Lord Newby
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(12 years, 2 months ago)
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Baroness Noakes
My Lords, I shall also speak to Amendments 190B and 192ZA in this group. These amendments, and others in the group, concern the inquiry and investigation provisions of Part 5. I should say at the outset that I regard the provisions of Part 5 as crucial to the Bill. The earlier parts of the Bill created new regulations with very significant powers, and it is entirely likely that the new regulators will make mistakes in the use of those new powers and that things will go wrong, so we need strong provisions in the Bill—
Lord Newby
My Lords, I remind your Lordships that if you are leaving the Chamber, please do so as quietly as possible.
Baroness Noakes
My Lords, I was saying that Part 5 of this Bill is crucial because it sets up the provisions that will deal with things when they go wrong—if the regulators make mistakes or if things do not turn out well. Part 5 ensures that there are proper investigations and proper reporting of those investigations. I remind the Committee that there have been problems in this area in the very recent past. It took the heroic efforts of the Treasury Select Committee in another place to get the FSA’s report on the failure of RBS into the public domain. We still have nothing on HBOS. The FSA’s reports on both RBS and Northern Rock were internal reports, and therefore non-independent. The Bank of England, which will be the new home for the PRA, is not itself a beacon of good practice when it comes to reviews of its own performance. So we need to be sure that we get this part of the Bill absolutely right.
I welcome the new duties in Clauses 69 and 70 on the FCA and the PRA to investigate and report on possible regulatory failures. I similarly welcome the powers in Clause 73 which allow the Treasury to direct the regulators to carry out investigations in certain circumstances. However, internal investigations will often not be good enough, which is why in principle the powers in Clause 64 are very welcome. These allow the Treasury to arrange independent inquiries where there have been certain events which, to paraphrase, threatened the stability of the financial system or risked or caused significant damage to the interests of consumers or businesses.
The first amendment that I tabled to Clause 64 was Amendment 192ZA, which is one of our familiar and much-loved may/must amendments. I could see no circumstance in which the Treasury, having satisfied itself that a public inquiry is in the public interest, should have any optionality about whether to set up an independent inquiry. Amendment 192ZA would change that “may” into a “must” so that, if the public interest test is met, the Treasury must set up an independent inquiry. Having looked at this a second time, however, I tabled Amendment 190AA, which would replace subsection (4) and turn it round. Under my proposed new subsection (4) the Treasury must arrange an inquiry unless it believes that the inquiry is not in the public interest. I believe that this more naturally represents the thought process that would go on in the Treasury; that is, the Treasury would order an inquiry unless there was a sound reason for not doing so. For good measure I have also tabled in this group Amendment 192ZA, which is another may/must amendment, this time to Clause 73, which allows but does not require the Treasury to direct the FCA or the PRA to carry out an internal investigation. My amendment would require a direction.
I am aware that the wording and structure of Clause 64 follow that of Section 14 of FiSMA. However, I do not believe that that is necessarily conclusive. The new duties set out in Clauses 69 and 70 in respect of regulatory failure positively require the PRA and the FCA to organise investigations in specified circumstances. The only let-out is if the Treasury directs them that they are not required to carry out investigations. Can the Minister explain why “must” is the correct formulation for the PRA and the FCA, but not the correct formulation for the Treasury?
I hope that the Minister will explain the relationship between Clause 64 and Section 14 of FiSMA. It seems to me that Section 14 becomes redundant when this Bill is made law, but I could not find any provision for its repeal. So I ask my noble friend whether it is to remain in force, and if so, for what purpose?
Lastly, I ask the Minister to explain in what circumstances the Government would intend to use the independent inquiry route in Clause 64, as opposed to the self-investigation route in Clauses 69, 70 and 73. I tried to research how often Section 14 of FiSMA has been used but drew a blank; in fact, I am not sure that it has ever been used. I hope that the Minister will be able to explain in what circumstances the Government would want to use the independent inquiry route, rather than relying on self-investigation. For example, given the circumstances surrounding the financial crisis, would they have thought it appropriate to have ordered an independent inquiry—that is, one not left simply to the regulator concerned—or do the Government believe that self-inquiry is the appropriate route? If there is no independent inquiry for something as grave as the financial crisis that we have recently experienced, what is Clause 64 for? I look forward to hearing my noble friend’s response. I beg to move.
Lord Newby
My Lords, I will start by giving the Government’s response to the first of these two amendments, and then come to the specific points that have been raised by a number of noble Lords.
As noble Lords have pointed out, Clause 74 provides in some detail how investigations should be conducted in order to deliver transparency and confidence, which, as I think everybody agrees, well conducted and appropriate inquiries should bring about. Amendment 192A seeks to add to these requirements by setting out that,
“the regulator must have regard to its regulatory principles”
in carrying out these inquiries, and to act proportionately, reasonably and fairly. I agree that high standards of conduct should apply as much to the conduct of an investigation as to the regulator’s normal regulatory work, but the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, will probably not be totally surprised when I say that there are two reasons why the amendment is not necessary.
First, on proportionality, we do not believe that it is necessary to put this in the Bill again because the regulator already has to have regard to the regulatory principles in exercising its general functions, and the regulatory principles include proportionality, under proposed new Section 3B. Proportionality is already built in to the way that the regulator does everything so we do not think it is necessary here.
Secondly, as the noble Lord has set out, and we have set out before, public law already requires regulators to act reasonably, and the principles of natural justice require the regulator to deliver procedural fairness. The noble Lord talked about the problem of judicial review. I think everybody agrees that if you have to initiate a judicial review, this is an extremely expensive, long, drawn-out process, but if the noble Lord’s amendment was accepted, my understanding is—I may be wrong—that if the regulator were to be challenged it would be under a judicial review anyway, so the same problem would arise. The noble Lord, Lord Flight, said that this amendment was a question of belt and braces. We agree, but in legislation you do not need belt and braces—you need a good belt or good braces, and we think we have got that.
The other thing that is possibly slightly confusing is that the investigations we are talking about in this part of the Bill are investigations into regulatory failure rather than the conduct of firms. The noble Lord, Lord Peston, asked whether an investigation would come into the public domain. The real concern, which we have debated before, relates to the conduct of business of a company—has it been misbehaving?—which is different from the issue of regulatory failure, which is what Clause 74 deals with.
Lord Peston
The noble Lord did say that this will be an investigation into regulatory failure. Therefore, the investigator is investigating himself or herself. After all, who has failed? It is the regulator.
Lord Newby
My Lords, we come to the noble Lord’s point which concerns Clause 73(2)(b). The architecture is that the regulator will look at the failure of firms and regulatory failure. We have seen this with the work the FSA did on RBS. It produced a comprehensive report on what it saw as regulatory failure. Although there were arguments about what would or would not be published, in terms of whether the regulator did a good job and whether it is capable of doing so, the answer we would draw from that investigation is that it did do quite a good job. There will be many cases when it is appropriate for the regulator to look back at what has happened in the past—
Lord Peston
I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord, but I am trying to get some sense of reality about this. It is the Treasury that considers that something needs to be done. Therefore, the Treasury must suspect something. Where, for example, does the Treasury get its information from, for it to feel that it has to issue this directive? What does the Treasury know that the regulator did not? Then it tells the regulator to look at something because it observes regulatory failure. The whole thing seems to be an intellectual mess. That is my point. It is not necessarily the point that was made by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson. Like my noble friend Lord Davies, I am keen to have a powerful and effective regulatory system. I am also keen that we do not have a botch of a regulatory system. What we have said on the previous two Committee days on the Bill is that we think quite a few aspects of this are a botched job. Is that going too far in criticising? I do not think so.
Lord Newby
My Lords, the noble Lord asks a number of questions. First, why might the Treasury have a role and why is the regulator not doing it already? There may be a number of occasions when the Treasury first gets information from somebody and wants to tell the regulator. There are some occasions when the Treasury might want to prod the regulator into action. I have been critical of occasions when I felt the regulator has not moved as quickly as I would have liked in undertaking investigations. This part of the Bill enables the Treasury to give it a kick if it is needed. The other point, which is a valid point, is that if there is a really serious problem of regulatory failure, this is not the only way in which the Treasury can make sure that an investigation is undertaken. The Treasury can appoint any kind of investigator that it wants. This part of the Bill simply explains how the Treasury operates and the rules which apply if there is a lesser regulatory failure which probably happened some time in the past, where it seems appropriate for the regulator to have a look. I understand the noble Lord’s concerns, but he should not be as worried as he is.
I will respond to the second amendment in this group, which we have not debated at great length. It seeks to add to the grounds on which the regulator may decide to postpone or suspend an investigation if the investigation did not meet the principles by which the investigator must abide. Unlike with the previous amendment, where we agree with what the noble Lord seeks to achieve but do not think that he needs to have his belt and braces, we think that this amendment could have perverse and unexpected effects by enabling the regulator to stop an investigation for any reason it wanted. For example, it could realise that an investigation was going to be very time-consuming and burdensome, perhaps because of the level of detail involved. Under this proposal, it could end an investigation and argue that it was doing so because the investigation breached its principle on economic and efficient use of resource. For those reasons, we cannot support that amendment.
A number of noble Lords, including the noble Lords, Lord Hodgson and Lord Flight, expressed broader concerns about the FSA and the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, quoted Lex in aid of that. The noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, and the noble Lord, Lord Peston, said that the FCA should have regard to competitiveness. These are broader issues that go beyond the scope of the amendments, but on the concerns expressed by Lex, I can understand why people are at this stage worrying about whether the balance that the regulators strike between the interests of the firms and those of the consumers of their products is right. We are pretty confident that it will be. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, pointed out that it is important that the regulators are rigorous and balance the interests of the firms and those of their consumers. The way in which the Bill is structured should enable them to do that and we are confident that they have that very much in mind.
Competitiveness has been debated previously and we have already agreed that we will look at this issue, particularly the degree to which the PRA and FCA should have regard to the importance of economic growth. We have said that we will return with further amendments in this area on Report, when we will no doubt have an extremely interesting debate on them. For today, however, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, will decide not to press his amendments.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Newby for that extensive and courteous response. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Flight, and the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, for their support. I can accept that this is a part of the Bill where the particular concerns that I have do not weigh as heavily as they did on the regulatory principles on page 28 of the Bill which we debated before we broke for the Summer Recess. I am happy to withdraw my amendment today, but I am not yet convinced that “reasonably and fairly” is not a useful addition in some part of the Bill even if it is not here. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Newby
“( ) In subsection (6), after “filed” insert “(in Scotland, lodged)”.”
Lord Newby
My Lords, this small group of government amendments are of a purely technical nature. Amendment 193J amends Section 120 of the Banking Act 2009 to reflect the terminology of Scottish law, under which documents are “lodged” with the court.
Amendments 201A, 201B and 201C are concerned with the rulebooks that the new authorities will use. The FSA’s rulebook is currently made up of around 9,000 pages of rules. In the new system, these rules will become FCA rules, PRA rules, rules shared by both the FCA and the PRA, or Bank of England rules in relation to recognised clearing houses. Noble Lords will no doubt be aware that the Government intend that the new regulatory system will be put in place on 1 April next year. The Government are working closely with the FSA and the Bank of England on the practical aspects of transition to the new regulatory system, while listening to representations from industry on how disruption can be minimised in the run-up to the new system being put in place.
The amendments will give greater precision to the transition of the rulebook by enabling the new regulators to adopt relevant sections of the FSA rulebook, and its supporting materials, by designating the relevant regulatory material to the PRA and/or the FCA, or the Bank, and to make any necessary modifications. The amendments also permit the FSA and the PRA to appoint a set of persons to undertake this designation exercise. The recruitment processes to appoint members of the boards of the new regulators are well under way and the amendments will permit the future PRA and FCA boards to be appointed so that they, rather than the current boards, can make the decisions on the designation of rules.
The new rulebooks will not come into force until 1 April next year but we need the new boards to be able to make and publish their new rulebooks as early as possible in advance of 1 April next year so that industry and the public have certainty and sufficient notice to get ready. These are technical but practical and helpful amendments and I beg to move.
Lord Davies of Oldham
My Lords, it may be a source of some surprise on the Government Bench that I rise to speak on these purely technical amendments, but I merely ask Ministers to recognise that, their having looked kindly on three amendments that I proposed earlier today, I have kept my silence on three groups of amendments that they proposed and which have gone through without dissent.
Lord Newby
“(2A) If an order under this section makes provision by virtue of subsection (2)(b) enabling the FCA to exercise any of its powers under sections 205 to 206A of FSMA 2000 (disciplinary measures) by reference to an act or omission that constitutes an offence under CCA 1974, the order must also make provision by virtue of subsection (2)(d) ensuring that a person in respect of whom the power has been exercised cannot subsequently be convicted of the offence by reference to the same act or omission.”
Lord Newby
My Lords, the Government are bringing forward amendments to Clause 91 in response to concerns raised by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. I am very grateful to that committee, chaired by my noble friend Lady Thomas of Winchester, for its close and rigorous scrutiny of the powers that Clause 91 will confer and for the committee’s useful suggestions, which have informed the government amendments that I am now bringing forward.
Clause 91 enables the Treasury to make further provision about consumer credit following the transfer of regulation from the OFT to the FCA. It is necessary to take a power in this instance because the precise amendments that we will need to make to FiSMA and the Consumer Credit Act to effect the transfer will depend on the detailed proposals for the new FCA consumer credit regime, on which we will consult next year. These amendments clarify and put certain limits on how the power may be exercised.
Amendment 194A responds to the committee’s concern about the risk of double jeopardy. The amendment provides that, where criminal sanctions under the Consumer Credit Act and regulatory sanctions under FiSMA are available to the FCA in relation to the same act or omission, a person may not be convicted if he has been the subject of regulatory sanctions under FiSMA. This approach reflects that taken in Section 41 of the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008, which the Delegated Powers Committee helpfully highlighted in its report as a useful precedent.
The second set of amendments in this group responds to the committee’s concern about the need to introduce certain constraints on the power in Clause 91 to ensure that it continues to be exercised in accordance with current government policy. Government Amendments 196ZA to 196ZC require the Treasury to have regard to the importance of securing an appropriate degree of protection for consumers and the principle that a burden imposed should be proportionate to its benefits.
These new duties to have regard reflect the two values underpinning the Clause 91 power. First, the Government remain very conscious of the fact that the primary rationale for the transfer of credit regulation to the FCA is to strengthen consumer protection. Thus, the requirements in the Consumer Credit Act should be repealed only where their effect can be replicated in an FCA rulebook under a FiSMA-based regime or where they are no longer appropriate. Secondly, this duty to have regard confirms that the Government remain committed to ensuring that regulatory burdens on small businesses are proportionate to the benefits.
I hope that these amendments adequately address the committee’s concerns. I beg to move.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara
My Lords, in keeping with our previous remarks, I think that we have very little of substance to make in the way of comment on these proposals, as set out by the noble Lord. As he said, they are largely technical and clarificatory, and they focus on the good work done in the committee, which we all welcome.
Lord Newby
Lord Newby
My Lords, the amendment suggests that the FCA should make rules about the maximum cost and duration of a loan. Obviously the Government share many of the noble Lord’s concerns about some practice in the payday lending sector, including poor affordability checks, particularly in relation to rolling over loans and the unfair treatment of customers in financial difficulty. The noble Lord is absolutely right: what we have seen in the last year or two has been an explosion of this kind of loan, available within minutes over the internet. That is the new, all-pervasive problem. I, too, looked at taking out a loan and the companies vied not only to let me have a loan, but to do so quickest—almost saying how many minutes. Some would do it in half an hour, some in 15 minutes. That is a new development. I did not have to go to Walthamstow; I could do it sitting at my desk while doing other things. That is a particularly seductive approach and one of the reasons the sector has grown so quickly. It also has an aura of simplicity and respectability, which going into a shop in a high street to get a loan does not necessarily have.
The Government and I are extremely sympathetic to many of the things that the noble Lord seeks to achieve. As we see it, one of the key benefits of transferring consumer credit to the FCA is that it will equip that regulator with better tools than exist at the minute to keep up with this kind of development, particularly the new developments in respect of the internet and via text messaging. The FCA will also have greater resources to supervise the compliance of these firms and a much wider range of powers to take action when it spots a problem, either at a firm-specific or sector-wide level.
Lord Borrie
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Stevenson has made some very powerful points with his criticism of the behaviour, over a period of time, of debt management companies—any company that eases, or purports to ease, the problems of debtors by making a plan for them to pay off their debts. What a debt management plan offers is, or may be, perfectly good and in the interests of the debtor. I would not like it to be the case that the only people in that business are not-for-profit organisations, even those such as the excellent one, StepChange, which my noble friend is involved with. He is quite right in criticising the commercial debt management companies that have been operating so far; but they have not operated without restraint, because, as he indicated, the Office of Fair Trading has been concerned with a number of their practices, including misleading advertising and exorbitant charges. A number of debt management companies have had their consumer credit licences removed after evidence was presented.
My concern about my noble friend’s amendment is not over the prohibition of specified fees for debt management or the other details of this clause that he would like to insert into the Bill. I am all in favour of those. However, I am not very keen—and my noble friend has not mentioned them—on the opening words of the proposed clause, which are:
“Phasing out commercial debt management”.
I do not want to see commercial debt management phased out so that it does not exist, as I do not believe that charitable organisations can provide for all the needs that debtors legitimately have and the services that they could legitimately seek and benefit from, assuming there were adequate controls over debt management companies, as there are for other firms who have to have a consumer credit licence.
The suspension of consumer credit licences, which we dealt with half an hour ago, and the increasing powers of the FCA compared with the Office of Fair Trading should do a great deal to help. It may be that an amendment of the kind that my noble friend is putting forward would be a helpful advance, but I hope he does not stick to the opening words about the “phasing out” of commercial debt management.
Lord Newby
My Lords, the Government obviously sympathise with the concerns about some of the practices in the fee-charging debt management sector, which this amendment seeks to restrict and ultimately close. Debt management firms by their very nature deal with some of the most financially vulnerable consumers in the country. It is therefore absolutely vital that there is an appropriate regulatory framework in place to make sure that these firms treat their customers fairly.
We also need to do more to make sure that there is effective signposting to free-to-customer debt advice options, such as the services provided by organisations like Citizens Advice and StepChange, of which the noble Lord is such a distinguished chair. The Government are therefore working with the debt management sector towards a protocol of best practice for the industry. The OFT has also recently updated its guidance for debt management firms, expanding on the practices that the regulator considers “unfair or improper” and could cause a business to lose its licence.
It is right that, from April 2014, the FCA’s more proactive and intrusive regulatory approach, and the stronger and more sophisticated regulatory powers available under FiSMA, will extend to the debt management sector. I can give the noble Lord that assurance. The rules that the FCA will be able to make could indeed cover many of the points in his amendments, but at this point, in advance of the powers being moved across and in advance of any consultation on the details of the rules, we think it would be inappropriate to set those out in the Bill.
Lord Newby
My Lords, this amendment seeks to codify a process for switching bank accounts and—as with a number of other amendments—we sympathise with the intention behind what the noble Lord, Lord Flight, is seeking to do, but I do not think the amendment is technically necessary for reasons which I will explain. As the noble Lord pointed out, there has been a great deal of progress since the Independent Banking Commission recommended that a new switching redirection service should be set up to ease the process of switching current accounts. The Payments Council has committed to delivering that recommendation. The new switching service will provide a safe, hassle-free and convenient service for customers to switch their bank accounts in no more than seven working days.
We believe that, working with the industry, the Payments Council is on track to deliver the new service by September next year. As the noble Lord, Lord Flight, said, all the major current account providers in the UK have signed up and the Treasury is keeping the pressure on the Payments Council via monthly working-level meetings and quarterly reports. The banks which have not yet decided to join, the 3%, obviously cover a very small percentage of the market. The reason for their having declined is usually that they do not yet offer a current account or because they are unable to update their systems in time. The Payments Council plans to launch a second wave of switches, possibly in the first quarter of 2014, to accommodate those institutions, while allowing sufficient time for the switching service to prove its stability. So we hope that the small rump will be included in the system by the first quarter of 2014.
The noble Baroness described the problems that she has had in switching her bank account. I had a better experience. When I decided to combine my bank account with that of my wife—after more than 30 years of marriage—I found that, broadly speaking, I got the service envisaged in the Payment Council’s new approach. The problem I had was that although the bulk of my direct debits were satisfactorily dealt with, for reasons which were completely unclear a small number were not. Of course, one finds that out only when one gets a stiff letter saying that some essential thing which you are funding on an ongoing basis is about to be revoked because you have cancelled it. In my case, the problem was not that the intentions were dishonourable, it was simply that the system was not as effective as the two banks would have liked me to believe.
The noble Lord, Lord Flight, demonstrated the value of competition in the banking sector, in that Metro Bank seems to have achieved something in respect of money-laundering that the serried ranks of the established banks have failed to do, which is to have a simple way to prove who you are to their satisfaction. No doubt noble Lords such as me have experienced this bizarre situation in the past couple of years. I have been rung up by my bank to say that because I am a politically sensitive person, I had to prove my bona fides to the bank. Given the nature of the bank, which I had better not name, my response was to say, “I think you had better prove your bona fides to me”, which did not go down desperately well. Of course, it did not have to and I did.
The noble Baroness asked a very important question: can we trust all the banks to do that in a timely manner and in a way that does not cause the sort of problems that she had? I point out that the drafting of the FCA’s competition objective at new Section 1E(2)(b) requires the FCA to have regard to the ease with which consumers can switch providers in considering the effectiveness of competition. So the importance of removing barriers to switching in promoting effective competition is hardwired into the legislation. The FCA will have a lean to require the banks to behave in an efficient and effective way.
In the light of all those considerations, I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Flight
My Lords, the first point I would like to stress is that, as I understand it, the Payments Council’s proposals do not involve grandfathering anti-money-laundering. I will take that up further, but if we do not get that, it ends up achieving very little. The noble Lord has in part answered my second point: if you start off with domestic competition being an objective of the FCA, part of achieving that has to be being able to move bank accounts easily. I hope that the empowerment that the FCA has in this area, to which the Minister referred, will be adequate.
As I said earlier, this is essentially a probing amendment, but it is important. Going back to why banks make a great problem of anti-money-laundering, it is because they do not want to lose customers. It is not a question of cracking anything marvellous; anti-money-laundering requirements were wonderful for financial services businesses. They made it a hassle for everyone to move their custom somewhere else. Those businesses are not stupid. Indeed, I have regarded anti-money-laundering as almost a plot by the whole financial services industry to strengthen their oligopoly.
The Payments Council measures are crucial, and I hope that the Treasury will clarify that point in its discussions with the council. Having said that, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, for her support—I agreed with everything she said, in truth—I hope that the profile of this issue will be raised and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.