House of Lords (Expulsion and Suspension) Bill [HL]

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Friday 24th October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I, too, add my support to the Bill. On the last occasion on which I was the last Back-Bench speaker in a Second Reading debate, I used the opportunity to respond to opponents of the Bill. My role today is clearly different in that I am here to add my support to everyone who has spoken.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, made clear, the provisions of this Bill are based on previous measures. In the last Parliament, I served on the Joint Committee on the Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill, which became the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. The provisions for expulsion were lost in the wash-up. In this Parliament, I served on the Joint Committee on the Draft House of Lords Reform Bill. The Labour Government supported the former Bill and the present coalition Government supported the latter Bill—in other words, all three main parties have signed up to the provisions embodied in this Bill. The drafting of this Bill follows that of the previous Bills, especially the House of Lords Reform Bill, so no party with any merit can claim that the Bill deviates from the provisions that they have previously supported.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, said, the Bill extends our current limited powers and brings us into line with the other place. There is clearly a powerful case for bringing us into line with the House of Commons. The two Houses do not necessarily have to march in step but, if there is a difference, there is a more powerful case for this House to have the power of expulsion. After all, MPs do not enjoy security of tenure; they can be removed by their constituents. They may be removed in between elections in exceptional circumstances, if the Recall of MPs Bill before the House of Commons is enacted.

As my noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury said, membership of this House is a privilege, but it is also a responsibility. We have to maintain high standards. We have the code of conduct; that is necessary but it is not sufficient. We lack the powers necessary to enforce it in the event of a major transgression. We can suspend Members, but only for limited periods, as we have heard. That is useful and we have made use of it, but we need the ability in exceptional circumstances to suspend for a greater period than is presently possible or even to expel. It is not difficult to envisage circumstances in which a Member brings the House into serious disrepute without breaking the law.

The provisions of this Bill give us the powers that we need. It is up to the House to provide due process for the consideration of cases. The report of the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege, echoing previous committee recommendations, detailed the minimum requirements for fairness in such cases. These should be embodied in Standing Orders and not in the detail of the Bill—otherwise there is the danger of the provisions coming within the purview of the courts. The Bill in my view gets the balance right. It is a modest Bill, at least in length, but it is a necessary one for the reasons that noble Lords have advanced. Like my noble friend Lord Cormack, I see no reason at all why it should not be permitted to proceed to the statute book and do so swiftly.

House of Lords: Labour Peers’ Working Group Report

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Thursday 19th June 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I, too, congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, on securing this debate and on the report that is before us. The report constitutes a constructive contribution to the debate on the future of this House. In my view, it is far superior to the documents laid before us in recent years by successive Governments. White Papers have taken as given, first, that the second Chamber should be elected and, secondly, that the functions of the current second Chamber are appropriate and should be retained. By not justifying either point, the Government have avoided addressing the fact that the two are not compatible: if you accept one, the other has to be abandoned. Election would change, fundamentally, the terms of trade between the parties in the House. There would be no reason to accept the existing functions of the House or to exercise restraint in the use of existing powers, let alone to accept those powers as adequate.

By not addressing the contradiction, Governments have been able to focus solely on composition. Election is seen as the democratic option, and the functions are fine, so let us just proceed with election. This stance is fundamentally flawed, so the Government’s House of Lords Reform Bill of 2012 was always going to be a bad Bill. It failed to grasp the need to address functions and powers, just as it failed to recognise that election is not necessarily the democratic option.

This report is to be welcomed because it avoids those mistakes. It addresses functions, doing so through recognising the position of the House within a system of asymmetrical bicameralism. It recognises that the functions derive from the House seeing its role as complementary to that of the elected House. The report puts it very well:

“It is a ‘think again’ house, not a ‘yield or we veto’ house”.

In other words, the House adds value by fulfilling functions that do not challenge the primacy of the elected Chamber. Those functions have, on the whole, been well fulfilled, but there is scope for increasing the efficiency and the effectiveness of the House. The report goes on to say:

“The task then is to find a model for reform that tackles the defects of the present House while preserving its strengths”.

I think it important to recognise that the reforms advanced in the paper are practical proposals that derive from a clear appreciation of the role of the House. I find myself in agreement with most of the proposals embodied in the report, which is hardly surprising given that many echo what was in the original Steel Bill. However, there are a few with which I would take issue. Rather than seek to make what would be essentially Committee-stage points, I will just make a few general comments designed to contribute to the debate.

The report follows the Steel Bill in recommending that the House of Lords Appointments Commission be put on a statutory basis and that the by-election option for hereditary Peers be abolished. There was a reason both were in the Bill. Either they need to be implemented together or putting the Appointments Commission on a statutory basis needs to be achieved before the by-election provision is ended. The merit of the by-election option is that it brings in Members over whom the Prime Minister has no veto: he cannot block a Member who comes here under the provisions of the 1999 Act. At the moment, the Appointments Commission is formally an advisory body to the Prime Minister. By putting it on a statutory footing, one can protect the independence of the commission and there would thus continue to be a route to this House that is free of executive control.

I support the recommendations that this House should be smaller than the House of Commons and that no party should have a majority in the House—again, provisions of the Steel Bill—but I would not necessarily reduce the size to 450. I would be wary, in any event, of a fixed number of Members and one geared to the existing committee activity of the House. I think we could reduce numbers but expand the committee role of the House. I would also be wary of using an age limit to reduce the size of the House, which I would regard as too arbitrary. My view is that we should consider a scheme whereby, at the start of a new Parliament, the parties agree on how many Peers each should retain in the light of the outcome of a general election—the proportions could be geared to the proportion of votes achieved—and then each party group would be responsible for electing those they wish to retain. That would enable the issue of overall size, as well as party balance, to be addressed effectively. Providing that the House was never larger than the House of Commons would prevent the membership ballooning in size.

On the wider issue of a constitutional convention, I am one of those who support that proposal. I have argued previously in this House for creating a constitutional convention, although one somewhat different in scope to what is often proposed. I believe that we need a convention to help us make sense of where we are, and not necessarily to tell us where we should be going—Parliament can decide that once we have a much clearer appreciation of where we are in terms of the structures and relationships that form our constitution. Just over 30 years ago, I published a book entitled The Constitution in Flux. If it was in flux then, how are we to characterise it today? As the report recognises, we have experienced constitutional changes that have been both rapid and discrete. One change impinges on others, but in ways that have not necessarily been thought through. We are particularly vulnerable to the law of unintended consequences. If we plough ahead with further changes, that vulnerability becomes even greater. Hence the case for having a commission able to stand back and assist us in making sense of where we are.

We are now in a situation where it is difficult for a Government to resist the recommendation that there should be a referendum in the event of their embarking on an attempt at major change. I have made the point before that I have a principled objection to referendums, but the problem for successive Governments is that they have not. They have therefore conceded the case for referendums on proposals for major constitutional change. The position was well summarised by the Constitution Committee in its report, Referendums in the United Kingdom, published in 2010. It was for that reason that, as a member of the Joint Committee on the Government’s draft Bill, I voted to recommend that the Government’s proposals be subject to a referendum. The situation is not the ideal, but it is the real, and that is what we have to deal with.

To conclude, I very much welcome this report. It is a considered contribution to debate and forms the basis for moving forward to achieve change which is both practical and desirable. Moving forward on a cross-party basis is to be encouraged. This report meshes with, and reinforces, other contributions to the debate on the reform of this House and I hope that it will be considered seriously by both sides of the House.

Coalition Government: Constitution Committee Report

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Tuesday 13th May 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I am delighted that this important and timely report is being debated this evening. Like others, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, and the Constitution Committee on a valuable and prudent analysis of the constitutional implications of coalition Government. I was especially impressed by the committee’s analysis of the convention of collective responsibility. Its explanation of and justification for the convention are superb. I support strongly its recommendations in paragraphs 138 to 141. Indeed, there are no recommendations that I do not support, although—as I shall argue—there are some that I would wish to develop.

The report is measured and realistic. Its starting point is that there may again be coalition Governments following elections in which no one party wins an absolute majority of seats but it accepts that that is a case of if rather than when. The conditions of 2010 were exceptional in terms of the confluence of electoral arithmetic and economic crisis. In other circumstances, the outcome of a hung Parliament may be minority Government rather than a coalition. If there is an indecisive outcome and if negotiations take place for the formation of a coalition Government, it would be desirable to have in place some agreed framework for those negotiations. The report offers eminently reasonable recommendations for that framework.

The recommendations are essentially modest in that they cannot solve two basic problems associated with such negotiations, but they go some way to addressing one of them. The basic problem is that of a democratic deficit. Coalitions formed as the result of post-election bargaining lack the seal of electoral approval. Some argue that if party A gets 35% of the vote and party B gets 20%, then a coalition of the two parties enjoys the support of 55% of the electorate. It does not. It enjoys the definitive support of not one elector because nobody was given the opportunity to vote for A plus B. Its legitimacy comes from the support of the parties in Parliament. Its popular legitimacy is, in essence, indirect rather than direct.

The second problem is that of incomplete information. Whatever one thinks of party manifestos, each party has time to prepare its policy proposals to put before the electorate. There may be a lengthy process of internal discussion and, indeed, of external consultation, drawing in specialists to advise. There may even be an opportunity to anticipate one’s stance in the event of an indecisive election result, but one cannot utilise the same process of consultation and discussion. In coalition forming, as we have already heard, there is pressure to reach agreement quickly—at least, there is in the United Kingdom.

We are used to a quick and almost seamless transition from one Government to another, usually on the day following the general election. As has been mentioned, by our standards, the five days of negotiations in 2010 were a long time. The pressure on negotiators was to reach agreement quickly and in conditions of competition. The discussions took place in secrecy. Deals were agreed in a virtually sealed environment. There was no opportunity to consult on what was being agreed, in terms of not just political acceptability but feasibility. I am concerned here not with the partisan aspects but with the evidence base. Those involved with the negotiations may be very bright, but they may not be specialists in all the subjects under discussion.

Let me illustrate that with a couple of commitments embodied in the coalition agreement. The Conservatives conceded the case for a fixed-term Parliament. The coalition agreement stated:

“We will put a binding motion before the House of Commons stating that the next general election will be held on the first Thursday of May 2015”.

No binding Motion was ever brought before the House of Commons, for one very good reason: there was no one to be bound by such a binding Motion. The prerogative cannot be bound by what is a declaratory Motion.

The agreement also said that the legislation would provide for an early dissolution if 55% or more of MPs voted for it. Did this figure derive from a study of practice in other legislatures? If one looks at the provisions of other legislatures, the answer is clearly no. It was the product of a quick calculation based on party strengths in the new Parliament. It was only later that a change was made to make the figure two-thirds of MPs, a figure employed by several other legislatures.

I take those as illustrative of the problem of incomplete information. The pressure to reach agreement quickly in conditions of secrecy may result in commitments that are difficult to undo. There is added pressure on Parliament, not least your Lordships’ House, but if the coalition partners mobilise a majority in the other place, we are limited in challenging the ends of the policy even if we have the scope to affect the means. It would be far better if the policies agreed were the product of considered and informed reflection. I therefore welcome the recommendation of the Constitution Committee at paragraph 22 that five days should not be taken as a complete period for forming a government. It recommends that no more or less time should be taken than is required to produce a government able to command the confidence of the House of Commons. I would be inclined to say there should be no more or less time than is required to generate informed policy commitments and to command the confidence of the House of Commons.

[Lord Maclennan of Rogart (LD)]

Does my noble friend agree that to seek to lay down a programme for government for five years in five days is in itself unachievable, that events will change things, and that it is therefore better to enunciate the principles, vision or goals rather than the precise methods of achieving them?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Norton of Louth]

I am not suggesting that it has to be detailed; I am referring to the feasibility and to quickly checking that what is being suggested at a high level of policy is at least grounded in what is feasible and correct.

There is one other problem to which I wish to draw attention. It complements the recommendations embodied in the report. The formation of a coalition may exacerbate a problem of experience in government. There are benefits in Ministers having some grounding in government by either experience or training. In recent decades, we have had people appointed to senior ministerial office with no prior experience of government. That is a consequence of a party being in opposition for a relatively long time. The problem is compounded by the formation of a coalition where it draws in a party which has not had expectation of being in office and has no Members with ministerial experience.

I have pursued for some time the need for ministerial training and, indeed, for training of senior civil servants when it comes to understanding our constitutional arrangements. If there is a significant churn in senior civil servants and Ministers are taking office with no prior experience or knowledge of the subject, we have serious problems.

We have generalist Ministers and generalist civil servants having responsibility for what may be important, and at times complex, areas of policy but with no grounding in the subject at all. A particular example is training. At the end of 2012 I tabled a Question asking how many Ministers in the Cabinet Office and the office of Lord President of the Council had received training from the National School of Government or Civil Service Learning in constitutional principles and practice. My noble friend Lady Northover provided a concise answer: “None”.

We need to think seriously about how we ensure that Ministers new to office get a grasp of how to undertake their responsibilities, as well as gain some knowledge of the area of their responsibility. Relying on officials may not be sufficient, especially if the officials are as new as the Minister. There may be a case for those on the Opposition Front Bench not only to have contact with officials, but also to be provided with sessions with specialists, not just in the subject area of their portfolios, but also in the running of government.

In the event of a coalition there may be a case for some briefing sessions to be incorporated into the period between reaching agreement and the meeting of the new Parliament. I strongly support the recommendations of the Constitution Committee at paragraph 40 for administrative support and factual briefings for those engaged in negotiations, but I think there is a case for further advice and training once a new Government are formed. For that reason I also support the recommendation at paragraph 26 for a 12-day gap between an election and the meeting of a new Parliament to be the preferred choice, while recognising that even longer may be required.

I raise the issue as an important one for the quality of government. It goes beyond the issue of coalition formation, but forming coalitions may, as I say, exacerbate the problem, especially if it involves third parties which have had no expectation of office.

I again congratulate the Constitution Committee on another excellent report. Its message is that we may not have a coalition government in the event of an indecisive election result, but if we do, we need to have the mechanisms in place to facilitate it. It is an eminently sensible report. I trust that the Government will embrace its recommendations. I say to my noble friend Lord Lexden that I am not sure whether or not that is fine wine, but then I am teetotal.

Standards in Public Life

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Tuesday 4th February 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I too congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Bew, on initiating this important debate. I wish to make three short points. The first is that maintaining standards, as embodied in the Code of Conduct, is necessary, but it is not sufficient to establish high levels of trust in our political system. As is clear from the survey, we have some way to go to meet the necessary standards. However, ensuring compliance with the code should be seen as only part of the solution. What flows from the survey, and the Hansard Society’s annual Audits of Political Engagement, is that we should be pursuing both a bottom-up and a top-down approach to restoring trust.

The bottom-up approach is captured by one of the final sentences of the survey, on page 51:

“It also seems likely that perceptions of standards would respond to better public information about how different institutions try to ensure that they live up to the principles in public life”.

One of the problems is lack of understanding of the political process. Like the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, I believe it is necessary to bolster citizenship education. It is in the national curriculum, but there are no incentives for head teachers to take it seriously. We need to be ensuring that there are incentives, and resources, for schools to deliver it effectively. It is essential to the health of our political system.

However, ensuring that people are more informed about the system is no guarantee that it will enhance support for it. That will come when people recognise that politicians are acting in good faith to deliver on their promises. There is thus a major challenge for politicians in terms of behaviour. We need political parties to move away from empty partisanship and to get out of the Downsian cycle of outbidding one another. We need politicians to show leadership—the top-down approach—to lead from the front and not follow focus groups or the latest passing bandwagon. Margaret Thatcher pursued policies that were contentious, but her leadership style resonated. We need to be addressing these issues. It is easy to advocate constitutional reform, but that is a form of displacement activity. It is to suggest that the structure, rather than those who occupy it, is the problem. The problem is the people who occupy it. Once we accept that we are part of the problem— indeed, a central part—we can then start to tackle it.

My question to the Minister is straightforward: do you agree?

The Future of the Civil Service

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Thursday 16th January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I, too, am delighted that the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, has secured this important and timely debate. In the time available, I want to make two points. First, I very much endorse the recommendation of the Public Administration Select Committee for a commission on the Civil Service. That case is well made in its report. The Government’s Civil Service Reform Plan focuses on making the Civil Service more effective both in service delivery and in offering policy advice. As I said in evidence to the Public Administration Committee, it takes a narrow and one-dimensional view of the relationship between Ministers and civil servants.

Ministers depend on good civil servants. Conversely, civil servants rely on good Ministers, and Parliament relies on Ministers and officials who understand their responsibilities to Parliament. The system relies on an understanding of these relationships, but the basis on which this rests is being eroded. It is being eroded as a consequence of the turnover in senior civil servants and the lack of turnover in the party in government. Some politicians have become senior Ministers with no prior experience of government. Turnover in the senior Civil Service takes out the administrative experience and specialisation that offsets the fact that both civil servants and Ministers are generalists.

This makes the case for a major review and one that puts the Civil Service within the context of our system of government and not simply as some discrete managerial entity. Ministers see civil servants as part of the problem without acknowledging that they too are part of the problem. For that reason, the decision on how to address the problem should not be left to government.

That brings me to my second point. The Government have rejected the proposal for a commission. That, combined with my preceding point, means that it is up to Parliament to take ownership of the process. I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, and my noble friend Lord Waldegrave: on practical grounds we will not get an independent commission. If the Government decline to support a Joint Committee, it is up to this House to establish an ad hoc committee on the Civil Service. In response to my noble friend Lord Waldegrave, that would time limit the actual inquiry.

We are not short of expertise, as is so clearly demonstrated by this debate. My comments today are thus not addressed to the Minister but to the House. In my view, we should grasp the opportunity.

Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Bill

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Tuesday 5th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 65 I shall also speak to Amendments 67, 70, 71, 75, 76, 77 and 113, which are in the names of my noble friends Lady Royall and Lady Hayter. This is an extensive group of amendments but the main focus is to expand greatly the amount of information that the register holds. For example, one of the key amendments in the middle of this group concentrates on the detail of spending by lobbyists. This is important as, without these details, it is possible only to build up a very limited picture of the lobbying activity taking place because, as Unlock Democracy says in its briefing to noble Lords:

“A good faith estimate of what it being spent on lobbying would also show scale, disparities and trends in lobbying”.

Compare the current, limited proposals in the Bill with the level of transparency in place in the United States, where it is relatively easy to find out how much is being spent, and by which companies and sectors, using publicly available information. For example, the Senate record of spending shows that Boeing spent $15,440,000 on lobbying in the US in 2012. General Electric spent $21,200,000. These are very significant sums and they are spent by in-house lobbyists. As we know, this can have a marked effect on policy and the discussions around it. For example, an IMF working paper from 2009 draws a direct link between the amounts of money spent in lobbying by financial services firms and high-risk lending practices before the financial crisis. Ameriquest Mortgage and Countrywide Financial, both of which were at the heart of the crash, spent $20.5 million and $8.7 million respectively in political donations, campaign contributions and lobbying activities from 2002 to 2006. The IMF paper concludes that,

“the prevention of future crises might require weakening political influence of the financial industry or closer monitoring of lobbying activities to understand better the incentives”.

This is still pertinent here. As recently as 2 July, the head of the Prudential Regulation Authority was reported in the FT as saying that he was going to draw up rules to prevent the banks lobbying parliamentary officials against new requirements for leverage. Under the proposals in the Bill, we will not get any of the same transparency when it comes, for example, to lobbying by the big six energy companies. It has been reported that Ministers from the Department of Energy and Climate Change have met representatives from the energy giants on 128 occasions since 2010, yet have held talks with the main groups representing energy consumers only 26 times during the same period. We need much more information about what is going on here.

Amendment 65 would exclude the option of an individual residence being listed as the address of a lobbyist. Our concern is that this seems to represent a potential loophole, which we urge the Government to reconsider. The effect of the Bill, if passed in its current form, is that the level of transparency for the register is limited to the individual name and address of a main place of business or, if there is no such place, the individual’s residence. This is surely a loophole that would bar us from knowing who the individual works for. That concern fits into the wider point raised by our Amendment 67: that an increase in transparency should allow us to see who is lobbying on behalf of a company and which members of staff are engaged in that lobbying.

There are also a number of amendments in this group in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie. We should be very grateful for the way in which he has gone through the Bill with such forensic attention to detail. His amendments have similar intentions to ours and we support them. I beg to move.

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, my Amendment 115 is in this group. From my point of view, it is the core amendment in terms of shifting the emphasis of the Bill. As I have drafted it, the clause is designed to be integrated in the Bill, but essentially it seeks to advance an alternative to what the Government propose. If the Government insist on the current provisions of the Bill then, as today has increasingly shown, it will achieve little by way of making lobbying of Government transparent; if anything, we are establishing that it may serve to obscure rather than enlighten.

As we have heard, the focus of Part 1 as it stands is on those who lobby. As I argued at Second Reading, a more comprehensive approach, achieving transparency without the need for a clunky bureaucratic framework, is to focus on those who are lobbied. That would shift the emphasis far more to the actual activity. My amendment is designed to give effect to what I argued at Second Reading.

If one placed a statutory requirement on Ministers when making statements of the sort enumerated in Clause 3 to publish at the same time details of those who lobbied them on the matter, that would ensure that the public were aware of all those who had lobbied the department. I stress the department because the amendment encompasses civil servants, special advisers and PPSs. Any representations made to anyone in the department would be shown. It would not matter who the lobbyists were: full-time independent lobbyists, in-house lobbyists, part-time lobbyists or individuals making representations on that particular issue—all would be caught. We would thus have true, comprehensive transparency. That is the key point, and it is important that we establish the principle.

I know what the Government’s response will be because the Minister kindly replied to my amendment earlier, before I had spoken to it. It is clear what the Government’s position is: “We believe in transparency as long as it’s not too much trouble”. That is essentially what was advanced. Yet we have already heard today a fair amount of material that suggests that it is doable. My noble friend Lord Tyler has made a powerful case for a database and has explained how it could be done—it is manageable. My amendment would take us somewhat further than that in terms of the amount of information that would be produced, and perhaps the time when it was produced because it would be drawn together at a particular point, but, as my noble friend has demonstrated, putting that material together is not that difficult.

At Second Reading I made the case, and I will revert to it, about what Select Committees do. The Minister was saying, “When a Minister brings forward a Bill, good heavens, he might receive lots of representations. If he had to produce and publish those, my goodness, the workload would be horrendous. How could it be achievable?”. Well, what would happen if a Select Committee received lots of representation, perhaps in three figures, when it was conducting an inquiry, and then when it was doing its report actually had to list those who had made representations and then publish the evidence? Oh, my goodness—it already does. Select Committees manage that sort of exercise on very lean resources, so the Government should be able to undertake a similar exercise with the resources at their disposal. As my noble friend Lord Tyler has indicated, it is no longer a case of putting together lots of papers from different sources; much can be done electronically, such as recording meetings for the database and publishing Ministers’ diaries the day after the event, so we are already getting there. That is not the obstacle that the Minister was suggesting, so it is not really credible now to argue that it is not doable; it is.

The problem is not the practicality but the political will. If the political will were there to achieve it then it could be done, and it would achieve the Government’s stated aim in a way that Part 1 simply does not do. As it is drafted, it would not achieve a great deal at all; it would create a burden of bureaucracy that would not add much by way of transparency. If we believe in the transparency of lobbying—in other words, if we actually want to give effect to the first words of the Short Title—then this is the route to go. I look forward to the Minister’s second response.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords, I support wholeheartedly the amendment spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, although I have slight reservations as it is debatable whether PPSs should be included.

I shall speak to Amendments 68 and 69, which stand in my name in this group. Amendment 68 is to press Ministers on whether they feel the Bill adequately covers the possibility that lobbyists may, for whatever reason, seek to hide the name of the recipient of the payment. There is a reference in Schedule 1, Part 2 to the beneficiaries of payments, but I do not think it is absolutely clear what the intention is there. A person lobbying may be acting on behalf of another whose identity as a lobbyist is not to be revealed, but where the person whose name or company name is not to be revealed is the recipient of the financial consideration. There may be circumstances where a lobbyist has been subcontracted by another lobbyist to carry out work where the subcontractor has an expertise which the main contractor lacks, but where the main contractor does not wish to lose their client account due to a lack of expertise. There may be circumstances where a lobbyist subcontracts the work for a particular client to avoid revealing to another client that the main contractor lobbyist has other clients in the same commercial sector. There may be circumstances where a lobbyist hires a subcontractor for Client A to avoid revealing to his or her client that he is also representing Client B, whose interests are diametrically opposed. These are but a few scenarios that could include the avoidance of registrar penalties, potential disqualification as a registered person or even matters relating to liability to the Inland Revenue.

Amendment 69 brings us to the heart of the legislation. It dominated debate in the Commons. It would require the name of the person lobbied and the subject of the lobbying, which we have been dealing with extensively this evening. It follows broadly the case made by Graham Allen MP, chair of Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, in his Amendment 100 during Report stage in the Commons. His committee had recommended:

“The information that the registrar requires to be listed should be expanded to include the subject matter and purpose of the lobbying, when this is not already clear from a company’s name. To be clear, this should not involve the disclosure of detailed information about the content of the meeting—just a broad outline of the subject matter and the intended outcome”.

The Government’s response to that recommendation is just not credible. It talks of the availability of information, which I raised on an earlier amendment on ministerial diaries. We know that that system does not work because it is a congested system. The truth is that we have a huge gap in transparency and, sadly, the Government are doing very little to bridge it. The register is useless if all it does is list a few names that are already on the lists of the professional bodies. We need real hard information on who is lobbying, when they lobby, on what issue and on whose account.

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[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

I think that that is unlikely, but this is obviously something on which we should perhaps consult informally with the industry, to see whether there are any serious concerns. I am not aware that there are and, as I have said, the current voluntary register is in the same league but slightly more expensive.

Amendment 113, from the Opposition, would amend the reference to the setting of the subscription charge from one that requires the Minister to seek to recover the full costs to one that would require the Minister to ensure that the charge is set so as to recover the full costs of the registrar’s activities. I recognise that it is intended to emphasise the importance of ensuring that the charge recoups completely the cost of the register, but assure the Opposition that the Government are very well aware of the importance of ensuring that the register is fully funded by the industry.

We expect that the register will cost around £200,000 a year to run and that that cost will be borne not by the taxpayer but by the lobbying industry. The register that the Opposition have suggested would cost a great deal more—possibly nearer the £3 million that it costs to operate the Canadian register. Perhaps they would like to consider how they would ensure that those costs were recovered from the much larger number of individuals and organisations that they intend to capture.

The Opposition’s Amendment 114A would remove subsection (2) from Clause 24, thereby affecting the regulation-making powers under that part. The Joint Committee on Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform has recently published a very thorough and thoughtful report on the delegated powers included in the Bill. The Government are giving the committee’s recommendations careful consideration and will respond formally shortly.

I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Norton, that I responded to his Amendment 115 before he had spoken to it. Rather too many meetings over the past day left me less well organised than ideally I should have been. I took him down as saying that the Government believe in transparency but not too far. I would say that the Government believe in transparency, but want to be proportionate in our approach. I fear that some of the amendments that have been floated today have suggested that we move from a situation of extremely moderate transparency to one in which there will be a very burdensome set of regulations, which would go further than we need to at this time.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My noble friend is now talking about moderate transparency rather than transparency, so he is already limiting it. He is very keen on “proportionate”, I have noticed; it has come up a number of times today. I am just wondering how proportionate it is to introduce a register of perhaps 350 companies when we have not established how many of them already publish their client list. If most of those who are going to be registered already publish their client list, it is proportionate at the wrong end, because there is no point, really, in doing it. It is not good enough just to establish how many would be covered by the register; we need to know whether it would actually add anything to our knowledge of what those companies are doing and who their clients are. There may not be any point in doing it.

My point is that, if you are going to do it, do it properly; if you want transparency for lobbying and you are going to be comprehensive, there will be a cost to it. If you are going to do it properly and have a register, I am afraid that you have to go down the Canadian route. My argument is that you can avoid doing that by going down my route, whereby you get transparency of lobbying, not simply listing lobbyists.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Tyler (LD)]

My Lords, I want to reinforce the contributions that have been made on these two amendments, particularly the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Martin of Springburn, about the relationship between a constituency Member of Parliament and any representatives of any interests in that constituency. As I understand it—as I recall, this was reinforced in the other place on Report—there is nothing in the Bill that in any way impedes the opportunity and the responsibility of representing the people of one’s constituency in any way that may be appropriate. It is very important that we reiterate that principle now. I am very pleased to hear the noble Lord, Lord Martin, make that point again.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, I will be very interested to see whether anyone reports the words of the noble Lord, Lord Martin, about the Press Gallery.

I rise to support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, because he makes a very important point—I am surprised that it has not come up more in our discussions on the Bill—and that is this point about a kitemark for lobbying firms. Lobbying has always been a contentious activity. When I was writing about lobbying in the 1980s I made the point then that quite often the problem is not in the relationship between the lobbyist and the parliamentarian. Parliamentarians know perfectly well when they are being lobbied and essentially where it is coming from and can assess what is happening; if you like, they know the quality of the lobbying. The real problem, I argued, was between the client and the lobbyist, because clients would not necessarily know the quality of the firms they were employing to make representations. Lobbying firms are very good at making grand claims for their success rates.

Therefore, there is an issue of lobbying firms wanting to portray themselves in a certain way. My concern here is the one made by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours: you will get firms on the register using that to promote their interests to potential clients—putting on the notepaper something such as “Registered lobbyist, regulated by the Registrar of Lobbying Companies”, as a way of giving themselves the seal of approval. I fully endorse what the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, is trying to do in his amendment but I think that it raises that broader issue which he has touched on and which we need to be very much aware of. I am surprised that we have not considered that to a greater extent. It is just one of the problems if you go down this particular route of having a formal register, especially if there is no code attached to it.

[Lord Hardie]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, and support the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, for the same reasons. I also support the amendment proposed by my noble friend Lord Martin of Springburn but for a different reason from that given by the noble Lord, Lord Tyler. The example the noble Lord gave of meeting the employer in the company of someone who was both a lobbyist and a newspaper reporter highlights the need for a code of conduct. What is there to stop the lobbyist in that situation from sitting in on a meeting and then rushing away and phoning his newspaper to tell them he has a scoop—or whatever it is called nowadays—that the factory in Springburn has or has not been saved. More subtly, he could tell one of his fellow reporters. Therefore it is important that the distinction is maintained. Of course, if there was a code of conduct I would hope that that would be contrary to the code and the lobbyist could be deregistered, or whatever the appropriate word is.

Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Bill

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Tuesday 5th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Brougham and Vaux) (Con)]

I advise the Committee that if this amendment is agreed to I cannot call Amendment 2 due to pre-emption.

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to my amendments in this group which seek to achieve the same aim as Amendment 1 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie. I will keep my comments fairly brief as the noble and learned Lord has made the case that I would have made. However, I want to make a few points in support of the thrust of what these amendments seek to achieve. The Short Title of this Christmas tree Bill begins, “Transparency of Lobbying”. That is misleading because the Bill does not contribute to transparency of lobbying. The Bill may result in us knowing who engages in the activity of lobbying—in other words, lobbyists—but it contributes little to knowing what lobbying takes place on particular policies or measures. It could be argued that it is necessary to know who the lobbyists are in order to know what lobbying takes place, but it is certainly not sufficient, and I am not sure that it is even necessary.

The value of a register of lobbyists is far from clear. As I argued on Second Reading, I am not clear what the compelling argument is for introducing a register. The value of the register proposed in the Bill is especially unclear. It is not a register of lobbyists. It is not even a register of professional lobbyists; it is a register of some professional lobbyists. If one is to have a register of lobbyists and, as I say, I am not persuaded of the case for it, one should at least try to make it comprehensive. This entails broadening the class of lobbyists covered in the Bill as well as the class of those being lobbied. This group of amendments deals with the class of lobbyists. We will come shortly to the other aspect of the Bill and its limitations. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, powerfully made the case for the measure to be extended to encompass in-house lobbyists. As I argued at Second Reading, I see no case for distinguishing between those who are paid and are external to a company and those who are employed directly by a company.

It is no good saying that in-house lobbyists should be excluded as it is apparent on whose behalf they are lobbying. The fact that someone works for a company as a political lobbyist is not necessarily a matter of public record. They may have a title which masks their activity and may work in a public affairs division rather than a parliamentary affairs unit. If one is truly going to have a register of lobbyists for the purposes of transparency, one should aim, as I say, to be comprehensive and not go for an option that excludes more than nine out of every 10 lobbyists.

My amendments, like those of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, are designed to encompass in-house lobbyists. That is the purpose of the whole grouping. I am not particularly wedded to the wording because the aim at this stage is to get the Government to concede that the Bill as drafted will not make any significant difference to transparency in respect of lobbying government. Indeed, Part 1 conflicts with what the Government seek to achieve because it establishes a new regulatory regime at public expense and for no clear purpose. The taxpayer will not get value for money. If my noble friend the Minister argues that extending the definition to in-house lobbyists is too complex or not practically feasible that, I fear, is not so much an argument for rejecting the amendments as it is for dropping this part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

That is, again, a fair point, which the Government will look at. We are extending regulation into lobbying here and are reluctant to go too far too quickly. There may be a means of considering further extension on review. The noble Lord will know that we now have a regular practice of having a five-year review of legislation. If whichever Government are then in power decide that this is inadequate, we will see what can be done.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

I come back to my noble friend’s point about who would be included in the register. He gave the figure of 350. Does he know how many of those would be caught who do not already reveal who their clients are?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, that stretches my expertise very considerably. I will have to consult and write to the noble Lord about that. It is a good academic question. The Government have been quite clear that there is no exemption from the requirement to register for large multidisciplinary firms that conduct consultant lobbying. We refined the exception provided in paragraph 1 by amendment in Committee in the other place to clarify that it will not be enjoyed by organisations such as, for example, law firms if they run consultant lobbying operations and lobby in a manner which is not incidental to their other activity—even if consultant lobbying is not their primary activity. As such, they will be required to register if they meet the other criteria outlined in the definition of consultant lobbying. The provisions outlined in paragraph 1 provide an important and effective exemption for those whose limited involvement in lobbying is in a manner which is merely incidental to their normal professional activity. However, it brings within its scope those that provide consultant lobbying as a major part of their activities and firms for which consultant lobbying is a significant part of their activity.

Opposition Amendment 39 provides a long list of exemptions from the Opposition’s definition of professional lobbying. Exemptions are provided for constituents contacting their Member of Parliament, persons making communications on their own behalf, persons responding to government consultations or an invitation to submit evidence to a parliamentary committee, persons acting on behalf of government, persons not receiving remuneration, and those responding to a court order. That is a very large and unwieldy list of exceptions partly because once one extends this to professional lobbying, the question of definition itself becomes much more difficult. That is, again, partly why we have stuck to consultant lobbying in our approach.

Finally, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, asked about sovereign powers and the Government of Taiwan. It is very helpful that he has raised Taiwan but it would probably be better, to be absolutely sure that I am correct, that I offer to write to him on that specific point. I would like to reassure him as far as I can.

I hope that I have managed to answer most of the points in these amendments. I have outlined why it is not necessary to extend the register to those who lobby on their own or their employer’s behalf, because it is clear whose interests are being represented. Our proposals will deliver a focused, problem-specific register and, as such, we believe that these amendments are not necessary. I urge the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, that is a very fair intervention. That is one of the reasons why we hesitate to include people whose main responsibilities within the charity or company for which they work is to contact government. The public affairs departments of major companies are the ones dealing with government, trying to interface between the company and the political process, and it would be the public affairs departments of many companies with which one would therefore logically deal. I know many people who have gone to work in the public affairs departments of companies—I am sure we all do. It is very often where people who have been involved in politics go afterwards to earn what they failed to earn in politics.

The noble and learned Lord is absolutely correct to say that in the exact definition of a professional lobbyist we are talking about people who are employed by a company, campaigning group or charity and pursue its interests in its relations with government. A consultant lobbyist is someone who lobbies on behalf of someone else apart from their own company. Theoretically, I suppose it is possible to imagine a consultant lobbyist all of whose income comes from one external client but the majority of consultant lobbying firms provide assistance, advice and lobbying for a large number of clients. That is the industry with which we are all familiar and with which those of us in government often interact. That is the distinction we make.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, before the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, responds, my noble friend has really not addressed the distinction between those who do the activity and the activity itself. The Government are supposed to be trying to provide transparency about the activity, not simply listing those who may engage in it—in this case, only some who engage in it.

The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, referred to what I said at Second Reading about what is in effect an alternative to this rather clunky mechanism being proposed by the Government. What I was proposing gets fairly comprehensively at the activity of who is lobbying on each measure that the Government bring forward. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, may wish to note that my Amendment 115 is intended to get at that. It is an alternative to what the Government are proposing and it would actually deal with that particular problem. My noble friend may wish to bear that in mind in responding to the amendments because I am not sure he has established that there is a need for this part of the Bill, certainly not compared with the alternative that I am putting forward, which actually gets at the nub of ensuring transparency of lobbying.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

If I might add to that, particularly if there are only 350 registrations.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Tyler]

I referred specifically to the non-ministerial government departments, on which the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, made a very valid point, because they are not within the hierarchy of departments responsible to the Permanent Secretary, in the same way as other civil servants. So I do not accept that. The addition to which he specifically referred would have considerable merit. I would look at that very carefully, and I hope that my noble friend the Minister will, as well.

Unlike others, I accept that we are making a limited addition to the transparency of the whole process with the register. Far more important is to make sure that the meetings that take place with whoever is lobbying are as transparent, timely and accessible as we can make them. What surely should not be limited should be the encounter with such critical political decision-makers and their advisers as the special advisers attached to senior Ministers. Therefore, I hope that my amendment will find favour with the House and with my noble friend the Minister.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, I have amendments in the grouping as well. My amendments have similar aims to those of the noble Lords, Lord Hardie and Lord Rooker, and of the noble Baronesses, Lady Royall and Lady Hayter. I was very attracted by the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, because of the breadth of what it covers. However, I also noticed an omission; it does not encompass senior members of the Civil Service but confines itself to Permanent Secretaries. I think that there is a problem there.

When this Bill was considered in the other place, the point was well made that it appears to have been written by people who do not understand lobbying—clearly people who have not read the book by the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. If it helps, I have a copy of his book on my shelf.

There are a number of problems but, as has been identified, Clause 2(3) is particularly problematic as it is so narrow. If you are going to lobby, the target is normally the Minister, and you therefore have to focus on the channels for reaching the Minister. The Permanent Secretary is not a significant channel for this purpose. Other officials will deal with that particular policy area—or a special adviser or the parliamentary private secretary. In saying that, I have nothing against special advisers; they play an extraordinarily valuable role from which Ministers and civil servants benefit. Parliamentary private secretaries also play a valuable role, so both should be included in the measure.

I know the objection as regards PPSs will be that they are private members, but increasingly they have been drawn within government. They are now mentioned in the Ministerial Code and are subject to certain requirements under it. Therefore, they are particularly good channels for reaching Ministers. We should encompass within the Bill’s remit all those who are being lobbied for the purposes of affecting public policy. The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, does a valuable job in that regard, but one could add to it. I suspect that between now and Report we could come up with an amendment that brings together the various points that have been made and ensures that if we are to go down this route—and I am not persuaded that we should—those who are lobbied with a view to affecting public policy will be included in the Bill.

As it stands, Clause 2 is too narrow and, as I say, Permanent Secretaries should not feature significantly in it. I commend the various amendments that seek to widen the provision, so that if the Government go down this route at least they will do so effectively.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

My Lords, I support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, provided that “government” is defined not as it is in the Bill but as it is in the amendments standing in the names of the baronial opposition Front Bench, by which I mean Amendments 33 and 43.

I approach all this with a certain bemused detachment. I have to intervene because the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, appeared to imply that Permanent Secretaries are not important, although I am sure that he did not mean to do so. I say “bemused detachment” because none of this would ever have applied to me—not the Bill as it stands or with any of the amendments, even the wide-reaching, admirable amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rooker. I was never a civil servant. I was a Permanent Under-Secretary but I was never a civil servant. The Diplomatic Service is a separate service. I apologise for making a rather pedantic—indeed, possibly, pompous—point, but there is something wrong in the drafting. I was a public servant but not a civil servant.

When I was a Permanent Secretary I never met a consultant lobbyist, thus proving the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Norton. They do not come to see Permanent Secretaries. If you are Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Office, the people who come to see you are CEOs or chairmen of companies that are in trouble and want the help of an embassy or high commission somewhere around the world. They do not send government affairs people, so widening the definition would not bring in Permanent Secretaries—they come themselves. They certainly do not send a professional consultant lobbyist to see the Permanent Secretary or, I think, the Minister. I think they do to see special advisers, so I think that is a very important addition which has to be brought in. They tend to see the relevant desk or the Under-Secretary. They do not come near the Permanent Secretary.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

Perhaps we need to discuss between Committee and Report which definition of senior civil servants Ministers and various Members of the House wish to adopt. I was adopting my own understanding of the senior Civil Service, which is the 5,000 I mentioned.

I will be interested to hear from the Opposition whether they also need to be included in this. Again, that is something that perhaps the Opposition Front Bench and the Government should usefully discuss between Committee and Report. I come back to say that the best can be the enemy of the good in requiring too many people to be brought within the context of this Bill. I take the very powerful speech from the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, about non-ministerial departments to mind. I also take some of his other points about particular senior civil servants. We will consider all these points and, in that light, I trust that the noble Lord will be willing to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, I do not understand my noble friend’s point about numbers. It is irrelevant in the sense that it is the consultants who are doing the lobbying to those people. It does not matter how many they are. It is merely the fact that they are engaging with some of them that requires them to register.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

The register is of lobbyists. If we wish to include in the register every single Member of Parliament and others with whom they interact, we would get into a very complicated business. The question is who you wish to define as a consultant lobbying—as Amendment 3 says—to government.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, Amendments 54 and 74 are in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Royall. We support an independent registrar, which means independent of the industry as well as working independently of the Government. However, the matters over which the registrar must judge, the standards that he or she sets and the objectives set for the office have an importance to Parliament and to our standards and expectations. We believe that that requires an organic link to Parliament, not just to the Government of the day.

We think it appropriate that that link is to the elected House, which by its nature is responsive to the outside electorate and their concerns and interests. We recommend that the Minister, in making the appointment, should consult the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee of the other place and that, in similar mode, the registrar should report back to that committee on an annual basis.

We recognise the strength of the other amendments in this group, and we trust that the Minister will similarly do so and agree to take these away and bring back his own amendments on Report. I beg to move.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, the principle in Amendment 74 of the registrar reporting is important. In my view, though, rather than reporting to a particular committee, it would be more appropriate to oblige the registrar to produce an annual report to Parliament itself. If it were going to be confined, I would not just confine it to the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee of the other place; I hear what the noble Baroness says, but there would also be a case for the Constitution Committee of you Lordships’ House being included as well. My preference would be for a report to Parliament, but I wholly support the principle that there ought to be a report. As the noble Baroness said, bringing the registrar within the scope of Parliament is entirely appropriate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Martin of Springburn]

I could live with that.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

I add my support to my noble friend’s amendment, but it does not go far enough. Partly for the reason he just mentioned, I would be more ambitious, along the lines indicated by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. There is no reason why you cannot have a rolling publication after the event excluding, following the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Martin, the venue because that is not really germane. It is the substance of the discussion that matters. I would be more ambitious than my noble friend Lord Tyler.

As the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours said, the amendment links to what I am arguing. It moves us in the right direction, so I am fully in support; it is just that I want to go further because this is a database of meetings between Ministers and external organisations and we need to extend it in terms of who is being seen. Just confining it to Ministers creates problems, so we need a larger database, or we certainly need to be able to identify those who are being lobbied.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, I am fascinated to hear this great outbreak of revolution in transparency. We thought that we were set out on a constructive step forward on transparency. I am not sure that I want all Ministers’ and civil servants’ diaries published the day after they meet anyone, which I think is what the noble Lord, Lord Norton, was beginning to suggest.

I will try to answer the various probing amendments. A number of them, starting with Amendment 54, are about stiffening the independence of the registrar. Amendment 54 would require the Minister to consult with the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee before appointing the registrar. I am not aware whether that has yet been requested by the committee itself, but it is an interesting proposal.

The amendments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, would prevent any person who had been a civil servant or a political adviser in the previous five years being appointed registrar. This is also thoughtful, and designed to provide assurance regarding the independence of the registrar which, of course, the Government are entirely committed to establishing and maintaining. Under the Bill, the registrar will be appointed according to the public appointment principles of open and fair competition and the Minister will be able to dismiss the registrar only where they are satisfied that there are reasonable grounds that he is unable, unwilling or unfit to perform the functions of his office. If thought unreasonable, any such decision by a Minister could be challenged in the usual way, by judicial review. The registrar will be independent of the lobbying industry and the Government, and will have a clear remit to operate independently of the lobbying industry and the Government.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, seeks to extend the positions that will not be eligible for appointment as registrar to capture those officials who would be required to submit information to him or her under his new clause. The Government are not persuaded of the case for the noble and learned Lord’s additions, and would therefore resist this amendment.

The Government recognise the importance of ensuring that the registrar is independent. We are confident that our proposals secure that, but are grateful for these suggestions and will of course consider whether they should be pursued further.

Amendment 63 has attracted a considerable amount of support. It would require that, in addition to the statutory register of consultant lobbyists, the registrar would be required to keep and publish a central database of ministerial meetings with external organisations.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

The words “relevant select committee” could be used.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

On that point, legislation does write in the name of committees or the equivalent, so it is quite possible to do that.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

Not only does the noble Lord, Lord Norton, supply me with his wonderful Hull students to help me with my work, but he comes up with answers to my questions, for which I thank him.

What seems like a small amendment about writing the committee in is an important signal. I am sorry that we keep hearing the words “not persuaded” from that side. Having had the earlier discussion about Part 2 of the Bill, we very much hope that the Government will be persuaded by what they hear. I had hoped that some of that might have bled into Part 1 of the Bill and that the Government might have been persuaded by some of the things we said. However, we will leave it here, although we may want to come back to some of it at a later stage. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

House of Lords: Membership

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Thursday 24th October 2013 Grand Committee

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I, too, congratulate my noble friend Lord Higgins on raising this important and timely question. For reasons of time, I turn to the memorandum by the Clerk of the Parliament, which provides some innovative suggestions, some more innovative than others. I commend the suggested amendment of Standing Order 22 as a helpful way of addressing the problem of those who do not attend. I will focus on a proposal designed to address the problem of those who do and place a strain on resources.

As we have heard, the Leader’s Group, chaired by my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, raised the prospect of some Members being offered a modest payment upon retirement. The Clerk’s memorandum examines ways in which such a payment may be made, following the comments of the Leader’s Group, as we have heard, in a way that is compatible with a saving to the taxpayer. The memorandum is thorough in identifying how this may be achieved.



Since the memorandum was first published, the Leader of the House has stated that the Government, and other parties, do not support the idea. Speaking earlier this year, he said:

“I should make clear, as I have done before, that the Government do not support making taxpayers’ money available to Members of the House to encourage them to retire. That would be wrong, and it would be seen to be wrong. I am glad to hear that my view on this is shared by all groups and all parties.”.—[Official Report, 28/2/13; col. 81.]

I have two questions for the Minister based on this statement. First, if it is wrong for taxpayers’ money to encourage Members of this House to retire, why is it not considered wrong to use taxpayers’ money to encourage Members of the other House to retire? It used to be the case that some MPs sat well beyond retirement age because they could not afford to retire. The Government introduced financial packages that, for all intents and purposes, were designed to enable MPs to retire gracefully. Not only is there now a pension, but for the past 22 years there has also been a resettlement grant. Why is this use of public money deemed right, but something similar for this House is wrong?

Secondly, why do the Government find it wrong to use taxpayers’ money to facilitate Members leaving the House, but have no difficulty using taxpayers’ money to enable new Peers to be created? I have seen estimates of how much it will cost the public purse if the latest tranche of new Peers prove reasonably assiduous in attendance. The scheme embodied in the memorandum of the Clerk of the Parliaments is designed to save money in the long term, and help to reduce the size of the House, whereas the current practice of the Government in creating new Peers achieves precisely the opposite. I look forward to the Minister justifying this state of affairs.

The Government appear to have no qualms about creating more Peers, adding to the burden on the public purse, while making no real effort to address the problem of the size of the House. I see no principled reason for the stance taken by the Leader of the House. The Clerk’s suggested scheme is a valuable contribution to the debate, and if it is not to be pursued, we need a much more considered response from Ministers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, retirement is essential to this because unless we are going to have a House that grows older gracefully and has very little renewal, we have to have a scheme that encourages retirement. The House has been getting older. After 17 years I have just passed the average age of the House. We need good new Members because we do not entirely want to be a House that represents the wisdom of 25 years ago, and therefore we need to address the question of retirement. I have had one or two conversations with older Peers who have suggested that a more dignified retirement arrangement, in which the House recognises the service of those Members who are retiring, would be of very considerable assistance to them. I am willing to take that back and, indeed, I have already discussed it with the Leader of the House. I think that it is something which we should all attempt to progress as best we can.

On a financial leaving package, let me simply say to the noble Lord, Lord Norton, that we receive allowances in this House; we are not paid. Most of us, the noble Lord, Lord Norton, and me included, have pensions. I think that I can guess what the size of his academic pension will be when he retires. I had a discussion with an older Labour Peer who said that I did not understand how working-class people like him would survive without their allowances. I reminded him sharply that I knew roughly what his academic pension was, and that if he could not survive on a professorial pension there was a real problem.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My point had nothing to do with pensions because there is no salary, so it was not premised on that—that was the analogy that I was drawing with House of Commons. The resettlement grant has absolutely nothing to do with pensions.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, let me simply say, because time is short, that service in this House is a privilege which we should not expect to have to be bought out of. That is the view which I and a number of others hold. The Government remain unconvinced that we should attempt to buy older Peers out. I recognise that there is a substantial problem which older Peers think about in terms of party balance. I think that it is also the recognition issue that we are concerned about and very much want to continue.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, asked whether the Government would respond to the PCRC’s proposals for all-party talks. We will certainly respond to that report.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

Before my noble friend leaves his previous point, is he saying that service in the House of Commons is not a privilege?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, Members of the House of Commons earn their keep and are much more often in the prime of life. Most of us who come here have earned our salaries elsewhere and have pensions from elsewhere. That is part of the distinction that I am making.

Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Bill

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd October 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I start with two general observations about the Bill. The first concerns process and the second concerns construction.

The Bill is the product of the “something must be done” response to a particular problem. There is a problem, not least in terms of public perception of illicit or unethical lobbying of policy-makers, but that problem requires a considered response, one that both addresses the problem and is seen to do so. This Bill, as I shall argue, fails on both grounds. My principal point here, following other noble Lords, is that the measure has been rushed. I share the concerns expressed by the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House in its report on the Bill. As it noted, the Government had announced that there would be a White Paper and a draft Bill. There has been neither. As has been said, this places a particular responsibility on your Lordships’ House in scrutinising the measure.

In terms of construction, this is a Christmas tree Bill. The previous Labour Government brought in Bills that were essentially two Bills in one and sometimes three Bills in one. This Government have continued the practice. The title of the Bill is something of a giveaway. The relationship between the three parts is tenuous, to say the least. This practice places particular strains on the other place in terms of detailed examination in Committee. This House can adapt its examination to the discrete parts of the Bill somewhat more effectively, but it is none the less a practice to be deprecated.

I turn to the substance of the Bill. Like my noble friend Lord Lang, I shall focus on Part 1. Much that I say will reinforce the points that he made. As the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, said, there is general acceptance that there should be more transparency in lobbying. This Bill, though, is too narrowly drawn to correct the mischief that has motivated its introduction. The Bill is concerned to identify those who engage in lobbying on a commercial basis, and do so as free-standing entities. I am not sure what that adds to our knowledge. The more one reads the exclusions in the Bill, the more one recognises the limitations of the exercise. It excludes small-scale commercial lobbyists, those for whom lobbying is not the principal purpose of their business and in-house lobbyists. Some companies have sizable lobbying teams. One suspects that their activities may at times be as much a concern to the public as are the activities of dedicated lobbying firms. Will the Minister tell us why the Government differentiate between lobbying of Ministers on, say, the duty on cigarettes by in-house lobbyists of tobacco companies and lobbying by commercial lobbyists bought in by tobacco companies for the purpose of lobbying Ministers? From the perspective of the exercise of lobbying, and how it is perceived by the public, what is the salient distinction?

That brings me to another crucial limitation of the Bill. The focus is one of status and, as I have explained, a rather narrow one. It is not directed at the actual activity, other than indirectly. It seeks to influence behaviour through making public who engages in commercial lobbying. There is no statutory code of conduct and no stipulation of principles that should govern the behaviour. In so far as the Bill influences behaviour, it may be to encourage lobbyists to avoid making representations in a way that brings them within the scope of the Bill but, as most are not presently caught within the ambit of the Bill, it will not make that much difference anyway. All that the Bill does is to introduce a new layer of regulation for no obvious public benefit. It tells us, at some cost, what is largely already known.

The Bill, in short, is fundamentally flawed. The point has been well made in the other place by Members on both sides that it is based on a lack of understanding of how lobbying actually works. It was expressed especially well by a former student of mine, Tracey Crouch, who spent several years as a lobbyist. As she pointed out, the lobbying industry today provides a very different service and is a very different industry from what it was 10 or 15 years ago. Consultant lobbyists are more likely to advise clients on how to undertake lobbying of government rather than undertake it themselves, and if they do undertake it, they are not likely to be lobbying Permanent Secretaries. The Government appear not to understand the industry as it now is, most of which will not be caught by the provisions of the Bill.

The Bill is neither one thing nor the other. Either it should go the whole way and introduce a comprehensive register of lobbyists or it should be abandoned and the Government should instead address the problem from a very different, and I believe more effective, perspective. The case for a comprehensive register has been made by others. I am not persuaded of the need for a register, comprehensive or otherwise; it may prove counterproductive with lobbyists using registration as a seal of approval. More importantly, I do not believe that it would assuage public concerns about the lobbying of government.

The other approach, which I commend to the House, is to shift the emphasis entirely and build on existing practice. In opening the debate, my noble friend Lord Younger made the point that there is now more transparency about policy-making meetings, with a quarterly publication on those meetings. My noble friend Lord Lang also referred to that. Why not build on that? When Select Committees produce reports, they publish the names of those who have given evidence, that is, who made representations to them. It is normal practice to publish the material submitted to them. Why not require Ministers, when making policy announcements or publishing Bills or draft Bills, to list the names of all those who have made representations to the department on the issue? Listing all those who have lobbied on the subject would be transparent and comprehensive. It would not matter whether it was an in-house lobbyist, a paid or unpaid lobbyist, or simply individuals writing in. It avoids the need to define lobbying, and we would know who had made representations.

There may be a case, building on existing practice, for publishing the notes of meetings and written representations, similar to the evidence volumes published by Select Committees. If this was routine practice, drawing material together on a particular measure, it would properly address the problem. There may also be a case for extending it to non-decision-making: that is, when a Minister decides not to pursue a particular policy under consideration. I appreciate that there may be, indeed no doubt are, flaws in this alternative proposal, but I have yet to find any that render it a less desirable approach than that embodied in the Bill. Perhaps the Minister can explain why my proposal is not to be preferred over that advanced by the Government. If he cannot, the Government may wish to reflect on the wisdom of continuing with a flawed Bill.

Elections: Voting Age

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Wednesday 27th February 2013 Grand Committee

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Tyler on raising this issue. It is one that we have variously discussed before, as he mentioned, although I am not sure that there has been that much said recently, here or in the other place, that has added much to our knowledge on the subject. On my noble friend’s point about a single election for which the election age was specifically lowered, I note that there is a precedent; it has happened before, in 1918.

Debate on the issue appears to stem from a false premise. Voting is a consequence of political interest, not a cause of it. Lowering the voting age is not likely to have a positive impact on turnout any more than it did when it was lowered to 18 in 1969. It did not promote participation in democracy, but rather served to demonstrate what we already knew: young people are among the groups least likely to vote. That is borne out by the data for recent general elections. One does not change that by further lowering the voting age.

Focusing on the voting age may be seen as a form of displacement activity, recommending change to process rather than addressing the real causes of distrust in the political system. The claim made in another place by one MP in an EDM that,

“lowering the voting age could play a huge role in helping young people feel more connected with political processes”,

is to misunderstand the root of the problem and is arguably a dangerous misunderstanding.

Our time today would be better spent getting to grips with the really important question of why young people are not willing to engage with the political process. As the Youth Citizenship Commission observed,

“while enfranchisement of 16 and 17 year olds is a valid issue for consideration, it is not the key component of any strategy for better engagement of young people”.

It is variously pointed out that more young people will vote for participants in television programmes such as “X Factor” and “Britain’s Got Talent” than vote for parties in a general election. However, that observation rather misses the key point, which is that nowadays political activity has to contend with a plethora of competing interests in a way that it did not have to 40 or 50 years ago. Political parties used to hold a more prominent role in social activity than they do today. Young people are now able to indulge their passions, which can be instant and transient, through social media. Political parties are not able to respond effectively. They cannot offer instant gratification. Neither, I fear, can elections. We need to be addressing this mismatch. There is no easy answer, which is all the more reason for addressing the problem. What we are discussing this afternoon does not get to grips with the real issue.

As to the voting age, what are the arguments for change? Those who favour lowering the voting age advance the argument that at 16 you can join the Army, marry and pay taxes. You cannot simply join the Army at 16. You can apply to join the Army, which is not the same thing at all. Having applied, you have to be selected. What this recognises is that only certain people in this category have the requisite ability. Even if you are selected, you are not sent to the front line. You can marry but only with parental consent. Very few 16 year-olds pay income tax.

As the previous Government’s Children and Young People’s Unit said in its Young People and Politics: A Report on the YVote/YNot? Project in 2002:

“As far as lowering the voting age is concerned, it is clearly necessary to decide at what minimum age most people are sufficiently politically aware, mature, and independent to make up their minds and choose between the various candidates standing for election. On balance, Government takes the view that there is more likely to be a higher percentage of people aged 18 who are able to do this than at 16”.

We live in a society where the road to becoming an adult is staggered. We grant rights to young people at different ages on their journey to adulthood. There has to be some age at which we grant the right to vote. No magical property attaches to it being at 18, but neither does it to being at 16. Most nations opt for 18. A number do not, and just because most nations follow one practice, it does not mean that we have to follow. However, given the lack of a compelling case for change, and with no clear public support for it, I am not persuaded by the case that my noble friend proposes. It would be more fruitful to address the much more difficult issues that confront us.