors to make good and informed decisions about the merits of investing. Arguably, this would be impossible without information on the social and environmental impact and responsibility of a company. The UK’s largest institutional investor, Aviva Investors, has called for a,
“listing environment that requires companies to consider how responsible and sustainable their business model is, and also encourages them to put a forward looking sustainability strategy to the vote at their AGM”.
It is widely accepted that environmental and social governance performance can have a significant impact on shareholder value and should therefore be taken into full consideration by companies in their reporting and financial disclosure.
When a similar amendment to the Bill was raised in the other place, the then Minister said that the proposers,
“have raised some very important issues and there is a lot of truth in what they say. The reputation of the UK listing regime depends partly on the behaviour of companies, and we need to think about that quite carefully”.
He also said:
“Matters of stewardship and corporate behaviour are predominantly the responsibility of the Financial Reporting Council, which is responsible for the stewardship code and corporate governance issues”.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/5/12; col. 1028.]
However, as the FRC recently explained to the Treasury Select Committee, its role is about implementation and not about applying sanctions.
A gap is developing between what we would all agree is best practice and what needs to be done to ensure that the rules are followed; effective sanctions must be available. There is currently no single body responsible for all aspects of company behaviour, including the raising of finance. Under the current regime, the listing process provides the funds that companies need to invest and grow, and shareholders have the primary responsibility for holding business to account for its behaviour. However, there is no regulatory body responsible for both sides of that equation with sufficient powers to intervene. I believe that the FCA should take the lead as it has the authority, the expertise, the personnel and the funding to enable it to exercise vigilance over all UK listed companies. I beg to move.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, Amendment 165DA would require the FCA to have regard to fostering ethical corporate behaviour when exercising its listing functions. While we would all agree on the importance of corporate ethics, the issue here is whether we should make changes to the Bill to give the FCA specific roles or responsibilities in relation to them. The Government consider that the answer to that question is no.
The objective of our reforms is to put in place a new regulatory system with properly focused regulators who have clear responsibilities and objectives. This, of course, replaces a regulatory system which was not sufficiently focused and failed when the point came to protect consumers adequately. However important additional, worthy objectives might be, we need to be mindful at all times of the need for focus on the new bodies which we are creating. In this particular case, there are of course already other bodies or agencies engaged in these important matters. In particular, as the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, knows, the Financial Reporting Council is responsible for the corporate governance code and the stewardship code to which he referred. That is where I believe we should leave this responsibility, rather than blurring or muddling the lines.
Amendment 167E is more specific. It would require the FCA to make listing rules to require all listed energy and mining companies to carry out human rights due diligence and then require the companies concerned to make annual human rights impact reports to the exchange. Again, I can appreciate what is behind Amendment 167E but do not believe that it is necessary.
First, the FSA currently—and the FCA in future—is already able to make listing rules covering both points made by the amendment if it considers it appropriate to do so. I see that the noble Lord is nodding. We do not need to give new powers in this respect to the FCA, or to include new requirements in FiSMA. However, I know that the noble Lord will come back and say it is one thing that it has the ability to do it, and another thing if we think it to be sufficiently important. I understand that, but it does have that ability.
Secondly, we see the way forward to be encouraging transparency and supporting action in the countries in which mining and other extractive activity takes place. That is why the Government support the EU proposals to improve transparency in the extractive—oil, gas and mining—and forestry sectors. We are already engaged in the EU negotiations on this issue. The Government also support the extractive industries transparency initiative and encourage resource-rich countries to sign up to it. Under that initiative, companies publish the payments they make to Governments of resource-rich countries, and these Governments publish the payments they receive from extractives so that the benefits from extractives can be seen by all. Therefore, while I appreciate that the noble Lord wishes to go harder on this, I believe that the Government are being active on the case. These are important issues and it is better to leave it to the FRC through the code on the one hand, and to push forward with these important international initiatives on the other. On that basis, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Sassoon
“(a) in subsection (1), for “competent authority”, in the second and third places, substitute “FCA”, and(b) in subsection (3A), for “competent authority” substitute “FCA”.”
Lord Flight
My Lords, it is widely known that there are some concerns within the industry that in a more interventionist and judgment-based regulatory environment, the ability to challenge the regulators’ decisions should be strengthened rather than weakened. My amendments in this group essentially seek to retain the current provisions. I am obviously aware that the Government’s Amendments 184 and 185 go a long way to alleviate the underlying concerns here. Under them, the regulator will be obliged to issue another decision notice, not a final notice, when the tribunal gives a direction to the regulator to reconsider a non-disciplinary case.
However, if I have understood it correctly, the Government’s amendments enable the tribunal to substitute its opinion only in disciplinary cases and not in judgment-led decisions. I am not clear why judgment-led decisions should not be included, because they are the most sensitive and perhaps the most appropriate for further consideration. I look forward to hearing the Government’s case for tabling amendments on this issue. I beg to move.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, I am happy to speak next. In doing so, I will first need to go through the analysis of my noble friend’s amendments and the effect of the Government’s amendments in the group. I invite the noble Baroness to break in at any stage if it would help her.
The starting point is that the experience of the last few years has shown that we do not want a regulator with broad responsibilities that is too much focused on narrowly policing compliance with rules. We are still dealing with the consequences of that approach. The reforms, in particular those in this clause, are about giving the new regulators the right focus and mandate. They are also about judgment, and empowering the regulators to use their knowledge, experience and expertise to take difficult decisions, often on a proactive and preventive basis. The changes to the arrangements for appealing firm-specific decisions set out in Clause 21 play a key role in making this happen.
I will be clear about what our changes will mean. Clause 21 carries forward the rights of those who are dissatisfied with a firm-specific decision of the FCA or PRA to refer the matter to the tribunal, and preserves the ability of the tribunal to reconsider the matter afresh on a full-merits basis. There have been no changes to the grounds on which the tribunal will consider references. It will continue to consider references on a full-merits basis. In addition, for disciplinary matters or references under Section 393 of FiSMA that relate to third-party rights, the ability of the tribunal to substitute its opinion for that of the regulator remains unchanged.
What has changed is the nature of the directions that the tribunal will be able to give in the case of references that do not fall into the above category. In these cases, where the tribunal decides not to uphold a decision, it will not be able to substitute its decision for that of the regulator. Instead, it will be required to remit the decision back to the regulator, giving directions that it considers appropriate. The directions will be limited to findings relating to matters of fact or law that should or should not be considered by the regulator, and whether or not there were any procedural deficiencies. This is an important part of the move to judgment-led regulation, which recognises that it is the regulator’s job to take regulatory decisions, while providing a mechanism for judicial scrutiny of the fairness of those decisions.
I have already set out why the Government attach significant importance to the new arrangements for appealing non-disciplinary decisions. However, we must also ensure that we provide a fair regime for firms, and give certainty and clarity around procedures. That is what government Amendments 184 and 185 seek to do. Where a non-disciplinary reference is made, the tribunal remits the matter to the regulator. The regulator must then reconsider the matter in accordance with the tribunal’s directions. These amendments seek to provide clarity about what happens next. They require the regulator to issue a second decision notice rather than moving straight to a final notice, as would be the case under the Bill as drafted. Once a final notice has been issued, the firm’s or individual’s options for further challenge are strictly limited. A final notice can be appealed to the High Court only by way of a judicial review, on more limited grounds and at the risk of higher costs and lengthier delay.
Amendments 184 and 185 would require the relevant regulator to issue a second decision notice in all such cases once it has considered the tribunal’s direction and reached a new decision in accordance with the tribunal’s findings. This means that the firm or individual could challenge the second notice, for example if they do not think that the regulator has properly considered the tribunal’s direction in reaching its new decisions. There will be a second hearing before the tribunal, which will be able to consider the full merits of the matter and deal with the case more speedily and, because it will already be familiar with the case, at lesser cost to the firm and the regulator.
The amendments will increase fairness for firms and substantially strengthen the new arrangements. I hope that I have done enough to convince my noble friend. I think he already recognises that the government amendments go a considerable way toward allaying his concerns. Having heard the further explanation of how the process is intended to operate, I hope that he will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Flight
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his explanation of a rather complicated territory. Certainly I think it is as much as we are likely to get here. There is still a slight question in my mind about whether tribunals should be able to overrule judgment-led decisions. However, it seems that a reasonably fair system has been set out for members of the industry. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Sassoon
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, I shall start with Amendment 173ZAB. We are talking about new Section 137B which provides for FCA rules about the handling of clients’ money and related matters. It will replace existing Section 139 of FiSMA which is entitled, somewhat enigmatically, “Miscellaneous ancillary matters”, which does not really do it justice. However, as my noble friends have identified, it does not exactly reproduce Section 139. Their amendment would ensure that it tracks Section 139 in every respect by reinserting one subsection which, as my noble friend explained, relates to how references to money held on trust are to be construed in Scotland. Following consultation with the Scottish Law Commission, we reached the view that the relevant law in Scotland was sufficiently similar to the rest of the UK that it was neither necessary nor desirable to make different provision for Scotland in this way. I can reassure my noble friend that the recent Supreme Court judgment on Lehman Brothers also supports the view that a firm in Scotland which receives and holds a client’s money is obliged to hold that money in a way which preserves it for the client’s benefit as a trustee. This confirms that the approach taken in England, Wales and Northern Ireland is also correct for Scotland and that it is unnecessary to carry forward Section 139(3). I am happy to confirm that.
I turn now to social enterprise rules and Amendment 173AAZA, which seeks to give the FCA a new power to make social enterprise rules. I was of course delighted that my noble friend reminded us that social enterprises have not gone away over the summer break. I could leave it at that but I should probably do slightly more justice to this, although what I say will be entirely consistent with where I was before the break. We discussed in some detail the role that the FCA should or should not play in relation to social investment and enterprise and I will not repeat the whole of that debate. For the purposes of this amendment, I simply wish to put on record that where those running a social enterprise are carrying out a regulated activity, they will need to be authorised and will therefore be regulated by the FCA and will be subject to the rules that the FCA makes.
The drafting of the FCA’s objectives as well as new Section 137R make clear that the FCA should distinguish between different types of authorised persons and their consumers. There is therefore no need for a bespoke power. Specific rule-making powers in Clause 22 exist only where such rules go beyond the general rule-making power—for example, because they extend to unauthorised persons or affect third party rights. I would suggest that that is plainly not the case here.
On product intervention, I turn first to the group of amendments that seek to amend the FCA’s new product intervention power. This new power provides the FCA with a clear mandate from Parliament and the right tools to support a new and more proactive approach to consumer protection with greater regulatory scrutiny of the products themselves. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her recognition of and support for the importance of the new rules in this area.
Amendment 173AA would restrict the circumstances in which the FCA may make product intervention rules. I should like to reassure my noble friend that to a large extent the Bill already requires the FCA to exercise the power in the way intended in the amendment. To be clear, however, there is one respect in which I do not sympathise with the amendment; namely, proposed new subsection (11)(a). This seeks to raise the threshold for intervention to where a product or practice,
“gives rise to significant investor protection concerns or poses a serious threat”,
to market integrity or financial stability. The amendment would prevent the FCA intervening to advance its competition objective in relation, for example, to high exit fees which, I am sure my noble friend would agree, have a negative impact on switching. The Government believe that this is an important feature that we want to see in the marketplace. The power would therefore become an exclusively negative rather than a positive tool. That would represent a significant step back in terms of consumer protection and is why I cannot support my noble friend’s amendment.
Amendment 173AF deletes the option for the FCA to make temporary product intervention rules. It is correct that the FCA’s rule-making power is very broad. The new power puts beyond doubt that the FCA has a mandate in this area. It also introduces a safeguard as temporary rules expire after 12 months plus breach of a ban can render a contract unenforceable. The default will be that any product intervention rules are made under the normal rule-making procedure, with prior cost-benefit analysis and public consultation. However, given the speed with which a new product can gain traction in the market, and the fact that the FCA cost-benefit analysis and consultation take a minimum of six months, we think it is important that, specifically for product intervention rules, the FCA has the option to intervene more swiftly albeit with the limitation that I have just outlined.
I turn to Amendments 173AG and 173AH on the FCA’s statements of policy under this power. The purpose of the statement of policy is to provide industry and consumers with clarity around the circumstances in which the FCA will make temporary product intervention rules in the absence of prior consultation. The FSA has published a draft of the statement on its website and noble Lords will see that it sets out the factors that the FCA will take into account before and the process it will go through. Linking the statement to the temporary rule-making power does not, of course, preclude the FCA from publishing information about its general approach to product intervention. Indeed, the FSA has already published a discussion paper and a policy statement on this topic.
However, the link we have here is consistent with the wider approach taken in FiSMA and in the Bill that policy statements are required only where there is a very specific need to provide further guidance on how the regulator will exercise a power or function; for example, the power to impose penalties. Therefore, out of the very many policy statements that the FCA and the FSA have and will have, only 10 policy statements are required by FiSMA, as amended by the Bill, principally relating to enforcement and imposition of penalties. In this instance, the need for guidance does not extend to the general product intervention power as the process for making such rules is set out in the Bill itself so the statement is deliberately limited to the temporary power because of the very particular effect that a temporary power will have through the short cut to making it. Finally, while I can reassure my noble friend that I expect the FCA’s statement of policy to cover the main points in Amendment 173AH, I do not believe it appropriate to specify this much detail in the Bill.
I turn to the group of amendments that start with Amendment 173AAC relating to the issue of a longstop requirement for complaints about financial services. When the FSA last looked at the issue in 2007, it said that to introduce a time bar, it would need to be clear that the potential detriment to consumers was outweighed by the benefits to consumers and firms arising from greater certainly among independent financial advisers about the extent of their liabilities. It is this cost benefit analysis that needs to be addressed. The FSA said in its published response of 5 November 2011 to the Treasury Committee’s retail distribution review report that,
“the FSA believes the FCA should review this issue again at some point in the future”.
I certainly believe it is important that the expert regulator looks at this issue and undertakes the necessary consultation with consumers and firms. I am grateful to my noble friend for this amendment because it has prompted me to look back at the rather unspecific commitment that the FSA gave to the Treasury Committee. As a consequence of my noble friend’s prompting, I followed up on the point with the FSA and it has made a commitment that the FCA will consider whether to investigate the case for a long stop as part of its business planning for 2014-15. The timing of that is linked to the settling down of the RDR. Therefore, I am grateful to him for prompting this and I would encourage industry and consumer groups to continue a dialogue with the FSA on this topic.
I turn to the Amendments starting with 173ACA on the new power to make rules concerning financial promotions. I cannot agree with Amendments 173AC and 173ACA. Financial promotions can have an immediate detrimental impact if consumers act on them. Quick and decisive action is therefore needed on the part of the regulator and we must empower the regulator to use its judgment to make a call on a promotion. It may be too late once the promotion has been made or while the regulator undertakes further investigation. This is why the power applies both where it is clear that rules have been breached, and where in the view of the regulator this is likely to be the case, and enables the regulator to prevent a promotion from being made. To provide the most obvious example of why “likely to” is required, the FCA needs to be able to require a firm not to circulate a promotion where it becomes aware of a promotion before it is actually circulated and the FCA is of the view that it is likely to breach financial promotion rules if circulated.
Finally, I turn to Amendments 173AD and 173AE, which seek to change the disclosure obligations attached to this power. Amendment 173AD seeks to change the duty on the FCA to publish information about a direction it has given to a power to do so. Amendment 173AE seeks to block the FCA from publishing information where a direction has been revoked. The fundamental shortcoming of the current financial promotions regime is that in most cases the FSA is not able to publish the fact that it has asked a firm to withdraw a misleading promotion. The power—which I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving her support to—is designed to address the deficiency by giving the FCA a broad requirement, including a requirement to publish such information about the matter as it considers appropriate.
The Government believe it is important that the FCA should disclose what it has found for a number of reasons: it will help consumers, as they will be able to see what the regulator did and why; and, importantly, it will also increase the accountability of the regulator, as it will have to outline its thinking and set out where it has or has not taken action. The importance of the regulator both taking effective action and being seen to be taking effective action in this area is vital.
However, I accept that there may be circumstances when it is not necessary or appropriate to publish the information about a direction. Therefore we will look again at subsection (11) and consider carefully whether we should change the provisions relating to disclosure from a duty to a power. We will return to this issue on Report. On the basis of those reassurances and explanations I hope that my noble friend Lord Sharkey will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Sharkey
I am grateful to the Minister for confirming the Scottish situation. However, I am not entirely sure whether I am correct in understanding him to say that there is now no need to add explicitly cash received to cash held in Amendment 137B. On the assumption that that is the case—I can see that he is nodding to say that it is—I am happy to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Sassoon
Baroness Noakes
I am pleased to see that we are in agreement. Finally, I was concerned whether or not the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Oldham, thought that his amendment meant that all listed companies would be dealt with by the PRA and the FCA, because I do not think they have powers to deal with other than those bodies that are within the regulatory net, so it would only cover a relatively small proportion of his target.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, my noble friend has made the first point that I would make. The noble Lords, Lord Davies of Oldham and Lord Davies of Stamford, talked as if we were debating provisions that related to all listed companies, but my noble friend is completely right that this section does not apply to great global companies such as Vinci and others. Although it relates to an important group of companies, it is related essentially to authorised persons.
The Bill allows regulators to make rules regarding the role of employees in relation to remuneration committees and, in theory, the requirement that remuneration consultants be appointed by shareholders if they think that such rules would advance their objectives. However, I accept that, in practice, it is uncertain that that test would be met, particularly in the latter instance. In any case, other appropriate processes are already in place to consider these questions in the context of wider corporate governance reform—which, again, is precisely the point that my noble friend makes. This is a wider series of issues.
It is important to be reminded that, in January this year, the Department for Business published its response to its consultation on executive remuneration, which considered among others, the possibility of giving employees a say on remuneration. Although I do not want to be drawn into a wider debate—we should focus on financial services—the consultation responses nevertheless illuminate what would be appropriate or, as I would say, inappropriate for financial services businesses alone.
The Government’s view is that, while there will be qualified and enthusiastic employees willing to take on such a role, there are strong arguments against this proposal, including—on this I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford—that members of the remuneration committee need to be full board members if they are to understand the overall financial strategy and the wider business and economic context which impact on remuneration policy; that introducing external representatives on a single committee risks obscuring directors’ collective responsibility, as well as potentially creating additional tensions, which might reduce the effectiveness of the UK unitary board model; and that the level of responsibility of employee representatives and the possible conflicts of interest they might face would need to be resolved.
As a result of the BIS consultation on executive pay, the Government have decided to proceed with some key reforms, such as the introduction of a binding shareholder vote on remuneration, but the case for requiring companies to include employees on remuneration committees has not been made, and the Government are certainly not going to make or accept it in the narrower context that we are discussing today.
Lord Flight
When I sat on the remuneration committee of a financial services business, we already received substantial directions from the FSA as to what we were supposed to do, what we should do, how much we could put up pay and all sorts of things. I find it somewhat strange, but the direction is there and functioning already.
Lord Sassoon
Again, my noble friend is ahead of me and I shall not make that point—I am addressing some very narrow and specific matters—but he is completely right that we could debate whether the interventions already being made are appropriate. He may say that that they are excessive; I would say, “Well, that is for the FSA and there are important issues”. But, yes, the FSA is very active in this area, specifically on remuneration consultants.
The suggestion that remuneration consultants be appointed by shareholders was looked at in the consultation but it was not widely supported. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, did not spot it, but the proposal has been the subject not only of debate in this House in the past but of the recent consultation. It was not widely supported because of the costs associated with the appointment process and issues to be resolved about the remit and the flexibility of the proposal to accommodate new work. The benefits of the requirement would be uncertain.
However, a majority of respondents to the consultation said that more transparency over the use of remuneration consultants would be beneficial. Suggestions of areas for more transparency included appointment processes, advice provided, fees paid and management of conflicts of interests. The Department for Business is looking at ways in which it can improve transparency in the use of remuneration consultants by companies.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for raising these important issues, which are being taken forward in a wider context. The FCA will have all the powers that it needs to act in this area, as it does already—and as my noble friend pointed out—the FSA. I hope that, on the basis of that information, the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Davies of Oldham
Of course I shall withdraw the amendment, but not because the noble Lord, Lord Flight, has persuaded me that the FSA has been so much a busybody, so interfering and so effective that remuneration has never been an issue in the financial services. That argument runs counter to the facts on remuneration on which the nation as a whole has a firm grip.
I of course accept the chiding of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, that the Bill concerns only the financial services sector. I also hear from the Minister that it is extremely dangerous to take the first step because you might then stumble into the second step, and I am not sure that the Government are that committed to any significant strides forward on that at the present time. However, if the Minister is able to assure me that the development of ideas in the Department for Business is such that we are going to see legislation which gives some effect to the principles that I have adumbrated this evening and which helps to resolve what for the nation looks an outstanding scandal with regard to the issues of distribution of resources in our society, I go home with a little consolation and withdraw my amendment.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, the Government’s view is that, in general, decisions about advisory arrangements and consultancy fees are commercial decisions for firms themselves. However, the regulators could in fact already make the rules described in this amendment under the general rule-making power if they judged that was an appropriate way to advance their objectives. For example, if the PRA was satisfied that there was a problem with advisers being incentivised to advise in favour of high-risk mergers and acquisitions in a way that threatened the safety and soundness of PRA-authorised persons, it could step in to make rules to regulate the appointment of advisers.
Respecting the brevity with which this amendment was introduced, I should probably leave it at those two key reasons why we believe that it is redundant. I ask the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Oldham, to consider withdrawing it.
Lord Davies of Oldham
My Lords, I will certainly withdraw the amendment, having benefited from the clarity of the Minister’s reply—although I cannot say that I agreed with it.
Lord Davies of Oldham
My Lords, I am once again jettisoning a whole sheaf of notes in deference to the hour that we have reached. Amendment 173E, as part of the competition scrutiny provisions included in this Bill, calls for the Competition Commission, in consultation with the Treasury, to publish a report by the end of 2013 providing advice about the effect of regulating provision or practice,
“with reference to the Independent Commission on Banking recommendations on competition”.
The intention of the amendment is clear. It is to ensure that we make progress with regard to competition in banking, to show that we are in earnest about the necessity for early reforms and to use this Bill and the competition procedures within it to ensure that the maximum pressure is brought to bear on the competition authorities—and of course, behind them, the Government—to take as early action as is possible to remedy what the nation expects to be remedied in the light of the experience of the recent past. I beg to move.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, this amendment is identical to one tabled in Committee in another place, where my honourable friend the then Financial Secretary set out the reasons why the amendment is not appropriate. There are three such reasons. First, 2013 is the wrong time for a review of progress against the ICB recommendations. The ICB report itself recommended that the earliest that the market should be reviewed is in 2015, when it will be clearer whether its recommendations have led to improved market conditions. Secondly, there is no convincing reason why this review, if there is to be one, should be limited in scope to the ICB recommendations themselves. There may be new issues that the ICB report had not considered in depth and which it would be expedient to review at that time. Thirdly, we do not need this provision to ensure that the banking sector receives appropriate scrutiny from the competition authorities in the short term. The OFT, for example, launched a review of the personal current account market in July this year, which is likely to consider some of the issues covered by the ICB. The OFT has a power to refer markets to the Competition Commission at any time if it considers that a feature of the market,
“prevents, restricts or distorts competition … in the UK”.
I am very happy to give those reassurances and clarifications to the noble Lord in the hope that he will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Davies of Oldham
My Lords, of course I will withdraw my amendment. However, the noble Lord should not anticipate that when a Minister speaks in the Commons, the Opposition automatically assume that he has always produced exactly the accurate response to our amendments, which we then accept, and that we are duly grateful for the greater wisdom of the Administration. Far from it—we often derive some considerable satisfaction from pressing them at some length on another occasion. However, on this occasion I have not got any length. I beg to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Sassoon
Lord Sassoon
There are of course other amendments in the group but for the moment I will just speak to the two government amendments. New Part 12A of FiSMA, as inserted by Clause 25, confers on the regulators for the first time substantive powers in relation to unregulated parent undertakings of authorised persons. These new powers strengthen the regulatory framework by ensuring that the regulator can take appropriate action in relation to a parent undertaking that itself is not regulated but which controls and exerts influence over an authorised person.
Amendment 174ZA extends the meaning of “qualifying parent undertaking” so that the new Part 12A powers can also be applied to body corporates which have a place of business in the United Kingdom. At present, the powers are restricted to a parent undertaking that is a body corporate incorporated in the United Kingdom. There is a risk under the new Section 192B(2), as currently drafted, that some financial groups may be beyond the scope of new Part 12A powers or indeed may engage in regulatory arbitrage and restructure their operations to remove themselves from scope. Left unchanged, it would be possible for a firm to evade the powers by incorporating their parent undertaking overseas while retaining a place of business in the UK. It is important that the powers can be deployed for the purpose for which they were designed.
Amendment 174ZB is a bit of small tidying up of the drafting. As there is only one system of company law in the UK, it is not possible for a body corporate to be incorporated only in “part of” the UK. That is why we are making that second amendment. I beg to move.
Lord Whitty
My Lords, I am perfectly happy to accept and support the Minister’s proposals. My two amendments, and I think those of my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe, attempt at this point to reflect the reality of the changing structure of banking and the potential changing structure of financial services, and their interrelationship with retail. It could go wider than this, but it specifically relates to the phenomenon of supermarkets obtaining banking licences, establishing banking subsidiaries and operating in the banking and financial services area.
This presents significant issues of consumer information and consumer privacy. My first amendment is a simple one. We have, in this Bill, a number of safeguards in relation to financial companies’ relations with their parent company. However, among other things, subsection (4) of the previous Act’s proposed new Section 192B defines a parent undertaking that is susceptible to these protections:
“Condition C is that the parent undertaking is a financial institution of a kind prescribed by the Treasury by order”.
It then goes on to say that those conditions can be changed by the Treasury. However, the reality is that Tesco—I am not particularly having a go at Tesco—would not fall within that definition. Yet Tesco will have a banking operation and has every intention of building on that. My first amendment would therefore delete that restriction, so that a parent undertaking of a financial company could, in fact, be a company of any kind and not simply one which falls within the Treasury’s—from time to time altered—definition of a financial institution.
My second amendment relates directly to the area of potential consumer detriment. Again, I take the example of Tesco. There have been examples in the United States already, so it is not necessarily directed at Tesco; I have a Tesco card myself, as I am sure many other Members of the House do. I would not presume that Tesco would be in a position, deriving data from my Saturday afternoon purchases, to offer to their banking subsidiary indications of my current or potential credit-worthiness. Noble Lords may feel that I do not need that protection, but there will be many who do. The pattern of purchases, particularly for the more vulnerable consumers, can vary dramatically from time to time as circumstances change. Their credit-worthiness can alter if the interpretation of that data is such that the banking subsidiary thinks that they are no longer as credit-worthy as they were last month or last year.
This is an issue of privacy. This is an issue of clarity. It is an issue of confidence that consumers who have quite happily allowed the retail parent company to acquire very detailed information on their purchasing patterns should not have that information used for the entirely different purpose of establishing credit-worthiness and the ability to seek loans, overdrafts or banking facilities from a banking subsidiary. I emphasise this because the change in the structure and interface between banking and large-scale retail and other conglomerates is likely to get larger. In broad terms, the consumer interest benefits from this wider competition and the expertise that it may bring. However, Tesco itself has recognised that one of the synergies arising from its move into the banking sector would be using the club card for credit assessments, and one which, alongside a loyalty scheme, could benefit the banking as well as the retail side of its business. I do not think that that is right. I do not think that the ordinary consumer who goes to Tesco every week would think that it is right. It is, of course, also a facility available to a banking subsidiary of a supermarket which is not available to its competitors, who are part of a purely banking or financial institution.
I hope that the Minister will recognise this problem, and will at least agree that the first deletion is appropriate and to take away the issue raised by my second amendment and come back to us at a later stage, indicating his way of dealing with it. It is an issue which, as I say, is likely to grow in importance and makes hundreds of thousands of consumers vulnerable. I do not beg to move, as the Minister has done so, but I hope that he will take my words into account.
Lord Tunnicliffe
My Lords, I agree with all the points that my noble friend Lord Whitty has made and I will not rehearse them. Coming at the whole thing from a slightly different direction, it seems to me that Clause 25 is highly admirable. It seems to say that if you have an authorised person and that authorised person is owned by someone else, the regulator must be able to get at the someone else. It is a sensible clause in that it uses terms such as,
“may have a material adverse effect on the regulation by the regulator”.
It uses that twice, in both of the conditions in which it can happen. It is a very narrow clause. It is what we who like regulation find very good at setting out what the regulator may do.
Clause 25 also says that a regulator must adhere,
“to the principle that a burden or restriction which is imposed on a person should be proportionate to the benefits, considered in general terms, which are expected to result from its imposition”.
So the whole idea that the owner of a regulated person should come under regulation seems entirely a sign of good principle, and has proper safeguards set against it.
However, for the life of me I cannot understand what new Section 192B(4) is doing there. It states:
“Condition C is that the parent undertaking is a financial institution of a kind prescribed by the Treasury by order”.
Any owner of an authorised person should be susceptible to regulation within the limitations set out in Clause 25. This was debated in the Commons, but we make no apology for bringing it back here. In the Commons, Mr Hoban said:
“This is a proportionate expansion. We want to avoid the sense that the FCA or the PRA could intervene in the price of bread at Tesco or Sainsbury’s”.—[Official Report, Commons, Financial Services Bill Committee, 8/3/12; col. 466.]
That is an absolutely ridiculous reason to deny it. Clearly, the body of this clause says that it shall be used for serious material things in a proportionate way, which could have nothing to do with the price of bread at Sainsbury’s. I hope that the Minister will give a really full explanation of why this clause should not apply universally to all owners of authorised persons, not just to those as set out in condition C in subsection (4) of new Section 192B.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, the noble Lords, Lord Whitty and Lord Tunnicliffe, have been very clear about the purpose of these three amendments: that they seek to extend the power to capture all parent undertakings, including non-financial parents. The starting point here has to be the recognition, which was partly given by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, that we are talking about some new and important powers that go significantly beyond anything that the previous Government put in place in their architecture.
I know that the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, said that he approved of a lot of this. The fact is that we are moving the boundary forward very significantly, but to an appropriate place for the time being, while nevertheless taking the power—the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, recognised this—to move the boundary further if appropriate. I would have been rather happier if there had been more of a tone of approving of and recognising a significant shift, and gently encouraging us onwards, rather than a tone of outraged incomprehension that we have not moved very much further.
Lord Tunnicliffe
If I can help the Minister, I am entirely happy to welcome this clause—my opening remarks welcomed it—but I cannot understand why it has this serious limitation. The rest of the clause is beautifully balanced and seems entirely appropriate. Why does it not apply to more owners?
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, we are getting into significant new territory here. These are untried and untested powers in the United Kingdom. We want to make sure that they are targeted and used in a proportionate manner. That is why the Government have proposed limiting the powers to parent undertakings that are financial institutions of the kind described by the Treasury, which helps to keep this new and very significant power within acceptable bounds—and bounds within which Parliament can be clear about the movement of the regulatory boundary. I take the case of the supermarkets because they are an important area and the clearest case of where the boundary should be under focus. It is important and helpful for noble Lords to raise this matter in debate now, because it is quite proper that as experience of these new powers is gained and the evolution in the structures of holding companies for financial services institutions moves forward, these matters are kept under some form of scrutiny.
Let me deal first of all with the specific matter of data sharing, because this is a granular thing that affects customers in these groups now. The Data Protection Act 1998 already provides robust safeguards around the disclosure of customers’ personal information, including disclosure to another group company. Therefore, in the case which the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, postulates, the movement of data from one part of a group—the non-financial part—to the financial part will require consent from the consumer.
The Act also requires that the personal data have been obtained fairly from the customer in the first place, which would involve identifying any third parties to which the information would be disclosed. We believe that the current provisions in the Bill—in that specific respect and more broadly—strike the right balance between giving the regulator more intrusive powers over unregulated parent undertakings, protecting the personal data of consumers and ensuring that the net regulatory burden imposed on industry is proportionate.
However—and I restate this—the Government are very much alive to the concerns raised by noble Lords, and it is precisely for that reason that they have taken a power to remove the requirement that the parent undertaking be a financial institution. We have not put that in there unthinkingly; we have put it in there because we recognise the concerns that noble Lords have raised. I am sorry if the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, does not think that I have recognised the positivity with which he has come at this clause, but he does not perhaps recognise or give enough weight to the fact that we really are making a significant step forward and need to pause and think carefully before going further. The power, however, is there and the Government will use that power as and when it becomes clear that the balance needs to be struck differently. I am happy to restate that, so I hope that what I have said will reassure noble Lords that the Government take this matter very seriously.
Lord Sassoon
(a) is incorporated in the United Kingdom, or(b) has a place of business in the United Kingdom.”