Mental Health Bill [HL]

Lord Meston Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 27th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I shall also speak briefly to the other amendments in this group. I warn those who are planning to speak after me that I will be brief, because this amendment is self-evident and set out in our papers. I begin by reflecting on the fact that I think there is universal welcome for the creation of the nominated person situation. This is a good step forward and widely welcomed. What your Lordships’ Committee is trying to do is perhaps to fulfil its traditional role to make sure that it is set up in as watertight, practical, useful and effective way as possible.

This amendment did not originate with me; it originated with the Law Society. It provides for a mental health First-tier Tribunal to overrule the power of the nominated person. I note that the next amendment in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, suggests not the county court but the Court of Protection. I do not have any particular position on any of these things. It is useful for us in Committee to discuss this in detail. People far more expert than me will outline that, so I shall not go on at length.

I will note for the Committee’s understanding that my Amendment 71 was withdrawn, because it was doubled up with someone else’s but was put in a different place. It was just one of those technical juggles that happens. With that very brief introduction, I beg to move.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 69, which would replace the reference in the Bill to the county court with reference to use of the Court of Protection to deal with applications to terminate appointments of nominated persons. The single reference to the county court, currently in Schedule 2, is the only place where the county court is given jurisdiction to do anything in this legislation, which I suggest makes it something of an anomaly as well as an anachronism.

The reference to the county court simply carries forward the use of the county court from the 1959 and 1983 Acts, which provided for that court to deal with applications to displace nearest relatives. When I was first appointed a judge, I well remember being presented with an urgent application to displace the nearest relative, of which I then had no experience and in which I had never had any training. In the days before judicial computers, I had no access to anything but out-of-date and very limited books in the small court, no longer in existence, where I was then sitting for a few weeks and without help from any legal representatives. Few learning curves have been more rapid.

Since then, I would like to think I developed some expertise, but my later experience of those applications has led me to question whether the modern equivalent in this Bill concerning nominated persons would be better dealt with elsewhere. Such applications can involve detailed understanding of psychiatric reports and of the family dynamics for the patient concerned, particularly if the nominated person is unco-operative or disengaged. At the time when the earlier legislation stipulated the use of the county court, there was neither a separate family court nor the Court of Protection, which was created by the Mental Capacity Act 2005.

Of course, I do not suggest that county court judges could not deal with these applications—my life with my present and former judicial colleagues would probably not be worth living if I did so. A judge has to be prepared to turn his or her hand to whatever comes their way. However, I do suggest that the Court of Protection is now better equipped to deal with these applications with its specialist expertise and specifically nominated judiciary.

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In conclusion, this ambiguity, which is really unhelpful, will put approved mental health professionals in a difficult situation, particularly when appointing a nominated person for a care-experienced child or young person. There is just more work to do in this area.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, I support the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge. Indeed, we should be grateful to her for exposing the complexity and variety of situations which may arise and of which mental health professionals must be made aware, so that the decisions they have to make are properly informed by knowledge of the operative orders and the terms of any orders made by the family court. That seems absolutely fundamental. It reinforces the point I wanted to make at the end of the last group before I was very properly curtailed. It applies not only to the county courts if they are to retain some jurisdiction in this area but to the family court. Some serious thought must now be given to judicial training.

Has the Minister considered an approach to the Judicial College with a view to ensuring that both county court and indeed family court judges will be properly trained with regard to the obligations that will arise under this new legislation?

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, for the reasons that have been given I also support the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge. Just to add to what the noble Lord, Lord Meston, said, I respectfully point out to the Minister that if she does get in touch with the Judicial College, which I think would be a very sensible move, she should also let the President of the Family Division know.

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[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

I think I need to clarify a point of law—I am looking to the noble Lord, Lord Meston. In care proceedings, is parental responsibility removed? I do not believe it is; it remains with the parents. That is very important.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

It certainly is not removed.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

It is shared.

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[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have spoken a lot about the dangers of medicalising ordinary life and giving it a mental health label. The contribution I made in the previous Committee day on ADHD managed to get picked up by newspapers and generally cited as, “Cruel Baroness hates everybody that says they have ADHD”, so I have become even more infamous.

I welcome the call by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, for a review, because the more information and data we have about what is available in the community, the better. My only word of caution is that we should also recognise that, although we need more data, sometimes that data can be used as part of an advocacy for more resources and that data can be unreliable. My only caveat is that whatever the review does, it should not just take superficial headlines or self-diagnosis and self-ID as the truth, and that we should have some scepticism in that regard. We are going to have to understand the implications of this Bill when it is enacted for community care and provision. Therefore, I would welcome any attempt at getting to grips with the reality of that.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, I briefly want to support Amendment 151 in the context of the delays experienced by CAMHS—delays in obtaining appointments and assessments, and in getting treatment. When I last had to look at this, only recently, those delays were still very serious. They are distressing for the children concerned and for their parents. They are also frustrating for local authorities, social workers and the courts, which need to make informed decisions but are unable to do so because they are still waiting to understand what CAMHS have to say about a particular child’s problems.

Mental Health Bill [HL]

Lord Meston Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 22nd January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 55 I will speak to Amendment 136; both are in my name. This is another very important group, about children and young people’s competence and decision-making. Amendment 55 is about extending advanced decisions to those who are aged 16 and over. I recognise that there is also an important amendment from the noble Earl, Lord Howe, about advanced decisions—a similar issue, but perhaps taking a different approach.

The Bill will give legal weight to advance decisions within the Mental Health Act, which I very much welcome. Adults will be able to record their advance refusal of a particular treatment if they lose capacity. An advance decision will have the same effect as a refusal of treatment made with capacity and will ensure that the individual can access enhanced safeguards before the treatment can be given. Although advance choice documents, where advance decisions will be recorded, will be available to adults of all ages, the Bill as drafted does not permit under-18s to make advance decisions. As such, someone aged under 18 could say in an advance choice document that they refuse a particular treatment if they would not want it, but that would have limited weight. Specifically, it would mean that, if the child or young person lacked capacity or competence to consent to treatment when it was offered, their advance refusal would not give them access to the enhanced treatment safeguards that are available to adults, including tribunal appeal.

This means that, rather than being on an equal footing, children and young people would be disadvantaged compared with adults. Therefore, I see this very much as part of parity of treatment between children and adults. I am strongly of the view that the safeguards that flow from advance refusals of treatment should also be made available to young people. This is what my Amendment 55 is designed to do.

I add one more general point. We still have work to do in Committee to strengthen safeguards and protections for children and young people in mental health in-patient care. There should be a general principle of parity of treatment between children and young people and adults. Of course I recognise that some distinctions have to be made due to the legal status of under-18s, but I said at Second Reading, and it remains my view, that this Bill was never really designed with children and young people in mind, yet it can affect them greatly. In responding, can the Minister set out how much input DfE Ministers and officials have had on the drafting of the Bill?

It will probably help if I explain that Amendment 136 is closely related to Amendment 147, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, whom I have had the opportunity of corresponding with. I do not want, in speaking first, to pre-empt what the noble Lord will say, but I need to reference his amendment to explain mine. I share the concern that the Bill does not include a test to determine the ability of children under the age of 16 to make decisions—in other words, whether they are competent. Without such a test, this age group will not be able to benefit fully from the rights and safeguards included in the Bill; the question is how we best get there.

Under-16s are currently at a disadvantage. Whereas all those aged 16 and over are presumed to have capacity to make decisions for themselves unless evidence shows otherwise—in which case the Mental Capacity Act kicks in—under-16s are presumed to be unable to make decisions for themselves unless they demonstrate that they are competent to do so. There is also no clear and consistent approach for determining whether a child is competent. Although the concept of competence is generally understood, how to assess a child’s competence is not.

That is why I have a lot of sympathy with the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, which would insert a test for determining the ability of someone aged under 16 to make decisions under this legislation. His amendment explicitly limits this test to decisions made under the mental health legislation and is explicitly focused on the criteria with which to determine whether a child is competent. No doubt he will explain his amendment far more eloquently than I could ever do. My amendment would require the Secretary of State to review whether a statutory test for under-16s would be expedient for the purpose of this Act and for mental health legislation more generally. It is very much a stepping stone towards that position and, I hope, supports change in this area.

Such a review is important because it could address some of the concerns that have been expressed in this area. It could include whether such a test should be in the Bill or in a code, how best to make it clear that a test will be specific to the scope of legislation rather than having wider application, and how such a test would help with the successful implementation of the Bill. It could help to establish that the test is specific to whether a particular child can make a particular decision at a particular time, and set out what information is required.

I am aware that, in some of our broader discussions, concerns have been raised about the possible unintended consequences of such a test in relation both to parental responsibility and to a child being seen as Gillick competent—that is, they have the ability to understand the decision. I feel that a review would be helpful in looking at these issues and addressing those concerns head-on. In that way, we would make important steps in ensuring that the whole of the mental health reforms work properly and fairly for all children and young people. I beg to move.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness has just said, my Amendment 147, which deals with competence and decision-making, would provide what I suggest is a necessary statutory test to determine the decision-making competence of children under 16 years of age in all matters under this legislation for which such a determination is required. The Joint Committee on the draft Bill pointed out, echoing what was said in the independent review of the 1983 Act, that attempts both to protect and to empower children have produced a complex mixture of statute and case law with no single method of assessment and no consistent criteria to establish either capacity or competence. This is a particular disadvantage for children and young people, who do not have the benefit of any statutory presumption of competence such as that which applies to adults.

Importantly, the amendment, although offering a test, does not create any presumption of capacity in a child. Moreover, the reason for the child’s inability to decide is irrelevant. It would, however, require that those determining whether a child is competent must give reasonable grounds for reaching that conclusion. It is important to emphasise that this amendment is concerned only with how to assess whether a child is competent and not with the consequences of any determination that a child is competent.

This Bill has been produced with numerous references to capacity and/or competence in various contexts, including consent to CETR meetings, “disclosure of information”, “consent to treatment”, making advance choice decisions,

“terminating the appointment of a nominated person”

and involving “mental health advocates”. However, the Bill is currently silent on what is meant by “competence” and how it should be determined.

The existing statutory test in the Mental Capacity Act does not apply to those under 16. The separate concept of Gillick competence—it is derived from the pivotal case of that name, decided in 1986—requires inherently subjective assessments of the child’s understanding and maturity. I speak with some experience of having to decide whether or not a child is competent to participate independently in court proceedings concerning them. That exercise sometimes feels rather paternalistic and is, as has been pointed out, really subjective, with the test in Gillick offering no guidance on the extent to which adjustment should be made for factors such as peer pressure, drug and substance abuse, family stress, emotional disturbance or illness.

More recent case law shows that the Mental Capacity Act can be used to inform an assessment of child competence, but it is not mandatory to do so. The factors set out in this amendment to indicate a child’s ability to decide are the features carefully identified by Mr Justice Cobb, as he then was, in a case decided in 2017 concerning the difficult question of whether or not a girl under 16 had the capacity to consent to her child being adopted.

I therefore suggest that there is now a need for clearer and more rigorous guidelines—structured guidelines that are not just mechanistic checklists—for mental health and legal professionals to work with. The assessments that have to be made of a child’s ability to understand and weigh relevant information need to be decision-specific, child-specific and time-specific, and they have to recognise that competence can fluctuate as well as evolve. These are not straightforward assessments and are certainly not a mere formality.

A statutory test would be welcomed by practitioners and the courts. This is too important to be left to the code of practice; such codes are intended to reflect and supplement the law, not to create law. A clear test in the statute would only be of assistance to practitioners and would allow children to benefit from the safeguards within the Bill.

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[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, I understand the dilemma. The point I emphasise is that, in deciding this, one has to be clear that the child has a proper explanation of the ultimate decision that has to be made. It is to that end that the competence has to be assessed.

[Lord Stevens of Birmingham (CB)]

For those of us who are not anywhere near as legally expert as the noble Lord whose wise deliberations we have just heard, could he clarify the amendment that talks specifically about ring-fencing this new test for the Mental Health Bill? To what extent would that be consistent or not with, for example, the ruling of the Court of Appeal in Bell v Tavistock—the NHS trust—in the case of puberty blockers, which concerned the interpretation that the High Court had given to the Gillick test?

[Lord Meston (CB)]

I am tempted to say that I really do not know. That was a faster ball than I expected to receive. I think the answer is that the case law would be consistently applied, even as it stands now, but would undoubtedly be aided by a statutory test. Whether it would apply in cases such as that which the noble Lord just mentioned, I do not know. The purpose of the amendment is to provide a test for decisions that have to be made consequential upon this legislation, not other situations.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I entirely agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Meston, just said. The two interjections were very interesting but they do not really affect the guidance. That is crucial. The question asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, as to whether you can understand it but cannot make a decision, may well affect how the person applying the guidance does so. That would be one of the issues for whoever has the uncomfortable task of making the decision.

I think the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, is too cautious. If we go back to the Mental Capacity Act 2005, there is clear explanation and guidance in primary legislation as to how anyone who has to judge capacity is to do it. What we are talking about here—incompetence—is quite simply capacity. For some reason, which I find quite difficult, we seem to think that children under 16 have competence or do not, but over-16s have capacity or do not. It would have been far more sensible to use the same word for every person who will, in fact, be judged on whether they do or do not have capacity to make a decision of great importance, as it would be, in relation to mental health issues. I find it very odd.

However, and equally importantly, if it is in primary legislation for over-16s, why on earth would it be in guidance for under-16s? If it is good enough for over-16s, why is it not good enough for under-16s? The way the noble Lord, Lord Meston, has set this out seems admirable. It is very close to the Mental Capacity Act. I take and entirely agree with the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, but the Government seem to have ignored children to a very large extent, although children are a very important part of this Bill. I do not blame the Minister, because she did not draft it, but she has to bring it to us. I tabled a lot of amendments about parents and people with parental responsibility because they are largely ignored; I will speak about that later. But where we are dealing with children aged under 16, it is essential that they are treated in the same way as everybody else and that has to be in the Bill—in primary legislation.

Young people have had to deal with these issues ever since Lord Denning was presiding in the Court of Appeal in Gillick, but he did not help us at that stage as to how actually to deal with it. Like the noble Lord, Lord Meston, I have also had to make decisions as to whether under-16s were giving me advice that I thought was really worthy of listening to. Children of five can give extraordinarily good explanations, though I do not expect them to give them on mental health issues. I urge the Minister: it is crucial that everyone whose capacity is a matter at issue has it treated in exactly the same way. Therefore, to put it into guidance really will not do.

I will also speak on Amendments 55 and 56. I am very concerned about children. Bear in mind, however much we treat children aged over 16 with respect and as having the capacity to make decisions, and however much we listen to them, as we should listen to all children, there are stroppy teenagers—we all know about them—who, for one reason or another, will not do what adults tell or advise them. I am very concerned, and I am not quite sure about this because I am no expert on mental health legislation, that if a 16 year-old has the right to make advance decisions and they just say, “I do not want any injections, I do not want any pills, I absolutely refuse to have any treatment”, then unless there is an ability to override them they will have capacity and cannot be ignored. One has to view advance decisions for 16 to 18 year-olds with some degree of care. I am not saying that they should not happen, but I am not happy about them being universal and without some ability for them to be overridden.

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[Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)]

Probing, absolutely. Thank you. And again, on this issue I sense that we will be returning on Report. But, having said those things, I thank all noble Lords who participated in this debate and thank the Minister for her responses. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, I do not want to prolong this, but I have to say that, although I am disappointed and a little surprised by the response from the Government, the intention is to align the Mental Capacity Act and Gillick. It is frankly not correct, if I understand the situation, to say that it is not based on case law. I referred to a specific case in which the judge formulated, essentially, the test that appears in my amendment. As I say, I do not want to prolong this but, if necessary, I can refer the Government to that case.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

Perhaps I can just say to the noble Lord that, when I reflect on the discussions on this group, as well as all the others, it may be helpful to discuss this further.

Mental Health Bill [HL]

Lord Meston Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 20th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)]

I shall make a few points in response to the amendments that we have been discussing in this group. The noble Baroness, Lady May, made, very powerfully, an incredibly compelling case. The point she made about police officers sitting in A&E for many hours is so important. Not only is that a waste of police resources, it is often completely inappropriate for the person suffering from acute mental health problems. It can also be incredibly alarming for others in A&E. We all know that, sadly, far too many people are waiting for far too long in A&E, in the sort of environment that is in no way conducive to their overall health, physical or mental. That is my first point.

My second point relates to something that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said. There will still sometimes be a role for police officers. I know from personal experience how much a police presence can be required when a person suffering a very acute mental health crisis is likely to harm both themselves and others. Those others can often be family members who are trying to support the person suffering from the crisis but are also pretty scared for their own safety. It is important that we are talking about widening the range of people who can be that primary responder, but we are not saying that it should never be the police.

I agree that if we have a wider primary responder, that individual must be prepared to do it, happy to do it and appropriately trained. We heard a lot in earlier groups about the importance of good training. I was particularly taken with the statistic that the noble Baroness, Lady May, raised about the views of paramedics and how many of them support this, because they are the people right at the sharp end. I cannot quite remember the number who support it, but it was very large, and so I think it is something that we should take seriously.

Finally, I want to lend my support to Amendment 49A in the name of my noble friend Lady Barker. Speeding up access to appropriate services is important, as is making the best use of the workforce that we have. For those two reasons, the amendment that my noble friend put forward is important.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, I hesitate to interrupt, but I want to make much the same point that the noble Baroness has made based on my experience of a trip to A&E last year. I mentioned it anecdotally at Second Reading. There was a very disturbed person in A&E when I was having to wait there for some three hours. The hospital staff were struggling to contain the person in one room, as he kept leaving. He was not violent, but he was obviously distracting the hospital staff and worrying the other people present, who included children. As soon as anybody asked the staff what they were going to do, they said that they had to wait for the police. I have no doubt that the whole episode that I witnessed was prolonged by the need to wait for the police. Clearly, if this amendment or something like it is approved, it will widen the range of those who could be called upon to deal with such a crisis.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, there is little for me to do following the persuasive speech of my noble friend Lady May, other than to say how much I support her in putting forward her amendments. I hope that the Minister will approach the proposals my noble friend has made in a receptive and constructive way.

I was struck by the case put forward by my noble friend Lady Buscombe about how technology could assist in the handling of mental health incidents. I hope equally that the Minister will wish to follow up on my noble friend’s suggestions.

The question of whether police officers, and only police officers, should exercise the powers under the Act to remove a person suffering from a mental health crisis to a place of safety is one that, as my noble friend Lady May said, has been simmering in the Home Office and the Department of Health and Social Care for a decade or more. Extending those powers to suitably trained healthcare professionals would be a change that I suggest goes with the grain of this Bill as regards the emphasis that it places on looking after mental health patients in the best possible way. That is not a criticism of the police in any sense. The police do a magnificent job in tackling anything that they are called upon to do, but, as we have heard, the police themselves say that the vast majority of instances in which they are called upon to deal with a mental health incident do not require a policing response.

The issue of risk is important to consider. Statistically, as my noble friend said, most mental health incidents present no risk whatever to the police attending. Admittedly, it is not always possible to tell in advance how risky a particular encounter is likely to be, but I agree with my noble friend that, provided that a paramedic is suitably trained and equipped, they will have the necessary skill set to deal with any risk to their own safety, bearing in mind that if a police presence turns out to be necessary, they can always call for one.

I very much hope that, between now and Report, the Minister will agree to meet my noble friend, if that is what she wishes, to map out a way forward that will lead to a broadening of the Sections 135 and 136 powers.

Mental Health Bill [HL]

Lord Meston Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 25th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, consideration of this Bill has been greatly assisted by the thorough scrutiny and analysis undertaken by the Joint Committee on the draft Bill and its compelling report, published in January 2023. Parliament will now need to look with care at its recommendations, including those not incorporated into the Bill as now presented, and the justifications for any omission.

The first question tackled in that report was whether what is now required is fundamental reforming legislation rather than another amending statute. If I may follow on from the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, the bus was not built in 1983; its chassis was built in 1959, and we are still dealing with it. The report states:

“The Mental Health Act 1983 is … forty years old. It has been amended multiple times over those years, making it hard to use even for experienced professionals. It is overly complex, especially where it interacts with the Mental Capacity Act 2005”.


For example, the committee noted:

“Attempts to both protect and empower children in these settings have resulted in a complex mixture of statute law and case law alongside the MHA that … makes assessing a child’s rights to access certain safeguards in this draft Bill complex and obscure”.


For essentially good and pragmatic reasons, as the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, explained, the Joint Committee did not wish to introduce further delay or uncertainty, so favoured the form of the Bill considered by it, which is now before Parliament. However, for the courts, tribunals, lawyers and all the other consumers of the legislation, the question will remain, as per the quote in the invaluable Mental Health Act Manual:

“If the Mental Health Act is to be modernised, is it appropriate to base the modernisation on a legislative structure that was established over 60 years ago by the Mental Health Act 1959? The process of bolting on multiple miscellaneous amendments to that structure over the years has resulted in an Act which is overly complex, confusing, and expensive to operate”.


Inevitably, those problems will be exacerbated when this Bill adds further amendments to the 1983 Act. It is therefore to be hoped that the Government will see the Bill, as the Joint Committee put it, not as

“the end—or even a pause—in the process of reform of mental health legislation”.

Meanwhile, the code of practice under the 1983 Act will need, and I understand will now receive, further revision and updating once the Bill is enacted to cover the stronger requirements of the new legislation and provide clear guidance to meet the needs of patients and for all those who operate the changes.

I turn to some of the Bill’s detail. It is certainly welcome that it recognises the real problem that too many autistic people and others with learning difficulties have been detained inappropriately and for far too long. It is also welcome that the Bill removes police stations from the definition of a place of safety in the 1983 Act. Inevitably, the police will continue to have to deal with disturbed and distressed people suffering a chronic or temporary mental health crisis, but these are people who should not be in police stations any longer than absolutely necessary, particularly if expert assessment or treatment are required.

It is to be hoped that the changes will relieve the police of some of the difficult decisions as to risk required under the existing code of practice, but, as others have said, these changes will not work without sufficient community alternatives. As the noble Earl said, it will not be helpful if they simply pass the problem on to an A&E department. I do not want to get anecdotal, but I had a brief admission to A&E. It was, happily, not long lasting, but it was extraordinary to watch the staff in that hospital cope with a very determined and disturbed man. Unfortunately, I did not see the end of that because, luckily, I was released. Nevertheless, it is a problem that needs to be thought about hard.

By contrast with the ethos when I started as a lawyer, all courts now strive to ensure that people are not defined by their mental health problems, even if it is not always possible to prevent those with mental health problems entering the criminal justice system or to divert them from it once they are in it. Professionals in that system need help to deal with these people and their problems. Therefore, the improved provisions for transfer of prisoners to hospital, including those detained under the Immigration Act, should be valuable, but will always depend on compliance with the code of practice, which requires the need for in-patient treatment for a prisoner to be identified and acted on quickly.

The same problems apply when the criminal courts consider sentencing options. The courts depend on the Probation Service and legal representatives to draw attention to the possible need for psychiatric reports and detention. Having sat as a judge in the Crown Court, I can convey the real exasperation of the judiciary when necessary reports are not available or when suitable hospital places cannot be found without further delay and hearings in an overloaded court system.

I turn to a different topic, which has been referred to. The Bill will implement recommendations about replacing the existing “nearest relative” with “the nominated person”, under the principle of patient choice and autonomy. I have some concerns about the selection and replacement of nominated persons, and the complicated provisions within the Bill. Now is perhaps not the time for that, and I will leave it to Committee, but it needs to be looked at again. In particular, there is a need to focus on the consultation, at the very least, and recognition of the legitimate interests of parents and others with parental responsibility.

On this topic, I question—although, again, I leave this to Committee—the continued use of the county court for applications to terminate appointments of nominated persons. The use of the county court is left over from the 1959 Act, at a time when there was neither a separate family court nor a Court of Protection. I suggest that these would now be better equipped to deal with these applications.

There are further points focusing on the needs of children, one of which has already been touched on. It was highlighted by Dr Camilla Parker in her evidence and will strike a chord with many practitioners. It concerns the overlapping factors governing capacity and competence, and the differing processes for assessment. Dr Parker observed that, even after 40 years, we do not have “clear and consistent criteria” for determining whether a child is competent to make a decision. It would be helpful to understand the Government’s current intention, particularly if formulating any statutory tests is not intended.

More fundamentally important is the location for the placement of children. This overlaps with the real problem, which has been highlighted repeatedly by the judiciary, the Nuffield Family Justice Observatory and the Children’s Commissioner, of the use of deprivation of liberty orders, or DoLS, and placing children in unregistered settings—not just adult wards but unsuitable, unregistered settings. Again, I will return to this in Committee.

Support for Infants and Parents etc (Information) Bill [HL]

Lord Meston Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 6th September 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, it is impossible to disagree with anything said in this debate so far. The motives and thinking behind the Bill cannot be questioned: seeking to support the physical and emotional development and security of any child’s crucial early years, and underpinning initiatives already in place. The Bill would require a local authority to make information available about existing support services in their area, but it should be recognised that the proposed duty would not make support available from local authorities which would not otherwise be provided.

Moreover, beyond the primary duty to publish the information about services on a local authority’s website, the duty to go further in bringing information more directly to the attention of parents and carers is qualified by the terminology used in Clause 1(4), which leaves a discretion with expressions such as

“by any other means it considers appropriate”

and

“such steps as it considers appropriate”.

In most normal situations, new parents will have only limited contact with those who might provide the information the Bill wishes them to have, so local authorities will have only limited opportunities to convey it to individual parents and carers. Presumably, this can and will be done through the NHS, involving midwifery and health visiting services, and, I suggest, on registration of birth, which still requires a face-to-face appointment. In addition, social media and messaging will play a part, but I suggest we resist the temptation to see that as a panacea and certainly not as a substitute for direct contact, where possible.

Clause 1(3) refers to services available to prospective carers, as well as to others. It is therefore to be hoped that the benefits of the Bill will extend to other family members who find themselves taking responsibilities of kinship care or are considering doing so, not necessarily just in respect of children under the age of two. Kinship carers may be called on at short notice and will need to be supported as soon as they are known to the local authority.

I do not wish to take more time on the mechanics of the provision of information, which no doubt will be covered by guidance. Rather, I wish to raise questions about the reach of the information and support on offer. I look at the Bill by reference to my experience as a family court judge, dealing mainly with public and private law cases relating to children, which inevitably have a short and long-term impact on those children, their parents and wider family. They also have severe financial impact on hard-pressed local authorities. It is estimated that the total cost of care proceedings to the state each year is £1.2 billion, with a single public law case costing a local authority on average £120,000. This total annual cost incurred by central and local government represents 10% of all direct annual expenditure on the children’s social care system.

Anything the Bill can do to prevent litigation and to mitigate those costs must be of value. However, it has to be recognised that there are limitations. Some of the most complex cases that come before the family courts concern newborn children with mothers who have unaddressed drug or alcohol addiction, or mental health difficulties. The baby’s early weeks in hospital may have to be spent withdrawing from the drugs ingested in pregnancy. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, referred to foetal alcohol syndrome, which of course causes even worse long-term problems.

Typically, the mother will not have had or kept prenatal appointments, even if her pregnancy was known to the health services, which is not always the case. There may be little or no reliable family support available to her; there may be a background of intergenerational problems. These are the parents who are likely to be resistant or indifferent to the provision of advice and information. It is not through any fault, but they can lack insight and tend to make things more difficult for themselves. They can be mistrustful of children’s services, and resentful and dismissive of advice and help, fearing stigma and outside involvement. Sadly, those parents and their wider families—who are difficult to identify and engage—can also be the people most in need of the support which might be on offer.

Accordingly, all those who receive and might benefit from the information to be provided in accordance with the Bill will need to be given the confidence to find and use the support services offered. Visible and accessible support services will depend on the further development of the network of local family hubs. In the area in which I was the designated family judge, there is an excellent and well-regarded family hub aiming to provide holistic support from pre-birth onwards. The guide for all such hubs, issued in August 2022, set a high bar when it stated:

“The workforce should proactively reach out to vulnerable and seldom-heard families”.


It is therefore to be hoped that the present Government will extend the distribution and reach of family hubs, particularly, but not exclusively, in areas of deprivation and confirm a commitment to those hubs.

I will make two further points. First, the saddest statistic relating to care proceedings is that at least one in four women will return to court having had a previous child removed. The struggle to prevent recurrent removals has been highlighted by research done by the Nuffield Family Justice Observatory. Too often, some mothers have reacted to the removal of a child or baby with an ill-considered decision to have another baby, with all too often the same consequences. These are often mothers who find it so difficult to seek or accept help. For the courts, they can be truly wretched cases to deal with. Therefore, I repeat the hope that this Government will endorse the intensive support from, and expert work by, the charity Pause in the prevention of the cycle of removals. Pause has pointed out that the point at which a child is removed is also the point at which the mothers lose access to support and information, leaving them more vulnerable to further removals. These may not be “prospective parents” within the meaning of the Bill as currently drafted, but they are clearly parents who may later have children again in their care and who clearly have a continuing need for information, support and advice. I therefore hope that consideration is given to the use of this Bill to address the predicament of these parents and to reduce the misery and expense of their cases.

Secondly, I ask that the Government indicate their response to the powerful recent report by the Centre for Justice Innovation about Family Drug and Alcohol Courts—FDACs. They are truly problem-solving courts which achieve considerable savings and better outcomes for children and their families.

This Bill is to be applauded, but I suggest that some modest amendments could be made. These should be seen as steps that will greatly add value and save the costs of later and more complicated interventions by local authorities when children are older and the family’s difficulties more entrenched. The provision in Clause 3 for an annual report is welcome; it will allow for monitoring of compliance and will provide an overview, as the clause itself states.

As to amendments, I agree with what the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, said about trying to avoid overloading the Bill. However, I cannot help noting that the short title contains the abbreviation “etc”. I remember a legislative purist telling us to be wary of any Bill that contained that abbreviation in its short title; however, in this case, perhaps the use of that wording may give permissible scope for the sort of amendments suggested.

The Government have stated their wish to “fix the foundations”. If this Bill helps to reinforce the stability of children and future generations, it will indeed help to fix the foundations for children and underpin relationships within families.