Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Wednesday 10th November 2021 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

187: Clause 96, page 84, leave out line 18
Member’s explanatory statement
This is consequential on Lord Paddick’s objection to Clause 97 standing part of the Bill.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 187 in my name I will speak to the other amendments in this group. I ask the Committee to forgive the repetition.

I understand the Government’s desire to simplify out-of-court disposals and take the pressure off courts but, as I have said in several previous groups, research has shown that moving to the system suggested by the Bill, as piloted by some police forces, is likely to cost more, do nothing to reduce offending and have little or no impact on victim satisfaction.

I have also suggested that the complexity of having to impose conditions in every case when a police caution is given, whether a diversionary or community caution, is likely to have the unintended consequences of increasing the number of cases dealt with by no further action being taken and the number of cases sent to court—anything to avoid the complicated process of setting, arranging and monitoring compliance with the conditions that must be set whenever anyone is given a police caution. Research already shows a reduction in the number of out-of-court disposals in recent years, and these changes are likely to result in further reductions.

Clause 97 abolishes all other forms of out-of-court disposal. I will give some illustrations of what this means in practice. A young lawyer or medic who, completely out of character, has too much to drink, gets drunk and ends up making a nuisance of himself is arrested and, once sober, is given a simple caution. The salutary effect on such an individual’s future behaviour is dramatic, the impact on his career prospects negligible and the amount of time taken by the police to deal with the case minimal. If the impact of his being stopped and spoken to by a police officer has an immediate sobering effect, he might even be given a fixed penalty notice for disorder and sent on his way. Neither of these out-of-court disposals would be available under the Bill as drafted.

If someone drops litter, is seen by a police officer and refuses to put it in the bin, at the moment, that police officer can issue a fixed penalty notice for disorder. Under the Bill, the only course for the officer would be either not to take any action at all, undermining both the law and the authority of the police, or to arrest the person and take them to a police station so that they can be cautioned with conditions attached. I am at a bit of a loss as to what conditions might be attached to a caution for littering, but perhaps the Minister can enlighten the Committee.

Altogether, there are currently 27 minor offences that can be dealt with by a police officer issuing a fixed penalty notice on the spot, from cycling in a park where cycling is prohibited to possession of khat or cannabis. In all these cases, the only way to proceed, if this Bill passes unamended, would be to make an arrest, so that a community or diversionary caution with conditions attached could be administered.

This is a recipe for an increase in anti-social behaviour that goes unchallenged, because police officers faced with the bureaucracy of arrest and a community or diversionary caution with conditions attached will look the other way. What is unclear—the Committee needs to know this, and if the Minister cannot answer from the Dispatch Box, I ask him to write to me—is what happens to cannabis and khat warnings where people who have cannabis or khat found on them are seized by a police officer and a warning is given to them on the street. I would argue that that is a type of out-of-court disposal. Is this also to be outlawed by the Bill? If it is, it will have serious consequences for police resources.

What is proposed by this clause, with community and diversionary cautions being the only out-of-court disposals allowed, will result in fewer people having any action taken against them for anti-social behaviour and significant police resources being used to deal with minor offences. That is why Clause 97, which abolishes other forms of out-of-court disposals, such as fixed penalties for disorder, should not stand part of the Bill and the simple police caution should be retained. I beg to move.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is to retain simple cautions. The examples he gave illustrate the point I made earlier: that this is a very complex area, with a lot of history of government trying to manage out-of-court disposals in different ways. He gave the example of 27 minor offences which can be dealt with by fixed penalty notices and asked what happens with cannabis and khat warnings. I would be interested to hear the answer.

The noble Lord asked—I think rhetorically—what else a police officer can do other than give a conditional caution. The answer is that they can do nothing. They can give the person they are dealing with a talking to; in my experience, police officers are perfectly capable of doing that. Nevertheless, as I said in an earlier group, this is a very complex area. The Government have tried a number of different out-of-court disposal regimes in recent years; I am not aware that any approach was particularly better than previous ones. Indeed, the noble Lord gave examples of the not obvious success of the pilot schemes for this regime.

Nevertheless, I think that out-of-court disposals are appropriate. They need to be handled in a proportionate way and with the right amount of training for the police officers dealing with them. Clearly, an appropriate level of intervention would, one would hope, be for the benefit of the offenders, given that it is very likely that a large proportion of the offenders will be drug and alcohol users. Having said that, I will be interested to hear why the Minister thinks a simple caution is not appropriate to retain on the statute book.

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

Without turning this afternoon into a jurisprudential seminar, I certainly agree with the thrust of the point made by the noble Baroness that good law is often a combination of rules and discretion. At the level of generality, I would agree. However, it is not right to say that this is rigid; the conditions that can be applied are extremely flexible.

There are really two parts to the answer. First, within the new cautions regime, there is a great deal of flexibility as to the conditions that can be set out. If the noble Baroness looks at Clause 80 for diversionary cautions—which is mirrored in Clause 89 for community cautions—subsection (4) sets out the restrictive conditions and goes down to the one I mentioned in my response to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, which is

“not to engage in specified conduct”.

That is, essentially, the lowest form of engagement when no other suitable conditions exist. That really creates a condition where the offender is expected not to commit any further offences. That is a very low level of engagement, and when that is suitable will be a matter for the code of practice.

The second part of the answer is to repeat the point I made earlier that other forms of out of court disposal are still available—I mentioned fixed penalty notices and community resolution—so, with respect, I do not agree that we are putting in place a rigid regime. The conditions are flexible and there are some disposals that are outside the cautions structure, even now.

I do not think I did so before, but I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Can the Minister clarify something? I think he said something along the lines that the lowest level of condition is that the offender should not engage in similar activity again. So, if somebody is arrested and cautioned and the police say to them “Don’t do it again”, is that a condition attached to a caution?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

As I said a moment ago, this relates to Clause 80(4) and Clause 89(4), if the noble Lord looks at the last condition in each of those subsections. The code of practice, as I said in response to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, will make further provision for the circumstances in which that would be appropriate. Importantly, and I think differently from the simple caution, the police would still need to monitor conduct to ensure that someone had not reoffended, but that would be less onerous. This is a good example of where the new structure that we are putting in place preserves the best of the old regime but still has it on a more structured basis, focused on preventing reoffending as well as on the rehabilitation of the offender.

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

May I first deal with the caution points? I do not want to run those two topics together. On cautions, there is a fundamental point here. The simple caution is really what it says on the tin: a simple caution. In circumstances where the officer decides that it is appropriate to give a community caution with the lowest level—the one that we are talking about now—importantly, to get there, the officer or the authorised person still has to go through the process of speaking to the victim, thinking about what other options are available and looking at what other conditions are available. That process is valuable in all cases. That is one of the strengths of the new regime. I accept that that requires more consideration, but you end up with a system which is more robust and suitable and which results in a more proportionate response. Quite separately, I join the noble Baroness in what she said about Mr Dowling.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I thank noble Lords who have participated in this short debate and am grateful for the qualified support from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede.

If I heard the Minister right, he referred to public consultation and the proportion of respondents who said that they did not believe that out-of-court disposals reduced offending. Is he really saying that the Government are now legislating on the basis of public opinion rather than on the basis of evidence? There is no evidence that the two-tier system that has been piloted by a third of forces is any more effective, as I have quoted at length and repeatedly—which the Minister ignores. There is no evidence that this will be a better system for reducing offending. With the greatest of respect, just because the Government assert that it will be does not mean that it is.

I am struggling here. If we take the example of somebody who is arrested for being drunk and disorderly and who the police want to caution, they now have to attach conditions. Presumably, the lowest level of condition will be, “You should desist from behaving like this in the future.” Then the Minister says, “But of course the police will have to put measures in place to monitor the accused’s future behaviour.” I am completely at a loss as to what sort of monitoring the Minister has in mind in such circumstances. The more the Committee examines these proposals—perhaps I should say the lack of them, bearing in mind that we will not see whatever is contained in the code of practice until well beyond the Bill receiving Royal Assent—the more the whole thing begins to unravel.

Clearly, I will apologise to the Minister and to the Committee if I have misunderstood the legislation in terms of withdrawing the police’s ability to give fixed penalty notices for disorder. I hope that the Minister will do the same if it turns out that I am right and he is wrong. However, at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 187 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

189ZA: Schedule 10, page 231, line 15, leave out sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) and insert—
“(2) In paragraph 1(1)—(a) in the opening words, for “—” substitute “at the time the caution is given.”, and(b) omit paragraphs (a) and (b).””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would remove the spending period for cautions.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Forgive me for the delay, my Lords—so many amendments, so little time, as it were.

I am grateful to Transform Justice for its briefing on this issue and for its assistance in drafting this amendment. Currently, simple cautions with no conditions attached are considered “spent” within the meaning of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 as soon as they have been given. This means that they do not have to be disclosed to potential employers. The Government propose to abolish simple cautions, so those who would previously have received a simple caution, which do not have to be disclosed, could potentially receive a diversionary caution, which, like conditional cautions currently, have to be disclosed for three months after the caution is given. Given the Government’s commitment to reform rehabilitation periods elsewhere in the Bill, we suggest that the rehabilitation period for diversionary cautions should be removed. In Part 11, Clause 164 already sets out various changes to the rehabilitation periods for different sentences. Removing the diversionary caution rehabilitation period should be added to the list of those changes.

The Government argue that a three-month spending period is required for a diversionary caution to support protection of the public. There is strong evidence that employment is one of the most, if not the most, important factors in enabling people to cease offending behaviour and to move on to crime-free lives as productive members of society. A three-month rehabilitation period is short enough to have little impact on public protection, but its existence will require people in employment or seeking employment to declare the caution and risk losing their job or be refused employment. It will also act as a barrier to those seeking education and volunteering opportunities. Research has found that employers discriminate against people with criminal records and that most do not differentiate between a caution and a conviction. Introducing a spending period for the diversionary caution will therefore hamper people’s efforts to gain employment while doing little for public protection. Diversionary cautions should follow the spending regime for the existing simple caution and end at the point at which the caution is given. I beg to move Amendment 189ZA.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I support the noble Lord’s amendment. If I may, I will elasticate the rules of order slightly by referring to some other issues relating to the spending of cautions and of convictions.

In 2013 and 2014, an ad hoc committee of Members of this House and of the other place reported, sponsored by the National Children’s Bureau and the Michael Sieff Foundation, on the youth courts. I was part of that group, as was the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, who was very valuable member, and as was a certain Back-Bencher called Robert Buckland, who later became Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor. To be fair to him, despite having gone to the other side of good behaviour by becoming a member of the Cabinet, he always remained personally committed to what we had found. Our second recommendation was this:

“Children who have committed non-serious and non-violent offences, who have stopped offending, should have their criminal record expunged when they turn 18.”


I believe that that is a very important principle for which there is supporting evidence around the world. I am disappointed that the Bill is a touch pusillanimous in not picking up that recommendation—and I am grateful to say to the Minister that a number of our recommendations have been picked up.

If the noble Lord were to speak to Charlie Taylor, who held a very important position in the Ministry of Justice at that time, as chairman of the Youth Justice Board, and who is of course now Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons, he would find that he is also very supportive of that recommendation, with his huge experience of dealing with young people, first as a teacher and then in the criminal justice sphere.

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Although I am now straying from the amendment because our debate ranged more widely, perhaps I may respond to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and my noble friend Lord Hailsham. I hear their points about cautions. We seek to maintain a proper balance here. I hope that it is fair for me to say that the points raised go beyond the scope of the amendment, but I have heard them. I will reflect on and discuss them and, if noble Lords who have made those points think that it would be helpful, that might well include discussions with them. For the reasons that I have set out, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, for talking beyond the amendment, in that the Bill’s provisions apply to adults rather than children. He made extremely important points, supported by noble Lords around the House. We support what he was talking about.

The Minister rightly said that a community caution has no spending period, whereas a diversionary caution has a three-month period. He said that that was no change from the existing position. However, there is nothing to stop the police giving someone a diversionary caution in circumstances where, in the past, a simple caution with no spending period would have been given. We have heard many cases, often questionably appropriate, of serious offences being dealt with by the police by means of a simple caution with no spending period attached to it.

The Minister tried to bolster his argument by saying, “The accused must admit the offence and agree to the caution.” That is exactly the same with a simple caution: the police cannot give someone a simple caution unless they admit the offence and agree to the caution.

There is a real danger here that people who currently get a simple caution, which there is no need for them to disclose to, for example, an employer, will have to disclose it in future, with all the negative consequences that that might entail. At this stage, however, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 189ZA withdrawn.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Wednesday 10th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe (Lab)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 172, I will also speak to Amendments 173, 177, 179, 180 and 186, to be inserted after Clause 79. These are about victims’ financial losses, which can often arise as a result of an assault on their person, their property or their belongings. The amendments seek to ensure that the authorities and the perpetrators are made available of these costs and that, in turn, where possible, there might be some restitution for these innocent people whose property and goods have been attacked.

I bring the issue to the Committee’s attention based on a most unfortunate and regrettable experience of a friend of mine, Mr James McAra, who lives just outside Scunthorpe. He was at home watching television on the evening of 13 September this year in his house at Ashby. He was alone—he is a widower, aged 78 years, who has lived there for 55 years. He has brought up his family; they have all flown the nest and he is left alone. At 10 pm, his life was changed. There was a terrific crash outside the house, then suddenly his windows were smashed in and his front door was crashed down. Five masked, armed men with sledgehammers appeared in the house. He confronted one of them, who then gave him a push and shouted to his accomplices, “Oh fuck, it’s an old man. We’ve got the wrong effing house.” With that, they turned around, ran out and left him in a terrific state of shock. In the event, it turns out that the noise outside had been the smashing of his car with sledgehammers. It was so badly damaged that it has had to be written off.

As noble Lords can imagine, this is a most distressing experience—an attack and assault—for a man of such an age. The police arrived promptly; by all accounts, they were excellent and knew straightaway what had happened. The two houses next door had been raided on numerous occasions over the last two years in relation to drug dealing, and only two months earlier a young man had been found dead in one of them. The police believed that the attack on his property was intended for one of those houses, related to the ongoing drugs problem. This couple of houses, with numerous instances of anti-social behaviour, has made this once peaceful street a nightmare to live in. As a consequence, James is now considering moving because of this sickening experience and attack.

I turn to the amendments. To compound matters, Mr McAra is well out of pocket from this experience. The car insurance in no way covers the cost of the replacement car he has had to get. Then he has had to pay the excesses on the house insurance for new doors and new windows, and he has now been told that his future insurance premiums on his car and his property—the lot—will go up next year. Where is the justice for a victim of this kind?

I suspect that the chance of getting some reparations from the attackers, if they could be found, arrested and convicted, is quite a long shot. However, we have been disturbed to learn that it is not always understood by the authorities what the total cost has been and that there is no formal request for a record of the costs that might arise, in a variety of different ways, when someone is attacked in this way. Obviously, a requirement for conversations with the victims is laid down and victim support is offered, but financial losses are not necessarily recorded. I believe, and I am sure noble Lords share this view, that they should be. They should be taken into account in determining punishments and, if it is possible to get restitution, they should be known factors taken into account for that purpose.

Having heard this story, I am sure that noble Lords, like me, feel that it is time for some changes to try to give further assistance to victims. Mr McAra’s constituency MP is Holly Mumby-Croft, a Conservative MP who knows all about these facts and has been as supportive as she could be in the circumstances. She has been advised that these amendments will be put before the Committee today and, in due course, we are hoping they will be adopted and go back to the Commons. I think she is hoping that she can look for a sympathetic hearing from the Front Bench today. For positive action, in adopting these amendments, which will cost little to implement, we must go some way towards actually making changes. The amendments before us would facilitate such changes. On behalf of victims affected in this way, particularly Mr McAra, I have great pleasure in moving this amendment.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe, has relayed to the Committee clearly a very distressing case of mistaken identity and anti-social behaviour generally in that street, apparently to do with drug dealing. If the perpetrators of this terrible crime were found, I am not sure that they would be given a caution, and I thought this part of the Bill was about police cautions—but I accept the general point that victims need to be protected. Although a caution would not be applicable in this case of the break-in at the home and the damage to the car, there might be one in respect of the general anti-social behaviour in the street. It is absolutely essential that the needs of victims are taken into account by the police, including for the financial losses that victims have suffered.

As I said on a previous group, out-of-court settlements have a high victim approval rating already. These amendments, in so far as they apply to police cautions, would ensure that they remain high, and to that extent we support them.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree with the points that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, just made. I also think that Mr McAra should be very grateful to my noble friend Lord Brooke for raising the points about the lack of a formal record of the cost of the incidents. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that it seems very unlikely that anyone would get a caution for this sort of offence. Even if it got to court, there would be an obligation on the sentencing court to consider compensation, because one has to consider this whenever one sentences an individual. Nevertheless, my noble friend has raised an interesting question and I look forward to the Minister’s reply.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

174: Clause 80, page 75, line 1, leave out subsection (8)
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes the subsection which allows the maximum number of hours attached to the unpaid work condition and the attendance condition to be amended by regulations.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I will also speak to the other amendments in this group. The Committee has already considered these issues, so I can be brief. I apologise for not recognising that some of the amendments in a previous group covered similar issues.

In that previous group, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, suggested that the maximum number of hours attached to the unpaid work condition and the attendance condition, and the maximum fine that could be attached to a caution, should be set in the case of the fine and varied in all cases by regulations and that those should be amended only by the affirmative resolution procedure. The noble and learned Lord previously said in Committee that this was not an ideal solution, as regulations could not be amended and that this House was reluctant to use the “nuclear option” of praying to annul regulations, which is the only option available if it disagrees with a statutory instrument. Even with the affirmative resolution procedure in place, in practice, if the House disagrees with an increase to the maximum number of hours of unpaid work—or any of the other conditions attached to police cautions—there is little that it can do about it, unless changes are made through primary legislation.

I grant that the value of money is eroded over time by inflation and periodically the maximum fine capable of being attached as a condition to a caution may need to increase accordingly, but surely not the amount of time to be spent in unpaid work or subject to the attendance condition. There is a question of principle. If an offence is so grave that greater punishment is required, that should be a matter for the courts and not for a police officer to decide. There is precedent in our legal system for this principle. If magistrates want to impose a harsher sentence, they must refer eligible cases to the Crown Court, where a more senior judge can make a decision with more serious consequences.

When I joined the police service in the 1970s, the police performed the role of both investigator and prosecutor. Parliament then decided that prosecution decisions should be made by an independent body, the Crown Prosecution Service, for very good reasons that I do not need to rehearse here, while punishment of the individual has primarily been a matter for the courts, supported by reports from experts on the medical, social and criminal antecedents of the accused, in many cases, and considered by highly trained and experienced judges who are obliged to follow sentencing guidelines. In the proposals contained in this part of the Bill, the police are investigators, prosecutors and sentencers. There must be limits on the extent to which they should be allowed to carry out all three functions in relation to a case and those limits should be set out in primary legislation, on the face of the Bill. That is the purpose of these amendments and I beg to move Amendment 174.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I listened with interest to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. As he says, in this part of the Bill the police are investigators, prosecutors and sentencers. They also decide whether the matter should be sent to the CPS, with the people charged and sent into the court system. Of course, once the case gets into the court system, magistrates are judge, jury and sentencers. There are different roles at different stages of the system. The burden of the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is in some way to codify, limit and guide the police when they are doing this pre-court intervention with the type of cautions set out in the Bill. I look forward with interest to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for putting forward this group of amendments. If I can put it this way, the noble Lord realistically recognised that we have covered some of this ground before—not this particular issue but the conceptual underpinning on which it is based. I hope, therefore, that the Committee and the noble Lord will not take it amiss if I reply relatively briefly, because we have covered some of the points before.

Amendments 174, 176, 182 and 185 relate to the delegated powers contained in Part 6. The amendments propose to remove the clauses that allow the maximum amount of the financial penalty and the maximum number of unpaid work and attendance hours to be specified in regulations and would replace that by putting the details in the Bill. Amendments 175, 183 and 184 set out that the maximum penalty attached to a caution would be fixed at £200 and would make it explicit that an offender’s ability to pay must be taken into account.

The Bill contains powers to set and amend the amount of the maximum financial penalty and to amend the maximum number of unpaid work or attendance hours by regulations via secondary legislation. As I explained on a previous occasion, it was drafted that way to ensure maximum flexibility when responding to the needs of operational practitioners. Any changes to these regulations will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny in the normal way, but removing the delegated powers in their entirety, which is what Amendments 174, 176, 182 and 185 would do, would mean that there is no flexibility to amend either levels of financial penalty or the number of unpaid work hours. If we have the maximum financial penalty on the face of the Bill, to change it or update it, whether because of inflation or anything else, we would have to have to come back to primary legislation. I respectfully suggest that that is not a great use of parliamentary time.

Finally, as to the matter of whether the offender’s ability to pay should be explicitly set out in statute, of course it is a relevant factor, but we believe that this—alongside a range of other relevant factors around giving a financial penalty, the amount that it is set at and how quickly it is going to be paid—is better set out in detail in a statutory code of practice rather than in the Bill. With apologies for taking that a little shortly, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for saying something. The whole point of not allowing it to be in regulations is that it is an important question of principle that once a crime gets to a certain level requiring a certain punishment, it should be for the courts to administer that punishment, in the same way that if a magistrate decides that the punishment they are able to give is not sufficient, they have to refer it to a higher court. These are the people with the experience, training and background properly to assess both the individual and the circumstances, and to apply the penalty. Therefore, it should be dealt with in primary legislation.

This should not be about providing maximum flexibility for operational partners. It should be about consistency and certainty, and citizens knowing that above a certain level of unpaid work, attendance at a training course or a fine imposed by the police, they cannot go without referring the matter to the courts. That is the whole point. I completely accept that the Minister has explained why it is in regulations and not in the Bill. However, he has not addressed at all the argument that it should not be that flexible.

Why is the accused’s ability to pay important? I was talking to my noble friend Lady Randerson about this amendment earlier today; like the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, she is an experienced magistrate, now retired. She said, “It is so important to take into account the accused’s ability to pay, because if you impose a fine, say, of £200 on somebody who has little or no income, it will almost guarantee that they commit a crime in order to get the £200 to pay the fine.” That is why that seemingly innocuous addition, which should be in the Bill, is in fact absolutely important. In the light of the Minister failing to engage with the heart of the amendments, we will return to this issue on Report, but in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 174 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

178: Clause 86, page 78, line 17, leave out subsection (4)
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is to probe the effect of subsection (4).

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, by way of a little light relief for the Committee, I rise to move Amendment 178 in my name.

In this part of the Bill, “Part 6—Cautions”, Clause 86 deals with:

“Application of Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.”


On page 78, at line 17, Clause 86(4) states:

“Section 40 of the 1984 Act (review of police detention) applies to a person in police detention by virtue of section 85 above as it applies to a person in police detention in connection with the investigation of an offence, but with the following modifications—


(a) omit subsections (8) and (8A);


(b) in subsection (9), for the reference to section 37(9) or 37D(5) substitute a reference to the second sentence of section 85(6) above.”

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I was going to say “comprehensible” but that is a pretty high test— perhaps “as clear as good legislation can be”. I have to leave at least some space for my former colleagues at the Bar to have a career; if we make it too precise, we will do people out of a job. However, there is a serious point here, and I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that legislation should be as clear as possible. I will set out what the words are seeking to do, and if it is thought that there is a better way of putting them to get to the same result, obviously, I will be happy to hear it. However, let me explain what they seek to do.

Clause 86 sets out the provisions of PACE and the modifications required to them that will apply upon arrest for failure to comply with any condition attached to a diversionary caution. The purpose of the clause is to ensure that the diversionary caution operates effectively within the existing framework of police powers; it mirrors the approach taken in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which gives the police powers of arrest for failure to comply with the existing conditional caution.

The subsection of this clause ensures that someone arrested and detained by the police is subject to the same treatment as any detained person, and periodic reviews of their detention are carried out. Obviously, that is important. The same subsection also contains modifications to put specific matters in the Bill: the power to detain those who are unfit to be dealt with at the time of arrest; the power of arrest for detainees bailed for any breach—that is, non-compliance; and the power to search a detainee in police custody following arrest.

The modifications make specific reference to the diversionary caution. For example, the PACE power to search and examine a detainee to ascertain their identity is modified to ensure that the power will still exist where a detainee has failed to comply with any of the conditions attached to the person’s diversionary caution. Therefore, it provides—I was going to say “clarity” but perhaps that might be pushing the point a little—that these powers apply only to the diversionary caution and not also to the community caution, where there is no power of arrest or prosecution for non-compliance. That is why Clause 86(4) is needed. Without the necessary PACE provisions as modified, the powers for police to deal with breaches of a diversionary caution would be limited and that would undermine the effect of non-compliance with the conditions.

I do not know whether what I have said has reassured the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that the clause is properly focused. I hope that I have explained what it is trying to do. I am not being flippant and I do appreciate that legislation needs to be as clear as possible and that it is important that people understand what it encompasses. However, when one is legislating against the background of other legislation, it can be quite difficult to do it other than by cross-references back. If there is a better way to achieve the same result without adding pages and pages, I should be very happy to hear it, but I hope that I have explained what the clause is focused on and why it is drafted in the way it is. I therefore invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment. However, I am happy to discuss this matter between us if there is another way of doing it.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I am very grateful to the Minister. Perhaps I may gently suggest that if something akin to what the noble Lord said was contained even in the Explanatory Notes explaining that part of the Bill, we would not have to spend time in Committee trying to understand what it was about. I know that my noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have looked everywhere possible to try and decipher what that meant—to no avail. It may be that to parliamentary draftspeople it is as clear as day—but for us lesser mortals it is not. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, before my noble friend withdraws his amendment, I should say that he is quite right. There are a number of different points at which it is important for people to understand what legislation means. For us looking back at legislation, we can do so online and it is important that the changes go up online as soon as possible, including in the previous legislation. This is quite a serious point that is, of course, much broader than the Bill—but I am going to infuriate the Committee by getting it off my chest. One can spend an awful lot of time trying to understand what a piece of legislation, passed 20 years ago and amended five times, actually amounts to unless what is put online is completely up to date. It wastes an awful lot of noble Lords’ time and must waste Ministers’ time trying to get their heads around it if the Explanatory Notes do not set out those things intelligibly.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 178 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Framlingham (Con)]

My Lords, I am not as well versed in these matters as many noble Lords are, but, in the interest of clarity, could the Minister explain what a “diversionary caution” is?

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, we support this amendment, but, as I have already said, we have our doubts about the whole regime. For the benefit of noble Lords who missed the midnight debate on Monday, I bring you the edited highlights, which are relevant to this group.

I quoted from the House of Commons briefing paper 9165. On the Government’s proposals on diversionary and community cautions, it says:

“the available evidence suggests the system: … may result in a further decline in … OOCDs; … is likely to cost more … is unlikely to have a major impact on the reoffending rates of offenders; and … may improve victim satisfaction but is unlikely to have a major impact.”

I have to say that the high point for me on Monday night—or was it Tuesday morning?—was the Minister’s answer to my question about how effective conditional cautions, which are the existing system of cautions with conditions attached, were, compared with simple cautions that do not have conditions attached. The noble Lord announced with glee, if I may say that in a very respectful way, that:

“As the Committee will know from previous exchanges, I am quite a fan of data.”—[Official Report, 8/11/10; col. 1577.]


The Minister then looked at his phone and a message from his WhatsApp group—it is good to see members of the WhatsApp group in the Box today—saying that, in effect, there was no data. The Government not only keep no record of how many conditional versus simple cautions are administered, just the total number of all cautions, but have no record of what kind of conditions are attached to conditional cautions. On the basis of that data void, they plan to implement a system where all police cautions will need to have conditions attached.

I also quoted from a 2018 paper by Dr Peter Neyroud, former chief constable of Thames Valley Police and now a distinguished academic, published by the University of Cambridge and commissioned by the National Police Chiefs’ Council, entitled Out of Court Disposals Managed by the Police: A Review of the Evidence. On the police attaching conditions to cautions, he said:

“The result … was a significant degree of inconsistency and a substantial number of inappropriate and un-evidenced conditions.”


The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham gave us an example of, presumably, a youth who was banned from public transport, which meant he could not get to school. I continue to quote from Dr Peter Neyroud:

“Whilst the provision of further training and more guidance improved the situation somewhat, the cost of such an investment within a more general implementation of OOCD’s with conditions”—


exactly what the Government are proposing—

“would be prohibitive and, in any case, did not completely resolve the problems.”

Never mind—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, came up with a better idea: the inspectorates of the constabulary and of the CPS could ensure consistency, so that somebody in a similar situation, committing a similar offence, would have the same conditions attached, no matter where they were in the country. I am afraid not, said the Minister:

“Those two inspectorates are not regulators; they do not have power to enforce compliance.”—[Official Report, 8/11/21; col. 1576.]


Inconsistent, inappropriate and unevidenced conditions will be attached to cautions all over the country, bringing no benefit to offenders, little benefit to victims and increased costs to the criminal justice system. That is what this part of the Bill does.

We support this amendment, which should also apply to diversionary cautions, but the omens are not good that the police will know what they are doing when it comes to applying conditions to support the offender to desist from offending. There is serious doubt that, even when they do, the conditions will have any effect on reducing reoffending.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, this has been a wide-ranging debate. When the right reverend Prelate introduced it, he made a general plea in favour of cautions and on why his amendment was appropriate. He spoke of the benefits of cautions and what they need to be effective, and of the revolving door of crisis and crime and of a holistic approach. He particularly gave the example of women offenders, for whom a holistic approach is appropriate to reduce reoffending. Then he went on to give examples of why quite a lot of cautions fail—by giving too many conditions. My experience, through following both cautions and sentences through court, is that the more conditions you put in place, even if they are in place for the best of reasons, the more likely you are to have a breach and to re-enter that cycle, coming back to court or to the police when conditions are breached.

My central point is that out-of-court disposals are a difficult area. The Government and previous Governments have a lot of experience in trying to come up with an appropriate regime for out-of-court disposals. As we have heard on the Bill—I agree with pretty much all the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick—we have another cautions regime, which we hope will work in some way. I particularly noted the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, about the need to see draft regulations or a draft code of practice to ensure consistency across the country.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I hope it is in order to pick up one point that was put to me at the end of the last group and say a word on it. I hope the Committee will forgive me. It goes to all groups, in some ways, because it is about how legislation is put online. Legislation.gov.uk has a facility to look at the original texts and unscramble the later amendments, so to speak. A point that occurred as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, was speaking was whether one could put in hyperlinks to take you through different pieces of legislation. I am happy to look into that, but I now turn to this amendment.

My noble friend Lord Framlingham asked what a diversionary caution is. To try to sum up a large part of the Bill in about three sentences, I say that there is going to be a lower-tier disposal called a community caution and an upper-tier disposal called a diversionary caution. Conditions must be attached to both, aimed at one of three objectives—rehabilitation, reparation or punishment. Restrictive conditions can be set, where they contribute to reparation or rehabilitation. In that regard, there is a similarity to the existing conditional caution regime. I hope that answers the question.

I now turn to the substance of the amendment in the name of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester—moved by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham—alongside the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, and the noble Lord, Lord Beith. It goes to the primary objective of the new two-tier statutory framework, which I have just explained, to provide, as a requirement of the community caution, meaningful court conditions to help an offender stop offending.

I am grateful for the broad support, as a matter of principle, of the right reverend Prelate for the aims of the Bill on out-of-court disposals. I respectfully agree with the point made by the noble and learned Lord on the importance of the caution regime in the criminal justice system. I also agree with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, that cautions must be carefully considered to avoid the syndrome of repeated interventions.

While the amendment is obviously well intentioned, the Bill already makes provision for the purpose that underpins it in Clause 80 on diversionary cautions and Clause 89 on community cautions. The Bill asks the relevant person to focus on the position of the offender. Of course we all agree that one has to look at the position of the victim, but I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Beith, that one must also look at the offender. The Bill already does that.

While I agree with the broad thrust of the purpose of the amendment, I suggest that it is unnecessary. That is because, aside from the punitive option of a financial penalty, the conditions of both the diversionary and the community caution must be aimed at rehabilitation or reparation, thereby addressing the underlying causes of the offending. Importantly, the cautions enable referrals to support services where relevant as conditions of the disposal. Referrals at this pretty early stage of the criminal justice system could include referrals to relevant intervention services such as substance misuse services, mental health treatment providers or gambling addiction, or restorative justice referrals. All those help to address the underlying causes of offending behaviour and so help to reduce reoffending or the escalation of offending behaviour.

As I have said, a code of practice will accompany the legislation. It will be drawn up in collaboration with stakeholders and subject to a formal public consultation and to an affirmative statutory instrument. I respectfully agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, as he would no doubt expect me to, as to the fundamental importance of the rule of law in this and, indeed, other areas. I wonder whether actually the police are best viewed as being seen as part of the Executive; we could probably have an interesting debate on that. The answer might be that it depends on the purpose for which you are using the principle of the rule of law as to what exactly it would encompass.

To give the noble and learned Lord a bit more information, the way that the code of practice will be put together is that there will be an informal stakeholder engagement exercise with police forces, the National Police Chiefs Council, police and crime commissioners, the CPS and relevant third-sector organisations, which will help with drafting. We will then have a formal public consultation, which will take place next year. Importantly, the power to issue the code and the regulations is contained in the clauses of the Bill, so we will not have the power to do that until the Bill receives Royal Assent and is commenced.

I want to pick up the underlying points made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. I hope he will not take it amiss if I do not respond to those. There is a clear conceptual gulf between us, if I may put it that way, as to the purpose of the regime and whether it is soundly based. I set out the Government’s position on that earlier. I am not sure it is helpful if I just repeat those words each time because there is that gulf between us and I am not sure it is going to be bridged. I hope the noble Lord will therefore not take it amiss if I do not respond in detail.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

It is not a conceptual gulf. It is a question of where the evidence is that cautions with conditions attached are more beneficial than cautions without conditions attached. I can answer that question for the Minister: there is no evidence, because the Government do not collect any. That is coupled with the fact that this House will be asked—this Committee is debating it now—to sign a blank cheque for all this when the detail has not been worked out. There will be public consultation and consultation with stakeholders, but we have no idea what this is going to look like in the end. That is no way for this House to proceed with this legislation.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

Well, we did have that exchange. I went through the way that it has been piloted in various police forces, and we had an interesting exchange. I am happy to look again at the record and see whether there is anything else that I can add, but I am not sure that will necessarily persuade the noble Lord in any event. Again, I am not sure it is helpful to go through those fundamental points each and every time we come to one of these amendments.

I hope I have responded substantively—and, I hope, substantially—to the amendments tabled by the right reverend Prelate. For the reasons that I have set out, I ask him to withdraw them.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Monday 8th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, very briefly, from my professional experience, there is no safe level of alcohol for a driver. The message should be clear to all drivers that you should not drink and drive. I think that the limit should not be set at zero, because you can still have alcohol in your system the following day and there may be a need for some leeway, but at a level a lot lower than is currently the case. Certainly, the levels that are suggested in this amendment are reasonable. There needs to be a significant reduction in the alcohol limit, but perhaps not set at zero.

The other thing to say—I am sure the Minister will address the Committee on this—is that I am not sure that the second amendment is necessary, as the police are entitled to stop any driver to check their documents. If they then detect alcohol, provided the officer is in uniform, they can administer a breath test. I will leave that for the Minister to confirm.

[Baroness Randerson (LD)]

My Lords, I added my name to Amendment 157. I need to say very little following the speakers today, who have greater expertise than I have—and, of course, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, has her own tragic experience to bring to this debate.

I spoke about this issue during Oral Questions last week, and I just want to emphasise a couple of points that I made then. The limit we currently have is 54 years old; the science on which it is based has moved on, and it is outdated. We are not leading the world; we are lagging behind the rest of the world. From Australia to Scotland and the whole of the rest of Europe, we are behind.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

160: After Clause 76, insert the following new Clause—
“Power of police to stop vehicles
(1) Section 163 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (1), after “vehicle” in the second place in which it occurs, insert “, and switch off the engine,”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause to the Road Traffic Act 1988 would require a person to switch off their engine after being stopped by a constable in uniform or a traffic officer, and make it an offence not to do so.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, if the Committee will forgive me, I was not quick enough off the mark in the previous group when we were considering exceptional hardship. The Minister said that the Government opposed the amendment because it limited judicial discretion. As we will see in upcoming clauses, clause after clause of this Bill limits judicial discretion by means of primary legislation. I will remind the Government of what the Minister said in relation to that previous amendment when we come to those clauses.

I move Amendment 160 in my name and, in so doing, express my thanks to the Police Federation for raising this issue and for its assistance in drafting the amendment. Section 163 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 gives powers to the police to stop vehicles, which goes back to the previous group where we were discussing drink-driving. Section 163(1) says:

“A person driving a mechanically propelled vehicle on a road must stop the vehicle on being required to do so by a constable in uniform or a traffic officer.”


Section 163(3) says:

“If a person fails to comply with this section he is guilty of an offence.”


Similarly, Section 164 provides the power to require the driver to produce their driving licence. This poses several real dangers and unnecessary risks to our front-line police officers while dealing with such driver checks. The problem with the current legal framework is that an officer has to leave the relative safety of their own vehicle to make any request or to examine the driving licence. The driver of the stopped vehicle is under no obligation to get out of the vehicle or to switch off their engine.

The current law places officers in a vulnerable position in relation to the driver and occupants of the vehicle. They are permitted to remain in the vehicle to either flee when the officer is most vulnerable or even to use the vehicle as a weapon, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, said in an earlier amendment. This is a common occurrence, even in my professional experience, where drivers try to flee after you have got out of the police vehicle and spoken to them. The risk to the officer would be minimised by creating an obligation for the driver of the stopped vehicle to leave the vehicle, but it is also important to ensure others who may be present in the vehicle are not able to then drive the vehicle away, or at the officer, after the original driver has got out.

This amendment is intended to highlight this gap in the law, although I accept that it is not suitable as drafted. I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Randerson for pointing out that electric cars, for example, do not have an engine that can be switched off in the traditional sense of the words and that other vehicles do not require a set of keys to be in the ignition to start the engine. However, noble Lords will see exactly what the problem is and how, potentially, the risk to police officers could be minimised if, for example, the driver was required to immobilise the vehicle and get out of the car, unless there was a reasonable excuse for not doing so, for example if the driver was disabled. I look forward to a sympathetic response from the Minister, and I beg to move.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I am sorry, but I am going to speak on this if the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, is not going to.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I feel very strongly about this. It offends my sense of justice that people who do hit and runs never pay for their crime. They are a menace to society, with only six months’ maximum sentence for leaving someone for dead having hit them with a car and, of course, the figures are going up year after year—

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I think the noble Baroness may be speaking to the next group rather than this group.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I am. Sorry, ignore that. Strike that from the record. I will come back to that.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, if I understand the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, correctly, this amendment is aimed at improving the safety of police officers at the roadside. I share his concerns and want to reassure him that the safety of police officers is vitally important to this Government, as is demonstrated by our programme of work on the police covenant. I will not echo the arguments made to the noble Lord by the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, on the defects of his amendment, but I want to say that we are committed to ensuring that the police have the powers that they need to protect people.

The British model of policing is based on consent, and the exercise of police powers, including the Section 163 power, needs to be transparent, fair and legitimate to ensure that the public can remain confident in policing. I am supportive of the intention behind the extension of this power, but more evidence and consultation are needed to demonstrate that it would provide benefits to officers’ safety and build support for the effectiveness and legitimacy of the proposal to extend the power. I can say to the noble Lord that we will work closely with the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the College of Policing and the Police Federation to explore these issues further and consider what more can be done to improve officer safety at the roadside. On that basis, I hope that he will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I thank the noble Lord, Ponsonby of Shulbrede, for his support in principle. I think it would be problematic if the lone female driver was asked to get into the police vehicle, but I am not sure that the female driver would be in danger by getting out on to the roadside.

I am very grateful to the Minister for her support for the intention behind the amendment. As I acknowledged, more consultation is required, and I am very grateful that the Government are prepared to discuss these issues further with the National Police Chiefs’ Council and the Police Federation. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 160 withdrawn.

Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

161: After Clause 76, insert the following new Clause—
“Failing to stop or report accidents involving actual or potential serious or fatal injury
(1) After section 170(4) of the Road Traffic Act 1988, insert—“(4A) A person who fails to comply with subsection (2) or (3) when he knew that the accident had caused serious or fatal personal injury, or where he ought reasonably to have realised that it might have done so, is guilty of an offence.”(2) In Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 (prosecution and punishment of offences: offences under the Traffic Acts), after the entry relating to an offence under RTA subsection 170(4), insert the following—

“RTA section 170(4A)

Failing to stop and give particulars after accident involving actual or potential serious or fatal injury or to report accident

On indictment

14 years

Obligatory

Obligatory

6-11”

(3) After section 34(3)(d) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, insert—“(e) section 4A (failing to stop and give particulars after accident involving actual or potential serious or fatal injury or to report accident)”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment creates a new offence of failing to stop or report accidents where the driver knew that the accident had caused serious or fatal injury, or where he ought reasonably to have realised that it might have done so, with a maximum sentence of 14 years custody.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 161 is in my name, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb—as we already know. I am grateful to Living Streets, British Cycling, RoadPeace, Cycling UK, and the Road Danger Reduction Forum for their joint briefing and suggested amendment on this issue.

Currently, the maximum penalty for the offence of failing to stop to report accidents is a six-month custodial sentence. This may be appropriate in cases where someone has simply driven off after scratching the paintwork of someone else’s parked car, but not when someone has been left for dead by the roadside.

The briefing provided by two noble Lords cites the case of Scott Walker, who was struck and killed by a driver who was driving without insurance, failed to stop at the scene of the collision, failed to report the incident and then tried to conceal his involvement by having his car repaired to cover the damage. The sheriff who heard the case said that the maximum sentence of imprisonment

“would not adequately reflect the gravity of the offence.”

The parliamentary petition calling for tougher laws when someone dies and the driver fails to stop attracted more than 104,000 signatures.

Section 170 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 as amended requires:

“where, owing to the presence of a mechanically propelled vehicle on a road or other public place, an accident occurs by which … personal injury is caused to a person other than the driver of that mechanically propelled vehicle … The driver of the mechanically propelled vehicle must stop and, if required to do so by any person having reasonable grounds for so requiring, give his name and address and also the name and address of the owner and the identification marks of the vehicle … If for any reason the driver of the mechanically propelled vehicle does not give his name and address under subsection (2) above, he must report the accident … A person who fails to comply with subsection (2) or (3) above is guilty of an offence.”

The amendment would add a new subsection creating a new offence, where the driver knew or ought reasonably to have realised that the accident had caused serious or fatal personal injury, with a maximum penalty of 14 years’ imprisonment. As with the previous group, this amendment is intended to highlight the inadequacy of existing legislation.

Again, I accept that the wording may not be right; for example, the Road Traffic Act would need to be amended throughout, as other noble Lords have said, replacing the word “accident” with “collision” or “incident”, as some of these incidents involve deliberate acts, rather than being accidents, and the 14-year term may not be the right one. But the law is inadequate when someone fails to stop after a collision involving death or serious injury. I beg to move.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, as I said before, I support this amendment very strongly because hit-and-runs are a menace.

One of the problems is that the families who suffer from having somebody killed or injured rarely feel they get justice. That seems completely wrong. This amendment would mean that a judge has available the range of sentences necessary to reflect the severity of the offence. Sometimes the existing six months might be enough, and other times 14 years in custody would be the only option that can punish the wrongdoing and deter others from driving away from a serious collision. I am not big on increasing prison sentences, because I think we have far too many people in prison already, and many of them are there for the wrong reasons. But in this case, when you deliberately harm a person, prison is the place for that sort of violent person.

Judges should have the option of a lifetime ban for people who hit and run. There is no excuse for fleeing the scene—it is trying to escape justice. People should not be back on the road once they have done that. Hit-and-run is a cowardly thing; it is an attempt to escape and to not admit that you have done something wrong. Quite often, it can mean the difference between life and death for the person you have hit. This is a valuable amendment and will mean justice, not only for victims but their families and friends.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, as noble Lords have explained, Amendments 161 and 166 relate to the offence of drivers failing to stop. We know that in a small number of cases, the failure to stop might be related to an event that leads to the death of, or serious injury to, another person, but in the vast majority of cases, convictions involve low-level traffic incidents. In an extremely small number of cases, there may not be any other evidence to connect the death or serious harm with the driver who fails to stop, meaning the only offence they have committed is that failure to stop. I understand the concerns raised, but these amendments potentially risk providing for a maximum custodial sentence of 14 years for failure-to-stop offences resulting in serious or fatal injuries in circumstances where there would not have had to be evidence of a causal link between the failure to stop and the death or serious injury.

What is more, these amendments cut across the basis for the current offence. I must stress that the offence of failure to stop and report is designed to deal with the behaviour relating to the failure to stop. The offence is not to provide an alternative route to punish an offender for a more serious but unproven offence.

Where there is evidence that the driver caused harm, there are a range of other offences, including causing death or serious injury by dangerous or careless driving, with which the driver can be charged. In these cases, the courts can treat the failure to stop as an aggravating factor that adds to the overall seriousness of the offending. Where there is evidence that the driver knew about the incident and took steps to avoid detection, they may be charged with perverting the course of justice, a common law offence that already carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.

Linking death or serious injury with a failure to stop as the cause would risk creating an unnecessary and unfairly severe offence. To take an example, where there was evidence of causing death by careless driving and failure to stop, the offender would face a maximum penalty almost three times higher for failure to stop than they would for causing death by careless driving—14 years compared to five years— even though the causing death offence requires proof of a fault in the standard of driving.

The law already imposes severe penalties for vehicle offences that lead to death or serious injury, but when doing so, a clear causal link must be proved between the driver’s behaviour and the outcome. The proposed amendment would essentially be equating, or in some cases exceeding, the seriousness of failure to stop with actual culpability for causing death or injury. That, as I have said but want to repeat, causes serious anomalies with other offences that could result in potential injustices, and it is why the Government cannot accept the amendment.

In relation to Amendment 166, which also seeks to amend the current offence, we are concerned by the potential impacts on what is a complex area of law. For example, it is unclear what impact replacing the word “accident” with “collision” would have; it might exclude incidents that are currently and rightly within scope of the existing version of this section. We also reiterate our objections set out above to the creation of the offence of failing to report where the collision caused foreseeable serious or fatal injury.

We are of course aware of the traumatic effects of such incidents, however rare. From what I have already said, it should be clear that this is a complex area, and any change to the law has to fit within the current driving offence framework. However, let me assure noble Lords that my ministerial colleagues at the Department for Transport understand the concerns that have been raised. I can assure the Committee that the Department for Transport is exploring options that could be pursued in this area, including but not limited to the available penalties and how the offence operates as part of long-term and wider work on road safety. I hope that, with those assurances, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for contributing to this debate, including the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, who contributed twice. I thank her for her support. I agree in principle with what the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, said about sentence inflation; we are not in favour of that. However, the Minister talked about anomalies and this clearly is one—where someone causes death or serious injury and fails to stop after an accident but where no other offences are disclosed.

This is from memory, but in the case of the MP whom the noble Lord referred to, I think the incident in his part of the world in the south-west was a case of somebody who hit something, someone wandering in the road for example, and therefore an offence of careless, reckless or dangerous driving was not appropriate. However, the driver knew that they had hit something or somebody and still failed to stop or call the emergency services.

This is not about punishing the manner of driving that has caused death or serious injury, but about the dishonesty of knowing that you have hit somebody and knowing, from the speed that you were doing, that the person is likely to have received serious injury and, because you have failed to stop, what could have been survivable injuries become fatal injuries, because medical aid is not provided immediately or within a short space of time. As the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, said, almost everybody who has a car has a mobile phone, and with the extensive coverage of mobile phone signals there is no reason why immediate assistance cannot be summoned in most cases. As the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, said, failing to stop after an accident of this kind can mean the difference between life and death.

In my opening remarks I said that I was not sure that 14 years was the right punishment, that it needs to fit within the framework of punishment. In answer to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, there could be circumstances, such as the one that I have referred to, where offences other than failing to stop were not present. In those circumstances—for example, if somebody in foggy conditions wearing dark clothing in the middle of the night stumbles on to a roadway and is hit by a car, and the person driving knows that they have hit that individual but fails to stop—the only offence could be the failure to stop, yet it could have fatal consequences for the pedestrian involved.

I am grateful to the Minister for saying that colleagues in the Department for Transport will be looking at this issue, but it goes to the heart of the previous group on how there needs to be an overall look at road traffic offences in the light of changes that have taken place. The Minister also talked about difficulties that might be created because the amendment refers to collision versus accident, whereas other parts of road traffic law refer to accidents, but I did say that throughout road traffic legislation “accident” needs to be changed to “collision”, because some of the incidents are not accidents. However, it is encouraging that the Minister’s colleagues in the Department for Transport have agreed to look at this. On that basis, for the time being I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 161 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I am very glad to hear that. It is the first time in my experience—and I am not complaining, because the officials have worked incredibly hard on this—that the Box is entirely without officials.

To go back to the debate about delegated powers, this is what the Delegated Powers Committee said in general about this:

“We are particularly concerned that the Bill would … allow Ministers—and even a non-statutory body—to influence the exercise of new police powers (including in relation to unauthorised traveller encampments and stop and search) through ‘guidance’ that is not subject to Parliamentary scrutiny; … leave to regulations key aspects of new police powers—to restrict protest and to extract confidential information from electronic devices—that should instead be on the face of the Bill; and …allow the imposition of statutory duties via the novel concept of ‘strategy’ documents that need not even be published … We are disappointed that the inclusion of these types of delegations of power—on flimsy grounds—suggests that the Government have failed when preparing this Bill to give serious consideration to recommendations that we have made in recent reports on other Bills.”


In relation to this group of amendments, the committee makes complaint about three sets of delegations. The first is in relation to what could be suitable for community cautions. As I indicated, community cautions are for less serious offences. The Bill provides that they cannot be given for the most serious, indictable-only offences, but it gives the Secretary of State power to determine by affirmative procedure regulations the other offences for which they cannot be given.

The Government put forward a memorandum to justify this approach which said as follows:

“The list of offences which may not be suitable for”—


a community caution—

“is likely to change regularly”

and

“will be subject to continual updating and changing which makes it more suitable for secondary legislation”.

The Delegated Powers Committee report states:

“The Memorandum acknowledges that excluding offences from a community caution disposal ‘will have a significant impact on offenders, victims and the public’. It states that the affirmative procedure ‘is considered appropriate as it enables Parliament to debate the details of the restrictions [on community cautions]’.”


The Delegated Powers Committee report says that the Government are relying on a comparison with Section 130 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and then establishes, clearly rightly, that comparison with that Act is misguided and wrong. It says that the Government should follow the 2003 Act, but accurately and not inaccurately. What the Sexual Offences Act 2003 does is put in the Bill the excluded offences but gives power for them to be amended from time to time. Our amendments would follow the Delegated Powers Committee’s recommendations. I hope that the Government will feel able to accept that. If the noble Lord could indicate that, it would shorten that bit of it—sadly not.

The next group of problems is the conditions that are attached to a caution. A diversionary caution or a community caution must have one or more conditions attached to it. These can include requirements to carry out unpaid work, to attend a specified place for a specified purpose, and to pay a financial penalty. The complaint that the Delegated Powers Committee makes about this is that you need only the affirmative procedure where you are increasing the penalties but not when you are decreasing them.

The Delegated Powers Committee report says:

“We consider that the Government’s justification for its approach”—


applying only when penalties are increasing and not when they are decreasing—

“is flawed because it focusses solely on the impact of increases or decreases on the rights of offenders and on operational resources and fails to take into account the significant effect that decreases are capable of having on the way in which the policy works—and that making the new cautions less onerous forms of disposal may be something about which stakeholders (including victims of crime) and members of both Houses may have legitimate concerns.”

Again, we agree with that. The committee continues at paragraph 75:

“Accordingly, we consider that both increases and decreases in the maximum number of hours of unpaid work or attendance, or the maximum financial penalty, that may be attached to a diversionary caution or a community caution merit the same level of scrutiny”.


That is simply to quote what the Delegated Powers Committee says.

The final group relates to Clause 129 and Schedule 13, which gives the courts power

“to review community and suspended sentence orders, and … to commit an offender to custody for breach of”

such orders. The memorandum that the Government presented to the committee says that

“the aim… is to improve offender compliance with community orders and suspended sentence orders and to reduce reoffending. This is achieved through a multi-agency approach with links to wider support services, one element of which is providing for close oversight by a court of particular sentences being served in the community”.

The intention is to pilot for an initial 18-month period, and that may be applied to different cohorts throughout the country.

The committee report points out:

“The Secretary of State is given power to specify, by negative procedure … categories of community orders and suspended sentence orders that qualify for the review process”—


and it sets out certain things they can take into account in relation to it. The report continues:

“Where regulations specify a category for the first time, there must be an initial pilot period of 18 months … Both regulations that specify a category for the purposes of a pilot … are subject to the negative procedure … The Government’s justification for this is that ‘the principle of the provisions is made clear on the face of the legislation, and the power is limited by the legislation such that it may only be used to apply the provisions to different courts and cohorts of offenders … These matters are administrative in nature’.”


That is what the Government said in their memorandum.

The Delegated Powers Committee disagreed with that, saying that

“the categories of persons and the offences to which the review process will apply go to the heart of the underlying policy. The power gives the Secretary of State maximum discretion … but with minimal scrutiny … We therefore consider that regulations that provide for a category of community orders or suspended sentence orders to be subject to the review process on an indefinite basis should be subject to the affirmative procedure.”

That is what our third set of amendments does in relation to that.

I apologise for taking so long to go through this, but these are important issues.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I agree with the noble and learned Lord about the importance of this part of the Bill. Although the noble and learned Lord has just apologised for the length of his opening remarks on this group, I must warn the Committee that that was nothing compared with my opening remarks on the next group, if the Government wish to go there this evening.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, is right to demand that the list of excluded offences for which the police cannot give a community caution is in the Bill. This is yet another example of why this Bill is a shell, lacking in sufficient detail for noble Lords to give their consent to it. The Delegated Powers Committee agrees, as the noble and learned Lord has said.

He is also right that any changes to the maximum number of hours of unpaid work or attendance, or the maximum financial penalty that may be attached to a diversionary or community caution, should at least be subject to the affirmative resolution. But as the noble and learned Lord has said on previous groups, the House still has no ability to amend such an order. I will have more to say on that issue in a later group. Again, the Delegated Powers Committee agrees, as the noble and learned Lord has said.

Amendment 214B is about community orders and suspended sentence orders, and has, as far as I understand it, nothing to do with police cautions—I look for reassurance. I have no idea why it is in this group of amendments, other than that it is also covered by the Delegated Powers Committee’s report. I have no doubt that the noble and learned Lord is absolutely right about that as well, and the Delegated Power Committee agrees.

We support these amendments, mostly because they are right, and, in the case of Amendment 214B, because the noble and learned Lord is usually right.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I recognise that this group of amendments in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, has come about because of recommendations from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in its sixth report of the Session. It is a pleasure to discuss this matter, even at this hour. As to timing issues, I am sure the noble and learned Lord knows better than me with whom to take that matter up; I am not sure I am the correct post box for that.

I can assure the Committee that, even as the noble and learned Lord was speaking, I received a WhatsApp—I am not waiving privilege on all my WhatsApp messages—from the Bill team: “To reassure, we are here.” The team cannot answer back, but I can. I regret the way that the team’s their work ethic was impugned, unintentionally, I am sure.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

If I can adopt a previous role that I had as a police officer and come between the two parties to try to assist, I noticed that earlier this afternoon when the Minister was leading on a group of amendments, there was nobody in the Box. I assumed that that must have been because the officials were working remotely. I have to say that on this occasion I agree with the Minister. Even at—I do not know what time it was, perhaps 4 pm this afternoon—there was nobody in the Box when it was an MoJ issue.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

We can move on. We do not need to raise the temperature at 11.30 pm. We have other things to argue about.

Let us get to the substance of this. The committee proposed a number of changes relating to the cautions and problem-solving courts measures in the Bill, as elaborated by the noble and learned Lord and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. I shall make the central point that I want to make, because it goes to all the points that have been put down. I can assure the Committee, and in particular the noble and learned Lord, that the Government are looking at all the committee’s recommendations, which underpin these amendments, as part of our wider response to the committee, and we will revert to it in due course. I therefore hope that as time goes on, if I can put it that way, these issues will be highlighted, and I hope resolved to the noble and learned Lord’s satisfaction, but, if not, we can continue to discuss them.

I shall highlight just one matter, because I want to leave time for the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to give us his full oration on the next group, if we have time for it. On Amendment 169D, on excluded offences in respect of community cautions, the committee, as the noble and learned Lord explained, recommended that these offences are listed in the Bill rather than set out in regulations. As he explained, regulations would then be made where further amendments became necessary.

With respect to the committee, we maintain the position that the offences that are to be excluded for the purposes of community cautions are to be made by regulations. We point out that this approach of using regulations to identify excluded offences mirrors the approach taken in the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, which sets out that the simple caution, if I can call it that, may not be used in respect to offences specified by order made by the Secretary of State by secondary legislation. Just as there, so also here we believe that secondary legislation is the appropriate place for setting out the list of excluded offences, as the level of detail required may not be appropriate or suitable for the Bill. We suggest that that approach also allows sufficient time for essential engagement with stakeholders to identify those offences and to enable future changes to be incorporated without primary legislation.

I point out that the secondary legislation that we are talking about here is subject to the affirmative procedure, so the transparency that comes with that procedure will be maintained. I suggest that it would be a little bit clumsy and rare to use primary legislation for what has to be a fairly flexible approach to listing offences that should not be cautioned. We will of course discuss this carefully with stakeholders. The aim will be to bring an SI to Parliament that will be acceptable. I apprehend that I have not responded to the underlying point made by the noble and learned Lord, because I said that we will respond to the committee, but I hope he understands the thrust of my response and that for present purposes he is able to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

170: Clause 77, page 72, line 34, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b)
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with Lord Paddick’s amendment to page 72, line 37, ensures that a person may only be authorised to give a discretionary or community caution if they have been authorised by a prosecuting authority for those purposes; and requires a prosecuting authority to be satisfied that that person has received adequate training and is suitable to carry out those functions.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I will also speak to Amendments 171 and 190 in my name. I will then move to Amendment 186A which I support. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, who cannot be in his place, has asked me to speak to it on his behalf.

As I have said, I apologise in advance for the length of my remarks. The only consolations I can offer the Committee are that the Government wanted to group these amendments with other groups. Secondly, I do not take responsibility for the length of the remarks of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, which I have undertaken to read on his behalf.

These amendments are designed to do two things. First, they question the whole new system of police out of court disposals proposed in Part 6 of the Bill. These include, but are not limited to, cautions. Secondly, they attempt to try to make any system of cautions where conditions are attached more effective.

No doubt, the Minister will say that the new system of diversionary and community cautions is based on the existing system of conditional cautions. To some extent, the Minister may be right. Conditional cautions look very similar to diversionary and community cautions, except that, in the case of community cautions, failure to comply with the conditions of the caution cannot result in the prosecution of the offender for the original offence. The only way in which a recalcitrant offender can be punished if they fail to comply with the conditions of a community caution is for a financial penalty to be imposed instead. This can then be enforced through the courts. The Minister will tell me if I have any of this wrong. I look to the Minister for reassurance. Apparently, I am doing all right so far.

First, I cannot find any data on how many conditional cautions have been administered; the proportion of conditional cautions, compared with simple cautions where no conditions are attached; or conditional cautions as a proportion of other types of disposal. Considering the complexity of deciding on, arranging, administering and monitoring compliance with the conditions attached to a conditional caution, I can only imagine that most custody sergeants would avoid them like the plague, particularly when sending the case to court. Simpler, and arguably as effective, out of court disposals are available. Perhaps this is why the proposals in this Bill as drafted attempt to cut off any other form of out of court disposals. If agreed, these proposals would mean that police custody sergeants could avoid administering a diversionary or community caution only by deciding to take no further action or by sending the accused to court, despite an admission of guilt. I can assure the Committee that we would see a significant increase in these alternatives being adopted.

The House of Commons briefing paper 9165 on these proposals is illuminating. I am afraid that I am going to quote it at length, but I assure the Committee that it will be worth it. It states:

“The Government estimates the policy will cost a total of £109.19 million over ten years. It thinks the criminal justice system will incur extra operational costs of around £15.58 million per year. It also thinks the system will cost the police around £13.70 million to implement (over two years) … The actual costs are likely to be higher because some costly features of the proposed system, like proposed restrictions on the use of OOCDs”—


out of court disposals—

“for certain offences, were not present during the pilot.”

It goes on:

“The Government hopes the proposed system will help reduce reoffending. Available data does not suggest short-term reoffending rates are likely to go down. The evaluation of the 2014 pilot … found no statistically significant difference between the short-term re-offending rates of OOCD offenders”


in the pilot areas

“to those in comparable areas not using the framework.”

It continues:

“The Government also hopes the new system will improve victim satisfaction because more victims will be involved in the OOCD process.”


I have already cast doubt on that, because I am convinced that the police will “no further action” a lot more cases as a result. However, the paper states:

“It is true that more victims will be involved in the OOCD process under the new system, but this is unlikely to have a big impact on victim satisfaction rates. This is because the victim satisfaction rate for OOCD cases is already good. In 2019/20 84% of victims whose offender was issued a caution said they were satisfied with the police, a similar rate to victims whose offenders were charged (83%).”


The paper summarises by saying that

“the available evidence suggests the system … may result in a further decline in the use of OOCDs … is likely to cost more … is unlikely to have a major impact on the reoffending rates of offenders; and … may improve victim satisfaction but is unlikely to have a major impact.”

Can the Minister explain to the Committee why the Government are proposing to spend more to achieve nothing?

Turning to Amendments 170 and 171, a 2018 paper by Dr Peter Neyroud—a former chief constable of Thames Valley Police and now a distinguished academic—published by the University of Cambridge and commissioned by the National Police Chiefs’ Council, entitled Out of Court Disposals Managed by the Police: A Review of the Evidence, concluded:

“In order to be effective OOCD’s with conditions must be implemented well and three areas require particular attention: the eligibility screening of offenders; the needs assessment to match conditions to the offender; the setting and tracking of conditions”.


More specifically, he said:

“The result … was a significant degree of inconsistency and a substantial number of inappropriate and un-evidenced conditions. Whilst the provision of further training and more guidance improved the situation somewhat, the cost of … an investment within a more general implementation of OOCD’s with conditions would be prohibitive and, in any case, did not completely resolved the problems.”


On the issue of whether out of court disposals were more or less effective when they had conditions attached, he said, bearing in mind that this was a review of all the available evidence:

“Making a direct comparison between OOCD’s with conditions”—


both community cautions and diversionary cautions are OOCDs with conditions—

“and OOCD’s without conditions is difficult: none of the research makes this direct comparison.”

Let me summarise. The provisions in this Bill propose getting rid of all out of court disposals except for cautions, all of which will have to have conditions attached. There is no evidence that cautions with conditions attached are any more effective than cautions without them. Where conditions have been attached to cautions in the past, there was

“a significant degree of inconsistency and a substantial number of inappropriate and un-evidenced conditions.”

Amendments 170 and 171 suggest that only those adequately trained officers who are considered by the prosecuting authority to be suitable to decide on diversionary and community cautions can administer them. Amendment 190 is consequential.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

Absolutely. Let me deal with the out of court disposals themselves. I hope I have answered that point. There will, we hope, be a greater consistency of approach, but there will be differences. As for the scrutiny, as I said earlier, the code of practice will, we hope, provide a level of consistency of scrutiny that we also want to make sure is part of this structure. As I said earlier, that will be subject to an affirmative SI.

I am conscious of the time. I think we have drifted into Tuesday, so perhaps I should just conclude by thanking the Committee for contributions and invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment, although I am sure the discussions will continue. I also beg to move that the clauses stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, it is completely unacceptable that the noble Lord has said on numerous occasions that, because of the hour, he is not going to go into detail in answering the issues that I have raised. We either scrutinise this Bill properly or we do not. I do not care what time of night it is; we will scrutinise this Bill effectively. That is the first point to make.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

To be clear, the only reason I made that point is because I have a very long answer—I am happy to read it—explaining the different ways particular police forces have responded to the point. Apart from that, I gave exactly the answer I would have done had it been four o’clock in the afternoon. I assure the noble Lord that I have not deleted one sentence from my notes on the answer.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

In that case, I point out how completely inadequate the Minister’s answers have been. He completely did not address the research, which shows that there is no evidence that cautions with conditions attached are any more effective than simple cautions—there is no evidence. The noble Lord himself admitted that there cannot be any evidence because the Home Office does not keep any figures. It does not differentiate between conditional cautions and simple cautions; it just aggregates all cautions together. It also keeps no record of what conditions are applied in cases of conditional caution, so the Government have no evidence upon which to base this system, in which all cautions have to have conditions attached. They cannot demonstrate the efficacy of that system, and the research in the pilot forces also shows no impact on reoffending rates, little or no impact on victim satisfaction and significant increases in cost. The Minister has provided no reassurance on those issues at all.

As far as the amendments are concerned, conditional cautions are supposed to be about rehabilitation and reparation. How can an untrained police officer be an expert on what sort of rehabilitation a particular offender should undertake to have maximum impact on their reoffending? As both the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, said, the problem is not only the inconsistency of whether the conditions that different forces attach will have any efficacy at all—the Minister admitted that there would be inconsistency between forces—but a lack of public confidence in the system the Government are proposing. In one force area, someone will have very stringent rehabilitation and reparation conditions attached; for almost exactly the same type of individual and the same sort of offence, a completely different system or set of conditions will be applied. How can that provide the public with any confidence that justice is being done, when completely different conditions are being attached to very similar offenders and offences in different parts of the country, unless the officers who are giving out these conditions have been specifically trained, told what the standard approach is and approved by the Crown Prosecution Service, as my amendments suggest?

The noble Lord said that the safeguards and checks and balances will be included in codes of practice. I will tell the Committee why such an approach is not acceptable. With the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act, it turns out that, despite the arguments that we made against the safeguards and checks and balances being relegated to codes of practice, the Government now accept that any police inspector, whether specifically trained in dealing with covert human intelligence sources or not, can authorise a CHIS to commit a crime. That person will be immune from prosecution, even though that inspector is not authorised by their force or trained to give that authority —it is in the codes of practice. But the Government have admitted, in a letter to me from the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, that, if an untrained, unauthorised inspector authorised a CHIS to commit a crime, it would not be unlawful. That person would therefore be immune from prosecution. That is the danger of relegating safeguards, checks and balances to codes of practice and not having them in legislation.

The only thing I can take from what the Minister said is that this is really about saving court time and CPS time; I think I quote him accurately. It is not about preventing reoffending because we know that this system does not reduce it. It is about trying to take pressure off the courts, and that is no way to administer justice. We should give the criminal justice system the resources that it needs rather than taking the shoddy short cut to justice proposed in this part of the Bill. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 170 withdrawn.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 8th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I wonder whether the interesting amendment from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, might not have some unintended consequences that I, personally, would find very welcome. What if the “unlawful activity” included acts contrary to the Human Rights Act and the Equality Act? What if the landlord was trying to turf out Gypsies and Travellers who had no other home to go to? I believe that he will no doubt have an answer to that question.

More generally, on Clause 63—and I agree wholeheartedly with what the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, said—the openness of the terms, so eloquently laid out by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, amount to a tremendous allowance for prejudice. We should be in no doubt that this is very common. The hate crime reporting organisation, GATE Herts, funded by the then MHCLG, has ample evidence of explicitly Nazi sentiments being used whenever a Traveller or Gypsy community wanted to move on to a site. Stereotyping is the norm in these records. We heard examples in your Lordships’ House last week of whole communities being tarred by one incident. It is the same as somebody saying that white people should be barred from walking on the street at night because of a few incidents of night-time vandalism; it is that kind of remark, and it is prejudice. If such a remark urges violent action—the removal of Gypsies and Travellers—surely it is illegal.

Following the Minister’s remarks last Wednesday on police guidance in this kind of situation, she expressed some surprise at the use of the term “gold-plated”. Is “gold-plated” not a dog-whistle call to opponents of human rights? Most of us are proud of the Human Rights Act 1998, and how it reinforced our position as a leader in establishing a human rights culture after the Second World War. Be that as it may, the Human Rights Act, and behind it the European Convention on Human Rights, is our law—either one complies with the law or not. Gold-plating of human rights is not a term understood in law, and its implications, in this context, are to diminish any putative offence against the Human Rights Act. I think that Clause 63 is not helpful and should go.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, Clause 63 amends Section 61 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. Section 61 addresses the situation that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, alluded to on Wednesday—at Hansard col. 1313—when he told us that, 25 years ago, as a Member of Parliament, he was rung by a very distressed farmer in his constituency, whose land was being trespassed on. I make that 1996, but perhaps it was before the 1994 Act was effective.

As my noble friend Lady Brinton has said, Section 61 of the 1994 Act provides a power to remove trespassers on land. I will quote subsection (1):

“If the senior police officer present at the scene reasonably believes that two or more persons are trespassing on land and are present there with the common purpose of residing there for any period, that reasonable steps have been taken by or on behalf of the occupier to ask them to leave and … that any of those persons has caused damage to the land or to property on the land or used threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour towards the occupier, a member of his family or an employee or agent of his, or …that those persons have between them six or more vehicles on the land, he may direct those persons, or any of them, to leave the land and to remove any vehicles or other property they have with them on the land.”


Subsection (4) states:

“If a person knowing that a direction under subsection (1) … has been given which applies to him … fails to leave the land as soon as reasonably practicable, or … having left again enters the land as a trespasser within the period of three months beginning with the day on which the direction was given, he commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale, or both.”


That is the law now, unamended by this Bill.

As many noble Lords said on Wednesday, what is the problem that Part 4 is trying to solve, when there are clearly adequate powers already in existence? Clause 63 simply brings Section 61 of the 1994 Act into line with the rest of Part 4 of the Bill. For the reasons so thoroughly and persuasively argued on Wednesday, this clause, like the rest of Part 4, should not stand part of the Bill.

Section 68 of the 1994 Act, as amended by the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003, is the offence of aggravated trespass, where

“A person commits the offence of aggravated trespass if he trespasses on land and, in relation to any lawful activity which persons are engaging in or are about to engage in on that or adjoining land, does there anything which is intended by him to have the effect … of intimidating those persons or any of them so as to deter them or any of them from engaging in that activity … of obstructing that activity, or … of disrupting that activity.”


I am getting the sense of hunt saboteurs, HS2 protestors or, perhaps, those protesting against genetically modified crops, rather than Gypsy, Roma and Travellers. Section 68 appears to me to refer to deliberate interference with lawful activity by means of trespass, rather than coincidental interference; for example, ploughing a field that travellers are trespassing on. Unlike the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, I am not a lawyer, but perhaps the Minister can clarify the difference between Section 68 and what we have been talking about up until now.

As far as Amendment 150 is concerned, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, explained, it attempts to correct an error in existing legislation. I agree with the noble and learned Lord that the activity being disrupted should be and needs to be unlawful, rather than the trespasser simply asserting that he believes that it should not be happening. I am not sure that the accused should have to prove that they were not trespassing. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has said, that seems to be going perhaps a bit too far. We support the amendment in principle, in as far as the activity on the land that is being disrupted needs to be unlawful, rather than just being asserted as being unlawful.

As we leave this part of the Bill, I want to again acknowledge the long and tireless campaign by the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, to defend Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities. I fear that, at Report, we may need to adopt a different approach than simply removing all the clauses in Part 4 from the Bill, in the light of what the Minister said on Wednesday, at Hansard col. 1330, when she quoted from the Conservative Party manifesto:

“We will give the police new powers to arrest and seize the property and vehicles of trespassers who set up unauthorised encampments, in order to protect our communities. We will make intentional trespass a criminal offence.”


That is very interesting wording. New powers do not necessarily mean more draconian powers. I respectfully suggest that on Report this House should bring forward new powers that provide the necessary protections for all our communities, including Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities. For example—I quote from the manifesto—it could be argued that making

“intentional trespass a criminal offence”

entirely supports Amendment 135 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, providing that, where Travellers have no suitable legal pitch on a relevant caravan site situated in the local authority’s area, the trespass should not be regarded as intentional.

It is absolutely right that we, and many others in this Committee, express our outright opposition to Part 4 as drafted but, when we return to these issues on Report, it will be with more sophisticated amendments to take account of the wording in the Conservative Party manifesto—and the convention of not blocking, at least not entirely, commitments made by the governing party in their manifesto—that protect all communities, including Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, I will be relatively brief. We had a lengthy debate on the previous day in Committee about Part 4 on unauthorised encampments, and expressed our strong concerns about what is proposed in Part 4. I will just reiterate a couple of points. Certainly, our understanding is that the police seem to think the existing law adequate; indeed, so do local government officers who have direct involvement with the Gypsy, Traveller and Roma community.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, put forward Amendment 150 on the basis that it is putting right a wrong. The obvious concern is that, in so doing, it creates new wrongs or new unfairness, not least in relation to the Gypsy, Traveller and Roma community. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, probably quite rightly said that much of the debate might suggest that this amendment was aimed at others, perhaps those involved in protests over GM crops or HS2. Certainly, it involves a change as far as the onus of proof of the accused is concerned. The noble and learned Lord said that he is not going to press the amendment to a vote in Committee. I hope I am not misrepresenting what he said, but I think he said he would wait for the Minister’s response before deciding how and if to progress the matter further. We have our concerns about Amendment 150 and what exactly it might mean, but at this stage we stand in the same position as him: we will wait to hear what the Minister says on behalf of the Government in response to Amendment 150. At the moment we have fairly strong reservations about its implications, but we will listen to what the Government have to say.

--- Later in debate ---

I hope that, in the light of my explanation, my noble and learned friend will be content to withdraw his amendment and that the Committee will support Clause 63 standing part of the Bill.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation. With regard to the other examples that she has found over the weekend, showing that the law is not targeted at Gypsy, Roma and Traveller people, is it not the case that under the Equalities Act the law should not disproportionately impact on any particular community, not that they should not be the sole focus? Therefore, if the changes as drafted would disproportionately impact on the Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities, would that still not be contrary to the Equalities Act?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I have said all along, and the proponents of the amendments that we have discussed have underlined, that the absolute majority of the Gypsy, Roma and Traveller community are law-abiding people, so this is not something that disproportionately impacts on them. It is about people who cause destruction to other people’s land and property.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, like the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, I do not intend to stand here and announce our 100% support for what is proposed. We are interested in the issues raised and certainly look forward to the Government’s reply. To state the obvious, I say that local councils are key partners and innovators in improving road safety and encouraging the use of different modes of transport. What is proposed is quite a major step forward from that.

I will add one point, to which the answer may well be that the solution is obvious. Simply, if we end up with new powers or duties in this area being granted to local authorities, they must be accompanied by funding. The reply may be, “Well, of course they’ll get the money, because they’ll get it from any fines they might impose”, but it may not be quite as straightforward as that. Making such a move might put a bigger burden and workload on local authorities than might be envisaged. If people are thinking of going down this road, they should make sure that, from whatever source it may be coming, the funding is available.

As I recollect, the Government have plans, for which local authorities have been waiting a little while, to increase local authority powers to manage local roads, under the Traffic Management Act 2004. If I am right, will the Minister give us an update on where we stand on that and what kind of issues the Government are considering as part of any such plans? As part of that, have the Government looked at the issue of speeding enforcement—as suggested in these amendments—at local authority level when looking at any planned increases to local authority powers in this area? As I said at the beginning, we are interested in the issues raised by these amendments and look forward to hearing the Government’s response.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I apologise to the Committee: I was not going to say anything, but I could not resist. There is clearly an issue with people receiving endorsements on driving licences and potentially being disqualified from driving not being dealt with in the criminal courts and through the appeal process that they provide. On the issue around lack of enforcement, does the Minister have any information about the potential use of speed cameras in 20 miles per hour zones to increase enforcement and to what extent speed cameras are self-financing, in terms of the money they generate versus the cost of running them?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank noble Lords for taking part in this short but very interesting debate. As the noble Lord, Lord Tope, has explained, Amendment 163 would afford local authorities greater powers in managing speed and traffic light offence enforcement on their roads. I take it that Amendment 156 then seeks to extend the National Driver Offender Retraining Scheme so that it also can be operated by local authorities in respect of decriminalised offences.

The most dangerous traffic offences are punishable by either immediate disqualification from driving—as with drink and drug driving—or endorsement. I am sure that noble Lords agree that, because of their seriousness, none of these offences has been decriminalised and nor should they be—a point that the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, alluded to. The purpose of endorsements is to disqualify from driving people who show repeated dangerous behaviour and pose a threat to other road users, through the process of totting up penalty points, which of course is a key distinguishing feature of parking fines.

I remind noble Lords that speed offences are one of the types of offence referred to as the fatal four, along with mobile phone use while driving, not wearing a seat belt, and drink and drug-driving. Speed offences share a common feature with these other offences: they are prominent in the causation of fatal and serious collisions. We could not accept a situation where there were some speed limits that the police had no power to enforce.

Likewise, contravening a red traffic light can lead to serious and fatal collisions and that should not be decriminalised either. Traffic lights are provided to manage safety concerns at junctions, and offer safer places for people to cross the road. We have a good compliance record with red traffic lights in this country, and decriminalising enforcement would be likely to undermine that. That would impinge on the safety of all road users, but particularly vulnerable road users, including pedestrians and cyclists.

The Government are concerned that enforcement of civil penalties is not subject to the same rigorous scrutiny as criminal enforcement, and this would affect public confidence and their level of support. In particular, it would be likely to set back the growing public acceptance of speed and red light cameras. The public strongly agree that speed cameras save lives and are not there to make money. That is clearly demonstrated in the findings of the Department for Transport’s 2020 National Travel Attitudes Study, which showed that 59% of respondents agreed with the statement that speed cameras saved lives and only 41% agreed with the statement that they were mostly there to make money. Those figures are an improvement on those of 2011, when the equivalent numbers were 51% and 55% respectively. The Government, therefore, have no intention of decriminalising any of these offences: we believe that doing so would wrongly signal to the public that these dangerous behaviours had become less important.

Furthermore, the police are the primary enforcers of criminal offences, and have so far been responsible for delivering speeding courses. The National Driver Offender Retraining Scheme is run by UK Road Offender Education, a subsidiary of the Road Safety Trust, which is owned by the 43 police forces. This provides central governance, standards and consistency. UK Road Offender Education works with leading experts in road user behaviour to develop, review and deliver high-quality behaviour change courses—and I can personally attest that they work.

The scheme works alongside PentiP, the national Home Office fixed penalty processing system that is used by all police forces in England and Wales. This ensures that a repeat offender is not offered a second course within three years but is instead offered a fixed penalty notice and penalty points, otherwise court proceedings follow. We are not aware of a strong need to allow local or traffic authorities to charge for speeding courses, and there is a lack of evidence for the benefits, or indeed consequences, of doing so.

Unfortunately I cannot give the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, the update that he seeks, but I will write to him. I am afraid that also goes for the question from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick: I will write to him too. Given my answer, however, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Tope, will see fit to withdraw his amendment.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd November 2021 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

129: After Clause 54, insert the following new Clause—
“Misuse of Drugs Act 1971: power to search for possession of drugs for personal use
(1) The Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 is amended as follows.(2) In section 23 (powers to search and obtain evidence), after subsection (2) insert—“(2A) The constable conducting a search under subsection (2) must explain to the suspected person the grounds for suspicion and must record the explanation.(2B) Subsection (2) does not apply if the constable also has reasonable grounds to suspect that the drug is—(a) in the possession of the person for that person’s personal use only, or(b) in the vehicle or vessel for a person’s personal use only.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would remove the power of the police to search a person or vehicle for possession of controlled drugs for personal use only.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 129, I will speak also to Amendment 276 in my name. It is unfortunate that these amendments were not grouped with amendments concerning the new violent crime prevention orders, as these, too, relate to police stop and search.

As well as being a police officer rising to the most senior levels in the Metropolitan Police over the course of more than 30 years, I worked in Brixton in south London between 1980 and 1982, in the 1990s, and again in the early 2000s. I was a police sergeant during the Brixton riots, a chief inspector and acting superintendent in the 1990s in Brixton, and I was the police commander in Lambeth, unusually in the rank of commander—the equivalent of assistant chief constable—in the early 2000s. In so saying, I am an expert on police stop and search. I realise that an expert is somebody who knows a little bit more about a subject than other people do, but I think I fall into that category, particularly in areas with high levels of visible minority communities and a poor track record of police community relations.

In 2001, Lambeth, with Brixton at its heart, had the highest street robbery rate in western Europe and high levels of burglary, and criminals were openly dealing crack cocaine and heroin on the streets. We were 100 police officers short of the 1,000 officers we were supposed to have in Lambeth. I recall an incident when I was a sergeant in 1982, the year after the Brixton riots, that clearly demonstrated that the community was concerned about street robbery, and not about possession of small amounts of cannabis for personal use. When we chased a handbag thief into an illegal gambling den, the youth was ejected from the premises into our waiting arms; when we chased someone who we thought had cannabis, the door was slammed in our faces.

In 2001, it was more than just community priorities, and that involved the arrest of one of my officers for allegedly taking cannabis from suspects on the street and keeping it himself. But one of the prime motivations for suggesting on the front page of London Evening Standard that the police should not arrest people for small amounts of cannabis for personal use was that there were far more important things for the police to spend their time on—both far more serious crimes that were at endemic levels and crimes that were a priority for the community. Clearly, possession of small amounts of cannabis was not one of them. When the “no arrest” policy was introduced, a public opinion survey found that well over 80% of people in Lambeth were in favour of the approach—slightly lower among the black community but still over 80%.

Following intense media debate and the submission of detailed data about how long it took officers to process someone arrested for cannabis—two officers over four hours each—plus the administrative work by police support staff and the CPS to prepare the case for court, the court time involved and the usual conditional discharge or small fine on conviction, this all persuaded the then commissioner to agree to a six-month pilot in Lambeth, where no adult was arrested for possession of small amounts of cannabis. These are the sorts of penalties courts are imposing today for possession of small amounts of class A drugs for personal use, if the case gets to court at all—many cases are dealt with by means of a police caution.

Despite false stories in newspapers, an independent assessment by the Metropolitan Police Authority of the pilot, which was extended to 12 months, showed reductions in all forms of serious crime, an increase in the amount of cannabis seized—as officers were able to quickly and easily deal with any that they found by seizing it and warning the person on the street—and an increase in the number of class A drug dealers arrested. Fears of an influx into the borough of those seeking cannabis proved to be the reverse of what actually happened.

Police and community priorities change. Now, in many areas of the country, knife crime is the priority, rather than street robbery. Noble Lords will quite rightly think that properly targeted stop and search is a powerful weapon in taking knives off the street, particularly if third-party information—community intelligence—points to those who are the knife carriers.

Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services has done some number-crunching on stop and search, and I am very grateful to Matt Parr —he might not be thanking me in a moment—who briefed Peers on the issue last week. Some 63% of police stop and search is for drugs; over 80% of those stop and searches are on suspicion of possession of small amounts of drugs for personal use. On average, only 9% of police stop and searches—less than one in 10—are intelligence-led; the proportion varies by police force between 23% in the best performing and 1% in the worst. These are HMICFRS figures. The top five police forces in the UK account for 90% of all stop and search carried out. Policy Exchange, a centre-right think tank, published a report a few weeks ago that found the Metropolitan Police had the highest rate of stop and search of any police force and the lowest rate for apprehending drug dealers.

Tackling knife crime is the Government’s priority, it is our priority, and it is the priority of many communities, but, looking at the facts as presented by HMICFRS, it is not police officers’ priority when it comes to stop and search. My Amendment 129 would not allow the police to stop and search someone on suspicion of personal possession of a small amount of a controlled drug for personal use. The police already cannot search for possession of illegal psychoactive substances that are not covered by the Misuse of Drugs Act; in fact, possession of small amounts of illegal psychoactive substances for personal use is not even an offence.

We are not talking about not tackling drug dealing—that is not covered by this amendment; indeed, there will be more police resources available to tackle drug dealing. We are not even talking about an untried and untested leap of faith. When we did not arrest people for simple possession of cannabis over a 12-month period in Lambeth, the police ended up concentrating on more important offences instead, more serious crimes and crimes that were a priority for the community.

We have too few police officers at this time, as I had in Lambeth when I was the police commander. We have too much serious crime, as I did when I was the police commander in Lambeth. We need to focus scarce police resources on what really matters; whatever that priority is, it is not possession of small amounts of drugs for personal use.

The key to effectively reducing serious violence is the police and communities working together, with communities providing information to the police about who is involved in serious violence, so that the police can concentrate their efforts, particularly stop and search, on those carrying and using knives. Policy Exchange believes that community policing is key. Other metropolitan forces, such as Merseyside, the West Midlands and West Yorkshire, do less stop and search and more community policing than London’s Metropolitan Police, and they are far more effective at arresting those involved in drug dealing.

Nothing is more damaging to police-community relations, trust and confidence in the police than poorly targeted stop and search. From standing in the middle of Brixton, being bombarded with bricks, paving slabs and petrol bombs, as I was in 1981, following a massive poorly targeted stop and search operation, I can tell noble Lords that that is the sort of damage it does. Visible minorities are four times more likely and black people nine times more likely to be stopped and searched by the police than white people, but they are no more likely to have something illegal in their possession than white people. That is when the police have to have reasonable grounds to stop and search people. Amendment 129 would not allow the police to stop and search for small amounts of controlled drugs for personal use, removing the cause of so much hostility between the police and communities, whose support and co-operation are vital in reducing serious violence.

That is not the only disproportionate form of stop and search. In 2010, the then Home Secretary, Theresa May, responding to a European Court of Human Rights judgment that suspicionless stop and search under Section 44 of the Terrorism Act was illegal, said:

“The first duty of Government is to protect the public. But that duty must never be used as a reason to ride roughshod over our civil liberties”,


adding that the then Government would not have appealed the judgment, even if they could. She said that the court found that the powers were

“drawn too broadly—at the time of their initial authorisation and when they are used”

and

“contain insufficient safeguards to protect civil liberties.”—[Official Report, Commons, 8/7/10; col. 540.]

That is very similar to the position we are in today with Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, which still allows indiscriminate stop and search.

The purpose for which the police are using Section 60 goes far beyond what Parliament intended it to be used for. When this power was given to the police there was a recurring problem with rival gangs of football supporters arranging to meet at a specific time and place, arming themselves with weapons. Noble Lords will immediately see the point of a Section 60 power to search everyone in the area at the time rival gangs planned to meet, without the need for reasonable suspicion in these particular circumstances. This rarely, if ever, happens today.

Instead, if there has been a stabbing, the police will routinely impose a Section 60 order in the area surrounding the incident. That is not what it was intended for and of limited use in such circumstances. The first thing a knifeman will do after stabbing someone is dispose of the weapon and go to ground. Even if he is in the area, there is usually a description, from witnesses or CCTV, and other powers of stop and search based on reasonable suspicion can be used. I maintain that the Section 60 power is being misused and is ineffective.

The second problem with Section 60 is that indiscriminate stop and search causes untold damage to police-community relations. As I have said, people from minority-ethnic communities are four times more likely to be stopped and searched by the police and black people are nine times more likely. But when it comes to Section 60, where no reasonable suspicion is required, that figure rises to you being 18 times more likely to be stopped and searched by the police if you are black than if you are white. The overwhelming majority of these people have nothing on them to justify such a stop and search. Community intelligence is vital to make stop and search effective in tackling knife crime, but communities are losing trust and confidence in the police because too many innocent members of their communities are being stopped and searched using Section 60.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

It is part of that operational independence of the police that they know what is best for their area; therefore, it might be relevant for police forces in a certain area not to have much occasion for the use of Section 60 stop and search.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lady Chakrabarti, for their support for these amendments. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, that the issue of drugs is very complex: it needs a complex approach and stop and search of this nature is not the way to go. When I suggested to the commissioner that we did not arrest people for cannabis in Lambeth, former MP Ann Widdecombe accused me of usurping the power of Parliament: she cannot accuse me of that now.

Turning to the response of the Minister, almost her whole argument around Amendment 129 was an argument against decriminalisation, yet this amendment does not call for the decriminalisation of personal possession of drugs. It is all about focusing the police on serious crime, rationing scarce police resources by focusing them on what is really important to communities and to the courts. We heard from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, that he rarely saw anybody in front of him for possession, particularly of class B drugs, unless by chance—usually it is when the police find cannabis when they have arrested the person for something else. They are there for the substantive offence and they get charged for the cannabis as well, for example.

The noble Baroness talked about the harm caused by drugs. Why, then, are new psychoactive substances not controlled by the Misuse of Drugs Act not an offence? Why is personal possession of psychoactive substances not illegal under the Psychoactive Substances Act, if drugs cause so much harm? Why is alcohol not illegal when we look at the harm that alcohol causes? But we are not talking here about decriminalisation; we are talking about getting the police to focus on what is important. As far as Section 60 is concerned, I support stop and search. I have said how important stop and search—properly focused, acting on community intelligence and focusing on those who are suspected of carrying and using knives—is, and how important Section 60 is.

The Minister talked about the figures between 2019 and 2020 and the number of weapons that stop and search removed. This is not an argument about removing the power of the police to stop and search; it is about focusing intelligence-led stop and search on taking knives off the street to be even more effective. The figures that the noble Baroness gave about the number of weapons taken off the street, I assume, are not weapons found by using Section 60. If Section 60 searches were only 3% of all searches, and only 1%—one in a hundred—of Section 60 searches find a weapon, then the figures that the noble Baroness quoted cannot possibly be about Section 60. Why is she using figures about stop and search generally when the amendment she was addressing is about Section 60? It is a blunt instrument.

The noble Baroness is right; it has to be an inspector who authorises a Section 60. Until a couple of years ago, it was a superintendent who had to authorise a Section 60. That is why there has been a 2,800% increase in the number of times Section 60 orders are issued, and that is why Section 60 is so ineffective, with only one in 100 searches resulting in a weapon, and why it is so damaging to police-community relations, which are essential to tackling serious violence.

The noble Baroness said no one should be stopped and searched based on their race. You are 18 times more likely to be stopped and searched under Section 60 if you are black than if you are white. The two things do not add up. Of course nobody should be searched on the basis of their race, but the facts are that you are 18 times more likely to be stopped and searched if you are black than if you are white. That is why Section 60 is so damaging and so ineffective. That is why I brought this amendment but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 129.

Amendment 129 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

130: After Clause 54, insert the following new Clause—
“Duty of candour
(1) The Secretary of State must within 12 months after this Act comes into force—(a) consult such persons as they consider appropriate, and(b) lay before both Houses of Parliament a report regarding the matters in subsection (2).(2) Those matters are means of achieving a culture of transparency in police forces and prosecuting authorities in England and Wales including a statutory duty of candour in their dealings with the victims of crime and the relatives of victims of crime.(3) The proposed duty is subject to any exemption required in the interests of national security.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is based on a recommendation from the Report of the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel, to create a statutory duty of candour to be owed by law enforcement agencies to victims and their families.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

There is no rest for the wicked. I rise to move Amendment 130 in my name and support Amendment 132A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, which seeks to achieve similar things.

I must first declare an interest. When I was a deputy assistant commissioner in the Metropolitan Police—the equivalent of a deputy chief constable—I told the truth about a misleading statement made to the News of the World by the then commissioner of the Metropolitan Police about the shooting dead of the innocent Brazilian, Jean Charles de Menezes, by the police in 2005. Another senior officer leaked to the BBC the content of the statement I had made to the Independent Police Complaints Commission, which was investigating a complaint by the family of the deceased that the police had misled the public. In response, the Metropolitan Police issued a press release saying it knew the officer who had given evidence to the IPCC and what he said—what I said—was not true.

The deputy commissioner at the time tried to bully me into issuing a press statement saying that I was mistaken. Instead, I instructed solicitors to threaten to sue the Metropolitan Police if it did not retract its press statement which effectively called me a liar; I was not the easiest senior officer to manage, as noble Lords can probably work out. The Metropolitan Police withdrew the press release and paid my legal fees. The IPCC subsequently confirmed what I had told it was true, but the die was cast; I was subsequently forced out of the police service for telling the truth. I think it is important for the Committee to know where I am coming from when I talk about this issue.

My amendment is based on the recommendation in the Report of the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel to create

“a statutory duty of candour to be owed by … law enforcement agencies”

to victims and their families. The Daniel Morgan Independent Panel was announced by the former Home Secretary Theresa May on 10 May 2013 to address questions arising from and relating to police involvement in the murder of Daniel Morgan; the role played by police corruption in preventing those responsible for the murder being brought to justice; the failure to confront that corruption; the incidence of connections between private investigators, police officers and journalists; and the alleged corruption involved in the links between them.

It is not possible or necessary to go into all the findings of the independent panel, but I want to give two examples. First, the Metropolitan Police admitted on more than one occasion that police corruption had impacted on bringing those responsible for Daniel Morgan’s murder to justice, but when asked by the independent panel what that corruption was, and what impact it had had, the Metropolitan Police refused to provide an answer. This is even though Tim Godwin, the then acting commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, had made a formal admission of corruption on behalf of the Metropolitan Police at a meeting of the Metropolitan Police Authority. The Metropolitan Police’s response to the panel was, “You’ll have to ask him what he meant.”

Secondly, at every stage following the initial investigation of the murder, the Metropolitan Police maintained that the initial murder investigation had been carried out in accordance with the standards of murder investigation at that time. It was only seven years after the independent panel was formed that the Metropolitan Police made the panel aware of the existence of the London Homicide Manual, which set out the standards expected of murder investigations at the time of Daniel Morgan’s murder. This document proved that the initial investigation was not, in fact, carried out in accordance with the standards expected at the time. Such a lack of frankness, candour and honesty is a disgrace that these amendments seek to address.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for reminding us of the resilience and suffering of the Hillsborough victims’ families and of the Morgan family, and to the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lady Chakrabarti. I too prefer the noble Lord’s amendment; we tabled ours first. We need to address this issue.

The Minister said that this is not the first time that we have had a discussion about the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel report and the duty of candour, but it is the first time that we have had an opportunity to do something about it. It is, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said, very disappointing that the Government did not take the opportunity of this Bill, which is so obviously the vehicle that should be used to get a statutory duty of candour on to the statute book. I hope the noble Lord will bring back his amendment on Report, so that we can divide the House on this very important issue, because this needs to happen. Wherever you look, this is urgently needed, whether we talk about Hillsborough, Daniel Morgan or what is happening in the Metropolitan Police at the moment—even yesterday, officers were convicted of offences.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, raised the very important point about support for officers. I am still regarded as a traitor by some in the police service because I told the truth about what happened after the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, spoke powerfully about the need to protect victims, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, gave his own worrying example of the need for better, greater candour on the behalf of the police.

We will come back to this on Report but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 130.

Amendment 130 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Dholakia (LD)]

My Lords, the purpose of the amendment in my name is to remove Section 176 from the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. With regard to what is affectionately known as shoplifting, it is estimated by the British Retail Consortium that businesses lose £770 million a year to shop theft—and retail theft crimes are rising year on year. According to figures available from the Home Office, there was an overall increase in retail theft of 19.1% between 2014 and 2018, compared with an increase of 4.96% between 2010 and 2014. This is no surprise.

Section 176 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 allows anyone accused of shoplifting anything under £200 to plead guilty by post, as if they had been given a parking ticket. Use of this legislation is often cited as a cost-saving exercise, but the truth is that it does not save money. In fact, it does the opposite, as everyone loses, whether it is customers who end up paying higher prices or the retailers who lose their jobs when the business fails. But it is still being used, with Thames Valley Police for example informing local shops that they will not send out officers to deal with shoplifters who steal less than £100-worth of goods. This piece of legislation has, therefore, massively reduced the deterrent to theft and the punishment that an offender can expect, with many savvy criminals exploiting the situation to steal with virtual impunity.

Just one in 20 of all shoplifting offences are now prosecuted, while the number of cautions for such thefts have fallen from 40,000 to just 5,000 in a decade, according to figures obtained under the Freedom of Information Act. In addition, it is worth noting that it takes an average of 30 offences before an individual is convicted of a shop theft that results in a custodial situation. It is soul destroying for hard-working businesses to have their livelihood literally stolen away from them. The British Independent Retailers Association has come to see me on a number of occasions; its crime survey for 2021, just completed this month, shows that two-thirds of its members see most crimes against businesses valued at less than £200, while two-thirds of members also reported a disproportionate increase in the theft of goods worth less than £200 since this threshold was put in place in 2014. This shows that businesses are losing more and more each year to this type of crime, as it is currently being left unchecked.

John Barlow, a BIRA member in Nottingham, rightly pointed out that the police are basically telling kids, “Help yourselves”. Of course, there are more serious crimes that the police need to solve, but you cannot just give thieves a licence to steal. Shop theft is not a victimless crime; in fact, smaller independent retailers feel the impact of retail crime more acutely than larger retailers, which typically have better security systems, employ guards and security staff, sell larger orders and have better margins and economies of scale. Conversely, a small retailer operating on a typical margin of 8% would need to sell £2,500-worth of goods to make back £200 of stolen goods. In addition, they are often working alone, unable to call in back-up from another staff member, and left literally at the mercy of the perpetrator and the trauma of the event. How can this be right?

The removal of this legislation would send a signal to those who perpetrate shop theft: it is very clear that you will be prosecuted; your actions matter; and you will be held to account. It would show that this Government really hold our retailers, who have kept our country going through the pandemic, in high regard, and that the retailers can have confidence that justice will be served. I beg to move.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, we support my noble friend Lord Dholakia in wanting to protect small shopkeepers by calling on the police and CPS to take low-level shoplifting more seriously. Repeated low-level theft adds up and, as my noble friend has just said, when the profit margins are typically around only 8%, you need to sell a lot of goods to make up for those losses. This is particularly a problem if perpetrators do not believe that the police and courts will take effective action. I would welcome a response from the Minister to reassure small shopkeepers that the Government take this issue seriously—and that includes what action they will take in response to my noble friend’s amendment.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I am not sure that this requires a change in the law; I think the problem lies elsewhere. Section 176 should have been an improvement; low-value shoplifting offences should have been dealt with much more quickly and efficiently.

The Home Office guidance for implementing Section 176 is very clear. It sets out, for example, that repeat offenders, organised criminals and people going equipped should all be referred to the CPS for prosecution, rather than using the simplified procedures. I am interested to hear the Minister’s thoughts.

Something has gone wrong. I am going to guess that it is a consequence of 11 years of austerity inflicted on police forces. Rather than being a legal problem, it is a simple operational matter of the police not having the resources to deal with the problem—they cannot respond, investigate or prosecute. I think the solution lies in policing and not the law.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 1st November 2021 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

110ZA: Schedule 4, page 205, line 42, at end insert—
“(1C) The constable must record the reasons for each determination including the assessment of each of the matters the subject of subsection (1B).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, along with Lord Paddick‘s amendment to page 206 line 18, requires a custody officer to record case-specific reasons why it is necessary and/or proportionate to release a person on bail, including the reason for any conditions attached.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 110ZA in my name I will speak to my Amendments 110ZB, 110ZC and 110B and to Amendment 110A in the name of my noble friend Lady Harris of Richmond in this group.

We now come to pre-charge bail, also known as police bail, where the police need more time to investigate than the time limits for keeping someone in custody without charge allow. In 2017, in response to concerns that people were being kept on pre-charge bail for too long, particularly journalists under investigation as a result of the phone hacking scandal, the Government used 18 clauses of the Policing and Crime Act to severely curtail the time someone could be held on pre-charge bail.

At the time, briefed by police practitioners, we told the Government that their changes to police bail were unworkable and that they had gone too far the other way. Some 18 clauses of the Policing and Crime Act 2017 are now all but reversed, relegated to Schedule 4 to this Bill. There clearly needs to be a balance between the need for a thorough police investigation, diligently carried out within resource constraints—which, because of the significant cuts in police officer and police support staff numbers since 2010, have been considerable—and the adage that “justice delayed is justice denied”. The irony of telling the police to speed up their investigations while at the same time curtailing their ability to do so will not be lost on the Committee.

It must be necessary and proportionate for the police to release a person on bail, including the imposition of any conditions of that bail. I know from my own professional experience that custody officers tend to record something along the lines of “I am releasing this person on bail because it is necessary and proportionate to do so” or “because it is necessary to ensure that the person surrenders to custody” or whatever Section 30A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 says may be a reason for releasing a person on bail. This is simply copied and pasted into the custody record. I was sitting here earlier reading that and realising that perhaps, as a police inspector reviewing detention, I might have been guilty of a similar act of simply copying generic paragraphs out of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

This is not sufficient and Amendments 110ZA and 110ZB are designed to address this. The police officer should record the case-specific reasons why it is necessary and proportionate to bail the person and the case-specific reasons for imposing the conditions, if any, attached to the bail—not “to ensure the person surrenders to custody” but why the officer thinks this person is unlikely to surrender to custody; for example, because he has absconded in the past, perhaps. If the factors to be taken into account in paragraph 17 of Part 2 of Schedule 4 are included in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 in a new Section 30A(1B), so should be the requirement to say what it is about this person that makes release on bail necessary. Later in the Bill, in Clause 132(7), courts remanding children in custody will be required to set out their reasons for doing so in writing. This amendment requires the police to do the same when it comes to police bail decisions.

On Amendment 110ZC, following representations made by the Law Society—from my professional experience I see the merit in some and not others—I agree with it that the if the matter is straightforward, what is called in the legislation a “standard case”, a senior police officer should be able to extend bail only to a maximum of six months before the case is referred to a magistrates’ court for independent adjudication, rather than the nine months suggested in paragraph 29 of Schedule 4 to the Bill.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions. These amendments bring us to the issue of the reform of pre-charge bail. The intention of the Government with this set of changes is clear: to create a more effective and proportionate pre-charge bail system through “Kay’s law”, as referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. Kay’s law has been so named after Kay Richardson, who tragically lost her life at the hands of her estranged husband while he was released under investigation rather than on bail. It is clear that we need robust decision-making around the use of pre-charge bail in order to ensure that it is used fairly. This is why we have removed the presumption against bail and introduced the risk factors to be considered by the custody officer.

Let me first address the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. Amendments 110ZA and 110ZB relate to record-keeping for bail decisions. I certainly agree that there should be a clear audit trail to evidence how these decisions have been made. I do not, however, consider that it is necessary to legislate for this, given that it is an operational process, but it is our expectation that custody officers are already keeping records of how they came to their decisions as part of best practice within each force. I acknowledge that this may not be done with the consistency we would expect, which is why it would be more appropriate to include provision for this in the national statutory guidance on pre-charge bail, which is to be published by the College of Policing.

Amendment 110ZC is concerned with the timescales for the review of pre-charge bail. Again, I fully recognise that we must provide the correct balance here—the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, referred to balance in his opening remarks—between the rights of those who may have been victims of crime and those who, at this stage, have yet to be charged with an offence. The new timescales provided for in the Bill, which have been subject to public consultation and engagement with law enforcement, charities and victims’ services, strike a fair balance and will create a system that works better for all involved. That being the case, the Government are satisfied that nine months rather than six is the appropriate point at which decisions around the extension of pre-charge bail in standard cases should be referred to a magistrates’ court. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for sharing his personal experience on this subject. As he said, it will place further pressure on the police, but on the opposite side, it would potentially clog up the courts if referrals were brought forward. Following our consultation, we believe it is equitable for extensions up to nine months to be made by a senior police officer, and only then should the matter be referred to the courts.

Amendment 110B would require police forces to publish data annually on the number of individuals released on pre-charge bail and those released under investigation. We heard some powerful arguments from my noble friend Lord Wolfson about data in the previous group, and I am about to reiterate some of those, because we agree that accurate data is crucial in order to monitor the impact of these legislative changes and ensure that they are operating as intended. I am pleased to inform the noble Lord that the information he seeks is already collected by forces and published by the Home Office annually through the Police Powers and Procedures bulletin. Perhaps to anticipate a subsidiary question, statistics on the number of individuals released on pre-charge bail have been published yearly since 2017-18. The Government have recently amended this collection to include the number of people released under investigation. This information has been collected for 2020-21 and will be published later this year.

One might reasonably ask, since it has been four years since the last round of reforms, why we still do not know how many people are released under investigation. There are 43 forces across England and Wales, as the noble Lord well knows, which use different case management systems and data warehousing. We have been collecting data on the number of individuals on pre-charge bail since 2017, first on a voluntary and now on a mandatory basis, and we have also started collecting more data on pre-charge bail in terms of offence, breach, demographic and so on, and on released under investigation and voluntary attendance. This is voluntary collection at the moment, but we are working with police and systems providers where forces have been unable to provide data to enable reporting with the intention of changing to mandatory collection following the reforms as system updates allow.

Turning to quite a different matter, the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, has tabled Amendment 110A, and I acknowledge her long association with this subject. This would create a new criminal offence of breaching pre-charge bail conditions where a person is arrested elsewhere than at a police station and where there is no reasonable excuse to do so. It is essential that we keep in mind the safety and welfare of victims at this stage of the criminal justice system, as well as balancing this against the risk of criminalisation of individuals who have not been charged with an offence. Noble Lords will be aware that debate around the consequences of breaching these conditions has been ongoing for a number of years. While I understand those concerns, I cannot agree that such a criminal offence would be a proportionate response to this issue. Pre-charge bail is just that: pre-charge. There has been no charge or conviction against the individual as yet. It would therefore be disproportionate to criminalise the individual at this point, particularly where they may face a harsher sentence for the breach than the one carried by the offence for which they were originally arrested. Bail should not be punitive in nature according to the principle of the presumption of innocence.

On top of this, the Government do not currently have an accurate snapshot of the number of individuals who breach their conditions each year—I fear we are back to data again. Without knowing how many people this would affect, such an amendment could well lead to unintended consequences, criminalising a potentially large group of people and tying up the courts system. I stress that there is obviously no desire on the part of the Government to allow suspects to breach their conditions wantonly. Where there has been a breach, police officers will look to consider whether a substantive offence is established, such as intimidation or harassment in the first instance. In certain circumstances, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, alluded to, there is also the option of a court order, such as a sexual risk order or the new domestic abuse protection order, breach of which is a criminal offence in itself.

The Bill also introduces a three-hour pause on the detention clock where an individual has been arrested for breach of their conditions. This will allow the police further time for progressing the case, either through investigation of the breach or preparing a substantive case for charging. The Government have already made a commitment in the Commons to increase the data collection in this area, which will provide a more detailed understanding of this issue. It is my hope that this may yield a more proportionate, tailored and workable policy solution in the future.

The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, referred to Sarah Jones’s amendment in the other place and asked about the Minister’s consultation. I fear I do not know the answer to that; I will get back to him on when it may be expected to report. She also acknowledged that the collection of data around breaches of conditions to better understand the scale of the problem was part of the problem we have here. I think the Minister’s response was welcomed by his colleague Sarah Jones in the other place and she was content to withdraw her amendment. It has been helpful to explore these issues, but in the light of my explanations, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Harris of Richmond for her support and for so clearly and powerfully explaining her Amendment 110A. Arresting somebody for breaching pre-charge bail where the only thing the police can do if somebody has breached the conditions is simply to re-bail them under the same conditions undermines the whole purpose of police bail—there is no sanction at all. The Minister said, “Well, the person has not been convicted of an offence and they could end up being convicted of breaching the bail but not of the original offence.” I may have been dreaming, but I seem to remember being at Highbury Corner Magistrates’ Court, albeit the stipendiary magistrate concerned was known colloquially as “Shotgun Maclean”, and his saying to an arresting officer that, unfortunately, in a not-guilty offensive weapon trial, the officer had failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of possessing an offensive weapon, but for breaching court bail—in that when they first appeared in court the person was released on court bail to reappear for the not guilty hearing—he would go to prison for three months.

There is the whole argument about this being disproportionate for somebody who is not convicted of a criminal offence if they were convicted of breaching bail, but it happens already when people who are innocent breach court bail. This seems to completely undermine the noble Lord’s argument. The point of Kay’s law is to stop dangerous people being released under investigation with no conditions attached. Without a sanction for breaching the conditions that are imposed, the conditions have no weight.

I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede. Regarding the sort of cases he referred to, I would expect—particularly if analysis of computers was involved, for example—that these would not be standard cases and that the Crown Prosecution Service would designate them as such, so the six-month or nine-month limit would not apply. I am not sure that the cases he referred to were relevant to the examples I gave.

I accept that the Government have consulted on this, but I would go back to the Law Society, which is on the other side of the argument—including as it does defence solicitors—and feels that nine months in a standard, straightforward case not involving such things as computer analysis would be a long enough extension for a senior officer. However, we will reflect on what the Minister has said and, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 110ZA withdrawn.

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[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, my task in this debate is easy: all I have to do is to support the noble Lord, Lord Beith, and say that I have rarely heard an amendment moved more comprehensively than he just did.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, we strongly support my noble friend Lord Beith. He has clearly explained his amendment: persons other than those mentioned in the Bill are in positions of trust. Although there is no evidence of widespread concern about instructors in dance, drama or music abusing their positions of trust, there are examples and fairly recent high-profile cases. My noble friend explains that either we should leave it to the courts to decide whether someone is in a position of trust or a more comprehensive list is required that is not limited, as my noble friend Lady Brinton said, to the examples in the amendments.

I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, to some extent, although one could imagine that children are more vulnerable in certain scenarios and one-to-one situations than in others. But we support the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Beith.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we too support these amendments, and I too found the introduction from the noble Lord, Lord Beith, to be comprehensive. The brief in front of me asks why some youth activities are included and others are not, which is the point the Minister will have to address when he winds up this brief debate. I will not repeat those points about why certain activities might be included and others might not, and I am sure that everyone who has spoken in this debate wants to achieve the same end, but there are different mechanisms to do that.

I agreed with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, who, as she said, somewhat unusually found herself in agreement with potentially using Henry VIII powers to amend legislation. While listening to this debate, I remembered the biography of a very famous English composer that I read recently, just a few months ago. He would fall foul of these regulations and would very likely go to jail on the basis of that biography.

I hope this problem is not widespread, but it is something that people are far more alert to these days than they were in the past. It is right that the Government should ensure that the appropriate structures are in place in each of the activities for which young people get support, so that, if things go wrong, the coaches or whoever is involved can be held to account in an appropriate way.

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

The art lesson may be a good example. With respect, there is a huge gulf between the relationship of somebody to their art teacher, if they go to an art group, and the sort of intimacy that a physical sports coach has with somebody or the sort of power, control and sense of authority that a religious leader has over a young person.

I shall give one example of evidence, picking a made-up country from private international law. Let us say that, in Ruritania, there is a huge number of cases of a particular category. It might well then be said, “We can see there is a problem with this category. It has happened in Ruritania. The circumstances are the same as in the UK. You should add that.” That is just one example. I do not want to limit the evidence that we would rely on but, with respect, we cannot say that, because there has been a case in an art class or a case here and a case there, we will include all these categories. We should not include every circumstance in which adults have close contact with under 18 year-olds. I think the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, wants to come in.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister for explaining the Government’s position but I do not understand the argument that we are surreptitiously changing the age of consent. If a 16 or 17 year-old wants to have a sexual relationship with their music teacher, they had better find another music teacher; the solution is quite simple. They should not continue in a professional relationship and have a sexual relationship at the same time.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

With great respect, the point put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, shows that if we draw this too widely, we are limiting the ability of a 16 or 17 year-old to have a sexual relationship with that person. This the balance that we want to strike. At the moment, there is nothing to prevent a 17 year-old having a consensual relationship with a person with whom they have a tuition relationship or other kind of relationship. The question is: where do you draw the line? We say the line should be drawn at sport and religion. If you draw it too widely, you impact on that person’s ability to have a sexual relationship with other adults.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

113: Clause 46, page 38, leave out lines 33 to 39.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to probe the proportionality of the inserted subsection in comparison to other offences.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 113 in my name I shall speak also to the other amendments in this group. I declare an interest as a Liberal Democrat and someone generally against sentence inflation, but I have specific points to make on this clause.

Clause 46 effectively increases the maximum penalty for “destroying or damaging” anything by fire, or for any offence involving damage to a memorial, which means something “erected or installed”, or

“a garden or any other thing planted or grown which has a commemorative purpose”,

whether it is the statue of a national hero or a slave trader, a person’s grave or a pet cemetery. The clause does this by removing the financial limit on when the case can be tried at, or sent to, the Crown Court for sentence. Magistrates’ courts cannot send someone to prison, I believe, for more than a maximum of 12 months, but a Crown Court judge can send someone to prison for criminal damage where there is no threat to life for a maximum of 10 years.

To put this into context, Clause 2 of this Bill, as drafted, increases the maximum penalty for assaulting an emergency worker from one year to two years, while this part of the Bill increases the penalty for damaging a memorial from one year to 10 years. It is clear where the Government’s priorities lie; it is more important to protect a statue of Churchill than it is to protect our brave men and women police officers.

It gets worse. New subsection (11B) of Section 22 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, inserted by Clause 46, includes

“any moveable thing (such as a bunch of flowers)”

left in or on a memorial, as part of the memorial—so, a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison for damaging a bunch of flowers. Pick up a bunch of flowers placed at the feet of Churchill’s statue and hit a police officer round the face with it, and you can get up to 10 years in prison for damaging the flowers but only two years for assaulting the police officer. Amendment 113 is designed to probe the proportionality of subsection (11B). Amendment 114 is consequential.

In fact, bearing in mind that the limit for a summary-only trial—at least in the original Bill, and I cannot find any amendment to it—is £200-worth of damage, to replace, repair or restore the property damaged, it is unlikely that anything other than minor superficial damage would be below this value. There may well be a case to treat graves as a special case, where it can be deeply distressing if the burial plot is disturbed, but, aside from that, I am yet to be convinced that Clause 46 should stand part of the Bill, at least in its current form.

There is far more merit in protecting the living, as Amendment 115 proposes to do, than in protecting the memorials of the dead. Damaging life-saving equipment is a very serious matter, and there is far more merit in this amendment than in Clause 46.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I rise to support these amendments. We are now getting into the stuff that I will fight tooth and nail over. As an archaeologist and activist, I feel that I have a little bit of insight into this whole situation and perhaps into the ridiculous law that the Government are trying to introduce here. Instead of debating and discussing it and coming to a sensible resolution, this is part of a battle in a culture war, which is absolutely ludicrous.

History is important, but it is not fixed. People like to think that we all know what it is and it is in all the books, but, actually, as an archaeologist, I know that we reinterpret it all the time and are constantly making new discoveries. Just in the last week or so, we found Roman statues in a totally unexpected place. This is what happens: we change our minds about history and it gets rewritten.

The problem is that we have some very ugly history, which is littered with powerful and wealthy white men who, behind a thin veneer of toffish respectability, did some quite nasty things and were responsible for atrocities such as the enslavement of millions of people, genocides, war crimes and the grabbing of wealth from some of the many nations that we now call “developing nations”. Our statues ignore this history and pretend that it was benign and that these were good guys, which is simply not true: they were slavers and pillagers, and we ought to recognise that. Having their so-called heroism set in stone is actually quite offensive. There is no hint in many of these statues that they did some evil deeds.

People—many members of the public—do not like this, and they are showing their dissatisfaction with celebrating people who really should not be celebrated. They raped and pillaged, and the fact that they then spent a lot of money on universities, libraries or parks does not really make it all all right. So the question of what we should do with these monuments is important, but not easy. It should force us to confront the evils within our history and reflect on how they carry through to the social and economic conditions of our present.

Instead of leading on this quite important dialogue, the Government simply storm in with a new criminal offence, which I find so ludicrous that I feel I ought to go and speak directly to the Home Secretary about it. They are trying to put their fingers in their ears, sing “Rule Britannia” and pretend that all of this did not happen and that it was all okay—but it was not. Councils all over the country and the Government have to realise that statues are not something that we cannot change or remove. The fact is that some of these statues celebrate evil deeds, and the Government should recognise that.

I have more to say, if noble Lords wish.

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

The short answer to that is that I did not make my argument on the basis of deterrence. Sentencing encompasses a number of factors: there is deterrence; there is the actual punishment for the offence; there is marking society’s disapproval at what was done. I hope that I made my argument very clearly on the first two. I was not suggesting that people would necessarily be deterred; I hope that they will be, but that is not the main basis of my argument.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for taking part in this short debate, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for her support, albeit coming at the issue from a slightly different angle to the one from which I was coming. I also thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, for picking up on what I said, which is that this needs to be more targeted. I specifically said that Clause 46 “as drafted” is not suitable. It needs to be much more accurately targeted; otherwise, it enables people to make the accusation that I did not make, that this is about dramatically increasing the penalty for what could be very minor damage to a statue of a very divisive figure. In fact, I made reference to the fact that doing anything to a grave, for example, could be deeply distressing and it may be that the penalty needs to be increased for that particular purpose. Clause 46, however, goes far too wide and draws those who feel that it is about culture wars into the argument, where that would not be the case if it were more far more tightly drawn; but at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 113 withdrawn.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Committee stage & Lords Hansard part one
Wednesday 20th October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, I no longer have to declare an interest but some Members here may know that I was until May this year police and crime commissioner in Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland. As such, I will make a very brief contribution to this first debate in Committee.

I personally support—I hope from my experience—the early amendments that have been proposed. As has been said already, it is quite clear that anyone who works with the police nowadays, knows them or sees them closely at work, will know that for a long time, I suspect, as in the rest of society, mental health, mental illness and all that follows from it was not given anywhere near the importance it should have been. I am glad to say that it is my experience, certainly in the police force I was close to, and I am sure in others too, that chief officer teams are now giving the issue of mental health due regard. That is why any covenant that left this out would be lacking; I do not want to comment on the covenant— good points have been made on it.

I urge the Minister and the Government to consider seriously these obviously non-partisan suggestions, which are meant to be helpful. That is all I want to say, but my experience tells me that this is becoming a larger and larger issue as year follows year for police forces up and down the country.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I start also by paying tribute to my noble friend Lady Harris of Richmond for her tireless work in supporting police officers in the many different roles that she has in addition to her work in this House. It was particularly important to hear about the work of police treatment centres, although they clearly do not have the capacity to deal with all officers who are affected. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, in his opening remarks, talked about only being able to imagine what police officers go through. I hope to enlighten the Committee about some of those experiences.

I have Amendment 4 in this group, but I support all these amendments, though perhaps with a qualification on one of them. My experience in the police service was not, in many respects, very different from that of others who have served or those who continue to serve, except perhaps that I was the most junior officer on my relief or response team, as it would now be known. For 18 months, as the junior officer delegated, I was the one who dealt with all the sudden deaths. My first appearance in court was at the Coroner’s Court, when the husband of an elderly couple had taken an overdose of prescription medication. Having worked night duty until 4 am, I was allowed to “slide off”, as I had to be at the mortuary at 9 am to identify the body. I had not seen a dead body before that night—I was 19 years of age—and I was unprepared for the sight and smell of at least half a dozen other bodies that had been opened up for examination by the pathologist when I arrived at the mortuary. It is an important role for a police officer to identify the body that he or she found as being the same one that the pathologist is about to perform the post-mortem on. I will not go into graphic details, but the Committee needs to get a flavour of the trauma that police officers are exposed to.

Noble Lords might think that the first case is the one that sticks in one’s mind, but whether it is the open-top car that overturned at speed, with no protection for the passengers in the back from the road surface, or the pensioner not seen for weeks in the summer, with swarms of flies on her badly decomposed body that was sticking to the bed when the undertakers tried to remove her, or the charred bodies in a number of fires that I attended, the impact on one’s mental health is considerable and cumulative. I can still picture and smell those scenes; I remember the taste that they left in my mouth.

It is not just the horror of such scenes; it is the emotional impact as well. There was a young man in his early 20s who had hung himself from a coat hook on the back of a door. There was a young mother, whose normal session with her psychiatrist had been cancelled because of Christmas; finding a name and address in her handbag next to her body at the base of a tower block, I went to the address, knocked on the door and was invited by her husband into a room where her young children were playing under the Christmas tree with the toys that the mother had bought them. If that was not bad enough, when I suggested that we ought to go into a different room so that I could tell the husband the tragic news that his wife had committed suicide, he asked me, “How did she do it?”. Experiences like that, as noble Lords can hear, I still vividly remember.

It is not just the deaths. I remember a young man who had a broken glass slammed into his face. We had to take him to hospital in the police van, as there were no ambulances available—some things do not change. I remember the terrified look on his face as he shook uncontrollably from the shock. Another man jumped from the fourth floor and landed on spiked railings. We held him up for what seemed to be an eternity, while the fire brigade cut around the railings; they could not use oxyacetylene torches because the heat would have transmitted to his body. Then we had to hold him in the ambulance between two trolleys, with the railings still through his body.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

8: After Clause 1, insert the following new Clause—
“Scrutiny of investigation: timeliness
(1) The Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2020 are amended as follows. (2) After regulation 13 insert—“13A Scrutiny of investigation: timeliness (1) A legally qualified person within the meaning of regulation 28(4)(a) and (6) of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 shall be appointed to scrutinise the information provided pursuant to regulation 13. (2) On each occasion where information is provided in writing under regulation 13 paragraph (1) or (2) the legally qualified person appointed under paragraph (1) shall determine whether there is good and sufficient reason for—(a) the time already taken; and(b) realistically anticipated to be needed for completion of the investigation.(3) In determining whether there is good and sufficient reason under paragraph (2) the legally qualified person may have regard to any relevant matter, and shall have particular regard to—(a) whether the investigation has been efficient and effective;(b) whether there has been unnecessary or unreasonable delay having regard to complexity and seriousness of the case;(c) the impact upon the officer and others;(d) any anticipated further delay;(e) the public interest and affect upon confidence in the police disciplinary system; and(f) representations made on behalf of any person entitled to receive a copy of the information provided under regulation 13.(4) Unless the legally qualified person determines that there is good and sufficient reason under paragraph (2)(a) and (b) then—(a) all investigation into possible misconduct or gross misconduct shall be terminated forthwith; and(b) no disciplinary proceedings may be initiated in respect of the matters under investigation.(5) Nothing in this provision shall have any effect in relation to any criminal investigation.”(3) After regulation 19 insert—“19A Scrutiny of investigation: timeliness (1) A legally qualified person within the meaning of regulation 28(4)(a) and (6) shall be appointed to scrutinise the information provided pursuant to regulation 19.(2) On each occasion where information is provided in writing under regulation 19(1) the legally qualified person appointed under paragraph (1) shall determine whether there is good and sufficient reason for—(a) the time already taken; and(b) realistically anticipated to be needed for completion of the investigation.(3) In determining whether there is good and sufficient reason under paragraph (2) the legally qualified person may have regard to any relevant matter, and shall have particular regard to—(a) whether the investigation has been efficient and effective;(b) whether there has been unnecessary or unreasonable delay having regard to complexity and seriousness of the case;(c) the impact upon the officer and others;(d) any anticipated further delay;(e) the public interest and affect upon confidence in the police disciplinary system; and (f) representations made on behalf of any person entitled to receive a copy of the information provided under regulation 19.(4) Unless the legally qualified person determines that there is good and sufficient reason under paragraph (2)(a) and (b) then—(a) all investigation into possible misconduct or gross misconduct shall be terminated forthwith; and (b) no disciplinary proceedings may be initiated in respect of the matters under investigation.(5) Nothing in this provision shall have any effect in relation to any criminal investigation.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amends the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2020 to provide for a mechanism for scrutiny and consequences where there are delays in disciplinary proceedings being brought against police officers.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, there has been much criticism of the police complaints and misconduct process from the perspective of members of the public being unable to achieve justice, but much less has been said about the impact on the officers under investigation, to which I alluded in the last group. When we come to consider Clause 43 and Schedule 4 to the Bill, I will remind the House of the changes the Government brought about in the Policing and Crime Act 2017 to limit the length of time members of the public could be kept under investigation by the police and on police bail. The Government accepted the unfairness of suspects being kept in suspense for months, even years, with the threat of prosecution still hanging over them. This is something many police officers face, with even graver potential consequences than someone who is accused of a criminal offence—potentially losing their livelihoods through being sacked or required to resign from the police service.

When I was a police inspector in charge of a relief, or shift, of officers, a woman who had been arrested and taken to one of my police stations made an allegation of indecent assault by a police officer during a routine search to ensure that she did not have anything that could cause injury while she was being held in a cell. I heard a commotion in the custody suite and went to see what was happening, only to find her spreadeagled on the floor with one officer on each limb. The situation was explained to me: she had resisted being searched, fighting with the female officer designated to search her, and had to be restrained. I asked the prisoner if she was okay and if she was going to behave herself now, and then ordered two female officers to take her into a cell to be searched, much to the concern of male officers, who I ordered to remain just outside the cell door.

Another prisoner, who was present in the custody suite and subsequently interviewed in prison by officers from the complaints unit, corroborated to some extent the female prisoner’s account—a scuffle and then being held down on the floor—although her allegation was actually of indecent assault by a female officer during the search, out of sight of the witness. When the complaints unit took all the female officers who had been on duty that night away for questioning simultaneously and suspended one from duty, I asked that I be interviewed as I was also a witness who had seen nothing untoward.

As a result, I was interviewed as a suspect under caution in a criminal investigation. Although I had already qualified for a promotion, it was delayed for 18 months, and the local area police commander recommended that I face a full disciplinary hearing for lack of supervision, with a recommendation that I be sacked—perhaps related to having recently separated from my wife and having sought permission to cohabit with a man, or perhaps not.

The day that the local area commander retired from the police service, the headquarters complaints and discipline department responsible for scheduling discipline hearings dropped all proceedings against me, and I was promoted. But in the intervening period, my health suffered, my marriage ended and my career was on hold, even though I had done nothing wrong and, arguably, in coming forward as a witness, everything right.

This is but a relatively minor, albeit personal, example of the impact that prolonged police misconduct investigations can have, which, unlike criminal investigations, have no effective time limits placed upon them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, set out, this amendment seeks to further improve the timeliness of disciplinary and misconduct proceedings against police officers. It seeks to do this by amending existing regulations governing complaint and misconduct investigations by the IOPC, as well as those conducted by force professional standards departments. In substance, they seek to introduce a new system of separate independent adjudicators with powers to close down investigations which have taken longer than 12 months, where they decide that there is no “good and sufficient” reason for delay.

Again, with this amendment, I agree with the thrust of what the noble Lord and others said, namely that disciplinary and misconduct investigations should be conducted and completed in a timely fashion, for the reasons set out by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Hogan-Howe. Like the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, when I heard “10 years” I was utterly shocked. However, this amendment comes at a time when investigation timescales are already reducing and when the Government have worked hard to reduce bureaucracy in the system and not add to it.

Under the IOPC’s predecessor, the Independent Police Complaints Commission, investigations would on average take 11 months. Since 2018, under the IOPC, that has fallen by almost 30% to just eight months. The IOPC has closed more than 90% of its cases in under 12 months and is making strong progress on the number of cases that it closes in under nine months and even in under six months. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said, it is in nobody’s interest for investigations to drag on for long periods unnecessarily. We recognise the impact that this can have on everyone concerned.

It might be helpful in terms of explaining the trajectory that the Government introduced a package of reforms in February last year to the police complaints and disciplinary systems. It included new provisions to improve timeliness, with an expectation that investigations will normally be completed within 12 months. If not, the investigating body must provide a written explanation of any delays and steps to bring the investigation to a conclusion. The Government expect the IOPC to go further, and it now has targets in its business plans to complete many of those investigations in under nine and six months, as I said.

There are a number of reasons why cases might take too long, including the complexity of a case, the time- scale being impacted by parallel criminal investigations, and delays in obtaining expert evidence or post-mortem reports. It might be further complicated by delays in obtaining accounts from key police witnesses and subjects. That said, it is not acceptable for investigations to go on for too long, but the trajectory of timescales is certainly downwards.

The noble Lord’s amendment would introduce an additional layer of cost and bureaucracy. It would also risk creating perverse incentives for investigators to rush to meet deadlines at the expense of the quality of an investigation, particularly in those complex cases or if historic matters are at stake.

If an investigation into police wrongdoing was terminated without being concluded and that officer might have had a case to answer for gross misconduct—I can think of very recent cases which are relevant here—this would significantly undermine public confidence and potentially the course of justice. I am sure that is not the intention of noble Lords.

The amendment also risks undermining the independence of the police disciplinary system, blurring the lines between when legally qualified persons are appointed to this role and when the same person is appointed as a legally qualified chair of a misconduct hearing. These individuals would be selected from the same pool. That fundamentally changes the role of a legally qualified chair and jeopardises the independence of their position and the disciplinary system.

In conclusion, the Government have already taken steps to reduce investigation timescales and we will be monitoring the timeliness of investigations, drawing on new data collection requirements that we introduced as part of recent reforms. I hope that, for the reasons I have outlined, the noble Lord will be happy to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this important debate, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for her support for speedy justice. Obviously, this impacts the complainant as well as the officers.

I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for his contribution. It seems very strange standing here and talking about a former commissioner in that way, but I am in police mode at the moment, I think. He made a very important point about firearms officers who volunteer to take on this enormous responsibility and are then treated so badly by the system.

The Police Federation—I am grateful for its support of these amendments—accepts that there will be delays if a criminal investigation is involved. However, there are still significant delays even after the criminal matters have been dealt with, as I outlined in the examples I gave.

I thank the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, for his promise to come back all guns blazing, as it were, if I bring the amendment back on Report.

It is interesting that there is a parallel with the Armed Forces again. I spoke to a former soldier who was resigning from the police service and asked him why. He said that he was leaving because, in the Armed Forces, when something goes wrong, the most senior officer involved takes responsibility and faces a court martial, while in the police service, the responsibility is pushed down to the lowest-possible level, to alleviate the responsibility of senior officers. That is an aspect of the culture of the police service; I agree with that officer’s conclusions.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, talked about public confidence. If there is no confidence in the Independent Office for Police Conduct and the police complaints system, this will be partly due to the undue delays. Complainants are beginning to think “What are they trying to cover up? Why is it taking so long?”. It is essential that these things are dealt with in a timely manner.

I thank the Minister for her support in principle, but the examples I gave were not complex cases; they were simple, but they still took years. They did not involve expert witnesses, yet there were still delays. These are recent cases from last year.

I am sorry but I do not accept the Minister’s assertion that this amendment would result in a rush to complete investigations. These completely independent people would assess whether there were justified reasons for investigations going on as long as they had. Clearly, if these investigations were not being dealt with in a timely manner, they would have something to worry about. This is about picking up those cases in which there is unnecessary and unreasonable delay. Of course, the same chair would not adjudicate over whether an investigation was going on too long and then chair the discipline investigation.

We are on to something here and I am very grateful to the Police Federation for bringing it to my attention. We may well need to discuss this further on Report, but at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 8 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 10 in this group. According to the Times newspaper, in an article dated 10 March this year, Chris Philp MP, the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office and Ministry of Justice responsible, according to the article, for sentencing, said that

“detailed research had found that the likelihood of being caught and punished was much more important in discouraging people from committing crime than length of jail sentences.”

Answering a Parliamentary Question about the deterrent effect of longer sentences, he said, again according to the Times:

“The evidence is mixed, although harsher sentencing tends to be associated with limited or no general deterrent effect. Increases in the certainty of apprehension and punishment have consistently been found to have a deterrent effect.”


I subsequently discovered that this was the Answer to a Written Question on 19 February from the Conservative Member for Rother Valley about pet theft—of which more on another day. The Bill certainly is the gift that keeps on giving.

Noble Lords around the Committee will be aware that we on these Benches have consistently said that longer prison sentences do not deter criminals and now, according to the Government, harsher sentences have limited or no deterrent effect. So why do we have Clause 2 in the Bill? Noble Lords may be surprised that, as a former police officer, I am not supportive of this measure. Something needs to be done about assaults on emergency workers, but an increase in the maximum sentence is not what is needed. What is needed is a change in attitude among the general public, in society and in the courts towards assaults on emergency workers in general and on police officers in particular. It appears to me to have become accepted by many that being assaulted is part of the job of a police officer or an emergency worker. But no one should be expected to tolerate abuse or assault because of the work they do, whether they are a Member of Parliament or an emergency worker.

The type of assault covered by this clause is common assault. Anything that causes a significant injury, even if it is not permanent, such as a bruise, can and should result in a charge under Section 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, for which the maximum term of imprisonment is already five years. We are talking about relatively minor physical harm. Can the Minister tell the Committee how many cases of assault on an emergency worker to date have attracted the current maximum penalty of 12 months in prison—or a sentence of imprisonment at all?

The reason for my amendment, in effect for the Sentencing Council to review its guidance for the existing offence where the existing maximum penalty is 12 months’ imprisonment, is to ensure that the courts and the Crown Prosecution Service reflect the seriousness of this offence in their decision-making, rather than what we see week after week reported on social media, where assaults on emergency workers in general and police officers in particular are treated by the CPS and the courts as part and parcel of the job. That sends a message to criminals and the general public that you can assault emergency workers with impunity, because in court you will be just be given a slap on the wrist—if it even gets that far. What is the point of increasing the maximum penalty for an offence to two years when the Government themselves acknowledge that harsher sentences have little or no deterrent effect and the courts, which can currently send someone to prison for up to 12 months, rarely if ever do so?

The Government may say that in some cases severe penalties can have a deterrent effect—but an increase from one year to two years for an offence often committed in the heat of the moment during the course of a confrontation between a police officer and a member of the public is unlikely to be one of them. Far better that the Government mount a publicity campaign stating that it is completely unacceptable to attack emergency workers who put their lives on the line every day to protect and serve the public, than that they make a minor adjustment to the maximum penalty that is likely to go unnoticed by those it is targeted at, either as a deterrent or in court following conviction, unless there is a significant change in the attitude of judges, prompted by a change in the sentencing guidelines.

On Amendment 11, proposed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, clearly, prison officers are as vital a uniformed force as police, fire and rescue services, the ambulance service and the coastguard, and they are afforded similar protection. I quite understand how others working in prisons feel that they are more vulnerable and, as the right reverend Prelate said, they feel they have a target on their back because they are excluded. He gave the appalling example of an assault on a prison chaplain that resulted in bruising to the chaplain. But, again, I say that that offence could have been prosecuted under Section 47, where there is an even greater penalty available than for an assault on an emergency worker. So we are not supportive of the increase.

On Amendment 9, in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, of course, if such substances are actually thrown at a prison officer or other emergency worker, it would amount to assault and therefore it would be covered by existing legislation around assaults on emergency workers, with a similar penalty to the one the noble Earl is proposing in his amendment. So we feel that there needs to be a change in attitude towards the apparent acceptability of assaults on emergency workers, rather than simply a cosmetic increase in the maximum penalty.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, I think the noble Lord and I are in agreement that the problem is that we are not prosecuting these offences, rather than the outcome in the courts. Because, for the prisoners, it may be that even another three-month penalty for my new offence would be enough to deter them—or, using the existing penalties, as the noble Lord said, it is the probability of being prosecuted that matters.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Tuesday 18th May 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I first pay tribute to her Majesty the Queen as we enter her Platinum Jubilee year. Her example of a lifetime of public service at the highest level is extraordinary. I am also greatly looking forward to the maiden speeches of the noble Baronesses, Lady Fullbrook and Lady Fleet—the first of many valuable contributions to this House, I am sure.

As we consider the home affairs, justice and culture aspects of the Queen’s Speech, I remind the House of the comments of my noble friend Lord Newby, who said last week:

“The Queen’s Speech contains many Bills of second-order importance but none offering fundamental change”.—[Official Report, 11/5/21; col. 16]


I would go further. The Government seem to be continuing along the same path, following policies where the broadsheet analysis of the right-wing tabloid headline shows the negative unintended consequences of government policy.

One of our strongest sectors is culture, yet the only legislation in that space is the online safety Bill, which is an inadequate reaction to protecting children and other vulnerable internet users who are being exposed to things online that they would be protected from in the physical world. Meanwhile, there is nothing to encourage or facilitate our musicians and performers, who are facing the disastrous twin impacts on their livelihood of a global pandemic and restrictions on their ability to tour in the European Union.

We on these Benches believe in freedom and fair play—what some might call traditional British values. That includes the freedom to succeed no matter who you are or what your background or backstory is, and the freedom of the individual from unnecessary interference by government. Yet this Conservative Government seek to unfairly discriminate, further marginalising minorities and the poor, further limiting challenges to government overreach, and pursuing populist policies where the evidence clearly shows that they do not work. This is a Queen’s Speech of promising headlines with unintended negative consequences.

Proposals to ensure that speakers are not “no-platformed” in universities make it more likely those with radical views—ones that need to be heard, challenged and debated—are not invited in the first place. The electoral integrity Bill is a solution in search of a non-existent problem, and is likely to disproportionately disfranchise the poor and ethnic minorities.

Whether through the extension of treason offences, or longer and longer prison sentences for existing offences, not only are the Government pursuing a policy that has proved to be ineffective in deterring criminals, they are adding to overcrowding in prisons, making rehabilitation more difficult and radicalisation easier. Sedition has its roots in the perceived unfairness of society, and draconian punishment is one of those unfairnesses.

In their immigration proposals, the Government seek to penalise legitimate asylum seekers, contrary to our international obligations on refugee resettlement. This is not because they do not have a valid and lawful right to seek sanctuary in the UK, but because they arrive here by what the Government consider the wrong route. For the majority of those desperate enough to put their lives at risk by crossing the channel, there is no alternative safe and legal route to take. There is currently no way for those being bombed in Syria by their own President, or those caught between warring factions in Yemen, to claim asylum within their own country. All UK resettlement schemes are currently closed, with no plans or timetable for reopening them, nor for establishing new ones.

Instead of first establishing or re-establishing resettlement schemes and setting targets for the number of asylum seekers to whom the UK will give sanctuary, the Government are spending millions of pounds on barbed wire and enforcement patrols on the French coast. They are forcing legitimate asylum seekers into the hands of people traffickers—the only people who know how to get around the increased security measures.

One people smuggler, quoted by the Guardian, said:

“We thank your government for our full pockets.”


If you say to voters in the red or blue wall, “Look at these illegal immigrants crossing the channel”, you encourage xenophobia. If you say, “This is the only way these desperate people, who are not safe in their own country, can seek sanctuary here”, you encourage understanding. It is a choice, and the Conservative Government, through their immigration proposals, are choosing the former.

In the year of the 40th anniversary of the Brixton riots, this Conservative Government choose to ignore the recommendations of the Scarman report and instead condone enforcing the law over maintenance of the Queen’s peace, as we saw at the Clapham Common vigil. At the same time, they fail to address the unfairness, discrimination and waste of scarce police resources on disproportionate stop and search.

Placing further restrictions on protests might seem reasonable in the light of the Extinction Rebellion protests last year. I know from years of experience as an advanced public order-trained senior police officer that it takes several degrees of magnitude more police officers to enforce a ban on a demonstration than it does to work with organisers to ensure compliance with conditions. Outside London, the majority of police leaders consulted by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary said that it was not a lack of legislation but a lack of police resources that was the limiting factor in policing protests.

What are the consequences? Following the tragic case of Sarah Everard, the Mayor of London claimed that women and girls were not safe on the streets of London. The commissioner of the Met barely qualified that statement last week, when she said that the streets were

“not safe for everyone all of the time.”

The streets of London are not safe because police officers are increasingly being withdrawn from their beats to enforce bans on demonstrations and because they are targeting stop and search on black people, looking for drugs. You are eight times more likely to be stopped and searched for drugs if you are black, but no more likely than white people to be found with drugs. The overwhelming majority of stop searches are for drugs, not for knives. No wonder the black community still feels “overpoliced and underprotected”, as a black clergyman told the Macpherson inquiry into the tragic death of Stephen Lawrence.

We all want the freedom to be able to walk our streets in safety and for our women friends and family to walk safely down any street at any time. For this to happen, we must restore a visible policing presence, as the National Police Chiefs’ Council said yesterday. We do not want even more of our police officers sitting in police vans, ready to enforce a ban on a peaceful protest —which is the likely consequence of the Government’s proposals. We do not want our police officers wasting their time stopping and searching innocent people in the vain hope of finding a small quantity of drugs. We want violent criminals to be in fear of the police, not for women and girls to be in fear of men.

Fair play is not just about protecting the most vulnerable. It is part of what makes us proud to be British. Fair play is not just about ensuring lawful protest and that black people feel welcomed and protected. It is about focusing scarce police resources on ensuring everyone’s freedom to walk the streets in safety. Freedom and fair play are what make our country great. This Government’s proposals are in danger of undermining that greatness.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Wednesday 21st April 2021 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Watkins of Tavistock) (CB)]

Does anyone else in the Chamber wish to speak? No? I call the next speaker on the list, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, has said, with the best will in the world, much of the legislation that this House passes will be ineffective if judges do not understand the issues. Sadly, in some cases—albeit a limited number—it is clear that they do not understand the issues surrounding domestic abuse, in particular, coercive control, rape and sexual abuse, despite current training.

To the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, I would say that there is a difference between outputs and outcomes. I am not sure whether this is an appropriate analogy, but I know from my own experience of race relations training, for example, that the cultural shift needed is difficult to achieve. The proof of the pudding is in the eating and, at times, the training of the judiciary has failed the test. Despite the Minister’s assertion, I fail to understand how mandating such training without dictating the specific content can be contrary to the principle of judicial independence, as my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames has said.

However, we are grateful for the reassurances that the Government have given as a result of the concerted efforts by the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, and my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, we on these Benches support the intention behind the noble Baroness’s amendment. The case for improved training is well made. The amendment’s wording does not dictate what the training should be but puts the requirement for it in the Bill. Around the House, I think that we can all agree on the need for updated, quality training and to ensure that it happens.

I have said many times that this is a good Bill and will be a good Act of Parliament, but it is important that everything is done to ensure that all aspects of the law are correct. That includes ensuring that our judges and magistrates are properly trained. We owe that to victims, because domestic abuse is something that we now talk about in the country and in the House. That was not the case many years ago and we should not just assume that judges and magistrates completely understand the issues. That is why it is important that we get the training right.

I accept entirely the point the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, makes about judicial independence. I think we all support that, but there have been one or two occasions at the other end of the building when other parts of the Conservative Party were not so keen on judicial independence, when the judge made a decision that they did not like—we should get that on the record. It is not always the case that there is a great call of support for judicial independence, but I will leave the point there. I do not in any way bring the noble Lord into that; I have the highest respect for him.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)]

I must ask at this point: does anyone in the Chamber wish to speak? No? In that case it is over to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, it really is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for reasons that will become apparent, not least because we are three non-lawyers in a row.

On Report, the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, wondered whether I was accusing the Government of being misogynistic, following on from what the noble Baroness has just said. I say very clearly that that is not what I said or intended to say. I shall clarify. The essence of misogyny, as I understand it, is hatred of women who fail to comply with the sexist stereotype of a compliant, subordinate woman—hatred of women who stand up for themselves. I am not accusing the Government of hating women, but in my opinion there are echoes of that view of women being subordinate in their approach to this issue.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, has said, on the face of it the Government’s refusal to extend the so-called householder defence to victims of domestic abuse who use disproportionate force against their abusers in self-defence in the same way that a householder is allowed to use disproportionate force against an intruder appears to smack of the view that men should stand and fight but women should run away.

I do not intend to go over the arguments that I made at previous stages of the Bill; suffice it to say that I do not believe the Government’s arguments hold water. As a result, I am led to the conclusions that I have expressed. I would not be averse to the Government repealing the so-called householder defence, but I believe that to allow predominantly male householders to avail themselves of such a defence while not extending it to predominantly women victims of domestic abuse is inconsistent and incompatible.

While I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Randall of Uxbridge, about Lords Amendment 38, in my view the Government’s approach is again inconsistent. The law specifically provides a statutory defence to victims of modern slavery when those victims are compelled to commit an offence, even though there is an existing common-law defence of duress. When it comes to victims of domestic abuse who are compelled to commit an offence as a result of such abuse, the Government argue that the existing common-law defence of duress is sufficient. Either the existing common-law defence of duress is sufficient for both victims of domestic abuse and victims of modern slavery or it is not. In my view, the Government should not be able to have it both ways.

Clearly, these anomalies need to be addressed. Motion D1 provides for an independent review of defences for those who offend due to domestic abuse, which we support. The review of sentencing as suggested by the Government does not appear to us to go far enough.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws set out in detail the case for her amendments in Committee and on Report, and it is disappointing that they have been rejected by the other place. In response, she has tabled Motion D1 in her name. As we have heard, she is seeking an independent review to look at the issues that we have been talking about throughout our consideration of these matters. I think that is the right way forward.

I am conscious that the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, is resisting the new Motion from my noble friend, but she made the point, as have others, that if the Government are resisting the issues raised in the amendment, he ought to address the question of whether they could be looked at by the review of sentencing—or is that a step too far for the Government?

There is a huge issue here. I recall the debates that we had when my noble friend and others presented harrowing cases. There is a real point here: if there is an intruder in someone’s house then, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, often a male can defend himself there and has a defence, but a woman attacked by her partner in her own home, which should be a place of safety, cannot rely on such a defence. That cannot be right.

The Bill is seeking to address the whole issue of domestic abuse in all its various facets. It is a good Bill, but it would be an even better one if we could make sure that all the gaps were plugged here. The fact is that women in their own homes, their place of safety, can often find themselves in very dangerous situations. If they have to defend themselves and end up injuring or killing their partner, we should understand that and ensure that they have the proper defences to take account of the difficult situation that they have found themselves in, often over many years. After all, these things escalate; they do not happen overnight.

My noble friend has identified an important point here, and I hope that when the Minister responds he can address it. We need to find a way to look at the issues that my noble friend raised in the review of sentencing, as he referred to in his earlier remarks.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)]

Does anyone else in the Chamber wish to speak at this point? No? I therefore call the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, the Commons reason for disagreeing with Lords Amendment 40 relies on a government review of a report by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary. In light of the two recent reports by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary on the policing of protests, I now have serious concerns about HMIC’s political independence. As a result, any Commons disagreement based on a government review of immigration control, let alone one based on an HMIC report, provides me with no reassurance whatever.

Motion E1 would ensure that the personal details of victims and witnesses of domestic abuse were not used for immigration control purposes. Victims of rape or sexual assault, as well as victims of domestic abuse, who have gone to the police have been deported as a result of coming forward as vulnerable victims of serious crime. Perpetrators of rape, sexual assault and domestic violence threaten victims that, if they go to the police, they will be deported.

Can the Government help with what I understand to be their position on how the sharing of information between police and immigration enforcement can benefit victims of domestic abuse? Is it their position that were a victim to be subject to coercive control on the basis of their immigration status, sharing information with immigration enforcement could establish that the victim’s immigration status was in fact compliant, removing the mechanism of coercive control? If that is the Government’s argument, how is that sharing of personal information without consent compliant with GDPR? It is outside the exemption provided by paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 to the Data Protection Act 2018, which provides an exemption only for the maintenance of effective immigration control, or the investigation or detection of activities that would undermine the maintenance of effective immigration control.

As the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has just said, it matters not what a victim’s immigration status is, if the victim fears that the consequences of reporting a crime of which they are the victim or witness might be their deportation. As the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London has said, there is one other question for the Government: what is more important, ending violence against women, girls and other vulnerable victims of serious crime, or immigration control? If the Government oppose Motion E1, they are sending a very clear message that they care more about immigration control than protecting vulnerable victims of crime. We on these Benches will always put ending violence against women, girls and other vulnerable victims first, by voting with the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, if she divides the House. The noble Baroness has taken full account of the concerns of the other place and there appears to us to be no reason not to support her alternative amendments.

[Baroness Wilcox of Newport (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I make it clear at the outset that if the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, divides the House then the Opposition Benches will strongly support her. This amendment would provide for the circumstances where victims’ data cannot be shared for immigration purposes if they come forward to report abuse. However, and importantly, it provides that, for this section to come into force, there must be a vote in both Houses to approve it, after either the Government have published their review and Parliament has debated it, or after 1 July if the Government have regrettably not lived up to their word and published their review by then. This amendment rightly and democratically gives Parliament the ability to hold the Government to account on taking action after they publish their review. It is needed to allow victims to feel able to report abuse without fear, so that dangerous perpetrators are reported and stopped.

One of the consequences of putting immigration control above the safety of victims is that perpetrators can commit these crimes with impunity—a risk not only for survivors but for wider communities. Better trust in the police to protect victims of abuse and investigate crime for migrant women will improve responses for all survivors, and indeed the public.

This revised amendment is a thoroughly reasonable backstop. It gives the Government the time they have asked for to publish their review, but it gives Parliament the power, and indeed the responsibility, to hold the Government to account and to demand action on this issue if there is no subsequent implementation. I wholly recommend the amendment to the Minister and to the Government.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)]

The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has withdrawn. I have no notification of unlisted speakers, but does anyone in the Chamber wish to speak? No. In that case, I call the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I start by joining other noble Lords in paying tribute to my noble friend Lady Hamwee, who has been a passionate campaigner on these issues. I was going to say that she had stepped down from the Front Bench, but she has stepped up to bigger and better things in the House, and I personally will miss her greatly.

Lords Amendment 41 would have provided a route for victims of domestic abuse who are subject to immigration control to be given the opportunity to apply for leave to remain—not given leave to remain but given the opportunity to apply—by allowing them to stay in the UK pending the outcome of their application and to be supported financially during this time. Many of these victims are reliant on their abusive partner for support, making escape from domestic abuse almost impossible. Initially, the Government said the reason they objected was that they thought people might falsely claim to be victims of domestic abuse in order to seek leave to remain in the UK. Again, we have to ask: what is more important, protecting vulnerable victims of domestic abuse or immigration control? The Commons reason is simply

“Because the Amendment would involve a charge on public funds”.


The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester has presented an alternative amendment, a very modest amendment, that seeks to address all the concerns the Government have previously expressed. There is a £1.5 million 12-month pilot supporting such victims of domestic abuse, and the amendment simply ensures that, during the pilot period, victims are not turned down because of a lack of funds. It then sets a timetable for the introduction of a permanent solution once the results of the pilot have been evaluated. The amendment comprehensively sets out the evidence necessary to show that someone is a genuine victim of domestic abuse. This alternative amendment is the very least the Government should do for these particularly vulnerable victims of domestic abuse, and we would support the right reverend Prelate were she to divide the House.

Lords Amendment 43 would have ensured that all victims of domestic abuse received equal protection and support irrespective of their status, including their immigration status. The Commons reason for disagreeing was that it would

“involve a charge on public funds”.

Indeed it might—but it would also have been a significant step towards the UK finally being able to ratify the Istanbul convention. The noble Baroness, Lady Helic, has proposed an alternative amendment that would at least ensure that local authorities consider the needs of all victims, including migrant women, when they make strategic decisions about tackling domestic abuse. This cannot be the landmark Bill the Government intend it to be unless it puts the final pieces into place to enable the UK to ratify the Istanbul convention. I recall an expression my mother was fond of: “Don’t spoil the ship for a ha’porth of tar.”

I was hoping that this Bill could be, like the Modern Slavery Act, a magnificent piece of legislation of which all sides of the House could be justifiably proud. We have already vastly improved the Bill in this House; it would be a shame if we now left it less than watertight.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

As we have heard, Lords Amendments 41 and 43 were both disagreed by the Commons because they would involve a charge on public funds. The Commons did not offer any further reason. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester and the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, have now tabled Amendments F1 and F2. The amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, provides that local authorities “must have regard” to Article 4(3) of the Istanbul convention when they are preparing their strategy for accommodation-based services under the Bill. Article 4(3) of the convention provides that protection for victims must be secured without discrimination based on any ground such as race, religion or migrant status. We support the aim of this amendment, which also serves to remind the Government of their commitment to ratify the vital Istanbul convention, for which they have not yet set a timeframe. Perhaps we will hear something definite on this point in the Government’s response to this amendment.

Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill

Lord Paddick Excerpts

3rd reading
Thursday 11th March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, we on these Benches want to do everything we can to make the UK safer. What we sought to do in the Bill was to protect civil liberties and the rule of law. We have questioned the presumption that longer sentences, and people spending more time in prison, will make UK citizens safer. Instead, we have been trying to create a system in which prisoners stand the best chance of being deradicalised and rehabilitated.

As the noble Lord has said, terrorism prevention and investigation measures are supposed to do exactly what it says on the tin—to prevent terrorism while an investigation takes place. The changes the Government sought to bring about would have made it possible to extend TPIMs indefinitely, including what could amount to house arrest, by removing the overnight restrictions on curfews. Unless the compromise amendment forced on the Government by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, survives ping-pong, indefinite detention without trial beckons.

The Bill extends compulsory lie detector—polygraph —tests not only to convicted terrorists on licence from prison, but to subjects of TPIMs orders who are not convicted, and should have the right to silence. Instead, those unconvicted suspects face a term of imprisonment for not answering questions. The long-established right to silence has been eroded.



It is not all bad. As a result of the briefings arranged by the Government, as the Minister said, I am now convinced of the benefits of the limited use of polygraph tests for those released on licence from prison and I am reassured by the efforts being made to manage the risks presented by terrorist offenders on release from prison, although I still believe that they could be enhanced by extending the remit of the Parole Board, as sensibly proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew. On a personal level, I am very grateful for the open and engaging way in which both Ministers have interacted with us, for the engagement with like-minded noble Lords across the House and to our own and Labour’s staff members, Sarah and Grace, for the considerable help and assistance they have provided.

Finally, I would be lost without the help and support of my noble friends, in particular my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames and my noble friend Lady Hamwee, whose contributions in the Chamber are just the tip of an iceberg of dedication, superhuman effort and selfless support for others.